Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) U. Chunduri
Request for Comments: 7602 W. Lu
Category: Standards Track A. Tian
ISSN: 2070-1721 Ericsson Inc.
N. Shen
Cisco Systems, Inc.
July 2015
IS-IS Extended Sequence Number TLV
Abstract
This document defines the Extended Sequence Number TLV to protect
Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS) PDUs from replay
attacks.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7602.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Replay Attacks and Impact on IS-IS Networks . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. IIHs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. LSPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. SNPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Extended Sequence Number TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Sequence Number Wrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Mechanism and Packet Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. IIHs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. SNPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Backward Compatibility and Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. IIHs and SNPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. ESSN Encoding Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.1. Using Timestamps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.2. Using Non-volatile Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix B. Operational/Implementation Considerations . . . . . 11
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction
With the rapid development of new data center infrastructures, due to
its flexibility and scalability attributes,
Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS) [ISO10589] has
been adopted widely in various Layer 2 / Layer 3 routing and
switching deployments of data centers and for critical business
operations. Its flexibility and scalability make it well suited for
the rapid development of new data center infrastructures. Also,
while technologies such as Software-Defined Networking (SDN) may
improve network management and enable new applications, their use has
an effect on the security requirements of the routing infrastructure.
A replayed IS-IS PDU can potentially cause many problems in IS-IS
networks, including bouncing adjacencies, blackholing, and even some
form of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks as explained in Section 2.
This problem is also discussed in the Security Considerations
section, in the context of cryptographic authentication work as
described in [RFC5304] and [RFC5310].
Currently, there is no mechanism to protect IS-IS Hello (IIH) PDUs
and Sequence Number PDUs (SNPs) from replay attacks. However, Link
State PDUs (LSPs) have a sequence number in the LSP header as defined
in [ISO10589], with which they can effectively mitigate intra-session
replay attacks. But, LSPs are still susceptible to inter-session
replay attacks.
This document defines the Extended Sequence Number (ESN) TLV to
protect IS-IS PDUs from replay attacks.
The new ESN TLV defined here thwarts these threats and can be
deployed with the authentication mechanisms specified in [RFC5304]
and [RFC5310] for a more secure network.
Replay attacks can be effectively mitigated by deploying a group key
management protocol (being developed as defined in [GROUP-IKEv2] and
[MRKMP]) with a frequent key change policy. Currently, there is no
such mechanism defined for IS-IS. Even if such a mechanism is
defined, usage of this TLV can be helpful to avoid replays before the
keys are changed.
Also, it is believed that, even when such a key management system is
deployed, there always will be some systems based on manual keying
that coexist with systems based on key management protocols. The ESN
TLV defined in this document is helpful for such deployments.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
1.2. Acronyms
CSNP - Complete Sequence Number PDU
ESN - Extended Sequence Number
IIH - IS-IS Hello
IS - Intermediate System
LSP - IS-IS Link State PDU
PDU - Protocol Data Unit
PSNP - Partial Sequence Number PDU
SNP - Sequence Number PDU
2. Replay Attacks and Impact on IS-IS Networks
Replaying a captured protocol packet to cause damage is a common
threat for any protocol. Securing the packet with cryptographic
authentication information alone cannot mitigate this threat
completely. This section explains the replay attacks and their
applicability to each IS-IS PDU.
2.1. IIHs
When an adjacency is brought up, an IS sends an IIH packet with an
empty neighbor list (TLV 6); it can be sent with or without
authentication information. Packets can be replayed later on the
broadcast network, and this may cause all ISs to bounce the
adjacency, thus churning the network. Note that mitigating replay is
only possible when authentication information is present.
2.2. LSPs
Normal operation of the IS-IS update process as specified in
[ISO10589] provides timely recovery from all LSP replay attacks.
Therefore, the use of the extensions defined in this document is
prohibited in LSPs. Further discussion of the vulnerability of LSPs
to replay attacks can be found in [ISIS-ANALYSIS].
