wdiff rfc7628.original rfc7628.txt

KITTEN
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) W. Mills
Internet-Draft
Request for Comments: 7628 Microsoft
Intended status:
Category: Standards Track T. Showalter
Expires: November 30, 2015
ISSN: 2070-1721
H. Tschofenig
ARM Ltd.
May 29,
August 2015

A set Set of SASL Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) Mechanisms
for OAuth
draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-23.txt

Abstract

OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a
protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by
orchestrating an approval interaction, interaction or by allowing the third-party
application to obtain access on its own behalf.

This document defines how an application client uses credentials
obtained via OAuth over the Simple Authentication and Security Layer
(SASL) to access a protected resource at a resource serve. server. Thereby,
it enables schemes defined within the OAuth framework for non-HTTP-
based application protocols.

Clients typically store the user's long-term credential. This does,
however, lead to significant security vulnerabilities, for example,
when such a credential leaks. A significant benefit of OAuth for
usage in those clients is that the password is replaced by a shared
secret with higher entropy, i.e., the token. Tokens typically
provide limited access rights and can be managed and revoked
separately from the user's long-term password.

Status of This Memo

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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents an Internet Standards Track document.

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(IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for a maximum publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

Information about the current status of six months this document, any errata,
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 30, 2015.
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7628.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.1. OAuth Identifiers in the SASL Context . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.2. Server Response to Failed Authentication . . . . . . 9
3.2.3. Completing an Error Message Sequence . . . . . . . . 11
3.3. OAuth Access Token Types using Keyed Message Digests . . 11
4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Successful OAuth 1.0a Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4. SMTP Example of a Failed Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 17
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Acknowledgements . . . . . . 20
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 21

1. Introduction

OAuth 1.0a [RFC5849] and OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] are protocol frameworks
that enable a third-party application to obtain limited access to a
protected resource, either by orchestrating an approval interaction
on behalf of a resource owner by
orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party
application to obtain access on its own behalf.

The core OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749] specifies the interaction
between the OAuth client and the authorization server; it does not
define the interaction between the OAuth client and the resource
server for the access to a protected resource using an Access Token. access token.
Instead, the OAuth client to resource server interaction is described
in separate specifications, such as the bearer token specification
[RFC6750]. OAuth 1.0a included includes the protocol specification for the
communication between the OAuth client and the resource server in
[RFC5849].

The main use cases for OAuth 2.0 1.0a and OAuth 1.0a 2.0 have so far focused
on an HTTP-based [RFC7230] environment only. This document
integrates OAuth 1.0a and OAuth 2.0 into non-HTTP-based applications
using the integration into SASL. the Simple Authentication and Security
Layer (SASL) [RFC4422]. Hence, this document takes advantage of the
OAuth protocol and its deployment base to provide a way to use the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)
[RFC4422] SASL
to gain access to resources when using non-HTTP-based protocols, such
as the Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) [RFC3501] and the
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [RFC5321]. This document gives
examples of use in IMAP and SMTP.

To illustrate the impact of integrating this specification into an
OAuth-enabled application environment, Figure 1 shows the abstract
message flow of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. As indicated in the figure,
this document impacts the exchange of messages (E) and (F) since SASL
is used for interaction between the client and the resource server
instead of HTTP.

----+
+--------+ +---------------+ |
| |--(A)-- Authorization Request --->| Resource | |
| | | Owner | |Plain
| |<-(B)------ Access Grant ---------| | |OAuth
| | +---------------+ |2.0
| | |
| | Client Credentials & +---------------+ |
| |--(C)------ Access Grant -------->| Authorization | |
| Client | | Server | |
| |<-(D)------ Access Token ---------| | |
| | (w/ Optional Refresh Token) +---------------+ |
| | ----+
| | ----+
| | +---------------+ |
| | | | |OAuth
| |--(E)------ Access Token -------->| Resource | |over
| | | Server | |SASL
| |<-(F)---- Protected Resource -----| | |
| | | | |
+--------+ +---------------+ |
----+

Figure 1: OAuth 2.0 Protocol Flow

The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)

SASL is a framework for providing authentication and data security
services in connection-oriented protocols via replaceable
authentication mechanisms. It provides a structured interface
between protocols and mechanisms. The resulting framework allows new
protocols to reuse existing authentication mechanisms and allows old
protocols to make use of new authentication mechanisms. The
framework also provides a protocol for securing subsequent exchanges
within a data security layer.

