MILE
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) C. Inacio
Internet-Draft
Request for Comments: 8134 CMU
Intended status:
Category: Informational D. Miyamoto
Expires: May 17, 2017
ISSN: 2070-1721 UTokyo
November 13, 2016
MILE
March 2017
Management Incident Lightweight Exchange (MILE) Implementation Report
draft-ietf-mile-implementreport-10
Abstract
This document is a collection of implementation reports from vendors,
consortiums, and researchers who have implemented one or more of the
standards published from the IETF INCident Handling (INCH) and
Management Incident Lightweight Exchange (MILE) working groups.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft document is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list It represents the consensus of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a maximum candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of six months RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 17, 2017.
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8134.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Consortiums and Information Sharing and Analysis Centers
(ISACs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Anti-Phishing Working Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Advanced Cyber Defence Centre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Research and Education Networking Information Sharing and
Analysis Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Open Source Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. EMC/RSA RID Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. NICT IODEF-SCI implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. n6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Vendor Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Deep Secure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. IncMan Suite, DFLabs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Surevine Proof of Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. MANTIS Cyber-Intelligence Management Framework . . . . . 8
5. Vendors with Planned Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9
5.1. Threat Central, HP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. DAEDALUS, NICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Other Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Collaborative Incident Management System . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. Automated Incident Reporting - AirCERT . . . . . . . . . 10
6.3. US Department of Energy CyberFed . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11
7. Implementation Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. Code Generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.2. iodeflib . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.3. iodefpm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.4. Usability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Acknowledgements . IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. IANA Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 13
10. Security Considerations Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11. Informative References
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
This draft document is a collection of information about Security Incident security incident
reporting protocols, protocols and the implementation of systems that use them
to share such information. It is simply a collection of information,
and it makes no attempt to compare the various standards or
implementations. As such, it will be of interest to Network
Operators network
operators who wish to collect and share such data.
Operationally, Operators operators would need to decide which incident data
collection group they want to be part of, and that choice will
strongly influence their choice of reporting protocol and
applications used to gather and distribute the data.
This document is a collection of implementation reports from vendors
and researchers who have implemented one or more of the standards
published from the INCH and MILE working groups. The standards
include:
o Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) v1, RFC5070
[RFC5070], v1 [RFC5070]
o Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) v2,
RFC5070-bis [RFC5070-bis], v2 [RFC7970]
o Extensions to the IODEF-Document Class for Reporting Phishing,
RFC5901 [RFC5901], Phishing
[RFC5901]
o Sharing Transaction Fraud Data, RFC5941 [RFC5941], Data [RFC5941]
o Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID), RFC6545 [RFC6545], (RID) [RFC6545]
o Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages over
HTTP/TLS, RFC6546 [RFC6546],
HTTP/TLS [RFC6546]
o Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) Extension for
Structured Cybersecurity Information (SCI), RFC7203 [RFC7203]. (SCI) [RFC7203]
The implementation reports included in this document have been
provided by the team or product responsible for the implementations
of the mentioned RFCs. Additional submissions are welcome and should
be sent to the draft editor. A more complete list of implementations,
including open source efforts and vendor products, can also be found
at the following location:
http://siis.realmv6.org/implementations/
<http://siis.realmv6.org/implementations/>
2. Consortiums and Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs)
2.1. Anti-Phishing Working Group
The Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) is one of the biggest
coalitions against cybercrime, especially phishing. In order to
collect threat information in a structured format, APWG provides a
phishing and cybercrime reporting tool which that sends threat information
to APWG by tailoring information with the IODEF format, based on RFC5070 RFC
5070 [RFC5070] and RFC5901. RFC 5901 [RFC5901].
2.2. Advanced Cyber Defence Centre
The Advanced Cyber Defense Defence Centre (ACDC), (ACDC) is an European wide a Europe-wide activity to
fight against botnets. ACDC provides solutions to mitigate on-going attacks, as well as consolidating
attacks and consolidates information provided by various stakeholders
into a pool of knowledge. Within ACDC, IODEF is one of the supported schema
schemas for exchanging the information.