2.3. SNPs
A replayed CSNP can result in the sending of unnecessary PSNPs on a
given link. A replayed CSNP or PSNP can result in unnecessary LSP
flooding on the link.
3. Extended Sequence Number TLV
The Extended Sequence Number (ESN) TLV is composed of 1 octet for the
Type, 1 octet that specifies the number of bytes in the Value field,
and a 12-byte Value field. This TLV is defined only for IIH and SNP
PDUs.
Code - 11.
Length - total length of the value field, which is 12 bytes.
Value - 64-bit Extended Session Sequence Number (ESSN), which is
followed by a 32-bit, monotonically increasing, per-packet
sequence number.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Extended Session Sequence Number (High-Order 32 Bits) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Extended Session Sequence Number (Low-Order 32 Bits) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Packet Sequence Number (32 Bits) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Extended Sequence Number (ESN) TLV
The ESN TLV defined here is optional. Though this is an optional
TLV, it can be mandatory on a link when 'verify' mode is enabled as
specified in Section 5.1. The ESN TLV MAY be present only in IIH
PDUs and SNPs. A PDU with multiple ESN TLVs is invalid and MUST be
discarded on receipt.
The 64-bit ESSN MUST be nonzero and MUST contain a number that is
increased whenever it is changed due any situation, as specified in
Section 3.1. Encoding the 64-bit unsigned integer ESSN value is a
local matter, and implementations MAY use one of the alternatives
provided in Appendix A. Effectively, for each PDU that contains the
ESN TLV, the 96-bit unsigned integer value consisting of the 64-bit
ESSN and 32-bit Packet Sequence Number (PSN) -- where the ESSN is the
higher-order 64 bits -- MUST be greater than the most recently
received value in a PDU of the same type originated by the same IS.
3.1. Sequence Number Wrap
If the 32-bit Packet Sequence Number in the ESN TLV wraps or the
router performs a cold restart, the 64-bit ESSN value MUST be set
higher than the previous value. IS-IS implementations MAY use the
guidelines provided in Appendix A for accomplishing this.
4. Mechanism and Packet Encoding
The encoding of the ESN TLV in each applicable IS-IS PDU is detailed
below. Please refer to Section 5 for appropriate operations on how
to interoperate with legacy node(s) that do not support the
extensions defined in this document. If the received PDU with the
ESN TLV is accepted, then the stored value for the corresponding
originator and PDU type MUST be updated with the latest value
received. Please note that level information is included in the PDU
type.
4.1. IIHs
ESN TLV information is maintained for each type of IIH PDU being sent
on a given circuit. The procedures for encoding, verification, and
sequence number wrapping are explained in Section 3.
4.2. SNPs
Separate CSNP/PSNP ESN TLV information is maintained per PDU type,
per originator, and per link. The procedures for encoding,
verification, and sequence number wrapping are explained in Section
3.
5. Backward Compatibility and Deployment
The implementation and deployment of the ESN TLV can be done to
support backward compatibility and gradual deployment in the network
without requiring a flag day. This feature can also be deployed for
the links in a certain area of the network where the maximum security
mechanism is needed, or it can be deployed for the entire network.
The implementation SHOULD allow the configuration of ESN TLV features
on each IS-IS link level. The implementation SHOULD also allow
operators to control the configuration of the 'send' and/or 'verify'
feature of IS-IS PDUs for the links and for the node. In this
document, the 'send' operation mode is to include the ESN TLV in its own IS-IS
PDUs, and the 'verify' operation mode is to process the ESN TLV in the
receiving IS-IS PDUs from neighbors.
In the face of
When an adversary doing an active attack, is actively attacking, it is possible to have
inconsistent data views in the network, if there is a considerable
delay in enabling the ESN TLV 'verify' operation mode where nodes were configured to
the 'send' mode, e.g., from the first node to the last node in the network or all nodes
of a particular LAN segment, where 'send' mode is configured. segment. This happens primarily because replay
PDUs can potentially be accepted by the nodes where the 'verify' operation mode
is still not provisioned at the time of the attack. To minimize such
a window, it is recommended that provisioning of 'verify' SHOULD be
done in a timely fashion by the network operators.
