<?xmlversion="1.0" encoding="US-ASCII"?> <!-- This template is for creating an Internet Draft using xml2rfc, which is available here: http://xml.resource.org. -->version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?> <!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM"rfc2629.dtd" [ <!-- One method to get references from the online citation libraries. There has to be one entity for each item to be referenced. An alternate method (rfc include) is described in the references. --> <!ENTITY RFC2119 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"> <!ENTITY RFC3279 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3279.xml"> <!-- <!ENTITY RFC3280 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3280.xml"> --> <!ENTITY RFC4055 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4055.xml"> <!-- <!ENTITY RFC4086 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4086.xml"> --> <!ENTITY RFC5280 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml"> <!ENTITY RFC5480 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5480.xml"> <!ENTITY RFC5912 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5912.xml"> <!ENTITY RFC6979 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6979.xml"> <!ENTITY RFC8017 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8017.xml"> <!ENTITY RFC8174 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"> <!ENTITY I-D.draft-josefsson-pkix-eddsa SYSTEM "http://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml-ids/reference.I-D.draft-josefsson-pkix-eddsa-04.xml"> ]> <?xml-stylesheet type='text/xsl' href='rfc2629.xslt' ?> <!-- used by XSLT processors --> <!-- For a complete list and description of processing instructions (PIs), please see http://xml.resource.org/authoring/README.html. --> <!-- Below are generally applicable Processing Instructions (PIs) that most I-Ds might want to use. (Here they are set differently than their defaults in xml2rfc v1.32) --> <?rfc strict="yes" ?> <!-- give errors regarding ID-nits and DTD validation --> <!-- control the table of contents (ToC) --> <?rfc toc="yes"?> <!-- generate a ToC --> <?rfc tocdepth="4"?> <!-- the number of levels of subsections in ToC. default: 3 --> <!-- control references --> <?rfc symrefs="yes"?> <!-- use symbolic references tags, i.e, [RFC2119] instead of [1] --> <?rfc sortrefs="yes" ?> <!-- sort the reference entries alphabetically --> <!-- control vertical white space (using these PIs as follows is recommended by the RFC Editor) --> <?rfc compact="yes" ?> <!-- do not start each main section on a new page --> <?rfc subcompact="no" ?> <!-- keep one blank line between list items --> <!-- end of list of popular I-D processing instructions -->"rfc2629-xhtml.ent"> <rfccategory="std"xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" docName="draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-15" submissionType="IETF" category="std" consensus="yes" number="8692" ipr="trust200902"updates="3279">updates="3279" obsoletes="" xml:lang="en" tocInclude="true" tocDepth="4" symRefs="true" sortRefs="true" version="3"> <!--category values: std, bcp, info, exp, and historic ipr="full3978" (probably old) ipr values: full3667, noModification3667, noDerivatives3667 you can add the attributes updates="NNNN" and obsoletes="NNNN" they will automatically be output with "(if approved)"xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 2.35.0 --> <!-- ***** FRONT MATTER ***** --> <front><!-- The abbreviated title is used in the page header - it is only necessary if the full title is longer than 39 characters --><title abbrev="SHAKEidentifiersIdentifiers in X.509">Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSAusingUsing SHAKEs</title><!-- add 'role="editor"' below for the editors if appropriate --><seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8692"/> <author fullname="Panos Kampanakis"initials="P.K."initials="P." surname="Kampanakis"> <organization>Cisco Systems</organization> <address> <email>pkampana@cisco.com</email> </address> </author> <author fullname="Quynh Dang"initials="Q.D."initials="Q." surname="Dang"> <organization>NIST</organization> <address> <postal> <street>100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930</street> <city>Gaithersburg</city> <region>MD</region> <code>20899-8930</code><country>USA</country><country>United States of America</country> </postal><!-- <phone>+44 7889 488 335</phone> --><email>quynh.dang@nist.gov</email><!-- uri and facsimile elements may also be added --> </address> </author> <!-- <author fullname="Sean Turner" initials="S.T." surname="Turner"> <organization>sn3rd</organization> <address> <postal> <street></street> <city>Soham</city> <region></region> <code></code> <country>UK</country> </postal> <phone>+44 7889 488 335</phone> <email>sean@sn3rd.com</email></address> </author>--><dateyear="2019" /> <!-- If the month and yearmonth="December" year="2019"/> <area>General</area> <workgroup>LAMPS WG</workgroup> <keyword>SHAKE in X.509, SHAKEs in PKIX, certificates with SHAKE hashes</keyword> <abstract> <t>Digital signatures areboth specifiedused to sign messages, X.509 certificates, andareCertificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). This document updates thecurrent ones, xml2rfc will fill in"Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" (RFC 3279) and describes thecurrent dayconventions foryou. If onlyusing thecurrent year is specified, xml2rfc will fillSHAKE function family in Internet X.509 certificates and revocation lists as one-way hash functions with thecurrent dayRSA Probabilistic signature andmonth for you. If the year is not the current one, it is necessary to specify at least a month (xml2rfc assumes day="1" if not specified for the purpose of calculating the expiry date). With drafts it is normally sufficient to specify just the year. --> <!-- Meta-data Declarations --> <area>General</area> <workgroup>LAMPS WG</workgroup> <!-- WG name at the upperleft corner of the doc, IETF is fine for individual submissions. If this element is not present, the default is "Network Working Group", which is used by the RFC Editor as a nod to the history of the IETF. --> <!-- <keyword>template</keyword> --> <!