wdiff sandy.alt-original rfc8205.txt

Network Working Group
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Lepinski, Ed.
Internet-Draft
Request for Comments: 8205 NCF
Intended status:
Category: Standards Track K. Sriram, Ed.
Expires: October 29, 2017
ISSN: 2070-1721 NIST
April 27,
June 2017

BGPsec Protocol Specification
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-23

Abstract

This document describes BGPsec, an extension to the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) that provides security for the path of autonomous
systems Autonomous
Systems (ASes) through which a BGP update UPDATE message passes. BGPsec is
implemented via an optional non-transitive BGP path attribute that
carries digital signatures produced by each autonomous system AS that propagates the update
UPDATE message. The digital signatures provide confidence that every
AS on the path of ASes listed in the update UPDATE message has explicitly
authorized the advertisement of the route.

Status of This Memo

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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 29, 2017.
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. BGPsec Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. The BGPsec Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Negotiating BGPsec Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. The BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Secure_Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Signature_Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9
4. BGPsec Update UPDATE Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. General Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. Constructing the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH Attribute . . . . . . . . . 14 13
4.3. Processing Instructions for Confederation Members . . . . 18
4.4. Reconstructing the AS_PATH Attribute . . . . . . . . . . 19
5. Processing a Received BGPsec Update . . . . UPDATE Message . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1. Overview of BGPsec Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.2. Validation Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6. Algorithms and Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.1. Algorithm Suite Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.2. Considerations for the SKI Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.3. Extensibility Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7. Operations and Management Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.1. Capability Negotiation Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.2. Preventing Misuse of pCount=0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.3. Early Termination of Signature Verification . . . . . . . 30
7.4. Non-Deterministic Non-deterministic Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . 30
7.5. Private AS Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.6. Robustness Considerations for Accessing RPKI Data . . . . 32
7.7. Graceful Restart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.8. Robustness of Secret Random Number in ECDSA . . . . . . . 32
7.9. Incremental/Partial Deployment Considerations . . . . . . 33
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8.1. Security Guarantees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8.2. On the Removal of BGPsec Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.3. Mitigation of Denial of Service Denial-of-Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . 35 36
8.4. Additional Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 36
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
10. Contributors References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
10.1. Authors . . . . . . Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
10.2. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . Informative References . . . . . . . 40
11. References . . . . . . . . . . 41
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . 43
Contributors . . . . . . . . . 40
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 43
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 45

1. Introduction

This document describes BGPsec, a mechanism for providing path
security for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271] route
advertisements. That is, a BGP speaker who receives a valid BGPsec
update
UPDATE message has cryptographic assurance that the advertised route
has the following property: Every AS every Autonomous System (AS) on the path
of ASes listed in the update UPDATE message has explicitly authorized the
advertisement of the route to the subsequent AS in the path.

This document specifies an optional (non-transitive) BGP path
attribute, BGPsec_Path. BGPsec_PATH. It also describes how a BGPsec-compliant BGP
speaker (referred to hereafter as a BGPsec speaker) can generate,
propagate, and validate BGP update UPDATE messages containing this attribute
to obtain the above assurances.

BGPsec is intended to be used to supplement BGP Origin Validation
[RFC6483][RFC6811] origin validation
[RFC6483] [RFC6811], and when used in conjunction with origin
validation, it is possible to prevent a wide variety of route
hijacking attacks against BGP.

BGPsec relies on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
certificates that attest to the allocation of AS number and IP
address resources. (For more information on the RPKI, see RFC 6480
[RFC6480] and the documents referenced therein.) Any BGPsec speaker
who wishes to send, to external (eBGP) peers, BGP update UPDATE messages
containing the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH needs to possess a private key associated
with an RPKI router certificate [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] [RFC8209] that corresponds to the
BGPsec speaker's AS number. Note, however, that a BGPsec speaker
does not need such a certificate in order to validate received update UPDATE
messages containing the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute (see Section 5.2).

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

2. BGPsec Negotiation

This document defines a BGP capability [RFC5492] that allows a BGP
speaker to advertise to a neighbor the ability to send or to receive
BGPsec update UPDATE messages (i.e., update UPDATE messages containing the
BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attribute).

2.1. The BGPsec Capability

This capability has capability code: TBD code 7.

The capability length for this capability MUST be set to 3.

The three 3 octets of the capability format are specified in Figure 1.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+---------------------------------------+
| Version | Dir | Unassigned |
+---------------------------------------+
| |
+------ AFI -----+
| |
+---------------------------------------+

Figure 1: BGPsec Capability format. Format

The first four 4 bits of the first octet indicate the version of BGPsec
for which the BGP speaker is advertising support. This document
defines only BGPsec version 0 (all four 4 bits set to zero). 0). Other versions
of BGPsec may be defined in future documents. A BGPsec speaker MAY
advertise support for multiple versions of BGPsec by including
multiple versions of the BGPsec capability in its BGP OPEN message.

The fifth bit of the first octet is a direction bit Direction bit, which indicates
whether the BGP speaker is advertising the capability to send BGPsec
update
UPDATE messages or receive BGPsec update UPDATE messages. The BGP speaker
sets this bit to 0 to indicate the capability to receive BGPsec
update
UPDATE messages. The BGP speaker sets this bit to 1 to indicate the
capability to send BGPsec update UPDATE messages.

The remaining three 3 bits of the first octet are unassigned and for future
use. These bits are set to zero 0 by the sender of the capability and
ignored by the receiver of the capability.

The second and third octets contain the 16-bit Address Family
Identifier (AFI) (AFI), which indicates the address family for which the
BGPsec speaker is advertising support for BGPsec. This document only
specifies BGPsec for use with two address families, IPv4 and IPv6,
with AFI values 1 and 2 2, respectively [IANA-AF]. BGPsec for use with
other address families may be specified in future documents.

2.2. Negotiating BGPsec Support

In order to indicate that a BGP speaker is willing to send BGPsec
update
UPDATE messages (for a particular address family), a BGP speaker
sends the BGPsec Capability capability (see Section 2.1) with the Direction bit
(the fifth bit of the first octet) set to 1. In order to indicate
that the speaker is willing to receive BGP update UPDATE messages containing
the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute (for a particular address family), a BGP
speaker sends the BGPsec capability with the Direction bit set to 0.
In order to advertise the capability to both send and receive BGPsec
update
UPDATE messages, the BGP speaker sends two copies of the BGPsec
capability (one with the direction Direction bit set to 0 and one with the
direction
Direction bit set to 1).

Similarly, if a BGP speaker wishes to use BGPsec with two different
address families (i.e., IPv4 and IPv6) over the same BGP session,
then the speaker includes two instances of this capability (one for
each address family) in the BGP OPEN message. A BGP speaker MUST NOT
announce BGPsec capability if it does not support the BGP
multiprotocol extension [RFC4760]. Additionally, a BGP speaker
MUST NOT advertise the capability of BGPsec support for a particular
AFI unless it has also advertised the multiprotocol extension
capability for the same AFI [RFC4760].

In a BGPsec peering session, a peer is permitted to send update UPDATE
messages containing the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute if, if and only if:

o The given peer sent the BGPsec capability for a particular version
of BGPsec and a particular address family with the Direction bit
set to 1; 1, and

o The other (receiving) peer sent the BGPsec capability for the same
version of BGPsec and the same address family with the Direction
bit set to 0.

In such a session, it can be said that the use of the particular
version of BGPsec has been negotiated for a particular address
family. Traditional BGP update UPDATE messages (i.e. (i.e., unsigned, containing
the AS_PATH attribute) MAY be sent within a session regardless of
whether or not the use of BGPsec is successfully negotiated.
However, if BGPsec is not successfully negotiated, then BGP update UPDATE
messages containing the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute MUST NOT be sent.

This document defines the behavior of implementations in the case
where BGPsec version zero 0 is the only version that has been successfully
negotiated. Any future document which that specifies additional versions
of BGPsec will need to specify behavior in the case that support for
multiple versions is negotiated.

BGPsec cannot provide meaningful security guarantees without support
for four-byte 4-byte AS numbers. Therefore, any BGP speaker that announces the
BGPsec capability, MUST also announce the capability for four-
byte 4-byte AS
support [RFC6793]. If a BGP speaker sends the BGPsec capability but
not the four-byte 4-byte AS support capability capability, then BGPsec has not been
successfully negotiated, and update UPDATE messages containing the BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attribute MUST NOT be sent within such a session.

3. The BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH Attribute

The BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute is an optional non-transitive BGP path
attribute.

This document registers an attribute type code for this attribute:
BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH (see Section 9).

The BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute carries the secured information regarding
the path of ASes through which an update UPDATE message passes. This
includes the digital signatures used to protect the path information.
The update UPDATE messages that contain the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute are
referred to as "BGPsec Update UPDATE messages". The BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute
replaces the AS_PATH attribute in a BGPsec update UPDATE message. That is,
update
UPDATE messages that contain the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute MUST NOT
contain the AS_PATH attribute, and vice versa.

Figure 2: High-level diagram High-Level Diagram of the BGPsec_Path attribute. BGPsec_PATH Attribute

Figure 3 provides the specification of the format for the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH
attribute.

+-------------------------------------------------------+
| Secure_Path (variable) |
+-------------------------------------------------------+
| Sequence of one or two Signature_Blocks (variable) |
+-------------------------------------------------------+

Figure 3: BGPsec_Path attribute format. BGPsec_PATH Attribute Format

The Secure_Path contains AS path information for the BGPsec update UPDATE
message. This is logically equivalent to the information that is
contained in a non-BGPsec AS_PATH attribute. The information in the
Secure_Path is used by BGPsec speakers in the same way that
information from the AS_PATH is used by non-BGPsec speakers. The
format of the Secure_Path is described below in Section 3.1.

The BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute will contain one or two Signature_Blocks,
each of which corresponds to a different algorithm suite. Each of
the Signature_Blocks will contain a Signature Segment for each AS
number (i.e., Secure_Path Segment) in the Secure_Path. In the
most common case, the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute will contain only a
single Signature_Block. However, in order to enable a transition
from an old algorithm suite to a new algorithm suite (without a
flag day), it will be necessary to include two Signature_Blocks (one
for the old algorithm suite and one for the new algorithm suite)
during the transition period. (See Section 6.1 for more discussion
of algorithm transitions.) The format of the Signature_Blocks is
described below in Section 3.2.

3.1. Secure_Path

A detailed description of the Secure_Path information in the
BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attribute is provided here. The specification for the
Secure_Path field is provided in Figures 4 and 5.

+-----------------------------------------------+
| Secure_Path Length (2 octets) |
+-----------------------------------------------+
| One or More more Secure_Path Segments (variable) |
+-----------------------------------------------+

Figure 4: Secure_Path format.

