IPSECME
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. Migault
Internet-Draft
Request for Comments: 8750 Ericsson
Intended status:
Category: Standards Track T. Guggemos
Expires: April 23, 2020
ISSN: 2070-1721 LMU Munich
Y. Nir
Dell EMC
October 21, 2019 Technologies
March 2020
Implicit IV Initialization Vector (IV) for Counter-based Counter-Based Ciphers in
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv-11
Abstract
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) sends an initialization vector
(IV) in each packet. The size of the IV depends on the applied
transform, being
transform and is usually 8 or 16 octets for the transforms defined by at
the time this document is was written. Some algorithms When used with IPsec, some
algorithms, such as AES-GCM,
AES-CCM AES-CCM, and ChaCha20-Poly1305 when used with IPsec, ChaCha20-Poly1305, take the
IV to generate a nonce that is used as an input parameter for
encrypting and decrypting. This IV must be unique but can be
predictable. As a result, the value provided in the ESP Sequence
Number (SN) can be used instead to generate the nonce. This avoids
sending the IV
itself, itself and saves 8 octets per packet in the case of
AES-GCM, AES-CCM AES-CCM, and
ChaCha20-Poly1305 8 octets per packet. ChaCha20-Poly1305. This document describes how
to do this.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 23, 2020.
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8750.
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Table of Contents
1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Notation
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Implicit IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. IKEv2 Initiator Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. IKEv2 Responder Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10.1.
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10.2.
9.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described BCP 14
[RFC2119], [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Introduction
Counter-based AES modes of operation such as AES-CCM ([RFC4309]), [RFC4309] and
AES-GCM ([RFC4106]) [RFC4106] require the specification of an a nonce for each ESP
packet. The same applies for ChaCha20-Poly1305 ([RFC7634]).
Currently [RFC7634].
Currently, this nonce is generated thanks to the Initialization Vector initialization
vector (IV) provided in each ESP packet ([RFC4303]). [RFC4303]. This practice is
designated in this document as "explicit IV".
In some contexts, such as IoT, the Internet of Things (IoT), it may be
preferable to avoid carrying the extra bytes associated to the IV and
instead generate it locally on each peer. The local generation of
the IV is designated in this document as "implicit IV".
The size of this IV depends on the specific algorithm, but all of the
algorithms mentioned above take an 8-octet IV.
This document defines how to compute the IV locally when it is
implicit. It also specifies how peers agree with the Internet Key
Exchange version 2 (IKEv2 - [RFC7296]) (IKEv2) [RFC7296] on using an implicit IV versus
an explicit IV.
This document limits its scope to the algorithms mentioned above.
Other algorithms with similar properties may later be defined to use
similar mechanisms.
This document does not consider AES-CBC ([RFC3602]) [RFC3602], as AES-CBC
requires the IV to be unpredictable. Deriving it directly from the
packet counter as described below is insecure insecure, as mentioned in
Security Consideration
Section 6 of [RFC3602] [RFC3602], and has led to real world real-world chosen
plain-text attack plaintext
attacks such as BEAST [BEAST].
This document does not consider AES-CTR [RFC3686] [RFC3686], as it focuses on
the recommended AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)
suites provided in [RFC8221].
2. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Terminology
o
IoT: Internet of Things.
o Things
IV: Initialization Vector.
o Vector
IIV: Implicit Initialization Vector.
o Vector
Nonce: a A fixed-size octet string used only once. In our case, the
nonce takes this document,
the IV as input and is provided as an used to generate the nonce input parameter for the
encryption/decryption.
4. Implicit IV
With the algorithms listed in Section 2, 1, the 8-byte IV MUST NOT
repeat for a given key. The binding between an ESP packet and its IV
is provided using the Sequence Number or the Extended Sequence
Number. Figure Figures 1 and Figure 2 represent the IV with a regular 4-byte
Sequence Number and with an 8-byte Extended Sequence Number Number, respectively.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Zero |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Implicit IV with a 4 byte 4-Byte Sequence Number
o
Sequence Number: the 4 byte
The 4-byte Sequence Number carried in the ESP packet.
o
Zero: a 4 byte
A 4-byte array with all bits set to zero.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Extended |
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Implicit IV with an 8-byte 8-Byte Extended Sequence Number
o
Extended Sequence Number: the
The 8-byte Extended Sequence Number of the Security Association.