When OAuth is integrated into SASL SASL, the high-level steps are as
follows:

(A) The client requests authorization from the resource owner. The
authorization request can be made directly to the resource owner
(as shown), shown) or indirectly via the authorization server as an
intermediary.

(B) The client receives an authorization grant grant, which is a
credential representing the resource owner's authorization,
expressed using one of the grant types defined in [RFC6749] or
[RFC5849] or using an extension grant type. The authorization
grant type depends on the method used by the client to request
authorization and the types supported by the authorization
server.

(C) The client requests an access token by authenticating with the
authorization server and presenting the authorization grant.

(D) The authorization server authenticates the client and validates
the authorization grant, and if valid valid, it issues an access
token.

(E) The client requests the protected resource from the resource
server and authenticates it by presenting the access token.

(F) The resource server validates the access token, and if valid, it
indicates a successful authentication.

Again, steps (E) and (F) are not defined in [RFC6749] (but are
described in, for example, [RFC6750] for the OAuth Bearer Token bearer token
instead) and are the main functionality specified within this
document. Consequently, the message exchange shown in Figure 1 is
the result of this specification. The client will generally need to
determine the authentication endpoints (and perhaps the service
endpoints) before the OAuth 2.0 protocol exchange messages in steps
(A)-(D) are executed. The discovery of the resource owner,
authorization server endpoints, and client registration are outside
the scope of this specification. The client must discover the
authorization endpoints using a discovery mechanism such as OpenID
Connect Discovery (OIDCD) [OpenID.Discovery] or Webfinger WebFinger using host-meta host-
meta [RFC7033]. Once credentials are obtained obtained, the client proceeds
to steps (E) and (F) defined in this specification. Authorization
endpoints MAY require client registration registration, and generic clients SHOULD
support the Dynamic Client Registration protocol
[I-D.ietf-oauth-dyn-reg]. [RFC7591].

OAuth 1.0 1.0a follows a similar model but uses a different terminology
and does not separate the resource server from the authorization
server.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].

The reader is assumed to be familiar with the terms used in the OAuth
2.0 specification [RFC6749] and SASL [RFC4422].

In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and
server
server, respectively. Line breaks have been inserted for
readability.

Note that the IMAP SASL specification requires base64 encoding, as
specified in Section 4 of [RFC4648].

3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specifications

SASL is used as an authentication framework in a variety of
application layer
application-layer protocols. This document defines the following
SASL mechanisms for usage with OAuth:

OAUTHBEARER: OAuth 2.0 bearer tokens, as described in [RFC6750].
RFC 6750 uses Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] to
secure the protocol interaction between the client and the
resource server.

OAUTH10A: OAuth 1.0a MAC Message Authentication Code (MAC) tokens
(using the HMAC-SHA1 keyed message digest), as described in
Section 3.4.2 of [RFC5849].

New extensions may be defined to add additional OAuth Access Token
Types. Such a new SASL OAuth mechanism can be added by registering
the new name(s) with IANA in the SASL Mechanisms registry and citing
this specification for the further definition.

SASL mechanisms using this document as their definition do not
provide a data security layer; that is, they cannot provide integrity
or confidentiality protection for application messages after the
initial authentication. If such protection is needed, TLS or some
similar solution should be used. Additionally, for the two
mechanisms specified in this document, TLS MUST be used for
OAUTHBEARER to protect the bearer token; for OAUTH10A OAUTH10A, the use of TLS
is RECOMMENDED.

These mechanisms are client initiated and lock-step, in lockstep, with the
server always replying to a client message. In the case where the
client has and correctly uses a valid token token, the flow is:

1. Client sends a valid and correct initial client response.

2. Server responds with a successful authentication.

In the case where authentication fails fails, the server sends an error
result, then
result; the client MUST then send an additional message to the server
in order to allow the server to finish the exchange. Some protocols
and common SASL implementations do not support both sending a SASL
message and finalizing a SASL negotiation. The additional client
message in the error case deals with this problem. This exchange is:

