Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Thomson, Ed.
Request for Comments: 9001 Mozilla
Category: Standards Track S. Turner, Ed.
ISSN: 2070-1721 sn3rd
April
May 2021
Using TLS to Secure QUIC
Abstract
This document describes how Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used to
secure QUIC.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9001.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Notational Conventions
2.1. TLS Overview
3. Protocol Overview
4. Carrying TLS Messages
4.1. Interface to TLS
4.1.1. Handshake Complete
4.1.2. Handshake Confirmed
4.1.3. Sending and Receiving Handshake Messages
4.1.4. Encryption Level Changes
4.1.5. TLS Interface Summary
4.2. TLS Version
4.3. ClientHello Size
4.4. Peer Authentication
4.5. Session Resumption
4.6. 0-RTT
4.6.1. Enabling 0-RTT
4.6.2. Accepting and Rejecting 0-RTT
4.6.3. Validating 0-RTT Configuration
4.7. HelloRetryRequest
4.8. TLS Errors
4.9. Discarding Unused Keys
4.9.1. Discarding Initial Keys
4.9.2. Discarding Handshake Keys
4.9.3. Discarding 0-RTT Keys
5. Packet Protection
5.1. Packet Protection Keys
5.2. Initial Secrets
5.3. AEAD Usage
5.4. Header Protection
5.4.1. Header Protection Application
5.4.2. Header Protection Sample
5.4.3. AES-Based Header Protection
5.4.4. ChaCha20-Based Header Protection
5.5. Receiving Protected Packets
5.6. Use of 0-RTT Keys
5.7. Receiving Out-of-Order Protected Packets
5.8. Retry Packet Integrity
6. Key Update
6.1. Initiating a Key Update
6.2. Responding to a Key Update
6.3. Timing of Receive Key Generation
6.4. Sending with Updated Keys
6.5. Receiving with Different Keys
6.6. Limits on AEAD Usage
6.7. Key Update Error Code
7. Security of Initial Messages
8. QUIC-Specific Adjustments to the TLS Handshake
8.1. Protocol Negotiation
8.2. QUIC Transport Parameters Extension
8.3. Removing the EndOfEarlyData Message
8.4. Prohibit TLS Middlebox Compatibility Mode
9. Security Considerations
9.1. Session Linkability
9.2. Replay Attacks with 0-RTT
9.3. Packet Reflection Attack Mitigation
9.4. Header Protection Analysis
9.5. Header Protection Timing Side Channels
9.6. Key Diversity
9.7. Randomness
10. IANA Considerations
11. References
11.1. Normative References
11.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Sample Packet Protection
A.1. Keys
A.2. Client Initial
A.3. Server Initial
A.4. Retry
A.5. ChaCha20-Poly1305 Short Header Packet
Appendix B. AEAD Algorithm Analysis
B.1. Analysis of AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM Usage
Limits
B.1.1. Confidentiality Limit
B.1.2. Integrity Limit
B.2. Analysis of AEAD_AES_128_CCM Usage Limits
Contributors
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
This document describes how QUIC [RFC9000] [QUIC-TRANSPORT] is secured using
TLS [TLS13].
TLS 1.3 provides critical latency improvements for connection
establishment over previous versions. Absent packet loss, most new
connections can be established and secured within a single round
trip; on subsequent connections between the same client and server,
the client can often send application data immediately, that is,
using a zero round-trip setup.
This document describes how TLS acts as a security component of QUIC.
2. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document uses the terminology established in [RFC9000]. [QUIC-TRANSPORT].
For brevity, the acronym TLS is used to refer to TLS 1.3, though a
newer version could be used; see Section 4.2.
2.1. TLS Overview
TLS provides two endpoints with a way to establish a means of
communication over an untrusted medium (for example, the Internet).
TLS enables authentication of peers and provides confidentiality and
integrity protection for messages that endpoints exchange.
Internally, TLS is a layered protocol, with the structure shown in
Figure 1.
