Network Working GroupIndependent Submission W. KumariInternet-DraftRequest for Comments: 7304 GoogleIntended status:Category: InformationalNovember 22, 2013 Expires: May 26,July 2014 ISSN: 2070-1721 AmethodMethod formitigating namespace collisions draft-wkumari-dnsop-defense-collision-mitigate-03Mitigating Namespace Collisions Abstract This document outlines a possible, but not recommended, method to mitigate the effect of collisions in the DNS namespace by providing a means for end users to disambiguate the conflict. Status of This Memo ThisInternet-Draftdocument issubmitted in full conformance withnot an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. This is a contribution to theprovisionsRFC Series, independently ofBCP 78any other RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at its discretion andBCP 79. Internet-Draftsmakes no statement about its value for implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by the RFC Editor areworking documentsnot a candidate for any level oftheInternetEngineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The listStandard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741. Information about the currentInternet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximumstatus ofsix monthsthis document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may beupdated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documentsobtained atany time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on May 26, 2014.http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7304. Copyright Notice Copyright (c)20132014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document.Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.Table of Contents 1.Introduction / BackgroundIntroduction/Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3.Implementation / Disclaimers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. IANA Considerations . . . .Implementation/Disclaimers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Appendix A. Changes / Author Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.Introduction / BackgroundIntroduction/Background Collisions in the DNS occur in multipleways; oneways. One common case is that an organization has usedan sub-domaina subdomain (foo) oftheirits primary domain (example.com) for corporate infrastructure, and then the string"foo"'foo' is delegated as aTLD.Top-Level Domain (TLD). When an employee of the organization enters 'www.foo', is the goal to reach a machine in the internal namespace (www.foo.example.com) or the hostname 'www' in the 'foo' TLD? This document describes a means of disambiguatingthese,this and similar cases. Implementation ofthese methods arethis method is not recommended;they areit is documented here to explain some of the pitfalls withapproaches like these.such an approach. 2. Mitigation The mitigation described in this document involves presentingthemultiple options to theuser,user and allowing them to indicate which of the names is the one theywereare trying to reach. The mitigation wouldlookuplook up the name in multiple namespaces.When ifIf a conflict is detected, it would then provide a means for the user to indicate which one of the colliding names they wish to connect to, and return the disambiguated answer to the application. An additional feature of mitigation could befor the mitigationto cache the user'schoice, and / orchoice and/or provide a means to set priorities. This could be accomplished in a number of ways, including: o Intercepting the resolution requests from the application in a "shim" type library o Replacing the resolver libraryentirelyTentirely o Integrating this type of mitigation into applications (some web browsers already do something similar to this) o Proxying the request to a server that provides an interstitial page that allows the user to indicate the intended name (for applications such asHTTP requests)HTTP) There are a number of issues with this solution, including but not limited to: o There may not be a human available to disambiguate the answer (unattended machines, mail servers,etc.)etc.). o Thehuman / userhuman/user may have no idea which is the correct choice, especially in the case of a phishingattackorattack or other maliciousintentintent. o The additional latency introduced may cause the originating application to timeoutout. o Theuserexperience would be time consumingtofor users as they must select each site and subsite intended(www.intranet,(e.g., www.intranet, images.intranet,etc.)etc.). o Caching the responses could lead to problems when the user changes location (internal sites would fail whenoffsite,offsite or otherwise lead to incorrect sites beingloaded)loaded). For these and other reasons, implementation of this technique is not recommended. 3.Implementation / DisclaimersImplementation/Disclaimers This document does not reference an implementation. Due to the numerous issues described above, we do not recommend that this solution be implemented.WeThis is a very slight mitigation, and we do not recommend thatthisit be viewed as a solution to the namespace collision problem.This is a very slight mitigation. It should not be viewed as a solution to the "namespace collision" issue.4.IANA Considerations This document contains no IANA considerations. 5.Security Considerations While this method may make some users more aware of which version of a name they are going to use (and so careful users may avoid some phishing attacks), the security risks described above outweigh this potential benefit. There are numerous security implications in this approach, including leaking internal names(secret-project.corp.example.com),(e.g., secret-project.corp.example.com), users being tricked into selecting the incorrect choice when trying to disambiguate answers, etc. For these reasons, it is not recommended that this solution be deployed.6.5. Acknowledgements Theauthors wishauthor wishes to thanksome folk, includingthe following individuals: Fred Baker, Bob Braden, Carsten Bormann, Nevil Brownlee, Eric Burger, Brian Carpenter, Benoit Claise, Keith Drage, Martin J. Duerst, David Harrington, Paul Hoffamn, JohnLevineLevine, and TedLemon, 7. References Appendix A. Changes / Author Notes. [RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication.] From -00 to -01. o Nothing changed in the template. from -01 to -02 o Rewrite. Less flippant. From -02 to -03: o Changed to Informational. Suggestion from ISE:"I see only one remaining thing - you've changed its Intended Status to Experimental. I think Informational would be better, since 'Experimental' implies that you have an implementation and are publishing the document so that others can try it too. "Lemon. Author's Address Warren Kumari Google 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway Mountain View, CA 94043 USEmail:EMail: warren@kumari.net