The specification for the Secure_Path field is provided in Figure 4
and Figure 5. Format

The Secure_Path Length contains the length (in octets) of the entire
Secure_Path (including the two 2 octets used to express this length
field). As explained below, each Secure_Path Segment is
six 6 octets
long. Note that this means the Secure_Path Length is two greater
than six times the number of Secure_Path Segments (i.e., the number
of AS numbers in the path).

The Secure_Path contains one Secure_Path Segment (see Figure 5) for
each Autonomous System AS in the path to the originating AS of the prefix specified in
the update UPDATE message. (Note: Repeated Autonomous
Systems ASes are compressed out "compressed out" using
the pCount field field, as discussed below.)

Figure 5: Secure_Path Segment format. Format
The AS Number (in Figure 5) is the AS number of the BGP speaker that
added this Secure_Path Segment to the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute. (See
Section 4 for more information on populating this field.)

The pCount field contains the number of repetitions of the associated
autonomous system
AS number that the signature covers. This field enables a BGPsec
speaker to mimic the semantics of prepending multiple copies of their
AS to the AS_PATH without requiring the speaker to generate multiple
signatures. Note that Section 9.1.2.2 ("Breaking Ties") Ties (Phase 2)") in
[RFC4271] mentions the "number of AS numbers" in the AS_PATH
attribute that is used in the route selection process. This metric
(number of AS numbers) is the same as the AS path length obtained in
BGPsec by summing the pCount values in the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute.
The pCount field is also useful in managing route servers (see
Section 4.2), AS confederations (see Section 4.3), and AS Number
migrations (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration] [RFC8206] for details).

The left most (i.e. leftmost (i.e., the most significant) bit of the Flags field in
Figure 5 is the Confed_Segment flag. The Confed_Segment flag is set
to one 1 to indicate that the BGPsec speaker that constructed this
Secure_Path Segment is sending the update UPDATE message to a peer AS within
the same Autonomous System AS confederation [RFC5065]. (That is, a sequence of
consecutive Confed_Segment flags are set in a BGPsec
update UPDATE message
whenever, in a non-BGPsec update UPDATE message, an AS_PATH segment of type
AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE occurs.) In all other cases cases, the Confed_Segment
flag is set to zero. 0.

The remaining seven 7 bits of the Flags field are unassigned and unassigned. They MUST be
set to zero 0 by the sender, sender and ignored by the receiver. Note, however,
that the signature is computed over all eight 8 bits of the flags Flags field.

As stated earlier in Section 2.2, BGPsec peering requires that the
peering ASes MUST each support four-byte 4-byte AS numbers. Currently- Currently assigned two-byte
2-byte AS numbers are converted into four-byte 4-byte AS numbers by setting the
two high-order octets of the four-octet 4-octet field to zero 0 [RFC6793].

3.2. Signature_Block

A detailed description of the Signature_Blocks in the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH
attribute is provided here using Figure Figures 6 and Figure 7.

+---------------------------------------------+
| Signature_Block Length (2 octets) |
+---------------------------------------------+
| Algorithm Suite Identifier (1 octet) |
+---------------------------------------------+
| Sequence of Signature Segments (variable) |
+---------------------------------------------+

Figure 6: Signature_Block format. Format

The Signature_Block Length in Figure 6 is the total number of octets
in the Signature_Block (including the two 2 octets used to express this
length field).

The Algorithm Suite Identifier is a one-octet 1-octet identifier specifying the
digest algorithm and digital signature algorithm used to produce the
digital signature in each Signature Segment. An IANA registry of
algorithm suite identifiers for use in BGPsec is specified in the
BGPsec algorithms document [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. [RFC8208].

A Signature_Block in Figure 6 has exactly one Signature Segment (see
Figure 7) for each Secure_Path Segment in the Secure_Path portion of
the BGPsec_Path Attribute. (That BGPsec_PATH attribute (that is, one Signature Segment for each
distinct AS on the path for the prefix in the Update message.) UPDATE message).

+---------------------------------------------+
| Subject Key Identifier (SKI) (20 octets) |
+---------------------------------------------+
| Signature Length (2 octets) |
+---------------------------------------------+
| Signature (variable) |
+---------------------------------------------+

Figure 7: Signature Segment format. Format

The Subject Key Identifier (SKI) field in Figure 7 contains the value
in the Subject Key Identifier extension of the RPKI router
certificate [RFC6487] that is used to verify the signature (see
Section 5 for details on the validity of BGPsec update UPDATE messages).
The SKI field has a fixed size of 20 octets size. octets. See Section 6.2 for
considerations for the SKI size.

The Signature Length field contains the size (in octets) of the value
in the Signature field of the Signature Segment.

The Signature field in Figure 7 contains a digital signature that
protects the prefix and the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute (see Section Sections 4 and Section
5 for details on signature generation and validation, respectively).

4. BGPsec Update UPDATE Messages

Section 4.1 provides general guidance on the creation of BGPsec
Update Messages
UPDATE messages -- that is, update UPDATE messages containing the
BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attribute.

Section 4.2 specifies how a BGPsec speaker generates the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH
attribute to include in a BGPsec Update UPDATE message.

Section 4.3 contains special processing instructions for members of
an autonomous system AS confederation [RFC5065]. A BGPsec speaker that is not a member
of such a confederation MUST NOT set the Confed_Segment flag in its
Secure_Path Segment (i.e. (i.e., leave the Confed_Segment flag
bit at the
default value zero) of 0) in all BGPsec update UPDATE messages it sends.

Section 4.4 contains instructions for reconstructing the AS_PATH
attribute in cases where a BGPsec speaker receives an update UPDATE message
with a BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute and wishes to propagate the update UPDATE
message to a peer who does not support BGPsec.

4.1. General Guidance

The information protected by the signature on a BGPsec update UPDATE message
includes the AS number of the peer to whom the update UPDATE message is
being sent. Therefore, if a BGPsec speaker wishes to send a BGPsec
update
UPDATE message to multiple BGP peers, it MUST generate a separate
BGPsec
update UPDATE message for each unique peer AS to whom the update UPDATE
message is sent.

A BGPsec update UPDATE message MUST advertise a route to only a single
prefix. This is because a BGPsec speaker receiving an update UPDATE message
with multiple prefixes would be unable to construct a valid BGPsec
update
UPDATE message (i.e., valid path signatures) containing a subset of
the prefixes in the received update. If a BGPsec speaker wishes to
advertise routes to multiple prefixes, then it MUST generate a
separate BGPsec update UPDATE message for each prefix. Additionally, a
BGPsec update UPDATE message MUST use the MP_REACH_NLRI [RFC4760] attribute
to encode the prefix.

The BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute and the AS_PATH attribute are mutually
exclusive. That is, any update UPDATE message containing the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH
attribute MUST NOT contain the AS_PATH attribute. The information
that would be contained in the AS_PATH attribute is instead conveyed
in the Secure_Path portion of the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute.

In order to create or add a new signature to a BGPsec update UPDATE message
with a given algorithm suite, the BGPsec speaker MUST possess a
private key suitable for generating signatures for this algorithm
suite. Additionally, this private key must correspond to the public
key in a valid Resource PKI end-entity RPKI end entity certificate whose AS number resource
extension includes the BGPsec speaker's AS number
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]. [RFC8209]. Note
also that new signatures are only added to a BGPsec update UPDATE message
when a BGPsec speaker is generating an update UPDATE message to send to an
external peer (i.e., when the AS number of the peer is not equal to
the BGPsec speaker's own AS number).

The Resource PKI RPKI enables the legitimate holder of IP address prefix(es) to
issue a signed object, called a Route Origination Origin Authorization (ROA),
that authorizes a given AS to originate routes to a given set of
prefixes (see RFC 6482 [RFC6482]). It is expected that most relying parties Relying
Parties (RPs) will utilize BGPsec in tandem with origin validation
(see RFC 6483 [RFC6483] and RFC 6811 [RFC6811]). Therefore, it is
RECOMMENDED that a BGPsec speaker only originate a BGPsec update UPDATE
message advertising a route for a given prefix if there exists a
valid ROA authorizing the BGPsec speaker's AS to originate routes to
this prefix.

If a BGPsec router has received only a non-BGPsec update UPDATE message
containing the AS_PATH attribute (instead of the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH
attribute) from a peer for a given prefix, then it MUST NOT attach a
BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attribute when it propagates the update UPDATE message. (Note
that a BGPsec router may also receive a non-BGPsec update UPDATE message
from an internal peer without the AS_PATH attribute, i.e., with just
the NLRI Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) in it. In that
case, the prefix is originating from that AS, and if it is selected
for advertisement, the BGPsec speaker SHOULD attach a BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH
attribute and send a signed route (for that prefix) to its external
BGPsec-speaking peers.)

Conversely, if a BGPsec router has received a BGPsec update UPDATE message
(with the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute) from a peer for a given prefix and
it chooses to propagate that peer's route for the prefix, then it
SHOULD propagate the route as a BGPsec update UPDATE message containing the
BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attribute.

Note that removing BGPsec signatures (i.e., propagating a route
advertisement without the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute) has significant
security ramifications. (See Section 8 for a discussion of the
security ramifications of removing BGPsec signatures.) Therefore,
when a route advertisement is received via a BGPsec update UPDATE message,
propagating the route advertisement without the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute
is NOT RECOMMENDED, unless the message is sent to a peer that did not
advertise the capability to receive BGPsec update UPDATE messages (see
Section 4.4).

Furthermore, note that when a BGPsec speaker propagates a route
advertisement with the BGPsec_Path attribute BGPsec_PATH attribute, it is not attesting to
the validation state of the update UPDATE message it received. (See
Section 8 for more discussion of the security semantics of BGPsec
signatures.)

If the BGPsec speaker is producing an update UPDATE message which that would, in
the absence of BGPsec, contain an AS_SET (e.g., the BGPsec speaker is
performing proxy aggregation), then the BGPsec speaker MUST NOT
include the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute. In such a case, the BGPsec
speaker MUST remove any existing BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH in the received
advertisement(s) for this prefix and produce a traditional (non-
BGPsec) update
(non-BGPsec) UPDATE message. It should be noted that BCP 172
[RFC6472] recommends against the use of AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in
the AS_PATH of BGP updates. UPDATE messages.