-- Keywords will be incorporated into HTML output files in a meta tag but they have no effect on text or nroff output. If you submit your draft to the RFC Editor, the keywords will be used for the searPKIch engine. --> <abstract> <t>Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates and CRLs. This document updates the "Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Profile" (RFC3279) and describes the conventions for using the SHAKE function family in Internet X.509 certificates and revocation lists as one-way hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature algorithms. The conventionsElliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signature algorithms. The conventions for the associated subject public keys are also described.</t> </abstract> </front> <middle> <sectiontitle="Change Log"> <t>[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]</t> <t><list style="symbols"> <t>draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-15: <list> <t>Minor editorial nits.</t> </list></t> <t>draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-14: <list> <t>Fixing error with incorrect preimage resistance bits for SHA128 and SHA256.</t> </list></t> <t>draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-13: <list> <t>Addressing one applicable comment from Dan M. about sec levels while in secdir review of draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes.</t> <t>Addressing comment from Scott B.'s opsdir review about references in the abstract.</t> </list></t> <t>draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-12: <list> <t>Nits identified by Roman, Eric V. Ben K., Barry L. in ballot position review.</t> </list></t> <t>draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-11: <list> <t>Nits identified by Roman in AD Review.</t> </list></t> <t>draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-10: <list> <t>Updated IANA considerations section to request for OID assignments. </t> </list></t> <t>draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-09: <list> <t>Fixed minor text nits.</t> <t>Added text name allocation for SHAKEs in IANA considerations.</t> <t>Updates in Sec Considerations section.</t> </list></t> <t>draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-08: <list> <t>Small nits from Russ while in WGLC.</t> </list></t> <t>draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-07: <list> <t>Incorporated Eric's suggestion from WGLC.</t> </list></t> <t>draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-06: <list> <t>Added informative references.</t> <t>Updated ASN.1 so it compiles.</t> <t>Updated IANA considerations.</t> </list></t> <t>draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-05: <list> <t>Added RFC8174 reference and text.</t> <t>Explicitly explained why RSASSA-PSS-params are omitted in section 5.1.1.</t> <t>Simplified Public Keys section by removing redundant info from RFCs.</t> </list></t> <t>draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-04: <list> <t>Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k in Deterministic ECDSA. That should be RFC6979-bis. </t> <t>Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks about randomness of k because we are using deterministic ECDSA.</t> <t>Various ASN.1 fixes.</t> <t>Text fixes.</t> </list></t> <t>draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-03: <list> <t>Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim. </t> <t>Added ASN.1.</t> </list></t> <t>draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-02: <list> <t>Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the introduction, the new OIDs and their use in PKIX.</t> <t>Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcode hash, salt and MGF, according the WG consensus.</t> <t>Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and clarify the algorithm identifier usage.</t> <t>Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1.</t> <t>Consolidated subsection for message digest algorithms.</t> <t>Text fixes.</t> </list></t> <t>draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-01: <list> <t>Changed titles and section names.</t> <t>Removed DSA after WG discussions.</t> <t>Updated shake OID names and parameters, added MGF1 section.</t> <t>Updated RSASSA-PSS section.</t> <t>Added Public key algorithm OIDs.</t> <t>Populated Introduction and IANA sections.</t> </list></t> <t>draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-00: <list> <t>Initial version</t> </list></t> </list></t> </section> <section title="Introduction">numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Introduction</name> <t><xreftarget="RFC3279"/>target="RFC3279" format="default"/> defines cryptographic algorithm identifiers for theInternet"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate RevocationListsList (CRL)profileProfile" <xreftarget="RFC5280"/>.target="RFC5280" format="default"/>. This document updatesRFC3279RFC 3279 and defines identifiers for several cryptographic algorithms that usevariable lengthvariable-length output SHAKE functions introduced in <xreftarget="SHA3"/>target="SHA3" format="default"/> which can be used with. </t>RFC 5280.</t> <t>In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions(SHAKEs),(SHAKEs) are defined: SHAKE128 andSHAKE256, are defined.SHAKE256. Four other hash function instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512, are also defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is avariable lengthvariable-length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the output is a d-bits-long digest of message M. The corresponding collision and second-preimage-resistance strengths for SHAKE128 aremin(d/2,128)min(d/2, 128) andmin(d,128)min(d, 128) bits, respectively(Appendix(see Appendix A.1 of <xreftarget="SHA3"/>).target="SHA3" format="default"/>). And the corresponding collision and second-preimage-resistance strengths for SHAKE256 aremin(d/2,256)min(d/2, 256) andmin(d,256)min(d, 256) bits, respectively.</t> <t>A SHAKE can be used as the message digest function (to hash themessage to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS <xref target="RFC8017"/> and ECDSA <xref target="X9.62"/> and as the hash in the mask generation function (MGF) in RSASSA-PSS. <!