wdiff rfc7908.original rfc7908.txt

Global Routing Operations
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) K. Sriram
Internet-Draft
Request for Comments: 7908 D. Montgomery
Intended status:
Category: Informational US NIST
Expires: November 6, 2016
ISSN: 2070-1721 D. McPherson
E. Osterweil
Verisign, Inc.
B. Dickson
May 5,
June 2016

Problem Definition and Classification of BGP Route Leaks
draft-ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition-06

Abstract

A systemic vulnerability of the Border Gateway Protocol routing
system, known as 'route leaks', "route leaks", has received significant attention in
recent years. Frequent incidents that result in significant
disruptions to Internet routing are labeled "route leaks", route leaks, but to date
a common definition of the term has been lacking. This document
provides a working definition of route leaks, leaks while keeping in mind
the real occurrences that have received significant attention.
Further, this document attempts to enumerate (though not
exhaustively) different types of route leaks based on observed events
on the Internet. The aim is to provide a taxonomy that covers
several forms of route leaks that have been observed and are of
concern to the Internet user community as well as the network
operator community.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft document is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
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This Internet-Draft will expire on November 6, 2016.
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Working Definition of Route Leaks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Classification of Route Leaks Based on Documented Events . . 3
3.1. Type 1: Hairpin Turn with Full Prefix . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Type 2: Lateral ISP-ISP-ISP Leak . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Type 3: Leak of Transit-Provider Prefixes to Peer . . . . 5
3.4. Type 4: Leak of Peer Prefixes to Transit Provider . . . . 5
3.5. Type 5: Prefix Re-Origination Re-origination with Data Path to
Legitimate Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.6. Type 6: Accidental Leak of Internal Prefixes and More More-
Specific Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Additional Comments about the Classification . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. IANA Considerations . . Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11

1. Introduction

Frequent incidents [Huston2012][Cowie2013][Toonk2015-A][Toonk2015-B][
Cowie2010][Madory][Zmijewski][Paseka][LRL][Khare] [Huston2012] [Cowie2013] [Toonk2015-A]
[Toonk2015-B] [Cowie2010] [Madory] [Zmijewski] [Paseka] [LRL] [Khare]
that result in significant disruptions to Internet routing are
commonly called "route leaks". Examination of the details of some of
these incidents reveals that they vary in their form and technical
details. In order to pursue solutions to "the route leak route-leak problem" it
is important to first provide a clear, technical definition of the
problem and enumerate its most common forms. Section 2 provides a
working definition of route leaks, keeping in view many recent
incidents that have received significant attention. Section 3
attempts to enumerate (though not exhaustively) different types of
route leaks based on observed events on the Internet. Further,
Section 3 provides a taxonomy that covers several forms of route
leaks that have been observed and are of concern to the Internet user
community as well as the network operator community. This document
builds on and extends earlier work in the IETF [draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-def][draft-di
ckson-sidr-route-leak-reqts]. [ROUTE-LEAK-DEF]
[ROUTE-LEAK-REQ].

2. Working Definition of Route Leaks

A proposed working definition of route leak "route leak" is as follows:

A "route leak" route leak is the propagation of routing announcement(s) beyond
their intended scope. That is, an AS's announcement from an Autonomous
System (AS) of a learned BGP route to another AS is in violation of
the intended policies of the receiver, the sender sender, and/or one of the
ASes along the preceding AS path. The intended scope is usually
defined by a set of local redistribution/filtering policies
distributed among the ASes involved. Often, these intended policies
are defined in terms of the pair-wise peering business relationship
between ASes (e.g., customer, transit provider, peer). (For For
literature related to AS relationships and routing policies, see [Gao] [Luckie]
[Gao], [Luckie], and [Gill]. For measurements of valley-free
violations in Internet routing, see [Anwar] [Giotsas]
[Wijchers].) [Anwar], [Giotsas], and
[Wijchers].

The result of a route leak can be redirection of traffic through an
unintended path which that may enable eavesdropping or traffic analysis, analysis and
may or may not result in an overload or black-hole. black hole. Route leaks can
be accidental or malicious, malicious but most often arise from accidental
misconfigurations.

