wdiff rfc7630.original rfc7630.txt

OPSAWG
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Merkle, Ed.
Internet-Draft
Request for Comments: 7630 Secunet Security Networks
Intended status:
Category: Standards Track M. Lochter
Expires: October 22, 2015
ISSN: 2070-1721 BSI
April 20,
August 2015

HMAC-SHA-2 Authentication Protocols
in USM the User-based Security Model (USM) for SNMPv3
draft-ietf-opsawg-hmac-sha-2-usm-snmp-06

Abstract

This memo specifies new HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols for the
User-based Security Model (USM) for SNMPv3 defined in RFC 3414.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents an Internet Standards Track document.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list It represents the consensus of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for a maximum publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of six months RFC 5741.

Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents obtained at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on October 22, 2015.
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7630.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. The Internet-Standard Management Framework . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. The HMAC-SHA-2 Authentication Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Deviations from the HMAC-SHA-96 Authentication Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2.1. Processing an Outgoing Message . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2.2. Processing an Incoming Message . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Key Localization and Key Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Structure of the MIB Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Relationship to Other MIB Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Relationship to SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2. Relationship to SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.3. MIB modules required Modules Required for IMPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. Use of the HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols Authentication Protocols in USM . . 10 9
9.2. Cryptographic strength Strength of the authentication protocols Authentication Protocols . 10 9
9.3. Derivation of keys Keys from passwords Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 10
9.4. Access to the SNMP-USM-HMAC-SHA2-MIB . . . . . . . . . . 11
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 11
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

1. Introduction

This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB)
for use with network management protocols. In particular particular, it defines
additional authentication protocols for the User-based Security Model
(USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol version 3 (SNMPv3)
specified in RFC 3414 [RFC3414].

In RFC 3414, two different authentication protocols, HMAC-MD5-96 and
HMAC-SHA-96, are defined based on the hash functions MD5 and SHA-1,
respectively. This memo specifies new HMAC-SHA-2 authentication
protocols for USM using an HMAC a Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
based on the SHA-2 family of hash functions [SHA] and truncated to
128 bits for SHA-224, to 192 bits for SHA-256, to 256 bits for SHA-384, SHA-
384, and to 384 bits for SHA-512. These protocols are
straightforward adaptations of the authentication protocols HMAC-MD5-96 HMAC-
MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-96 to the SHA-2 based SHA-2-based HMAC.

2. The Internet-Standard Management Framework

For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current
Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer to section 7 of
RFC 3410 [RFC3410].

Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
the Management Information Base or MIB. MIB objects are generally
accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the
Structure of Management Information (SMI). This memo specifies a MIB
module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in STD 58,
RFC 2578 [RFC2578], STD 58, RFC 2579 [RFC2579] and STD 58, RFC 2580
[RFC2580].

3. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119
[RFC2119].

4. The HMAC-SHA-2 Authentication Protocols

This section describes the HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols. They protocols, which
use the SHA-2 hash functions, which are described functions (described in FIPS PUB 180-4 [SHA] and
RFC 6234 [RFC6234], [RFC6234]) in the HMAC mode described (described in RFC 2104 [RFC2104]
and RFC 6234, 6234), truncating the output to 128 bits for SHA-
224, SHA-224, 192
bits for SHA-256, 256 bits for SHA-384, and 384 bits for SHA-512.
RFC 6234 also provides source code for all the SHA-2 algorithms and
HMAC (without truncation). It also includes test harness and
standard test vectors for all the defined hash functions and HMAC
examples.

The following protocols are defined:

usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol: uses SHA-224 and truncates the
output to 128 bits (16 octets);

usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol: uses SHA-256 and truncates the
output to 192 bits (24 octets);

usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol: uses SHA-384 and truncates the
output to 256 bits (32 octets);

usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocol: uses SHA-512 and truncates the
output to 384 bits (48 octets).

Implementations conforming to this specification MUST support
usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol and SHOULD support
usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocol. The protocols
usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol and usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol are
OPTIONAL.

4.1. Deviations from the HMAC-SHA-96 Authentication Protocol

All the HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols are straightforward
adaptations of the HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-96 authentication
protocols. Precisely, Specifically, they differ from the HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-
SHA-96 authentication protocols in the following aspects:

o The SHA-2 hash function is used to compute the message digest in
the HMAC computation according to RFC 2104 and RFC 6234, as
opposed to the MD5 hash function [RFC1321] and SHA-1 hash function
[SHA] used in HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-96, respectively.
Consequently, the length of the message digest prior to truncation
is 224 bits for SHA-224 based the SHA-224-based protocol, 256 bits for SHA-256 based the SHA-
256-based protocol, 384 bits for SHA-384 based the SHA-384-based protocol, and
512 bits for
SHA-512 based the SHA-512-based protocol.