The case where the BGPsec speaker sends a BGPsec update UPDATE message to an
iBGP (internal BGP) peer is quite simple. When originating a new
route advertisement and sending it to a BGPsec-capable iBGP peer, the
BGPsec speaker omits the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute. When originating a
new route advertisement and sending it to a non-BGPsec iBGP peer, the
BGPsec speaker includes an empty AS_PATH attribute in the update UPDATE
message. (An empty AS_PATH attribute is one whose length field
contains the value zero 0 [RFC4271].) When a BGPsec speaker chooses to
forward a BGPsec update UPDATE message to an iBGP peer, the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH
attribute SHOULD NOT be removed, unless the peer doesn't support
BGPsec. In the case when an iBGP peer doesn't support BGPsec, then a
BGP update UPDATE message with AS_PATH is reconstructed from the BGPsec update
UPDATE message and then forwarded (see Section 4.4). In particular,
when forwarding to a BGPsec-capable iBGP (or eBGP) peer, the BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attribute SHOULD NOT be removed even in the case where
the BGPsec update UPDATE message has not been successfully validated. (See
Section 5 for more information on validation, validation and Section 8 for the
security ramifications of removing BGPsec signatures.)

All BGPsec update UPDATE messages MUST conform to BGP's maximum message
size. If the resulting message exceeds the maximum message size,
then the guidelines in Section 9.2 of RFC 4271 [RFC4271] MUST be
followed.

4.2. Constructing the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH Attribute

When a BGPsec speaker receives a BGPsec update UPDATE message containing a
BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attribute (with one or more signatures) from an (internal
or external) peer, it may choose to propagate the route advertisement
by sending it to its other (internal or external) peers. When
sending the route advertisement to an internal BGPsec-speaking peer,
the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute SHALL NOT be modified. When sending the
route advertisement to an external BGPsec-speaking peer, the
following procedures are used to form or update the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH
attribute.

To generate the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute on the outgoing update UPDATE message,
the BGPsec speaker first generates a new Secure_Path Segment. Note
that if the BGPsec speaker is not the origin AS and there is an
existing BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute, then the BGPsec speaker prepends its
new Secure_Path Segment (places in first position) onto the existing
Secure_Path.

The AS number in this Secure_Path Segment MUST match the AS number in
the Subject field of the Resource PKI RPKI router certificate that will be used to
verify the digital signature constructed by this BGPsec speaker (see
Section 3.1.1 in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] [RFC8209] and RFC 6487 [RFC6487]).

The pCount field of the Secure_Path Segment is typically set to the
value 1. However, a BGPsec speaker may set the pCount field to a
value greater than 1. Setting the pCount field to a value greater
than one 1 has the same semantics as repeating an AS number multiple
times in the AS_PATH of a non-BGPsec update UPDATE message (e.g., for
traffic engineering purposes).

To prevent unnecessary processing load in the validation of BGPsec
signatures, a BGPsec speaker SHOULD NOT produce multiple consecutive
Secure_Path Segments with the same AS number. This means that to
achieve the semantics of prepending the same AS number k times, a
BGPsec speaker SHOULD produce a single Secure_Path Segment -- with a
pCount of k -- and a single corresponding Signature Segment.

A route server that participates in the BGP control plane, plane but
does not act as a transit AS in the data plane, plane may choose to set
pCount to 0. This option enables the route server to participate in
BGPsec and obtain the associated security guarantees without
increasing the length of the AS path. (Note that BGPsec speakers
compute the length of the AS path by summing the pCount values in the BGPsec_Path
attribute,
BGPsec_PATH attribute; see Section 5.) However, when a route server
sets the pCount value to 0, it still inserts its AS number into the
Secure_Path Segment, as this information is needed to validate the
signature added by the route server. See
[I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration] [RFC8206] for a discussion
of setting pCount to 0 to facilitate AS Number Migration. migration. Also, see
Section 4.3 for the use of pCount=0 in the context of an AS
confederation. See Section 7.2 for operational guidance for
configuring a BGPsec router for setting pCount=0 and/or accepting
pCount=0 from a peer.

Next, the BGPsec speaker generates one or two Signature_Blocks.
Typically, a BGPsec speaker will use only a single algorithm suite, suite
and thus create only a single Signature_Block in the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH
attribute. However, to ensure backwards compatibility during a
period of transition from a 'current' algorithm suite to a 'new'
algorithm suite, it will be necessary to originate update UPDATE messages
that contain a Signature_Block for both the 'current' and the 'new'
algorithm suites (see Section 6.1).

If the received BGPsec update UPDATE message contains two Signature_Blocks
and the BGPsec speaker supports both of the corresponding algorithm
suites, then the new update UPDATE message generated by the BGPsec speaker
MUST include both of the Signature_Blocks. If the received BGPsec
update
UPDATE message contains two Signature_Blocks and the BGPsec speaker
only supports one of the two corresponding algorithm suites, then the
BGPsec speaker MUST remove the Signature_Block corresponding to the
algorithm suite that it does not understand. If the BGPsec speaker
does not support the algorithm suites in any of the Signature_Blocks
contained in the received update UPDATE message, then the BGPsec speaker
MUST NOT propagate the route advertisement with the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH
attribute. (That is, if it chooses to propagate this route
advertisement at all, it MUST do so as an unsigned BGP update UPDATE
message. See Section 4.4 for more information on converting to an
unsigned BGP UPDATE message.)

Note that in the case where the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH has two Signature_Blocks
(corresponding to different algorithm suites), the validation
algorithm (see Section 5.2) deems a BGPsec update UPDATE message to be
'Valid' if there is at least one supported algorithm suite (and
corresponding Signature_Block) that is deemed 'Valid'. This means
that a 'Valid' BGPsec update UPDATE message may contain a Signature_Block
which
that is not deemed 'Valid' (e.g., contains signatures that BGPsec
does not successfully verify). Nonetheless, such Signature_Blocks
MUST NOT be removed. (See Section 8 for a discussion of the security
ramifications of this design choice.)

For each Signature_Block corresponding to an algorithm suite that the
BGPsec speaker does support, the BGPsec speaker MUST add a new
Signature Segment to the Signature_Block. This Signature Segment is
prepended to the list of Signature Segments (placed in the first
position) so that the list of Signature Segments appears in the same
order as the corresponding Secure_Path Segments. The BGPsec speaker
populates the fields of this new Signature Segment as follows.

The Subject Key Identifier field in the new segment is populated with
the identifier contained in the Subject Key Identifier extension of
the RPKI router certificate corresponding to the BGPsec speaker
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles].
[RFC8209]. This Subject Key Identifier will be used by recipients of
the route advertisement to identify the proper certificate to use in
verifying the signature.

The Signature field in the new segment contains a digital signature
that binds the prefix and BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute to the RPKI router
certificate corresponding to the BGPsec speaker. The digital
signature is computed as follows:

o For clarity, let us number the Secure_Path and corresponding
Signature Segments from 1 to N N, as follows. Let Secure_Path
Segment 1 and Signature Segment 1 be the segments produced by the
origin AS. Let Secure_Path Segment 2 and Signature Segment 2 be
the segments added by the next AS after the origin. Continue this
method of numbering numbering, and ultimately let Secure_Path Segment N and
Signature Segment N be those that are being added by the current
AS. The current AS (Nth AS) is signing and forwarding the update UPDATE
message to the next AS (i.e. (i.e., the (N+1)th AS) in the chain of ASes
that form the AS path.

o In order to construct the digital signature for Signature
Segment N (the Signature Segment being produced by the current
AS), first construct the sequence of octets to be hashed as shown
in Figure 8. This sequence of octets includes all the data that
the Nth AS attests to by adding its digital signature in the update
which
UPDATE message that is being forwarded to a BGPsec speaker in the
(N+1)th AS. (For the design rationale for choosing the specific
structure in Figure 8, please see [Borchert].)
+------------------------------------+
| Target AS Number |
+------------------------------------+ ---\
+------------------------------------+----\
| Signature Segment : N-1 | \
+------------------------------------+ |
| Secure_Path Segment : N | |
+------------------------------------+ \
... > Data from
+------------------------------------+ / N Segments
| Signature Segment : 1 | |
+------------------------------------+ |
| Secure_Path Segment : 2 | |
+------------------------------------+ /
| Secure_Path Segment : 1 | /
+------------------------------------+---/
| Algorithm Suite Identifier |
+------------------------------------+
| AFI |
+------------------------------------+
| SAFI |
+------------------------------------+
| Prefix |
+------------------------------------+

Figure 8: Sequence of octets Octets to be hashed. Be Hashed

The elements in this sequence (Figure 8) MUST be ordered exactly
as shown. The 'Target AS Number' is the AS to whom the BGPsec
speaker intends to send the update UPDATE message. (Note that the
'Target AS Number' is the AS number announced by the peer in the
OPEN message of the BGP session within which the update UPDATE message is
sent.) The Secure_Path and Signature Segments (1 through N-1) are
obtained from the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute. Finally, the Address
Family Identifier (AFI), Subsequent Address Family Identifier
(SAFI), and Prefix fields are obtained from the MP_REACH_NLRI
attribute [RFC4760]. Additionally, in the Prefix field field, all of
the trailing bits MUST be set to zero 0 when constructing this
sequence.

o Apply to this octet sequence (in Figure 8) the digest algorithm
(for the algorithm suite of this Signature_Block) to obtain a
digest value.

o Apply to this digest value the signature algorithm, algorithm (for the
algorithm suite of this Signature_Block) to obtain the digital
signature. Then populate the Signature Field field (in Figure 7) with
this digital signature.

The Signature Length field (in Figure 7) is populated with the length
(in octets) of the value in the Signature field.

4.3. Processing Instructions for Confederation Members

Members of autonomous system AS confederations [RFC5065] MUST additionally follow the
instructions in this section for processing BGPsec update UPDATE messages.

When a BGPsec speaker in an AS confederation receives a BGPsec update UPDATE
message from a peer that is external to the confederation and chooses
to propagate the update UPDATE message within the confederation, then it first
adds a signature signed to its own Member-AS (i.e. (i.e., the Target 'Target AS number
Number' is the BGPsec speaker's Member-AS number). Number). In this
internally modified
update, UPDATE message, the newly added Secure_Path
Segment contains the public AS number (i.e. (i.e., Confederation
Identifier), the Segment's segment's pCount value is set to 0, and
Confed_Segment flag is set to one. 1. Setting pCount=0 in this case helps
ensure that the AS path length is not unnecessarily incremented. The
newly added signature is generated using a private key corresponding
to the public AS number of the confederation. The BGPsec speaker
propagates the modified update UPDATE message to its peers within the
confederation.

Any BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH modifications mentioned below in the context of
propagation of the update UPDATE message within the confederation are in
addition to the modification described above (i.e. (i.e., with pCount=0).