The above definition is not intended to be all encompassing. Our aim
here is to have a working definition that fits enough observed
incidents so that the IETF community has a basis for developing
solutions for route leak route-leak detection and mitigation.

3. Classification of Route Leaks Based on Documented Events

As illustrated in Figure 1, a common form of route leak occurs when a
multi-homed
multihomed customer AS (such as AS3 in Figure 1) learns a prefix
update from one transit provider (ISP1) and leaks the update to
another transit provider (ISP2) in violation of intended routing
policies, and further further, the second transit provider does not detect
the leak and propagates the leaked update to its customers, peers,
and transit ISPs.

Figure 1: Illustration of the basic notion Basic Notion of a route leak. Route Leak

This document proposes the following taxonomy to cover several types
of observed route leaks, leaks while acknowledging that the list is not
meant to be exhaustive. In what follows, the AS that announces a
route that is in violation of the intended policies is referred to as
the "offending AS".

3.1. Type 1: Hairpin Turn with Full Prefix

Description: A multi-homed multihomed AS learns a route from one upstream ISP and
simply propagates it to another upstream ISP (the turn essentially
resembling a hairpin). Neither the prefix nor the AS path in the
update is altered. This is similar to a straight forward
path-poisoning straightforward path-
poisoning attack [Kapela-Pilosov], but with full prefix. It should
be noted that leaks of this type are often accidental (i.e. (i.e., not
malicious). The update basically makes a hairpin turn at the
offending AS's multi-homed multihomed AS. The leak often succeeds (i.e. (i.e., the
leaked update is accepted and propagated) because the second ISP
prefers customer announcement over peer announcement of the same
prefix. Data packets would reach the legitimate destination destination, albeit
via the offending AS, unless they are dropped at the offending AS due
to its inability to handle resulting large volumes of traffic.

o Example incidents: Examples of Type 1 route-leak incidents are (1)
the Dodo-Telstra incident in March 2012 [Huston2012], (2) the
VolumeDrive-Atrato incident in September 2014 [Madory], and (3)
the massive Telekom Malaysia route leak of about 179,000 prefixes,
which in turn Level3 accepted and propagated [Toonk2015-B].

3.2. Type 2: Lateral ISP-ISP-ISP Leak

Description: The term "lateral" here is synonymous with "non-transit"
or "peer-to-peer". This type of route leak typically occurs when,
for example, three sequential ISP peers (e.g. (e.g., ISP-A, ISP-B, and ISP-
C)
ISP-C) are involved, and ISP-B receives a route from ISP-A and in
turn leaks it to ISP-C. The typical routing policy between laterally
(i.e.
(i.e., non-transit) peering ISPs is that they should only propagate
to each other their respective customer prefixes.

o Example incidents: In [Mauch-nanog][Mauch], [Mauch-nanog] and [Mauch], route leaks of
this type are reported by monitoring updates in the global BGP
system and finding three or more very large ISP ASNs Autonomous System
Networks (ASNs) in a sequence in a BGP update's AS path. [Mauch]
observes that its detection algorithm detects for these anomalies
and potentially route leaks because very large ISPs do not not, in general
general, buy transit services from each other. However, it also
notes that there are exceptions when one very large ISP does
indeed buy transit from another very large ISP, and accordingly accordingly,
exceptions are made in its detection algorithm for known cases.

3.3. Type 3: Leak of Transit-Provider Prefixes to Peer

Description: This type of route leak occurs when an offending AS
leaks routes learned from its transit provider to a lateral (i.e. (i.e.,
non-transit) peer.

o Example incidents: The incidents reported in [Mauch] include the
Type 3 leaks.