5.1. IIHs and SNPs
On the link level, the ESN TLV involves the IIH PDUs and SNPs (both
CSNP and PSNP). The 'send' and 'verify' modes described above can be
set independently on each link and, in the case of a broadcast
network, independently on each level.
To introduce ESN support without disrupting operations, ISs on a
given interface are first configured to operate in 'send' mode. Once
all routers operating on an interface are operating in 'send' mode,
'verify' mode can be enabled on each IS. Once 'verify' mode is set
for an interface, all the IIH PDUs and SNPs being sent on that
interface MUST contain the ESN TLV. Any such PDU received without an
ESN TLV MUST be discarded when 'verify' mode is enabled. Similarly,
to safely disable ESN support on a link, 'verify' mode is disabled on
all ISs on the link. Once 'verify' mode is disabled on all routers
operating on an interface, 'send' mode can be disabled on each IS.
Please refer to Section 5 for considerations on enabling or disabling
'verify' mode on all ISs on a link.
6. IANA Considerations
A new TLV codepoint, as defined in this document, has been assigned
by IANA from the "IS-IS TLV Codepoints" registry. It is referred to
as the Extended Sequence Number TLV and has the following attributes:
Value Name IIH LSP SNP Purge
----- --------------------- --- --- --- -----
11 ESN TLV y n y n
7. Security Considerations
This document describes a mechanism to mitigate the replay attack
threat as discussed in the Security Considerations sections of
[RFC5304] and [RFC5310]. If an adversary interferes either does by not forward the
forwarding packets or delay the same by delaying messages as specified described in Section
3.3 of [RFC6862], the mechanism specified in this document cannot
mitigate those threats. Also, some of the threats described in
Section 2.3 of [ISIS-ANALYSIS] are not addressable with the ESN TLV
as specified in this document. This document does not introduce any
new security concerns to IS-IS or any other specifications
referenced.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[ISO10589] International Organization for Standardization,
"Intermediate system to intermediate system intra-domain-
routing routine information exchange protocol for use in
conjunction with the protocol for providing the
connectionless-mode Network Service (ISO 8473)", ISO/IEC
10589:2002, Second Edition, Nov. 2002.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
8.2. Informative References
[MRKMP] Hartman, S., Zhang, D., and G. Lebovitz, "Multicast Router
Key Management Protocol (MaRK)", Work in Progress, draft-
hartman-karp-mrkmp-05,
draft-hartman-karp-mrkmp-05, September 2012.
[ISIS-ANALYSIS]
Chunduri, U., Tian, A., and W. Lu, "KARP IS-IS security
analysis", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-karp-isis-
analysis-07, July 2015.
[GDOI-MAC] Weis, B. and S. Rowles, "GDOI Generic Message
Authentication Code Policy", Work in Progress, draft-weis-
gdoi-mac-tek-03, September 2011.
[GROUP-IKEv2] Rowles, S., Yeung, A., Ed., Tran, P., and Y. Nir,
"Group Key Management using IKEv2", Work in Progress,
draft-yeung-g-ikev2-08, October 2014.
[RFC5304] Li, T. and R. Atkinson, "IS-IS Cryptographic
Authentication", RFC 5304, DOI 10.17487/RFC5304, October
2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5304>.
[RFC5310] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, R.,
and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic
Authentication", RFC 5310, DOI 10.17487/RFC5310, February
2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5310>.
[RFC6518] Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "Keying and Authentication for
Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines", RFC 6518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6518, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6518>.
[RFC6862] Lebovitz, G., Bhatia, M., and B. Weis, "Keying and
Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Overview,
Threats, and Requirements", RFC 6862,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6862, March 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6862>.
[RFC7474] Bhatia, M., Hartman, S., Zhang, D., and A. Lindem, Ed.,
"Security Extension for OSPFv2 When Using Manual Key
Management", RFC 7474, DOI 10.17487/RFC7474, April 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7474>.