2.3. Research and Education Networking Information Sharing and Analysis
Center
The Research and Education Networking Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (REN-ISAC) is a private community of the research researchers and higher
education
higher-education members for sharing that share threat information, information and employs
IODEF formatted-messages to exchange information.
REN-ISAC also recommends using an IODEF attachment provided with a
notification email for processing rather than relying on parsing of
the email body text. text of email. The tools provided by REN-ISAC is are designed
to handle such email.
http://www.ren-isac.net/notifications/using_iodef.html
<http://www.ren-isac.net/notifications/using_iodef.html>
3. Open Source Implementations
3.1. EMC/RSA RID Agent
The EMC/RSA RID agent is an open source implementation of the IETF
standards for the exchange of incident and indicator data. The code
has been released under a an MIT license license, and development will continue
with the open source community at the Github GitHub site for RSA
Intelligence Sharing:
https://github.com/RSAIntelShare/RID-Server.git
<https://github.com/RSAIntelShare/RID-Server.git>
The code implements the RFC6545, Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)
described in RFC 6545 [RFC6545] and RFC6546, the Transport of RID over HTTP/TLS protocol. HTTP/
TLS protocol described in [RFC6546]. The code supports the evolving RFC5070-bis
Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) data model
[RFC7970] from the work in the IETF working
group Managed Incident Lightweight
Exchange (MILE). (MILE) working group.
3.2. NICT IODEF-SCI implementation
Japan's National Institute of Information and Communications
Technology (NICT) Network Security Research Institute implemented
open source tools for exchanging, accumulating, and locating IODEF-
SCI (RFC7203, [RFC7203]documents. [RFC7203] documents.
Three tools are available from GitHub. These tools assist the
exchange of IODEF-SCI documents between parties. IODEF-SCI is
RFC7203 that [RFC7203]
extends IODEF so that an IODEF document can embed
structured cybersecurity information Structured
Cybersecurity Information (SCI). For instance, it can embed MMDEF, CEE, MAEC Malware
Metadata Exchange Format (MMDEF), Common Event Expression (CEE),
Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC) in XML XML, and CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifiers.
The three tools are generator, exchanger, and parser. The generator
generates IODEF-SCI documents or appends an XML to an existing IODEF
document. The exchanger sends the IODEF document to a specified
correspondent node. The parser receives, parses, and stores the
IODEF-SCI document. The parser also creates an interface that
enables users to locate IODEF-SCI documents which that have previously been
received. The code has been released under a an MIT license and
development will continue on GitHub.
Note that users can enjoy using this software at their own risk.
Available Online:
https://github.com/TakeshiTakahashi/IODEF-SCI
<https://github.com/TakeshiTakahashi/IODEF-SCI>
3.3. n6
n6 is a platform for processing security-related information, information; it was
developed by NASK (Poland the Poland Research and Academic Computer Network), Network (NASK)
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) Polska. The n6 API provides
a common and unified way of representing data across the different
sources that participate in knowledge management.
n6 exposes a REST-ful (Representational State Transfer) API over
HTTPS with mandatory authentication via TLS client certificates, Transport Layer Security
(TLS) client certificates to ensure confidential and trustworthy
communications. Moreover, it uses an event-based data model for
representation of all types of security information.
Each event is represented as a JSON object with a set of mandatory
and optional attributes. n6 also supports alternative output data
formats for keeping compatibility with existing systems - IODEF and
CSV - although these formats lack some of the attributes that may be
present in the native JSON format.
Available Online:
https://github.com/CERT-Polska/n6sdk
<https://github.com/CERT-Polska/n6sdk>
4. Vendor Implementations
4.1. Deep Secure
Deep-Secure Guards are built to protect a trusted domain from:
o Releasing releasing sensitive data that does not meet the organisational organizational
security policy policy, and
o Applications applications receiving badly constructed or malicious data which that
could exploit a vulnerability (known or unknown) unknown).