1. Client sends an invalid initial client response.

2. Server responds with an error message.

3. Client sends a dummy client response.

4. Server fails the authentication.

3.1. Initial Client Response

Client responses are a GS2 [RFC5801] header followed by zero or more
key/value pairs, or it may be empty. The gs2-header rule is defined
here as a placeholder for compatibility with GS2 if a GS2 mechanism
is formally defined, but this document does not define one. The key/value key/
value pairs take the place of the corresponding HTTP headers and
values to convey the information necessary to complete an OAuth style OAuth-style
HTTP authorization. Unknown key/value pairs MUST be ignored by the
server. The ABNF [RFC5234] syntax is:

kvsep = %x01
key = 1*(ALPHA)
value = *(VCHAR / SP / HTAB / CR / LF )
kvpair = key "=" value kvsep
;;gs2-header = See RFC 5801
client_resp
client-resp = (gs2-header kvsep *kvpair kvsep) / kvsep

The GS2 header MAY include the user name username associated with the resource
being accessed, the "authzid". It is worth noting that application
protocols are allowed to require an authzid, as are specific server
implementations.

The client response consisting of only a single kvsep is used only
when authentication fails, fails and is only valid in that context. If sent
as the first message from the client client, the server MAY simply fail the
authentication without returning discovery information since there is
no user or server name indication.

The following keys and corresponding values are defined in the client
response:

auth (REQUIRED): The payload that would be in the HTTP
Authorization header if this OAuth exchange was being carried
out over HTTP.

host: Contains the host name hostname to which the client connected. In an
HTTP context context, this is the value of the HTTP Host header.

port: Contains the destination port that the client connected to,
represented as a decimal positive integer string without
leading zeros.

For OAuth token types such as OAuth 1.0a that use keyed message
digests
digests, the client MUST send host and port number key/values, and
the server MUST fail an authorization request requiring keyed message
digests that are not accompanied by host and port values. In OAuth
1.0a
1.0a, for example, the so-called "signature base string calculation"
includes the reconstructed HTTP URL.

3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values

In these mechanisms mechanisms, values for path, query string and post body are
assigned default values. OAuth authorization schemes MAY define
usage of these in the SASL context and extend this specification.
For OAuth Access Token Types that include a keyed message digest of
the request request, the default values MUST be used unless explicit values
are provided in the client response. The following key values are
reserved for future use:

mthd (RESERVED): HTTP method, method; the default value is "POST".

path (RESERVED): HTTP path data, data; the default value is "/".

post (RESERVED): HTTP post data, data; the default value is the empty
string ("").

qs (RESERVED): The HTTP query string, string; the default value is the
empty string ("").

3.2. Server's Response

The server validates the response according to the specification for
the OAuth Access Token Types used. If the OAuth Access Token Type
utilizes a keyed message digest of the request parameters parameters, then the
client must provide a client response that satisfies the data
requirements for the scheme in use.

The server fully validates the client response before generating a
server response; this will necessarily include the validation steps
listed in the specification for the OAuth Access Token Type used.
However, additional validation steps may be needed, depending on the
particular application protocol making use of SASL. In particular,
values included as kvpairs in the client response (such as host and
port) which that correspond to values known to the application server by
some other mechanism (such as an application protocol data unit or
pre-configured
preconfigured values) MUST be validated to match between the initial
client response and the the other source(s) of such information. As a
concrete example, when SASL is used over IMAP to an IMAP server for a
single domain domain, the hostname can be available via configuration; this
hostname must be validated to match the value sent in the 'host'
kvpair.

The server responds to a successfully verified client message by
completing the SASL negotiation. The authenticated identity reported
by the SASL mechanism is the identity securely established for the
client with the OAuth credential. The application, not the SASL
mechanism, based on local access policy determines whether the
identity reported by the mechanism is allowed access to the requested
resource. Note that the semantics of the authzid is are specified by
the SASL framework [RFC4422].

3.2.1. OAuth Identifiers in the SASL Context

In the OAuth framework framework, the client may be authenticated by the
authorization server server, and the resource owner is authenticated to the
authorization server. OAuth access tokens may contain information
about the authentication of the resource owner and about the client
and may therefore make this information accessible to the resource
server.

If both identifiers are needed by an application the developer will
need to provide a way to communicate that from the SASL mechanism
back to the application.