When a BGPsec speaker sends a BGPsec update UPDATE message to a peer that
belongs within its own Member-AS, the confederation member SHALL NOT
modify the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute. When a BGPsec speaker sends a
BGPsec update UPDATE message to a peer that is within the same confederation
but in a different Member-AS, the BGPsec speaker puts its Member-AS
number
Number in the AS Number field of the Secure_Path Segment that it adds
to the BGPsec update UPDATE message. Additionally, in this case, the
Member-AS that generates the Secure_Path Segment sets the
Confed_Segment flag to one. 1. Further, the signature is generated with a
private key corresponding to the BGPsec speaker's Member-AS Number.
(Note: In this document, intra-Member-AS peering is regarded as iBGP iBGP,
and inter-Member-AS peering is regarded as eBGP. The latter is also
known as confederation-eBGP.)

Within a confederation, the verification of BGPsec signatures added
by other members of the confederation is optional. Note that if a
confederation chooses not to verify digital signatures within the
confederation, then BGPsec is not able to provide no any assurances
about the integrity of the Member-AS Numbers placed in Secure_Path
Segments where the Confed_Segment flag is set to one. 1.

When a confederation member receives a BGPsec update UPDATE message from a
peer within the confederation and propagates it to a peer outside the
confederation, it needs to remove all of the Secure_Path Segments
added by confederation members as well as the corresponding Signature
Segments. To do this, the confederation member propagating the route
outside the confederation does the following:

o First, starting with the most recently added Secure_Path Segment,
remove all of the consecutive Secure_Path Segments that have the
Confed_Segment flag set to one. 1. Stop this process once a
Secure_Path Segment is reached which that has its Confed_Segment flag set to zero. 0 is
reached. Keep a count of the number of segments removed in this
fashion.

o Second, starting with the most recently added Signature Segment,
remove a number of Signature Segments equal to the number of
Secure_Path Segments removed in the previous step. (That is,
remove the K most recently added Signature Segments, where K is
the number of Secure_Path Segments removed in the previous step.)

o Finally, add a Secure_Path Segment containing, in the AS field,
the AS Confederation Identifier (the public AS number of the
confederation) as well as a corresponding Signature Segment. Note
that all fields other than the AS field are populated as per
Section 4.2.

Finally, as discussed above, an AS confederation MAY optionally
decide that its members will not verify digital signatures added by
members. In such a confederation, when a BGPsec speaker runs the
algorithm in Section 5.2, the BGPsec speaker, during the process of
Signature
signature verifications, first checks whether the Confed_Segment flag
in a Secure_Path Segment is set to one. 1. If the flag is set to one, 1, the
BGPsec speaker skips the verification for the corresponding
Signature, signature
and immediately moves on to the next Secure_Path Segment. Note that
as specified in Section 5.2, it is an error when a BGPsec speaker receives
receives, from a peer, peer who is not in the same AS confederation, a
BGPsec update UPDATE message containing a Confed_Segment flag set to one. 1.

4.4. Reconstructing the AS_PATH Attribute

BGPsec update UPDATE messages do not contain the AS_PATH attribute.
However, the AS_PATH attribute can be reconstructed from the
BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attribute. This is necessary in the case where a route
advertisement is received via a BGPsec update UPDATE message and then
propagated to a peer via a non-BGPsec update UPDATE message (e.g., because
the latter peer does not support BGPsec). Note that there may be
additional cases where an implementation finds it useful to perform
this reconstruction. Before attempting to reconstruct an AS_PATH for
the purpose of forwarding an unsigned (non-BGPsec) update UPDATE message to
a peer, a BGPsec speaker MUST perform the basic integrity checks
listed in Section 5.2 to ensure that the received BGPsec update UPDATE
message is properly formed.

The AS_PATH attribute can be constructed from the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH
attribute as follows. Starting with a blank AS_PATH attribute,
process the Secure_Path Segments in order from least-recently least recently added
(corresponding to the origin) to most-recently most recently added. For each
Secure_Path Segment Segment, perform the following steps:

1. If the Secure_Path Segment has pCount=0, then do nothing (i.e. (i.e.,
move on to process the next Secure_Path Segment).

2. If the Secure_Path Segment has pCount greater than 0 and the
Confed_Segment flag is set to one, 1, then look at the most-recently most recently
added segment in the AS_PATH.

* In the case where the AS_PATH is blank or in the case where
the most-recently most recently added segment is of type AS_SEQUENCE, add
(prepend to the AS_PATH) a new AS_PATH segment of type
AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE. This segment of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE
shall contain a number of elements equal to the pCount field
in the current Secure_Path Segment. Each of these elements
shall be the AS number contained in the current Secure_Path
Segment. (That is, if the pCount field is X, then the segment
of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE contains X copies of the
Secure_Path Segment's AS Number field.)

* In the case where the most-recently most recently added segment in the
AS_PATH is of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE, then add (prepend to
the segment) a number of elements equal to the pCount field in
the current Secure_Path Segment. The value of each of these
elements shall be the AS number contained in the current
Secure_Path Segment. (That is, if the pCount field is X, then
add X copies of the Secure_Path Segment's AS Number field to
the existing AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE.)

3. If the Secure_Path Segment has pCount greater than 0 and the
Confed_Segment flag is set to zero, 0, then look at the most- most recently
added segment in the AS_PATH.

* In the case where the AS_PATH is blank or in the case where
the most-recently most recently added segment is of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE,
add (prepend to the AS_PATH) a new AS_PATH segment of type
AS_SEQUENCE. This segment of type AS_SEQUENCE shall contain a
number of elements equal to the pCount field in the current
Secure_Path Segment. Each of these elements shall be the AS
number contained in the current Secure_Path Segment. (That
is, if the pCount field is X, then the segment of type
AS_SEQUENCE contains X copies of the Secure_Path Segment's AS
Number field.)

* In the case where the most recently added segment in the
AS_PATH is of type AS_SEQUENCE AS_SEQUENCE, then add (prepend to the
segment) a number of elements equal to the pCount field in the
current Secure_Path Segment. The value of each of these
elements shall be the AS number contained in the current
Secure_Path Segment. (That is, if the pCount field is X, then
add X copies of the Secure_Path Segment's AS Number field to
the existing AS_SEQUENCE.)

As part of the above procedure described procedure, above, the following additional
actions are performed in order not to exceed the size limitations of
AS_SEQUENCE and AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE. While adding the next
Secure_Path Segment (with its prepends, if any) to the AS_PATH being
assembled, if it would cause the AS_SEQUENCE (or AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE)
at hand to exceed the limit of 255 AS numbers per segment [RFC4271]
[RFC5065], then the BGPsec speaker would follow the recommendations
in RFC 4271 [RFC4271] and RFC 5065 [RFC5065] of creating another
segment of the same type (AS_SEQUENCE or AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE) and
continue filling that.

Finally, one special case of reconstruction of AS_PATH is when the
BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attribute is absent. As explained in Section 4.1, when a
BGPsec speaker originates a prefix and sends it to a BGPsec-capable
iBGP peer, the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH is not attached. So So, when received from a
BGPsec-capable iBGP peer, no BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute in a BGPsec update UPDATE
message is equivalent to an empty AS_PATH [RFC4271].

5. Processing a Received BGPsec Update UPDATE Message

Upon receiving a BGPsec update UPDATE message from an external (eBGP) peer,
a BGPsec speaker SHOULD validate the message to determine the
authenticity of the path information contained in the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH
attribute. Typically, a BGPsec speaker will also wish to perform
origin validation (see RFC 6483 [RFC6483] and RFC 6811 [RFC6811]) on
an incoming BGPsec update UPDATE message, but such validation is independent
of the validation described in this section.

Section 5.1 provides an overview of BGPsec validation validation, and
Section 5.2 provides a specific algorithm for performing such
validation. (Note that an implementation need not follow the
specific algorithm in Section 5.2 as long as the input/output
behavior of the validation is identical to that of the algorithm in
Section 5.2.) During exceptional conditions (e.g., the BGPsec
speaker receives an incredibly large number of update UPDATE messages at once)
once), a BGPsec speaker MAY temporarily defer validation of incoming
BGPsec update UPDATE messages. The treatment of such BGPsec update UPDATE
messages, whose validation has been deferred, is a matter of local
policy. However, an implementation SHOULD ensure that deferment of
validation and status of deferred messages is visible to the
operator.

The validity of BGPsec update UPDATE messages is a function of the current
RPKI state. When a BGPsec speaker learns that the RPKI state has
changed (e.g., from an RPKI validating cache via the RPKI-to-Router RPKI-Router
protocol
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]), [RFC8210]), the BGPsec speaker MUST re-run rerun validation on all
affected update UPDATE messages stored in its Adj-RIB-In [RFC4271]. For
example, when a given RPKI router certificate ceases to be valid
(e.g., it expires or is revoked), all update UPDATE messages containing a
signature whose SKI matches the SKI in the given certificate MUST be re-assessed
reassessed to determine if they are still valid. If this
reassessment determines that the validity state of an update UPDATE message
has changed changed, then, depending on local policy, it may be necessary to
re-run
rerun best path selection.

BGPsec update UPDATE messages do not contain an AS_PATH attribute. The
Secure_Path contains AS path information for the BGPsec update UPDATE
message. Therefore, a BGPsec speaker MUST utilize the AS path
information in the Secure_Path in all cases where it would otherwise
use the AS path information in the AS_PATH attribute. The only
exception to this rule is when AS path information must be updated in
order to propagate a route to a peer (in which case the BGPsec
speaker follows the instructions in Section 4). Section 4.4 provides
an algorithm for constructing an AS_PATH attribute from a BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH
attribute. Whenever the use of AS path information is called for
(e.g., loop detection, detection or the use of the AS path length in best path
selection)
selection), the externally visible behavior of the implementation
shall be the same as if the implementation had run the algorithm in
Section 4.4 and used the resulting AS_PATH attribute as it would for
a non-BGPsec update UPDATE message.

5.1. Overview of BGPsec Validation

Validation of a BGPsec update UPDATE message makes use of data from RPKI
router certificates. In particular, it is necessary that the
recipient have access to the following data obtained from valid RPKI
router certificates: the AS Number, Public Key Key, and Subject Key
Identifier from each valid RPKI router certificate.

Note that the BGPsec speaker could perform the validation of RPKI
router certificates on its own and extract the required data, or it
could receive the same data from a trusted cache that performs RPKI
validation on behalf of (some set of) BGPsec speakers. (For example,
the trusted cache could deliver the necessary validity information to
the BGPsec speaker by using the router key Router Key PDU (Protocol Data Unit)
for the RPKI-to-Router RPKI-Router protocol [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis].) [RFC8210].)

To validate a BGPsec update UPDATE message containing the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH
attribute, the recipient performs the validation steps specified in
Section 5.2. The validation procedure results in one of two states:
'Valid' and 'Not Valid'.