-- This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs to be used in X.509 and their meaning.--> </t> </section> <!-- This PI places the pagebreak correctly (before the section title) in the text output. --> <section anchor="terminology" title="Terminology"> <t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t> </section> <!-- Terminology --> <?rfc needLines="8" ?> <section title="Identifiers" anchor="oids"> <!-- Commention out the below OIDs as they are no longer pertinent for the below public keys and sigs --> <!-- The Object Identifiers (OIDs) for these two hash functions are defined in <xref target="shake-nist-oids"/> and are included here for convenience: </t> <t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[ id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 17 } ShakeOutputLen ::= INTEGER - - Output length in octets ]]></artwork></figure></t> <t>When using the id-shake128-len algorithm identifier, the parameters MUSTmessage to bepresent,signed) in RSA Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS) <xref target="RFC8017" format="default"/> andthey MUST employECDSA <xref target="X9.62" format="default"/> and as theShakeOutputLen --> <!-- "MUST employ syntax borrowed from RFC4055 --> <!-- syntax that contains an encoded positive integer value at least 32 in this specification.</t> <t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[ id-shake256-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 18 } ShakeOutputLen ::= INTEGER - - Output lengthhash inoctets ]]></artwork></figure></t> <t>When using the id-shake256-len algorithm identifier,theparameters MUSTmask generation function (MGF) in RSASSA-PSS. </t> </section> <section anchor="terminology" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Terminology</name> <t> The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to bepresent,interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, theyMUST employ the ShakeOutputLen --> <!-- "MUST employ syntax borrowed from RFC4055 --> <!-- syntax that contains an encoded positive integer value at least 64appear inthis specification.</t>all capitals, as shown here. </t> </section> <!-- Terminology --> <section anchor="oids" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Identifiers</name> <t>This section defines four new object identifiers (OIDs), for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with each of SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. The same algorithm identifiers can be used for identifying a public key in RSASSA-PSS.</t> <t>The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.</t><t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[ id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)TBD130 } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)TBD231 }]]></artwork></figure></t>]]></sourcecode> <t>The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs arebelow.</t> <t><list> <t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[below. </t> <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[ id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)TBD332 } id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)TBD4 } ]]></artwork></figure></t> </list></t> <!-- <xref target="RFC8017"/>, but we include it here as well for convenience:</t> <t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[ id-mgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 833 }]]></artwork></figure>--> <!-- <t>The parameters field associated with id-mgf1 MUST have a hashAlgorithm value that identifies the hash used with MGF1. To use SHAKE as this hash, this parameter MUST be id-shake128-len or id-shake256-len as specified in <xref target="xofs" /> above. </t>-->]]></sourcecode> <t>The parameters for the four identifiers aboveMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be absent. That is, the identifierSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be a SEQUENCE of onecomponent,component: the OID.</t><t><xref target="rsa-sigs"/><t>Sections <xref target="rsa-sigs" format="counter"/> and <xreftarget="ecdsa-sigs"/>target="ecdsa-sigs" format="counter"/> specify the required output length for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA. In summary, when hashing messages to be signed, output lengths of SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are 256 and 512bitsbits, respectively. When the SHAKEs are used asmask generation functionsMGFs in RSASSA-PSS, their output length is (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) or (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520) bits, respectively, where n is the RSA modulus size in bits.</t> </section> <sectiontitle="Usenumbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Use inPKIX">PKIX</name> <sectiontitle="Signatures" anchor="sigs">anchor="sigs" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Signatures</name> <t>Signatures are used in a number of different ASN.1 structures. As shown in the ASN.1 representation from <xreftarget="RFC5280"/>target="RFC5280" format="default"/> below, in an X.509 certificate, a signature is encoded with an algorithm identifier in the signatureAlgorithm attribute and a signatureValue attribute that contains the actual signature. </t><t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[ Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureValue BIT STRING }]]></artwork></figure></t>]]></sourcecode> <t>The identifiers defined in <xreftarget="oids"/>target="oids" format="default"/> can be used as the AlgorithmIdentifier in the signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence Certificate and the signature field in the sequence TBSCertificate in X.509 <xreftarget="RFC5280"/>.target="RFC5280" format="default"/>. The parameters of these signature algorithms areabsentabsent, as explained in <xreftarget="oids"/>.</t>target="oids" format="default"/>.</t> <t>ConformingCACertification Authority (CA) implementationsMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> specify the algorithms explicitly by using the OIDs specified in <xreftarget="oids"/>target="oids" format="default"/> when encoding RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates and CRLs. Conforming client implementations that process certificates and CRLs using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> recognize the corresponding OIDs. Encoding rules for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA signature values are specified in <xreftarget="RFC4055"/>target="RFC4055" format="default"/> and <xreftarget="RFC5480"/>,target="RFC5480" format="default"/>, respectively.