wdiff rfc8052v1.txt rfc8052.txt

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) B. Weis
Request for Comments: 8052 M. Seewald
Category: Standards Track Cisco Systems
ISSN: 2070-1721 H. Falk
SISCO
January
June 2017

Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) Protocol
Support for IEC 62351 Security Services

Abstract

The IEC 61850 power utility automation family of standards describes
methods using Ethernet and IP for distributing control and data
frames within and between substations. The IEC 61850-90-5 and IEC
62351-9 standards specify the use of the Group Domain of
Interpretation (GDOI) protocol (RFC 6407) to distribute security
transforms for some IEC 61850 security protocols. This memo defines
GDOI payloads to support those security protocols.

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8052.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Notation Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. IEC 61850 Protocol Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. ID Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. SA TEK Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. KD Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. Example ID, SA TEK, and KD Payloads for IEC 61850 . 17 18
Appendix B. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B.1. DER Length Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B.2. Groups with Multiple Senders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix C. Data Attribute Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

1. Introduction

Power substations use Generic Object Oriented Substation Events
(GOOSE) protocol [IEC-61850-8-1] to distribute control information to
groups of devices using a multicast strategy. Sources within the
power substations also distribute IEC 61850-9-2 sampled values data
streams [IEC-61850-9-2]. The IEC 62351-9 standard [IEC-62351-9]
describes key management methods for the security methods protecting
these IEC 61850 messages, including methods of device authentication
and authorization, and methods of policy and keying material
agreement for IEC 61850 message encryption and data integrity
protection. These key management methods include the use of GDOI
[RFC6407] to distribute the security policy and session keying
material used to protect IEC 61850 messages when the messages are
sent to a group of devices.

The protection of the messages is defined in IEC 62351-6
[IEC-62351-6], IEC 61850-8-1 [IEC-61850-8-1], and IEC 61850-9-2
[IEC-61850-9-2]. Protected IEC 61850 messages typically include the
output of a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and may also be
encrypted using a symmetric cipher such as the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES).

Section 5.5.2 of RFC 6407 specifies that the following information
needs to be provided in order to fully define a new Security
Protocol: security
protocol:

o The Protocol-ID for the particular Security Protocol security protocol

o The SPI Size

o The method of SPI generation

o The transforms, attributes, and keys needed by the Security
Protocol security
protocol

This document defines GDOI payloads to distribute policy and keying
material to protect IEC 61850 messages and defines the necessary
information to ensure interoperability between IEC 61850
implementations.

This memo extends RFC 6407 in order to define extensions needed by
IEC 62351-9. With the current IANA registry rules set up by RFC
6407, this requires "Standards Action" [RFC5226] by the IETF; this
document satisfies that requirement. As the relevant IEC
specifications are not available to the IETF community, it is not
possible for this RFC to fully describe the security considerations
that apply. Therefore, implementers need to depend on the security
analysis within the IEC specifications. As two different Standards
Development Organizations are involved here, and since group key
management is inherently complex, it is possible that some security
issues have not been identified, so additional analysis of the
security of the combined set of specifications may be advisable.

1.1. Requirements Notation Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

1.2. Terminology

The following key terms are used throughout this document:

Generic Object Oriented Substation Events: Power substation control
model defined as per IEC 61850.

IEC 61850 message: A message in the IEC 61850 family of protocols
carrying control or data frames between substation devices.

1.3. Acronyms

The following acronyms are used throughout this document:

AES Advanced Encryption Standard

GCKS Group Controller/Key Server

GDOI Group Domain of Interpretation

GM Group Member

GOOSE Generic Object Oriented Substation Events

KD Key Download

KEK Key Encryption Key

MAC Message Authentication Code

SA Security Association

SPI Security Parameter Index

TEK Traffic Encryption Key

2. IEC 61850 Protocol Information

The following subsections describe the GDOI payload extensions that
are needed in order to distribute security policy and keying material
for the IEC 62351 Security Services. The Identification (ID) Payload
is used to describe an IEC 62351 GDOI group. The Security
Association (SA) Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) payload is used to
describe the policy defined by a Group Controller/Key Server (GCKS)
for a particular IEC 62351 traffic selector. No changes are required
to the Key Download (KD) Payload, but a mapping of IEC 62351 keys to
the KD Payload payload key types is included.