Deep-Secure Guards support HTTPS and XMPP (optimised server to server
protocol) the Extensible Messaging and
Presence Protocol (XMPP -- optimized server-to-server protocol),
transports. The Deep-Secure Guards support transfer of XML
based XML-based
business content by creating a schema to translate the known good
content to and from the intermediate format. This means that the
Deep-Secure Guards can be used to protect:
o IODEF/RID using the HTTPS transport binding (RFC6546) [RFC6546]
o IODEF/RID using an XMPP binding
o ROLIE Resource-Oriented Lightweight Indicator Exchange (ROLIE) using
HTTPS transport binding (XEP-0268, [XEP-0268]) [XEP-0268]
o STIX/TAXII Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) / Trusted
Automated Exchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) using the
HTTPS transport binding
Deep-Secure Guards also support the SMTP transport and perform deep
content inspection of content including XML attachments. The Mail
Guard supports S/MIME S/MIME, and Deep Secure is working on support for the
upcoming PLASMA standard standard, which enables an information centric information-centric policy
enforcement of data use.
4.2. IncMan Suite, DFLabs
The Incident Object Description Exchange Format, documented in the
RFC5070, RFC
5070 [RFC5070], defines a data representation that provides a
framework for sharing information commonly exchanged by Computer
Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) about computer security
incidents. IncMan Suite implements the IODEF standard for exchanging
details about incidents, either for exporting or importing
activities. This has been introduced to enhance the capabilities of
the various Computer
Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT), CSIRTs to facilitate collaboration and sharing of useful experiences, sharing
experiences (sharing awareness on specific
cases. cases).
The IODEF implementation is specified as an XML schema, schema; therefore all
data are stored in an xml file; in XML file. In this file file, all the data of an
incident are organized in a hierarchical structure to describe the
various objects and their relationships.
The IncMan Suite relies on IODEF as a transport format, which is
composed by various classes for describing the entities which that are part
of the incident description. For instance instance, the various relevant
timestamps (detection time, start time, end time, and report time),
the techniques used by the intruders to perpetrate the incident, the
impact of the incident, technical and non-technical (time and
monetary)
monetary), and obviously all systems involved in the incident.
4.2.1. Exporting Incidents
Each incident defined in the IncMan Suite can be exported via a User
Interface feature user
interface feature, and it will create a xml an XML document. Due to the
nature of the data processed, the IODEF extraction might be
considered privacy sensitive by the parties exchanging the
information or by those described by it. For this reason, specific
care needs to be taken in ensuring the distribution to an appropriate
audience or third party, either during the document exchange and or the
subsequent processing.
The xml XML document generated will include a description and details of
the incident along with all the systems involved and the related
information. At this stage stage, it can be distributed for import into a
remote system.
4.2.2. Importing Incidents
The IncMan Suite provides the functionality to import incidents
stored in files and transported via IODEF-compliant xml XML documents.
The importing process comprises is comprised of two steps: first, the file is
inspected to validate if it is well formed, then formed; second, all data are
uploaded inside the system.
If the incident already exists in the system with the same incident
id,
ID, the new one being imported will be created under a new id. ID. This
approach prevents accidentally overwriting existing info information or
merging inconsistent data.
The IncMan Suite also includes a feature to upload incidents from
emails.
The incident, described in xml XML format, can be stored directly into
the body of the email message or transported as an attachment of the
email. At regular intervals, intervals that are customizable by the user, the
IncMan Suite monitors for incoming emails, which are filtered by a
configurable white-
list white-list and black-list mechanism on the sender's
email account, then account. Then, a parser processes the received email and a new
incident is created
automatically, automatically after having validated the email
body or the attachment to ensure it the format is well formed format. formed.
4.3. Surevine Proof of Concept
XMPP is enhanced and extended through the XMPP Extension Protocols
(or XEPs).
