wdiff rfc8642.original rfc8642.txt

Network Working Group
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Borkenhagen
Internet-Draft
Request for Comments: 8642 AT&T
Updates: 1997 (if approved) R. Bush
Intended status:
Category: Standards Track IIJ & Arrcus
Expires: December 15, 2019
ISSN: 2070-1721 R. Bonica
Juniper Networks
S. Bayraktar
Cisco Systems
June 13,
August 2019

Well-Known Community

Policy Behavior
draft-ietf-grow-wkc-behavior-08

Abstract for Well-Known BGP Communities

Abstract

Well-known BGP communities are manipulated differently across various
current implementations; implementations, resulting in difficulties for operators.
Network operators should deploy consistent community handling across
their networks while taking the inconsistent behaviors from the
various BGP implementations into consideration.. consideration. This document
recommends specific actions to limit future inconsistency, namely inconsistency: namely,
BGP implementors must not create further inconsistencies from this
point forward.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. These behavioral changes, though subtle, actually
update RFC 1997.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents an Internet Standards Track document.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid the IETF community. It has
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Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

Information about the current status of six months this document, any errata,
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 15, 2019.
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8642.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Manipulation of Communities by Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Community Manipulation Policy Differences . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Documentation of Vendor Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Note on an Inconsistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Note for Those Writing RFCs for New Community-Like Attributes 5
6. Action Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9. Acknowledgments Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Acknowledgments . . . . . 6
10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

1. Introduction

The BGP Communities Attribute attribute was specified in [RFC1997] [RFC1997], which
introduced the concept of Well-Known Communities. well-known communities. In hindsight,
[RFC1997] did not prescribe as fully as it should have how Well-Known
Communities well-known
communities may be manipulated by policies applied by operators.
Currently, implementations differ in this regard, and these
differences can result in inconsistent behaviors that operators find
difficult to identify and resolve.

This document describes the current behavioral differences in order
to assist operators in generating consistent community-manipulation
policies in a multi-vendor environment, environment and to prevent the
introduction of additional divergence in implementations.

This document recommends specific actions to limit future
inconsistency, namely
inconsistency: namely, BGP implementors MUST NOT create further
inconsistencies from this point forward.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

2. Manipulation of Communities by Policy

[RFC1997] says:

A BGP speaker receiving a route with the COMMUNITIES path
attribute may modify this attribute according to the local policy." policy.

One basic operational need is to add or remove one or more
communities to or from the set. The focus of this document is
another common operational need, need: to replace all communities with a
new set. To simplify this second case, most BGP policy
implementations provide a syntax to "set" a community that operators
use to mean "remove any/all communities present on the route, route and
apply this set of communities
instead." instead".

Some operators prefer to write explicit policy to delete unwanted
communities rather than use "set", i.e., using "set;" i.e. using a "delete community *:*"
and then "add community x:y ..." configuration statements in an
attempt to replace all communities. The same community manipulation community-manipulation
policy differences described in the following section exist in the
syntax for both "set" and "delete community *:*" syntax. *:*". For simplicity,
the remainder of this document refers only to the "set" behaviors,
which we refer to collectively as each implementation's '"set" directive.'
directive'.

3. Community Manipulation Policy Differences

Vendor implementations differ in the treatment of certain Well-Known well-known
communities when modified using the syntax to "set" the community.
Some replace all communities communities, including the Well-Known ones well-known ones, with the
new set, while set; others replace all non-Well-Known Communities non-well-known communities but do not
modify any Well-Known Communities well-known communities that are present.

These differences result in what would appear to be identical policy
configurations having very different results on different platforms.

4. Documentation of Vendor Implementations

In this section section, we document the syntax and observed behavior of the
"set" directive in several popular BGP implementations to illustrate
the severity of the problem operators face.

In Juniper Networks' Junos OS, "community set" removes all
communities, Well-Known well-known or otherwise.

