JOSE Working GroupInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. JonesInternet-DraftRequest for Comments: 7518 MicrosoftIntended status:Category: Standards TrackJanuary 13, 2015 Expires: July 17,May 2015 ISSN: 2070-1721 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-40AbstractThe JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)This specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE), and JSON Web Key (JWK) specifications. It defines several IANA registries for these identifiers. Status ofthisThis Memo ThisInternet-Draftissubmitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documentsan Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The listIt represents the consensus ofcurrent Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents validthe IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved fora maximumpublication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741. Information about the current status ofsix monthsthis document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may beupdated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documentsobtained atany time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on July 17, 2015.http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 54 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 54 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Cryptographic Algorithms for Digital Signatures and MACs . ..6 3.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS . . . . 6 3.2. HMAC with SHA-2 Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3. Digital Signature withRSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 .RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 . . . . . . . . 8 3.4. Digital Signature with ECDSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..9 3.5. Digital Signature with RSASSA-PSS . . . . . . . . . . . .1110 3.6. Using the Algorithm "none" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1211 4. Cryptographic Algorithms for Key Management . . . . . . . . .1211 4.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE . . . . 12 4.2. Key Encryption withRSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 .RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 . . . . . . . . . .1413 4.3. Key Encryption with RSAES OAEP . . . . . . . . . . . . ..14 4.4. Key Wrapping with AES Key Wrap . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1514 4.5. Direct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key . . . . . .1615 4.6. Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static (ECDH-ES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1615 4.6.1. Header Parameters Used for ECDH Key Agreement . . . .1716 4.6.1.1. "epk" (Ephemeral Public Key) Header Parameter . .1716 4.6.1.2. "apu" (Agreement PartyUInfo) Header Parameter . . 17 4.6.1.3. "apv" (Agreement PartyVInfo) Header Parameter . . 17 4.6.2. Key Derivation for ECDH Key Agreement . . . . . . . .1817 4.7. Key Encryption with AES GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1918 4.7.1. Header Parameters Used for AES GCM Key Encryption . .2019 4.7.1.1. "iv" (Initialization Vector) Header Parameter . .2019 4.7.1.2. "tag" (Authentication Tag) Header Parameter . . .2019 4.8. Key Encryption with PBES2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.8.1. Header Parameters Used for PBES2 Key Encryption . . .2120 4.8.1.1. "p2s" (PBES2salt input)Salt Input) Header Parameter . . . .. . . .21 4.8.1.2. "p2c" (PBES2count)Count) Header Parameter . . . . . .. . . .21 5. Cryptographic Algorithms for Content Encryption . . . . . . .2221 5.1. "enc" (Encryption Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2322 5.2.1. Conventions Used in Defining AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 . . ..23 5.2.2. Generic AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . 23 5.2.2.1. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Encryption . . . . . . . . . ..23 5.2.2.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Decryption . . . . . . . . . ..25 5.2.3. AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..25 5.2.4. AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..26 5.2.5. AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..26 5.2.6. Content Encryption with AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 . . . . . .2726 5.3. Content Encryption with AES GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6. Cryptographic Algorithms for Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2827 6.1. "kty" (Key Type) Parameter Values . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 6.2. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys . . . . . . . . . . ..28 6.2.1. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Public Keys . . . . . . 28 6.2.1.1. "crv" (Curve) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . .2928 6.2.1.2. "x" (X Coordinate) Parameter . . . . . . . . . ..29 6.2.1.3. "y" (Y Coordinate) Parameter . . . . . . . . . ..29 6.2.2. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Private Keys . . . . .. 3029 6.2.2.1. "d" (ECC Private Key) Parameter . . . . . . . . .3029 6.3. Parameters for RSA Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6.3.1. Parameters for RSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . ..30 6.3.1.1. "n" (Modulus) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6.3.1.2. "e" (Exponent) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . ..30 6.3.2. Parameters for RSA Private Keys . . . . . . . . . . .3130 6.3.2.1. "d" (Private Exponent) Parameter . . . . . . . .. 3130 6.3.2.2. "p" (First Prime Factor) Parameter . . . . . . ..31 6.3.2.3. "q" (Second Prime Factor) Parameter . . . . . . . 31 6.3.2.4. "dp" (First Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter . . ..31 6.3.2.5. "dq" (Second Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter . . . 31 6.3.2.6. "qi" (First CRT Coefficient) Parameter . . . . ..31 6.3.2.7. "oth" (Other Primes Info) Parameter . . . . . . .3231 6.4. Parameters for Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6.4.1. "k" (Key Value) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3332 7.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry . .3433 7.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3635 7.2. Header Parameter Names Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7.3. JSON Web Encryption Compression Algorithms Registry . . . 43 7.3.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.3.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7.4. JSON Web Key Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7.4.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4544 7.4.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7.5. JSON Web Key Parameters Registration . . . . . . . . . .. 4645 7.5.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7.6. JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve Registry . . . . . . . . . ..48 7.6.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 7.6.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5049 8.1. Cryptographic Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 8.2. Key Lifetimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 8.3. RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 Security Considerations . . . . . . . ..50 8.4. AES GCM Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 8.5. Unsecured JWS Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.6.Denial of ServiceDenial-of-Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.7. Reusing Key Material when Encrypting Keys . . . . . . . .5251 8.8. Password Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 8.9. Key Entropy and Random Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5352 8.10. Differences between Digital Signatures and MACs . . . . .5352 8.11. Using Matching Algorithm Strengths . . . . . . . . . . ..53 8.12. Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks . . . . . . . . . . ..53 8.13. Timing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..53 8.14. RSA Private Key Representations and Blinding . . . . . ..53 9. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..53 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..53 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5556 Appendix A. Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference . . . . . . . .5759 A.1. Digital Signature/MAC Algorithm IdentifierCross-ReferenceCross- Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58. . . 60 A.2. Key Management Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference . . .5861 A.3. Content Encryption Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference .5962 Appendix B. Test Cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms . . . .. 6062 B.1. Test Cases for AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . .6163 B.2. Test Cases for AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 . . . . . . . . .6264 B.3. Test Cases for AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 . . . . . . . . .6365 Appendix C. Example ECDH-ES Key Agreement Computation . . . . .. 64 Appendix D.66 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 Appendix E. Document History . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. 6769 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7869 1. IntroductionThe JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)This specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS], JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE], and JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] specifications. It defines several IANA registries for these identifiers. All these specifications utilizeJavaScript Object Notation (JSON)JSON-based [RFC7159]baseddata structures. This specification also describes the semantics and operations that are specific to these algorithms and key types. Registering the algorithms and identifiers here, rather than in the JWS, JWE, and JWK specifications, is intended to allow them to remain unchanged in the face of changes in the set of Required, Recommended, Optional, and Deprecated algorithms over time. This also allows changes to the JWS, JWE, and JWK specifications without changing this document. Names defined by this specification are short because a core goal is for the resulting representations to be compact. 1.1. Notational Conventions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described inKey"Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate RequirementLevelsLevels" [RFC2119].If these words are used without being spelled in uppercase then they are toThe interpretation should only beinterpreted with their normal natural language meanings.applied when the terms appear in all capital letters. BASE64URL(OCTETS) denotes the base64url encoding of OCTETS, per Section 2 of [JWS]. UTF8(STRING) denotes the octets of the UTF-8 [RFC3629] representation of STRING, where STRING is a sequence of zero or more Unicode [UNICODE] characters. ASCII(STRING) denotes the octets of the ASCII [RFC20] representation of STRING, where STRING is a sequence of zero or more ASCII characters. The concatenation of two values A and B is denoted as A || B. 2. TerminologyTheseThe termsdefined by the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] specification are incorporated into this specification:"JSON Web Signature (JWS)", "Base64url Encoding", "Header Parameter", "JOSE Header", "JWS Payload", "JWS Protected Header", "JWS Signature", "JWS Signing Input", and "UnsecuredJWS". These termsJWS" are defined by theJSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE]JWS specificationare incorporated into this specification:[JWS]. The terms "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", "Additional Authenticated Data (AAD)", "Authentication Tag", "Content Encryption Key (CEK)", "Direct Encryption", "Direct Key Agreement", "JWE Authentication Tag", "JWE Ciphertext", "JWE Encrypted Key", "JWE Initialization Vector", "JWE Protected Header", "Key Agreement with Key Wrapping", "Key Encryption", "Key Management Mode", and "KeyWrapping". These termsWrapping" are defined by theJSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK]JWE specificationare incorporated into this specification:[JWE]. The terms "JSON Web Key (JWK)" and"JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set)". These terms"JWK Set" are defined by theInternet Security Glossary, Version 2 [RFC4949] are incorporated into this specification:JWK specification [JWK]. The terms "Ciphertext", "Digital Signature", "Initialization Vector", "Message Authentication Code (MAC)", and"Plaintext"."Plaintext" are defined by the "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949]. This term is defined by this specification: Base64urlUInt The representation of a positive or zero integer value as the base64url encoding of the value's unsignedbig endianbig-endian representation as an octet sequence. The octet sequence MUST utilize the minimum number of octets needed to represent the value. Zero is represented as BASE64URL(single zero-valued octet), which is "AA". 3. Cryptographic Algorithms for Digital Signatures and MACs JWS uses cryptographic algorithms to digitally sign or create aMessage Authentication Code (MAC)MAC of the contents of the JWS Protected Header and the JWS Payload. 3.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS The table below is the set of "alg" (algorithm)header parameterHeader Parameter values defined by this specification for use with JWS, each of which is explained in more detail in the following sections:+--------------+-----------------------------------+----------------++--------------+-------------------------------+--------------------+ |alg"alg" Param | Digital Signature or MAC | Implementation | | Value | Algorithm | Requirements |+--------------+-----------------------------------+----------------++--------------+-------------------------------+--------------------+ | HS256 | HMAC using SHA-256 | Required | | HS384 | HMAC using SHA-384 | Optional | | HS512 | HMAC using SHA-512 | Optional | | RS256 |RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 usingSHA-256| Recommended | | | SHA-256 | | | RS384 |RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 usingSHA-384| Optional | | | SHA-384 | | | RS512 |RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 usingSHA-512| Optional | | | SHA-512 | | | ES256 | ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 | Recommended+ | | ES384 | ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 | Optional | | ES512 | ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 | Optional | | PS256 | RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 andMGF1| Optional | | | MGF1 with SHA-256 | | | PS384 | RSASSA-PSS using SHA-384 andMGF1| Optional | | | MGF1 with SHA-384 | | | PS512 | RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 andMGF1| Optional | | | MGF1 with SHA-512 | | | none | No digital signature or MAC | Optional | | | performed | |+--------------+-----------------------------------+----------------++--------------+-------------------------------+--------------------+ The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements column indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification. See Appendix A.1 for a table cross-referencing the JWS digital signature and MAC "alg" (algorithm) values defined in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages. 3.2. HMAC with SHA-2 Functions Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) enable one to use a secret plus a cryptographic hash function to generate aMessage Authentication Code (MAC).MAC. This can be used to demonstrate that whoever generated the MAC was in possession of the MAC key. The algorithm for implementing and validating HMACs is provided in RFC 2104 [RFC2104]. A key of the same size as the hash output (for instance, 256 bits for "HS256") or larger MUST be used with this algorithm. (This requirement is based on Section 5.3.4 (Security Effect of the HMAC Key) of NIST SP 800-117 [NIST.800-107], which states that the effective security strength is the minimum of the security strength of the key and two times the size of the internal hash value.) The HMAC SHA-256 MAC is generated per RFC 2104, using SHA-256 as the hash algorithm "H", using the JWS Signing Input as the "text" value, and using the shared key. The HMAC output value is the JWS Signature. The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWS Signature is an HMAC value computed using the corresponding algorithm:+-----------------+--------------------++-------------------+--------------------+ |alg"alg" Param Value | MAC Algorithm |+-----------------+--------------------++-------------------+--------------------+ | HS256 | HMAC using SHA-256 | | HS384 | HMAC using SHA-384 | | HS512 | HMAC using SHA-512 |+-----------------+--------------------++-------------------+--------------------+ The HMAC SHA-256 MAC for a JWS is validated by computing an HMAC value per RFC 2104, using SHA-256 as the hash algorithm "H", using the received JWS Signing Input as the "text" value, and using the shared key. This computed HMAC value is then compared to the result of base64url decoding the received encoded JWS Signature value. The comparison of the computed HMAC value to the JWS Signature value MUST be done in a constant-time manner to thwart timing attacks. Alternatively, the computed HMAC value can be base64url encoded and compared to the received encoded JWS Signature value (also in a constant-time manner), as this comparison produces the same result as comparing the unencoded values. In either case, if the values match, the HMAC has been validated. Securing content and validation with the HMAC SHA-384 and HMACSHA- 512SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for HMAC SHA-256 -- just using the corresponding hash algorithms with correspondingly larger minimum key sizes and result values: 384 bits each for HMAC SHA-384 and 512 bits each for HMAC SHA-512. An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.1 of [JWS]. 