wdiff rfc8481.original rfc8481.txt

Network Working Group
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bush
Internet-Draft
Request for Comments: 8481 Internet Initiative Japan
Updates: 6811 (if approved) August 20, September 2018
Intended status:
Category: Standards Track
Expires: February 21, 2019
ISSN: 2070-1721

Clarifications to BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation Clarifications
draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify-05

Abstract

Deployment of Based on Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) based

Abstract

Deployment of BGP origin validation based on Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) is hampered by, among other things, vendor mis-
implementations
misimplementations in two critical areas: which routes are validated
and whether policy is applied when not specified by configuration.
This document is meant to clarify possible misunderstandings causing
those
mis-implementations; and misimplementations; it thus updates RFC 6811 by clarifying that
all prefixes should have their validation state set, set and that policy
must not be applied without operator configuration.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
be interpreted as described in [RFC8174] only when they appear in all
upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English
words, without normative meaning.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents an Internet Standards Track document.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list It represents the consensus of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for a maximum publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

Information about the current status of six months this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents obtained at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on February 21, 2019.

Internet-DrafBGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation Clarifications August 2018
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Evaluate ALL Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Set State, Don't Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

1. Introduction

Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among
other things, vendor mis-implementations misimplementations in two critical areas: which
routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified
by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible
misunderstandings causing those mis-implementations. misimplementations.

When a route is distributed into BGP, the origin validation state is
set to NotFound, Valid, or Invalid per [RFC6811]. Operational
testing has shown that the specifications of that RFC were not
sufficient to avoid divergent implementations. This document
attempts to clarify two areas which seem to cause confusion.

The implementation issues seem not to be about how to validate, i.e.,
how to decide if a route is NotFound, Valid, or Invalid. The issues
seem to be which routes should be evaluated and have their evaluation
state set, and whether to apply policy without operator
configuration.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

3. Suggested Reading

It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, BGP [RFC4271], the RPKI, RPKI
[RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), (ROAs) [RFC6482], and RPKI-
based Prefix Validation, Validation [RFC6811].

4. Evaluate ALL Prefixes

Significant Clarification: A router MUST evaluate and set the
validation state of all routes in BGP coming from any source (eBGP, (e.g.,
eBGP, iBGP, or redistribution from static, connected, etc.), static or connected routes),
unless specifically configured otherwise by the operator. Else Otherwise,
the operator does not have the ability to drop Invalid routes coming
from every

Internet-DrafBGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation Clarifications August 2018 potential source; source and is therefore liable to complaints
from neighbors about propagation of Invalid routes. For this reason,
[RFC6811] says:

"When

When a BGP speaker receives an UPDATE from a neighbor, it SHOULD
perform a lookup as described above for each of the Routes in the
UPDATE message. The lookup SHOULD also be applied to routes that
are redistributed into BGP from another source, such as another
protocol or a locally defined static route." route.

[RFC6811] goes on to say say, "An implementation MAY provide
configuration options to control which routes the lookup is applied
to."

When redistributing into BGP from connected, static, any source (e.g., IGP, iBGP, etc., or
from static or connected routes), there is no AS_PATH in the input to
allow RPKI validation of the originating AS. Autonomous System (AS). In
such cases, the router MUST use the AS of the router's BGP
configuration. If that is ambiguous because of confederation, AS
migration, or other multi-AS configuration, then the router
configuration MUST provide a means of specifying the AS to be used on
the redistribution, either per redistribution or globally.

5. Set State, Don't Act

Significant Clarification: Once routes are evaluated and have their
state set, the operator should be in complete control of any policy
applied based on the evaluation state. Absent specific operator
configuration, policy MUST NOT be applied.

Automatic origin validation policy actions such as those described in
[RFC8097], BGP
"BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community, Community" [RFC8097]
MUST NOT be carried out or otherwise applied unless specifically
configured by the operator.

6. Security Considerations

This document does not create security considerations beyond those of
[RFC6811].

7. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA Considerations.

7. Acknowledgments

Many thanks to John Scudder who had the patience to give constructive
review multiple times, and to Keyur Patel who noted that the AS might
have to be specified. George Michaelson, Jay Borkenhagen, John
Heasley, and Matthias Waehlisch kindly helped clean up loose wording.

Internet-DrafBGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation Clarifications August 2018 actions.

8. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.

[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.

[RFC8097] Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R.
Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
Community", RFC 8097, DOI 10.17487/RFC8097, March 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8097>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8097>.

[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

Acknowledgments

Many thanks to John Scudder, who had the patience to give
constructive review multiple times, and Keyur Patel, who noted that
the AS might have to be specified. George Michaelson, Jay
Borkenhagen, John Heasley, and Matthias Waehlisch kindly helped clean
up loose wording.

Author's Address

Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US
United States of America

Email: randy@psg.com