+-------------+------------+--------------+---------+
Content | | | Application | |
Layer | Handshake | Alerts | Data | ... |
| | | | |
+-------------+------------+--------------+---------+
Record | |
Layer | Records |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------+
Figure 1: TLS Layers
Each content-layer message (e.g., Handshake, Alerts, handshake, alerts, and Application
Data) application
data) is carried as a series of typed TLS records by the record
layer. Records are individually cryptographically protected and then
transmitted over a reliable transport (typically TCP), which provides
sequencing and guaranteed delivery.
The TLS authenticated key exchange occurs between two endpoints:
client and server. The client initiates the exchange and the server
responds. If the key exchange completes successfully, both client
and server will agree on a secret. TLS supports both pre-shared key
(PSK) and Diffie-Hellman over either finite fields or elliptic curves
((EC)DHE) key exchanges. PSK is the basis for Early Data (0-RTT);
the latter provides forward secrecy (FS) when the (EC)DHE keys are
destroyed. The two modes can also be combined to provide forward
secrecy while using the PSK for authentication.
After completing the TLS handshake, the client will have learned and
authenticated an identity for the server, and the server is
optionally able to learn and authenticate an identity for the client.
TLS supports X.509 [RFC5280] certificate-based authentication for
both server and client. When PSK key exchange is used (as in
resumption), knowledge of the PSK serves to authenticate the peer.
The TLS key exchange is resistant to tampering by attackers, and it
produces shared secrets that cannot be controlled by either
participating peer.
TLS provides two basic handshake modes of interest to QUIC:
* A full 1-RTT handshake, in which the client is able to send
Application Data
application data after one round trip and the server immediately
responds after receiving the first handshake message from the
client.
* A 0-RTT handshake, in which the client uses information it has
previously learned about the server to send Application Data application data
immediately. This Application Data application data can be replayed by an
attacker, so 0-RTT is not suitable for carrying instructions that
might initiate any action that could cause unwanted effects if
replayed.
A simplified TLS handshake with 0-RTT application data is shown in
Figure 2.
Client Server
ClientHello
(0-RTT Application Data) -------->
ServerHello
{EncryptedExtensions}
{Finished}
<-------- [Application Data]
{Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
() Indicates messages protected by Early Data (0-RTT) Keys
{} Indicates messages protected using Handshake Keys
[] Indicates messages protected using Application Data
(1-RTT) Keys
Figure 2: TLS Handshake with 0-RTT
Figure 2 omits the EndOfEarlyData message, which is not used in QUIC;
see Section 8.3. Likewise, neither ChangeCipherSpec nor KeyUpdate
messages are used by QUIC. ChangeCipherSpec is redundant in TLS 1.3;
see Section 8.4. QUIC has its own key update mechanism; see
Section 6.
Data is protected using a number of encryption levels:
* Initial Keys keys
* Early Data data (0-RTT) Keys keys
* Handshake Keys keys
* Application Data data (1-RTT) Keys keys
Application Data may appear data can only appear in the early data and Application
Data application
data levels. Handshake and alert messages may appear in any level.
The 0-RTT handshake can be used if the client and server have
previously communicated. In the 1-RTT handshake, the client is
unable to send protected Application Data application data until it has received all
of the handshake messages sent by the server.
3. Protocol Overview
QUIC [RFC9000] [QUIC-TRANSPORT] assumes responsibility for the confidentiality
and integrity protection of packets. For this it uses keys derived
from a TLS handshake [TLS13], but instead of carrying TLS records
over QUIC (as with TCP), TLS handshake and alert messages are carried
directly over the QUIC transport, which takes over the
responsibilities of the TLS record layer, as shown in Figure 3.
+--------------+--------------+ +-------------+
| TLS | TLS | | QUIC |
| Handshake | Alerts | | Applications|
| | | | (h3, etc.) |
+--------------+--------------+-+-------------+
| |
| QUIC Transport |
| (streams, reliability, congestion, etc.) |
| |
+---------------------------------------------+
| |
| QUIC Packet Protection |
| |
+---------------------------------------------+
Figure 3: QUIC Layers
QUIC also relies on TLS for authentication and negotiation of
parameters that are critical to security and performance.