It is expected that the output of the validation procedure will be
used as an input to BGP route selection. That said, BGP route
selection, and thus the handling of the validation states states, is a
matter of local policy, policy and is handled using local policy mechanisms.
Implementations SHOULD enable operators to set such local policy on a
per-session basis. (That is, it is expected that some operators will
choose to treat BGPsec validation status differently for update UPDATE
messages received over different BGP sessions.)

BGPsec validation needs need only be performed at the eBGP edge. The
validation status of a BGP signed/unsigned update UPDATE message MAY be
conveyed via iBGP from an ingress edge router to an egress edge
router via some mechanism, according to local policy within an AS.
As discussed in Section 4, when a BGPsec speaker chooses to forward a
(syntactically correct) BGPsec update UPDATE message, it SHOULD be forwarded
with its
BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute intact (regardless of the validation
state of the update UPDATE message). Based entirely on local policy, an
egress router receiving a BGPsec update UPDATE message from within its own
AS MAY choose to perform its own validation.

5.2. Validation Algorithm

This section specifies an algorithm for validation of BGPsec update UPDATE
messages. A conformant implementation MUST include a BGPsec update
validation algorithm that is functionally equivalent to the
externally visible behavior of this algorithm.

First, the recipient of a BGPsec update UPDATE message performs a check to
ensure that the message is properly formed. Both syntactical and
protocol violation errors are checked. BGPsec_Path The BGPsec_PATH attribute
MUST be present when a BGPsec update UPDATE message is received from an
external (eBGP) BGPsec peer and also when such an update UPDATE message is
propagated to an internal (iBGP) BGPsec peer (see Section 4.2). The
error checks specified in Section 6.3 of [RFC4271] are performed,
except that for BGPsec
updates UPDATE messages the checks on the AS_PATH
attribute do not apply and instead the following checks on BGPsec_Path the
BGPsec_PATH attribute are performed:

1. Check to ensure that the entire BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute is
syntactically correct (conforms to the specification in this
document).

2. Check that the AS number in the most recently added Secure_Path
Segment (i.e. (i.e., the one corresponding to the eBGP peer from which
the update UPDATE message was received) matches the AS number of that
peer as specified in the BGP OPEN message. (Note: This check is
performed only at an ingress BGPsec routers router where the update UPDATE
message is first received from a peer AS.)

3. Check that each Signature_Block contains one Signature Segment
for each Secure_Path Segment in the Secure_Path portion of the
BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attribute. (Note that the entirety of each
Signature_Block MUST be checked to ensure that it is well formed,
even though the validation process may terminate before all
signatures are cryptographically verified.)

4. Check that the update UPDATE message does not contain an AS_PATH
attribute.

5. If the update UPDATE message was received from an a BGPsec peer that is not
a member of the BGPsec speaker's AS confederation, check to
ensure that none of the Secure_Path Segments contain a Flags
field with the Confed_Segment flag set to one. 1.

6. If the update UPDATE message was received from a BGPsec peer that is a
member of the BGPsec speaker's AS confederation, check to ensure
that the Secure_Path Segment corresponding to that peer contains
a Flags field with the Confed_Segment flag set to one. 1.

7. If the update UPDATE message was received from a peer that is not
expected to set pCount=0 (see Section Sections 4.2 and Section 4.3) 4.3), then check
to ensure that the pCount field in the most-recently most recently added
Secure_Path Segment is not equal to zero. 0. (Note: See Section 7.2
for router configuration guidance related to this in Section 7.2.) item.)

8. Using the equivalent of AS_PATH corresponding to the Secure_Path
in the update UPDATE message (see Section 4.4), check that the local AS
number is not present in the AS path (i.e. (i.e., rule out an AS loop).

If any of these checks fail, it is an error in the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH
attribute. BGPsec speakers MUST handle any syntactical or protocol
errors in the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute by using the "treat-as-withdraw"
approach as defined in RFC 7606 [RFC7606]. (Note: Since the AS
number of a transparent route server does appear in the Secure_Path
with pCount=0, the route server MAY check to see if its local AS is
listed in the Secure_Path, and this check MAY be included in the loop
detection
loop-detection check listed above.)

Next, the BGPsec speaker examines the Signature_Blocks in the
BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attribute. A Signature_Block corresponding to an
algorithm suite that the BGPsec speaker does not support is not
considered in validation. the validation process. If there is no Signature_Block
corresponding to an algorithm suite that the BGPsec speaker supports,
then in order to consider the update UPDATE message in the route selection
process, the BGPsec speaker MUST strip the Signature_Block(s),
reconstruct the AS_PATH from the Secure_Path (see Section 4.4), and
treat the update UPDATE message as if it was were received as an unsigned BGP update.
UPDATE message.

For each remaining Signature_Block (corresponding to an algorithm
suite supported by the BGPsec speaker), the BGPsec speaker iterates
through the Signature Segments in the Signature_Block, starting with
the most recently added segment (and concluding with the
least recently added segment). Note that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between Signature Segments and Secure_Path Segments
within the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute. The following steps make use of
this correspondence. correspondence:

o (Step 1): Step 1: Let there be K AS hops in a received BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute
that is to be validated. Let AS(1), AS(2), ..., AS(K+1) denote
the sequence of AS numbers from the origin AS to the validating
AS. Let Secure_Path Segment N and Signature Segment N in the BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attribute refer to those corresponding to AS(N) (where
N = 1, 2, ..., K). The BGPsec speaker that is processing and
validating the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute resides in AS(K+1). Let
Signature Segment N be the Signature Segment that is currently
being verified.

o (Step 2): Step 2: Locate the public key needed to verify the signature (in
the current Signature Segment). To do this, consult the valid
RPKI router certificate data and look up all valid (AS, SKI, (AS Number,
Public Key) Key, Subject Key Identifier) triples in which the AS
matches the AS number in the corresponding Secure_Path Segment.
Of these triples that match the AS number, check whether there is
an SKI that matches the value in the Subject Key Identifier field
of the Signature Segment. If this check finds no such matching
SKI value, then mark the entire Signature_Block as 'Not Valid' and
proceed to the next Signature_Block.

o (Step 3): Step 3: Compute the digest function (for the given algorithm
suite) on the appropriate data.

In order to verify the digital signature in Signature Segment N,
construct the sequence of octets to be hashed as shown in Figure 9
(using the notations defined in Step 1). (Note that this sequence
is the same sequence that was used by AS(N) that created the
Signature Segment N (see Section 4.2 and Figure 8).)

+------------------------------------+
| Target AS Number |
+------------------------------------+ ---\
+------------------------------------+----\
| Signature Segment : N-1 | \
+------------------------------------+ |
| Secure_Path Segment : N | |
+------------------------------------+ \
... > Data from
+------------------------------------+ / N Segments
| Signature Segment : 1 | |
+------------------------------------+ |
| Secure_Path Segment : 2 | |
+------------------------------------+ /
| Secure_Path Segment : 1 | /
+------------------------------------+---/
| Algorithm Suite Identifier |
+------------------------------------+
| AFI |
+------------------------------------+
| SAFI |
+------------------------------------+
| Prefix |
+------------------------------------+

Figure 9: The Sequence of octets Octets to be hashed Be Hashed for signature
verification Signature Verification
of Signature Segment N; N = 1,2, ..., K, where Where K is Is the
number Number of
AS hops Hops in the BGPsec_Path attribute. BGPsec_PATH Attribute

The elements in this sequence (Figure 9) MUST be ordered exactly
as shown. For the first segment to be processed (the
most recently added segment (i.e. (i.e., N = K) given that there are K
hops in the Secure_Path), the 'Target AS Number' is AS(K+1), the
AS number of the BGPsec speaker validating the update UPDATE message.
Note that if a BGPsec speaker uses multiple AS Numbers (e.g., the
BGPsec speaker is a member of a confederation), the AS number used
here MUST be the AS number announced in the OPEN message for the
BGP session over which the BGPsec update UPDATE message was received.

For each other Signature Segment (N smaller than K), the 'Target
AS Number' is AS(N+1), the AS number in the Secure_Path Segment
that corresponds to the Signature Segment added immediately after
the one being processed. (That processed (that is, in the Secure_Path Segment that
corresponds to the Signature Segment that the validator just
finished processing.) processing).

The Secure_Path and Signature Segment are obtained from the
BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attribute. The Address Family Identifier (AFI),
Subsequent Address Family Identifier (SAFI), AFI, SAFI, and Prefix fields are
obtained from the MP_REACH_NLRI attribute [RFC4760].
Additionally, in the Prefix field all of the trailing bits MUST be
set to zero 0 when constructing this sequence.

o (Step 4): Step 4: Use the signature validation algorithm (for the given
algorithm suite) to verify the signature in the current segment.
That is, invoke the signature validation algorithm on the
following three inputs: the value of the Signature field in the
current segment; segment, the digest value computed in Step 3 above; above, and
the public key obtained from the valid RPKI data in Step 2 above.
If the signature validation algorithm determines that the
signature is invalid, then mark the entire Signature_Block as
'Not Valid' and proceed to the next Signature_Block. If the
signature validation algorithm determines that the signature is
valid, then continue processing Signature Segments (within the
current Signature_Block).

If all Signature Segments within a Signature_Block pass validation
(i.e., all segments are processed and the Signature_Block has not yet
been marked 'Not Valid'), then the Signature_Block is marked as
'Valid'.

If at least one Signature_Block is marked as 'Valid', then the
validation algorithm terminates and the BGPsec update UPDATE message is
deemed to be 'Valid'. (That is, if a BGPsec update UPDATE message contains two Signature_Blocks
Signature_Blocks, then the update UPDATE message is deemed 'Valid' if the
first Signature_Block is marked 'Valid' OR the second Signature_Block
is marked 'Valid'.)

6. Algorithms and Extensibility

6.1. Algorithm Suite Considerations

Note that there is currently no support for bilateral negotiation
(using BGP capabilities) between BGPsec peers to use a particular
(digest and signature) algorithm suite. This is because the
algorithm suite used by the sender of a BGPsec update UPDATE message MUST be
understood not only by the peer to whom it is directly sending the
message,
message but also by all BGPsec speakers to whom the route
advertisement is eventually propagated. Therefore, selection of an
algorithm suite cannot be a local matter negotiated by BGP peers, peers but
instead must be coordinated throughout the Internet.

To this end, a mandatory algorithm suites document exists which [RFC8208] specifies a mandatory-to-use 'current'
algorithm suite for use by all BGPsec speakers [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. speakers.

