Network Working GroupInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. AldrinInternet-DraftRequest for Comments: 7882 Google,Inc Intended status:Inc. Category: Informational C. PignataroExpires: November 7, 2016ISSN: 2070-1721 Cisco G. Mirsky Ericsson N. Kumar CiscoMay 6,July 2016 Seamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (S-BFD) Use Casesdraft-ietf-bfd-seamless-use-case-08Abstract This document describes various use cases foraSeamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection(S-BFD),(S-BFD) and provides requirements such that protocol mechanisms allow forasimplified detection of forwarding failures. These use cases support S-BFD,aswhich is a simplified mechanismto use Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)for using BFD with a largeportionsproportion of negotiation aspects eliminated, accelerating the establishment of a BFD session.S-BFDThe benefits of S- BFD include quickprovisioningprovisioning, as well as improved control and flexibilitytofor network nodes initiatingthepath monitoring. 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Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2....................................................3 1.1. Terminology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3................................................3 2. Introduction to Seamless BFD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4....................................4 3. Use Cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.......................................................5 3.1. Unidirectional Forwarding Path Validation. . . . . . . . 5..................5 3.2. Validation of the Forwarding PathPriorprior to Switching Traffic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6..........................................6 3.3. Centralized Traffic Engineering. . . . . . . . . . . . . 7............................7 3.4. BFD in Centralized Segment Routing. . . . . . . . . . . 8.........................8 3.5. Efficient BFD Operation under Resource Constraints. . . 8.........8 3.6. BFD for Anycast Addresses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8..................................8 3.7. BFD Fault Isolation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9........................................9 3.8. Multiple BFD Sessions to the Same Target Node. . . . . . 9..............9 3.9. An MPLS BFD SessionPerper ECMP Path. . . . . . . . . . . . 10.........................10 4. Detailed Requirements foraSeamless BFD. . . . . . . . . . 10.........................11 5. Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12........................................12 6.IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 9.References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 9.1......................................................12 6.1. Normative References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 9.2.......................................12 6.2. Informative References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13....................................13 Acknowledgements ..................................................15 Contributors ......................................................15 Authors' Addresses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14................................................15 1. Introduction Bidirectional Forwarding Detection(BFD) is a lightweight protocol,(BFD), as defined in [RFC5880], is a lightweight protocol used to detect forwarding failures. Variousprotocolsprotocols, applications, andapplicationsclients rely on BFDas its clientsfor failure detection. Even though the protocol is lightweight and simple, there are certain use cases where fastersetting upsetup of sessions and faster continuitycheckchecks of thedata forwardingdata-forwarding pathsisare necessary. This document identifies these use cases and consequent requirements, such that enhancements and extensions result in a Seamless BFD (S-BFD) protocol. BFD is a simple and lightweight "Hello" protocol to detectdata planedata-plane failures. With dynamic provisioning of forwarding paths on a large scale, establishing BFD sessions for each of those paths not only creates operationalcomplexity,complexity but also causes undesirable delay in establishing or deleting sessions. The existing session establishment mechanism of the BFD protocol has to be enhanced in order to minimize the time for the session to come up to validate the forwarding path. This document specifically identifies various use cases and corresponding requirements in order to enhance BFD and other supporting protocols. Specifically, one key goal is removing the time delay (i.e., the "seam") between when a network node wants to perform a continuity test and when the node completes that continuity test. Consequently, "Seamless BFD" (S-BFD) has been chosen as the name for this mechanism. While the identified requirements could meet various use cases, it is outside the scope of this document to identify all of the possible and necessary requirements. Solutions related to the identifiedusesuse cases andprotocol specificprotocol-specific enhancements or proposals are outside the scope of this document as well. Protocol definitions to support these use cases can be foundat [I-D.ietf-bfd-seamless-base]in [RFC7880] and[I-D.ietf-bfd-seamless-ip].