The 4 byte low order four low-order bytes are carried in the ESP packet.
This document solely defines the IV generation of the algorithms
defined in [RFC4106] for AES-GCM, [RFC4309] for AES-CCM AES-CCM, and
[RFC7634] for ChaCha20-Poly1305. All other aspects and parameters of
those algorithms are unchanged, unchanged and are used as defined in their
respective specifications.
5. IKEv2 Initiator Behavior
An initiator supporting this feature SHOULD propose implicit IV (IIV)
algorithms in the Transform Type 1 (Encryption Algorithm)
Substructure of the Proposal Substructure inside the Security
Association Payload (SA Payload) (SA) payload in the IKEv2 Exchange. To facilitate
backward compatibility with non-supporting peers peers, the initiator
SHOULD also include those same algorithms with explicit IV as
separate transforms.
6. IKEv2 Responder Behavior
The rules of SA Payload payload processing require that the responder picks pick
its algorithms from the proposal sent by the initiator, thus this will
ensure ensuring
that the responder will never send an SA payload containing the IIV
transform to an initiator that did not propose it.
7. Security Considerations
Nonce generation for these algorithms has not been explicitly
defined. It has been left to the implementation as long as certain
security requirements are met. Typically, for AES-GCM, AES-CCM AES-CCM, and
ChaCha20-Poly1305, the IV is not allowed to be repeated for one
particular key. This document provides an explicit and normative way
to generate IVs. The mechanism described in this document meets the
IV security requirements of all relevant algorithms.
As the IV must not repeat for one SA when Counter-Mode ciphers are
used, implicit IV as described in this document MUST NOT be used in
setups with the chance that the Sequence Number overlaps for one SA.
The sender's counter and the receiver's counter MUST be reset (by
establishing a new SA and thus a new key) prior to the transmission
of the 2^32nd packet for an SA that uses a non extended Sequence
Number (respectively the 2^64nd 2^32nd packet for an SA that does not use an Extended Sequence
Number and prior to the transmission of the 2^64th packet for an SA
that uses does use an Extended Sequence Number). Number. This prevents sequence number Sequence
Number overlaps for the mundane point-to-point case. Multicast as
described in [RFC5374], [RFC6407] [RFC6407], and [I-D.yeung-g-ikev2] [G-IKEv2] is a prominent example,
where
example in which many senders share one secret and thus one SA. As
such,
Implicit implicit IV may only be used with Multicast if some mechanisms
are employed that prevent the Sequence Number to overlap from overlapping for
one SA,
otherwise Implicit SA; otherwise, implicit IV MUST NOT be used with Multicast.
This document defines three new encryption transforms that use
implicit IV. Unlike most encryption transforms defined to date,
which can be used for both ESP and IKEv2, these transforms are
defined for ESP only and cannot be used in IKEv2. The reason for
this is that IKEv2 messages don't contain a unique per-message value
that can be used for IV generation. The Message-ID field in the
IKEv2 header is similar to the SN field in the ESP header, but recent
IKEv2 extensions
([RFC6311], [RFC7383]) [RFC6311] [RFC7383] do allow it to repeat, so there
is not an easy way to derive unique IV from IKEv2 header fields.
8. IANA Considerations
The
IANA has updated the "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
Parameters" registry [RFC7296] by adding the following new code
points to the "Transform Type Values"/"Transform Type 1 - Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs"
subregistry under the "Transform Type Values" registry [IANA]:
- ENCR_AES_CCM_8_IIV: 29
- ENCR_AES_GCM_16_IIV: 30
- ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305_IIV: 31
These algorithms should be added with this document as
+--------+----------------------------+---------------+-----------+
| Number | Name | ESP Reference
and "Not Allowed" for | IKEv2 Reference.
9. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Valery Smyslov, Eric Vyncke, Alexey Melnikov,
Adam Roach, Magnus Nystrom (security directorate), as well as our
three Security ADs Eric Rescorla, Benjamin Kaduk and Roman Danyliw
for their valuable comments. We also would like |
| | | | Reference |
+========+============================+===============+===========+
| 29 | ENCR_AES_CCM_8_IIV | RFC 8750 | Not |
| | | | allowed |
+--------+----------------------------+---------------+-----------+
| 30 | ENCR_AES_GCM_16_IIV | RFC 8750 | Not |
| | | | allowed |
+--------+----------------------------+---------------+-----------+
| 31 | ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305_IIV | RFC 8750 | Not |
| | | | allowed |
+--------+----------------------------+---------------+-----------+
Table 1: Additions to thank David
Schinazi for its implementation, as well as the ipseceme chairs Tero
Kivinen and David Waltermire for moving this work forward.
NOTE TO THE EDITOR Eric has a accent on E and Magnus has double
points on o.
10. "Transform Type 1 - Encryption Algorithm
Transform IDs" Registry
9. References
10.1.
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3602] Frankel, S., Glenn, R., and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC Cipher
Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec", RFC 3602,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3602, September 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3602>.
[RFC3686] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP)", RFC 3686, DOI 10.17487/RFC3686, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3686>.
[RFC4106] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4106, DOI 10.17487/RFC4106, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4106>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC4309] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM
Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4309, DOI 10.17487/RFC4309, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4309>.
[RFC5374] Weis, B., Gross, G., and D. Ignjatic, "Multicast
Extensions to the Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol", RFC 5374, DOI 10.17487/RFC5374, November 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5374>.
[RFC6311] Singh, R., Ed., Kalyani, G., Nir, Y., Sheffer, Y., and D.
Zhang, "Protocol Support for High Availability of IKEv2/
IPsec", RFC 6311, DOI 10.17487/RFC6311, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6311>.
[RFC6407] Weis, B., Rowles, S., and T. Hardjono, "The Group Domain
of Interpretation", RFC 6407, DOI 10.17487/RFC6407,
October 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6407>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC7383] Smyslov, V., "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2) Message Fragmentation", RFC 7383,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7383, November 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7383>.
[RFC7634] Nir, Y., "ChaCha20, Poly1305, and Their Use in the
Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) and IPsec", RFC 7634,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7634, August 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7634>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8221] Wouters, P., Migault, D., Mattsson, J., Nir, Y., and T.
Kivinen, "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 8221,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8221, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8221>.
10.2.
9.2. Informational References
[BEAST] Thai, Duong, T. and J. Juliano, Rizzo, "Here Come The xor Ninjas", , May
2011, <https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/266529975_Here_Come_The_Ninjas>.
[I-D.yeung-g-ikev2]
[G-IKEv2] Weis, B. and V. Smyslov, "Group Key Management using
IKEv2", draft-yeung-g-ikev2-16 (work Work in progress), July
2019. Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
ipsecme-g-ikev2-00, 8 January 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-
g-ikev2-00>.
[IANA] "IANA IKEv2 Parameter - Type 1 - Encryption Algorithm
Transform IDs", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-
parameters/ikev2-parameters.xhtml#ikev2-parameters-5>. IANA, "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
Parameters",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters>.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Valery Smyslov, Éric Vyncke, Alexey Melnikov,
Adam Roach, and Magnus Nyström (security directorate) as well as our
three Security ADs -- Eric Rescorla, Benjamin Kaduk, and Roman
Danyliw -- for their valuable comments. We also would like to thank
David Schinazi for his implementation as well as Tero Kivinen and
David Waltermire (the IPSECME Chairs) for moving this work forward.
Authors' Addresses
Daniel Migault
Ericsson
8275 Trans Canada Route
Saint Laurent, Laurent QC H4S 0B6
Canada
Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com
Tobias Guggemos
LMU Munich
Oettingenstr. 67
80538 Munich, Bavaria Munich
Germany
Email: guggemos@mnm-team.org guggemos@nm.ifi.lmu.de
URI: http://mnm-team.org/~guggemos
Yoav Nir
Dell EMC Technologies
9 Andrei Sakharov St
Haifa 3190500
Israel
Email: ynir.ietf@gmail.com