It is anticipated that, in the future, the mandatory algorithm suites
document [RFC8208] or its successor
will be updated to specify a transition from the 'current' algorithm
suite to a 'new' algorithm suite. During the period of transition,
all BGPsec update UPDATE messages SHOULD simultaneously use both the
'current' algorithm suite and the 'new' algorithm suite. (Note that Section
Sections 3 and Section 4 specify how the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute can contain
signatures, in parallel, for two algorithm suites.) Once the
transition is complete, the use of the old 'current' algorithm will
be deprecated, the use of the 'new' algorithm will be mandatory, and
a subsequent 'even newer' algorithm suite may be specified as
recommended
"recommended to implement. implement". Once the transition has successfully
been completed in this manner, BGPsec speakers SHOULD include only a
single Signature_Block (corresponding to the 'new' algorithm).

6.2. Considerations for the SKI Size

Depending on the method of generating key identifiers [RFC7093], the
size of the SKI in a an RPKI router certificate may vary. The SKI
field in the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute has a fixed size of 20 octets size (see
Figure 7). If the SKI is longer than 20 octets, then use the
leftmost 20 octets of the SKI (excluding the tag and length)
[RFC7093]. If the SKI value is shorter than 20 octets, then pad the
SKI (excluding the tag and length) to the right (least significant
octets) with octets having zero "0" values.

6.3. Extensibility Considerations

This section discusses potential changes to BGPsec that would require
substantial changes to the processing of the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH and thus
necessitate a new version of BGPsec. Examples of such changes
include:

o A new type of signature algorithm that produces signatures of
variable length

o A new type of signature algorithm for which the number of
signatures in the Signature_Block is not equal to the number of
ASes in the Secure_Path (e.g., aggregate signatures)

o Changes to the data that is protected by the BGPsec signatures
(e.g., attributes other than the AS path)

In the case that such a change to BGPsec were deemed desirable, it is
expected that a subsequent version of BGPsec would be created and
that this version of BGPsec would specify a new BGP path attribute, attribute --
let's call it BGPsec_Path_Two, which "BGPsec_PATH_Two" -- that is designed to accommodate
the desired changes to BGPsec. In such a case, the mandatory algorithm
suites document [RFC8208] or its
successor would be updated to specify algorithm suites appropriate
for the new version of BGPsec.

At this point point, a transition would begin which that is analogous to the
algorithm transition discussed in Section 6.1. During the transition
period
period, all BGPsec speakers SHOULD simultaneously include both the
BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attribute and the new BGPsec_Path_Two BGPsec_PATH_Two attribute. Once
the transition is complete, the use of BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH could then be
deprecated, at which point BGPsec speakers should include only the
new BGPsec_Path_Two BGPsec_PATH_Two attribute. Such a process could facilitate a
transition to a new BGPsec semantics in a backwards compatible backwards-compatible
fashion.

7. Operations and Management Considerations

Some operations and management issues that are closely relevant to
BGPsec protocol specification and its deployment are highlighted here.
The Best Current Practices best practices concerning operations and deployment of BGPsec are
provided in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops]. [RFC8207].

7.1. Capability Negotiation Failure

Section 2.2 describes the negotiation required to establish a BGPsec-
capable
BGPsec-capable peering session. Not only must the BGPsec capability
be exchanged (and agreed on), but the BGP multiprotocol extension
[RFC4760] for the same AFI and the four-byte 4-byte AS capability [RFC6793]
MUST also be exchanged. Failure to properly negotiate a BGPsec
session,
session -- due to a missing capability, for example, example -- may still
result in the exchange of BGP (unsigned) updates. UPDATE messages. It is
RECOMMENDED that an implementation log the failure to properly
negotiate a BGPsec session. Also, an implementation MUST have the
ability to prevent a BGP session from being established if configured for
to only BGPsec use. use BGPsec.

7.2. Preventing Misuse of pCount=0

A peer that is an Internet Exchange Point (IXP) (i.e. Route Server) (i.e., route server)
with a transparent AS is expected to set pCount=0 in its Secure_Path
Segment while forwarding an update UPDATE message to a peer (see
Section 4.2). Clearly, such an IXP MUST configure its BGPsec router
to set pCount=0 in its Secure_Path Segment. This also means that a
BGPsec speaker MUST be configured so that it permits pCount=0 from an
IXP peer. Two other cases where pCount is set to zero 0 are in the context
contexts of an AS confederation (see Section 4.3) and of AS migration
[I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration].
[RFC8206]. In these two cases, pCount=0 is set and accepted within
the same AS (albeit the AS has two different identities). Note that
if a BGPsec speaker does not expect a peer AS to set its pCount=0, pCount=0 and
if an update UPDATE message received from that peer violates this, then the update
UPDATE message MUST be considered to be in error (see the list of
checks in Section 5.2). See Section 8.4 for a discussion of security
considerations concerning pCount=0.

7.3. Early Termination of Signature Verification

During the validation of a BGPsec update, UPDATE message, route processor
performance speedup can be achieved by incorporating the following
observations. An update UPDATE message is deemed 'Valid' if at least one of
the Signature_Blocks is marked as 'Valid' (see Section 5.2).
Therefore, if an update UPDATE message contains two Signature_Blocks and the
first one verified is found 'Valid', then the second Signature_Block
does not have to be verified. And if the update UPDATE message is chosen
for best path, then the BGPsec speaker adds its signature (generated
with the respective algorithm) to each of the two Signature_Blocks
and forwards the update. UPDATE message. Also, a BGPsec update UPDATE message is
deemed 'Not Valid' if at least one signature in each of the
Signature_Blocks is invalid. This principle can also be used for
route processor workload savings, i.e. i.e., the verification for a
Signature_Block terminates early when the first invalid signature is
encountered.

7.4. Non-Deterministic Non-deterministic Signature Algorithms

Many signature algorithms are non-deterministic. That is, many
signature algorithms will produce different signatures each time they
are run (even when they are signing the same data with the same key).
Therefore, if a BGPsec router receives a BGPsec update UPDATE message from a
peer and later receives a second BGPsec update UPDATE message from the same
peer for the same prefix with the same Secure_Path and SKIs, the
second
update UPDATE message MAY differ from the first update UPDATE message in the
signature fields (for a non-deterministic signature algorithm).
However, the two sets of signature fields will not differ if the
sender caches and reuses the previous signature. For a deterministic
signature algorithm, the signature fields MUST be identical between
the two updates. UPDATE messages. On the basis of these observations, an
implementation MAY incorporate optimizations in update validation
processing.

7.5. Private AS Numbers

It is possible that a stub customer of an ISP employs a private AS
number. Such a stub customer cannot publish a ROA in the global Global RPKI
for the private AS number and the prefixes that they use. Also, the
global
Global RPKI cannot support private AS numbers (i.e. (i.e., BGPsec speakers
in private ASes cannot be issued router certificates in the global Global
RPKI). For interactions between the stub customer (with the private
AS number) and the ISP, the following two scenarios are possible:

1. The stub customer sends an unsigned BGP update UPDATE message for a
prefix to the ISP's AS. An edge BGPsec speaker in the ISP's AS
may choose to propagate the prefix to its non-BGPsec and BGPsec
peers. If so, the ISP's edge BGPsec speaker MUST strip the
AS_PATH with the private AS number, number and then (a) re-originate the
prefix without any signatures towards its non-BGPsec peer and
(b) re-originate the prefix including its own signature towards
its BGPsec peer. In both cases (i.e. (i.e., (a) and (b)), the prefix
MUST have a ROA in the global Global RPKI authorizing the ISP's AS to
originate it.

2. The ISP and the stub customer may use a local RPKI repository
(using a mechanism such as one of the mechanisms described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-slurm]).
Then
[SLURM]). Then, there can be a ROA for the prefix originated by
the stub AS, and the eBGP speaker in the stub AS can be a BGPsec
speaker having a router certificate, albeit the ROA and router
certificate are valid only locally. With this arrangement, the
stub AS sends a signed update UPDATE message for the prefix to the ISP's
AS. An edge BGPsec speaker in the ISP's AS validates the update UPDATE
message, using RPKI data based on the local RPKI view. Further,
it may choose to propagate the prefix to its non-BGPsec and
BGPsec peers. If so, the ISP's edge BGPsec speaker MUST strip
the Secure_Path and the Signature Segment received from the stub
AS with the private AS
number, number and then (a) re-originate the
prefix without any signatures towards its non-BGPsec peer and
(b) re-originate the prefix including its own signature towards
its BGPsec peer. In both cases (i.e. (i.e., (a) and (b)), the prefix
MUST have a ROA in the
global Global RPKI authorizing the ISP's AS to
originate it.

It is possible that private AS numbers are used in an AS
confederation [RFC5065]. The BGPsec protocol requires that when a
BGPsec
update UPDATE message propagates through a confederation, each
Member-AS that forwards it to a peer Member-AS MUST sign the update UPDATE
message (see Section 4.3). However, the global Global RPKI cannot support
private AS numbers. In order for the BGPsec speakers in Member-ASes
with private AS numbers to have digital certificates, there MUST be a
mechanism in place in the confederation that allows the establishment
of a local, customized view of the RPKI, augmenting the global Global RPKI
repository data as needed. Since this mechanism (for augmenting and
maintaining a local image of RPKI data) operates locally within an AS
or AS confederation, it need not be standard based. However, a
standard-based mechanism can be used (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-slurm]). [SLURM]). Recall that in
order to prevent exposure of the internals of AS confederations, a
BGPsec speaker exporting to a non-member removes all
intra-confederation Secure_Path Segments and Signatures (see
Section 4.3).

7.6. Robustness Considerations for Accessing RPKI Data

The deployment structure, technologies technologies, and best practices concerning
global
Global RPKI data to reach routers (via local RPKI caches) are
described in [RFC6810] [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]
[I-D.ietf-sidr-publication] [RFC7115] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops]
[I-D.ietf-sidr-delta-protocol]. [RFC6810], [RFC8210], [RFC8181], [RFC7115], [RFC8207],
and [RFC8182]. For example, serial-number based Serial-Number-based incremental update
mechanisms are used for efficient transfer of just the data records
that have changed since the last update [RFC6810]
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]. Update [RFC8210]. The
update notification file is used by relying parties Relying Parties (RPs) to discover
whether any changes exist between the state of the global Global RPKI
repository and the RP's cache
[I-D.ietf-sidr-delta-protocol]. [RFC8182]. The notification describes
the location of (1) the files containing the snapshot and
(2) incremental deltas deltas, which can be used by the RP to synchronize
with the repository. Making use of these technologies and best
practices results in enabling robustness, efficiency, and better
security for the BGPsec routers and RPKI caches in terms of the flow
of RPKI data from repositories to RPKI caches to routers. With these
mechanisms, it is believed that an attacker wouldn't be able to
meaningfully correlate RPKI data flows with BGPsec RP (or router)
actions, thus avoiding attacks that may attempt to determine the set
of ASes interacting with an RP via the interactions between the RP
and RPKI servers.