3.4. Type 4: Leak of Peer Prefixes to Transit Provider

Description: This type of route leak occurs when an offending AS
leaks routes learned from a lateral (i.e. (i.e., non-transit) peer to its
(the AS's) own transit provider. These leaked routes typically
originate from the customer cone of the lateral peer.

o Example incidents: Examples of Type 4 route-leak incidents are (1)
the Axcelx-Hibernia route leak of Amazon Web Services (AWS)
prefixes causing disruption of AWS and a variety of services that
run on AWS [Kephart],(2) [Kephart], (2) the Hathway-Airtel route leak of 336
Google prefixes causing widespread interruption of Google services
in Europe and Asia [Toonk2015-A], (3) the Moratel-PCCW route leak
of Google prefixes causing Google's services to go offline
[Paseka], and (4) Some some of the example incidents cited for Type 1
route leaks above are also inclusive of Type 4 route leaks. For
instance, in the Dodo-Telstra incident [Huston2012], the leaked
routes from Dodo to Telstra included routes that Dodo learned from
its transit providers as well as lateral peers.

3.5. Type 5: Prefix Re-Origination Re-origination with Data Path to Legitimate Origin

Description: A multi-homed multihomed AS learns a route from one upstream ISP and
announces the prefix to another upstream ISP as if it is being
originated by it (i.e. (i.e., strips the received AS path, path and re-originates
the prefix). This can be called re-origination or mis-origination.
However, somehow a reverse path to the legitimate origination AS may
be present and data packets reach the legitimate destination albeit
via the offending AS. (Note: The presence of a reverse path here is
not attributable to the use of path poisoning a path-poisoning trick by the
offending AS.) But sometimes the reverse path may not be present,
and data packets destined for the leaked prefix may be simply
discarded at the offending AS.

o Example incidents: Examples of Type 5 route leak include (1) the
China Telecom incident in April 2010 [Hiran][Cowie2010][Labovitz], [Hiran] [Cowie2010]
[Labovitz], (2) the Belarusian GlobalOneBel route leak route-leak incidents
in February-
March February-March 2013 and May 2013 [Cowie2013], (3) the Icelandic
Opin Kerfi-
Simmin route leak Kerfi-Simmin route-leak incidents in July-August 2013
[Cowie2013], and (4) the Indosat route leak route-leak incident in April 2014
[Zmijewski]. The reverse paths (i.e. (i.e., data paths from the
offending AS to the legitimate destinations) were present in
incidents #1, #2 #2, and #3 cited above, but not in incident #4. In
incident #4, the misrouted data packets were dropped at Indosat's
AS.

3.6. Type 6: Accidental Leak of Internal Prefixes and More Specific More-Specific
Prefixes

Description: An offending AS simply leaks its internal prefixes to
one or more of its transit-provider ASes and/or ISP peers. The
leaked internal prefixes are often more specific more-specific prefixes subsumed by
an already announced less specific announced, less-specific prefix. The more specific more-specific
prefixes were not intended to be routed in eBGP. External BGP (eBGP).
Further, the AS receiving those leaks fails to filter them.
Typically, these leaked announcements are due to some transient
failures within the AS; they are short-lived and typically withdrawn
quickly following the announcements. However, these more specific more-specific
prefixes may momentarily cause the routes to be preferred over other
aggregate (i.e. (i.e., less specific) route announcements, thus redirecting
traffic from its normal best path.

o Example incidents: Leaks of internal routes occur frequently (e.g.
(e.g., multiple times in a week), and the number of prefixes
leaked range from hundreds to thousands per incident. One highly
conspicuous and widely disruptive leak of internal routes happened
in August 2014 when AS701 and AS705 leaked about 22,000 more
specifics of
already announced already-announced aggregates [Huston2014][Toonk2014]. [Huston2014]
[Toonk2014].

4. Additional Comments about the Classification

It is worth noting that Types 1 through 4 are similar in that a route
is leaked in violation of policy in each case, but what varies is the
context of the leaked-route source AS and destination AS roles.

A Type 5 route leak (i.e. (i.e., prefix mis-origination with data path to
legitimate origin) can also happen in conjunction with the AS
relationship contexts in Types 2, 3, and 4. While these
possibilities are acknowledged, simply enumerating more types to
consider all such special cases does not add value as far as solution
development for route leaks is concerned. Hence, the special cases
mentioned here are not included in enumerating route leak route-leak types.

5. Security Considerations

No security considerations apply since this is a problem definition
document.