All multi-octet fields are in network byte order.

2.1. ID Payload

The ID payload in a GDOI GROUPKEY-PULL exchange allows the Group
Member (GM) to declare the group it would like to join. A group is
defined by an ID payload as defined in GDOI [RFC6407] and reproduced
in Figure 1.

Figure 1: RFC 6407 Identification Payload

An ID Type name of ID_OID (value 13) is defined in this memo to
specify an Object Identifier (OID) [ITU-T-X.683] encoded using
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [ITU-T-X.690]. Associated with
the OID may be an OID-Specific Payload DER encoded as further
defining the group. Several OIDs are specified in [IEC-62351-9] for
use with IEC 61850. Each OID represents a GOOSE or Sampled Value
protocol, and in some cases IEC 61850 also specifies a particular
multicast destination address to be described in the OID-Specific
Payload field. The format of the ID_OID Identification Data is
specified as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: ID_OID Identification Data

The ID_OID Identification Data fields are defined as follows:

o OID Length (1 octet) -- Length of the OID field.

o OID (variable) -- An ASN.1 ObjectIdentifier encoded using DER
[ITU-T-X.690].

o OID-Specific Payload Length (2 octets) -- Length of the OID-
Specific Payload. payload. Set to zero if the OID does not require an OID-
Specific Payload. payload.

o OID-Specific Payload (variable) -- OID-specific selector encoded
in DER. If OID-Specific Payload Length is set to zero, this field
does not appear in the ID payload.

2.2. SA TEK Payload

The SA TEK payload contains security attributes for a single set of
policy associated with a group TEK. The type of policy to be used
with the TEK is described by a Protocol-ID field included in the SA
TEK. As shown in Figure 3 reproduced from RFC 6407, each Protocol-ID
describes a particular TEK Protocol-Specific Payload definition.

Figure 3: RFC 6407 SA TEK Payload

The Protocol-ID name of GDOI_PROTO_IEC_61850 (value 3) is defined in
this memo for the purposes of distributing IEC 61850 policy. A
GDOI_PROTO_IEC_61850 SA TEK includes an OID and (optionally) an OID-
Specific Payload payload that together define the selectors for the network
traffic. The selector fields are followed by security policy fields
indicating how the specified traffic is to be protected. The
GDOI_PROTO_IEC_61850 TEK Protocol-Specific Payload is defined as
shown in Figure 4.

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! OID Length ! OID ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! OID-Specific Payload Length ! OID-Specific Payload ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! SPI !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! Auth Alg ! Enc Alg !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! Remaining Lifetime Value !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! SA Data Attributes ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!

Figure 4: IEC 61850 SA TEK Payload
The GDOI_PROTO_IEC_61850 SA TEK Payload payload fields are defined as
follows:

o OID Length (1 octet) -- Length of the OID field.

o OID (variable) -- An ASN.1 ObjectIdentifier encoded using DER.
OIDs defined in IEC 61850 declare the type of IEC 61850 message to
be protected, as defined by [IEC-62351-9].

o OID-Specific Payload Length (2 octets) -- Length of the OID-
Specific Payload. payload. This field is set to zero if the policy does
not include an OID-Specific Payload. payload.

o OID-Specific Payload (variable) -- The traffic selector (e.g.,
multicast address) specific to the OID encoded using DER. Some
OID policy settings do not require the use of an OID-Specific
Payload,
payload, in which case this field is not included in the TEK and
the OID-Specific Payload Length is set to zero.

o SPI (4 octets) -- Identifier for the Current Key. This field
represents an SPI.

o Auth Alg (2 octets) -- Authentication Algorithm ID. Valid values
are defined in Section 2.2.2.

o Enc Alg (2 octets) -- Confidentiality Algorithm ID. Valid values
are defined in Section 2.2.3.

o Remaining Lifetime value (4 octets) -- The number of seconds
remaining before this TEK expires. A value of zero (0) shall
indicate that the TEK does not have an expire time.

o SA Data Attributes (variable length) -- Contains zero or more
attributes associated with this SA. Section 2.2.4 defines
attributes.

