wdiff rfc8164.original rfc8164.txt

HTTP Working Group
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Nottingham
Internet-Draft
Intended status:
Request for Comments: 8164
Category: Experimental M. Thomson
Expires: September 18, 2017
ISSN: 2070-1721 Mozilla
March 17,
May 2017

Opportunistic Security for HTTP/2
draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-11

Abstract

This document describes how "http" URIs can be accessed using
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and HTTP/2 to mitigate pervasive
monitoring attacks. This mechanism not a replacement for "https"
URIs; it is vulnerable to active attacks.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft document is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for examination, experimental implementation, and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents
evaluation.

This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
community. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list It represents the consensus of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid the IETF
community. It has received public review and has been approved for
publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not
all documents approved by the IESG are a maximum candidate for any level of
Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.

Information about the current status of six months this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents obtained at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on September 18, 2017.
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8164.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ....................................................2
1.1. Goals and Non-Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Non-goals ........................................3
1.2. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 .....................................3
2. Using HTTP URIs over TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 ........................................3
2.1. Alternative Server Opt-In . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 ..................................4
2.2. Interaction with "https" URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 ..............................5
2.3. The "http-opportunistic" well-known Well-Known URI . . . . . . . . . 5 ....................5
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 .............................................6
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 .........................................7
4.1. Security Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 ........................................7
4.2. Downgrade Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 ..........................................7
4.3. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 .....................................7
4.4. Confusion Regarding regarding Request Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 7 .........................7
4.5. Server Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 ............................................8
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 ......................................................8
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 .......................................8
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. .....................................9
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 ...................................................9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 ................................................10

1. Introduction

This document describes a use of HTTP Alternative Services [RFC7838]
to decouple the URI scheme from the use and configuration of
underlying encryption. It allows an "http" URI [RFC7230] to be
accessed using HTTP/2 [RFC7230] and Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246]
with Opportunistic Security [RFC7435].

This document describes a usage model whereby sites can serve "http"
URIs over TLS, thereby avoiding the problem of serving Mixed Content
(described in [W3C.CR-mixed-content-20160802]) while still providing
protection against passive attacks.

Opportunistic Security does not provide the same guarantees as using
TLS with "https" URIs, because it is vulnerable to active attacks,
and does not change the security context of the connection.
Normally, users will not be able to tell that it is in use (i.e.,
there will be no "lock icon").

1.1. Goals and Non-Goals Non-goals

The immediate goal is to make the use of HTTP more robust in the face
of pervasive passive monitoring [RFC7258].

A secondary (but significant) goal is to provide for ease of
implementation, deployment deployment, and operation. This mechanism is
expected to have a minimal impact upon performance, performance and require a
trivial administrative effort to configure.

Preventing active attacks (such as a Man-in-the-Middle) man-in-the-middle attacks) is a
non-goal for this specification. Furthermore, this specification is
not intended to replace or offer an alternative to "https", since
"https" both prevents active attacks and invokes a more stringent
security model in most clients.

1.2. Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Using HTTP URIs over TLS

An origin server that supports the resolution of "http" URIs can
indicate support for this specification by providing an alternative
service advertisement [RFC7838] for a protocol identifier that uses
TLS, such as "h2" [RFC7540]. Such a protocol MUST include an
explicit indication of the scheme of the resource. This excludes
HTTP/1.1; HTTP/1.1 clients are forbidden from including the absolute
form of a URI in requests to origin servers (see Section 5.3.1 of
[RFC7230]).

A client that receives such an advertisement MAY make future requests
intended for the associated origin [RFC6454] to the identified
service (as specified by [RFC7838]), provided that the alternative
service opts in as described in Section 2.1.

A client that places the importance of protection against passive
attacks over performance might choose to withhold requests until an
encrypted connection is available. However, if such a connection
cannot be successfully established, the client can resume its use of
the cleartext connection.

