wdiff rfc8004.original rfc8004.txt

Network Working Group
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Laganier
Internet-Draft
Request for Comments: 8004 Luminate Wireless, Inc.
Obsoletes: 5204 (if approved) L. Eggert
Intended status:
Category: Standards Track NetApp
Expires: February 5, 2017 August 4,
ISSN: 2070-1721 October 2016

Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Rendezvous Extension
draft-ietf-hip-rfc5204-bis-08

Abstract

This document defines a rendezvous extension for the Host Identity
Protocol (HIP). The rendezvous extension extends HIP and the HIP
registration extension
Registration Extension for initiating communication between HIP nodes
via HIP rendezvous servers. Rendezvous servers improve reachability
and operation when HIP nodes are multi-homed multihomed or mobile. This document
obsoletes RFC5204. RFC 5204.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents an Internet Standards Track document.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list It represents the consensus of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for a maximum publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of six months RFC 7841.

Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on February 5, 2017.
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8004.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Overview of Rendezvous Server Operation . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Diagram Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Rendezvous Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Relaying the Base Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Rendezvous Server Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. RENDEZVOUS Registration Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Parameter Formats and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1. RVS_HMAC Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.2. FROM Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.3. VIA_RVS Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9
4.3. Modified Packets Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3.1. Processing Outgoing I1 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3.2. Processing Incoming I1 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3.3. Processing Outgoing R1 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3.4. Processing Incoming R1 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Acknowledgments References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5204 . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . 14
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5204 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

1. Introduction

The

"The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Architecture
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis] Architecture" [HIP-ARCH] introduces
the rendezvous mechanism to help a HIP node to contact a frequently
moving HIP node. The rendezvous mechanism involves a third party,
the rendezvous server (RVS), which serves as an initial contact point
("rendezvous point") for its clients. The clients of an RVS are HIP
nodes that use the HIP Registration Extension [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis] [RFC8003] to register
their HIT->IP address mappings with the RVS. After this
registration, other HIP nodes can initiate a base exchange using the
IP address of the RVS instead of the current IP address of the node
they attempt to contact. Essentially, the clients of an RVS become
reachable at the RVS's IP address. Peers can initiate a HIP base
exchange with the IP address of the RVS, which will relay this
initial communication such that the base exchange may successfully
complete.

2. Terminology

This section defines terms used throughout the remainder of this
specification.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

In addition to the terminology defined in the HIP specification
[RFC7401] and the HIP Registration Extension
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis], [RFC8003], this document
defines and uses the following terms:

Rendezvous Service
A HIP service provided by a rendezvous server an RVS to its rendezvous clients. The rendezvous server
RVS offers to relay some of the arriving base exchange packets
between the initiator Initiator and
responder. Responder.

Rendezvous Server (RVS)
A HIP registrar providing rendezvous service.

Rendezvous Client
A HIP requester that has registered for rendezvous service at a
rendezvous server. an
RVS.

Rendezvous Registration
A HIP registration for rendezvous service, established between a
rendezvous server an
RVS and a rendezvous client.

3. Overview of Rendezvous Server Operation

Figure 1 shows a simple HIP base exchange without a rendezvous
server, an RVS, in which
the initiator Initiator initiates the exchange directly with the responder Responder by
sending an I1 packet to the responder's Responder's IP address, as per the HIP
specification [RFC7401].

+-----+ +-----+
| |-------I1------>| |
| I |<------R1-------| R |
| |-------I2------>| |
| |<------R2-------| |
+-----+ +-----+

Figure 1: HIP base exchange Base Exchange without rendezvous server. a Rendezvous Server
The End-Host Mobility and Multihoming with the Host Identity Protocol HIP specification [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5206-bis]
[HIP-HOST-MOB] allows a HIP node to notify its peers about changes in
its set of IP addresses. This specification presumes initial
reachability of the two nodes with respect to each other.

However, such a HIP node MAY also want to be reachable to other
future correspondent peers that are unaware of its location change.
The HIP Architecture [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis] [HIP-ARCH] introduces rendezvous
servers RVSs with whom a HIP node
MAY register its host identity tags Host Identity Tags (HITs) and current IP addresses.
An RVS relays HIP packets arriving for these HITs to the node's
registered IP addresses. When a HIP node has registered with an RVS,
it SHOULD record the IP address of its RVS in its DNS record, using
the HIP DNS resource record type defined in the HIP DNS Extension [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5205-bis].
[RFC8005].