[RFC7881]. 1.1. Terminology The reader is expected to be familiar with the BFD [RFC5880], IP[RFC0791][RFC791] [RFC2460], MPLS [RFC3031], and Segment Routing(SR) [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing] terminologies[SR-ARCH] terms and protocol constructs.1.2. Requirements LanguageThe key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 2. Introduction to Seamless BFD BFD, as defined in [RFC5880], requires two network nodes to exchange locally allocated discriminators. These discriminators enable the identification of the sender and the receiver of BFD packets over the particular session. Subsequently, BFD performs proactive continuity monitoring of the forwarding path between the two. Several specifications describe BFD's multiple deployment uses: o [RFC5881] defines BFD over IPv4 and IPv6 for single IPhopshops. o [RFC5883] defines BFD overmultihop pathsmulti-hop paths. o [RFC5884] defines BFD for MPLS Label Switched Paths(LSPs)(LSPs). o [RFC5885] defines BFD for MPLS Pseudowires(PWs)(PWs). Currently, BFD is best suitedto verifyfor verifying that two endpoints are mutually reachable or that an existing connection continues to be up and alive. In order for BFD to be able to initially verify that a connection is valid and that it connects the expected set of endpoints, it is necessary to provide each endpoint with the discriminators associated with the connection at each endpoint prior to initiating BFD sessions. The discriminators are used to verify that the connection is up andverifiable.valid. Currently, the exchange of discriminators and the demultiplexing of the initial BFD packetsisare application dependent. If this information is already known to theend-pointsendpoints of a potential BFD session, the initial handshake including an exchange of discriminators isunnecessaryunnecessary, and it is possible for the endpoints to begin BFD messaging seamlessly. A key objective of the S-BFD use cases described in this document is to avoid needing to exchange the initial packets before the BFD session can be established, with the goal of getting to the established state more quickly; in other words, the initial exchange of discriminator information is an unnecessary extra step that may be avoided for these cases. In a given scenario, an entity (such as anoperator,operator or a centralized controller) determines a set of network entities to which BFD sessions might need to be established. In traditional BFD, each of those network entities chooses a BFDdiscriminatorDiscriminator for each BFD session that the entity will participate in (see Section 6.3 of [RFC5880]). However, a key goal ofa Seamless BFDS-BFD is to provide operational simplification. In this context, for S-BFD, each of those network entities is assigned one or more BFDdiscriminators,Discriminators, andallowingthose network entities are allowed to use onediscriminatorDiscriminator value for multiple sessions. Therefore, there may be only one or a few discriminators assigned to a node. These network entities will create an S-BFD listener session instance that listens for incoming BFDcontrolControl packets. When the mappings between specific network entities and their corresponding BFDdiscriminatorsDiscriminators are known to other network nodes belonging to the same administrative domain, then, without having received any BFDpacketpackets from a particular target, a network entity in this network is able to send a BFDcontrolControl packet to the target's assigned discriminator in the Your Discriminator field. The target network node, upon reception of such a BFDcontrolControl packet, will transmit a response BFDcontrolControl packet back to the sender. 3. Use Cases As per the BFD protocol [RFC5880], BFD sessions are established using a handshake mechanism prior to validating the forwarding path. This section outlines some use cases where the existing mechanism may not be able to satisfy the requirements identified. In addition, some of the use cases also stress the need for expedited BFD session establishment while preserving the benefits of forwarding failure detection using existing BFDmechanics.mechanisms. Both of these high-level goals result in the S-BFD usecases.cases outlined in this document. 