3.2.2. Server Response to Failed Authentication

For a failed authentication authentication, the server returns a an error result in
JSON [RFC7159]
formatted error result, format and fails the authentication. The error result
consists of the following values:

status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error
codes are defined in the IANA "OAuth Extensions Error Registry"
as specified in the OAuth 2 2.0 core specification.

scope (OPTIONAL): An OAuth scope which that is valid to access the
service. This may be omitted omitted, which implies that unscoped
tokens are required. If a scope is specified specified, then a single
scope is preferred. At the time this document was written written,
there are several implementations that do not properly support
space separated
space-separated lists of scopes, so the use of a space space-
separated list of scopes is NOT RECOMMENDED.

openid-configuration (OPTIONAL): The URL for a document following
the OpenID Provider Configuration Information schema as
described in OpenID Connect Discovery (OIDCD)
[OpenID.Discovery] section OIDCD [OpenID.Discovery], Section 3 that is
appropriate for the user. As specified in OIDCD OIDCD, this will
have the "https" URL scheme. This document MUST have all OAuth related
OAuth-related data elements populated. The server MAY return
different URLs for users in different domains domains, and the client
SHOULD NOT cache a single returned value and assume it applies
for all users/domains that the server suports. supports. The returned
discovery document SHOULD have all data elements required by
the OpenID Connect Discovery specification populated. In
addition, the discovery document SHOULD contain the
'registration_endpoint' element to identify the endpoint to be
used with the Dynamic Client Registration protocol [I-D.ietf-oauth-dyn-reg] [RFC7591] to
obtain the minimum number of parameters necessary for the OAuth
protocol exchange to function. Another comparable discovery or
client registration mechanism MAY be used if available.

The use of the 'offline_access' scope, as defined in
[OpenID.Core]
[OpenID.Core], is RECOMMENDED to give clients the capability to
explicitly request a refresh token.

If the resource server provides a scope scope, then the client MUST always
request scoped tokens from the token endpoint. If the resource
server does not return a scope scope, the client SHOULD presume an unscoped
token is required to access the resource.

Since clients may interact with a number of application servers, such
as email servers and XMPP Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
(XMPP) [RFC6120] servers, they need to have a way to determine
whether dynamic client registration has been performed already and
whether an already available refresh token can be re-used reused to obtain an
access token for the desired resource server. This specification RECOMMENDs
RECOMMENDS that a client uses the information in the 'iss' element
defined in OpenID Connect Core [OpenID.Core] to make this
determination.

3.2.3. Completing an Error Message Sequence

Section 3.6 of SASL [RFC4422] explicitly prohibits additional
information in an unsuccessful authentication outcome. Therefore,
the error message is sent in a normal message. The client MUST then
send either an additional client response consisting of a single %x01
(control A) character to the server in order to allow the server to
finish the exchange or send a SASL cancellation token abort message as generally defined in section
Section 3.5 of SASL [RFC4422]. A specific example of a
cancellation token can be found an abort
message is the "BAD" response to an AUTHENTICATE in IMAP [RFC3501] section [RFC3501],
Section 6.2.2.

3.3. OAuth Access Token Types using Keyed Message Digests

OAuth Access Token Types may use keyed message digests digests, and the
client and the resource server may need to perform a cryptographic
computation for integrity protection and data origin authentication.

OAuth is designed for access to resources identified by URIs. SASL
is designed for user authentication, authentication and has no facility for more
fine-grained access control. In this specification specification, we require or
define default values for the data elements from an HTTP request
which allow that
allows the signature base string to be constructed properly. The
default HTTP path is "/" "/", and the default post body is empty. These
atoms are defined as extension points so that no changes are needed
if there is a revision of SASL which that supports more specific resource
authorization, e.g., IMAP access to a specific folder or FTP access
limited to a specific directory.

Using the example in the OAuth 1.0a specification as a starting
point, on an IMAP server running on port 143 and given below is the authorization request in OAuth 1.0a style authorization request (with
%x01 shown as ^A and line breaks added for readability) below: readability), assuming it
is on an IMAP server running on port 143:

n,a=user@example.com,^A
host=example.com^A
port=143^A
auth=OAuth realm="Example",
oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
oauth_timestamp="137131201",
oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
oauth_signature="Tm90IGEgcmVhbCBzaWduYXR1cmU"^A^A

The signature base string would be constructed per the OAuth 1.0 1.0a
specification [RFC5849] with the following things noted:

o The method value is defaulted to POST.

o The scheme defaults to be "http", and any port number other than
80 is included.

o The path defaults to "/".

o The query string defaults to "".