+-----+
+--I1--->| RVS |---I1--+
| +-----+ |
| v
+-----+ +-----+
| |<------R1-------| |
| I |-------I2------>| R |
| |<------R2-------| |
+-----+ +-----+

Figure 2: HIP base exchange Base Exchange with a rendezvous server. Rendezvous Server

Figure 2 shows a HIP base exchange involving a rendezvous server. an RVS. It is assumed
that HIP node R previously registered its HITs and current IP
addresses with the RVS, using the HIP Registration Extension
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis].
[RFC8003]. When the initiator Initiator I tries to establish contact with the responder
Responder R, it must send the I1 of the base exchange either to one
of R's IP addresses (if known via DNS or other means) or to one of
R's rendezvous servers. RVSs. Here, I obtains the IP address of R's rendezvous server RVS from R's DNS
record and then sends the I1 packet of the HIP base exchange to RVS.
RVS, noticing that the HIT contained in the arriving I1 packet is not
one of its own, MUST check its current registrations to determine if
it needs to relay the packets. Here, it determines that the HIT
belongs to R and then relays the I1 packet to the registered IP
address. R then completes the base exchange without further
assistance from RVS by sending an R1 directly to the I's IP address,
as obtained from the I1 packet. In this specification, the client of
the RVS is always the
responder. Responder. However, there might be reasons
(such as NAT and firewall traversal) to allow a client to initiate a
base exchange through its own RVS, like NAT and firewall
traversal. RVS. This specification does not
address such scenarios, which should be specified in other documents.

3.1. Diagram Notation

Notation Significance
-------- ------------

I, R I and R are the respective source and destination IP
addresses in the IP header.

HIT-I, HIT-R HIT-I and HIT-R are the initiator's Initiator's and the
responder's
Responder's HITs in the packet, respectively.

REG_REQ A REG_REQUEST parameter is present in the HIP header.

REG_RES A REG_RESPONSE parameter is present in the HIP header.

FROM:I A FROM parameter containing the IP address I is
present in the HIP header.

RVS_HMAC An RVS_HMAC parameter containing an HMAC Hashed Message
Authentication Code (HMAC) keyed with the appropriate
registration key is present in the HIP header.

VIA:RVS A VIA_RVS parameter containing the IP address RVS of
a rendezvous server is present in the HIP header.

3.2. Rendezvous Client Registration

Before a rendezvous server an RVS starts to relay HIP packets to a rendezvous client, the
rendezvous client needs to register with it the RVS to receive
rendezvous service by using the HIP Registration Extension
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis] [RFC8003]
as illustrated in the following schema:

+-----+ +-----+
| | I1 | |
| |--------------------------->| |
| |<---------------------------| |
| I | R1(REG_INFO) | RVS |
| | I2(REG_REQ) | |
| |--------------------------->| |
| |<---------------------------| |
| | R2(REG_RES) | |
+-----+ +-----+

Rendezvous client registering Client Registering with a rendezvous server. Rendezvous Server

3.3. Relaying the Base Exchange

If a HIP node and one of its rendezvous servers RVSs have a rendezvous registration, the rendezvous servers
RVSs relay inbound I1 packets (that contain one of the client's HITs)
by rewriting the IP header. They replace the destination IP address
of the I1 packet with one of the IP addresses of the owner of the
HIT, i.e., the rendezvous client. They MUST also recompute the IP
checksum accordingly.

Because of egress ingress filtering on the path from the RVS to the client
[RFC2827][RFC3013],
[RFC2827] [RFC3013], a HIP rendezvous server RVS SHOULD replace the source IP address,
i.e., the IP address of I, with one of its own IP addresses. The
replacement IP address SHOULD be chosen according to relevant IPv4
and IPv6 specifications [RFC1122][RFC6724]. [RFC1122] [RFC6724]. Because this
replacement conceals the initiator's Initiator's IP address, the RVS MUST append
a FROM parameter containing the original source IP address of the
packet. This FROM parameter MUST be integrity protected by an
RVS_HMAC keyed with the corresponding rendezvous registration
integrity key [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis]. [RFC8003].