3.1. Unidirectional Forwarding Path Validation Even though bidirectional verification of forwardingpathpaths is useful, there are scenarios where verification is only required in one direction between a pair of nodes. One such caseis,is when a static route uses BFD to validate reachability to the next-hop IP router. In this case, the static route is established from one network entity to another. The requirement in this case is only to validate the forwarding path for that statically established unidirectional path. Validation of the forwarding path in the direction of the target entity to the originating entity is notrequired,required in this scenario. Many LSPs have the same unidirectional characteristics and unidirectional validation requirements. Such LSPs are common in Segment Routing andLDP basedLDP-based MPLS networks. A final example is when a unidirectional tunnel uses BFD to validate the reachability of an egress node. Additionally,there are operational implications tovalidation of the unidirectional pathvalidation.has operational implications. Ifthetraditional BFD is to be used, the target networkentity has to be provisionedentity, as well as an initiator, has to be provisioned, even thoughthe reverse pathreverse-path validation with the BFD session is not required. However, in the case of unidirectional BFD, there is no need for provisioning on the target networkentity,entity -- only on the sourceone.entity. In this use case, a BFD session could be established in a single direction. When thetargetedtarget network entity receives the packet, itidentitiesidentifies the packet as BFD in an application-specific manner (for example, a destination UDP port number). Subsequently, the BFD module processes the packet, using the Your Discriminator value as context. Then, the network entity sends a response to the originator. This does not necessitate the requirement for establishment of abi-directional session, hencebidirectional session; hence, thetwo waytwo-way handshake to exchange discriminators is not needed. The target node does not need to know the My Discriminator value of the source node. Thus, in this use case a requirement for BFDfor this use caseis to enable session establishment from the source network entity to the target network entity without the need to have a session (and state) for the reverse direction. Further, another requirement is that the BFD response from the target back to the sender can take any (in-band or out-of-band) path. The BFD module in the target network entity (for the BFD session), upon receipt of a BFD packet, starts processing the BFD packet based on the discriminator received. The source network entity can therefore establish a unidirectional BFD session without the bidirectional handshake and exchange of discriminators for session establishment. 3.2. Validation of the Forwarding PathPriorprior to Switching TrafficThisIn this usecase is whencase, BFD is used to verify reachability before sending traffic via a path/LSP. This comeswithat acost, which is thatcost: traffic is preventedto usefrom using the path/LSP until BFD is able to validatethe reachability, whichreachability; this could take seconds due to BFD session bring-up sequences [RFC5880], LSPpingPing bootstrapping [RFC5884], etc. This use case would be better supported by eliminating the need for the initial BFD session negotiation. All it takes to be able to send BFD packets to atarget,target and for the target to properlydemultiplexing these,demultiplex these packets is for the source network entities to know whatthe discriminatorDiscriminator valuestowill be used for the session.The sameThis is also the case for S-BFD: the three-way handshake mechanism is eliminated during thebootstrapbootstrapping of BFD sessions. However, this information is required at each entity to verify that BFD messages are being received from the expectedend-points, henceendpoints; hence, the handshake mechanism serves no purpose. Elimination of the unnecessary handshake mechanism allows for faster reachability validation of BFD provisioned paths/LSPs. In addition, it is expected that some MPLS technologies will requiretraffic engineeredtraffic-engineered LSPs to be created dynamically, perhaps driven by external applications,as e.g.as, for example, inSoftware Defined NetworksSoftware-Defined Networking (SDN). It will be desirable to perform BFD validation as soon as the LSPs are created, so as to use them. In order to support this use case, an S-BFD session is established without the need for session negotiation and exchange of discriminators. 