In this example example, the signature base string with line breaks added for
readability would be:

POST&http%3A%2F%2Fexample.com:143%2F&oauth_consumer_key%3D9djdj82h4
8djs9d2%26oauth_nonce%3D7d8f3e4a%26oauth_signature_method%3DHMAC-SH
A1%26oauth_timestamp%3D137131201%26oauth_token%3Dkkk9d7dh3k39sjv7

4. Examples

These examples illustrate exchanges between IMAP and SMTP clients and
servers. All IMAP examples use SASL-IR [RFC4959] and send payload in
the initial client response. The Bearer Token bearer token examples assume
encrypted transport; if the underlying connection is not already TLS TLS,
then STARTTLS MUST be used as TLS is required in the Bearer Token bearer token
specification.

Note to implementers: The SASL OAuth method names are case
insensitive. One example uses "Bearer" but that could as easily be
"bearer", "BEARER", or "BeArEr".

4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange

This example shows a successful OAuth 2.0 bearer token exchange in
IMAP. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.

[Initial connection and TLS establishment...]
S: * OK IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
C: t0 CAPABILITY
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR
S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTH AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhvc3Q9c2Vy
dmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmd
DRxbVRjMk52YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZMjl0Q2c9PQEB bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhv
c3Q9c2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9QmVhcmVyI
HZGOWRmdDRxbVRjMk52YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZMjl0Q2c9PQ
EB
S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded

As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. base64 encoded. The
decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and long
lines wrapped for readability) is:

n,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^Aport=143^A
auth=Bearer vF9dft4qmTc2Nvb3RlckBhbHRhdmlzdGEuY29tCg==^A^A

The same credential used in an SMTP exchange is shown below. Again Again,
this example assumes that TLS is already established per the Bearer
Token bearer
token specification requirements.

[connection begins]
S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9
C: EHLO sender.example.com
S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]
S: 250-SIZE 35651584
S: 250-8BITMIME
S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER
S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
S: 250-STARTTLS
S: 250 PIPELINING
[Negotiate TLS...]
C: t1 AUTH OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhvc3Q9c2Vy
dmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9NTg3AWF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmd
DRxbVRjMk52YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZMjl0Q2c9PQEB
S: 235 Authentication successful.
[connection continues...]

The decoded initial client response is:

n,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^Aport=587^A
auth=Bearer vF9dft4qmTc2Nvb3RlckBhbHRhdmlzdGEuY29tCg==^A^A

4.2. Successful OAuth 1.0a Token Exchange

This IMAP example shows a successful OAuth 1.0a token exchange. Note
that line breaks are inserted for readability. This example assumes
that TLS is already established. Signature computation is discussed
in Section 3.3.

S: * OK IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
C: t0 CAPABILITY
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER OAUTH10A AUTH=OAUTH10A SASL-IR
S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTH AUTHENTICATE OAUTH10A bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhvc3Q9ZXhhb
XBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD1PQXV0aCByZWFsbT0iRXhhbXBsZSIsb2F1
dGhfY29uc3VtZXJfa2V5PSI5ZGpkajgyaDQ4ZGpzOWQyIixvYXV0aF90b2tlbj0
ia2trOWQ3ZGgzazM5c2p2NyIsb2F1dGhfc2lnbmF0dXJlX21ldGhvZD0iSE1BQy
1TSEExIixvYXV0aF90aW1lc3RhbXA9IjEzNzEzMTIwMSIsb2F1dGhfbm9uY2U9I
jdkOGYzZTRhIixvYXV0aF9zaWduYXR1cmU9IlRtOTBJR0VnY21WaGJDQnphV2R1
WVhSMWNtVSUzRCIBAQ==
S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded
As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. base64 encoded. The
decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and
lines wrapped for readability) is:

4.3. Failed Exchange

This IMAP example shows a failed exchange because of the empty
Authorization header, which is how a client can query for the needed
scope. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.