Rather than a strict layering, these two protocols cooperate: QUIC
uses the TLS handshake; TLS uses the reliability, ordered delivery,
and record layer provided by QUIC.
At a high level, there are two main interactions between the TLS and
QUIC components:
* The TLS component sends and receives messages via the QUIC
component, with QUIC providing a reliable stream abstraction to
TLS.
* The TLS component provides a series of updates to the QUIC
component, including (a) new packet protection keys to install and
(b) state changes such as handshake completion, the server
certificate, etc.
Figure 4 shows these interactions in more detail, with the QUIC
packet protection being called out specially.
+------------+ +------------+
| |<---- Handshake Messages ----->| |
| |<- Validate 0-RTT Parameters ->| |
| |<--------- 0-RTT Keys ---------| |
| QUIC |<------- Handshake Keys -------| TLS |
| |<--------- 1-RTT Keys ---------| |
| |<------- Handshake Done -------| |
+------------+ +------------+
| ^
| Protect | Protected
v | Packet
+------------+
| QUIC |
| Packet |
| Protection |
+------------+
Figure 4: QUIC and TLS Interactions
Unlike TLS over TCP, QUIC applications that want to send data do not
send it through using TLS application_data Application Data records. Rather, they send it as
QUIC STREAM frames or other frame types, which are then carried in
QUIC packets.
4. Carrying TLS Messages
QUIC carries TLS handshake data in CRYPTO frames, each of which
consists of a contiguous block of handshake data identified by an
offset and length. Those frames are packaged into QUIC packets and
encrypted under the current encryption level. As with TLS over TCP,
once TLS handshake data has been delivered to QUIC, it is QUIC's
responsibility to deliver it reliably. Each chunk of data that is
produced by TLS is associated with the set of keys that TLS is
currently using. If QUIC needs to retransmit that data, it MUST use
the same keys even if TLS has already updated to newer keys.
Each encryption level corresponds to a packet number space. The
packet number space that is used determines the semantics of frames.
Some frames are prohibited in different packet number spaces; see
Section 12.5 of [RFC9000]. [QUIC-TRANSPORT].
Because packets could be reordered on the wire, QUIC uses the packet
type to indicate which keys were used to protect a given packet, as
shown in Table 1. When packets of different types need to be sent,
endpoints SHOULD use coalesced packets to send them in the same UDP
datagram.
+=====================+=================+==================+
| Packet Type | Encryption Keys | PN Space |
+=====================+=================+==================+
| Initial | Initial secrets | Initial |
+=====================+-----------------+------------------+
| 0-RTT Protected | 0-RTT | Application data |
+=====================+-----------------+------------------+
| Handshake | Handshake | Handshake |
+=====================+-----------------+------------------+
| Retry | Retry | N/A |
+=====================+-----------------+------------------+
| Version Negotiation | N/A | N/A |
+=====================+-----------------+------------------+
| Short Header | 1-RTT | Application data |
+=====================+-----------------+------------------+
Table 1: Encryption Keys by Packet Type
Section 17 of [RFC9000] [QUIC-TRANSPORT] shows how packets at the various
encryption levels fit into the handshake process.
4.1. Interface to TLS
As shown in Figure 4, the interface from QUIC to TLS consists of four
primary functions:
* Sending and receiving handshake messages
* Processing stored transport and application state from a resumed
session and determining if it is valid to generate or accept early 0-RTT
data
* Rekeying (both transmit and receive)
* Updating handshake state
Additional functions might be needed to configure TLS. In
particular, QUIC and TLS need to agree on which is responsible for
validation of peer credentials, such as certificate validation
[RFC5280].
4.1.1. Handshake Complete
In this document, the TLS handshake is considered complete when the
TLS stack has reported that the handshake is complete. This happens
when the TLS stack has both sent a Finished message and verified the
peer's Finished message. Verifying the peer's Finished message
provides the endpoints with an assurance that previous handshake
messages have not been modified. Note that the handshake does not
complete at both endpoints simultaneously. Consequently, any
requirement that is based on the completion of the handshake depends
on the perspective of the endpoint in question.