Appendix A. ESSN Encoding Mechanisms
IS-IS nodes implementing this specification SHOULD use available
mechanisms to preserve the 64-bit Extended Session Sequence Number's
strictly increasing property, whenever it is changed for the deployed
life of the IS-IS node (including cold restarts).
This appendix provides guidelines for maintaining the strictly
increasing property of the 64-bit ESSN in the ESN TLV, and
implementations can resort to any similar method as long as this
property is maintained.
A.1. Using Timestamps
One mechanism for accomplishing this is by encoding the 64-bit ESSN
as the system time represented by a 64-bit unsigned integer value.
This MAY be similar to the system timestamp encoding for the NTP long
format as defined in Appendix A.4 of [RFC5905]. The new current time
MAY be used when the IS-IS node loses its sequence number state
including when the Packet Sequence Number wraps.
Implementations MUST make sure while encoding the 64-bit ESN value
with the current system time that it does not default to any previous
value or some default node time of the system, especially after cold
restarts or any other similar events. In general, system time must
be preserved across cold restarts in order for this mechanism to be
feasible. One example of such implementation is to use a battery
backed real-time clock (RTC).
A.2. Using Non-volatile Storage
One other mechanism for accomplishing this is similar to the one
specified in [RFC7474] -- use the 64-bit ESSN as a wrap/boot count
stored in non-volatile storage. This value is incremented anytime
the IS-IS node loses its sequence number state, including when the
Packet Sequence Number wraps.
There is a drawback to this approach, which is described as follows
in Section 8 of [RFC7474]. It requires the IS-IS implementation to
be able to save its boot count in non-volatile storage. If the non-
volatile storage is ever repaired or router hardware is upgraded such
that the contents are lost, keys MUST be changed to prevent replay
attacks.
Appendix B. Operational/Implementation Considerations
Since the ESN is maintained per interface, PDU type, per level, originator, and per PDU
type,
link, this scheme can be useful for monitoring the health of the
IS-IS adjacency. A Packet Sequence Number skip on that occurs upon
receiving an IIH can be recorded by the neighbors and can be used
later to correlate with adjacency state changes over the interface. For instance
instance, in multi-
access multi-access media, all completely different issues on the
network may be indicated when all neighbors have the record skips from the
same IIH sender or versus when only one neighbor has the Packet Sequence Number skips can
indicate completely different issues on the network. records skips. For
operational issues, effective usage of the TLV defined in this
document MAY also need more system information before making concrete
conclusions; defining all that information is beyond the scope of
this document.
Acknowledgements
As some sort of sequence number mechanism to thwart protocol replays
is a old concept, the authors of this document do not make any claims
on the originality of the overall protection idea described. The
authors are thankful for the review and the valuable feedback
provided by Acee Lindem and Joel Halpern. Thanks to Alia Atlas,
Chris Hopps, Nevil Brownlee, and Adam W. Montville for their reviews
and suggestions during IESG directorate review. The authors also
thank Christer Holmberg, Ben Campbell, Barry Leiba, Stephen Farrell,
and Alvaro Retana for their reviews of this document.
Contributors
The authors would like to thank Les Ginsberg for his significant
contribution in detailed reviews and suggestions.
Authors' Addresses
Uma Chunduri
Ericsson Inc.
300 Holger Way,
San Jose, California 95134
United States
Phone: 408 750-5678
Email: uma.chunduri@ericsson.com
Wenhu Lu
Ericsson Inc.
300 Holger Way,
San Jose, California 95134
United States
Email: wenhu.lu@ericsson.com
Albert Tian
Ericsson Inc.
300 Holger Way,
San Jose, California 95134
United States
Phone: 408 750-5210
Email: albert.tian@ericsson.com
Naiming Shen
Cisco Systems, Inc.
225 West Tasman Drive,
San Jose, California 95134
United States
Email: naiming@cisco.com