S: * OK IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
C: t0 CAPABILITY
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR
S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTH AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAW
hvc3Q9c2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9AQE=
S: + eyJzdGF0dXMiOiJpbnZhbGlkX3Rva2VuIiwic2NvcGUiOiJleGFtcGxl
X3Njb3BlIiwib3BlbmlkLWNvbmZpZ3VyYXRpb24iOiJodHRwczovL2V4
YW1wbGUuY29tLy53ZWxsLWtub3duL29wZW5pZC1jb25maWcifQ==
YW1wbGUuY29tLy53ZWxsLWtub3duL29wZW5pZC1jb25maWd1cmF0aW9u
In0=
C: AQ==
S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed

The decoded initial client response is:

n,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^A
port=143^Aauth=^A^A

The decoded server error response is:

{
"status":"invalid_token",
"scope":"example_scope",
"openid-configuration":"https://example.com/.well-known/openid-config"
}
The client responds with the required dummy response, response; "AQ==" is the
base64 encoding of the ASCII value 0x01. The same exchange using the
IMAP specific
IMAP-specific method of cancelling canceling an AUTHENTICATE command sends "*"
and is shown below.

S: * OK IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
C: t0 CAPABILITY
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR IMAP4rev1
S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTH AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAW
hvc3Q9c2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9AQE=
S: + eyJzdGF0dXMiOiJpbnZhbGlkX3Rva2VuIiwic2NvcGUiOiJleGFtcGxl
X3Njb3BlIiwib3BlbmlkLWNvbmZpZ3VyYXRpb24iOiJodHRwczovL2V4
YW1wbGUuY29tLy53ZWxsLWtub3duL29wZW5pZC1jb25maWd1cmF0aW9u
In0=
C: *
S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed

4.4. SMTP Example of a Failed Negotiation

This example shows an authorization failure in an SMTP exchange. TLS
negotiation is not shown shown, but as noted above above, it is required for the
use of Bearer Tokens. bearer tokens.

[connection begins]
S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9
C: EHLO sender.example.com
S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]
S: 250-SIZE 35651584
S: 250-8BITMIME
S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER
S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
S: 250 PIPELINING
[Negotiate TLS...]
C: AUTH OAUTHBEARER bix1c2VyPXNvbWV1c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tLAFhdXRoPUJlYXJl
ciB2RjlkZnQ0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoZEhSaGRtbHpkR0V1WTI5dENnPT0BAQ==
S: 334 eyJzdGF0dXMiOiJpbnZhbGlkX3Rva2VuIiwic2NoZW1lcyI6ImJlYXJlciBtYWMiL
CJzY29wZSI6Imh0dHBzOi8vbWFpbC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS8ifQ==
C: AQ==
S: 535-5.7.1 Username and Password not accepted. Learn more at
S: 535 5.7.1 http://support.example.com/mail/oauth
[connection continues...]

The initial client response is:

n,user=someuser@example.com,^A
auth=Bearer vF9dft4qmTc2Nvb3RlckBhdHRhdmlzdGEuY29tCg==^A^A
The server returned an error message in the 334 SASL message, message; the
client responds with the required dummy response, and the server
finalizes the negotiation.

{
"status":"invalid_token",
"schemes":"bearer mac",
"scope":"https://mail.example.com/"
}

5. Security Considerations

OAuth 1.0a and OAuth 2 2.0 allow for a variety of deployment scenarios,
and the security properties of these profiles vary. As shown in
Figure 1 1, this specification is aimed to be integrated into a larger
OAuth deployment. Application developers therefore need to
understand their security requirements based on a threat assessment
before selecting a specific SASL OAuth mechanism. For OAuth 2.0 2.0, a
detailed security document [RFC6819] provides guidance to select
those OAuth 2.0 components that help to mitigate threats for a given
deployment. For OAuth 1.0a 1.0a, Section 4 of RFC 5849 [RFC5849] provides guidance
specific to OAuth 1.0. 1.0a.

This document specifies two SASL Mechanisms for OAuth and each comes
with different security properties.

OAUTHBEARER: This mechanism borrows from OAuth 2.0 bearer tokens
[RFC6750]. It relies on the application using TLS to protect the
OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token bearer token exchange; without TLS usage at the
application layer layer, this method is completely insecure.
Consequently, TLS MUST be provided by the application when
choosing this authentication mechanism.

OAUTH10A: This mechanism re-uses reuses OAuth 1.0a MAC tokens (using the
HMAC-SHA1 keyed message digest), as described in Section 3.4.2 of
[RFC5849]. To compute the keyed message digest in the same way as
in RFC 5839 5839, this specification conveys additional parameters
between the client and the server. This SASL mechanism only
supports client authentication. If server-side authentication is
desireable
desirable, then it must be provided by the application underneath
the SASL layer. The use of TLS is strongly RECOMMENDED.