4.1.2. Handshake Confirmed
In this document, the TLS handshake is considered confirmed at the
server when the handshake completes. The server MUST send a
HANDSHAKE_DONE frame as soon as the handshake is complete. At the
client, the handshake is considered confirmed when a HANDSHAKE_DONE
frame is received.
Additionally, a client MAY consider the handshake to be confirmed
when it receives an acknowledgment for a 1-RTT packet. This can be
implemented by recording the lowest packet number sent with 1-RTT
keys and comparing it to the Largest Acknowledged field in any
received 1-RTT ACK frame: once the latter is greater than or equal to
the former, the handshake is confirmed.
4.1.3. Sending and Receiving Handshake Messages
In order to drive the handshake, TLS depends on being able to send
and receive handshake messages. There are two basic functions on
this interface: one where QUIC requests handshake messages and one
where QUIC provides bytes that comprise handshake messages.
Before starting the handshake, QUIC provides TLS with the transport
parameters (see Section 8.2) that it wishes to carry.
A QUIC client starts TLS by requesting TLS handshake bytes from TLS.
The client acquires handshake bytes before sending its first packet.
A QUIC server starts the process by providing TLS with the client's
handshake bytes.
At any time, the TLS stack at an endpoint will have a current sending
encryption level and a receiving encryption level. TLS encryption
levels determine the QUIC packet type and keys that are used for
protecting data.
Each encryption level is associated with a different sequence of
bytes, which is reliably transmitted to the peer in CRYPTO frames.
When TLS provides handshake bytes to be sent, they are appended to
the handshake bytes for the current encryption level. The encryption
level then determines the type of packet that the resulting CRYPTO
frame is carried in; see Table 1.
Four encryption levels are used, producing keys for Initial, 0-RTT,
Handshake, and 1-RTT packets. CRYPTO frames are carried in just
three of these levels, omitting the 0-RTT level. These four levels
correspond to three packet number spaces: Initial and Handshake
encrypted packets use their own separate spaces; 0-RTT and 1-RTT
packets use the application data packet number space.
QUIC takes the unprotected content of TLS handshake records as the
content of CRYPTO frames. TLS record protection is not used by QUIC.
QUIC assembles CRYPTO frames into QUIC packets, which are protected
using QUIC packet protection.
QUIC CRYPTO frames only carry TLS handshake messages. TLS alerts are
turned into QUIC CONNECTION_CLOSE error codes; see Section 4.8. TLS
application data and other content types cannot be carried by QUIC at
any encryption level; it is an error if they are received from the
TLS stack.
When an endpoint receives a QUIC packet containing a CRYPTO frame
from the network, it proceeds as follows:
* If the packet uses the current TLS receiving encryption level,
sequence the data into the input flow as usual. As with STREAM
frames, the offset is used to find the proper location in the data
sequence. If the result of this process is that new data is
available, then it is delivered to TLS in order.
* If the packet is from a previously installed encryption level, it
MUST NOT contain data that extends past the end of previously
received data in that flow. Implementations MUST treat any
violations of this requirement as a connection error of type
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
* If the packet is from a new encryption level, it is saved for
later processing by TLS. Once TLS moves to receiving from this
encryption level, saved data can be provided to TLS. When TLS
provides keys for a higher encryption level, if there is data from
a previous encryption level that TLS has not consumed, this MUST
be treated as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
Each time that TLS is provided with new data, new handshake bytes are
requested from TLS. TLS might not provide any bytes if the handshake
messages it has received are incomplete or it has no data to send.
The content of CRYPTO frames might either be processed incrementally
by TLS or buffered until complete messages or flights are available.
TLS is responsible for buffering handshake bytes that have arrived in
order. QUIC is responsible for buffering handshake bytes that arrive
out of order or for encryption levels that are not yet ready. QUIC
does not provide any means of flow control for CRYPTO frames; see
Section 7.5 of [RFC9000]. [QUIC-TRANSPORT].