(XEPs). XEP-0268 [XEP-0268] describes incident management (using
IODEF) of the XMPP network itself, effectively supporting self-
healing the XMPP network. In order to more generically cover the
incident management of a network over the same network, XEP-0268
requires some updates. We are working on these changes together with
a new XEP that supports "social networking" over XMPP, enhancing which enhances
the publish-and-subscribe XEP (XEP-0060 [XEP-0060]). [XEP-0060]. This now allows nodes to
publish and subscribe to any type of content and therefore receive
the content. XEP-0060 will be used to describe IODEF content. We
now have an alpha version of the server-side software and client-side
software required to demonstrate the "social networking" capability
and are currently enhancing this to support
Cyber Incident cyber incident management
in real-time. real time.
4.4. MANTIS Cyber-Intelligence Management Framework
MANTIS
Model-based Analysis of Threat Intelligence Sources (MANTIS) provides
an example implementation of a framework for managing cyber threat
intelligence expressed in standards such as STIX, CybOX, Cyber Observable
Expression (CybOX), IODEF, etc. The aims of providing such an
example implementation
are: are as follows:
o To facilitate discussions about emerging standards such as STIX,
CybOX
CybOX, et al. al., with respect to questions regarding tooling: how
would a certain aspect be implemented, and how do changes affect
an implementation? Such discussions become much easier and have a
better basis if they can be lead in the context of example tooling
that is known to the community.
o To lower the barrier of entry for organizations and teams (esp.
(especially CSIRT/CERT teams) in using emerging standards for cyber-threat
intelligence
cyber-threat-intelligence management and exchange.
o To provide a platform on the basis of which research and community-
driven
community-driven development in the area of cyber-threat cyber-threat-
intelligence management can occur.
5. Vendors with Planned Support
5.1. Threat Central, HP
HP has developed HP Threat Central, a security intelligence platform
that enables automated, real-time collaboration between organizations
to combat today's increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks. One way
automated sharing of threat indicators is achieved is through close
integration with the HP ArcSight SIEM Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) for automated upload and consumption of information
from the Threat Central Server. In
addition addition, HP Threat Central
supports open standards for sharing threat information so that
participants who do not use HP Security Products can participate in
the sharing ecosystem. It is planned that future versions will also
support IODEF for the automated upload and download of threat
information.
5.2. DAEDALUS, NICT
DAEDALUS is a real-time alert system based on a large-scale darknet
monitoring facility that has been deployed as a part of the nicter Network
Incident analysis Center for Tactical Emergency Response (nicter)
system of NICT, which is based in Japan. DAEDALUS consists of an
analysis center (i.e., nicter) and several cooperative organizations.
Each organization installs a darknet sensor and establishes a secure
channel between it and the analysis center, and it continuously
forwards darknet traffic toward the center. In addition, each
organization registers the IP address range of its livenet at the
center in advance. When these distributed darknet sensors observe
malware activities from the IP address of a cooperate cooperating organization,
then the analysis center sends an alert to the organization. The
future version of DAEDALUS will support IODEF for sending alert
messages to the users.
6. Other Implementations
6.1. Collaborative Incident Management System
A Collaborative Incident Management System (CIMS) is a proof-of-concept proof-of-
concept system for collaborative incident handling and for the
sharing of information about cyber defence defense situational awareness information
between the
participants, participants; it was developed for the Cyber Coalition
2013 (CC13) exercise organized by NATO. the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). CIMS was implemented based on Request Tracker
(RT), an open source software widely used for handling incident
response
responses by many CERTs and CSIRTs.