2.2.1. Selectors

The OID and (optionally) an OID-Specific Payload that payload together define the
selectors for the network traffic. While they may match the OID and
OID-Specific Payload payload that the GM had previously requested in the ID
payload, there is no guarantee that this will be the case. Including
selectors in the SA TEK is important for at least the following
reasons:

o The Key Server (KS) policy may direct the KS to return multiple
TEKs, each representing different traffic selectors, and it is
important that every GM receiving the set of TEKs explicitly
identify the traffic selectors associated with the TEK.

o The KS policy may include the use of a GDOI GROUPKEY-PUSH message,
which distributes new or replacement TEKs to group members. Since
the GROUPKEY-PUSH message does not contain an ID payload, the TEK
definition must include the traffic selectors.

2.2.2. Authentication Algorithms

This memo defines the following Authentication Algorithms authentication algorithms for use
with this TEK. These algorithms are defined in [IEC-TR-61850-90-5],
including requirements on one or more algorithms defined as mandatory
to implement.

o NONE. Specifies that an Authentication Algorithm authentication algorithm is not required,
or when the accompanying confidentiality algorithm includes
authentication (e.g., AES-GCM-128). See Section 3 for cautionary
notes regarding using this value without any confidentiality
algorithm.

o HMAC-SHA256-128. Specifies the use of SHA-256 [FIPS180-3.2008] [FIPS180-4]
combined with HMAC [RFC2104]. The output is truncated to 128
bits, as per [RFC2104]. The key size is the size of the hash
value produced by SHA-256 (256 bits).

o HMAC-SHA256. Specifies the use of SHA-256 [FIPS180-3.2008] [FIPS180-4] combined
with HMAC [RFC2104]. The key size is the size of the hash value
produced by SHA-256 (256 bits).

o AES-GMAC-128. Specifies the use of AES [FIPS197] in the Galois
Message Authentication Code (GMAC) mode [SP.800-38D] with a
128-bit key size.

o AES-GMAC-256. Specifies the use of AES [FIPS197] in the Galois
Message Authentication Code (GMAC) mode [SP.800-38D] with a
256-bit key size.

2.2.3. Confidentiality Algorithms

This memo defines the following Confidentiality Algorithms confidentiality algorithms for use
with this TEK. These algorithms are defined in [IEC-TR-61850-90-5],
including requirements on one or more algorithms defined as mandatory
to implement.

o NONE. Specifies that confidentiality is not required. Note: See
Section 3 for guidance on cautionary notes regarding using this
value.

o AES-CBC-128. Specifies the use of AES [FIPS197] in the Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC) mode [SP.800-38A] with a 128-bit key size.
This encryption algorithm does not provide authentication and MUST
NOT be used with the NONE Authentication Algorithm. authentication algorithm.

o AES-CBC-256. Specifies the use of AES [FIPS197] in the Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC) mode [SP.800-38A] with a 256-bit key size.
This encryption algorithm does not provide authentication and MUST
NOT be used with the NONE Authentication Algorithm. authentication algorithm.

o AES-GCM-128. Specifies the use of AES [FIPS197] in the Galois/
Counter Mode (GCM) mode [SP.800-38D] with a 128-bit key size.
This encryption algorithm provides authentication and is used with
a NONE Authentication Algorithm. authentication algorithm.

o AES-GCM-256. Specifies the use of AES [FIPS197] in the Galois/
Counter Mode (GCM) mode [SP.800-38D] with a 256-bit key size.
This encryption algorithm provides authentication and is used with
a NONE Authentication Algorithm. authentication algorithm.