Once the TLS handshake is complete, this is indicated to QUIC along
with any final handshake bytes that TLS needs to send. At this
stage, the transport parameters that the peer advertised during the
handshake are authenticated; see Section 8.2.
Once the handshake is complete, TLS becomes passive. TLS can still
receive data from its peer and respond in kind, but it will not need
to send more data unless specifically requested -- either by an
application or QUIC. One reason to send data is that the server
might wish to provide additional or updated session tickets to a
client.
When the handshake is complete, QUIC only needs to provide TLS with
any data that arrives in CRYPTO streams. In the same manner that is
used during the handshake, new data is requested from TLS after
providing received data.
4.1.4. Encryption Level Changes
As keys at a given encryption level become available to TLS, TLS
indicates to QUIC that reading or writing keys at that encryption
level are available.
The availability of new keys is always a result of providing inputs
to TLS. TLS only provides new keys after being initialized (by a
client) or when provided with new handshake data.
However, a TLS implementation could perform some of its processing
asynchronously. In particular, the process of validating a
certificate can take some time. While waiting for TLS processing to
complete, an endpoint SHOULD buffer received packets if they might be
processed using keys that aren't are not yet available. These packets can
be processed once keys are provided by TLS. An endpoint SHOULD
continue to respond to packets that can be processed during this
time.
After processing inputs, TLS might produce handshake bytes, keys for
new encryption levels, or both.
TLS provides QUIC with three items as a new encryption level becomes
available:
* A secret
* An Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) function
* A Key Derivation Function (KDF)
These values are based on the values that TLS negotiates and are used
by QUIC to generate packet and header protection keys; see Section 5
and Section 5.4.
If 0-RTT is possible, it is ready after the client sends a TLS
ClientHello message or the server receives that message. After
providing a QUIC client with the first handshake bytes, the TLS stack
might signal the change to 0-RTT keys. On the server, after
receiving handshake bytes that contain a ClientHello message, a TLS
server might signal that 0-RTT keys are available.
Although TLS only uses one encryption level at a time, QUIC may use
more than one level. For instance, after sending its Finished
message (using a CRYPTO frame at the Handshake encryption level) an
endpoint can send STREAM data (in 1-RTT encryption). If the Finished
message is lost, the endpoint uses the Handshake encryption level to
retransmit the lost message. Reordering or loss of packets can mean
that QUIC will need to handle packets at multiple encryption levels.
During the handshake, this means potentially handling packets at
higher and lower encryption levels than the current encryption level
used by TLS.
In particular, server implementations need to be able to read packets
at the Handshake encryption level at the same time as the 0-RTT
encryption level. A client could interleave ACK frames that are
protected with Handshake keys with 0-RTT data, and the server needs
to process those acknowledgments in order to detect lost Handshake
packets.
QUIC also needs access to keys that might not ordinarily be available
to a TLS implementation. For instance, a client might need to
acknowledge Handshake packets before it is ready to send CRYPTO
frames at that encryption level. TLS therefore needs to provide keys
to QUIC before it might produce them for its own use.
4.1.5. TLS Interface Summary
Figure 5 summarizes the exchange between QUIC and TLS for both client
and server. Solid arrows indicate packets that carry handshake data;
dashed arrows show where application data can be sent. Each arrow is
tagged with the encryption level used for that transmission.
Client Server
====== ======
Get Handshake
Initial ------------->
Install tx 0-RTT keys
0-RTT - - - - - - - ->
Handshake Received
Get Handshake
<------------- Initial
Install rx 0-RTT keys
Install Handshake keys
Get Handshake
<----------- Handshake
Install tx 1-RTT keys
<- - - - - - - - 1-RTT
Handshake Received (Initial)
Install Handshake keys
Handshake Received (Handshake)
Get Handshake
Handshake ----------->
Handshake Complete
Install 1-RTT keys
1-RTT - - - - - - - ->
Handshake Received
Handshake Complete
Handshake Confirmed
Install rx 1-RTT keys
<--------------- 1-RTT
(HANDSHAKE_DONE)
Handshake Confirmed
Figure 5: Interaction Summary between QUIC and TLS
Figure 5 shows the multiple packets that form a single "flight" of
messages being processed individually, to show what incoming messages
trigger different actions. This shows multiple "Get Handshake"
invocations to retrieve handshake messages at different encryption
levels. New handshake messages are requested after incoming packets
have been processed.