o The resulting message digest (output of HMAC) is truncated to

* 16 octets for usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol

* 24 octets for usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol

* 32 octets for usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol

* 48 octets for usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocol

as opposed to the truncation to 12 octets in HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-
SHA-96.

o The user's secret key to be used when calculating a digest MUST
be: be

* 28 octets long and derived with SHA-224 for the SHA-224 based SHA-224-based
protocol usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol

* 32 octets long and derived with SHA-256 for the SHA-256 based SHA-256-based
protocol usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol

* 48 octets long and derived with SHA-384 for the SHA-384 based SHA-384-based
protocol usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol

* 64 octets long and derived with SHA-512 for the SHA-512 based SHA-512-based
protocol usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocol
as opposed to the keys being 16 and 20 octets long in HMAC-MD5-96
and HMAC-SHA-96, respectively.

4.2. Processing

This section describes the procedures for the HMAC-SHA-2
authentication protocols. The descriptions are based on the
definition of services and data elements defined for HMAC-SHA-96 in
RFC 3414 with the deviations listed in Section 4.1.

4.2.1. Processing an Outgoing Message

Values of constants M (the length of the secret key in octets) and N
(the length of the MAC Message Authentication Code (MAC) output in octets)
octets), and the hash function H used below, below are:

usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol: M=28, N=16; N=16, H=SHA-224;

usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol: M=32, N=24; N=24, H=SHA-256;

usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol: M=48, N=32; N=32, H=SHA-384;

usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocol: M=64, N=48.

correspondingly. N=48, H=SHA-512.

4.2.1. Processing an Outgoing Message

This section describes the procedure followed by an SNMP engine
whenever it must authenticate an outgoing message using one of the
authentication protocols defined above. Values of the constants M
and N, and the hash function H are as defined in Section 4.2 and are
selected based on which authentication protocol is configured for the
given USM usmUser Table entry.

1. The msgAuthenticationParameters field is set to serialization,
according to the rules in RFC 3417 [RFC3417], serialization
of an OCTET STRING containing N zero octets. octets; it is serialized
according to the rules in RFC 3417 [RFC3417].

2. From Using the secret authKey of M octets, calculate the HMAC-SHA-2
digest HMAC is calculated over it
the wholeMsg according to RFC 6234. Take the first 6234 with hash function H.

3. The N first octets of the final digest - this is the Message Authentication Code (MAC).

3. Replace above HMAC are taken as the computed
MAC value.

4. The msgAuthenticationParameters field is replaced with the MAC
obtained in the previous step.

5. The authenticatedWholeMsg is then returned to the caller together
with the statusInformation indicating success.

4.2.2. Processing an Incoming Message

This section describes the procedure followed by an SNMP engine
whenever it must authenticate an incoming message using one of the
HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols. Values of the constants M and N are
N, and the same hash function H are as defined in Section 4.2.1, 4.2 and are
selected based on which authentication protocol is configured for the
given USM usmUser Table entry.

This section describes the procedure followed by an SNMP engine
whenever it must authenticate an incoming message using one of the
HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols.

1. If the digest received in the msgAuthenticationParameters field
is not N octets long, then an a failure and an errorIndication
(authenticationError) is are returned to the calling module.

2. The MAC received in the msgAuthenticationParameters field is
saved.

3. The digest in the msgAuthenticationParameters field is replaced
by the N zero octets.

4. Using the secret authKey, authKey of M octets, the HMAC is calculated over
the
wholeMsg. wholeMsg according to RFC 6234 with hash function H.

5. The N first octets of the above HMAC are taken as the computed
MAC value.

6. The msgAuthenticationParameters field is replaced with the MAC
value that was saved in step 2.

7. The newly calculated MAC is compared with the MAC saved in step
2. If they do not match, then a failure and an errorIndication
(authenticationFailure) are returned to the calling module.

8. The authenticatedWholeMsg and statusInformation indicating
success are then returned to the caller.

5. Key Localization and Key Change

For any of the protocols defined in Section 4, key localization and
key change SHALL be performed according to RFC 3414 [RFC3414] using
the same SHA-2 hash function applied as in the respective HMAC-SHA-2 authentication
protocol.

6. Structure of the MIB Module

The MIB module specified in this memo does not define any managed
objects, subtrees, notifications notifications, or tables, but tables; rather, it only defines
object identities (for authentication protocols) under a subtree of
an existing MIB.

7. Relationship to Other MIB Modules

7.1. Relationship to SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB

RFC 3414 specifies the MIB module for the User-based Security Model
(USM) USM for SNMPv3 (SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB), (SNMP-USER-
BASED-SM-MIB), which defines authentication protocols for USM based
on the hash functions MD5 and SHA-1, respectively. The following MIB
module defines new HMAC-SHA2 authentication protocols for USM based
on the SHA-2 hash functions [SHA]. The use of the HMAC-SHA2
authentication protocols requires the usage of the objects defined in
the SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB.