3.3. Centralized Traffic Engineering Various technologies in the SDN domain that involve controller-based networks have evolved such that the intelligence, traditionally placed in a distributed and dynamic control plane, is separated from the networking entities themselves; instead, it resides in a (logically) centralized place. There are various controllers that perform the functionin establishmentof establishing forwarding paths for the data flow. Traffic engineering(TE)is one important function, where the path of the traffic flow is engineered, depending upon various attributes and constraints of the traffic paths as well as the network state. When the intelligence of the network resides in a centralized entity, the ability to manage and maintain the dynamicnetworknetwork, and its multiple data paths and nodereachabilityreachability, becomes a challenge. One way to ensure that the forwarding paths are valid and working is done by validation using BFD. Whentraffic engineeredtraffic-engineered tunnels are created, it is operationally critical to ensure that the forwarding paths are working, prior to switching the traffic onto the engineered tunnels. In the absence of distributedcontrol planecontrol-plane protocols, it may be desirable to verify any arbitrary forwarding path in the network. With tunnels being engineered by a centralized entity, when the network state changes, traffic has to be switched with minimum latency and without black-holing of the data. It is highly desirable in this centralizedtraffic engineeringtraffic-engineering use case that the traditional BFD session establishment and validation of the forwarding pathdoesdo not become a bottleneck. If the controller or other centralized entity is able to very rapidly verify the forwarding path of atraffic engineeredtraffic-engineered tunnel, it could steer the traffic onto thetraffic engineeredtraffic-engineered tunnel veryquicklyquickly, thus minimizing adverseeffecteffects on a service. This is even more useful and necessary when the scale of the network and the number oftraffic engineeredtraffic-engineered tunnelsgrows.grow. The cost associated with the time required for BFD session negotiation and establishment of BFD sessions to identify valid paths is very high when providing network redundancy is a critical issue. 3.4. BFD in Centralized Segment Routing A monitoring techniqueoffor a Segment Routing network based on a centralized controller is described in[I-D.ietf-spring-oam-usecase].[SR-MPLS]. SpecificOAMOperations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) requirements for Segment Routing are captured in[I-D.ietf-spring-sr-oam-requirement].[SR-OAM-REQS]. In validating this use case, one of the requirements is to ensure that the BFD packet's behavior is according to the monitoring specified for thesegment,segment and that the packet is U-turned at the expected node. Thiscriteriacriterion ensures the continuity check to the adjacentsegment-id.Segment Identifier. To support this use case, the operational requirement is for BFD, initiated from a centralized controller, to perform liveness detection for any given segmentunderin its domain. 3.5. Efficient BFD Operation under Resource Constraints When BFD sessions are beingsetup,set up, torndowndown, or modified (i.e., when parameters such asintervalintervals andmultipliermultipliers are being modified), BFD requires additionalpacketspackets, other than scheduled packettransmissionstransmissions, to complete the negotiation procedures (i.e.,P/F bits).Poll (P) bits and Final (F) bits; see Section 4.1 of [RFC5880]). There are scenarios where network resources are constrained: a node may require BFD to monitor a very large number of paths, or BFD may need to operate inlow poweredlow-powered andtraffic sensitivetraffic-sensitive networks; these includemicrowave, low powered nano-cells,microwave systems, low-powered nanocells, and others. In these scenarios, it is desirable for BFD to slow down, speed up, stop, or resumeat-at will and with a minimal number of additional BFD packets exchanged to modify the session or establish a new one. The established BFD sessionparametersparameters, and such attributeslikeas transmissioninterval,interval and receiver interval,etc.,need to be modifiable without changing the state of the session. 