Additionally, the following aspects are worth pointing out:

An access token is not equivalent to the user's long term password.

Care has to be taken when these OAuth credentials are used for
actions like changing passwords (as it is possible with some
protocols, e.g., XMPP [RFC6120]). The resource server should
ensure that actions taken in the authenticated channel are
appropriate to the strength of the presented credential.

Lifetime of the application sessions.

It is possible that SASL will be used to authenticate a connection
connection, and the life of that connection may outlast the life
of the access token used to establish it. This is a common
problem in application protocols where connections are long-lived, long lived
and not a problem with this mechanism mechanism, per se. Resource servers
may unilaterally disconnect clients in accordance with the
application protocol.

Access tokens have a lifetime.

Reducing the lifetime of an access token provides security
benefits
benefits, and OAuth 2.0 introduces refresh tokens to obtain new
access token tokens on the fly without any need for a human interaction.
Additionally, a previously obtained access token might be revoked
or rendered invalid at any time. The client MAY request a new
access token for each connection to a resource server, but it
SHOULD cache and re-use reuse valid credentials.

6. Internationalization Considerations

The identifer identifier asserted by the OAuth authorization server about the
resource owner inside the access token may be displayed to a human.
For example, when SASL is used in the context of IMAP IMAP, the client may
assert the resource owner's email address to the IMAP server for
usage in an email-based application. The identifier may therefore
contain internationalized characters characters, and an application needs to
ensure that the mapping between the identifier provided by OAuth is
suitable for use with the application layer application-layer protocol SASL is
incorporated into.

At the time of writing the standardization An example of a SASL-compatible container is the various claims in
the access token (in
JSON format) is still ongoing, see
[I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token]. Once completed it will provide Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519], which provides a standardized format
for exchanging identity information between the authorization server and the resource server. identity information that supports
internationalized characters.

7. IANA Considerations

7.1. SASL Registration

The IANA is requested to register has registered the following entry in the SASL Mechanisms
registry:

SASL mechanism name: OAUTHBEARER
Security Considerations: See this document

Published Specification: See this document

For further information: Contact the authors of this document.

Intended usage: common COMMON

Owner/Change controller: the IESG

Note: None

The IANA is requested to register has registered the following entry in the SASL Mechanisms
registry:

SASL mechanism name: OAUTH10A

Security Considerations: See this document

Published Specification: See this document

For further information: Contact the authors of this document.

Intended usage: common COMMON

Owner/Change controller: the IESG

Note: None

8. References

8.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-oauth-dyn-reg]
Richer, J., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and P.
Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-27 (work in progress), March
2015.

[OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", February 2014. November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.

[OpenID.Discovery]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, "OpenID
Connect Discovery 1.0", July 2011. November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/
openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html>.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997. 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. A., Ed. and K. Zeilenga, Ed., "Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, DOI
10.17487/RFC4422, June 2006. 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4422>.

[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006. 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

[RFC5234] Crocker, D. D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, DOI 10.17487/
RFC5234, January 2008. 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.

[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/
RFC5246, August 2008. 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

[RFC5801] Josefsson, S. and N. Williams, "Using Generic Security
Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanisms
in Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL): The
GS2 Mechanism Family", RFC 5801, DOI 10.17487/RFC5801,
July 2010. 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5801>.

[RFC5849] Hammer-Lahav, E., Ed., "The OAuth 1.0 Protocol", RFC 5849,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5849, April 2010. 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5849>.

[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012. 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.

[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, DOI 10.17487/
RFC6750, October 2012. 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.

[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March 2014.

8.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token]
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.

[RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-32 (work in
progress), December 2014.
P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.

8.2. Informative References

[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
4rev1", RFC 3501, DOI 10.17487/RFC3501, March 2003. 2003,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3501>.

[RFC4959] Siemborski, R. and A. Gulbrandsen, "IMAP Extension for
Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) Initial
Client Response", RFC 4959, DOI 10.17487/RFC4959,
September 2007. 2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4959>.

[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008. 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.

[RFC6120] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, DOI 10.17487/RFC6120,
March 2011. 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6120>.

[RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819, DOI
10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013. 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819>.