6. IANA Considerations

This document does not require an action from IANA.

7. Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Jared Mauch, Jeff Haas, Warren Kumari,
Amogh Dhamdhere, Jakob Heitz, Geoff Huston, Randy Bush, Job Snijders,
Ruediger Volk, Andrei Robachevsky, Charles van Niman, Chris Morrow,
and Sandy Murphy for comments, suggestions, and critique. The
authors are also thankful to Padma Krishnaswamy, Oliver Borchert, and
Okhee Kim for their comments and review.

8. Informative References

[Anwar] Anwar, R., Niaz, H., Choffnes, D., Cunha, I., Gill, P.,
and N. Katz-Bassett, "Investigating Interdomain Routing
Policies in the Wild", In Proceedings of the 2015 ACM
Conference on Internet Measurement Conference (IMC),
DOI 10.1145/2815675.2815712, October 2015,
<http://www.cs.usc.edu/assets/007/94928.pdf>.

[Cowie2010]
Cowie, J., "China's 18 Minute Mystery", Dyn
Research/Renesys Research: The
New Home of Renesys Blog, November 2010,
<http://research.dyn.com/2010/11/
chinas-18-minute-mystery/>.

[Cowie2013]
Cowie, J., "The New Threat: Targeted Internet Traffic
Misdirection", Dyn Research/Renesys Research: The New Home of Renesys Blog,
November 2013, <http://research.dyn.com/2013/11/
mitm-internet-hijacking/>.

[draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-def]
Dickson, B., "Route Leaks -- Definitions", IETF Internet
Draft (expired), October 2012,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-dickson-sidr-route-
leak-def-03>.

[draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-reqts]
Dickson, B., "Route Leaks -- Requirements for Detection
and Prevention thereof", IETF Internet Draft (expired),
March 2012, <http://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-reqts-02>.

[Gao] Gao, L. and J. Rexford, "Stable Internet routing without
global coordination", Routing Without
Global Coordination", IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Networking, Networking
(TON), Volume 9, Issue 6, pp 689-692,
DOI 10.1109/90.974523, December 2001,
<http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~jrex/papers/
sigmetrics00.long.pdf>.

[Gill] Gill, P., Schapira, M., and S. Goldberg, "A Survey of
Interdomain Routing Policies", ACM SIGCOMM Computer
Communication Review, Volume 44, Issue 1, pp 28-34,
DOI 10.1145/2567561.2567566, January 2014,
<http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/survey.pdf>.

[Giotsas] Giotsas, V. and S. Zhou, "Valley-free violation in
Internet routing - Analysis based on BGP Community data",
2012 IEEE ICC 2012, International Conference on
Communications (ICC), DOI 10.1109/ICC.2012.6363987, June
2012.

[Hiran] Hiran, R., Carlsson, N., and P. Gill, "Characterizing
Large-scale
Large-Scale Routing Anomalies: A Case Study of the China
Telecom Incident", PAM In Proceedings of the 14th
International Conference on Passive and Active Measurement
(PAM) 2013, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-36516-4_23, March 2013,
<http://www3.cs.stonybrook.edu/~phillipa/papers/
CTelecom.html>.

[Huston2012]
Huston, G., "Leaking Routes", Asia Pacific Network
Information Centre (APNIC) Blog, March 2012,
<http://labs.apnic.net/blabs/?p=139/>.

[Huston2014]
Huston, G., "What's so special about 512?", Asia Pacific
Network Information Centre (APNIC) Blog, September 2014,
<http://labs.apnic.net/blabs/?p=520/>.

[Kapela-Pilosov]
Pilosov, A. and T. Kapela, "Stealing the Internet: An
Internet-Scale Man in the Middle Attack", DEFCON-16 Las
Vegas, NV, USA, 16th
Defcon Conference, August 2008,
<https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-16/dc16-
presentations/defcon-16-pilosov-kapela.pdf>.

[Kephart] Kephart, N., "Route Leak Causes Amazon and AWS Outage",
ThousandEyes Blog, June 2015,
<https://blog.thousandeyes.com/route-leak-causes-amazon-
and-aws-outage>.