3.6. BFD for Anycast Addresses The BFD protocol requires two endpoints to host BFD sessions, both sending packets to each other. This BFD model does not fit well with anycast address monitoring, as BFD packets transmitted from a network node to an anycast address will reach only one of potentially many network nodes hosting the anycast address. This use case verifies that a source node can send a packet to an anycastaddress,address and that the target node to which the packet is delivered can send a response packet to the source node. Traditional BFD cannot fulfill this requirement, since it does not provide for a set of BFD agents to collectively form one endpoint of a BFD session. The concept of aTarget Listener"target listener" in S-BFDsolvesfulfills this requirement. To support this use case, the BFD sender transmits BFD packets, which are received by any of the nodes hosting the anycast address to which the BFD packets are being sent. The anycast target that receives the BFDpacket,packet responds. This use case does not implytheBFD session establishment with every node hosting the anycast address. Consequently, in thisany castanycast use case, target nodes that do not happen to receive any of the BFD packets do not need to maintain any state, and the source node does not need to maintain separate state for each target node. 3.7. BFD Fault Isolation BFD formultihopmulti-hop paths [RFC5883] and BFD for MPLS LSPs [RFC5884] perform end-to-end validation, traversing multiple network nodes. BFD has been designed to declare a failureupon lackto receive some number of consecutivepacket reception, whichpackets. This failure can be caused by a fault anywhere along thesepath.paths. Fast failure detection allows for rapid fault detection and consequent rapid path recovery procedures. However, operators often have to follow up, manually or automatically, to attempt to identify and localize the fault that caused BFD sessions to fail (i.e., fault isolation).TheIf Equal-Cost Multipath (ECMP) is used, the usage of other tools to isolate the fault (e.g., traceroute) may cause the packets to traverse a different path through thenetwork, if Equal-Cost Multipath (ECMP) is used.network. In addition, the longer it takes from the time of BFD session failure tostartingthe time that faultisolation,isolation begins, the more likelythatthe fault will not beable to beisolated (e.g., a faultcan getmay be corrected via rerouting orrouted around).some other means during that time). If BFD had built-infault isolationfault-isolation capability, fault isolationcan getwould be triggeredatwhen theearliest sign offaultdetection.was first detected. This embedded fault isolationwillwould be more effectivewhen(i.e., faults would be detected sooner) if those BFDfault isolationfault-isolation packetsare load balancedwere load-balanced in the same way as the BFD packets that weredropped, detecting the fault.dropped. This use case describes S-BFDfault isolationfault-isolation capabilities, utilizing a TTL field (e.g., as described in Section 5.1.1 of[I-D.ietf-bfd-seamless-ip])[RFC7881]) or usingstatus indicating fields.fields that indicate status. 3.8. Multiple BFD Sessions to the Same Target Node BFD is capable of providing very fast failure detection, as relevant network nodes continuously transmit BFD packets at the negotiated rate. If BFD packet transmission is interrupted, even for a very short period of time, BFD can declare a failure irrespective of pathliveliness. It is possible, onliveness. On a system where BFD is running, it is possible for certain events to (intentionally or unintentionally)tocause ashortbrief interruption of BFD packet transmissions. With distributed architectures of BFD implementations, this case can beprotected. In this case, theprevented. This use caseofis for an S-BFD node running multiple BFD sessions toa targets,the same target node, with those sessions hosted on different system modules (e.g., in different CPU instances). This can reduceBFDfalse failures, resulting in a more stable network. To support this use case, a mapping between the multiple discriminators on a singlesystem,system and the specific entity withinthethat system is required. 3.9. An MPLS BFD SessionPerper ECMP Path BFD for MPLS LSPs, defined in [RFC5884], describes proceduresto runfor running BFD as an LSP in-band continuity checkmechanism, through usage ofmechanism by using MPLSecho requestEcho Request messages [RFC4379] to bootstrap the BFD session on the target (i.e., egress) node. Section 4 of [RFC5884] also describesathe possibility of running multiple BFD sessions per alternativepathsofLSP.LSPs. [RFC7726] furtherclarifiedclarifies the procedures,bothfor both ingress and egress nodes,ofregarding how to bootstrap, maintain, and remove multiple BFD sessions for the same <MPLS LSP, FEC>tuple.tuple ("FEC" means Forwarding Equivalence Class). However, this mechanism still requires the use of MPLS LSP Ping for bootstrapping,round-tripsround trips for initialization, and keeping state at the receiver. In the presence of ECMP within an MPLS LSP, it may be desirable to run in-band monitoring that exercises every path of this