Figure 5 shows one possible structure for a simple handshake
exchange. The exact process varies based on the structure of
endpoint implementations and the order in which packets arrive.
Implementations could use a different number of operations or execute
them in other orders.
4.2. TLS Version
This document describes how TLS 1.3 [TLS13] is used with QUIC.
In practice, the TLS handshake will negotiate a version of TLS to
use. This could result in a version of TLS newer than 1.3 being
negotiated if both endpoints support that version. This is
acceptable provided that the features of TLS 1.3 that are used by
QUIC are supported by the newer version.
Clients MUST NOT offer TLS versions older than 1.3. A badly
configured TLS implementation could negotiate TLS 1.2 or another
older version of TLS. An endpoint MUST terminate the connection if a
version of TLS older than 1.3 is negotiated.
4.3. ClientHello Size
The first Initial packet from a client contains the start or all of
its first cryptographic handshake message, which for TLS is the
ClientHello. Servers might need to parse the entire ClientHello
(e.g., to access extensions such as Server Name Identification (SNI)
or Application Layer Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)) in order to decide
whether to accept the new incoming QUIC connection. If the
ClientHello spans multiple Initial packets, such servers would need
to buffer the first received fragments, which could consume excessive
resources if the client's address has not yet been validated. To
avoid this, servers MAY use the Retry feature (see Section 8.1 of
[RFC9000])
[QUIC-TRANSPORT]) to only buffer partial ClientHello messages from
clients with a validated address.
QUIC packet and framing add at least 36 bytes of overhead to the
ClientHello message. That overhead increases if the client chooses a
Source Connection ID field longer than zero bytes. Overheads also do
not include the token or a Destination Connection ID longer than 8
bytes, both of which might be required if a server sends a Retry
packet.
A typical TLS ClientHello can easily fit into a 1200-byte packet.
However, in addition to the overheads added by QUIC, there are
several variables that could cause this limit to be exceeded. Large
session tickets, multiple or large key shares, and long lists of
supported ciphers, signature algorithms, versions, QUIC transport
parameters, and other negotiable parameters and extensions could
cause this message to grow.
For servers, in addition to connection IDs and tokens, the size of
TLS session tickets can have an effect on a client's ability to
connect efficiently. Minimizing the size of these values increases
the probability that clients can use them and still fit their entire
ClientHello message in their first Initial packet.
The TLS implementation does not need to ensure that the ClientHello
is large enough to meet the QUIC's requirements for QUIC packets. QUIC
PADDING frames are added to increase the size of the packet as
necessary; datagrams that carry
Initial packets; see Section 14.1 of [RFC9000]. [QUIC-TRANSPORT]. QUIC
implementations use PADDING frames or packet coalescing to ensure
that datagrams are large enough.
4.4. Peer Authentication
The requirements for authentication depend on the application
protocol that is in use. TLS provides server authentication and
permits the server to request client authentication.
A client MUST authenticate the identity of the server. This
typically involves verification that the identity of the server is
included in a certificate and that the certificate is issued by a
trusted entity (see for example [RFC2818]).
| Note: Where servers provide certificates for authentication,
| the size of the certificate chain can consume a large number of
| bytes. Controlling the size of certificate chains is critical
| to performance in QUIC as servers are limited to sending 3
| bytes for every byte received prior to validating the client
| address; see Section 8.1 of [RFC9000]. [QUIC-TRANSPORT]. The size of a
| certificate chain can be managed by limiting the number of
| names or extensions; using keys with small public key
| representations, like ECDSA; or by using certificate
| compression [COMPRESS].
A server MAY request that the client authenticate during the
handshake. A server MAY refuse a connection if the client is unable
to authenticate when requested. The requirements for client
authentication vary based on application protocol and deployment.