One of the functionality functionalities implemented in CIMS was the ability to
import and export IODEF messages in the body of emails. The intent
was to verify the suitability of IODEF to achieve the objective of
collaborative incident handling. The customized version of RT could
be configured to send an email message containing an IODEF message
whenever an incident ticket was created, modified modified, or deleted. These
IODEF messages would then be imported into other incident handling
systems in order to allow participating CSIRTs to use their usual
means for incident handling, handling while still interacting with those using
the proof-of-concept CIMS. Having an IODEF message generated for
every change made to the incident information in RT (and for the
system to allow incoming IODEF email messages to be associated to an
existing incident) would in some way allow all participating CSIRTs
to actually work on a "common incident ticket", at least at the
conceptual level. Of particular importance was the ability for users
to exchange information between each other concerning actions taken
in the handling of a particular incident, thus creating a sort of
common action log, log as well as requesting/tasking others to provide
information or perform a specified action and correlating received
responses to the original request or tasking. task. As well, a specific
"profile" was developed to identify a subset of the IODEF classes
that would be used during the exercise, exercise in an attempt to channel all
users into a common usage pattern of the otherwise flexible IODEF
standard.
6.2. Automated Incident Reporting - AirCERT
AirCERT was implemented by CERT/CC the CERT / Coordination Center (CC) of
Carnegie Mellon's Software Engineering Institute CERT division.
AirCERT was designed to be an Internet-scalable distributed system
for sharing security event data. The AirCERT system was designed to
be an automated collector of flow and IDS Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) alerts. AirCERT would collect that information into a
relational database and be able to share reporting using IODEF and
the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (RFC4765, [RFC4765]). [RFC4765]. AirCERT
additionally used SNML [SNML] to exchange information about the
network. AirCERT was implemented in a combination of C and Perl
modules and included periodic graphing capabilities leveraging
RRDTool. the
Round-Robin Database Tool (RRDTool).
AirCERT was intended for large scale large-scale distributed deployment and
eventually and,
eventually, the ability to sanitize data to be shared across
administrative domains. The architecture was designed to allow
collection of data at on a per site per-site basis and to allow each site to
create data sharing based on its own particular trust relationships.
6.3. US Department of Energy CyberFed
The CyberFed system was implemented and deployed by Argonne National
Laboratory to automate the detection and response of attack activity
against Department of Energy (DoE) computer networks. CyberFed
automates the collection of network alerting activity from various
perimeter network defenses and logs those events into its database.
CyberFed then automatically converts that information into blocking
information transmitted to all participants. The original
implementation used IODEF messages wrapped in an XML extension to
manage a large array of indicators. The CyberFed system was not
designed to describe a particular incident as much as to describe a
set of current network blocking network-blocking indicators that can be generated and
deployed machine-to-machine. machine to machine.
CyberFed is primarily implemented in Perl. Included as part of the
CyberFed system are scripts which that interact with a large number of
firewalls, IDS/IPS IDS / Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) devices, DNS
systems, and proxies which that operate to implement both the automated
collection of events as well as the automated deployment of black
listing.
Currently
Currently, CyberFed supports multiple exchange formats including
IODEF and STIX. OpenIOC Open Indicators of Compromise (OpenIOC) is also a
potential exchange format that the US DoE is considering.
7. Implementation Guide
The section aims at sharing the tips for development of IODEF-capable
systems.
7.1. Code Generators
For implementing IODEF-capable systems, it is feasible to employ code
generators for the XML Schema Document Definition (XSD). The generators are
used to save development costs since they automatically create useful
libraries for accessing XML attributes, composing messages, and/or
validating XML objects. The IODEF XSD was defined in section Section 8 of
RFC5070,
RFC 5070 [RFC5070] and is availabe at http://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-
registry/schema/iodef-1.0.xsd. available from the "ns" registry
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry>.
However, there still remains some issues. issues remain. Due to the complexity of the IODEF XSD,
some code generators could not generate code from the XSD file. The
tested code generators were are as follows.
o XML::Pastor [XSD:Perl] (Perl)
o RXSD [XSD:Ruby] (Ruby)
o PyXB [XSD:Python] (Python)
o JAXB [XSD:Java] (Java)
o CodeSynthesis XSD [XSD:Cxx] (C++)
o Xsd.exe [XSD:CS] (C#)
For instance, we have tried to use XML::Pastor, but it could not
properly understand its schema due to the complexity of IODEF XSD.