7.7. Graceful Restart

During Graceful Restart (GR), restarting and receiving BGPsec
speakers MUST follow the procedures specified in [RFC4724] for
restarting and receiving BGP speakers, respectively. In particular,
the behavior of retaining the forwarding state for the routes in the
Loc-RIB [RFC4271] and marking them as stale stale, as well as not
differentiating between stale routing information and other
information during forwarding forwarding, will be the same as specified the behavior
specified in [RFC4724].

7.8. Robustness of Secret Random Number in ECDSA

The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with curve
P-256 is used for signing updates UPDATE messages in BGPsec
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. [RFC8208]. For
ECDSA, it is stated in Section 6.3 of [FIPS186-4] that a new secret
random number "k" shall be generated prior to the generation of each
digital signature. A high entropy high-entropy random bit generator (RBG) must be
used for generating "k", and any potential bias in the "k" generation
algorithm must be mitigated (see the methods described in [FIPS186-4]
and [SP800-90A]).

7.9. Incremental/Partial Deployment Considerations

How

What will migration from BGP to BGPsec look like? What are the
benefits for the first adopters? Initially Initially, small groups of
contiguous ASes would be doing BGPsec. There would be possibly be one
or more such groups in different geographic regions of the global
Internet. Only the routes originated within each group and
propagated within its borders would get the benefits of cryptographic
AS path protection. As BGPsec adoption grows, each group grows in
size
size, and eventually they join together to form even larger BGPsec
capable
BGPsec-capable groups of contiguous ASes. The benefit for early
adopters starts with AS path security within the contiguous-AS regions of
contiguous ASes spanned by their respective groups. Over time time, they
would see those
contiguous-AS regions of contiguous ASes grow much larger.

During partial deployment, if an AS in the path doesn't support
BGPsec, then BGP goes back to traditional mode, i.e. i.e., BGPsec updates UPDATE
messages are converted to unsigned updates UPDATE messages before forwarding
to that AS (see Section 4.4). At this point, the assurance that the update
UPDATE message propagated via the sequence of ASes listed is lost.
In other words, for the BGPsec routers residing in the ASes starting
from the origin AS to the AS before the one not supporting BGPsec,
the assurance can
be still be provided, but not beyond that (for the updates
UPDATE messages in consideration).

8. Security Considerations

For a discussion of the BGPsec threat model and related security
considerations, please see RFC 7132 [RFC7132].

8.1. Security Guarantees

When used in conjunction with Origin Validation origin validation (see RFC 6483
[RFC6483] and RFC 6811 [RFC6811]), a BGPsec speaker who receives a
valid BGPsec update message, UPDATE message containing a route advertisement for a
given prefix, prefix is provided with the following security guarantees:

o The origin AS number corresponds to an autonomous system AS that has been
authorized, in the RPKI, by the IP address space holder to
originate route advertisements for the given prefix.

o For each AS in the path, a BGPsec speaker authorized by the holder
of the AS number intentionally chose (in accordance with local
policy) to propagate the route advertisement to the subsequent AS
in the path.

That is, the recipient of a valid BGPsec update UPDATE message is assured
that the update UPDATE message propagated via the sequence of ASes listed in
the Secure_Path portion of the BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH attribute. (It should be
noted that BGPsec does not offer any guarantee that the data packets
would flow along the indicated path; it only guarantees that the BGP
update
UPDATE message conveying the path indeed propagated along the
indicated path.) Furthermore, the recipient is assured that this
path terminates in an autonomous system AS that has been authorized by the IP address
space holder as a legitimate destination for traffic to the given
prefix.

Note that although BGPsec provides a mechanism for an AS to validate
that a received update UPDATE message has certain security properties, the
use of such a mechanism to influence route selection is completely a
matter of local policy. Therefore, a BGPsec speaker can make no
assumptions about the validity of a route received from an external
(eBGP) BGPsec peer. That is, a compliant BGPsec peer may (depending
on the local policy of the peer) send update UPDATE messages that fail the
validity test in Section 5. Thus, a BGPsec speaker MUST completely
validate all BGPsec update UPDATE messages received from external peers.
(Validation of update UPDATE messages received from internal peers is also a
matter of local policy, policy; see Section 5.)

8.2. On the Removal of BGPsec Signatures

There may be cases where a BGPsec speaker deems 'Valid' (as per the
validation algorithm in Section 5.2) a BGPsec update UPDATE message that
contains both a 'Valid' and a 'Not Valid' Signature_Block. That is,
the update UPDATE message contains two sets of signatures corresponding to
two algorithm suites, and one set of signatures verifies correctly
and the other set of signatures fails to verify. In this case, the
protocol specifies that a BGPsec speaker choosing to propagate the
route advertisement in such an update UPDATE message MUST add its signature
to each of the Signature_Blocks (see Section 4.2). Thus Thus, the BGPsec
speaker creates a signature using both algorithm suites and creates a
new update UPDATE message that contains both the 'Valid' and the 'Not Valid'
set of signatures (from its own vantage point).

To understand the reason for such a design decision, consider the
case where the BGPsec speaker receives an update UPDATE message with both a
set of algorithm A signatures which that are 'Valid' and a set of algorithm
B signatures which that are 'Not Valid'. In such a case case, it is possible
(perhaps even likely, depending on the state of the algorithm
transition) that some of the BGPsec speaker's peers (or other
entities further 'downstream' downstream in the BGP topology) do not support
algorithm A. Therefore, if the BGPsec speaker were to remove the
'Not Valid' set of signatures corresponding to algorithm B, such
entities would treat the message as though it were unsigned. By
including the 'Not Valid' set of signatures when propagating a route
advertisement, the BGPsec speaker ensures that 'downstream' downstream entities
have as much information as possible to make an informed opinion
about the validation status of a BGPsec update. UPDATE message.

Note also that during a period of partial BGPsec deployment, a
'downstream'
downstream entity might reasonably treat unsigned messages
differently from BGPsec updates UPDATE messages that contain a single set of
'Not Valid' signatures. That is, by removing the set of 'Not Valid'
signatures
signatures, the BGPsec speaker might actually cause a downstream
entity to 'upgrade' the status of a route advertisement from
'Not Valid' to unsigned. Finally, note that in the above scenario,
the BGPsec speaker might have deemed algorithm A signatures 'Valid'
only because of some issue with the RPKI state local to its AS (for
example, its AS might not yet have obtained a CRL Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) indicating that a key used to verify an algorithm A
signature belongs to a newly revoked certificate). In such a case,
it is highly desirable for a downstream entity to treat the update UPDATE
message as 'Not Valid' (due to the revocation) and not as 'unsigned'
(which would happen if the 'Not Valid' Signature_Blocks were removed enroute).
en route).

A similar argument applies to the case where a BGPsec speaker (for
some reason reason, such as a lack of viable alternatives) selects as its
best path (to a given prefix) a route obtained via a 'Not Valid'
BGPsec
update UPDATE message. In such a case, the BGPsec speaker should
propagate a signed BGPsec update UPDATE message, adding its signature to the
'Not Valid' signatures that already exist. Again, this is to ensure
that
'downstream' downstream entities are able to make an informed decision and
not erroneously treat the route as unsigned. It should also be noted
that due to possible differences in RPKI data observed at different
vantage points in the network, a BGPsec update UPDATE message deemed 'Not
Valid' at an upstream BGPsec speaker may be deemed 'Valid' by another
BGP speaker downstream.

Indeed, when a BGPsec speaker signs an outgoing update UPDATE message, it is
not attesting to a belief that all signatures prior to its own
signature are valid.
Instead Instead, it is merely asserting that:

o The BGPsec speaker received the given route advertisement with the
indicated prefix, AFI, SAFI, and Secure_Path; Secure_Path, and

o The BGPsec speaker chose to propagate an advertisement for this
route to the peer (implicitly) indicated by the 'Target AS
Number'.

8.3. Mitigation of Denial of Service Denial-of-Service Attacks

The BGPsec update validation procedure is a potential target for
denial of service
denial-of-service attacks against a BGPsec speaker. The mitigation
of denial of service denial-of-service attacks that are specific to the BGPsec protocol
is considered here.

To mitigate the effectiveness of such denial of service denial-of-service attacks,
BGPsec speakers should implement an update validation algorithm that
performs expensive checks (e.g., signature verification) after
performing checks that are less expensive checks (e.g., syntax checks). The
validation algorithm specified in Section 5.2 was chosen so as to
perform checks which that are likely to be expensive after checks that are
likely to be inexpensive. However, the relative cost of performing
required validation steps may vary between implementations, and thus
the algorithm specified in Section 5.2 may not provide the best
denial of service
denial-of-service protection for all implementations.

Additionally, sending update UPDATE messages with very long AS paths (and
hence a large number of signatures) is a potential mechanism to
conduct denial of service denial-of-service attacks. For this reason, it is important
that an implementation of the validation algorithm stops attempting
to verify signatures as soon as an invalid signature is found. (This
ensures that long sequences of invalid signatures cannot be used for
denial of service
denial-of-service attacks.) Furthermore, implementations can
mitigate such attacks by only performing validation on update UPDATE
messages that, if valid, would be selected as the best path. That
is, if an update UPDATE message contains a route that would lose out in best
path selection for other reasons (e.g., a very long AS path) path), then it
is not necessary to determine the BGPsec-validity status of the
route.

8.4. Additional Security Considerations

The mechanism of setting the pCount field to zero 0 is included in this
specification to enable route servers in the control path to
participate in BGPsec without increasing the length of the AS path.
Two other scenarios where pCount=0 is utilized are in the context contexts of
an AS confederation (see Section 4.3) and of AS migration
[I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration]. [RFC8206].
In these two scenarios, pCount=0 is set and also accepted within the
same AS (albeit the AS has two different identities). However,
entities other than route servers, confederation ASes ASes, or migrating
ASes could conceivably use this mechanism (set the pCount to zero) 0) to
attract traffic (by reducing the length of the AS path)
illegitimately. This risk is largely mitigated if every BGPsec
speaker follows the operational guidance in Section 7.2 for
configuration for setting pCount=0 and/or accepting pCount=0 from a
peer. However, note that a recipient of a BGPsec
update UPDATE message
within which an upstream entity two or more hops away has set pCount
to zero 0 is unable to verify for themselves whether pCount was set to zero 0
legitimately.

There is a possibility of passing a BGPsec update UPDATE message via
tunneling between colluding ASes. For example, say, let's say that AS-X
does not peer with
AS-Y, AS-Y but colludes with AS-Y, and it signs and
sends a BGPsec update UPDATE message to AS-Y by tunneling. AS-Y can then
further sign and propagate the BGPsec
update UPDATE message to its peers.
It is beyond the scope of the BGPsec protocol to detect this form of
malicious behavior. BGPsec is designed to protect messages sent
within BGP (i.e. (i.e., within the control plane) - -- not when the control
plane in is bypassed.

