rfc8928v6.txt		rfc8928.txt
	skipping to change at line 913 ¶		skipping to change at line 913 ¶
	network may form many addresses and register them using AP-ND.		network may form many addresses and register them using AP-ND.
	The perimeter of the attack is all the 6LRs in range of the		The perimeter of the attack is all the 6LRs in range of the
	attacker. The 6LR MUST protect itself against overflows and		attacker. The 6LR MUST protect itself against overflows and
	reject excessive registration with a status code of 2 "Neighbor		reject excessive registration with a status code of 2 "Neighbor
	Cache Full". This effectively blocks another (honest) 6LN from		Cache Full". This effectively blocks another (honest) 6LN from
	registering to the same 6LR, but the 6LN may register to other		registering to the same 6LR, but the 6LN may register to other
	6LRs that are in its range but not in that of the attacker.		6LRs that are in its range but not in that of the attacker.
	7.3. Related to 6LoWPAN ND		7.3. Related to 6LoWPAN ND
	The threats and mediations discussed in 6LoWPAN ND [RFC6775]		The threats and mitigations discussed in 6LoWPAN ND [RFC6775]
	[RFC8505] also apply here, in particular, denial-of-service (DoS)		[RFC8505] also apply here, in particular, denial-of-service (DoS)
	attacks against the registry at the 6LR or 6LBR.		attacks against the registry at the 6LR or 6LBR.
	Secure ND [RFC3971] forces the IPv6 address to be cryptographic since		Secure ND [RFC3971] forces the IPv6 address to be cryptographic since
	it integrates the CGA as the IID in the IPv6 address. In contrast,		it integrates the CGA as the IID in the IPv6 address. In contrast,
	this specification saves about 1 KB in every NS/NA message. Also,		this specification saves about 1 KB in every NS/NA message. Also,
	this specification separates the cryptographic identifier from the		this specification separates the cryptographic identifier from the
	registered IPv6 address so that a node can have more than one IPv6		registered IPv6 address so that a node can have more than one IPv6
	address protected by the same cryptographic identifier.		address protected by the same cryptographic identifier.
	skipping to change at line 1224 ¶		skipping to change at line 1224 ¶
	[breaking-ed25519]		[breaking-ed25519]
	Samwel, N., Batina, L., Bertoni, G., Daemen, J., and R.		Samwel, N., Batina, L., Bertoni, G., Daemen, J., and R.
	Susella, "Breaking Ed25519 in WolfSSL", Topics in		Susella, "Breaking Ed25519 in WolfSSL", Topics in
	Cryptology - CT-RSA, pp. 1-20, March 2018,		Cryptology - CT-RSA, pp. 1-20, March 2018,
	<https://link.springer.com/		<https://link.springer.com/
	chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-76953-0_1>.		chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-76953-0_1>.
	[CURVE-REPR]		[CURVE-REPR]
	Struik, R., "Alternative Elliptic Curve Representations",		Struik, R., "Alternative Elliptic Curve Representations",
	Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lwig-curve-		Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lwig-curve-
	representations-13, 2 November 2020,		representations-14, 15 November 2020,
	<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lwig-curve-		<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lwig-curve-
	representations-13>.		representations-14>.
	[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",		[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
	RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005,		RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3972>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3972>.
	[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,		[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
	"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,		"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,		DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.
	skipping to change at line 1478 ¶		skipping to change at line 1478 ¶
	(=0x20ae19a1 b8a086b4 e01edd2c 7748d14c 923d4d7e 6d7c61b2 29e9c5a2		(=0x20ae19a1 b8a086b4 e01edd2c 7748d14c 923d4d7e 6d7c61b2 29e9c5a2
	7eced3d9)		7eced3d9)
	Acknowledgments		Acknowledgments
	Many thanks to Charlie Perkins for his in-depth review and		Many thanks to Charlie Perkins for his in-depth review and
	constructive suggestions. The authors are also especially grateful		constructive suggestions. The authors are also especially grateful
	to Robert Moskowitz and Benjamin Kaduk for their comments and		to Robert Moskowitz and Benjamin Kaduk for their comments and
	discussions that led to many improvements. The authors wish to also		discussions that led to many improvements. The authors wish to also
	thank Shwetha Bhandari for actively shepherding this document and		thank Shwetha Bhandari for actively shepherding this document and
	Roman Danyliw, Alissa Cooper, Mirja Kuehlewind, Eric Vyncke, Vijay		Roman Danyliw, Alissa Cooper, Mirja Kühlewind, Éric Vyncke, Vijay
	Gurbani, Al Morton, and Adam Montville for their constructive reviews		Gurbani, Al Morton, and Adam Montville for their constructive reviews
	during the IESG process. Finally, many thanks to our INT area ADs,		during the IESG process. Finally, many thanks to our INT area ADs,
	Suresh Krishnan and Erik Kline, who supported us along the whole		Suresh Krishnan and Erik Kline, who supported us along the whole
	process.		process.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Pascal Thubert (editor)		Pascal Thubert (editor)
	Cisco Systems, Inc.		Cisco Systems, Inc.
	Building D		Building D
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