ECMP.OtherwiseOtherwise, there will be scenarios where an in-band BFD session remains up through one path but traffic is black-holing over another path. A BFD session per ECMP path of an LSP requires the definition of procedures that update [RFC5884] in terms of how to bootstrap and maintain the correct set of BFD sessions on the egress node. However, for traditional BFD, that requires the constant use of MPLS Echo Request messages to create and delete BFD sessions on the egressnode,node when ECMP paths and/or correspondingload balanceload-balance hash keys change. If a BFD session over any paths of the LSP can be instantiated,stoppedstopped, and resumed without requiring additional proceduresoffor bootstrapping via an MPLSecho requestEcho Request message, it would greatly simplify both implementations andoperations,operations andbenefitswould benefit networkdevicesdevices, as less processingarewould be required by them. To support this requirement, multiple S-BFD sessions need to be established over different ECMP pathsfrombetween the same pair of sourcetoand targetnode.nodes. 4. Detailed Requirements foraSeamless BFDREQ#1: AREQ 1: Upon receipt of an S-BFD packet, a target network entity (for the S-BFDsession), upon receipt of the S-BFD packet,session) MUST process the packet based on the discriminator received in the BFD packet. If the S-BFD context is found, the target network entity MUST be able to send a response.REQ#2:REQ 2: The source network entity MUST be able to establish a unidirectional S-BFD session without the bidirectional handshake of discriminators for session establishment.REQ#3:REQ 3: The S-BFD session MUST be able to be established without the need for the exchange of discriminatorsinduring session negotiation.REQ#4:REQ 4: In a Segment Routed network, S-BFD MUST be able to perform liveness detection initiated from a centralized controller for any given segmentunderin its domain.REQ#5:REQ 5: The established S-BFD session parameters and attributes, such as transmissioninterval,interval and reception interval,etc.,MUST be modifiable without changing the state of the session.REQ#6:REQ 6: An S-BFD source network entity MUST be able to sendS-BFD controlControl packets to an anycastaddress whichaddress. These packets are received and processed by any node hostingthat address, and mustthe anycast address. The S-BFD entity MUST be able to receive responses to S-BFD Control packets from any of these anycast nodes, without establishing a separateBFDS-BFD session with every nodehosinghosting the anycast address.REQ#7:REQ 7: S-BFD SHOULD supportfault isolationfault-isolation capability, which MAY be triggered when a fault is encountered.REQ#8:REQ 8: S-BFD SHOULD be able to establish multiple sessions between the same pair of source and target nodes. This requirement enables but does not guarantee the ability to monitordivergedivergent paths in ECMP environments. It also provides resiliency in distributed router architectures. The mapping between BFDdiscriminatorsDiscriminators and particular entities (e.g., ECMP paths,or Line Cards)line cards) is outthe scopeof scope for the S-BFDspecification. REQ#9:protocol. REQ 9: The S-BFD protocol MUST provide mechanisms for loop detection and prevention, protecting against malicious attacks attempting to create packet loops.REQ#10:REQ 10: S-BFD MUST incorporate robust security protections against impersonators,malicionsmalicious actors, and various active and passive attacks. The simple and accelerated establishment of an S-BFD session should not negatively affect security. 5. Security Considerations This document detailstheuse cases for S-BFD and identifies various associated requirements. Some of these requirements are security related. The use caseshereindescribed herein do not expose a system to abuse ortoadditional security risks. Since some negotiation aspects are eliminated, a misconfiguration can result in S-BFD packets being sent to an incorrect node. If this receiving node runs S-BFD, the packet will bediscarted because of thediscarded due to discriminator mismatch. If the node does not run S-BFD, the packet will be naturally discarded. The proposed new protocols, extensions, and enhancements fora Seamless BFDS-BFD supporting these use cases and realizing these requirements will addresstheassociated security considerations.A Seamless BFDS-BFD should not have reduced security capabilities as compared to traditional BFD. 6.IANA Considerations There are no IANA considerations introduced by this document. 9.References9.1.6.