A variant of the collusion by tunneling mentioned above can happen in
the context of AS confederations. When a BGPsec router (outside of a
confederation) is forwarding an update UPDATE message to a Member-AS in the
confederation, it signs the update UPDATE message to the public AS number of
the confederation and not to the member's AS number (see
Section 4.3). The Member-AS can tunnel the signed update UPDATE message to
another Member-AS as received (i.e. (i.e., without adding a signature).
The update UPDATE message can then be propagated using BGPsec to other
confederation members or to BGPsec neighbors outside of the
confederation. This kind of operation is possible, but no grave
security or reachability compromise is feared for the following
reasons: (1)

o The confederation members belong to one organization organization, and strong
internal trust is expected; and (2) expected.

o Recall that the signatures that are internal to the confederation
MUST be removed prior to forwarding the update UPDATE message to an
outside BGPsec router (see Section 4.3).

BGPsec does not provide protection against attacks at the transport
layer. As with any BGP session, an adversary on the path between a
BGPsec speaker and its peer is able to perform attacks such as
modifying valid BGPsec updates UPDATE messages to cause them to fail
validation, injecting (unsigned) BGP update UPDATE messages without BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attributes, injecting BGPsec update UPDATE messages with BGPsec_Path
BGPsec_PATH attributes that fail validation, or causing the peer to tear-down
tear down the BGP session. The use of BGPsec does nothing to
increase the power of an on-path adversary -- in particular, even an
on-path adversary cannot cause a BGPsec speaker to believe that a
BGPsec-invalid route is valid. However, as with any BGP session,
BGPsec sessions SHOULD be protected by appropriate transport security
mechanisms (see the Security Considerations section in [RFC4271]).

There is a possibility of replay attacks which are attacks, defined as follows. In the
context of BGPsec, a replay attack occurs when a malicious BGPsec
speaker in the AS path suppresses a prefix withdrawal (implicit or
explicit). Further, a replay attack is said to occur also when a
malicious BGPsec speaker replays a previously received BGPsec
announcement for a prefix that has since been withdrawn. The
mitigation strategy for replay attacks involves router certificate
rollover; please see
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-rollover] [ROLLOVER] for details.

9. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to register has registered a new BGP capability from described in Section 2.1 in
the BGP Capabilities Code "Capability Codes" registry's "IETF Review" range. range [RFC8126]. The
description for the new capability is "BGPsec Capability". The This
document is the reference for the new capability is this document (i.e. the RFC that
replaces draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol). capability.

IANA is has also requested to register registered a new path attribute from described in Section 3
in the BGP "BGP Path Attributes Attributes" registry. The code for this new
attribute is "BGPsec_Path". The "BGPsec_PATH". This document is the reference for the
new attribute is
this document (i.e. the RFC that replaces draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-
protocol). attribute.

IANA is requested to define has defined the "BGPsec Capability" registry in the
Resource "Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) (RPKI)" group. The registry is as shown in
Figure 10 10, with values assigned from Section 2.1:

Figure 10: IANA registry Registry for BGPsec Capability. Capability

The Direction bit (4th (fourth bit) has a value of either 0 or 1, and both
values are fully specified by this document (i.e. the RFC that replaces
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol). document. Future Version values
and future values of the Unassigned bits are assigned using the
"Standards Action" registration procedures defined in RFC 5226 [RFC5226]. 8126
[RFC8126].

IANA is requested to define has defined the "BGPsec_Path "BGPsec_PATH Flags" registry in the
RPKI "Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" group. The registry is as shown in
Figure 11 11, with one value assigned from Section 3.1:

Figure 11: IANA registry Registry for BGPsec_Path BGPsec_PATH Flags field. Field

Future values of the Unassigned bits are assigned using the
"Standards Action" registration procedures defined in RFC 5226
[RFC5226].

11. 8126
[RFC8126].

10. References

11.1.

10.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
Formats, & Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-
algs-18 (work in progress), April 2017.

[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-21 (work in progress), January 2017.

[IANA-AF] "Address Family Numbers",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers/
address-family-numbers.xhtml>.
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers>.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

[RFC4724] Sangli, S., Chen, E., Fernando, R., Scudder, J., and Y.
Rekhter, "Graceful Restart Mechanism for BGP", RFC 4724,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4724, January 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4724>.

[RFC4760] Bates, T., Chandra, R., Katz, D., and Y. Rekhter,
"Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4", RFC 4760,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4760, January 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4760>.

[RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous
System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5065, August 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5065>.

[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.

[RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement
with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492, February
2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5492>.

[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.

[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.

[RFC6793] Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-Octet
Autonomous System (AS) Number Space", RFC 6793,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6793, December 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6793>.

[RFC7606] Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K.
Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages",
RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>.

11.2.

[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

[RFC8208] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8208,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8208, June 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8208>.

[RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
and Certification Requests", RFC 8209,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, June 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209>.

10.2. Informative References

[Borchert]
Borchert, O. and M. Baer, "Modification "Subject: Modification request: draft-
ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-14",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-14", message to the IETF
SIDR WG Mailing List
message , List, 10 February 10, 2016,
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/
sidr/8B_e4CNxQCUKeZ_AUzsdnn2f5Mu>.

[FIPS186-4]
"FIPS
National Institute of Standards Publication 186-4: Digital and Technology, "Digital
Signature
Standard", Standard (DSS)", NIST FIPS Publication
186-4, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, July 2013,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>.

[I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration]
George, W. and S. Murphy, "BGPSec Considerations for AS
Migration", draft-ietf-sidr-as-migration-06 (work in
progress), December 2016.

[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops]
Bush, R., "BGPsec Operational Considerations", draft-ietf-
sidr-bgpsec-ops-16 (work in progress), January 2017.

[I-D.ietf-sidr-delta-protocol]
Bruijnzeels, T., Muravskiy, O., Weber, B., and R. Austein,
"RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)", draft-ietf-sidr-
delta-protocol-08 (work in progress), March 2017.

[I-D.ietf-sidr-publication]
Weiler, S., Sonalker, A., and R. Austein, "A Publication
Protocol for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", draft-ietf-sidr-publication-12 (work in
progress), March 2017.

[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-09 (work in
progress), February 2017.

[I-D.ietf-sidr-slurm]
Mandelberg, D., Ma, D., and T. Bruijnzeels, "Simplified
Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI",
draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-04 (work in progress), March 2017.

[I-D.ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-rollover]
Weis, B., Gagliano, R., and K. Patel, "BGPsec Router
Certificate Rollover", draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-
rollover-00 (work in progress), March 2017.

[RFC6472] Kumari, W. and K. Sriram, "Recommendation for Not Using
AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", BCP 172, RFC 6472,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6472, December 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6472>.

[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

[RFC6483] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route
Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs)", RFC 6483, DOI 10.17487/RFC6483, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6483>.

[RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>.

[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.

[RFC7093] Turner, S., Kent, S., and J. Manger, "Additional Methods
for Generating Key Identifiers Values", RFC 7093,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7093, December 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7093>.

[RFC7115] Bush, R., "Origin Validation Operation Based on the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185,
RFC 7115, DOI 10.17487/RFC7115, January 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7115>.

[RFC7132] Kent, S. and A. Chi, "Threat Model for BGP Path Security",
RFC 7132, DOI 10.17487/RFC7132, February 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7132>.

[RFC8181] Weiler, S., Sonalker, A., and R. Austein, "A Publication
Protocol for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", May 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8181>.

[RFC8182] Bruijnzeels, T., Muravskiy, O., Weber, B., and R. Austein,
"The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)", RFC 8182,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8182, May 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8182>.

[RFC8206] George, W. and S. Murphy, "BGPsec Considerations for AS
Migration", RFC 8206, DOI 10.17487/RFC8206, June 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8206>.

[RFC8207] Bush, R., "BGPsec Operational Considerations", BCP 211,
RFC 8207, DOI 10.17487/RFC8207, June 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8207>.

[RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol Version 1",
RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, June 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.

[ROLLOVER]
Weis, B., Gagliano, R., and K. Patel, "BGPsec Router
Certificate Rollover", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-
sidrops-bgpsec-rollover-00, March 2017.

[SLURM] Mandelberg, D., Ma, D., and T. Bruijnzeels, "Simplified
Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI",
Work in Progress, draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-04, March 2017.

[SP800-90A]
"NIST 800-90A:
National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generator
Validation System", October Generators", NIST SP 800-90A
Rev 1, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1, June 2015,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/drbg/
DRBGVS.pdf>.

10.2.
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Michael Baer, Oliver Borchert, David
Mandelberg, Mehmet Adalier, Sean Turner, John Scudder, Wes George, Jeff Haas, Keyur Patel,
Alvaro Retana, Nevil Brownlee, Matthias Waehlisch, Sandy Murphy, Chris Morrow, Tim Polk, Russ
Mundy, Wes Hardaker, Sharon Goldberg, Ed Kern, Doug Maughan, Pradosh
Mohapatra, Mark Reynolds, Heather Schiller, Jason Schiller, Ruediger
Volk, and David Ward for their review, comments, and suggestions
during the course of this work. Thanks are also due to many IESG
reviewers whose comments greatly helped improve the clarity,
accuracy, and presentation in the document.

10.

Contributors

10.1. Authors
Rob Austein
Dragon Research Labs
Email: sra@hactrn.net

Steven Bellovin
Columbia University
Email: smb@cs.columbia.edu

Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
Email: randy@psg.com

Russ Housley
Vigil Security
Email: housley@vigilsec.com

Matt Lepinski
New College of Florida
mlepinski@ncf.edu

Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies
kent@bbn.com
Email: kent@alum.mit.edu

Warren Kumari
Google
Email: warren@kumari.net

Doug Montgomery
USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
Email: dougm@nist.gov

Kotikalapudi Sriram
USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
kotikalapudi.sriram@nist.gov

Chris Morrow
Google, Inc.
Email: morrowc@google.com

Sandy Murphy
SPARTA, Inc., a Parsons Company
Email: sandy@tislabs.com

Keyur Patel
Arrcus
Email: keyur@arrcus.com

John Scudder
Juniper Networks
Email: jgs@juniper.net

Samuel Weiler
W3C/MIT
Email: weiler@csail.mit.edu

Authors' Addresses

Matthew Lepinski (editor)
NCF
New College of Florida
5800 Bay Shore Road
Sarasota
Sarasota, FL 34243
USA
United States of America

Email: mlepinski@ncf.edu

Kotikalapudi Sriram (editor)
NIST
USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
USA
United States of America

Email: kotikalapudi.sriram@nist.gov