wdiff rfc8020.original rfc8020.txt

Domain Name System Operations (dnsop) Working Group
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Bortzmeyer
Internet-Draft
Request for Comments: 8020 AFNIC
Updates: 1034, 2308 (if approved) S. Huque
Intended status:
Category: Standards Track Verisign Labs
Expires: March 22, 2017 September 18,
ISSN: 2070-1721 November 2016

NXDOMAIN really means there is nothing underneath
draft-ietf-dnsop-nxdomain-cut-05

NXDOMAIN: There Really Is Nothing Underneath

Abstract

This document states clearly that when a DNS resolver receives a
response with a response code of NXDOMAIN, it means that the domain
name which is thus denied AND ALL THE NAMES UNDER IT do not exist.

REMOVE BEFORE PUBLICATION: this document should be discussed in the
IETF DNSOP (DNS Operations) group, through its mailing list. The
source of the document, as well as a list of open issues, is
currently kept at Github [1].

This documents document clarifies RFC 1034 and modifies a portion of RFC 2308,
so 2308:
it updates both of them.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents an Internet Standards Track document.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list It represents the consensus of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for a maximum publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

Information about the current status of six months this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents obtained at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on March 22, 2017.
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8020.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction and background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Background .....................................2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 ................................................3
2. Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Rules ...........................................................3
3. Updates to RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 .................................................5
3.1. Updates to RFC1034 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 RFC 1034 ........................................5
3.2. Updates to RFC2308 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 RFC 2308 ........................................5
4. Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 ........................................................5
5. Possible issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Issues .................................................6
6. Implementation considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. ...................................6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Implementation status - RFC EDITOR: REMOVE BEFORE PUBLICATION 7
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11. .........................................7
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11.1. ......................................................7
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11.2. .......................................7
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 .....................................8
Appendix A. Why can't we just use the owner name of the returned
SOA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 ...................................................9
Appendix B. Related approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Approaches .....................................9
Acknowledgments ....................................................9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 ................................................10

1. Introduction and background Background

The DNS protocol [RFC1035] defines response code 3 as "Name Error",
or "NXDOMAIN" [RFC2308], which means that the queried domain name
does not exist in the DNS. Since domain names are represented as a
tree of labels ([RFC1034], Section 3.1), non-existence nonexistence of a node
implies non-existence nonexistence of the entire sub-tree subtree rooted at this node.

The DNS iterative resolution algorithm precisely interprets the
NXDOMAIN signal in this manner. If it encounters an NXDOMAIN
response code from an authoritative server, it immediately stops
iteration and returns the NXDOMAIN response to the querier.

However, in most known existing resolvers today, a cached non-
existence
nonexistence for a domain is not considered "proof" that there can be
no child domains underneath. This is due to an ambiguity in
[RFC1034] that failed to distinguish Empty Non-Terminal names (ENT) names
([RFC7719]) from nonexistent names (Section 3.1). The distinction
became especially important for the development of DNSSEC, which
provides proof of non-existence. nonexistence. [RFC4035], section Section 3.1.3.2,
describes how security-aware authoritative name servers make the
distinction, but no existing RFCs describe the behavior for recursive
name servers.

This document specifies that an NXDOMAIN response for a domain name
means that no child domains underneath the queried name exist either.
And either;
furthermore, it means that DNS resolvers should interpret cached non-
existence
nonexistence in this manner. Since the domain names are organized in
a tree, it is a simple consequence of the tree structure: non-existence
nonexistence of a node implies non-existence nonexistence of the entire sub-tree subtree
rooted at this node.

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

"QNAME": defined in [RFC1034] and in [RFC1035], Section 4.1.2, but,
because [RFC2308] provides a different definition, we repeat the
original one here: the QNAME is the domain name in the question
section.

"Denied name": the domain name whose existence has been denied by a
response RCODE of rcode NXDOMAIN. In most cases, it is the QNAME but,
because of [RFC6604], it is not always the case.

Other terms are defined in [RFC1034] or [RFC1035] or [RFC1034], [RFC1035], and (like NXDOMAIN
itself) in the more recent [RFC7719].

The domain name space is conceptually defined in terms of a tree
structure. The implementation of a DNS resolver/cache MAY use a tree
or other data structures. The cache being a subset of the data in
the domain name space, it is much easier to reason about it in terms
of that tree structure and to describe things in those terms (names
under/above, descendent descendant names, subtrees etc). subtrees, etc.). In fact, the DNS
algorithm description in [RFC1034] even states an assumption that the
cache is a tree structure, so the precedent is already well
established: see its section 4.3.2 Section 4.3.2, which says "The following
algorithm assumes that the RRs are organized in several tree
structures, one for each zone, and another for the cache..." So, in
this document, each time we talk of about a tree or tree operations, it
refers
we're referring to the model, not to the actual implementation.