2.2.4. SA Attributes

The following attributes may be present in an SA TEK. The attributes
must follow the format described in Appendix C).

2.2.4.1. SA Time Activation Delay (SA_ATD)

A GCKS will sometimes distribute an SA TEK in advance of when it is
expected to be used. This is communicated to group members using the
SA Activation Time Delay (SA_ATD) attribute. When a GM receives an
SA_TEK with this attribute, it waits for the number of seconds
contained within the attribute before installing it for either
transmitting or receiving.

This Activation Time Delay attribute applies only this SA, and MAY be
used in either a GROUPKEY-PULL or GROUPKEY-PUSH exchange. RFC 6407
also describes an ACTIVATION_TIME_DELAY attribute for the Group
Associated Policy (GAP) payload, which is applied to all Security
Associations and is restricted to use in a GROUPKEY-PUSH message. If
both attributes are included in a GROUPKEY-PUSH payload, the value
contained in SA_ATD will be used.

2.2.4.2. Key Delivery Assurance (SA_KDA)

Group policy can include notifying a multicast source ("Publisher")
of an indication of whether multicast receivers ("Subscribers") have
previously received the SA TEK. This notification allows a Publisher
to set a policy as to whether to activate the new SA TEK or not based
on the percentage of Subscribers that are able to receive packets
protected by the SA TEK. The attribute value is a number between 0
and 100 (inclusive).

2.2.5. SPI Discussion

As noted in Section 1, RFC 6407 requires that characteristics of an
SPI must be defined. An SPI in a GDOI_PROTO_IEC_61850 SA TEK is
represented as a Key Identifier (KeyID). The SPI size is 4 octets.
The SPI is unilaterally chosen by the GCKS using any method chosen by
the implementation. However, an implementation needs to take care
not to duplicate an SPI value that is currently in use for a
particular group.

2.3. KD Payload

The KD Payload payload contains group keys for the policy specified in the SA
Payload. It is comprised of a set of Key Packets, each of which hold
the keying material associated with an SPI (i.e., an IEC 61850 Key
Identifier). The RFC 6407 KD payload format is reproduced in
Figure 5.

Figure 5: KD Payload

Each Key Packet holds the keying material associated with a
particular IEC 61850 Key Identifier, although GDOI refers to it as an
SPI. The keying material is described in a set of attributes
indicating an encryption key, integrity key, etc., in accordance with
the security policy of the group as defined by the associated SA
Payload. Each Key Packet has the following format, reproduced in
Figure 6.

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! KD Type ! RESERVED ! Key Packet Length !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! SPI Size ! SPI (variable) ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
~ Key Packet Attributes ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!

Figure 6: Key Packet

No changes are needed to GDOI in order to distribute IEC 61850 keying
material, but the keys MUST be distributed as defined in Section 5.6
of RFC 6407. The KD Type MUST be TEK (1).

A key associated with an IEC 61850 Authentication Algorithm authentication algorithm
(distributed in the Auth Alg field) MUST be distributed as a
TEK_INTEGRITY_KEY attribute. The value of the attribute is
interpreted according to the type of key distributed in the SA TEK:

o HMAC-SHA256-128, HMAC-SHA256. The value is 32 octets.

o AES-GMAC-128. The value is 20 octets. The first 16 octets are
the 128-bit AES key, and the remaining four octets are used as the
salt value in the nonce.

o AES-GMAC-256. The value is 36 octets. The first 32 octets are
the 256-bit AES key, and the remaining four octets are used as the
salt value in the nonce.

A key associated with an IEC 61850 Confidentiality Algorithm confidentiality algorithm
(distributed in the Enc Alg SA TEK field) MUST be distributed as a
TEK_ALGORITHM_KEY attribute. The value of the attribute is
interpreted according to the type of key distributed in the SA TEK:

o AES-CBC-128. The value is 16 octets.

o AES-CBC-256. The value is 32 octets.

o AES-GCM-128. The value is 20 octets. The first 16 octets are the
128-bit AES key, and the remaining four octets are used as the
salt value in the nonce.

o AES-GCM-256. The value is 36 octets. The first 32 octets are the
256-bit AES key, and the remaining four octets are used as the
salt value in the nonce.