The same applies to RXSD Ruby XSD (RXSD) and JAXB. Java Architecture for XML
Binding (JAXB). Only PyXB, Python XML Schema Bindings (PyXB),
CodeSynthesis XSD XSD, and Xsd.exe were able to understand the complex
schema.
Unfortunately, there is no recommended workaround. A possible
workaround is a double conversion of the XSD file. This entails the
XSD being serialized into XML, and afterwards XML; afterwards, the resulting XML is
converted back into an XSD. The resultant XSD was successfully
processed by the all the tools listed above.
It should be noted that IODEF uses '-' (hyphen) symbols in its
classes or attributes, which are listed as follows. follows:
o IODEF-Document Class; it Class: It is the top level top-level class in the IODEF data
model described in section Section 3.1 of RFC5070. RFC 5070 [RFC5070].
o The vlan-name and vlan-num Attribute; according Attributes: According to section Section 3.16.2
of RFC5070, RFC 5070 [RFC5070], they are the name and number of Virtual LAN
and are the attributes for Address class.
o Extending the Enumerated Values of Attribute; according Attribute: According to section
Section 5.1 of RFC5070, it RFC 5070 [RFC5070], this is a an extension techniques technique
to add new enumerated values to an attribute, and it has a prefix
of "ext-", e.g., ext-
value, ext-value, ext-category, ext-type, and so on.
According to the language specification, many programing language programming languages
prohibit having '-' symbols in the name of class. The code
generators must replace or remove the '-' when building the
librarlies.
libraries. They should have the name space restore the '-' when
outputting the XML along with IODEF XSD.
7.2. iodeflib
iodeflib is an open source implementation written in Python. This
provides simple but powerful APIs to create, parse parse, and edit IODEF
documents. It was designed in order to keep its interface as simple
as possible, whereas generated libraries tend to inherit the
complexity of IODEF XSD. In addition, the iodeflib interface
includes functions to hide some unnecessarily nested structures of
the IODEF schema, schema and adding add more convenient shortcuts.
This tool is available through the following link:
http://www.decalage.info/python/iodeflib
<http://www.decalage.info/python/iodeflib>
7.3. iodefpm
IODEF.pm is an open source implementation written in Perl. This also
provides a simple interface for creating and parsing IODEF documents, documents
in order to facilitate the translation of the a key-value based key-value-based format
to the IODEF representation. The module contains a generic XML DTD
parser and includes a simplified node based node-based representation of the
IODEF DTD. It Hence, it can hence easily be upgraded or extended to support
new XML nodes or other DTDs.
This tool is available through the following link:
http://search.cpan.org/~saxjazman/
<http://search.cpan.org/~saxjazman/>
7.4. Usability
Here notes some
Some tips to avoid problems. problems are noted here:
o IODEF has a category attribute for the NodeRole class. Though
various categories are described, they are not sufficient. For
example, in the case of web mail webmail servers, should the user choose
"www" or
"mail". "mail"? One suggestion is selecting to select "mail" as the
category attribute and adding add "www" for another attirbute. attribute.
o The numbering of Incident ID incident IDs needs to be considered. Otherwise,
information, such as the number of incidents within a certain period
period, could be observed by document receivers. This is easily
mitigated by randomizing the assignment of incident IDs.
8. Acknowledgements
The MILE Implementation report has been compiled through the
submissions of implementers of INCH and MILE working group standards.
A special note of thanks to the following contributors:
John Atherton, Surevine
Humphrey Browning, Deep-Secure
Dario Forte, DFLabs
Tomas Sander, HP
Ulrich Seldeslachts, ACDC
Takeshi Takahashi, National Institute of Information and
Communications Technology Network Security Research Institute
Kathleen Moriarty, EMC
Bernd Grobauer, Siemens
Dandurand Luc, NATO
Pawel Pawlinski, NASK
9. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA.
10. does not require any IANA actions.
9. Security Considerations
This draft document provides a summary of implementation reports from
researchers and vendors who have implemented RFCs and drafts from the
MILE and INCH working groups. There are no security considerations
added in this draft because of the nature of the document.
11.