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. [RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>. [RFC5881] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop)", RFC 5881, DOI 10.17487/RFC5881, June 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5881>. [RFC5883] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for Multihop Paths", RFC 5883, DOI 10.17487/RFC5883, June 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5883>. [RFC5884] Aggarwal, R., Kompella, K., Nadeau, T., and G. Swallow, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for MPLS Label Switched Paths (LSPs)", RFC 5884, DOI 10.17487/RFC5884, June 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5884>. [RFC5885] Nadeau, T.,Ed.Ed., and C. Pignataro, Ed., "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for the Pseudowire Virtual Circuit Connectivity Verification (VCCV)", RFC 5885, DOI 10.17487/RFC5885, June 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5885>.9.2.6.2. Informative References[I-D.ietf-bfd-seamless-base] Akiya, N., Pignataro, C., Ward, D., Bhatia, M., and J. Networks, "Seamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (S-BFD)", draft-ietf-bfd-seamless-base-09 (work in progress), April 2016. [I-D.ietf-bfd-seamless-ip] Akiya, N., Pignataro, C., and D. Ward, "Seamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (S-BFD) for IPv4, IPv6 and MPLS", draft-ietf-bfd-seamless-ip-04 (work in progress), April 2016. [I-D.ietf-spring-oam-usecase] Geib, R., Filsfils, C., Pignataro, C., and N. Kumar, "A Scalable and Topology-Aware MPLS Dataplane Monitoring System", draft-ietf-spring-oam-usecase-03 (work in progress), April 2016. [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing] Filsfils, C., Previdi, S., Decraene, B., Litkowski, S., and R. Shakir, "Segment Routing Architecture", draft-ietf- spring-segment-routing-07 (work in progress), December 2015. [I-D.ietf-spring-sr-oam-requirement] Kumar, N., Pignataro, C., Akiya, N., Geib, R., Mirsky, G., and S. Litkowski, "OAM Requirements for Segment Routing Network", draft-ietf-spring-sr-oam-requirement-01 (work in progress), December 2015. [RFC0791][RFC791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, DOI10.17487/RFC0791,10.17487/RFC791, September 1981, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>. [RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460, December 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>. [RFC3031] Rosen, E., Viswanathan, A., and R. Callon, "Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture", RFC 3031, DOI 10.17487/RFC3031, January 2001, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3031>. [RFC4379] Kompella, K. and G. Swallow, "Detecting Multi-Protocol Label Switched (MPLS) Data Plane Failures", RFC 4379, DOI 10.17487/RFC4379, February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4379>. [RFC7726] Govindan, V., Rajaraman, K., Mirsky, G., Akiya, N., and S. Aldrin, "Clarifying Procedures for Establishing BFD Sessions for MPLS Label Switched Paths (LSPs)", RFC 7726, DOI 10.17487/RFC7726, January 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7726>.7.[RFC7880] Pignataro, C., Ward, D., Akiya, N., Bhatia, M., and S. Pallagatti, "Seamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (S-BFD)", RFC 7880, DOI 10.17487/RFC7880, July 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7880>. [RFC7881] Pignataro, C., Ward, D., and N. Akiya, "Seamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (S-BFD) for IPv4, IPv6, and MPLS", RFC 7881, DOI 10.17487/RFC7881, July 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7881>. [SR-ARCH] Filsfils, C., Ed., Previdi, S., Ed., Decraene, B., Litkowski, S., and R. Shakir, "Segment Routing Architecture", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-spring-segment-routing-09, July 2016. [SR-MPLS] Geib, R., Ed., Filsfils, C., Pignataro, C., Ed., and N. Kumar, "A Scalable and Topology-Aware MPLS Dataplane Monitoring System", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-spring-oam-usecase-03, April 2016. [SR-OAM-REQS] Kumar, N., Pignataro, C., Akiya, N., Geib, R., Mirsky, G., and S. Litkowski, "OAM Requirements for Segment Routing Network", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-spring-sr-oam-requirement-02, July 2016. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Tobias Gondrom and EricGray,Gray for their insightful and useful comments. The authors appreciate the thorough review and comments provided by Dale R. Worley.8.Contributors The following are key contributors to this document: Manav Bhatia, Ionos Networks Satoru Matsushima, Softbank Glenn Hayden, ATT Santosh P K Mach Chen, Huawei Nobo Akiya, Big Switch Networks Authors' Addresses Sam Aldrin Google,IncInc. Email: aldrin.ietf@gmail.com Carlos Pignataro Cisco Systems, Inc. Email: cpignata@cisco.com Greg Mirsky Ericsson Email: gregory.mirsky@ericsson.com Nagendra Kumar Cisco Systems, Inc. Email: naikumar@cisco.com