</t> <t>When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus and ECDSA curve orderSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length. Refer to <xreftarget="Security"/>target="Security" format="default"/> for more details.</t> <sectiontitle="RSASSA-PSS Signatures" anchor="rsa-sigs">anchor="rsa-sigs" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>RSASSA-PSS Signatures</name> <t>The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in <xreftarget="RFC8017"/>.target="RFC8017" format="default"/>. When id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256specified(specified in <xreftarget="oids"/>target="oids" format="default"/>) is used, the encodingMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> omit the parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifierSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be a SEQUENCE of onecomponent,component: id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. <xreftarget="RFC4055"/>target="RFC4055" format="default"/> defines RSASSA-PSS-params thatareis used to define the algorithms and inputs to the algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the hash, mask generation algorithm,trailertrailer, and salt are embedded in the OID definition.</t> <t>The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash algorithm used as themask generation function <!-- "MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1)" <xref target="RFC8017"/> -->MGF in RSASSA-PSSMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be the same: both SHAKE128 or both SHAKE256. The output length of the hash algorithmwhichthat hashes the messageSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be 32 bytes (for SHAKE128) or 64 bytes (for SHAKE256). </t> <t>Themask generation functionMGF takes an octet string of variable length and a desired output length asinput,input and outputs an octet string of the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEsMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used natively as theMGF function,MGF, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that uses the hash function in multipleiterationsiterations, as specified inSection B.2.1 of<xreftarget="RFC8017"/>.target="RFC8017" section="B.2.1" sectionFormat="of"/>. In other words, the MGF is defined as<!-- <t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[ SHAKE128(mgfSeed, maskLen) ]]></artwork></figure> and <figure><artwork><![CDATA[ SHAKE256(mgfSeed, maskLen) ]]></artwork></figure></t> -->the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256, respectively. The mgfSeed is the seed from which the mask is generated, an octet string <xreftarget="RFC8017"/>.target="RFC8017" format="default"/>. As explained in Step 9 ofsection 9.1.1 of<xreftarget="RFC8017"/>,target="RFC8017" sectionFormat="of" section="9.1.1"/>, the output length of the MGF is emLen - hLen - 1 bytes. emLen is the maximum message length ceil((n-1)/8), where n is the RSA modulus in bits. hLen is 32 and64-bytes64 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256, respectively.ThusThus, when SHAKE is used as the MGF, the SHAKE output length maskLen is (8*emLen - 264) or (8*emLen - 520) bits, respectively. For example, when RSA modulus n is2048,2048 bits, the output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 1784 or1528-bits1528 bits when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used, respectively. </t> <t>The RSASSA-PSS saltLengthMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be 32 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or 64 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. Finally, the trailerFieldMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be 1, which represents thetrailer field with hexadecimal value 0xBC <xref target="RFC8017"/>.</t> <!-- <t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[ id-RSASSA-PSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 k } RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE { hashAlgorithm HashAlgorithm, maskGenAlgorithm MaskGenAlgorithm, saltLength INTEGER, trailerField INTEGER } ]]></artwork></figure></t> --> <!-- <section title="EdDSA with SHAKE"> <t>[ EDNOTE: For the group to decide: pre-hash version or non-prehash version EdDSAs. PureEdDSA, the pre-hashed version of EdDSA, as currently also proposed in draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures mandates the hash function as SHA512 for Ed25519 and SHAKE256(x,64) for Ed448. The HashEdDSA version of EdDSA does not define the hash. It is up to the WG to go the Pre-hash route which would require an OID that contained the hash. ] </t> <t> <list> <t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[ id-eddsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { } ]]></artwork></figure></t> <t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[ id-eddsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { } ]]></artwork></figure></t> </list></t> </section> -->trailer field with hexadecimal value 0xBC <xref target="RFC8017" format="default"/>.</t> </section> <sectiontitle="ECDSA Signatures" anchor="ecdsa-sigs">anchor="ecdsa-sigs" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>ECDSA Signatures</name> <t>The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in <xreftarget="X9.62"/>.target="X9.62" format="default"/>. When the id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256 (specified in <xreftarget="oids"/>)target="oids" format="default"/>) algorithm identifier appears, the respective SHAKE function (SHAKE128 or SHAKE256) is used as the hash. The encodingMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> omit the parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifierSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be a SEQUENCE of onecomponent,component: the OID id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256.