2. Rule Rules

When an iterative caching DNS resolver receives a response NXDOMAIN, an NXDOMAIN response,
it SHOULD store it in its cache and then all names and RRsets resource
record sets (RRsets) at or below that node SHOULD then be considered to be
unreachable. Subsequent queries for such names SHOULD elicit an
NXDOMAIN response.

But

But, if a resolver has cached data under the NXDOMAIN cut, it MAY
continue to send it as a reply (until the TTL of this cached data
expires), since this may avoid additional processing when a query is
received. Section 6 provides more information about this.

Another exception is that a validating resolver MAY decide to
implement the "NXDOMAIN cut" behaviour behavior (described in the first
paragraph of this section) only when the NXDOMAIN response has been
validated with DNSSEC. See Section 8 7 for the rationale.

The fact that a subtree does not exist is not forever: [RFC2308],
section
Section 3, already describes the amount of time that an NXDOMAIN
response may be cached (the "negative TTL").

If the NXDOMAIN response due to a cached non-existence nonexistence is from a
DNSSEC signed
DNSSEC-signed zone, then it will have accompanying NSEC or NSEC3
records that authenticate the non-existence nonexistence of the name. For a
descendant name of the original NXDOMAIN name, the same set of NSEC
or NSEC3 records proves the non-existence nonexistence of the descendant name. The
iterative, caching resolver MUST return these NSEC or NSEC3 records
in the response to the triggering query if the query had the DNSSEC
OK (DO) bit set.

Warning: if there is a chain of CNAME (or DNAME), the name which that does
not exist is the last of the chain ([RFC6604]) and not the QNAME.
The NXDOMAIN stored in the cache is for the denied name, not always
for the QNAME.

As an example of the consequence of these rules, consider two
successive queries to a resolver, resolver with a non-existing nonexisting domain
'foo.example': the first is for 'foo.example' (which results in an
NXDOMAIN) and the second for 'bar.foo.example' (which also results in
an NXDOMAIN). Many resolvers today will forward both queries, as
noticed in Section 9. queries.
However, following the rules in this document ("NXDOMAIN cut"), a
resolver would cache the first NXDOMAIN response, as a sign of non-existence,
nonexistence, and then immediately return an NXDOMAIN response for
the second query, without transmitting it to an authoritative server.

If the first request is for 'bar.foo.example' and the second for
'baz.foo.example', then the first NXDOMAIN response won't tell
anything about 'baz.foo.example' and therefore 'baz.foo.example'; therefore, the second query will be
transmitted as it was before the use of "NXDOMAIN cut" optimisation optimization
(see Appendix A).

3. Updates to RFCs

3.1. Updates to RFC1034 RFC 1034

This document clarifies possible ambiguities in [RFC1034] that did
not clearly distinguish Empty Non-Terminal names (ENT) names ([RFC7719])
from nonexistent names, and it refers to subsequent documents that
do.
Empty Non-Terminals ENTs are nodes in the DNS that do not have no resource record sets
associated with them, them but have descendant nodes that do. The correct
response to Empty Non-Terminals ENTs is NODATA (i.e. (i.e., a response code of NOERROR and an
empty ANSWER answer section). Additional clarifying language on these
points is provided in section Section 7.16 of [RFC2136] and
sections in Sections 2.2.2
and 2.2.3 of [RFC4592].

3.2. Updates to RFC2308 RFC 2308

The second paragraph of section Section 5 of in [RFC2308] states the following:
"A

A negative answer that resulted from a name error (NXDOMAIN)
should be cached such that it can be retrieved and returned in
response to another query for the same <QNAME, QCLASS> that
resulted in the cached negative response." response.

This document revises that paragraph to the following: "A

The above section same.

Section 2 above elaborates on the revised rule and specifies when it
may be reasonable to relax or ignore it.

4. Benefits

The main benefit is a better efficiency of the caches. In the
example above, the resolver sends only one query instead of two, the
second one being answered from the cache. This will benefit the
entire DNS ecosystem, since the authoritative name servers will have
less unnecessary traffic to process.

The correct behavior (in [RFC1034] and made clearer in this document)
is specially especially useful when combined with QNAME minimisation minimization [RFC7816]
since it will allow a resolver to stop searching as soon as an
NXDOMAIN is encountered.

"NXDOMAIN cut" may also help mitigate certain types of random QNAME
attacks [joost-dnsterror] and [balakrichenan-dafa888], where there is
a fixed suffix which that does not exist. In these attacks against the
authoritative name server, queries are sent to resolvers for a QNAME
composed of a fixed suffix ("dafa888.wf" in one of the articles
above), which is typically nonexistent, and a random prefix,
different for each request. A resolver receiving these requests have has
to forward them to the authoritative servers. With "NXDOMAIN cut", a
system administrator would just have to send to the resolver a query
for the fixed suffix, the resolver would get a NXDOMAIN and then
would stop forwarding the queries. (It would be better if the SOA
record in the NXDOMAIN response were sufficient to find the non-
existing domain
nonexisting domain, but it this is not the case, see Appendix A.)