[Khare] Khare, V., Ju, Q., and B. Zhang, "Concurrent Prefix
Hijacks: Occurrence and Impacts", IMC 2012, Boston, MA, In Proceedings of the
2013 ACM Conference on Internet Measurement Conference
(IMC), DOI 10.1145/2398776.2398780, November 2012,
<http://www.cs.arizona.edu/~bzhang/
paper/12-imc-hijack.pdf>.

[Labovitz]
Labovitz, C., "Additional Discussion of the April China
BGP Hijack Incident", Arbor Networks IT Security Blog,
November 2010,
<http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2010/11/additional-
discussion-of-the-april-china-bgp-hijack-incident/>.

[LRL] Khare, V., Ju, Q., and B. Zhang, "Large Route Leaks",
Project web page,
University of Arizona (UA) Network Research Lab: Projects
Webpage, 2012, <http://nrl.cs.arizona.edu/projects/
lsrl-events-from-2003-to-2009/>.

[Luckie] Luckie, M., Huffaker, B., Dhamdhere, A., Giotsas, V., and
kc. claffy, "AS Relationships, Customer Cones, and
Validation", IMC 2013, In Proceedings of the 2013 Conference on
Internet Measurement Conference (IMC),
DOI 10.1145/2504730.2504735, October 2013,
<http://www.caida.org/~amogh/papers/asrank-IMC13.pdf>.

[Madory] Madory, D., "Why Far-Flung Parts of the Internet Broke
Today", Dyn Research/Renesys Research: The New Home of Renesys Blog,
September 2014, <http://research.dyn.com/2014/09/
why-the-internet-broke-today/>.

[Mauch] Mauch, J., "BGP Routing Leak Detection System", Project
web page, 2014,
<http://puck.nether.net/bgp/leakinfo.cgi/>.

[Mauch-nanog]
Mauch, J., "Detecting Routing Leaks by Counting",
NANOG-41 Albuquerque, NM, USA, 41st
NANOG Conference, October 2007,
<https://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog41/presentations/
mauch-lightning.pdf>.

[Paseka] Paseka, T., "Why Google Went Offline Today and a Bit about
How the Internet Works", CloudFare CloudFlare Blog, November 2012,
<http://blog.cloudflare.com/
why-google-went-offline-today-and-a-bit-about/>.

[ROUTE-LEAK-DEF]
Dickson, B., "Route Leaks -- Definitions", Work in
Progress, draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-def-03, October
2012.

[ROUTE-LEAK-REQ]
Dickson, B., "Route Leaks -- Requirements for Detection
and Prevention thereof", Work in Progress, draft-dickson-
sidr-route-leak-reqts-02, March 2012.

[Toonk2014]
Toonk, A., "What caused today's Internet hiccup",
BGPMON Blog, August 2014, <http://www.bgpmon.net/
what-caused-todays-internet-hiccup/>.

[Toonk2015-A]
Toonk, A., "What caused the Google service interruption",
BGPMON Blog, March 2015, <http://www.bgpmon.net/
what-caused-the-google-service-interruption/>.

[Toonk2015-B]
Toonk, A., "Massive route leak causes Internet slowdown",
BGPMON Blog, June 2015, <http://www.bgpmon.net/
massive-route-leak-cause-internet-slowdown/>.

[Wijchers]
Wijchers, B. and B. Overeinder, "Quantitative Analysis of
BGP Route Leaks", RIPE-69, Reseaux IP Europeens (RIPE) 69th
Meeting, November 2014, <http://ripe69.ripe.net/
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[Zmijewski]
Zmijewski, E., "Indonesia Hijacks the World", Dyn
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Acknowledgements

Authors' Addresses

Kotikalapudi Sriram
US NIST

Email: ksriram@nist.gov

Doug Montgomery
US NIST

Email: dougm@nist.gov

Danny McPherson
Verisign, Inc.

Email: dmcpherson@verisign.com

Eric Osterweil
Verisign, Inc.

Email: eosterweil@verisign.com

Brian Dickson

Email: brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com