</t> <t>For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standardspecification,specification <xref target="X9.62" format="default"/>, the output length of the hash function must be explicitly determined. The output length, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSAMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be 256 or 512 bits, respectively. </t> <t>Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates or CRLsSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> generate such signatures with a deterministically generated,non-randomnonrandom k in accordance with all the requirements specified in <xreftarget="RFC6979"/>. <!-- Sections 7.2 and 7.3 of <xref target="X9.62"/> or with all the requirements specified in Section 4.1.3 of <xref target="SEC1"/>. -->target="RFC6979" format="default"/>. TheyMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also generate such signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in <xreftarget="X9.62"/>target="X9.62" format="default"/> or <xreftarget="SEC1"/>target="SEC1" format="default"/> if they have a stated policy that requires conformance to those standards. Those standards have not specified SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64 octets, respectively, can be used instead of256256- and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as SHA256 and SHA512.</t><!-- <t>In Section 3.2 "Generation of k" of <xref target="RFC6979"/>, HMAC is used to derive the deterministic k. Conforming implementations that generate deterministic ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in X.509 MUST use KMAC with SHAKE128 or KMAC with SHAKE256 as specfied in <xref target="SP800-185"/> when SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 is used as the message hashing algorithm, respectively. In this situation, KMAC with SHAKE128 and KMAC with SHAKE256 have 256-bit and 512-bit outputs respectively, and the optional customization bit string S is an empty string.</t> --></section> </section> <sectiontitle="Public Keys">numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Public Keys</name> <t>Certificates conforming to <xreftarget="RFC5280"/>target="RFC5280" format="default"/> can convey a public key for any public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the public key algorithm through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier is an OIDandwith optionally associated parameters. The conventions and encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA<!-- and EdDSA -->publickeyskey algorithm identifiers are as specified inSection 2.3.1Sections <xref target="RFC3279" section="2.3.1" sectionFormat="bare"/> and2.3.5 of<xreftarget="RFC3279"/>, Section 3.1target="RFC3279" section="2.3.5" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xreftarget="RFC4055"/> and Section 2.1 oftarget="RFC3279" format="default"/>, <xreftarget="RFC5480"/>. <!--target="RFC4055" sectionFormat="of" section="3.1"/> and <xreftarget="I-D.josefsson-pkix-eddsa"/>--></t>target="RFC5480" sectionFormat="of" section="2.1"/>. </t> <t>Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to identify RSA public keys. The rsaEncryption object identifier continues to identify the subject public key when the RSA private key owner does not wish to limit the use of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs. When the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the AlgorithmIdentifiers for RSASSA-PSS defined in <xreftarget="oids"/> SHOULDtarget="oids" format="default"/> <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used as the algorithm field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo sequence <xreftarget="RFC5280"/>.target="RFC5280" format="default"/>. Conforming client implementations that process RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE public keys when processing certificates and CRLsMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> recognize the corresponding OIDs. </t> <t>Conforming CA implementationsMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> specify the X.509 public key algorithm explicitly by using the OIDs specified in <xreftarget="oids"/>target="oids" format="default"/> when encoding ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in certificates and CRLs. Conforming client implementations that process ECDSA with SHAKE public keys when processing certificates and CRLsMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> recognize the corresponding OIDs. </t> <t>The identifier parameters, as explained in <xreftarget="oids"/>, MUSTtarget="oids" format="default"/>, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be absent.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="IANA"title="IANA Considerations">numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>IANA Considerations</name> <t>One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in <xreftarget="asn"/> is requested fortarget="asn" format="default"/> has been assigned in theSMI"SMI Security for PKIX ModuleIdentifiersIdentifier" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0) registry: </t><texttable> <ttcol align='center'>Decimal</ttcol> <ttcol align='center'>Description</ttcol> <ttcol align='center'>References</ttcol> <c>TBD</c> <c>id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019</c> <c>[EDNOTE: THIS RFC]</c> </texttable><table align="center"> <thead> <tr> <th align="center">Decimal</th> <th align="center">Description</th> <th align="center">References</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td align="center">94</td> <td align="center">id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019</td> <td align="center">RFC 8692</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <t>IANAis requested to updatehas updated theSMI"SMI Security for PKIXAlgorithms <xref target="SMI-PKIX"/>Algorithms" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6) registry <xref target="SMI-PKIX" format="default"/> with four additional entries: </t><texttable> <ttcol align='center'>Decimal</ttcol> <ttcol align='center'>Description</ttcol> <ttcol align='center'>References</ttcol> <c>TBD1</c> <c>id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128</c> <c>[EDNOTE: THIS RFC]</c> <c>TBD2</c> <c>id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256</c> <c>[EDNOTE: THIS RFC]</c> <c>TBD3</c> <c>id-ecdsa-with-shake128</c> <c>[EDNOTE: THIS RFC]</c> <c>TBD4</c> <c>id-ecdsa-with-shake256</c> <c>[EDNOTE: THIS RFC]</c> </texttable><table align="center"> <thead> <tr> <th align="center">Decimal</th> <th align="center">Description</th> <th align="center">References</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td align="center">30</td> <td align="center">id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128</td> <td align="center">RFC 8692</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="center">31</td> <td align="center">id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256</td> <td align="center">RFC 8692</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="center">32</td> <td align="center">id-ecdsa-with-shake128</td> <td align="center">RFC 8692</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="center">33</td> <td align="center">id-ecdsa-with-shake256</td> <td align="center">RFC 8692</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <t>IANAis also requested to updatehas updated theHash"Hash Function TextualNames RegistryNames" registry <xreftarget="Hash-Texts"/>target="Hash-Texts" format="default"/> with two additional entries for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256: </t><texttable> <ttcol align='center'>Hash<table align="center"> <thead> <tr> <th align="center">Hash FunctionName</ttcol> <ttcol align='center'>OID</ttcol> <ttcol align='center'>Reference</ttcol> <c>shake128</c> <c>2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.11</c> <c>[EDNOTE: THIS RFC]</c> <c>shake256</c> <c>2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.12</c> <c>[EDNOTE: THIS RFC]</c> </texttable>Name</th> <th align="center">OID</th> <th align="center">Reference</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td align="center">shake128</td> <td align="center">2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.11</td> <td align="center">RFC 8692</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="center">shake256</td> <td align="center">2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.12</td> <td align="center">RFC 8692</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </section> <section anchor="Security"title="Security Considerations">numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Security Considerations</name> <t>This document updates <xreftarget="RFC3279"/>.target="RFC3279" format="default"/>. Thesecurity considerationsSecurity Considerations section ofthat document applies to this specification as well.</t> <t>NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in Special Publications (SPs) <xref target="SP800-78-4"/> and <xref target="SP800-107"/>. These documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes for various security scenarios. </t> <!-- <t>The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic function, executing multiple times with the same input will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from running a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times. The shorter of any two outputs produced from a SHAKE with the same input is a prefix of the longer one. It is a similar situation as truncating a 512-bit output of SHA-512 by taking its 256 left-most bits. These 256 left-most bits are a prefix of the 512-bit output.</t> --> <!-- <t>Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of the signer's private key permits masquerade attacks.</t> --> <!-- <t>Implementations must randomly generate one-time values, suchthat document applies to this specification asthe k value when generating a ECDSA signature. In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs relies on random numbers. Thewell.</t> <t>NIST has defined appropriate use ofinadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate such cryptographic values can resultthe hash functions inlittle or no security. The generationterms ofquality random numbers is difficult. <xref target="RFC4086"/> offers important guidance in this area,the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in Special Publications (SPs) <xreftarget="SP800-90A"/> series provide acceptable PRNGs.</t> --> <!-- <t>Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developedtarget="SP800-78-4" format="default"/> andcomputing power increases, the work factor or time required to break a particular cryptographic algorithm may decrease. Therefore, cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should<xref target="SP800-107" format="default"/>. These documents can bepreparedused as guides toregularly update the set of algorithms in their implementations.</t> -->choose appropriate key sizes for various security scenarios. </t> <t>SHAKE128 with output length of256-bits256 bits offers128-bits128 bits of collision and preimage resistance. Thus, SHAKE128 OIDs in this specification areRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> with20482048- (112-bit security) or 3072-bit(128-bit security) RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256-bits (128-bit security). SHAKE256 with 512-bits output length offers 256-bits of collision and preimage resistance. Thus, the SHAKE256 OIDs in this specification are RECOMMENDED with 4096-bit RSA modulus or higher or curves with group order of at least 521-bits (256-bit security). Note that we recommended 4096-bit RSA because we would need 15360-bit modulus for 256-bits of security which is impractical for today's technology.</t> </section> <!-- Possibly a 'Contributors' section ... --> <section anchor="Acknowledgements" title="Acknowledgements"> <t>We would like to thank Sean Turner, Jim Schaad and Eric Rescorla for their valuable contributions to this document.</t> <t>The authors would like to thank Russ Housley for his guidance and very valuable contributions with the ASN.1 module.</t> </section> </middle> <!-- *****BACK MATTER ***** --> <back> <!-- References split into informative and normative --> <!-- There are 2 ways to insert reference entries from the citation libraries: 1. define an ENTITY at the top, and use "ampersand character"RFC2629; here (as shown) 2. simply use(128-bit security) RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256 bits (128-bit security). SHAKE256 with aPI "less than character"?rfc include="reference.RFC.2119.xml"?