5. Possible issues Issues

Let's assume that the TLD Top-Level Domain (TLD) example exists exists, but
foobar.example is not delegated (so the example's name servers will
reply NXDOMAIN for a query about anything.foobar.example). A system
administrator decides to name the internal machines of his
organization under office.foobar.example and uses a trick of his
resolver to forward requests about this zone to his local
authoritative name servers. "NXDOMAIN cut" would create problems here, since,
here; depending on the order of requests to the resolver, it may have
cached the non-
existence nonexistence from example and therefore "deleted"
everything under. under it. This document assumes that such a setup is rare
and does not need to be supported.

Another

Today, another possible issue that may happen: today, exists; we see broken authoritative name
servers which that reply to ENT ([RFC7719], section Section 6) with NXDOMAIN
instead of the normal NODATA ([RFC7719], section Section 3).

RFC-EDITOR: REMOVE THE PARAGRAPH BEFORE PUBLICATION. An example
today is mta2._domainkey.cbs.nl (which exists) where querying
_domainkey.cbs.nl yields NXDOMAIN. Another example is www.upenn.edu,
redirected to www.upenn.edu-dscg.edgesuite.net while a query for edu-
dscg.edgesuite.net returns NXDOMAIN.

Such name servers are definitely wrong and have always been. Their
behaviour is incompatible with DNSSEC. Given the advantages of
"NXDOMAIN cut", there is little reason to support this behavior.

6. Implementation considerations Considerations

This section is non-normative, non-normative and is composed only of various things
which
that may be useful for implementors. A recursive resolver may
implement its cache in many ways. The most obvious one is a tree
data structure, because it fits the data model of domain names. But,
in practice, other implementations are possible, as well as various
optimisations
optimizations (such as a tree, augmented by an index of some common
domain names).

If a resolver implements its cache as a tree (without any
optimisation),
optimization), one way to follow the rules of in Section 2 is, is as
follows: when receiving the NXDOMAIN, to prune the subtree of positive
cache entries at that node, node or to delete all individual cache entries for
names below that node. Then, when searching downward in its cache,
this iterative caching DNS resolver will stop searching if it
encounters a cached non-existence. nonexistence.

Some resolver resolvers may have a cache which that is NOT organized as a tree (but,
for instance, as a dictionary) and therefore dictionary); therefore, they have a reason to
ignore the rules of Section 2. So these rules are a use SHOULD and not a
MUST.

7. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

8. Security Considerations

The technique described here in this document may help against a denial-of-service denial-
of-service attack named "random qnames" and described in Section 4.

If a resolver does not validate the answers with DNSSEC, or if the
zone is not signed, the resolver can of course be poisoned with a
false NXDOMAIN, thus thus, "deleting" a part of the domain name tree.
This denial-of-service attack is already possible without the rules
of this document (but "NXDOMAIN cut" may increase its effects). The
only solution is to use DNSSEC.

9. Implementation status - RFC EDITOR: REMOVE BEFORE PUBLICATION

This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC6982].
The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort
has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not
be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
exist.

According to [RFC6982], "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.

It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit".

As of today, practically all existing DNS resolvers are conservative
by default: they consider a NXDOMAIN as only significant for the
denied name itself, not for the names under. Almost all the current
recursive servers will send upstream a query for out-of-cache
sub.example.com even if their cache contains an NXDOMAIN for
example.com.

There are a few exceptions. The Unbound resolver has a configuration
parameter called "harden-below-nxdomain" [2], which if set to "yes"
turns on "NXDOMAIN cut" behavior ("only DNSSEC-secure nxdomains are
used", see Section 8). The PowerDNS recursor has optional partial
support for "NXDOMAIN cut", for the root domain only, with its "root-
nx-trust" setting, described as [3] "If set, an NXDOMAIN from the
root-servers will serve as a blanket NXDOMAIN for the entire TLD the
query belonged to. The effect of this is far fewer queries to the
root-servers.".

10. Acknowledgments

The main idea is in this document is taken from
[I-D.vixie-dnsext-resimprove], section 3, "Stopping Downward Cache
Search on NXDOMAIN". Thanks to its authors, Paul Vixie, Rodney
Joffe, and Frederico Neves. Additionally Tony Finch, Ted Lemon, John
Levine, Jinmei Tatuya, Bob Harold and Duane Wessels provided valuable
feedback and suggestions.

11.

8. References

11.1.

8.1. Normative References

[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.

[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC2136] Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
"Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2136>.

[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.

[RFC4592] Lewis, E., "The Role of Wildcards in the Domain Name
System", RFC 4592, DOI 10.17487/RFC4592, July 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4592>.