I1(RVS, R, HIT-I, HIT-R
I1(I, RVS, HIT-I, HIT-R) +---------+ FROM:I, RVS_HMAC)
+----------------------->| |--------------------+
| | RVS | |
| | | |
| +---------+ |
| V
+-----+ R1(R, I, HIT-R, HIT-I, VIA:RVS) +-----+
| |<---------------------------------------------| |
| | | |
| I | I2(I, R, HIT-I, HIT-R) | R |
| |--------------------------------------------->| |
| |<---------------------------------------------| |
+-----+ R2(R, I, HIT-R, HIT-I) +-----+

Rendezvous server rewriting Server Rewriting IP addresses. Addresses

This modification of HIP packets at a rendezvous server an RVS can be problematic because the
HIP protocol uses integrity checks. Because the I1 does not include HMAC or
SIGNATURE parameters, these two end-
to-end end-to-end integrity checks are
unaffected by the operation of rendezvous
servers. RVSs.

The RVS SHOULD verify the checksum field of an I1 packet before doing
any modifications. After modification, it MUST recompute the
checksum field using the updated HIP header, which possibly included
new FROM and RVS_HMAC parameters, and a pseudo-header containing the
updated source and destination IP addresses. This enables the
responder
Responder to validate the checksum of the I1 packet "as is", without
having to parse any FROM parameters.

4. Rendezvous Server Extensions

This section describes extensions to the HIP Registration Extension
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis],
[RFC8003], allowing a HIP node to register with a
rendezvous server an RVS for rendezvous
service and to notify the RVS aware of changes to its current
location. It also describes an extension to the HIP specification
[RFC7401] itself, allowing establishment of HIP associations via one
or more HIP rendezvous server(s). RVSs.

4.1. RENDEZVOUS Registration Type

This specification defines an additional registration for the HIP
Registration Extension [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis] [RFC8003] that allows registering with a rendezvous server an RVS
for rendezvous service.

Number Registration Type
------ -----------------
1 RENDEZVOUS

4.2. Parameter Formats and Processing

4.2.1. RVS_HMAC Parameter

The RVS_HMAC is a non-critical parameter whose only difference with
the HMAC parameter defined in the HIP specification [RFC7401] is its
"type" code. This change causes it to be located after the FROM
parameter (as opposed to the HMAC):

Type 65500
Length Variable. Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
Padding.

HMAC HMAC computed over the HIP packet, excluding the
RVS_HMAC parameter and any following parameters. The
HMAC is keyed with the appropriate HIP integrity key
(HIP-lg or HIP-gl) established when rendezvous
registration happened. The HIP "checksum" field MUST be
set to zero, and the HIP header length in the HIP common
header MUST be calculated not to cover any excluded
parameter when the HMAC is calculated. The size of the
HMAC is the natural size of the hash computation
output depending on the used hash function.

To allow a rendezvous client and its RVS to verify the integrity of
packets flowing between them, both SHOULD protect packets with an
added RVS_HMAC parameter keyed with the HIP-lg or HIP-gl integrity
key established while registration occurred. A valid RVS_HMAC SHOULD
be present on every packet flowing between a client and a server and
MUST be present when a FROM parameter is processed.

4.2.2. FROM Parameter

Type 65498
Length 16
Address An IPv6 address or an IPv4-in-IPv6 format IPv4 address.

A rendezvous server

An RVS MUST add a FROM parameter containing the original source IP
address of a HIP packet whenever the source IP address in the IP
header is rewritten. If one or more FROM parameters are already
present, the new FROM parameter MUST be appended after the existing
ones.

Whenever an RVS inserts a FROM parameter, it MUST insert an RVS_HMAC
protecting the packet integrity, especially the IP address included
in the FROM parameter.

4.2.3. VIA_RVS Parameter

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Address |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. . .
. . .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Address |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Type 65502
Length Variable
Address An IPv6 address or an IPv4-in-IPv6 format IPv4 address.