7.2. Relationship to SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB

RFC 3411 [RFC3411] specifies the SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB, which defines a
subtree snmpAuthProtocols for SNMP authentication protocols. The
following MIB module defines new authentication protocols in the
snmpAuthProtocols subtree.

7.3. MIB modules required Modules Required for IMPORTS

The following MIB module IMPORTS definitions from SNMPv2-SMI
[RFC2578] and SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB [RFC3411].

8. Definitions

SNMP-USM-HMAC-SHA2-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-IDENTITY,
snmpModules FROM SNMPv2-SMI -- [RFC2578]
snmpAuthProtocols FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB; -- [RFC3411]

snmpUsmHmacSha2MIB MODULE-IDENTITY
LAST-UPDATED "201503090000Z" "201508130000Z" -- 9th Mar 13 August 2015, midnight
-- RFC Ed.: replace with publication date & remove this line
ORGANIZATION "SNMPv3 Working Group"
CONTACT-INFO "WG email: OPSAWG@ietf.org
Subscribe:
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsawg
Editor: Johannes Merkle
secunet Security Networks
postal:
Postal: Mergenthaler Allee 77
D-65760 Eschborn
Germany
phone:
Phone: +49 20154543091
email:
Email: johannes.merkle@secunet.com

Co-Editor: Manfred Lochter
Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
postal:
Postal: Postfach 200363
D-53133 Bonn
Germany
phone:
Phone: +49 228 9582 5643
email:
Email: manfred.lochter@bsi.bund.de"

DESCRIPTION "Definitions of Object Identities needed
for the use of HMAC-SHA2 by SNMP's User-based
Security Model.

Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)."

REVISION "201503090000Z" "201508130000Z" -- 9th Mar 13 August 2015, midnight
-- RFC Ed.: replace with publication date & remove this line
DESCRIPTION "Initial version, published as RFC TBD"
-- RFC Ed.: replace TBD with actual RFC number & remove this line 7630"
::= { snmpModules nn 235 } -- nn to be assigned by IANA
-- RFC Ed.: replace nn with actual number assigned by IANA & remove
-- this comment

usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The Authentication Protocol
usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol uses HMAC-SHA-224 and
truncates output to 128 bits."
REFERENCE "- Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, RFC 2104.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, 2012."
::= { snmpAuthProtocols aa 4 } -- aa to be assigned by IANA
-- RFC Ed.: replace aa with actual number assigned by IANA & remove
-- this comment

usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The Authentication Protocol
usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol uses HMAC-SHA-256 and
truncates output to 192 bits."
REFERENCE "- Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, RFC 2104.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, 2012."
::= { snmpAuthProtocols bb 5 } -- bb to be assigned by IANA
-- RFC Ed.: replace bb with actual number assigned by IANA & remove
-- this comment
usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The Authentication Protocol
usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol uses HMAC-SHA-384 and
truncates output to 256 bits."
REFERENCE "- Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, RFC 2104.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, 2012."
::= { snmpAuthProtocols cc 6 } -- cc to be assigned by IANA
-- RFC Ed.: replace cc with actual number assigned by IANA & remove
-- this comment

usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The Authentication Protocol
usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocol uses HMAC-SHA-512 and
truncates output to 384 bits."
REFERENCE "- Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, RFC 2104.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, 2012."
::= { snmpAuthProtocols dd 7 } -- dd to be assigned by IANA
-- RFC Ed.: replace dd with actual number assigned by IANA & remove
-- this comment

END

9. Security Considerations

9.1. Use of the HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols Authentication Protocols in USM

The security considerations of RFC 3414 [RFC3414] also apply to the
HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols defined in this document.

9.2. Cryptographic strength Strength of the authentication protocols Authentication Protocols

At the time of publication of this document, all of the HMAC-SHA-2
authentication protocols provide a very high level of security. The
security of each HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocol depends on the
parameters used in the corresponding HMAC computation, which are the
length of the key (if the key has maximum entropy), the size of the
hash function's internal state, and the length of the truncated MAC.
For the HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols protocols, these values are as
follows (values are given in bits).

+------------------------------+---------+----------------+---------+
| Protocol | Key | Size of | MAC |
| | length | internal state | length |
+------------------------------+---------+----------------+---------+
| usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol | 224 | 256 | 128 |
| usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol | 256 | 256 | 192 |
| usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol | 384 | 512 | 256 |
| usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocol | 512 | 512 | 384 |
+------------------------------+---------+----------------+---------+

Table 1: HMAC parameters Parameters of the HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols Authentication Protocols

The security of the HMAC scales with both the key length and the size
of the internal state: longer keys render key guessing attacks more
difficult, and a larger internal state decreases the success
probability of MAC forgeries based on internal collisions of the hash
function.