> here (for I-Ds: include="reference.I-D.narten-iana-considerations-rfc2434bis.xml") Both are cited textually in the same manner: by using xref elements. If you use512-bit output length offers 256 bits of collision and preimage resistance. Thus, thePI option, xml2rfc will, by default, try to find included filesSHAKE256 OIDs inthe same directory as the including file. You can also define the XML_LIBRARY environment variablethis specification are <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> with 4096-bit RSA modulus or higher or curves with avalue containing a setgroup order ofdirectories to search. These can be either inat least 512 bits, such as thelocal filing system or remote ones accessed by http (http://domain/dir/... ).--> <references title="Normative References"> <!--?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"?--> &RFC2119; &RFC3279; &RFC8174; <!-- &RFC3280; --> &RFC4055; &RFC5280; &RFC5480; &RFC8017; <!-- RFC8017 is Informational draft butNIST Curve P-521 (256-bit security). Note that weare keeping it in the Normative References even though idnits complainsrecommended a 4096-bit RSA because we would need anormative reference15360-bit modulus forRSASSA-PSS. RFC4056 does the same thing with RSASS-PSS v2.1 -->256 bits of security, which is impractical for today's technology.</t> </section> </middle> <!--<?rfc include="http://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml-ids/reference.I-D.draft-josefsson-pkix-eddsa-04.xml"?>*****BACK MATTER ***** --> <back> <references> <name>References</name> <references> <name>Normative References</name> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3279.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4055.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5480.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8017.xml"/> <referenceanchor="SHA3" target="https://www.nist.gov/publications/sha-3-standard-permutation-based-hash-and-extendable-output-functions">anchor="SHA3"> <front><title>SHA-3 Standard -<title> SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output FunctionsFIPS PUB 202</title></title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202"/> <seriesInfo name="FIPS PUB" value="202"/> <author><organization>National<organization> National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST)</organization></organization> </author> <datemonth="August"year="2015"/>month="August"/> </front> </reference> </references><references title="Informative References"> <!-- Here we use entities that we defined at the beginning. --> <!--&RFC2629; --> &RFC5912; &RFC6979; <!-- &RFC4086; --> <!--<reference anchor="shake-nist-oids" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-Register/Algorithm-Registration"> <front> <title>Computer Security Objects Register</title> <author> <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization> </author> <date month="October" year="2017" /> </front> </reference> --><references> <name>Informative References</name> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5912.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6979.xml"/> <reference anchor="SEC1" target="http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf"> <front> <title>SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography</title> <author> <organization>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group</organization> </author> <date month="May"year="2009" />year="2009"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="X9.62"> <front><title>X9.62-2005: Public<title>Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry:Thethe Elliptic Curve Digital SignatureStandardAlgorithm (ECDSA)</title> <seriesInfo name="ANSI" value="X9.62"/> <author><organization>American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI)</organization><organization>ANSI</organization> </author> <datemonth="November" year="2005" />year="2005"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="SP800-78-4"target="https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800-78/4/final/documents/sp800_78-4_revised_draft.pdf">target="http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-78-4"> <front><title>SP800-78-4: Cryptographic<title>Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-78-4"/> <seriesInfo name="NIST Special Publication (SP)" value="800-78-4"/> <author> <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)</organization> </author> <date month="May"year="2014" />year="2015"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="SMI-PKIX"target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6">target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers"> <front> <title>SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms</title> <author> <organization>IANA</organization> </author><date month="March" year="2019" /><date/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="Hash-Texts"target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/hash-function-text-names/hash-function-text-names.xhtml">target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/hash-function-text-names/"> <front> <title>Hash Function Textual Names</title> <author> <organization>IANA</organization> </author><date month="July" year="2017" /><date/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="SP800-107"target="https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800-107/rev-1/final/documents/draft_revised_sp800-107.pdf">target="http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-107r1"> <front><title>SP800-107: Recommendation<title>Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-107r1"/> <seriesInfo name="Revision" value="1"/> <seriesInfo name="NIST Special Publication (SP)" value="800-107"/> <author> <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)</organization> </author> <datemonth="May" year="2014" /> </front> </reference> <!-- <reference anchor="SP800-90A" target="http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf"> <front> <title>Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A</title> <author> <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization> </author> <date month="June" year="2015" /> </front> </reference> --> <!