[RFC6604] Eastlake 3rd, D., "xNAME RCODE and Status Bits
Clarification", RFC 6604, DOI 10.17487/RFC6604, April
2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6604>.

11.2.

8.2. Informative References

[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.

[RFC6982] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", RFC 6982,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6982, July 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6982>.

[RFC7719] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", RFC 7719, DOI 10.17487/RFC7719, December
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7719>.

[RFC7816] Bortzmeyer, S., "DNS Query Name Minimisation to Improve
Privacy", RFC 7816, DOI 10.17487/RFC7816, March 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7816>.

[I-D.vixie-dnsext-resimprove]

[DNSRRR] Vixie, P., Joffe, R., and F. Neves, "Improvements to DNS
Resolvers for Resiliency, Robustness, and Responsiveness",
draft-vixie-dnsext-resimprove-00 (work
Work in progress), Progress, draft-vixie-dnsext-resimprove-00, June
2010.

[I-D.ietf-dnsop-nsec-aggressiveuse]

[NSEC] Fujiwara, K., Kato, A., and W. Kumari, "Aggressive use of
NSEC/NSEC3", draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-aggressiveuse-02 (work Work in progress), Progress, draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-
aggressiveuse-04, September 2016.

[joost-dnsterror]
Joost, M., "About DNS Attacks and ICMP Destination
Unreachable Reports", December 2014,
<http://www.michael-joost.de/dnsterror.html>.

[balakrichenan-dafa888]
Balakrichenan, S., "Disturbance in the DNS - "Random
qnames", the dafa888 DoS attack"", October 2014,
<https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/20/session/3/
contribution/37>.

11.3. URIs

[1] https://github.com/bortzmeyer/ietf-dnsop-nxdomain

[2] https://www.unbound.net/documentation/unbound.conf.html

[3] https://doc.powerdns.com/md/recursor/settings/#root-nx-trust
contribution/3>.

Appendix A. Why can't we just use the owner name of the returned SOA?

In this document, we deduce the non-existence nonexistence of a domain only for
NXDOMAIN answers where the denied name was the exact domain. If a
resolver sends a query to the name servers of the TLD example, asking
for the MX mail exchange (MX) record for www.foobar.example, and
subsequently receives a NXDOMAIN, it can only register the fact that
www.foobar.example (and everything underneath) does not exist. This
is true regardless if of whether or not the accompanying SOA record is
for the domain example only. One cannot infer that foobar.example is
nonexistent. The accompanying SOA record indicates the apex of the
zone, not the closest existing domain name. So, using the owner name
of the SOA record in the
Authoritative authority section to deduce "NXDOMAIN cuts"
is currently definitely not OK.

RFC-EDITOR: REMOVE BEFORE PUBLICATION: to use a real example today,
ask the authoritative name servers of the TLD fr about
anything.which.does.not.exist.gouv.fr. The SOA will indicate fr (the
apex) even while gouv.fr does exist (there is no zone cut between
gouv.fr and fr).

Deducing the non-existence nonexistence of a node from the SOA in the NXDOMAIN
reply may certainly help with random qnames attacks attacks, but this is out-
of-scope for this document. It would require to address addressing the problems
mentioned in the first paragraph of this section. A possible
solution would be, is, when receiving a NXDOMAIN with a SOA which that is more than
one label up in the tree, to send requests for the domains which that are
between the QNAME and the owner name of the SOA. (A resolver
which that
does DNSSEC validation or QNAME minimisation minimization will need to do
it, it
anyway.)

Appendix B. Related approaches Approaches

The document [I-D.ietf-dnsop-nsec-aggressiveuse] [NSEC] describes another way to address some of the same
concerns (decreasing the traffic for
non-existing nonexisting domain names).
Unlike "NXDOMAIN cut", it requires
DNSSEC DNSSEC, but it is more powerful
since it can synthesize NXDOMAINs for domains that were not queried.

Acknowledgments

The main idea in this document is taken from [DNSRRR], Section 3,
"Stopping Downward Cache Search on NXDOMAIN". Thanks to its authors,
Paul Vixie, Rodney Joffe, and Frederico Neves. Additionally, Tony
Finch, Ted Lemon, John Levine, Jinmei Tatuya, Bob Harold, and Duane
Wessels provided valuable feedback and suggestions.

Authors' Addresses

Stephane Bortzmeyer
AFNIC
1, rue Stephenson
Montigny-le-Bretonneux 78180
France

Phone: +33 1 39 30 83 46
Email: bortzmeyer+ietf@nic.fr
URI: http://www.afnic.fr/ https://www.afnic.fr/

Shumon Huque
Verisign Labs
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston
Reston, VA 20190
USA
United States of America

Email: shuque@verisign.com
URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com/