A client can also explicitly probe for an alternative service
advertisement by sending a request that bears little or no sensitive
information, such as one with the OPTIONS method. Likewise, clients
with existing alternative services information could make such a
request before they expire, in order minimize the delays that might
be incurred.

Client certificates are not meaningful for URLs with the "http"
scheme, and therefore
scheme; therefore, clients creating new TLS connections to
alternative services for the purposes of this specification MUST NOT
present them. A server that also provides "https" resources on the
same port can request a certificate during the TLS handshake, but it
MUST NOT abort the handshake if the client does not provide one.

2.1. Alternative Server Opt-In

For various reasons, it is possible that the server might become
confused about whether requests' URLs have a an "http" or "https" scheme, for various reasons;
see
scheme (see Section 4.4. 4.4). To ensure that the alternative service has
opted into serving "http" URLs over TLS, clients are required to
perform additional checks before directing "http" requests to it.

Clients MUST NOT send "http" requests over a secured connection,
unless the chosen alternative service presents a certificate that is
valid for the origin as defined in [RFC2818]. Using an authenticated
alternative service establishes "reasonable assurances" for the
purposes of [RFC7838]. In addition to authenticating the server, the
client MUST have obtained a valid http-opportunistic "http-opportunistic" response for
an origin (as per Section 2.3) using the authenticated connection.
An exception to the latter restriction is made for requests for the
"http-opportunistic" well-known URI.

For example, assuming the following request is made over a TLS
connection that is successfully authenticated for those origins, the
following request/response pair would allow requests for the origins
"http://www.example.com" or "http://example.com" to be sent using a
secured connection:

HEADERS
+ END_STREAM
+ END_HEADERS
:method = GET
:scheme = http
:authority = example.com
:path = /.well-known/http-opportunistic

HEADERS
:status = 200
content-type = application/json
DATA
+ END_STREAM
[ "http://www.example.com", "http://example.com" ]

Though this

This document describes multiple origins, this is but only for operational
convenience. Only a request made to an origin (over an authenticated
connection) can be used to acquire this the "http-opportunistic" resource
for that origin. Thus Thus, in the example, the request to
"http://example.com" cannot be assumed to also provide an http-
opportunistic response a
representation of the "http-opportunistic" resource for
"http://www.example.com".

2.2. Interaction with "https" URIs

Clients MUST NOT send "http" requests and "https" requests on the same
connection. Similarly, clients MUST NOT send "http" requests for
multiple origins on the same connection.

2.3. The "http-opportunistic" well-known Well-Known URI

This specification defines the "http-opportunistic" well-known URI
[RFC5785]. A client is said to have a valid http-opportunistic "http-opportunistic"
response for a given origin when:

o The client has requested the well-known URI from the origin over
an authenticated connection and a 200 (OK) response was provided,
and

o That response is fresh [RFC7234] (potentially through revalidation
[RFC7232]), and

o That response has the media type "application/json", and

o That response's payload, when parsed as JSON [RFC7159], contains
an array as the root, and
o The array contains a string that is a case-insensitive case-insensitive, character-
for-character match for the origin in question, serialised serialized into
Unicode as per Section 6.1 of [RFC6454].

A client MAY treat an "http-opportunistic" resource as invalid if
values it contains are not strings.

This document does not define semantics for "http-opportunistic"
resources on an "https" origin, nor does it define semantics if the
resource includes "https" origins.

Allowing clients to cache the http-opportunistic "http-opportunistic" resource means
that all alternative services need to be able to respond to requests
for "http" resources. A client is permitted to use an alternative
service without acquiring the http-opportunistic "http-opportunistic" resource from that
service.

A client MUST NOT use any cached copies of an http-opportunistic "http-opportunistic"
resource that was acquired (or revalidated) over an unauthenticated
connection. To avoid potential errors, a client can request or
revalidate the http-opportunistic "http-opportunistic" resource before using any
connection to an alternative service.