The role of the truncated output length is more complicated:
according to [BCK], there is a trade-off in that "by

by outputting less bits the attacker has less bits to predict in a
MAC forgery but, on the other hand, the attacker also learns less
about the output of the compression function from seeing the
authentication tags computed by legitimate parties"; thus, parties.

Thus, truncation weakens the HMAC against forgery by guessing, but guessing but, at
the same time time, strengthens it against chosen message attacks aiming
at MAC forgery based on internal collisions or at key guessing. RFC
2104 and [BCK] allow truncation to any length that is not less than
half the size of the internal state.

Further discussion of the security of the HMAC construction is given
in RFC 2104.

9.3. Derivation of keys Keys from passwords Passwords

If secret keys to be used for HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols are
derived from passwords, the derivation SHOULD be performed using the
password-to-key algorithm from Appendix A.1 of RFC 3414 with MD5
being replaced by the SHA-2 hash function H used in the HMAC-SHA-2
authentication protocol. Specifically, the password is converted
into the required secret key by the following steps:

o forming a string of length 1,048,576 octets by repeating the value
of the password as often as necessary, truncating accordingly, and
using the resulting string as the input to the hash function H.
The resulting digest, termed "digest1", is used in the next step.

o forming a second string is formed by concatenating digest1, the SNMP
engine's snmpEngineID value, and digest1. This string is used as
input to the hash function H.

9.4. Access to the SNMP-USM-HMAC-SHA2-MIB

The SNMP-USM-HMAC-SHA2-MIB module defines OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
for use in other MIB modules. It does not define any objects that
can be accessed. As such, the SNMP-USM-HMAC-SHA2-MIB does not, by
itself, have any effect on the security of the Internet.

The values defined in this module are expected to be used with the
usmUserTable defined in the SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB [RFC3414]. The
considerations in Section 11.5 of RFC 3414 should be taken into
account.

10. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to assign has assigned an OID for the MIB as follows.

+--------------------+-------------------------+
| Descriptor | OBJECT IDENTIFIER value |
+--------------------+-------------------------+
| snmpUsmHmacSha2MIB | { snmpModules nn 235 } |
+--------------------+-------------------------+

Table 2: OID of MIB

with nn appearing in the MIB module definition in Section 8.

Furthermore, IANA is requested to assign has assigned a value in the SnmpAuthProtocols
registry for each of the following protocols.

Table 3: Code points assigned Points Assigned to HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols

-- RFC Ed.: replace YYYY with actual RFC number and remove this line

with aa, bb, cc, etc. appearing in the MIB module definition in
Section 8. Authentication Protocols

11. References

11.1. Normative References

[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, DOI
10.17487/RFC2104, February
1997. 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997. 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC2578] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Structure of Management Information
Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2578, April 1999. 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2578>.

[RFC2579] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Textual Conventions for SMIv2", STD
58, RFC 2579, DOI 10.17487/RFC2579, April 1999. 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2579>.

[RFC2580] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Conformance Statements for SMIv2",
STD 58, RFC 2580, DOI 10.17487/RFC2580, April 1999. 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2580>.

[RFC3414] Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model
(USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414, DOI 10.17487/
RFC3414, December 2002.

[SHA] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, March 2012. 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3414>.

[RFC6234] Eastlate Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, DOI
10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011. 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.

[SHA] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, DOI 10.6028/
NIST.FIPS.180-4, March 2012,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.

11.2. Informative References

[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992. 1992,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321>.

[RFC3410] Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart,
"Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet-
Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410, DOI 10.17487/
RFC3410, December 2002. 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3410>.

[RFC3411] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An
Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62, RFC 3411,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3411, December 2002. 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3411>.

[RFC3417] Presuhn, R., Ed., "Transport Mappings for the Simple
Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3417, DOI
10.17487/RFC3417, December
2002. 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3417>.

[BCK] Bellare, M., Canetti, R., and H. Krawczyk, "Keyed Hash
Functions for Message Authentication", Advances in
Cryptology - CRYPTO 99, 96, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
1109, Springer Verlag, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, DOI
10.1007/3-540-68697-5_1, 1996.

Authors' Addresses

Johannes Merkle (editor)
Secunet Security Networks
Mergenthaler Allee 77
65760 Eschborn
Germany

Phone: +49 201 5454 3091
EMail:
Email: johannes.merkle@secunet.com
Manfred Lochter
BSI
Postfach 200363
53133 Bonn
Germany

Phone: +49 228 9582 5643
EMail:
Email: manfred.lochter@bsi.bund.de