3. Security Considerations

GDOI is a Security Association (SA) management protocol for groups of
senders and receivers. This protocol performs authentication of
communicating protocol participants (Group Member, Group Controller/
Key Server). GDOI provides confidentiality of key management
messages, and it provides source authentication of those messages.
GDOI includes defenses against man-in-middle, connection-hijacking,
replay, reflection, and denial-of-service (DOS) attacks on unsecured
networks. GDOI assumes that the network is not secure and may be
under the complete control of an attacker. The Security
Considerations described in RFC 6407 are relevant to the distribution
of GOOSE and sampled values policy as defined in this memo.

Message Authentication is an optional property for IEC 62351 Security
Services; however, when encryption is used, authentication MUST also
be provided by using an authenticated encryption algorithm such as
AES-GCM-128 or by using a specific authentication algorithm such as
HMAC-SHA-256. Setting the Authentication Algorithm authentication algorithm to NONE but
setting the Confidentiality Algorithm confidentiality algorithm to an algorithm that does not
include authentication (i.e., is marked with an N in the
"Authenticated Encryption" column of the "IEC62351-9 "IEC 62351-9 Confidentiality
Values" registry) is not safe and MUST NOT be used. done.

When Message Authentication is used, a common practice is to truncate
the output of a MAC and include part some of the bits in the integrity
protection field of the data security transform. Current guidance in
[RFC2104] is to truncate no less than half of the length of the hash
output. The authentication algorithm HMAC-SHA256-128 defined in this
memo truncates the output to exactly half of the output, which
follows this guidance.

Confidentiality is an optional security property for IEC 62351
Security Services. Confidentiality Algorithm IDs SHOULD be included
in the IEC 61850 SA TEK Payload payload if the IEC 61850 messages are
expected to traverse public network links and are not protected by
another level of encryption (e.g., an encrypted Virtual Private
Network). Current cryptographic advice indicates that the use of
AES-CBC-128 for confidentiality is sufficient for the foreseeable
future [SP.800-131], [SP.800-131A], but some security policies may require the use
of AES-CBC-256.

IEC 62351 Security Services describe a variety of policy choices for
protecting network traffic, including the option of specifying no
protection at all. This is enabled with the use of NONE as an
Authentication Algorithm
authentication algorithm and/or Confidentiality Algorithm. confidentiality algorithm. The
following guidance is given regarding the use of NONE.

o Setting both the Authentication Algorithm authentication algorithm and Confidentiality
Algorithm confidentiality
algorithm to NONE is possible but NOT RECOMMENDED. Setting such a
policy is sometimes necessary during a migration period, when
traffic is being protected incrementally and some traffic has not
yet been scheduled for protection. Alternatively, site security
policy for some packet flows requires inspection of packet data on
the private network followed by network-layer encryption before
delivery to a public network.

o Setting the Confidentiality Algorithm confidentiality algorithm to NONE but setting the
Authentication Algorithm
authentication algorithm to a MAC can be an acceptable policy in
the following conditions: the disclosed information in the data
packets is comprised of raw data values and the disclosure of the
data files is believed to be of no more value to an observer than
traffic analysis on the frequency and size of packets protected
for confidentiality. Alternatively, site security policy for some
packet flows requires inspection of packet data on the private
network followed by network-layer encryption before delivery to a
public network.

o Setting the Authentication Algorithm authentication algorithm to NONE but setting the
Confidentiality Algorithm
confidentiality algorithm to an algorithm that does not include
authentication is not safe and MUST NOT be used. done.