After the responder Responder receives a relayed I1 packet, it can begin to
send HIP packets addressed to the initiator's Initiator's IP address, without
further assistance from an RVS. For debugging purposes, it MUST
append a newly created VIA_RVS parameter at the end of the R1 packet
that contains the IP address of the RVS that relayed the I1 packet.
Including more than one IP address in the VIA_RVS parameter is
outside the scope of this specification. The main goal of using the
VIA_RVS parameter is to allow operators to diagnose possible issues
encountered while establishing a HIP association via an RVS.

4.3. Modified Packets Processing

The following subsections describe the differences of the processing
of I1 and R1 while a rendezvous server an RVS is involved in the base exchange.

4.3.1. Processing Outgoing I1 Packets

An initiator Initiator SHOULD NOT send an opportunistic I1 with a NULL
destination HIT to an IP address that is known to be a rendezvous
server address, unless it wants to establish a HIP association with
the rendezvous server RVS itself and does not know its HIT.

When an RVS rewrites the source IP address of an I1 packet due to
egress filtering, it MUST add a FROM parameter to the I1 that
contains the initiator's Initiator's source IP address. This FROM parameter MUST
be protected by an RVS_HMAC keyed with the integrity key established
at rendezvous registration.

4.3.2. Processing Incoming I1 Packets

When a rendezvous server an RVS receives an I1 whose destination HIT is not its own, it
consults its registration database to find a registration for the
rendezvous service established by the HIT owner. If it finds an
appropriate registration, it relays the packet to the registered IP
address. If it does not find an appropriate registration, it drops
the packet.

A rendezvous server

An RVS SHOULD interpret any incoming opportunistic I1 (i.e., an I1
with a NULL destination HIT) as an I1 addressed to itself and SHOULD
NOT attempt to relay it to one of its clients.

When a rendezvous client receives an I1, it MUST validate any present
RVS_HMAC parameter. If the RVS_HMAC cannot be verified, the packet
SHOULD be dropped. If the RVS_HMAC cannot be verified and a FROM
parameter is present, the packet MUST be dropped.

A rendezvous client acting as responder Responder SHOULD drop opportunistic I1s
that include a FROM parameter, because this indicates that the I1 has
been relayed.

4.3.3. Processing Outgoing R1 Packets

When a responder Responder replies to an I1 relayed via an RVS, it MUST append
to the regular R1 header a VIA_RVS parameter containing the IP
addresses of the traversed RVSs.

4.3.4. Processing Incoming R1 Packets

The HIP specification [RFC7401] mandates that a system receiving an
R1 MUST first check to see if it has sent an I1 to the originator of
the R1 (i.e., the system is in state I1-SENT). When the R1 is
replying to a relayed I1, this check SHOULD be based on HITs only.
In case the IP addresses are also checked, then the source IP address
MUST be checked against the IP address included in the VIA_RVS
parameter.

5. Security Considerations

This section discusses the known threats introduced by these HIP
extensions and the implications on the overall security of HIP. In
particular, it argues that the extensions described in this document
do not introduce additional threats to the Host Identity Protocol. HIP.

It is difficult to encompass the whole scope of threats introduced by
rendezvous servers
RVSs because their presence has implications both at the IP and HIP
layers. In particular, these extensions might allow for redirection,
amplification, and reflection attacks at the IP layer, as well as
attacks on the HIP layer itself, for example, man-
in-the-middle man-in-the-middle
attacks against the HIP base exchange.

If an initiator Initiator has a priori knowledge of the responder's Responder's host
identity when it first contacts the responder Responder via an RVS, it has a
means to verify the signatures in the HIP base exchange, which
protects against man-in-the-middle attacks.

If an initiator Initiator does not have a priori knowledge of the responder's Responder's
host identity (so-called "opportunistic initiators"), Initiators"), it is almost
impossible to defend the HIP exchange against these attacks, because
the public keys exchanged cannot be authenticated. The only approach
would be to mitigate hijacking threats on HIP state by requiring an
R1 answering an opportunistic I1 to come from the same IP address
that originally sent the I1. This procedure retains a level of
security that is equivalent to what exists in the Internet today.

However, for reasons of simplicity, this specification does not allow
the establishment of a HIP association via a rendezvous server an RVS in an opportunistic
manner.