A server MUST NOT use post-handshake client authentication (as
defined in Section 4.6.2 of [TLS13]) because the multiplexing offered
by QUIC prevents clients from correlating the certificate request
with the application-level event that triggered it (see
[HTTP2-TLS13]). More specifically, servers MUST NOT send post-
handshake TLS CertificateRequest messages, and clients MUST treat
receipt of such messages as a connection error of type
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
4.5. Session Resumption
QUIC can use the session resumption feature of TLS 1.3. It does this
by carrying NewSessionTicket messages in CRYPTO frames after the
handshake is complete. Session resumption can be used to provide
0-RTT and can also be used when 0-RTT is disabled.
Endpoints that use session resumption might need to remember some
information about the current connection when creating a resumed
connection. TLS requires that some information be retained; see
Section 4.6.1 of [TLS13]. QUIC itself does not depend on any state
being retained when resuming a connection unless 0-RTT is also used;
see Section 7.4.1 of [RFC9000] [QUIC-TRANSPORT] and Section 4.6.1. Application
protocols could depend on state that is retained between resumed
connections.
Clients can store any state required for resumption along with the
session ticket. Servers can use the session ticket to help carry
state.
Session resumption allows servers to link activity on the original
connection with the resumed connection, which might be a privacy
issue for clients. Clients can choose not to enable resumption to
avoid creating this correlation. Clients SHOULD NOT reuse tickets as
that allows entities other than the server to correlate connections;
see Appendix C.4 of [TLS13].
4.6. 0-RTT
The 0-RTT feature in QUIC allows a client to send application data
before the handshake is complete. This is made possible by reusing
negotiated parameters from a previous connection. To enable this,
0-RTT depends on the client remembering critical parameters and
providing the server with a TLS session ticket that allows the server
to recover the same information.
This information includes parameters that determine TLS state, as
governed by [TLS13], QUIC transport parameters, the chosen
application protocol, and any information the application protocol
might need; see Section 4.6.3. This information determines how 0-RTT
packets and their contents are formed.
To ensure that the same information is available to both endpoints,
all information used to establish 0-RTT comes from the same
connection. Endpoints cannot selectively disregard information that
might alter the sending or processing of 0-RTT.
[TLS13] sets a limit of seven days on the time between the original
connection and any attempt to use 0-RTT. There are other constraints
on 0-RTT usage, notably those caused by the potential exposure to
replay attack; see Section 9.2.
4.6.1. Enabling 0-RTT
The TLS early_data extension in the NewSessionTicket message is
defined to convey (in the max_early_data_size parameter) the amount
of TLS 0-RTT data the server is willing to accept. QUIC does not use
TLS 0-RTT early data. QUIC uses 0-RTT packets to carry early data.
Accordingly, the max_early_data_size parameter is repurposed to hold
a sentinel value 0xffffffff to indicate that the server is willing to
accept QUIC 0-RTT data. To indicate that the server does not accept
0-RTT data, the early_data extension is omitted from the
NewSessionTicket. The amount of data that the client can send in
QUIC 0-RTT is controlled by the initial_max_data transport parameter
supplied by the server.
Servers MUST NOT send the early_data extension with a
max_early_data_size field set to any value other than 0xffffffff. A
client MUST treat receipt of a NewSessionTicket that contains an
early_data extension with any other value as a connection error of
type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
A client that wishes to send 0-RTT packets uses the early_data
extension in the ClientHello message of a subsequent handshake; see
Section 4.2.10 of [TLS13]. It then sends application data in 0-RTT
packets.
A client that attempts 0-RTT might also provide an address validation
token if the server has sent a NEW_TOKEN frame; see Section 8.1 of
[RFC9000].
[QUIC-TRANSPORT].
4.6.2. Accepting and Rejecting 0-RTT
A server accepts 0-RTT by sending an early_data extension in the
EncryptedExtensions; see Section 4.2.10 of [TLS13]. The server then
processes and acknowledges the 0-RTT packets that it receives.