-- <reference anchor="SP800-185" target="http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-185.pdf"> <front> <title>SHA-3 Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and ParallelHash. NIST SP 800-185</title> <author> <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization> </author> <date month="December" year="2016" />month="August" year="2012"/> </front> </reference>--></references> </references> <section anchor="asn"title="ASN.1 module">numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>ASN.1 Module</name> <t>This appendix includes the ASN.1 module for SHAKEs in X.509. This module does not come from any previously existing RFC.</t> <t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[This module references <xref target="RFC5912" format="default"/>.</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[ PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2019 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019(TBD)id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019(94) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN -- EXPORTS ALL; IMPORTS -- FROM[RFC5912]RFC 5912 PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) } -- FROM[RFC5912]RFC 5912 RSAPublicKey, rsaEncryption, pk-rsa, pk-ec, CURVE, id-ecPublicKey, ECPoint, ECParameters, ECDSA-Sig-Value FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } ; -- -- Message Digest Algorithms (mda-) -- DigestAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { -- This expands DigestAlgorithms from[RFC5912]RFC 5912 mda-shake128 | mda-shake256, ... } -- -- One-Way Hash Functions -- -- SHAKE128 mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes. } id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) 11 } -- SHAKE256 mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes. } id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) 12 } -- -- Public Key (pk-) Algorithms -- PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= { -- This expands PublicKeys from[RFC5912]RFC 5912 pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256, ... } -- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128 -- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128 -- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length -- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) bits, where n is the RSA -- modulus in bits. -- The saltLength is 32. The trailerField is 1. pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 KEY RSAPublicKey PARAMS ARE absent -- Private key format not in this module -- CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyCertSign, cRLSign } } -- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256 -- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256 -- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length -- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520)-bits, where n is the RSA -- modulus in bits. -- The saltLength is 64. The trailerField is 1. pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 KEY RSAPublicKey PARAMS ARE absent -- Private key format not in this module -- CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyCertSign, cRLSign } } -- -- Signature Algorithms (sa-) -- SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { -- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from[RFC5912]RFC 5912 sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 | sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 | sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 | sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256, ... } -- -- SMIME Capabilities (sa-) -- SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= { -- The expands SMimeCaps from[RFC5912]RFC 5912 sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps | sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps | sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps | sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps, ... } -- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE128 sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 PARAMS ARE absent -- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128 -- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128 -- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length -- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) bits, where n is the RSA -- modulus in bits. -- The saltLength is 32. The trailerField is 1 HASHES { mda-shake128 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 } } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)TBD130 } -- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE256 sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 PARAMS ARE absent -- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256 -- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256 -- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length -- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520)-bits, where n is the -- RSA modulus in bits. -- The saltLength is 64. The trailerField is 1. HASHES { mda-shake256 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 } } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)TBD231 } -- ECDSA with SHAKE128 sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake128 VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value PARAMS ARE absent HASHES { mda-shake128 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake128 } } id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)TBD332 } -- ECDSA with SHAKE256 sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake256 VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value PARAMS ARE absent HASHES { mda-shake256 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake256 } } id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)TBD433 } END]]></artwork></figure> </t>]]></sourcecode> </section> <section anchor="Acknowledgements" numbered="false" toc="default"> <name>Acknowledgements</name> <t>We would like to thank Sean Turner, Jim Schaad, and Eric Rescorla for their valuable contributions to this document.</t> <t>The authors would like to thank Russ Housley for his guidance and very valuable contributions with the ASN.1 module.</t> </section> </back> </rfc>