6. IANA Considerations

[RFC5204], obsoleted by this document, made the following definitions
and reservations in the IANA Registry for HIP Parameters Types: "Parameter Types" subregistry under "Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters":

Value Parameter Type Length
----- -------------- --------
65498 FROM 16
65500 RVS_HMAC variable
65502 VIA_RVS variable

This document updates

In the IANA Registry for HIP Parameters Types by
replacing "Parameter Types" subregistry under "Host Identity Protocol
(HIP) Parameters", references to [RFC5204] have been replaced by
references to this document.

[RFC5204], obsoleted by this document, made the following definition
and reservation in the IANA Registry for HIP Registration Types: "Registration Types" subregistry under "Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters":

Value Registration Type
----- -----------------
1 RENDEZVOUS

This document updates

In the IANA Registry for HIP Registration Types by
replacing "Registration Types" subregistry under "Host Identity Protocol
(HIP) Parameters", references to [RFC5204] have been replaced by
references to this document.

7. Acknowledgments

The following people have provided thoughtful and helpful discussions
and/or suggestions that have improved this document: Marcus Brunner,
Tom Henderson, Miika Komu, Mika Kousa, Pekka Nikander, Justino
Santos, Simon Schuetz, Tim Shepard, Kristian Slavov, Martin
Stiemerling, and Juergen Quittek.

Lars Eggert has received funding from the European Union's Horizon
2020 research and innovation program 2014-2018 under grant agreement
No. 644866. This document reflects only the authors' views and the
European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made
of the information it contains.

Thanks to Joel M. Halpern for performing the Gen-ART review of this
document as part of the publication process.

8. References

8.1.

7.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis]
Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Registration Extension", draft-ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis-10
(work in progress), January 2016.

[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5205-bis]
Laganier, J., "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name
System (DNS) Extension", draft-ietf-hip-rfc5205-bis-09
(work in progress), January 2016.

[RFC1122] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1122, October 1989,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1122>.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown,
"Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6
(IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>.

[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T.
Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.

8.2.

[RFC8003] Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Registration Extension", RFC 8003, DOI 10.17487/RFC8003,
October 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8003>.

[RFC8005] Laganier, J., "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name
System (DNS) Extension", RFC 8005, DOI 10.17487/RFC8005,
October 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8005>.

7.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis]

[HIP-ARCH] Moskowitz, R. and M. Komu, "Host Identity Protocol
Architecture", draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis-14 (work Work in
progress), Progress, draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-
bis-14, June 2016.

[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5206-bis]

[HIP-HOST-MOB]
Henderson, T., Vogt, C., and J. Arkko, "Host Mobility with
the Host Identity Protocol", draft-ietf-hip-rfc5206-bis-12
(work Work in progress), May Progress, draft-ietf-
hip-rfc5206-bis-14, October 2016.

[RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, DOI 10.17487/RFC2827,
May 2000, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2827>.

[RFC3013] Killalea, T., "Recommended Internet Service Provider
Security Services and Procedures", BCP 46, RFC 3013,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3013, November 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3013>.

[RFC5204] Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Rendezvous Extension", RFC 5204, DOI 10.17487/RFC5204,
April 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5204>.

Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5204

o Updated HIP references to revised HIP specifications.

Acknowledgments

The following people have provided thoughtful and helpful discussions
and/or suggestions that have improved this document: Marcus Brunner,
Tom Henderson, Miika Komu, Mika Kousa, Pekka Nikander, Juergen
Quittek, Justino Santos, Simon Schuetz, Tim Shepard, Kristian Slavov,
and Martin Stiemerling.

Lars Eggert has received funding from the European Union's Horizon
2020 research and innovation program 2014-2018 under grant agreement
No. 644866. This document reflects only the authors' views, and the
European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made
of the information it contains.

Thanks to Joel M. Halpern for performing the Gen-ART review of this
document as part of the publication process.

Authors' Addresses

Julien Laganier
Luminate Wireless, Inc.
Cupertino, CA
USA

EMail:
United States of America

Email: julien.ietf@gmail.com

Lars Eggert
NetApp
Sonnenallee 1
Kirchheim 85551
Germany

Phone: +49 151 12055791
EMail:
Email: lars@netapp.com
URI: http://eggert.org