3.3. Digital Signature withRSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 This section defines the use of theRSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 digital signature algorithm as defined in Section 8.2 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] (commonly known as PKCS #1), using SHA-2 [SHS] hash functions. A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms. TheRSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256 digital signature is generated as follows:Generategenerate a digital signature of the JWS Signing Input usingRSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGNRSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN and the SHA-256 hash function with the desired private key. This is the JWS Signature value. The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWS Signature is a digital signature value computed using the corresponding algorithm:+-----------------+--------------------------------++-------------------+---------------------------------+ |alg"alg" Param Value | Digital Signature Algorithm |+-----------------+--------------------------------++-------------------+---------------------------------+ | RS256 |RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-256 | | RS384 |RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-384 | | RS512 |RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-512 |+-----------------+--------------------------------++-------------------+---------------------------------+ TheRSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as follows:Submitsubmit the JWS Signing Input, the JWS Signature, and the public key corresponding to the private key used by the signer to theRSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFYRSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY algorithm using SHA-256 as the hash function. Signing and validation with theRSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-384 and RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure forRSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256 -- just using the corresponding hash algorithms instead of SHA-256. An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.2 of [JWS]. 3.4. Digital Signature with ECDSA The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [DSS] provides for the use of Elliptic Curvecryptography,Cryptography, which is able to provide equivalent security to RSA cryptography but using shorter key sizes and with greater processing speed for many operations. This means that ECDSA digital signatures will be substantially smaller in terms of length than equivalently strong RSA digital signatures. This specification defines the use of ECDSA with the P-256 curve and the SHA-256 cryptographic hash function, ECDSA with the P-384 curve and the SHA-384 hash function, and ECDSA with the P-521 curve and the SHA-512 hash function. The P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves are defined in [DSS]. The ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 digital signature is generated as follows: 1. Generate a digital signature of the JWS Signing Input using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 with the desired private key. The output will be the pair (R, S), where R and S are256 bit256-bit unsigned integers. 2. Turn R and S into octet sequences inbig endianbig-endian order, with each array being be 32 octets long. The octet sequence representations MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero octets contained in the values. 3. Concatenate the two octet sequences in the order R and then S. (Note that many ECDSA implementations will directly produce this concatenation as their output.) 4. The resulting64 octet64-octet sequence is the JWS Signature value. The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWS Signature is a digital signature value computed using the corresponding algorithm:+-----------------+-------------------------------++-------------------+-------------------------------+ |alg"alg" Param Value | Digital Signature Algorithm |+-----------------+-------------------------------++-------------------+-------------------------------+ | ES256 | ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 | | ES384 | ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 | | ES512 | ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 |+-----------------+-------------------------------++-------------------+-------------------------------+ The ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as follows: 1. The JWS Signature value MUST be a64 octet64-octet sequence. If it is not a64 octet64-octet sequence, the validation has failed. 2. Split the64 octet64-octet sequence into two32 octet32-octet sequences. The first octet sequence represents R and the second S. The values R and S are represented as octet sequences using the Integer-to- OctetString Conversion defined in Section 2.3.7 of SEC1 [SEC1] (inbig endianbig-endian octet order). 3. Submit the JWS SigningInputInput, R,SS, and the public key (x, y) to the ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 validator. Signing and validation with the ECDSA P-384 SHA-384 and ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 -- just using the corresponding hash algorithms with correspondingly larger result values. For ECDSA P-384 SHA-384, R and S will be 384 bits each, resulting in a96 octet96-octet sequence. For ECDSA P-521 SHA-512, R and S will be 521 bits each, resulting in a132 octet132-octet sequence. (Note that the Integer-to-OctetString Conversion defined in Section 2.3.7 of SEC1 [SEC1] used to represent R and S as octet sequences adds zero-valued high-order padding bits when needed to round the size up to a multiple of 8 bits; thus, each 521-bit integer is represented using 528 bits in 66 octets.) Examples using these algorithms are shown in Appendices A.3 and A.4 of [JWS]. 3.5. Digital Signature with RSASSA-PSS This section defines the use of the RSASSA-PSS digital signature algorithm as defined in Section 8.1 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] with the MGF1 mask generation function and SHA-2 hash functions, always using the same hash function for both the RSASSA-PSS hash function and the MGF1 hash function. The size of the salt value is the same size as the hash function output. All other algorithm parameters use the defaults specified inSectionAppendix A.2.3 of RFC 3447. A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm. The RSASSA-PSS SHA-256 digital signature is generated as follows:Generategenerate a digital signature of the JWS Signing Input using RSASSA- PSS-SIGN, the SHA-256 hash function, and the MGF1 mask generation function with SHA-256 with the desired private key. This is the JWSsignatureSignature value. The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWS Signature is a digital signature value computed using the corresponding algorithm:+-----------------+------------------------------------------------++-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ |alg"alg" Param Value | Digital Signature Algorithm |+-----------------+------------------------------------------------++-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | PS256 | RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 and MGF1 with | | | SHA-256 | | PS384 | RSASSA-PSS using SHA-384 and MGF1 with | | | SHA-384 | | PS512 | RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 and MGF1 with | | | SHA-512 |+-----------------+------------------------------------------------++-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ The RSASSA-PSS SHA-256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as follows:Submitsubmit the JWS Signing Input, the JWS Signature, and the public key corresponding to the private key used by the signer to the RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY algorithm using SHA-256 as the hash function and using MGF1 as the mask generation function with SHA-256. Signing and validation with the RSASSA-PSS SHA-384 and RSASSA-PSS SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for RSASSA-PSS SHA-256 -- just using the alternative hash algorithm in both roles. 3.6. Using the Algorithm "none" JWSs MAY also be created that do not provide integrity protection. Such a JWS is called an Unsecured JWS. An Unsecured JWS uses the "alg" value "none" and is formatted identically to other JWSs, but MUST use the empty octet sequence as its JWS Signature value. Recipients MUST verify that the JWS Signature value is the empty octet sequence. Implementations that support Unsecured JWSs MUST NOT accept such objects as valid unless the application specifies that it is acceptable for a specific object to not be integrity protected. Implementations MUST NOT accept Unsecured JWSs by default. In order to mitigate downgrade attacks, applications MUST NOT signal acceptance of Unsecured JWSs at a global level, and SHOULD signal acceptance on a per-object basis. See Section 8.5 for security considerations associated with using this algorithm. 4. Cryptographic Algorithms for Key Management JWE uses cryptographic algorithms to encrypt or determine the Content Encryption Key (CEK). 4.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE The table below is the set of "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values that are defined by this specification for use with JWE. These algorithms are used to encrypt the CEK, producing the JWE Encrypted Key, or to use key agreement to agree upon the CEK. +--------------------+--------------------+--------+----------------+ |alg"alg" Param Value | Key Management | More | Implementation | | | Algorithm | Header | Requirements | | | | Params | | +--------------------+--------------------+--------+----------------+ | RSA1_5 |RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 | (none) | Recommended- | | RSA-OAEP | RSAES OAEP using | (none) | Recommended+ | | | default parameters | | | | RSA-OAEP-256 | RSAES OAEP using | (none) | Optional | | | SHA-256 and MGF1 | | | | | with SHA-256 | | | | A128KW | AES Key Wrap with | (none) | Recommended | | | default initial | | | | | value using128| | | | |bit128-bit key | | | | A192KW | AES Key Wrap with | (none) | Optional | | | default initial | | | | | value using192| | | | |bit192-bit key | | | | A256KW | AES Key Wrap with | (none) | Recommended | | | default initial | | | | | value using256| | | | |bit256-bit key | | | | dir | Direct use of a | (none) | Recommended | | | shared symmetric | | | | | key as the CEK | | | | ECDH-ES | Elliptic Curve | "epk", | Recommended+ | | | Diffie-Hellman | "apu", | | | | Ephemeral Static | "apv" | | | | key agreement | | | | | using Concat KDF | | | | ECDH-ES+A128KW | ECDH-ES using | "epk", | Recommended | | | Concat KDF and CEK | "apu", | | | | wrapped with | "apv" | | | | "A128KW" | | | | ECDH-ES+A192KW | ECDH-ES using | "epk", | Optional | | | Concat KDF and CEK | "apu", | | | | wrapped with | "apv" | | | | "A192KW" | | | | ECDH-ES+A256KW | ECDH-ES using | "epk", | Recommended | | | Concat KDF and CEK | "apu", | | | | wrapped with | "apv" | | | | "A256KW" | | | | A128GCMKW | Key wrapping with | "iv", | Optional | | | AES GCM using128| "tag" | | | |bit128-bit key | | | | A192GCMKW | Key wrapping with | "iv", | Optional | | | AES GCM using192| "tag" | | | |bit192-bit key | | | | A256GCMKW | Key wrapping with | "iv", | Optional | | | AES GCM using256| "tag" | | | |bit256-bit key | | | | PBES2-HS256+A128KW | PBES2 with HMAC | "p2s", | Optional | | | SHA-256 and | "p2c" | | | | "A128KW" wrapping | | | | PBES2-HS384+A192KW | PBES2 with HMAC | "p2s", | Optional | | | SHA-384 and | "p2c" | | | | "A192KW" wrapping | | | | PBES2-HS512+A256KW | PBES2 with HMAC | "p2s", | Optional | | | SHA-512 and | "p2c" | | | | "A256KW" wrapping | | | +--------------------+--------------------+--------+----------------+ The More Header Params column indicates what additional Header Parameters are used by the algorithm, beyond "alg", which all use. All but "dir" and "ECDH-ES" also produce a JWE Encrypted Key value. The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements column indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification.See Appendix A.2 for a table cross-referencing theThe use of "-" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a future version of the specification. See Appendix A.2 for a table cross-referencing the JWE "alg" (algorithm) values defined in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages. 4.2. Key Encryption withRSAES-PKCS1-V1_5RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK withRSAES-PKCS1-V1_5RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 [RFC3447]. The "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter value "RSA1_5" is used for this algorithm. A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm. An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.2 of [JWE]. 4.3. Key Encryption with RSAES OAEP This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with RSAES using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [RFC3447]. Two sets of parameters for using OAEP are defined, which use different hash functions. In the first case, the default parameters specifiedby RFC 3447inSectionAppendix A.2.1 of RFC 3447 are used. (Those default parameters are the SHA-1 hash function and the MGF1 with SHA-1 mask generation function.) In the second case, the SHA-256 hash function and the MGF1 with SHA-256 mask generation function are used. The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWE Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the CEK using the corresponding algorithm:+-----------------+------------------------------------------------++-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ |alg"alg" Param Value | Key Management Algorithm |+-----------------+------------------------------------------------++-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | RSA-OAEP | RSAES OAEP using default parameters | | RSA-OAEP-256 | RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with | | | SHA-256 |+-----------------+------------------------------------------------++-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms. (This requirement is based on Table 4 (Security-strength time frames) of NIST SP 800-57 [NIST.800-57], which requires 112 bits of security for new uses, and Table 2 (Comparable strengths) of the same, which states that2048 bit2048-bit RSA keys provide 112 bits of security.) An example using RSAES OAEP with the default parameters is shown in Appendix A.1 of [JWE]. 4.4. Key Wrapping with AES Key Wrap This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm [RFC3394] using the default initial value specified in Section2.2.3.1.2.2.3.1 of that document. The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWE Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the CEK using the corresponding algorithm and key size:+---------------+---------------------------------------------------++-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ |alg"alg" Param | Key Management Algorithm | | Value | |+---------------+---------------------------------------------------++-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | A128KW | AES Key Wrap with default initial value using128| | |bit128-bit key | | A192KW | AES Key Wrap with default initial value using192| | |bit192-bit key | | A256KW | AES Key Wrap with default initial value using256| | |bit256-bit key |+---------------+---------------------------------------------------++-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.3 of [JWE]. 4.5. Direct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key This section defines the specifics of directly performing symmetric key encryption without performing a key wrapping step. In this case, the shared symmetric key is used directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value for the "enc" algorithm. An empty octet sequence is used as the JWE Encrypted Key value. The "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter value "dir" is used in this case. Refer to the security considerations on key lifetimes in Section 8.2 and AES GCM in Section 8.4 when considering utilizing direct encryption. 4.6. Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static (ECDH-ES) This section defines the specifics of key agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static [RFC6090], in combination with the Concat KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800-56A]. The key agreement result can be used in one of two ways: 1. directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK) for the "enc" algorithm, in the Direct Key Agreement mode, or 2. as a symmetric key used to wrap the CEK with the "A128KW", "A192KW", or "A256KW" algorithms, in the Key Agreement with Key Wrapping mode. A new ephemeral public key value MUST be generated for each key agreement operation. In Direct Key Agreement mode, the output of the Concat KDF MUST be a key of the same length as that used by the "enc" algorithm. In this case, the empty octet sequence is used as the JWE Encrypted Key value. The "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter value "ECDH-ES" is used in the Direct Key Agreement mode. In Key Agreement with Key Wrapping mode, the output of the Concat KDF MUST be a key of the length needed for the specified key wrapping algorithm. In this case, the JWE Encrypted Key is the CEK wrapped with theagreed uponagreed-upon key. The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWE Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the CEK using the result of the key agreement algorithm as the key encryption key for the corresponding key wrapping algorithm:+----------------+--------------------------------------------------++-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ |alg"alg" Param | Key Management Algorithm | | Value | |+----------------+--------------------------------------------------++-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | ECDH-ES+A128KW | ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with | | | "A128KW" | | ECDH-ES+A192KW | ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with | | | "A192KW" | | ECDH-ES+A256KW | ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with | | | "A256KW" |+----------------+--------------------------------------------------++-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ 4.6.1. Header Parameters Used for ECDH Key Agreement The following Header Parameter names are used for key agreement as defined below. 4.6.1.1. "epk" (Ephemeral Public Key) Header Parameter The "epk" (ephemeral public key) value created by the originator for the use in key agreement algorithms. This key is represented as a JSON Web Key [JWK] public key value. It MUST contain only public key parameters and SHOULD contain only the minimum JWK parameters necessary to represent the key; other JWK parameters included can be checked for consistency andhonoredhonored, or they can be ignored. This Header Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by implementations when these algorithms are used. 4.6.1.2. "apu" (Agreement PartyUInfo) Header Parameter The "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo) value for key agreement algorithms using it (such as "ECDH-ES"), represented as abase64url encodedbase64url-encoded string. When used, the PartyUInfo value contains information about the producer. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. This Header Parameter MUST be understood and processed by implementations when these algorithms are used. 4.6.1.3. "apv" (Agreement PartyVInfo) Header Parameter The "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) value for key agreement algorithms using it (such as "ECDH-ES"), represented as a base64url encoded string. When used, the PartyVInfo value contains information about the recipient. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. This Header Parameter MUST be understood and processed by implementations when these algorithms are used. 4.6.2. Key Derivation for ECDH Key Agreement The key derivation process derives theagreed uponagreed-upon key from the shared secret Z established through the ECDH algorithm, per Section 6.2.2.2 of [NIST.800-56A]. Key derivation is performed using the Concat KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800-56A], where the Digest Method is SHA-256. The Concat KDF parameters are set as follows: Z This is set to the representation of the shared secret Z as an octet sequence. keydatalen This is set to the number of bits in the desired output key. For "ECDH-ES", this is length of the key used by the "enc" algorithm. For "ECDH-ES+A128KW", "ECDH-ES+A192KW", and "ECDH-ES+A256KW", this is 128, 192, and 256, respectively. AlgorithmID The AlgorithmID value is of the form Datalen || Data, where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and Datalen is a fixed-length,big endian 32 bitbig-endian 32-bit counter that indicates the length (in octets) of Data. In the Direct Key Agreement case, Data is set to the octets of the ASCII representation of the "enc" Header Parameter value. In the Key Agreement with Key Wrapping case, Data is set to the octets of the ASCII representation of the "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter value. PartyUInfo The PartyUInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data, where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and Datalen is a fixed-length,big endian 32 bitbig-endian 32-bit counter that indicates the length (in octets) of Data. If an "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo) Header Parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url decoding the "apu" value and Datalen is set to the number of octets in Data. Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to the empty octet sequence. PartyVInfo The PartyVInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data, where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and Datalen is a fixed-length,big endian 32 bitbig-endian 32-bit counter that indicates the length (in octets) of Data. If an "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) Header Parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url decoding the "apv" value and Datalen is set to the number of octets in Data. Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to the empty octet sequence. SuppPubInfo This is set to the keydatalen represented as a32 bit big endian32-bit big-endian integer. SuppPrivInfo This is set to the empty octet sequence. Applications need to specify how the "apu" and "apv"parametersHeader Parameters are used for that application. The "apu" and "apv" values MUST be distinct, when used. Applications wishing to conform to [NIST.800-56A] need to provide values that meet the requirements of that document, e.g., by using values that identify the producer and consumer. Alternatively, applications MAY conduct key derivation in a manner similar toThe Diffie-Hellman"Diffie-Hellman Key AgreementMethodMethod" [RFC2631]:Inin that case, the "apu"fieldparameter MAY either be omitted or represent a random 512-bit value (analogous to PartyAInfo in Ephemeral-Static mode in RFC 2631) and the "apv"fieldparameter SHOULD NOT be present. See Appendix C for an example key agreement computation using this method. 4.7. Key Encryption with AES GCM This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE Content Encryption Key (CEK) with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)[AES, NIST.800-38D].([AES] and [NIST.800-38D]). Use of an Initialization Vector (IV) of size 96 bits is REQUIRED with this algorithm. TheInitialization VectorIV is represented inbase64url encodedbase64url-encoded form as the "iv" (initialization vector) Header Parameter value. The Additional Authenticated Data value used is the empty octet string. The requested size of the Authentication Tag output MUST be 128 bits, regardless of the key size. The JWE Encrypted Key value is theCiphertextciphertext output. The Authentication Tag output is represented inbase64url encodedbase64url-encoded form as the "tag" (authentication tag) Header Parameter value. The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWE Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the CEK using the corresponding algorithm and key size:+-----------------+---------------------------------------------++-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ |alg"alg" Param Value | Key Management Algorithm |+-----------------+---------------------------------------------++-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ | A128GCMKW | Key wrapping with AES GCM using128 bit128-bit key | | A192GCMKW | Key wrapping with AES GCM using192 bit192-bit key | | A256GCMKW | Key wrapping with AES GCM using256 bit256-bit key |+-----------------+---------------------------------------------++-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ 4.7.1. Header Parameters Used for AES GCM Key Encryption The following Header Parameters are used for AES GCM key encryption. 4.7.1.1. "iv" (Initialization Vector) Header Parameter The "iv" (initialization vector) Header Parameter value is thebase64url encodedbase64url-encoded representation of the96 bit Initialization Vector96-bit IV value used for the key encryption operation. This Header Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by implementations when these algorithms are used. 4.7.1.2. "tag" (Authentication Tag) Header Parameter The "tag" (authentication tag) Header Parameter value is thebase64url encodedbase64url-encoded representation of the128 bit128-bit Authentication Tag value resulting from the key encryption operation. This Header Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by implementations when these algorithms are used. 4.8. Key Encryption with PBES2 This section defines the specifics of performing password-based encryption of a JWE CEK, by first deriving a key encryption key from a user-supplied password using PBES2 schemes as specified in Section 6.2 of [RFC2898], then by encrypting the JWE CEK using the derived key. These algorithms use HMAC SHA-2 algorithms as thePseudo-RandomPseudorandom Function (PRF) for the PBKDF2 key derivation and AES Key Wrap [RFC3394] for the encryption scheme. The PBES2 password input is an octet sequence; if the password to be used is represented as a text string rather than an octet sequence, the UTF-8 encoding of the text string MUST be used as the octet sequence. The salt parameter MUST be computed from the "p2s" (PBES2 salt input) Header Parameter value and the "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter value as specified in the "p2s" definition below. The iteration count parameter MUST be provided as the "p2c" (PBES2 count) Header Parameter value. The algorithms respectively use HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, and HMAC SHA-512 as the PRF and use128, 192,128-, 192-, and256 bit256-bit AES Key Wrap keys. Theirderived- keyderived-key lengths respectively are 16, 24, and 32 octets. The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWE Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the CEK using the result of the corresponding password-based encryption algorithm as the key encryption key for the corresponding key wrapping algorithm: +--------------------+----------------------------------------------+ |alg"alg" Param Value | Key Management Algorithm | +--------------------+----------------------------------------------+ | PBES2-HS256+A128KW | PBES2 with HMAC SHA-256 and "A128KW" | | | wrapping | | PBES2-HS384+A192KW | PBES2 with HMAC SHA-384 and "A192KW" | | | wrapping | | PBES2-HS512+A256KW | PBES2 with HMAC SHA-512 and "A256KW" | | | wrapping | +--------------------+----------------------------------------------+ See Appendix C ofJSON Web Key (JWK)the JWK specification [JWK] for an example key encryption computation using "PBES2-HS256+A128KW". 4.8.1. Header Parameters Used for PBES2 Key Encryption The following Header Parameters are used for Key Encryption with PBES2. 4.8.1.1. "p2s" (PBES2salt input)Salt Input) Header Parameter The "p2s" (PBES2 salt input) Header Parameter encodes a Salt Input value, which is used as part of the PBKDF2 salt value. The "p2s" value is BASE64URL(Salt Input). This Header Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by implementations when these algorithms are used. The salt expands the possible keys that can be derived from a given password. A Salt Input value containing 8 or more octets MUST be used. A new Salt Input value MUST be generated randomly for every encryption operation; see RFC 4086 [RFC4086] for considerations on generating random values. The salt value used is (UTF8(Alg) || 0x00 || Salt Input), where Alg is the "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter value. 4.8.1.2. "p2c" (PBES2count)Count) Header Parameter The "p2c" (PBES2 count) Header Parameter contains the PBKDF2 iteration count, represented as a positive JSON integer. This Header Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by implementations when these algorithms are used. The iteration count adds computational expense, ideally compounded by the possible range of keys introduced by the salt. A minimum iteration count of 1000 is RECOMMENDED. 5. Cryptographic Algorithms for Content Encryption JWE uses cryptographic algorithms to encrypt andintegrity protectintegrity-protect thePlaintextplaintext and toalso integrity protect additional authenticated data.integrity-protect the Additional Authenticated Data. 5.1. "enc" (Encryption Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE The table below is the set of "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header Parameter values that are defined by this specification for use with JWE. +---------------+----------------------------------+----------------+ |enc"enc" Param | Content Encryption Algorithm | Implementation | | Value | | Requirements | +---------------+----------------------------------+----------------+ | A128CBC-HS256 | AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 | Required | | | authenticated encryption | | | | algorithm, as defined in Section | | | |Section5.2.3 | | | A192CBC-HS384 | AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 | Optional | | | authenticated encryption | | | | algorithm, as defined in Section | | | |Section5.2.4 | | | A256CBC-HS512 | AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 | Required | | | authenticated encryption | | | | algorithm, as defined in Section | | | |Section5.2.5 | | | A128GCM | AES GCM using128 bit128-bit key | Recommended | | A192GCM | AES GCM using192 bit192-bit key | Optional | | A256GCM | AES GCM using256 bit256-bit key | Recommended | +---------------+----------------------------------+----------------+ All also use a JWE Initialization Vector value and produce JWE Ciphertext and JWE Authentication Tag values. See Appendix A.3 for a table cross-referencing the JWE "enc" (encryption algorithm) values defined in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages. 5.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms This section defines a family of authenticated encryption algorithms built using a composition ofAdvanced Encryption Standard (AES)AES [AES] in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode [NIST.800-38A] with PKCS #7 padding[RFC5652],operations per Section 6.3operationsof [RFC5652] and HMAC[RFC2104, SHS]([RFC2104] and [SHS]) operations. This algorithm family is called AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2. It also defines three instances of thisfamily,family: the first using128 bit128-bit CBC keys and HMAC SHA-256, the second using192 bit192-bit CBC keys and HMAC SHA-384, and the third using256 bit256-bit CBC keys and HMAC SHA-512. Test cases for these algorithms can be found in Appendix B. These algorithms are based uponAuthenticated"Authenticated Encryption withAES-CBCAES- CBC andHMAC-SHA [I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2],HMAC-SHA" [AEAD-CBC-SHA], performing the same cryptographic computations, but with the Initialization Vector (IV) and Authentication Tag values remaining separate, rather than being concatenated with theCiphertextciphertext value in the output representation. This option is discussed in Appendix B of that specification. This algorithm family is a generalization of the algorithm family in[I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2],[AEAD-CBC-SHA] and can be used to implement those algorithms. 5.2.1. Conventions Used in Defining AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 We use the following notational conventions.CBC-PKCS5-ENC(X,CBC-PKCS7-ENC(X, P) denotes theAES CBCAES-CBC encryption of P using PKCS #7 paddingusingutilizing the cipher with the key X. MAC(Y, M) denotes the application of theMessage Authentication Code (MAC)MAC to the messageM,M using the key Y. 5.2.2. Generic AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithm This section defines AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 in a manner that is independent of theAES CBCAES-CBC key size or hash function to be used.SectionSections 5.2.2.1 andSection5.2.2.2 define the generic encryption and decryption algorithms. Sections 5.2.3 through 5.2.5 define instances of AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 that specify those details. 5.2.2.1. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Encryption The authenticated encryption algorithm takes as input four octet strings: a secret key K, a plaintext P,additional authenticated dataAdditional Authenticated Data A, and aninitialization vectorInitialization Vector IV. The authenticated ciphertext value E and theauthentication tagAuthentication Tag value T are provided as outputs. The data in the plaintext are encrypted and authenticated, and theadditional authenticated dataAdditional Authenticated Data are authenticated, but not encrypted. The encryption process is as follows, or uses an equivalent set of steps: 1. The secondary keys MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY are generated from the input key K as follows. Each of these two keys is an octet string. MAC_KEY consists of the initial MAC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in order. ENC_KEY consists of the final ENC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in order. The number of octets in the input key K MUST be the sum of MAC_KEY_LEN and ENC_KEY_LEN. The values of these parameters are specified by the Authenticated Encryption algorithms in Sections 5.2.3 through 5.2.5. Note that the MAC key comes before the encryption key in the input key K; this is in the opposite order of the algorithm names in the identifier "AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2". 2. TheInitialization Vector (IV)IV used is a128 bit128-bit value generated randomly or pseudorandomly for use in the cipher. 3. The plaintext is CBC encrypted using PKCS #7 padding using ENC_KEY as thekey,key and the IV. We denote the ciphertext output from this step as E. 4. The octet string AL is equal to the number of bits in theadditional authenticated dataAdditional Authenticated Data A expressed as a 64-bit unsignedbig endianbig-endian integer. 5. A messageauthentication tagAuthentication Tag T is computed by applying HMAC [RFC2104] to the following data, in order: theadditional authenticated dataAdditional Authenticated Data A, theinitialization vectorInitialization Vector IV, the ciphertext E computed in the previous step, and the octet string AL defined above. The string MAC_KEY is used as the MAC key. We denote the output of the MAC computed in this step as M. The first T_LEN bits of M are used as T. 6. TheCiphertextciphertext E and the Authentication Tag T are returned as the outputs of the authenticated encryption. The encryption process can be illustrated as follows. Here K, P, A, IV, and E denote the key, plaintext,additional authenticated data, initialization vector,Additional Authenticated Data, Initialization Vector, and ciphertext, respectively. MAC_KEY = initial MAC_KEY_LEN octets of K, ENC_KEY = final ENC_KEY_LEN octets of K, E =CBC-PKCS5-ENC(ENC_KEY,CBC-PKCS7-ENC(ENC_KEY, P), M = MAC(MAC_KEY, A || IV || E || AL), T = initial T_LEN octets of M. 5.2.2.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Decryption The authenticated decryption operation has five inputs: K, A, IV, E, and T as defined above. It has only a singleoutput,output: either a plaintext value P or a special symbol FAIL that indicates that the inputs are not authentic. The authenticated decryption algorithm is as follows, or uses an equivalent set of steps: 1. The secondary keys MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY are generated from the input key K as in Step 1 of Section 5.2.2.1. 2. The integrity and authenticity of A and E are checked by computing an HMAC with the inputs as in Step 5 of Section 5.2.2.1. The value T, from the previous step, is compared to the first MAC_KEY length bits of the HMAC output. If those values are identical, then A and E are considered valid, and processing is continued. Otherwise, all of the data used in the MAC validation are discarded, and theAuthenticated Encryptionauthenticated decryption operation returns an indication that it failed, and the operation halts. (But see Section 11.5 of [JWE] for security considerations on thwarting timing attacks.) 3. The value E is decrypted and the PKCS #7 padding is checked and removed. The value IV is used as theinitialization vector.Initialization Vector. The value ENC_KEY is used as the decryption key. 4. The plaintext value is returned. 5.2.3. AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 This algorithm is a concrete instantiation of the generic AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithm above. It uses the HMAC message authentication code [RFC2104] with the SHA-256 hash function [SHS] to provide message authentication, with the HMAC output truncated to 128 bits, corresponding to the HMAC-SHA-256-128 algorithm defined in [RFC4868]. For encryption, it uses AES in theCipher Block Chaining (CBC)CBC mode of operation as defined in Section 6.2 of [NIST.800-38A], with PKCS #7 padding and a128 bit initialization vector (IV)128-bit IV value. The AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 parameters specific to AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 are: The input key K is 32 octets long. ENC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets. MAC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets. The SHA-256 hash algorithm is used for the HMAC. The HMAC-SHA-256 output is truncated to T_LEN=16 octets, by stripping off the final 16 octets. 5.2.4. AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 is based on AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256, but with the following differences: The input key K is 48 octets long instead of 32. ENC_KEY_LEN is 24 octets instead of 16. MAC_KEY_LEN is 24 octets instead of 16. SHA-384 is used for the HMAC instead of SHA-256. The HMAC SHA-384 value is truncated to T_LEN=24 octets instead of 16. 