10. Informative References
[RFC4765] Debar, H., Curry, D., and B. Feinstein, "The Intrusion
Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF)", RFC 4765,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4765, March 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4765>.
[RFC5070] Danyliw, R., Meijer, J., and Y. Demchenko, "The Incident
Object Description Exchange Format", RFC 5070,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5070, December 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5070>.
[RFC5070-bis]
Danyliw, R., "The Incident Object Description Exchange
Format v2", 2016, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-
ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis>.
[RFC5901] Cain, P. and D. Jevans, "Extensions to the IODEF-Document
Class for Reporting Phishing", RFC 5901,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5901, July 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5901>.
[RFC5941] M'Raihi, D., Boeyen, S., Grandcolas, M., and S. Bajaj,
"Sharing Transaction Fraud Data", RFC 5941,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5941, August 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5941>.
[RFC6545] Moriarty, K., "Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)",
RFC 6545, DOI 10.17487/RFC6545, April 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6545>.
[RFC6546] Trammell, B., "Transport of Real-time Inter-network
Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS", RFC 6546,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6546, April 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6546>.
[RFC7203] Takahashi, T., Landfield, K., and Y. Kadobayashi, "An
Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF)
Extension for Structured Cybersecurity Information",
RFC 7203, DOI 10.17487/RFC7203, April 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7203>.
[RFC7970] Danyliw, R., "The Incident Object Description Exchange
Format Version 2", RFC 7970, DOI 10.17487/RFC7970,
November 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7970>.
[SNML] Trammell, B., Danyliw, R., Levy, S., and A. Kompanek,
"AirCERT: The Definitive Guide", 2005,
<http://aircert.sourceforge.net/docs/
aircert_manual-06_2005.pdf>.
[XEP-0060]
Millard, P., Saint-Andre, P., and R. Meijer, "XEP-0060:
Publish-Subscribe", December 2016,
<http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0060.html>.
[XEP-0268]
Hefczy, A., Jensen, F., Remond, M., Saint-Andre, P., and
M. Wild, "XEP-0268: Incident Handling", May 2012,
<http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0268.html>.
[XSD:CS] Microsoft, "XML Schema Definition Tool (Xsd.exe)",
<http://www.microsoft.com/>.
[XSD:Cxx] CodeSynthesis, "XSD - "XSD: XML Data Binding for C++",
<http://www.codesynthesis.com/>.
[XSD:Java]
Project Kenai, "JAXB Reference Implementation", "Project JAXB", <https://jaxb.java.net/>.
[XSD:Perl]
Ulsoy, A., "XML::Pastor", "XML-Pastor-1.0.4",
<http://search.cpan.org/~aulusoy/XML-Pastor-1.0.4/>.
[XSD:Python]
Bigot, P., "PyXB: "PyXB 1.2.5: Python XML Schema Bindings",
<https://pypi.python.org/pypi/PyXB>.
[XSD:Ruby]
Morsi, M., "RXSD - XSD "XSD / Ruby Translator",
<https://github.com/movitto/RXSD>.
Acknowledgements
The MILE implementation report has been compiled through the
submissions of implementers of INCH and MILE working group standards.
A special note of thanks to the following contributors:
John Atherton, Surevine
Humphrey Browning, Deep-Secure
Dario Forte, DFLabs
Tomas Sander, HP
Ulrich Seldeslachts, ACDC
Takeshi Takahashi, National Institute of Information and
Communications Technology Network Security Research Institute
Kathleen Moriarty, EMC
Bernd Grobauer, Siemens
Dandurand Luc, NATO
Pawel Pawlinski, NASK
Authors' Addresses
Chris Inacio
Carnegie Mellon University
4500 5th Ave., SEI 4108
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
US
United States of America
Email: inacio@andrew.cmu.edu
Daisuke Miyamoto
The Univerisity University of Tokyo
2-11-16 Yayoi, Bunkyo
Tokyo 113-8658
JP
Japan
Email: daisu-mi@nc.u-tokyo.ac.jp