Clients that use cached http-opportunistic "http-opportunistic" responses MUST ensure
that their cache is cleared of any responses that were acquired over
an unauthenticated connection. Revalidating an unauthenticated
response using an authenticated connection does not ensure the
integrity of the response.

3. IANA Considerations

This specification registers a Well-Known the following well-known URI [RFC5785]:

o URI Suffix: http-opportunistic

o Change Controller: IETF

o Specification Document(s): Section 2.3 of [this specification] RFC 8164

o Related Information:

4. Security Considerations

4.1. Security Indicators

User Agents agents MUST NOT provide any special security indicators when an
"http" resource is acquired using TLS. In particular, indicators
that might suggest the same level of security as "https" MUST NOT be
used (e.g., a "lock device").

4.2. Downgrade Attacks

A downgrade attack against the negotiation for TLS is possible.

For example, because the "Alt-Svc" header field [RFC7838] likely
appears in an unauthenticated and unencrypted channel, it is subject
to downgrade by network attackers. In its simplest form, an attacker
that wants the connection to remain in the clear need only strip the
"Alt-Svc" header field from responses.

4.3. Privacy Considerations

Cached alternative services can be used to track clients over time; time,
e.g., using a user-specific hostname. Clearing the cache reduces the
ability of servers to track clients; therefore therefore, clients MUST clear
cached alternative service information when clearing other origin-
based state (i.e., cookies).

4.4. Confusion Regarding regarding Request Scheme

HTTP implementations and applications sometimes use ambient signals
to determine if a request is for an "https" resource; for example,
they might look for TLS on the stack, stack or a server port number of 443.

This might be due to expected limitations in the protocol (the most
common HTTP/1.1 request form does not carry an explicit indication of
the URI scheme scheme, and the resource might have been developed assuming
HTTP/1.1), or it may be because of how the server and application are
implemented (often, they are two separate entities, with a variety of
possible interfaces between them).

Any security decisions based upon this information could be misled by
the deployment of this specification, because it violates the
assumption that the use of TLS (or port 443) means that the client is
accessing a an HTTPS URI, URI and operating in the security context implied
by HTTPS.

Therefore, server implementers and administrators need to carefully
examine the use of such signals before deploying this specification.

4.5. Server Controls

This specification requires that a server send both an Alternative
Service alternative
service advertisement and host content in a well-known location to
send HTTP requests over TLS. Servers SHOULD take suitable measures
to ensure that the content of the well-known resource remains under
their control. Likewise, because the Alt-Svc "Alt-Svc" header field is used
to describe policies across an entire origin, servers SHOULD NOT
permit user content to set or modify the value of this header.

5. References

5.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.

[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.

[RFC6454] Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454>.

[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.

[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.

[RFC7232] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Conditional Requests", RFC 7232,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7232, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7232>.

[RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching",
RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7234>.

[RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.

[RFC7838] Nottingham, M., McManus, P., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
Alternative Services", RFC 7838, DOI 10.17487/RFC7838,
April 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7838>.

5.2. Informative References

[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

[RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
December 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.

[RFC7469] Evans, C., Palmer, C., and R. Sleevi, "Public Key Pinning
Extension for HTTP", RFC 7469, DOI 10.17487/RFC7469, April
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7469>.

[W3C.CR-mixed-content-20160802]
West, M., "Mixed Content", World Wide Web Consortium CR
CR-mixed-content-20160802, August 2016,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/2016/CR-mixed-content-20160802>.

Appendix A.

Acknowledgements

Mike Bishop contributed significant text to this document.

Thanks to Patrick McManus, Stefan Eissing, Eliot Lear, Stephen
Farrell, Guy Podjarny, Stephen Ludin, Erik Nygren, Paul Hoffman, Adam
Langley, Eric Rescorla, Julian Reschke, Kari Hurtta, and Richard
Barnes for their feedback and suggestions.

Authors' Addresses

Mark Nottingham

Email: mnot@mnot.net
URI: https://www.mnot.net/

Martin Thomson
Mozilla

Email: martin.thomson@gmail.com