5.2.5. AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 is based on AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256, but with the following differences: The input key K is 64 octets long instead of 32. ENC_KEY_LEN is 32 octets instead of 16. MAC_KEY_LEN is 32 octets instead of 16. SHA-512 is used for the HMAC instead of SHA-256. The HMAC SHA-512 value is truncated to T_LEN=32 octets instead of 16. 5.2.6. Content Encryption with AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 This section defines the specifics of performing authenticated encryption with the AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithms. The CEK is used as the secret key K. The following "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWE Ciphertext and JWE Authentication Tag values have been computed using the corresponding algorithm: +---------------+---------------------------------------------------+ |enc"enc" Param | Content Encryption Algorithm | | Value | | +---------------+---------------------------------------------------+ | A128CBC-HS256 | AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 authenticated encryption | | | algorithm, as defined in Section 5.2.3 | | A192CBC-HS384 | AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 authenticated encryption | | | algorithm, as defined in Section 5.2.4 | | A256CBC-HS512 | AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 authenticated encryption | | | algorithm, as defined in Section 5.2.5 | +---------------+---------------------------------------------------+ 5.3. Content Encryption with AES GCM This section defines the specifics of performing authenticated encryption withAdvanced Encryption Standard (AES)AES in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)[AES, NIST.800-38D].([AES] and [NIST.800-38D]). The CEK is used as the encryption key. Use of aninitialization vectorIV of size 96 bits is REQUIRED with this algorithm. The requested size of the Authentication Tag output MUST be 128 bits, regardless of the key size. The following "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWE Ciphertext and JWE Authentication Tag values have been computed using the corresponding algorithm and key size:+-----------------+------------------------------++-------------------+------------------------------+ |enc"enc" Param Value | Content Encryption Algorithm |+-----------------+------------------------------++-------------------+------------------------------+ | A128GCM | AES GCM using128 bit128-bit key | | A192GCM | AES GCM using192 bit192-bit key | | A256GCM | AES GCM using256 bit256-bit key |+-----------------+------------------------------++-------------------+------------------------------+ An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.1 of [JWE]. 6. Cryptographic Algorithms for Keys A JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] is a JSON data structure that represents a cryptographic key. These keys can be either asymmetric or symmetric. They can hold both public and private information about the key. This section defines the parameters for keys using the algorithms specified by this document. 6.1. "kty" (Key Type) Parameter Values The table below is the set of "kty" (key type) parameter values that are defined by this specification for use in JWKs.+-------------+------------------------------------+----------------++-------------+--------------------------------+--------------------+ |kty"kty" Param | Key Type | Implementation | | Value | | Requirements |+-------------+------------------------------------+----------------++-------------+--------------------------------+--------------------+ | EC | Elliptic Curve [DSS] | Recommended+ | | RSA | RSA [RFC3447] | Required | | oct | Octet sequence (used torepresent| Required | | | represent symmetric keys) | |+-------------+------------------------------------+----------------++-------------+--------------------------------+--------------------+ The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements column indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification. 6.2. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys JWKs can represent Elliptic Curve [DSS] keys. In this case, the "kty" member value is "EC". 6.2.1. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Public Keys Anelliptic curveElliptic Curve public key is represented by a pair of coordinates drawn from a finite field, which together define a point on anelliptic curve.Elliptic Curve. The following members MUST be present for allelliptic curveElliptic Curve public keys: o "crv" o "x" The following member MUST also be present forelliptic curveElliptic Curve public keys for the three curves defined in the following section: o "y" 6.2.1.1. "crv" (Curve) Parameter The "crv" (curve)memberparameter identifies the cryptographic curve used with the key. Curve values from [DSS] used by this specification are: o "P-256" o "P-384" o "P-521" These values are registered in the IANAJSON"JSON Web Key EllipticCurveCurve" registry defined in Section 7.6. Additional "crv" values can be registered by other specifications. Specifications registering additional curves must define what parameters are used to represent keys for the curves registered. The "crv" value is a case-sensitive string. SEC1 [SEC1] point compression is not supported for any of these three curves. 6.2.1.2. "x" (X Coordinate) Parameter The "x" (x coordinate)memberparameter contains the x coordinate for theelliptic curveElliptic Curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the octet string representation of the coordinate, as defined in Section 2.3.5 of SEC1 [SEC1]. The length of this octet string MUST be the full size of a coordinate for the curve specified in the "crv" parameter. For example, if the value of "crv" is "P-521", the octet string must be 66 octets long. 6.2.1.3. "y" (Y Coordinate) Parameter The "y" (y coordinate)memberparameter contains the y coordinate for theelliptic curveElliptic Curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the octet string representation of the coordinate, as defined in Section 2.3.5 of SEC1 [SEC1]. The length of this octet string MUST be the full size of a coordinate for the curve specified in the "crv" parameter. For example, if the value of "crv" is "P-521", the octet string must be 66 octets long. 6.2.2. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Private Keys In addition to the members used to represent Elliptic Curve public keys, the following member MUST be present to represent Elliptic Curve private keys. 6.2.2.1. "d" (ECC Private Key) Parameter The "d" (ECC private key)memberparameter contains the Elliptic Curve private key value. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the octet string representation of the private key value, as defined in Section 2.3.7 of SEC1 [SEC1]. The length of this octet string MUST be ceiling(log-base-2(n)/8) octets (where n is the order of the curve). 6.3. Parameters for RSA Keys JWKs can represent RSA [RFC3447] keys. In this case, the "kty" member value is "RSA". The semantics of the parameters defined below are the same as those defined in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of RFC 3447. 6.3.1. Parameters for RSA Public Keys The following members MUST be present for RSA public keys. 6.3.1.1. "n" (Modulus) Parameter The "n" (modulus)memberparameter contains the modulus value for the RSA public key. It is represented as aBase64urlUInt encodedBase64urlUInt-encoded value. Note that implementers have found that some cryptographic libraries prefix an extra zero-valued octet to the modulus representations they return, for instance, returning 257 octets for a2048 bit2048-bit key, rather than 256. Implementations using such libraries will need to take care to omit the extra octet from thebase64url encodedbase64url-encoded representation. 6.3.1.2. "e" (Exponent) Parameter The "e" (exponent)memberparameter contains the exponent value for the RSA public key. It is represented as aBase64urlUInt encodedBase64urlUInt-encoded value. For instance, when representing the value 65537, the octet sequence to bebase64url encodedbase64url-encoded MUST consist of the three octets [1, 0, 1]; the resulting representation for this value is "AQAB". 6.3.2. Parameters for RSA Private Keys In addition to the members used to represent RSA public keys, the following members are used to represent RSA private keys. The parameter "d" is REQUIRED for RSA private keys. The others enable optimizations and SHOULD be included by producers of JWKs representing RSA private keys. If the producer includes any of the other private key parameters, then all of the others MUST be present, with the exception of "oth", which MUST only be present when more than two prime factors were used. 6.3.2.1. "d" (Private Exponent) Parameter The "d" (private exponent)memberparameter contains the private exponent value for the RSA private key. It is represented as aBase64urlUIntBase64urlUInt- encoded value. 6.3.2.2. "p" (First Prime Factor) Parameter The "p" (first prime factor)memberparameter contains the first prime factor. It is represented as aBase64urlUInt encodedBase64urlUInt-encoded value. 6.3.2.3. "q" (Second Prime Factor) Parameter The "q" (second prime factor)memberparameter contains the second prime factor. It is represented as aBase64urlUInt encodedBase64urlUInt-encoded value. 6.3.2.4. "dp" (First Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter The "dp" (first factor CRT exponent)memberparameter contains the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) exponent of the first factor. It is represented as aBase64urlUInt encodedBase64urlUInt-encoded value. 6.3.2.5. "dq" (Second Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter The "dq" (second factor CRT exponent)memberparameter contains theChinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)CRT exponent of the second factor. It is represented as aBase64urlUIntBase64urlUInt- encoded value. 6.3.2.6. "qi" (First CRT Coefficient) Parameter The "qi" (first CRT coefficient)memberparameter contains theChinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)CRT coefficient of the second factor. It is represented as aBase64urlUInt encodedBase64urlUInt-encoded value. 6.3.2.7. "oth" (Other Primes Info) Parameter The "oth" (other primes info)memberparameter contains an array of information about any third and subsequent primes, should they exist. When only two primes have been used (the normal case), this parameter MUST be omitted. When three or more primes have been used, the number of array elements MUST be the number of primes used minus two. For more information on this case, see the description of the OtherPrimeInfo parameters inSectionAppendix A.1.2 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447], upon which the following parameters aremodelled.modeled. If the consumer of a JWK does not support private keys with more than two primes and it encounters a private key that includes the "oth" parameter, then it MUST NOT use the key. Each array element MUST be an object with the followingmembers:members. 6.3.2.7.1. "r" (Prime Factor) The "r" (prime factor) parameter within an "oth" array member represents the value of a subsequent prime factor. It is represented as aBase64urlUInt encodedBase64urlUInt-encoded value. 6.3.2.7.2. "d" (Factor CRT Exponent) The "d"(Factor(factor CRTExponent)exponent) parameter within an "oth" array member represents the CRT exponent of the corresponding prime factor. It is represented as aBase64urlUInt encodedBase64urlUInt-encoded value. 6.3.2.7.3. "t" (Factor CRT Coefficient) The "t" (factor CRT coefficient) parameter within an "oth" array member represents the CRT coefficient of the corresponding prime factor. It is represented as aBase64urlUInt encodedBase64urlUInt-encoded value. 6.4. Parameters for Symmetric Keys When the JWK "kty" member value is "oct" (octet sequence), the member "k" (see Section 6.4.1) is used to represent a symmetric key (or another key whose value is a single octet sequence). An "alg" member SHOULD also be present to identify the algorithm intended to be used with the key, unless the application uses another means or convention to determine the algorithm used. 6.4.1. "k" (Key Value) Parameter The "k" (key value)memberparameter contains the value of the symmetric (or other single-valued) key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the octet sequence containing the key value. 7. IANA Considerations The following registration procedure is used for all the registries established by this specification.Values are registered on aThe registration procedure for values is Specification Required [RFC5226]basisafter a three-week review period on the jose-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the DesignatedExpert(s)Experts may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published. Registration requestsmust besent to thejose-reg-review@ietf.orgmailing list for reviewand comment, withshould use an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register algorithm: example"). Within the review period, the DesignatedExpert(s)Experts will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution. Criteria that should be applied by the DesignatedExpert(s) includesExperts include determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality,determiningwhether it is likely to be of general applicability orwhether it isuseful only for a single application, and whether the registration description is clear. IANA must only accept registry updates from the DesignatedExpert(s)Experts and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list. It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are able to represent the perspectives of different applications using this specification, in order to enablebroadly-informedbroadly informed review of registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the otherExpert(s). [[ Note to the RFC Editor and IANA: Pearl Liang of ICANN had requested that the draft supply the following proposed registry description information. It is to be used for all registries established by this specification. o Protocol Category: JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) o Registry Location: http://www.iana.org/assignments/jose o Webpage Title: (same as the protocol category) o Registry Name: (same as the section title, but excluding the word "Registry", for example "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms") ]]Experts. 7.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry This specification establishes the IANAJSON"JSON Web Signature and EncryptionAlgorithmsAlgorithms" registry for values of the JWS and JWE "alg" (algorithm) and "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header Parameters. The registry records the algorithm name, the algorithm description, the algorithm usage locations, the implementation requirements, the change controller, and a reference to the specification that defines it. The same algorithm name can be registered multiple times, provided that the sets of usage locations are disjoint. It is suggested that the length of the key be included in the algorithm name when multiple variations of algorithms are being registered that use keys of different lengths and the key lengths for each need to be fixed (for instance, because they will be created by key derivationfunctions), that the length of the key be included in the algorithm name.functions). This allows readers of the JSON text to more easily make security decisions. The DesignatedExpert(s)Experts should perform reasonable due diligence that algorithms being registeredareeither are currently considered cryptographically credible or are being registered as Deprecated or Prohibited. The implementation requirements of an algorithm may be changed over time as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the status of an algorithm toDeprecated,Deprecated or to change the status of an algorithm from Optional to Recommended+ or Required. Changes of implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification Required basis after review by the DesignatedExperts(s),Experts, with the new specification defining the revised implementation requirements level. 7.1.1. Registration Template Algorithm Name: The name requested (e.g., "HS256"). This name is a case-sensitive ASCII string. Names may not match other registered names in a case-insensitive manner unless the DesignatedExpert(s)Experts state that there is a compelling reason to allow anexception in this particular case.exception. Algorithm Description: Brief description of theAlgorithmalgorithm (e.g., "HMAC using SHA-256"). Algorithm Usage Location(s): The algorithm usagelocation.locations. This must be one or more of the values "alg" or "enc" if the algorithm is to be used with JWS or JWE. The value "JWK" is used if the algorithm identifier will be used as a JWK "alg" member value, but will not be used with JWS or JWE; this could be the case, for instance, for non-authenticated encryption algorithms. Other values may be used with the approval of a Designated Expert. JOSE Implementation Requirements: The algorithm implementation requirements for JWS and JWE, which must be one the words Required, Recommended, Optional, Deprecated, or Prohibited. Optionally, the word can be followed by a "+" or "-". The use of "+" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification. The use of "-" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a future version of the specification. Any identifiers registered for non-authenticated encryption algorithms or other algorithms that are otherwise unsuitable for direct use as JWS or JWE algorithms must be registered as "Prohibited". Change Controller: For Standards Track RFCs,statelist the "IESG". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included. Specification Document(s): Reference to thedocument(s)document or documents that specify the parameter, preferably includingURI(s)URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of thedocument(s).documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required. Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): References topublication(s)a publication or publications in well-known cryptographic conferences, by national standards bodies, or by other authoritative sources analyzing the cryptographic soundness of the algorithm to be registered. Thedesignated expertsDesignated Experts may require convincing evidence of the cryptographic soundness of a new algorithm to be provided with the registration request unless the algorithm is being registered as Deprecated or Prohibited. Having gone through working group and IETF review, the initial registrations made by this document are exempt from the need to provide this information. 