4. IANA Considerations

The "Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) Payloads" registry
[GDOI-REG] has been updated as described below. The terms "Expert
Review", "Reserved", and "Private Use" are used as defined in
[RFC5226].

o GDOI_PROTO_IEC_61850 (value 3) has been added to the "SA TEK
Payload Values - Protocol-ID" registry.

o A new "IEC62351-9 "IEC 62351-9 Authentication Values" registry has been
created. This registry defines Auth Alg values. Initial values
for the registry are given below; future assignments are to be
made through "Expert Review" [RFC5226].

Name Value
---- -----
Reserved 0
NONE 1
HMAC-SHA256-128 2
HMAC-SHA256 3
AES-GMAC-128 4
AES-GMAC-256 5
Unassigned 6-61439
Reserved for Private Use 61440-65535

o A new "IEC62351-9 "IEC 62351-9 Confidentiality Values" registry has been
created. This registry defines Enc Alg values. Initial values
for the registry are given below; future assignments are to be
made through "Expert Review" [RFC5226].

Name Value Authenticated Encryption
---- ----- ------------------------
Reserved 0
NONE 1
AES-CBC-128 2 N
AES-CBC-256 3 N
AES-GCM-128 4 Y
AES-GCM-256 5 Y
Unassigned 6-61439
Reserved for Private Use 61440-65535

o A new "GDOI SA TEK Attributes" registry has been created. This
registry defines SA TEK attributes. Initial values for the
registry are given below; future assignments are to be made
through "Expert Review" [RFC5226]. In the table, attributes that
are defined as Type/Value (TV) are marked as Basic (B); attributes
that are defined as Type/Length/Value (TLV) are marked as Variable
(V).

Attribute Value Type
--------- ----- ----
Reserved 0
SA_ATD 1 V
SA_KDA 2 B
Unassigned 3-28671
Reserved for Private Use 28672-32767

o A new "ID Types" registry has been created for the Identification
Payload when the DOI is GDOI. The This registry is taken from the "ID
Types"
"IPSEC Identification Type" registry for the IPsec DOI, which were previously assumed. DOI
[IPSEC-DOI-REG]. Values 1-12 are defined identically to the
equivalent values in the IPsec DOI. "IPSEC Identification Type" registry.

Value 13 (ID_OID) is defined in this memo. Initial values for the
registry are given below; future assignments are to be made
through "Expert Review" [RFC5226].

Name Value
---- -----
Reserved 0
ID_IPV4_ADDR 1
ID_FQDN 2
ID_USER_FQDN 3
ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET 4
ID_IPV6_ADDR 5
ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET 6
ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE 7
ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE 8
ID_DER_ASN1_DN 9
ID_DER_ASN1_GN 10
ID_KEY_ID 11
ID_LIST 12
ID_OID 13
Unassigned 14-61439
Reserved for Private Use 61440-65535

5. References

5.1. Normative References

[IEC-62351-9]
International Electrotechnical Commission, "IEC 62351 Part
9 "Power systems
management and associated information exchange - Key Management", Data and
communications security - Part 9: Cyber security key
management for power system equipment", IEC 62351-9, January 2013. 62351-9:2017,
May 2017.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.

[RFC6407] Weis, B., Rowles, S., and T. Hardjono, "The Group Domain
of Interpretation", RFC 6407, DOI 10.17487/RFC6407,
October 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6407>.

[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

5.2. Informative References

[FIPS180-3.2008]

[FIPS180-4]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-3, October 2008,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-3/
fips180-3_final.pdf>. 180-4,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, August 2015,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.

[FIPS197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, November 2001,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/
fips-197.pdf>.

[GDOI-REG]
IANA, "Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) Payloads",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/gdoi-payloads>.

[IEC-61850-8-1]
International Electrotechnical Commission, "Communication
networks and systems for power utility automation - Part
8-1: Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) -
Mappings to MMS (ISO 9506-1 and ISO 9506-2) and to ISO/IEC
8802-3", IEC 61850-8-1, June 2011.

[IEC-61850-9-2]
International Electrotechnical Commission, "Communication
networks and systems for power utility automation - Part
9-2: Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) -
Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3", IEC 61850-2,
September 2011.