In Cisco IOS XR, "set community" removes all communities except for
the following:

+-------------+-----------------------------------+
| Numeric | Common Name |
+-------------+-----------------------------------+
| 0:0 | internet |
| 65535:0 | graceful-shutdown |
| 65535:1 | accept-own rfc7611 |
| 65535:65281 | NO_EXPORT |
| 65535:65282 | NO_ADVERTISE |
| 65535:65283 | NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED (or local-AS) |
+-------------+-----------------------------------+

Table 1: Communities not removed Not Removed by Cisco Cisco's IOS XR

Table 1

Cisco IOS XR does allow Well-Known allows well-known communities to be removed only by
explicitly enumerating one at a time, time and not in the aggregate; aggregate -- for
example, "delete community accept-own". Operators are advised to
consult Cisco IOS XR documentation and/or Cisco support for full
details.

On Extreme networks' Brocade NetIron: NetIron, "set community X" removes all
communities and sets X.

In Huawei's VRP product, "community set" removes all communities,
Well-Known
well-known or otherwise.

In OpenBGPD, "set community" does not remove any communities, Well-
Known well-
known or otherwise.

Nokia's SR OS has several directives that operate on communities.
Its "set" directive is called using the "replace" keyword, replacing
all communities, Well-Known well-known or otherwise, with the specified
communities.

4.1. Note on an Inconsistency

The

IANA publishes a list of Well-Known Communities well-known communities [IANA-WKC].

Cisco IOS XR's set of Well-Known well-known communities that "set community"
will not overwrite diverges from the IANA's list of Well-Known well-known
communities. Quite a few Well-Known well-known communities from IANA's list do
not receive special treatment in Cisco IOS XR, and at least one
community on Cisco IOS XR's special treatment list, internet == 0:0,
is not formally a Well-Known Community well-known community as it is not in [IANA-WKC];
but [IANA-WKC] (it
is taken from the Reserved range [0x00000000-0x0000FFFF]. [0x00000000-0x0000FFFF]).

This merely notes an inconsistency. It is not a plea to 'protect' protect the
entire IANA list from "set community." community".

5. Note for Those Writing RFCs for New Community-Like Attributes

When establishing new [RFC1997]-like attributes similar to those in [RFC1997] (large
communities, wide communities, etc.), RFC authors should state
explicitly how the new attribute is to be handled.

6. Action Items

Network operators are encouraged to limit their use of the "set"
directive (within reason), reason) to improve consistency across platforms.

Unfortunately, it would be operationally disruptive for vendors to
change their current implementations.

Vendors MUST clearly document the behavior of the "set" directive in
their implementations.

Vendors MUST ensure that their implementations' "set" directive
treatment of any specific community does not change if/when that
community becomes a new Well-Known Community well-known community through future
standardization. For most implementations, this means that the "set"
directive MUST continue to remove the community; for those
implementations where the "set" directive removes no communities,
that behavior MUST continue.

Given the implementation inconsistencies described in this document,
network operators are urged never to rely on any implicit
understanding of a neighbor ASN's BGP community handling. I.e., That is,
before announcing prefixes with NO_EXPORT or any other community to a
neighbor ASN, the operator should confirm with that neighbor how the
community will be treated.

7. Security Considerations

Surprising defaults and/or undocumented behaviors are not good for
security. This document attempts to remedy that.

8. IANA Considerations

The IANA is requested to list has listed this document as an additional reference for the
[IANA-WKC] registry.

9. Acknowledgments

The authors thank Martijn Schmidt, Qin Wu for the Huawei data point,
Greg Hankins, Job Snijders, David Farmer, John Heasley, and Jakob
Heitz.

10. Normative References

[IANA-WKC]
IANA, "Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Well-Known Well-known
Communities", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/
bgp-well-known-communities>.

[RFC1997] Chandra, R., Traina, P., and T. Li, "BGP Communities
Attribute", RFC 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC1997, August 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1997>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1997>.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Martijn Schmidt and Qin Wu for the Huawei data
point as well as Greg Hankins, Job Snijders, David Farmer, John
Heasley, and Jakob Heitz.

Authors' Addresses

Jay Borkenhagen
AT&T
200 Laurel Avenue South
Middletown, NJ 07748
United States of America

Email: jayb@att.com

Randy Bush
IIJ & Arrcus
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, WA 98110
US
United States of America

Email: randy@psg.com

Ron Bonica
Juniper Networks
2251 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon, VA 20171
US
United States of America

Email: rbonica@juniper.net
Serpil Bayraktar
Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
United States of America

Email: serpil@cisco.com