7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents o Algorithm Name: "HS256" o Algorithm Description: HMAC using SHA-256 o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Required o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section3.13.2 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "HS384" o Algorithm Description: HMAC using SHA-384 o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section3.13.2 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "HS512" o Algorithm Description: HMAC using SHA-512 o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section3.13.2 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "RS256" o Algorithm Description:RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-256 o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section3.13.3 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "RS384" o Algorithm Description:RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-384 o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section3.13.3 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "RS512" o Algorithm Description:RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-512 o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section3.13.3 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "ES256" o Algorithm Description: ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended+ o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section3.13.4 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "ES384" o Algorithm Description: ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section3.13.4 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "ES512" o Algorithm Description: ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section3.13.4 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "PS256" o Algorithm Description: RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 and MGF1 withSHA- 256SHA-256 o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section3.13.5 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "PS384" o Algorithm Description: RSASSA-PSS using SHA-384 and MGF1 withSHA- 384SHA-384 o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section3.13.5 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "PS512" o Algorithm Description: RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 and MGF1 withSHA- 512SHA-512 o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section3.13.5 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "none" o Algorithm Description: No digital signature or MAC performed o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section3.13.6 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "RSA1_5" o Algorithm Description:RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended- o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section4.14.2 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "RSA-OAEP" o Algorithm Description: RSAES OAEP using default parameters o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended+ o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section4.14.3 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "RSA-OAEP-256" o Algorithm Description: RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 withSHA- 256SHA-256 o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section4.14.3 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "A128KW" o Algorithm Description: AES Key Wrap using128 bit128-bit key o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section4.14.4 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "A192KW" o Algorithm Description: AES Key Wrap using192 bit192-bit key o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section4.14.4 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "A256KW" o Algorithm Description: AES Key Wrap using256 bit256-bit key o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section4.14.4 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "dir" o Algorithm Description: Direct use of a shared symmetric key o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section4.14.5 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "ECDH-ES" o Algorithm Description: ECDH-ES using Concat KDF o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended+ o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section4.14.6 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "ECDH-ES+A128KW" o Algorithm Description: ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and "A128KW" wrapping o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section4.14.6 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "ECDH-ES+A192KW" o Algorithm Description: ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and "A192KW" wrapping o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section4.14.6 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "ECDH-ES+A256KW" o Algorithm Description: ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and "A256KW" wrapping o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section4.14.6 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "A128GCMKW" o Algorithm Description: Key wrapping with AES GCM using128 bit128-bit key o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.7 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "A192GCMKW" o Algorithm Description: Key wrapping with AES GCM using192 bit192-bit key o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.7 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "A256GCMKW" o Algorithm Description: Key wrapping with AES GCM using256 bit256-bit key o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.7 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "PBES2-HS256+A128KW" o Algorithm Description: PBES2 with HMAC SHA-256 and "A128KW" wrapping o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.8 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "PBES2-HS384+A192KW" o Algorithm Description: PBES2 with HMAC SHA-384 and "A192KW" wrapping o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.8 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "PBES2-HS512+A256KW" o Algorithm Description: PBES2 with HMAC SHA-512 and "A256KW" wrapping o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.8 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "A128CBC-HS256" o Algorithm Description: AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 authenticated encryption algorithm o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Required o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section5.15.2.3 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "A192CBC-HS384" o Algorithm Description: AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 authenticated encryption algorithm o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section5.15.2.4 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "A256CBC-HS512" o Algorithm Description: AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 authenticated encryption algorithm o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Required o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section5.15.2.5 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "A128GCM" o Algorithm Description: AES GCM using128 bit128-bit key o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section5.15.3 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "A192GCM" o Algorithm Description: AES GCM using192 bit192-bit key o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section5.15.3 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a o Algorithm Name: "A256GCM" o Algorithm Description: AES GCM using256 bit256-bit key o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc" o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section5.15.3 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a 7.2. Header Parameter Names Registration Thisspecificationsection registers the Header Parameter names defined inSectionSections 4.6.1,Section4.7.1, andSection4.8.1 of this specification in the IANAJSON"JSON Web Signature and Encryption HeaderParametersParameters" registrydefined inestablished by [JWS]. 7.2.1. Registry Contents o Header Parameter Name: "epk" o Header Parameter Description: Ephemeral Public Key o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.6.1.1 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Header Parameter Name: "apu" o Header Parameter Description: Agreement PartyUInfo o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.6.1.2 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Header Parameter Name: "apv" o Header Parameter Description: Agreement PartyVInfo o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.6.1.3 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Header Parameter Name: "iv" o Header Parameter Description: Initialization Vector o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.7.1.1 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Header Parameter Name: "tag" o Header Parameter Description: Authentication Tag o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.7.1.2 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Header Parameter Name: "p2s" o Header Parameter Description: PBES2saltSalt Input o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.8.1.1 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Header Parameter Name: "p2c" o Header Parameter Description: PBES2countCount o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.8.1.2 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 7.3. JSON Web Encryption Compression Algorithms Registry This specification establishes the IANAJSON"JSON Web Encryption CompressionAlgorithmsAlgorithms" registry for JWE "zip" member values. The registry records the compression algorithm value and a reference to the specification that defines it. 7.3.1. Registration Template Compression Algorithm Value: The name requested (e.g., "DEF"). Because a core goal of this specification is for the resulting representations to be compact, it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8 characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name iscase-sensitive.case sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a case-insensitive manner unless the DesignatedExpert(s)Experts state that there is a compelling reason to allow anexception in this particular case.exception. Compression Algorithm Description: Brief description of the compression algorithm (e.g., "DEFLATE"). Change Controller: For Standards Track RFCs,statelist "IESG". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included. Specification Document(s): Reference to thedocument(s)document or documents that specify the parameter, preferably includingURI(s)URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of thedocument(s).documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required. 7.3.2. Initial Registry Contents o Compression Algorithm Value: "DEF" o Compression Algorithm Description: DEFLATE o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] 7.4. JSON Web Key Types Registry This specification establishes the IANAJSON"JSON Web KeyTypesTypes" registry for values of the JWK "kty" (key type) parameter. The registry records the "kty" value, implementation requirements, and a reference to the specification that defines it. The implementation requirements of a key type may be changed over time as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the status of a key type toDeprecated,Deprecated or to change the status of a key type from Optional to Recommended+ or Required. Changes of implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification Required basis after review by the DesignatedExperts(s),Experts, with the new specification defining the revised implementation requirements level. 7.4.1. Registration Template "kty" Parameter Value: The name requested (e.g., "EC"). Because a core goal of this specification is for the resulting representations to be compact, it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8 characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name iscase-sensitive.case sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a case-insensitive manner unless the DesignatedExpert(s)Experts state that there is a compelling reason to allow anexception in this particular case.exception. Key Type Description: Brief description of the Key Type (e.g., "Elliptic Curve"). Change Controller: For Standards Track RFCs,statelist "IESG". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included. JOSE Implementation Requirements: The key type implementation requirements for JWS and JWE, which must be one the words Required, Recommended, Optional, Deprecated, or Prohibited. Optionally, the word can be followed by a "+" or "-". The use of "+" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification. The use of "-" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a future version of the specification. Specification Document(s): Reference to thedocument(s)document or documents that specify the parameter, preferably includingURI(s)URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of thedocument(s).documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required. 7.4.2. Initial Registry Contents Thisspecificationsection registers the values defined in Section 6.1. o "kty" Parameter Value: "EC" o Key Type Description: Elliptic Curve o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended+ o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o "kty" Parameter Value: "RSA" o Key Type Description: RSA o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Required o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o "kty" Parameter Value: "oct" o Key Type Description: OctetsequenceSequence o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Required o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.4 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 7.5. JSON Web Key Parameters Registration Thisspecificationsection registers the parameter names defined in Sections 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 of this specification in the IANAJSON"JSON Web KeyParametersParameters" registrydefined inestablished by [JWK]. 7.5.1. Registry Contents o Parameter Name: "crv" o Parameter Description: Curve o Used with "kty" Value(s): "EC" o Parameter Information Class: Public o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.1.1 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Parameter Name: "x" o Parameter Description: X Coordinate o Used with "kty" Value(s): "EC" o Parameter Information Class: Public o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.1.2 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Parameter Name: "y" o Parameter Description: Y Coordinate o Used with "kty" Value(s): "EC" o Parameter Information Class: Public o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.1.3 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Parameter Name: "d" o Parameter Description: ECC Private Key o Used with "kty" Value(s): "EC" o Parameter Information Class: Private o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.2.1 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Parameter Name: "n" o Parameter Description: Modulus o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" o Parameter Information Class: Public o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.1.1 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Parameter Name: "e" o Parameter Description: Exponent o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" o Parameter Information Class: Public o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.1.2 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Parameter Name: "d" o Parameter Description: Private Exponent o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" o Parameter Information Class: Private o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.2.1 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Parameter Name: "p" o Parameter Description: First Prime Factor o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" o Parameter Information Class: Private o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.2.2 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Parameter Name: "q" o Parameter Description: Second Prime Factor o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" o Parameter Information Class: Private o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.2.3 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Parameter Name: "dp" o Parameter Description: First Factor CRT Exponent o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" o Parameter Information Class: Private o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.2.4 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Parameter Name: "dq" o Parameter Description: Second Factor CRT Exponent o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" o Parameter Information Class: Private o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.2.5 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Parameter Name: "qi" o Parameter Description: First CRT Coefficient o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" o Parameter Information Class: Private o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.2.6 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Parameter Name: "oth" o Parameter Description: Other Primes Info o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA" o Parameter Information Class: Private o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.2.7 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Parameter Name: "k" o Parameter Description: Key Value o Used with "kty" Value(s): "oct" o Parameter Information Class: Private o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.4.1 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 7.6. JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve Registry Thisspecificationsection establishes the IANAJSON"JSON Web Key EllipticCurveCurve" registry for JWK "crv" member values. The registry records the curve name, implementation requirements, and a reference to the specification that defines it. This specification registers the parameter names defined in Section 6.2.1.1. The implementation requirements of a curve may be changed over time as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the status of a curve toDeprecated,Deprecated or to change the status of a curve from Optional to Recommended+ or Required. Changes of implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification Required basis after review by the DesignatedExperts(s),Experts, with the new specification defining the revised implementation requirements level. 