[IEC-62351-6]
International Electrotechnical Commission, "Power systems
management and associated information exchange - Data and
communications security - Part 6: Security for IEC 61850",
IEC 62351-6, June 2007.

[IEC-TR-61850-90-5]
International Electrotechnical Commission, "Communication
networks and systems for power utility automation - Part
90-5: Use of IEC 61850 to transmit synchrophasor
information according to IEEE C37.118", IEC TR 62351-90-5,
May 2012.

[IPSEC-DOI-REG]
IANA, "'Magic Numbers' for ISAKMP Protocol",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/isakmp-registry>.

[ITU-T-X.683]
International Telecommunications Union, "Information
technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1):
Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications",
ITU-T Recommendation X.683, July 2002,
<http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/
X.683-0207.pdf>. August 2015,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.683-201508-I/en>.

[ITU-T-X.690]
International Telecommunications Union, "Information
technology-ASN.1
technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
X.690, 2008. August 2015, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-
X.690-201508-I/en>.

[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.

[SP.800-131]

[SP.800-131A]
Barker, E. and A. Roginsky, "Recommendation "Transitions: Recommendation
for the Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and
Key Lengths", National Institute of Science and
Technology DRAFT NIST Special Publication 800-131, June
2010. 800-131A,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-131Ar1, November 2015,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-131Ar1.pdf>.

[SP.800-38A]
Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods and Techniques", NIST Special
Publication 800-38A, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38A, December
2001, <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/
nistspecialpublication800-38a.pdf>.

[SP.800-38D]
Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", NIST
Special Publication 800-38D, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38D,
November 2007,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/
nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf>.

Appendix A. Example ID, SA TEK, and KD Payloads for IEC 61850

An IED Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) begins a GROUPKEY-PULL
exchange and requests keys and security policy for
61850_UDP_ADDR_GOOSE (OID = 1.2.840.10070.61850.8.1.2 as defined in
[IEC-61850-9-2]) and IP multicast address 233.252.0.1 encoded as
specified in [IEC-61850-9-2].

OID and OID-Specific Payload protocol fields are variable-length
fields. To improve readability, their representations in Figures 7
and 8 are "compressed", as indicated by a trailing "~" for these
fields. Implementations should be aware that because these fields
are variably sized, some payload fields may not be conveniently
aligned on an even octet.

Note 2:

Note: The actual DER for the OID-Specific Payload field is defined in
[IEC-62351-6].

Figure 7: Sample Identification Payload

The Key Server responds with the following SA TEK payload including
two GDOI_PROTO_IEC_61850 Protocol-Specific TEK payloads in the second
GROUPKEY-PULL message. The first one is to be activated immediately
and has a lifetime of 3600 seconds (0x0E10) remaining. The second
has a lifetime of 12 hours (0xA8C0) and should be activated in 3300
seconds (0x0CE4), which gives a 5-minute (300-second) overlap of the
two SAs.

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! Next Payload ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! DOI = 2 !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! Situation = 0 !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! SA Attr NP=16 (SA TEK) ! RESERVED2 !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! NP=16 (SA TEK)! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! Prot-ID=3 !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! OID Len=13 ! OID=<06 0B 2A 86 48 CE 56 83 E3 1A 08 01 02> ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! OID-Specific Payload Len !OID SP=<DER for 233.252.0.1> ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! SPI=1 !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! AuthAlg=1 (HMAC-SHA256-128) ! EncAlg=2 (AES-CBC-128) !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! Remaining Lifetime=0x0E01 !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! SA Attr NP=16 (SA TEK) ! RESERVED2 !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! NP=0 ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! Prot-ID=3 !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! OID Len=13 ! OID=<06 0B 2A 86 48 CE 56 83 E3 1A 08 01 02> ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! OID-Specific Payload Len !OID SP=<DER for 233.252.0.1> ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! SPI=2 !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! AuthAlg=0 (NONE) ! EncAlg=4 (AES-GCM-128) !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! Remaining Lifetime=0xA8C0 !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! Type=1 (SA_ATD) ! Length=4 !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!
! Value=0x0CE4 !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-!