[RFC7033] Jones, P., Salgueiro, G., Jones, M., and J. Smarr,
"WebFinger", RFC 7033, DOI 10.17487/RFC7033, September 2013.
2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7033>.

[RFC7230] Fielding, R. R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", RFC
7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June
2014.

Appendix A. Acknowlegements 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.

[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the members of the Kitten KITTEN working
group,
group and in addition and specifically: Simon Josefson, Torsten
Lodderstadt, Ryan Troll, Alexey Melnikov, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Nico
Williams, Matt Miller, and Benjamin Kaduk.

This document was produced under the chairmanship of Alexey Melnikov,
Tom Yu, Shawn Emery, Josh Howlett, Sam Hartman. The supervising area
director was Stephen Farrell.

Appendix B. Document History

[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]

-23

o AD feedback from IESG review and comments.

o Fixed port number in SMTP examples.

o Minor editorial changes.

o Dyn-Reg draft becomes normative.

o Added explicit TLS start indicator in all examples, removed text
that said we assume that.

-19

o Last call feedback agaiun.

o Clarified usage of TLS in examples and fixed them some more.
Adding reference to RFC4422 and cancellation token and an example
for that.

-18

o Last call feedback round #5. Fixed -17 change log.

o Corrected "issue" to "iss", other minor changes.

-17

o Last call feedback again (WGLC #4). eradicated comma splicing.
Removed extra server message in example 4.3.

o Added recommendations for discovery and dynamic client
registration support.

-16

o Last call feedback again. Primarily editorial changes. Corrected
examples.

-15

o Last call feedack on the GS2 stuff being ripped out completely.

o Removed the "user" parameter Hartman, Matthew Miller, and put stuff back into the
gs2-header. Call out that the authzid goes in the gs2-header with
some prose about when it might be required. Very comparable to
-10.

o Added an OAuth 1.0A example explicitly.

-14

o Last call feedack on RFC citations needed, small editorial.

o Added the "user" parameter back, which
Benjamin Kaduk. The supervising Area Director was pulled when we started
down the GS2 path. Same language as -03.

o Defined a stub GS2 header to make sure that when the GS2 bride is
defined for this that nothing will break when it actually starts
to get populated.

-13

o Changed affiliation.

-12

o Removed -PLUS components from the specification.

-11

o Removed GSS-API components from the specification.

o Updated security consideration section.

-10

o Clarifications throughout the document in response to the feedback
from Jeffrey Hutzelman.

-09

o Incorporated review by Alexey and Hannes.

o Clarified the three OAuth SASL mechanisms.

o Updated references

o Extended acknowledgements

-08

o Fixed the channel binding examples for p=$cbtype

o More tuning of the authcid language and edited and renamed 3.2.1.

-07

o Struck the MUST langiage from authzid.

-06

o Removed the user field. Fixed the examples again.

o Added canonicalization language.

-05

o Fixed the GS2 header language again.

o Separated out different OAuth schemes into different SASL
mechanisms. Took out the scheme in the error return. Tuned up
the IANA registrations.

o Added the user field back into the SASL message.

o Fixed the examples (again).

-04

o Changed user field to be carried in the gs2-header, and made gs2
header explicit in all cases.

o Converted MAC examples to OAuth 1.0a. Moved MAC to an informative
reference.

o Changed to sending an empty client response (single control-A) as
the second message of a failed sequence.

o Fixed channel binding prose to refer to the normative specs and
removed the hashing of large channel binding data, which brought
mroe problems than it solved.

o Added a SMTP examples for Bearer use case.

-03

o Added user field into examples and fixed egregious errors there as
well.

o Added text reminding developers that Authorization scheme names
are case insensitive.

-02

o Added the user data element back in.

o Minor editorial changes.

-01

o Ripping out discovery. Changed to refer to I-D.jones-appsawg-
webfinger instead of WF and SWD older drafts.

o Replacing HTTP as the message format and adjusted all examples.

-00

o Renamed draft into proper IETF naming format now that it's
adopted.

o Minor fixes. Stephen Farrell.

Authors' Addresses

William Mills
Microsoft

Email: wimills@microsoft.com wmills_92105@yahoo.com

Tim Showalter

Email: tjs@psaux.com

Hannes Tschofenig
ARM Ltd.
110 Fulbourn Rd
Cambridge CB1 9NJ
Great Britain
United Kingdom

Email: Hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at