7.6.1. Registration Template Curve Name: The name requested (e.g., "P-256"). Because a core goal of this specification is for the resulting representations to be compact, it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8 characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name iscase-sensitive.case sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a case-insensitive manner unless the DesignatedExpert(s)Experts state that there is a compelling reason to allow anexception in this particular case.exception. Curve Description: Brief description of the curve (e.g., "P-256curve").Curve"). JOSE Implementation Requirements: The curve implementation requirements for JWS and JWE, which must be one the words Required, Recommended, Optional, Deprecated, or Prohibited. Optionally, the word can be followed by a "+" or "-". The use of "+" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification. The use of "-" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a future version of the specification. Change Controller: For Standards Track RFCs,statelist "IESG". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included. Specification Document(s): Reference to thedocument(s)document or documents that specify the parameter, preferably includingURI(s)URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of thedocument(s).documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required. 7.6.2. Initial Registry Contents o Curve Name: "P-256" o Curve Description: P-256curveCurve o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended+ o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.1.1 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Curve Name: "P-384" o Curve Description: P-384curveCurve o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.1.1 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 o Curve Name: "P-521" o Curve Description: P-521curveCurve o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.1.1 of[[ this document ]]RFC 7518 8. Security Considerations All of the security issues that are pertinent to any cryptographic application must be addressed by JWS/JWE/JWK agents. Among these issues are protecting the user's asymmetric private and symmetric secret keys and employing countermeasures to various attacks. The security considerations in [AES], [DSS], [JWE], [JWK], [JWS], [NIST.800-38D], [NIST.800-56A], [NIST.800-107], [RFC2104], [RFC3394], [RFC3447], [RFC5116], [RFC6090], and [SHS] apply to this specification. 8.1. Cryptographic Agility Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms become weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular cryptographic algorithm will be reduced. Therefore, implementers and deployments must be prepared for the set of algorithms that are supported and used to change over time. Thus, cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular, allowing new algorithms to be readily inserted. 8.2. Key Lifetimes Many algorithms have associated security considerations related to key lifetimes and/or the number of times that a key may be used. Those security considerations continue to apply when using those algorithms with JOSE data structures. See NIST SP 800-57 [NIST.800-57] for specific guidance on key lifetimes. 8.3. RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 Security Considerations While Section 8 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] explicitly calls for people not to adoptRSASSA-PKCS-v1_5RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 for new applications and instead requests that people transition to RSASSA-PSS, this specification does includeRSASSA-PKCS-v1_5,RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, for interoperability reasons, because it is commonly implemented. Keys used with RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 must follow the constraints in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447. Also, keys with a low public key exponent value, as described in Section 3 ofTwenty years"Twenty Years ofattacksAttacks on the RSAcryptosystemCryptosystem" [Boneh99], must not be used. 8.4. AES GCM Security Considerations Keys used with AES GCM must follow the constraints in Section 8.3 of [NIST.800-38D], which states: "The total number of invocations of the authenticated encryption function shall not exceed 2^32, including all IV lengths and all instances of the authenticated encryption function with the given key". In accordance with this rule, AES GCM MUST NOT be used with the same key value more than 2^32 times. AnInitialization VectorIV value MUST NOT ever be used multiple times with the same AES GCM key. One way to prevent this is to store a counter with the key and increment it with every use. The counter can also be used to prevent exceeding the 2^32 limit above. This security consideration does not apply to the composite AES-CBC HMAC SHA-2 or AES Key Wrap algorithms. 8.5. Unsecured JWS Security Considerations Unsecured JWSs (JWSs that use the "alg" value "none") provide no integrity protection. Thus, they must only be used in contexts in which the payload is secured by means other than a digital signature or MAC value, or they need not be secured. An example means of preventing accepting Unsecured JWSs by default is for the "verify" method of a hypothetical JWS software library to have a Boolean "acceptUnsecured" parameter that indicates "none" is an acceptable "alg" value. As another example, the "verify" method might take a list of algorithms that are acceptable to the application as a parameter and would reject Unsecured JWS values if "none" is not in that list. The following example illustrates the reasons for not accepting Unsecured JWSs at a global level. Suppose an application accepts JWSs over two channels, (1) HTTP and (2) HTTPS with client authentication. It requires a JWSsignatureSignature on objects received over HTTP, but accepts Unsecured JWSs over HTTPS. If the application were to globally indicate that "none" is acceptable, then an attacker could provide it with an Unsecured JWS over HTTP and still have that object successfully validate. Instead, the application needs to indicate acceptance of "none" for each object received over HTTPS (e.g., by setting "acceptUnsecured" to "true" for the first hypothetical JWS software library above), but not for each object received over HTTP. 8.6.Denial of ServiceDenial-of-Service Attacks Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that encrypt messages need to be cautious of cryptographic processing usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could supply content using keys that would result in excessive cryptographic processing, for example, keys larger than those mandated in this specification. Implementations should set and enforce upper limits on the key sizes they accept. Section 5.6.1 (Comparable Algorithm Strengths) of NIST SP 800-57 [NIST.800-57] contains statements on largest approved key sizes that may be applicable. 8.7. Reusing Key Material when Encrypting Keys It is NOT RECOMMENDED to reuse the same entire set of key material (Key Encryption Key, Content Encryption Key, Initialization Vector, etc.) to encrypt multiple JWK or JWK Set objects, or to encrypt the same JWK or JWK Set object multiple times. One suggestion for preventingre-usereuse is to always generate at least one new piece of key material for each encryption operation (e.g., a new Content Encryption Key, a newInitialization Vector,IV, and/or a new PBES2 Salt), based on the considerations noted in this document as well as from RFC 4086 [RFC4086]. 8.8. Password Considerations Passwords are vulnerable to a number of attacks. To help mitigate some of these limitations, this document applies principles from RFC 2898 [RFC2898] to derive cryptographic keys from user-supplied passwords. However, the strength of the password still has a significant impact. A high-entropy password has greater resistance to dictionary attacks.[NIST.800-63-1][NIST.800-63-2] contains guidelines for estimating password entropy, which can help applications and users generate stronger passwords. An ideal password is one that is as large as (or larger than) the derived key length. However, passwords larger than a certain algorithm-specific size are first hashed, which reduces an attacker's effective search space to the length of the hash algorithm. It is RECOMMENDED that a password used for "PBES2-HS256+A128KW" be no shorter than 16 octets and no longer than 128 octets and a password used for "PBES2-HS512+A256KW" be no shorter than 32 octets and no longer than 128 octets long. Still, care needs to be taken in where and how password-based encryption is used. These algorithms can still be susceptible to dictionary-based attacks if the iteration count is too small; this is of particular concern if these algorithms are used to protect data that an attacker can have indefinite number of attempts to circumvent the protection, such as protected data stored on a file system. 8.9. Key Entropy and Random Values See Section 10.1 of [JWS] for security considerations on key entropy and random values. 8.10. Differences between Digital Signatures and MACs See Section 10.5 of [JWS] for security considerations on differences between digital signatures and MACs. 8.11. Using Matching Algorithm Strengths See Section 11.3 of [JWE] for security considerations on using matching algorithm strengths. 8.12. Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks See Section 11.4 of [JWE] for security considerations on adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks. 8.13. Timing Attacks See Section 10.9 of [JWS] and Section 11.5 of [JWE] for security considerations on timing attacks. 8.14. RSA Private Key Representations and Blinding See Section 9.3 of [JWK] for security considerations on RSA private key representations and blinding. 9. Internationalization Considerations Passwords obtained from users are likely to require preparation and normalization to account for differences of octet sequences generated by different input devices, locales, etc. It is RECOMMENDED that applicationstoperform the steps outlined in[I-D.ietf-precis-saslprepbis][PRECIS] to prepare a password supplied directly by a user before performing key derivation and encryption. 10. References 10.1. Normative References [AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, November2001.2001, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/ fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf>. [Boneh99] "TwentyyearsYears ofattacksAttacks on the RSAcryptosystem",Cryptosystem", Notices of the American Mathematical Society (AMS), Vol. 46, No. 2, pp.203-213 http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/ papers/RSA-survey.pdf, 1999.203-213, 1999, <http://crypto.stanford.edu/ ~dabo/pubs/papers/RSA-survey.pdf>. [DSS] National Institute of Standards andTechnology,Technology (NIST), "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-4, July2013.2013, <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/ NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>. [JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption (work in progress), January 2015.RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>. [JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)",draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress), January 2015.RFC 7517, DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>. [JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)",draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature (work in progress), January 2015.RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. [NIST.800-38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation", NISTPUBSpecial Publication 800-38A, December2001.2001, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/ sp800-38a.pdf>. [NIST.800-38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", NISTPUBSpecial Publication 800-38D, December2001.2001, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/ SP-800-38D.pdf>. [NIST.800-56A] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", NIST Special Publication 800-56A, Revision 2, May2013.2013, <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/ NIST.SP.800-56Ar2.pdf>. [NIST.800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Recommendation for Key Management - Part 1: General (Revision 3)", NIST Special Publication 800-57, Part 1, Revision 3, July2012.2012, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/ nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57_part1_rev3_general.pdf>. [RFC20] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for Network Interchange", STD 80, RFC 20, DOI 10.17487/RFC0020, October1969.1969, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc20>. [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC:Keyed- HashingKeyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February1997.1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March1997.1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. [RFC2898] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898, DOI 10.17487/RFC2898, September2000.2000, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2898>. [RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, DOI 10.17487/RFC3394, September2002.2002, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3394>. [RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February2003.2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3447>. [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November2003.2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>. [RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256,HMAC-SHA- 384,HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868, DOI 10.17487/RFC4868, May2007.2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4868>. [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August2007.2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>. [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September2009.2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>. [RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February2011.2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090>. [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March2014.2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>. [SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Version 2.0, May2009.2009, <http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>. [SHS] National Institute of Standards andTechnology,Technology (NIST), "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, March2012.2012, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/ fips-180-4.pdf>. [UNICODE] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard",1991-,<http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>. 10.2. Informative References[CanvasApp] Facebook, "Canvas Applications", 2010. [I-D.ietf-precis-saslprepbis] Saint-Andre, P. and A. Melnikov, "Preparation, Enforcement, and Comparison of Internationalized Strings Representing Usernames and Passwords", draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis-13 (work in progress), December 2014. [I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2][AEAD-CBC-SHA] McGrew, D., Foley, J., and K. Paterson, "Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA",draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-05 (workWork inprogress),Progress, draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-05, July 2014.[I-D.miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk] Miller, M., "Using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Encryption (JWE) for Protecting JSON Web Key (JWK) Objects", draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk-02 (work in progress), June 2013. [I-D.rescorla-jsms] Rescorla, E. and J. Hildebrand, "JavaScript Message Security Format", draft-rescorla-jsms-00 (work in progress), March 2011.[CanvasApp] Facebook, "Canvas Applications", 2010, <http://developers.facebook.com/docs/authentication/ canvas>. [JCA] Oracle, "Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) Reference Guide",2014.2014, <http://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/techno tes/guides/security/crypto/CryptoSpec.html>. [JSE] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple Encryption", September2010.2010, <http://jsonenc.info/enc/1.0/>. [JSMS] Rescorla, E. and J. Hildebrand, "JavaScript Message Security Format", Work in Progress, draft-rescorla-jsms-00, March 2011. [JSS] Bradley, J. and N.Sakimura (editor),Sakimura, Ed., "JSON SimpleSign",Sign 1.0", Draft 01, September2010.2010, <http://jsonenc.info/jss/1.0/>. [JWE-JWK] Miller, M., "Using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Encryption (JWE) for Protecting JSON Web Key (JWK) Objects", Work in Progress, draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk-02, June 2013. [MagicSignatures]Panzer (editor),Panzer, J., Ed., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, "Magic Signatures", January2011.2011, <http://salmon-protocol.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/ draft-panzer-magicsig-01.html>. [NIST.800-107] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms", NIST Special Publication 800-107, Revision 1, August2012. [NIST.800-63-1]2012, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/ nistpubs/800-107-rev1/sp800-107-rev1.pdf>. [NIST.800-63-2] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Electronic Authentication Guideline", NIST Special Publication800-63-1, December 2011.800-63-2, August 2013, <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/ NIST.SP.800-63-2.pdf>. [PRECIS] Saint-Andre, P. and A. Melnikov, "Preparation, Enforcement, and Comparison of Internationalized Strings Representing Usernames and Passwords", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis-16, April 2015. [RFC2631] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", RFC 2631, DOI 10.17487/RFC2631, June1999.1999, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2631>. [RFC3275]Eastlake,Eastlake 3rd, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, "(Extensible Markup Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", RFC 3275, DOI 10.17487/RFC3275, March2002.2002, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3275>. [RFC4086]Eastlake,Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June2005.2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>. [RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January2008.2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>. [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May2008.2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>. [W3C.NOTE-xmldsig-core2-20130411] Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Solo, D., Hirsch, F., Roessler, T., Yiu, K., Datta, P., and S. Cantor, "XML Signature Syntax and Processing Version 2.0", World Wide Web Consortium Note NOTE-xmldsig-core2-20130411, April 2013, <http://www.w3.org/TR/2013/NOTE-xmldsig-core2-20130411/>. [W3C.REC-xmlenc-core-20021210] Eastlake, D. and J. Reagle, "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing", World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation REC- xmlenc-core-20021210, December 2002, <http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmlenc-core-20021210>. [W3C.REC-xmlenc-core1-20130411] Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Hirsch, F., and T. Roessler, "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1", World Wide Web Consortium RecommendationREC-xmlenc-core1- 20130411,REC-xmlenc- core1-20130411, April 2013, <http://www.w3.org/TR/2013/REC-xmlenc-core1-20130411/>. Appendix A. Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference This appendix contains tables cross-referencing the cryptographic algorithm identifier values defined in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages. See XML DSIG [RFC3275], XML DSIG 2.0 [W3C.NOTE-xmldsig-core2-20130411], XML Encryption [W3C.REC-xmlenc-core-20021210], XML Encryption 1.1 [W3C.REC-xmlenc-core1-20130411], and Java Cryptography Architecture [JCA] for more information about the names defined by those documents. A.1. Digital Signature/MAC Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference This section contains a table cross-referencing the JWS digital signature and MAC "alg" (algorithm) values defined in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages.+-------+------------------------------+-------------+--------------++-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | JWS | XML DSIG | | | JCA | OID |+-------+------------------------------+-------------+--------------++-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | HS256 |http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xm | HmacSHA256 | 1.2.840.1135 |http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha256 | |ldsig-more#hmac-sha256| HmacSHA256 |49.2.91.2.840.113549.2.9 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | HS384 |http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xm | HmacSHA384 | 1.2.840.1135http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha384 | | |ldsig-more#hmac-sha384 |HmacSHA384 |49.2.101.2.840.113549.2.10 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | HS512 |http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xm | HmacSHA512 | 1.2.840.1135 |http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha512 | |ldsig-more#hmac-sha512| HmacSHA512 |49.2.111.2.840.113549.2.11 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | RS256 |http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xm | SHA256withRhttp://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256 |1.2.840.1135| | SHA256withRSA |ldsig-more#rsa-sha256 | SA | 49.1.1.111.2.840.113549.1.1.11 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | RS384 |http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xm | SHA384withR | 1.2.840.1135http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha384 | | |ldsig-more#rsa-sha384SHA384withRSA |SA | 49.1.1.121.2.840.113549.1.1.12 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | RS512 |http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xm | SHA512withR | 1.2.840.1135 |http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha512 | |ldsig-more#rsa-sha512|SASHA512withRSA |49.1.1.131.2.840.113549.1.1.13 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ES256 |http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmhttp://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha256 |SHA256withE|1.2.840.1004| SHA256withECDSA | 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 |ldsig-more#ecdsa-sha256+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ |CDSAES384 |5.4.3.2http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha384 | |ES384|http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmSHA384withECDSA |SHA384withE1.2.840.10045.4.3.3 |1.2.840.1004+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ES512 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha512 |ldsig-more#ecdsa-sha384|CDSA|5.4.3.3SHA512withECDSA | 1.2.840.10045.4.3.4 |ES512+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ |http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmPS256 |SHA512withEhttp://www.w3.org/2007/05/xmldsig-more#sha256-rsa-MGF1 |1.2.840.1004| | SHA256withRSAandMGF1 |ldsig-more#ecdsa-sha5121.2.840.113549.1.1.10 |CDSA+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ |5.4.3.4PS384 | http://www.w3.org/2007/05/xmldsig-more#sha384-rsa-MGF1 |PS256|http://www.w3.org/2007/05/xm|SHA256withRSHA384withRSAandMGF1 |1.2.840.11351.2.840.113549.1.1.10 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | PS512 |ldsig-more#sha256-rsa-MGF1http://www.w3.org/2007/05/xmldsig-more#sha512-rsa-MGF1 |SAandMGF1|49.1.1.10| SHA512withRSAandMGF1 |PS384 | http://www.w3.org/2007/05/xm | SHA384withR | 1.2.840.1135 | | | ldsig-more#sha384-rsa-MGF1 | SAandMGF1 | 49.1.1.10 | | PS512 | http://www.w3.org/2007/05/xm | SHA512withR | 1.2.840.1135 |1.2.840.113549.1.1.10 || ldsig-more#sha512-rsa-MGF1 | SAandMGF1 | 49.1.1.10 | +-------+------------------------------+-------------+--------------++-------------------------------------------------------------------+ A.2. Key Management Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference This section contains a table cross-referencing the JWE "alg" (algorithm) values defined in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages.+----------+----------------------+-------------------+-------------++-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | JWE | XML ENC | | | JCA | OID |+----------+----------------------+-------------------+-------------++-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | RSA1_5 |http://www.w3.org/20 | RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padd | 1.2.840.113 | | | 01/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5 | ing | 549.1.1.1 | | RSA-OAEP | http://www.w3.org/20 | RSA/ECB/OAEPWithS | 1.2.840.113 | | | 01/04/xmlenc#rsa-oae | HA-1AndMGF1Paddin | 549.1.1.7http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5 | | |p-mgf1p | gRSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | RSA-OAEP |http://www.w3.org/20 | RSA/ECB/OAEPWithShttp://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p |1.2.840.113| |-256RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-1AndMGF1Padding |09/xmlenc11#rsa-oaep1.2.840.113549.1.1.7 |HA-256AndMGF1Padd+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ |549.1.1.7RSA-OAEP-256 | http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#rsa-oaep | |&|ing& http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#mgf1sha256 | | || http://www.w3.org/2 | MGF1ParameterSp | |RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-256AndMGF1Padding | |009/xmlenc11#mgf1sha|ec.SHA256 | | | | 256| & MGF1ParameterSpec.SHA256 | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.7 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ECDH-ES |http://www.w3.org/20 | ECDH | 1.3.132.1.1 |http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#ECDH-ES | |09/xmlenc11#ECDH-ES| ECDH |21.3.132.1.12 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | A128KW |http://www.w3.org/20 | AESWrap | 2.16.840.1. |http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128 | |01/04/xmlenc#kw-aes1 | | 101.3.4.1.5 | | | 28 | | | | A192KW | http://www.w3.org/20| AESWrap |2.16.840.1. | | | 01/04/xmlenc#kw-aes1 |2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.5 |101.3.4.1.2+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | A192KW | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes192 |92 | | 5 | | A256KW|http://www.w3.org/20| AESWrap |2.16.840.1.2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.25 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | A256KW |01/04/xmlenc#kw-aes2 | | 101.3.4.1.4 |http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes256 | |56| AESWrap |52.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.45 |+----------+----------------------+-------------------+-------------++-------------------------------------------------------------------+ A.3. Content Encryption Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference This section contains a table cross-referencing the JWE "enc" (encryption algorithm) values defined in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages. For the composite algorithms "A128CBC-HS256", "A192CBC-HS384", and "A256CBC-HS512", the correspondingAES CBCAES-CBC algorithm identifiers are listed.+----------+-------------------------+--------------+---------------++-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | JWE | XML ENC |JCA | OID | +----------+-------------------------+--------------+---------------+ | A128CBC- | http://www.w3.org/2001/|AES/CBC/PKCS|2.16.840.1.10 | | HS256 | 04/xmlenc#aes128-cbcJCA |5PaddingOID |1.3.4.1.2+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | A128CBC-HS256 |A192CBC-http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc |http://www.w3.org/2001/|AES/CBC/PKCS|2.16.840.1.10AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2 |HS384+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ |04/xmlenc#aes192-cbcA192CBC-HS384 |5Paddinghttp://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes192-cbc |1.3.4.1.22| |A256CBC-AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding |http://www.w3.org/2001/2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.22 |AES/CBC/PKCS+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ |2.16.840.1.10A256CBC-HS512 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc |HS512|04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc|5PaddingAES/CBC/PKCS5Padding |1.3.4.1.422.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | A128GCM |http://www.w3.org/2009/ | AES/GCM/NoPahttp://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes128-gcm |2.16.840.1.10| | AES/GCM/NoPadding |xmlenc11#aes128-gcm | dding | 1.3.4.1.62.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.6 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | A192GCM |http://www.w3.org/2009/ | AES/GCM/NoPa | 2.16.840.1.10http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes192-gcm | | |xmlenc11#aes192-gcmAES/GCM/NoPadding |dding | 1.3.4.1.262.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.26 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | A256GCM |http://www.w3.org/2009/ | AES/GCM/NoPa | 2.16.840.1.10 |http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes256-gcm | |xmlenc11#aes256-gcm|ddingAES/GCM/NoPadding |1.3.4.1.462.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.46 |+----------+-------------------------+--------------+---------------++-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Appendix B. Test Cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms The following test cases can be used to validate implementations of the AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithms defined in Section 5.2. They are also intended to correspond to test cases that may appear in a future version of[I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2],[AEAD-CBC-SHA], demonstrating that the cryptographic computations performed are the same. The variable names are those defined in Section 5.2. All values are hexadecimal. B.1. Test Cases for AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 K = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f ENC_KEY = 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f P = 41 20 63 69 70 68 65 72 20 73 79 73 74 65 6d 20 6d 75 73 74 20 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 65 71 75 69 72 65 64 20 74 6f 20 62 65 20 73 65 63 72 65 74 2c 20 61 6e 64 20 69 74 20 6d 75 73 74 20 62 65 20 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 66 61 6c 6c 20 69 6e 74 6f 20 74 68 65 20 68 61 6e 64 73 20 6f 66 20 74 68 65 20 65 6e 65 6d 79 20 77 69 74 68 6f 75 74 20 69 6e 63 6f 6e 76 65 6e 69 65 6e 63 65 IV = 1a f3 8c 2d c2 b9 6f fd d8 66 94 09 23 41 bc 04 A = 54 68 65 20 73 65 63 6f 6e 64 20 70 72 69 6e 63 69 70 6c 65 20 6f 66 20 41 75 67 75 73 74 65 20 4b 65 72 63 6b 68 6f 66 66 73 AL = 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 E = c8 0e df a3 2d df 39 d5 ef 00 c0 b4 68 83 42 79 a2 e4 6a 1b 80 49 f7 92 f7 6b fe 54 b9 03 a9 c9 a9 4a c9 b4 7a d2 65 5c 5f 10 f9 ae f7 14 27 e2 fc 6f 9b 3f 39 9a 22 14 89 f1 63 62 c7 03 23 36 09 d4 5a c6 98 64 e3 32 1c f8 29 35 ac 40 96 c8 6e 13 33 14 c5 40 19 e8 ca 79 80 df a4 b9 cf 1b 38 4c 48 6f 3a 54 c5 10 78 15 8e e5 d7 9d e5 9f bd 34 d8 48 b3 d6 95 50 a6 76 46 34 44 27 ad e5 4b 88 51 ff b5 98 f7 f8 00 74 b9 47 3c 82 e2 db M = 65 2c 3f a3 6b 0a 7c 5b 32 19 fa b3 a3 0b c1 c4 e6 e5 45 82 47 65 15 f0 ad 9f 75 a2 b7 1c 73 ef T = 65 2c 3f a3 6b 0a 7c 5b 32 19 fa b3 a3 0b c1 c4 B.2. Test Cases for AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 K = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 ENC_KEY = 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f P = 41 20 63 69 70 68 65 72 20 73 79 73 74 65 6d 20 6d 75 73 74 20 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 65 71 75 69 72 65 64 20 74 6f 20 62 65 20 73 65 63 72 65 74 2c 20 61 6e 64 20 69 74 20 6d 75 73 74 20 62 65 20 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 66 61 6c 6c 20 69 6e 74 6f 20 74 68 65 20 68 61 6e 64 73 20 6f 66 20 74 68 65 20 65 6e 65 6d 79 20 77 69 74 68 6f 75 74 20 69 6e 63 6f 6e 76 65 6e 69 65 6e 63 65 IV = 1a f3 8c 2d c2 b9 6f fd d8 66 94 09 23 41 bc 04 A = 54 68 65 20 73 65 63 6f 6e 64 20 70 72 69 6e 63 69 70 6c 65 20 6f 66 20 41 75 67 75 73 74 65 20 4b 65 72 63 6b 68 6f 66 66 73 AL = 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 E = ea 65 da 6b 59 e6 1e db 41 9b e6 2d 19 71 2a e5 d3 03 ee b5 00 52 d0 df d6 69 7f 77 22 4c 8e db 00 0d 27 9b dc 14 c1 07 26 54 bd 30 94 42 30 c6 57 be d4 ca 0c 9f 4a 84 66 f2 2b 22 6d 17 46 21 4b f8 cf c2 40 0a dd 9f 51 26 e4 79 66 3f c9 0b 3b ed 78 7a 2f 0f fc bf 39 04 be 2a 64 1d 5c 21 05 bf e5 91 ba e2 3b 1d 74 49 e5 32 ee f6 0a 9a c8 bb 6c 6b 01 d3 5d 49 78 7b cd 57 ef 48 49 27 f2 80 ad c9 1a c0 c4 e7 9c 7b 11 ef c6 00 54 e3 M = 84 90 ac 0e 58 94 9b fe 51 87 5d 73 3f 93 ac 20 75 16 80 39 cc c7 33 d7 45 94 f8 86 b3 fa af d4 86 f2 5c 71 31 e3 28 1e 36 c7 a2 d1 30 af de 57 T = 84 90 ac 0e 58 94 9b fe 51 87 5d 73 3f 93 ac 20 75 16 80 39 cc c7 33 d7 B.3. Test Cases for AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 K = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f ENC_KEY = 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f P = 41 20 63 69 70 68 65 72 20 73 79 73 74 65 6d 20 6d 75 73 74 20 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 65 71 75 69 72 65 64 20 74 6f 20 62 65 20 73 65 63 72 65 74 2c 20 61 6e 64 20 69 74 20 6d 75 73 74 20 62 65 20 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 66 61 6c 6c 20 69 6e 74 6f 20 74 68 65 20 68 61 6e 64 73 20 6f 66 20 74 68 65 20 65 6e 65 6d 79 20 77 69 74 68 6f 75 74 20 69 6e 63 6f 6e 76 65 6e 69 65 6e 63 65 IV = 1a f3 8c 2d c2 b9 6f fd d8 66 94 09 23 41 bc 04 A = 54 68 65 20 73 65 63 6f 6e 64 20 70 72 69 6e 63 69 70 6c 65 20 6f 66 20 41 75 67 75 73 74 65 20 4b 65 72 63 6b 68 6f 66 66 73 AL = 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 E = 4a ff aa ad b7 8c 31 c5 da 4b 1b 59 0d 10 ff bd 3d d8 d5 d3 02 42 35 26 91 2d a0 37 ec bc c7 bd 82 2c 30 1d d6 7c 37 3b cc b5 84 ad 3e 92 79 c2 e6 d1 2a 13 74 b7 7f 07 75 53 df 82 94 10 44 6b 36 eb d9 70 66 29 6a e6 42 7e a7 5c 2e 08 46 a1 1a 09 cc f5 37 0d c8 0b fe cb ad 28 c7 3f 09 b3 a3 b7 5e 66 2a 25 94 41 0a e4 96 b2 e2 e6 60 9e 31 e6 e0 2c c8 37 f0 53 d2 1f 37 ff 4f 51 95 0b be 26 38 d0 9d d7 a4 93 09 30 80 6d 07 03 b1 f6 M = 4d d3 b4 c0 88 a7 f4 5c 21 68 39 64 5b 20 12 bf 2e 62 69 a8 c5 6a 81 6d bc 1b 26 77 61 95 5b c5 fd 30 a5 65 c6 16 ff b2 f3 64 ba ec e6 8f c4 07 53 bc fc 02 5d de 36 93 75 4a a1 f5 c3 37 3b 9c T = 4d d3 b4 c0 88 a7 f4 5c 21 68 39 64 5b 20 12 bf 2e 62 69 a8 c5 6a 81 6d bc 1b 26 77 61 95 5b c5 Appendix C. Example ECDH-ES Key Agreement Computation This example uses ECDH-ES Key Agreement and the Concat KDF to derive theContent Encryption Key (CEK)CEK in the manner described in Section 4.6. In this example, the ECDH-ES Direct Key Agreement mode ("alg" value "ECDH-ES") is used to produce anagreed uponagreed-upon key for AES GCM with a128 bit128-bit key ("enc" value "A128GCM"). In this example, a producer Alice is encrypting content to a consumer Bob. The producer (Alice) generates an ephemeral key for the key agreement computation. Alice's ephemeral key (in JWK format) used for the key agreement computation in this example (including the private part) is: {"kty":"EC", "crv":"P-256", "x":"gI0GAILBdu7T53akrFmMyGcsF3n5dO7MmwNBHKW5SV0", "y":"SLW_xSffzlPWrHEVI30DHM_4egVwt3NQqeUD7nMFpps", "d":"0_NxaRPUMQoAJt50Gz8YiTr8gRTwyEaCumd-MToTmIo" } The consumer's (Bob's) key (in JWK format) used for the key agreement computation in this example (including the private part) is: {"kty":"EC", "crv":"P-256", "x":"weNJy2HscCSM6AEDTDg04biOvhFhyyWvOHQfeF_PxMQ", "y":"e8lnCO-AlStT-NJVX-crhB7QRYhiix03illJOVAOyck", "d":"VEmDZpDXXK8p8N0Cndsxs924q6nS1RXFASRl6BfUqdw" } Header Parameter values used in this example are as follows.In this example, theThe "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo)parameterHeader Parameter value is the base64url encoding of the UTF-8 string "Alice" and the "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo)parameterHeader Parameter value is the base64url encoding of the UTF-8 string "Bob". The "epk"parameter(ephemeral public key) Header Parameter is used to communicate the producer's (Alice's) ephemeral public key value to the consumer (Bob). {"alg":"ECDH-ES", "enc":"A128GCM", "apu":"QWxpY2U", "apv":"Qm9i", "epk": {"kty":"EC", "crv":"P-256", "x":"gI0GAILBdu7T53akrFmMyGcsF3n5dO7MmwNBHKW5SV0", "y":"SLW_xSffzlPWrHEVI30DHM_4egVwt3NQqeUD7nMFpps" } } The resulting Concat KDF [NIST.800-56A] parameter values are: Z This is set to the ECDH-ES key agreement output. (This value is often not directly exposed by libraries, due to NIST security requirements, and only serves as an input to a KDF.) In this example, Z is following the octet sequence (using JSON array notation): [158, 86, 217, 29, 129, 113, 53, 211, 114, 131, 66, 131, 191, 132, 38, 156, 251, 49, 110, 163, 218, 128, 106, 72, 246, 218, 167, 121, 140, 254, 144, 196]. keydatalen This value is 128 - the number of bits in the desired output key (because "A128GCM" uses a128 bit128-bit key). AlgorithmID This is set to the octets representing the32 bit big endian32-bit big-endian value 7 - [0, 0, 0, 7] - the number of octets in the AlgorithmID content "A128GCM", followed, by the octets representing the ASCII string "A128GCM" - [65, 49, 50, 56, 71, 67, 77]. PartyUInfo This is set to the octets representing the32 bit big endian32-bit big-endian value 5 - [0, 0, 0, 5] - the number of octets in the PartyUInfo content "Alice", followed, by the octets representing the UTF-8 string "Alice" - [65, 108, 105, 99, 101]. PartyVInfo This is set to the octets representing the32 bit big endian32-bit big-endian value 3 - [0, 0, 0, 3] - the number of octets in the PartyUInfo content "Bob", followed, by the octets representing the UTF-8 string "Bob" - [66, 111, 98]. SuppPubInfo This is set to the octets representing the32 bit big endian32-bit big-endian value 128 - [0, 0, 0, 128] - the keydatalen value. SuppPrivInfo This is set to the empty octet sequence. Concatenating the parameters AlgorithmID through SuppPubInfo results in an OtherInfo value of: [0, 0, 0, 7, 65, 49, 50, 56, 71, 67, 77, 0, 0, 0, 5, 65, 108, 105, 99, 101, 0, 0, 0, 3, 66, 111, 98, 0, 0, 0, 128] Concatenating the round number 1 ([0, 0, 0, 1]), Z, and the OtherInfo value results in the Concat KDF round 1 hash input of: [0, 0, 0, 1, 158, 86, 217, 29, 129, 113, 53, 211, 114, 131, 66, 131, 191, 132, 38, 156, 251, 49, 110, 163, 218, 128, 106, 72, 246, 218, 167, 121, 140, 254, 144, 196, 0, 0, 0, 7, 65, 49, 50, 56, 71, 67, 77, 0, 0, 0, 5, 65, 108, 105, 99, 101, 0, 0, 0, 3, 66, 111, 98, 0, 0, 0, 128] The resulting derived key, which is the first 128 bits of the round 1 hash output is: [86, 170, 141, 234, 248, 35, 109, 32, 92, 34, 40, 205, 113, 167, 16, 26] Thebase64url encodedbase64url-encoded representation of this derived key is: VqqN6vgjbSBcIijNcacQGgAppendix D.Acknowledgements Solutions for signing and encrypting JSON content were previously explored byMagic Signatures"Magic Signatures" [MagicSignatures],JSON"JSON Simple Sign 1.0" [JSS],Canvas Applications"Canvas Applications" [CanvasApp],JSON"JSON SimpleEncryptionEncryption" [JSE], andJavaScript"JavaScript Message SecurityFormat [I-D.rescorla-jsms],Format" [JSMS], all of which influenced thisdraft.document. TheAuthenticated"Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC andHMAC-SHA [I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2]HMAC-SHA" [AEAD-CBC-SHA] specification, upon which the AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithms are based, was written by David A. McGrew and Kenny Paterson. The test cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 are based upon those for[I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2][AEAD-CBC-SHA] by John Foley. Matt Miller wroteUsing"Using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Encryption (JWE) for Protecting JSON Web Key (JWK)Objects [I-D.miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk],Objects" [JWE-JWK], upon which the password-based encryption content of thisdraftdocument isbased upon.based. This specification is the work of the JOSEWorking Group,working group, which includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular, the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording that influenced this specification: Dirk Balfanz, Richard Barnes, Carsten Bormann, John Bradley, Brian Campbell, Alissa Cooper, Breno de Medeiros, Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Roni Even, Stephen Farrell, Yaron Y. Goland, Dick Hardt, Joe Hildebrand, Jeff Hodges, Edmund Jay, Charlie Kaufman, Barry Leiba, James Manger, Matt Miller, Kathleen Moriarty, Tony Nadalin, Axel Nennker, John Panzer, Emmanuel Raviart, Eric Rescorla, Pete Resnick, Nat Sakimura, Jim Schaad, Hannes Tschofenig, and Sean Turner. Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and Sean Turner, Stephen Farrell, and Kathleen Moriarty served as Securityarea directorsArea Directors during the creation of this specification.Appendix E. Document History [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]] -40 o Clarified the definitions of UTF8(STRING) and ASCII(STRING). -39 o Added the Algorithm Analysis Documents(s) field to the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry. o Updated the reference to draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis. -38 o Require discarding private keys with an "oth" parameter when the implementation does not support private keys with more than two primes. o Replaced uses of the phrases "JWS object" and "JWE object" with "JWS" and "JWE". -37 o Restricted algorithm names to using only ASCII characters. o Added language about ignoring private keys with an "oth" parameter when the implementation does not support private keys with more than two primes. o Updated the example IANA registration request subject line. -36 o Moved the normative "alg":"none" security considerations text into the algorithm definition. o Specified that registration reviews occur on the jose-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list. -35 o Addressed AppsDir reviews by Carsten Bormann. o Adjusted some table column widths. -34 o Addressed IESG review comments by Barry Leiba, Alissa Cooper, Pete Resnick, Stephen Farrell, and Richard Barnes. -33 o Changed the registration review period to three weeks. o Acknowledged additional contributors. -32 o Added a note to implementers about libraries that prefix an extra zero-valued octet to RSA modulus representations returned. o Addressed secdir review comments by Charlie Kaufman, Scott Kelly, and Stephen Kent. o Addressed Gen-ART review comments by Roni Even. o Replaced the term Plaintext JWS with Unsecured JWS. -31 o Referenced NIST SP 800-57 for guidance on key lifetimes. o Updated the reference to draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2. -30 o Cleaned up the reference syntax in a few places. o Applied minor wording changes to the Security Considerations section. -29 o Replaced the terms JWS Header, JWE Header, and JWT Header with a single JOSE Header term defined in the JWS specification. This also enabled a single Header Parameter definition to be used and reduced other areas of duplication between specifications. -28 o Specified the use of PKCS #7 padding with AES CBC, rather than PKCS #5. (PKCS #7 is a superset of PKCS #5, and is appropriate for the 16 octet blocks used by AES CBC.) o Revised the introduction to the Security Considerations section. Also introduced additional subsection headings for security considerations items and moved a few security consideration items from here to the JWS and JWE drafts. -27 o Described additional security considerations. o Updated the JCA and XMLENC parameters for "RSA-OAEP-256" and the JCA parameters for "A128KW", "A192KW", "A256KW", and "ECDH-ES". -26 o Added algorithm identifier "RSA-OAEP-256" for RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-256. o Clarified that the ECDSA signature values R and S are represented as octet sequences as defined in Section 2.3.7 of SEC1 [SEC1]. o Noted that octet sequences are depicted using JSON array notation. o Updated references, including to W3C specifications. -25 o Corrected an external section number reference that had changed. -24 o Replaced uses of the term "associated data" wherever it was used to refer to a data value with "additional authenticated data", since both terms were being used as synonyms, causing confusion. o Updated the JSON reference to RFC 7159. -23 o No changes were made, other than to the version number and date. -22 o Corrected RFC 2119 terminology usage. o Replaced references to draft-ietf-json-rfc4627bis with RFC 7158. -21 o Compute the PBES2 salt parameter as (UTF8(Alg) || 0x00 || Salt Input), where the "p2s" Header Parameter encodes the Salt Input value and Alg is the "alg" Header Parameter value. o Changed some references from being normative to informative, addressing issue #90. -20 o Replaced references to RFC 4627 with draft-ietf-json-rfc4627bis, addressing issue #90. -19 o Used tables to show the correspondence between algorithm identifiers and algorithm descriptions and parameters in the algorithm definition sections, addressing issue #183. o Changed the "Implementation Requirements" registry field names to "JOSE Implementation Requirements" to make it clear that these implementation requirements apply only to JWS and JWE implementations. -18 o Changes to address editorial and minor issues #129, #134, #135, #158, #161, #185, #186, and #187. o Added and used Description registry fields. -17 o Explicitly named all the logical components of a JWS and JWE and defined the processing rules and serializations in terms of those components, addressing issues #60, #61, and #62. o Removed processing steps in algorithm definitions that duplicated processing steps in JWS or JWE, addressing issue #56. o Replaced verbose repetitive phases such as "base64url encode the octets of the UTF-8 representation of X" with mathematical notation such as "BASE64URL(UTF8(X))". o Terms used in multiple documents are now defined in one place and incorporated by reference. Some lightly used or obvious terms were also removed. This addresses issue #58. o Changes to address minor issue #53. -16 o Added a DataLen prefix to the AlgorithmID value in the Concat KDF computation. o Added OIDs for encryption algorithms, additional signature algorithm OIDs, and additional XML DSIG/ENC URIs in the algorithm cross-reference tables. o Changes to address editorial and minor issues #28, #36, #39, #52, #53, #55, #127, #128, #136, #137, #141, #150, #151, #152, and #155. -15 o Changed statements about rejecting JWSs to statements about validation failing, addressing issue #35. o Stated that changes of implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification Required basis, addressing issue #38. o Made "oct" a required key type, addressing issue #40. o Updated the example ECDH-ES key agreement values. o Changes to address editorial and minor issues #34, #37, #49, #63, #123, #124, #125, #130, #132, #133, #138, #139, #140, #142, #143, #144, #145, #148, #149, #150, and #162. -14 o Removed "PBKDF2" key type and added "p2s" and "p2c" header parameters for use with the PBES2 algorithms. o Made the RSA private key parameters that are there to enable optimizations be RECOMMENDED rather than REQUIRED. o Added algorithm identifiers for AES algorithms using 192 bit keys and for RSASSA-PSS using HMAC SHA-384. o Added security considerations about key lifetimes, addressing issue #18. o Added an example ECDH-ES key agreement computation. -13 o Added key encryption with AES GCM as specified in draft-jones-jose-aes-gcm-key-wrap-01, addressing issue #13. o Added security considerations text limiting the number of times that an AES GCM key can be used for key encryption or direct encryption, per Section 8.3 of NIST SP 800-38D, addressing issue #28. o Added password-based key encryption as specified in draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk-02. -12 o In the Direct Key Agreement case, the Concat KDF AlgorithmID is set to the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the "enc" header parameter value. o Restored the "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) parameter. o Moved the "epk", "apu", and "apv" Header Parameter definitions to be with the algorithm descriptions that use them. o Changed terminology from "block encryption" to "content encryption". -11 o Removed the Encrypted Key value from the AAD computation since it is already effectively integrity protected by the encryption process. The AAD value now only contains the representation of the JWE Encrypted Header. o Removed "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) since it is no longer used. o Added more information about the use of PartyUInfo during key agreement. o Use the keydatalen as the SuppPubInfo value for the Concat KDF when doing key agreement, as RFC 2631 does. o Added algorithm identifiers for RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256 and SHA- 512. o Added a Parameter Information Class value to the JSON Web Key Parameters registry, which registers whether the parameter conveys public or private information. -10 o Changed the JWE processing rules for multiple recipients so that a single AAD value contains the header parameters and encrypted key values for all the recipients, enabling AES GCM to be safely used for multiple recipients. -09 o Expanded the scope of the JWK parameters to include private and symmetric key representations, as specified by draft-jones-jose-json-private-and-symmetric-key-00. o Changed term "JWS Secured Input" to "JWS Signing Input". o Changed from using the term "byte" to "octet" when referring to 8 bit values. o Specified that AES Key Wrap uses the default initial value specified in Section 2.2.3.1 of RFC 3394. This addressed issue #19. o Added Key Management Mode definitions to terminology section and used the defined terms to provide clearer key management instructions. This addressed issue #5. o Replaced "A128CBC+HS256" and "A256CBC+HS512" with "A128CBC-HS256" and "A256CBC-HS512". The new algorithms perform the same cryptographic computations as [I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2], but with the Initialization Vector and Authentication Tag values remaining separate from the Ciphertext value in the output representation. Also deleted the header parameters "epu" (encryption PartyUInfo) and "epv" (encryption PartyVInfo), since they are no longer used. o Changed from using the term "Integrity Value" to "Authentication Tag". -08 o Changed the name of the JWK key type parameter from "alg" to "kty". o Replaced uses of the term "AEAD" with "Authenticated Encryption", since the term AEAD in the RFC 5116 sense implied the use of a particular data representation, rather than just referring to the class of algorithms that perform authenticated encryption with associated data. o Applied editorial improvements suggested by Jeff Hodges. Many of these simplified the terminology used. o Added seriesInfo information to Internet Draft references. -07 o Added a data length prefix to PartyUInfo and PartyVInfo values. o Changed the name of the JWK RSA modulus parameter from "mod" to "n" and the name of the JWK RSA exponent parameter from "xpo" to "e", so that the identifiers are the same as those used in RFC 3447. o Made several local editorial changes to clean up loose ends left over from to the decision to only support block encryption methods providing integrity. -06 o Removed the "int" and "kdf" parameters and defined the new composite Authenticated Encryption algorithms "A128CBC+HS256" and "A256CBC+HS512" to replace the former uses of AES CBC, which required the use of separate integrity and key derivation functions. o Included additional values in the Concat KDF calculation -- the desired output size and the algorithm value, and optionally PartyUInfo and PartyVInfo values. Added the optional header parameters "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo), "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo), "epu" (encryption PartyUInfo), and "epv" (encryption PartyVInfo). o Changed the name of the JWK RSA exponent parameter from "exp" to "xpo" so as to allow the potential use of the name "exp" for a future extension that might define an expiration parameter for keys. (The "exp" name is already used for this purpose in the JWT specification.) o Applied changes made by the RFC Editor to RFC 6749's registry language to this specification. -05 o Support both direct encryption using a shared or agreed upon symmetric key, and the use of a shared or agreed upon symmetric key to key wrap the CMK. Specifically, added the "alg" values "dir", "ECDH-ES+A128KW", and "ECDH-ES+A256KW" to finish filling in this set of capabilities. o Updated open issues. -04 o Added text requiring that any leading zero bytes be retained in base64url encoded key value representations for fixed-length values. o Added this language to Registration Templates: "This name is case sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted." o Described additional open issues. o Applied editorial suggestions. -03 o Always use a 128 bit "authentication tag" size for AES GCM, regardless of the key size. o Specified that use of a 128 bit IV is REQUIRED with AES CBC. It was previously RECOMMENDED. o Removed key size language for ECDSA algorithms, since the key size is implied by the algorithm being used. o Stated that the "int" key size must be the same as the hash output size (and not larger, as was previously allowed) so that its size is defined for key generation purposes. o Added the "kdf" (key derivation function) header parameter to provide crypto agility for key derivation. The default KDF remains the Concat KDF with the SHA-256 digest function. o Clarified that the "mod" and "exp" values are unsigned. o Added Implementation Requirements columns to algorithm tables and Implementation Requirements entries to algorithm registries. o Changed AES Key Wrap to RECOMMENDED. o Moved registries JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters and JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values to the JWS specification. o Moved JSON Web Key Parameters registry to the JWK specification. o Changed registration requirements from RFC Required to Specification Required with Expert Review. o Added Registration Template sections for defined registries. o Added Registry Contents sections to populate registry values. o No longer say "the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Secured Input (which is the same as the ASCII representation)". Just call it "the ASCII representation of the JWS Secured Input". o Added "Collision Resistant Namespace" to the terminology section. o Numerous editorial improvements. -02 o For AES GCM, use the "additional authenticated data" parameter to provide integrity for the header, encrypted key, and ciphertext and use the resulting "authentication tag" value as the JWE Authentication Tag. o Defined minimum required key sizes for algorithms without specified key sizes. o Defined KDF output key sizes. o Specified the use of PKCS #5 padding with AES CBC. o Generalized text to allow key agreement to be employed as an alternative to key wrapping or key encryption. o Clarified that ECDH-ES is a key agreement algorithm. o Required implementation of AES-128-KW and AES-256-KW. o Removed the use of "A128GCM" and "A256GCM" for key wrapping. o Removed "A512KW" since it turns out that it's not a standard algorithm. o Clarified the relationship between "typ" header parameter values and MIME types. o Generalized language to refer to Message Authentication Codes (MACs) rather than Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) unless in a context specific to HMAC algorithms. o Established registries: JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters, JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms, JSON Web Signature and Encryption "typ" Values, JSON Web Key Parameters, and JSON Web Key Algorithm Families. o Moved algorithm-specific definitions from JWK to JWA. o Reformatted to give each member definition its own section heading. -01 o Moved definition of "alg":"none" for JWSs here from the JWT specification since this functionality is likely to be useful in more contexts that just for JWTs. o Added Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm using 512 bit keys ("A512KW"). o Added text "Alternatively, the Encoded JWS Signature MAY be base64url decoded to produce the JWS Signature and this value can be compared with the computed HMAC value, as this comparison produces the same result as comparing the encoded values". o Corrected the Magic Signatures reference. o Made other editorial improvements suggested by JOSE working group participants. -00 o Created the initial IETF draft based upon draft-jones-json-web-signature-04 and draft-jones-json-web-encryption-02 with no normative changes. o Changed terminology to no longer call both digital signatures and HMACs "signatures".Author's Address Michael B. Jones MicrosoftEmail:EMail: mbj@microsoft.com URI: http://self-issued.info/