Figure 8: Sample IEC 61850 SA Payload
The IED acknowledges that it is capable and willing to use this
policy in the third GROUPKEY-PULL message. In response, the KS sends
a KD payload to the requesting IED. This concludes the GROUPKEY-PULL
exchange.

Figure 9: Sample KD Payload

Appendix B. Implementation Considerations

Several topics have been suggested as useful for implementers.

B.1. DER Length Fields

The ID and SA TEK payloads defined in this memo include explicit
lengths for fields formatted as DER. This includes the OID Length
and OID-Specific Payload Length fields shown in Figures 2 and 4.
Strictly speaking, these lengths are redundant since the length of
the DER value is also encoded within the DER fields. It would be
possible to determine the lengths of the fields from those encoded
values. However, many implementations will find the explicit length
fields convenient when constructing and sanity checking the GDOI
messages including these payloads. Implementations will thus be
spared from manipulating the DER itself when performing activities
that do not otherwise require parsing in order to obtain values
therein.

B.2. Groups with Multiple Senders

GCKS policy may specify more than one protected type of IEC 61850
message within a GDOI group. This is represented within a GDOI SA
Payload by the presence of an SA TEK Payload payload for each multicast group
that is protected as part of group policy. The OID contained in each
of the SA TEK Payloads payloads may be identical, but the value of each OID-
Specific Payload would be unique. Typically, the OID-Specific
Payload
payload defines a destination address, and there is typically a
single sender to that destination address.

Appendix C. Data Attribute Format

Data attributes attached to an SA TEK following the Data Attribute data attribute
format are described in this section. Data attributes can be in
Type/Value (TV) format (useful when a value is defined to be less
than two octets in size) or in Type/Length/Value (TLV) form.

1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
!A! Attribute Type ! AF=0 Attribute Length !
!F! ! AF=1 Attribute Value !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. AF=0 Attribute Value .
. AF=1 Not Transmitted .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Figure 10: Data Attributes
The Data Attributes fields are defined as follows:

o Attribute Type (2 octets) -- Unique identifier for each type of
attribute. These attributes are defined as part of the DOI-
specific information. The most significant bit, or Attribute
Format (AF), indicates whether the data attributes follow the
Type/Length/Value (TLV) format or a shortened Type/Value (TV)
format. If the AF bit is a zero (0), then the Data Attributes data attributes are
of the Type/Length/Value (TLV) form. If the AF bit is a one (1),
then the Data Attributes data attributes are of the Type/Value form.

o Attribute Length (2 octets) -- Length in octets of the Attribute
Value. When the AF bit is a one (1), the Attribute Value is only
2 octets, and the Attribute Length field is not present.

o Attribute Value (variable length) -- Value of the attribute
associated with the DOI-specific Attribute Type. If the AF bit is
a zero (0), this field has a variable length defined by the
Attribute Length field. If the AF bit is a one (1), the Attribute
Value has a length of 2 octets.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Sean Turner, Steffen Fries, Yoav Nir, Vincent Roca,
Dennis Bourget, and David Boose for their thoughtful reviews, each of
which resulted in substantial improvements to this memo. Joe Salowey
provided valuable guidance as document shepherd during the
publication process. The authors are indebted to Kathleen Moriarty
for her agreement to sponsor the publication of the document.

Authors' Addresses

Brian Weis
Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, California 95134-1706
United States of America

Phone: +1 408 526 4796
Email: bew@cisco.com
Maik Seewald
Cisco Systems
Am Soeldnermoos 17
D-85399 Hallbergmoos
Germany

Phone: +49 619 6773 9655
Email: maseewal@cisco.com

Herb Falk
SISCO
6605 19-1/2 Mile Road
Sterling Heights, MI 48314
United States of America

Phone: +1 586 254 0020 x105
Email: herb@sisconet.com