A server rejects 0-RTT by sending the EncryptedExtensions without an
early_data extension. A server will always reject 0-RTT if it sends
a TLS HelloRetryRequest. When rejecting 0-RTT, a server MUST NOT
process any 0-RTT packets, even if it could. When 0-RTT was
rejected, a client SHOULD treat receipt of an acknowledgment for a
0-RTT packet as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION, if it
is able to detect the condition.
When 0-RTT is rejected, all connection characteristics that the
client assumed might be incorrect. This includes the choice of
application protocol, transport parameters, and any application
configuration. The client therefore MUST reset the state of all
streams, including application state bound to those streams.
A client MAY reattempt 0-RTT if it receives a Retry or Version
Negotiation packet. These packets do not signify rejection of 0-RTT.
4.6.3. Validating 0-RTT Configuration
When a server receives a ClientHello with the early_data extension,
it has to decide whether to accept or reject early 0-RTT data from the
client. Some of this decision is made by the TLS stack (e.g.,
checking that the cipher suite being resumed was included in the
ClientHello; see Section 4.2.10 of [TLS13]). Even when the TLS stack
has no reason to reject early 0-RTT data, the QUIC stack or the application
protocol using QUIC might reject early 0-RTT data because the configuration
of the transport or application associated with the resumed session
is not compatible with the server's current configuration.
QUIC requires additional transport state to be associated with a
0-RTT session ticket. One common way to implement this is using
stateless session tickets and storing this state in the session
ticket. Application protocols that use QUIC might have similar
requirements regarding associating or storing state. This associated
state is used for deciding whether early 0-RTT data must be rejected. For
example, HTTP/3 settings [QUIC-HTTP] determine how early 0-RTT data from
the client is interpreted. Other applications using QUIC could have
different requirements for determining whether to accept or reject
early
0-RTT data.
4.7. HelloRetryRequest
The HelloRetryRequest message (see Section 4.1.4 of [TLS13]) can be
used to request that a client provide new information, such as a key
share, or to validate some characteristic of the client. From the
perspective of QUIC, HelloRetryRequest is not differentiated from
other cryptographic handshake messages that are carried in Initial
packets. Although it is in principle possible to use this feature
for address verification, QUIC implementations SHOULD instead use the
Retry feature; see Section 8.1 of [RFC9000]. [QUIC-TRANSPORT].
4.8. TLS Errors
If TLS experiences an error, it generates an appropriate alert as
defined in Section 6 of [TLS13].
A TLS alert is converted into a QUIC connection error. The
AlertDescription value is added to 0x100 0x0100 to produce a QUIC error
code from the range reserved for CRYPTO_ERROR. CRYPTO_ERROR; see Section 20.1 of
[QUIC-TRANSPORT]. The resulting value is sent in a QUIC
CONNECTION_CLOSE frame of type 0x1c.
QUIC is only able to convey an alert level of "fatal". In TLS 1.3,
the only existing uses for the "warning" level are to signal
connection close; see Section 6.1 of [TLS13]. As QUIC provides
alternative mechanisms for connection termination and the TLS
connection is only closed if an error is encountered, a QUIC endpoint
MUST treat any alert from TLS as if it were at the "fatal" level.
QUIC permits the use of a generic code in place of a specific error
code; see Section 11 of [RFC9000]. [QUIC-TRANSPORT]. For TLS alerts, this
includes replacing any alert with a generic alert, such as
handshake_failure
(0x128 (0x0128 in QUIC). Endpoints MAY use a generic
error code to avoid possibly exposing confidential information.
4.9. Discarding Unused Keys
After QUIC has completed a move to a new encryption level, packet
protection keys for previous encryption levels can be discarded.
This occurs several times during the handshake, as well as when keys
are updated; see Section 6.
Packet protection keys are not discarded immediately when new keys
are available. If packets from a lower encryption level contain
CRYPTO frames, frames that retransmit that data MUST be sent at the
same encryption level. Similarly, an endpoint generates
acknowledgments for packets at the same encryption level as the
packet being acknowledged. Thus, it is possible that keys for a
lower encryption level are needed for a short time after keys for a
newer encryption level are available.
An endpoint cannot discard keys for a given encryption level unless
it has received all the cryptographic handshake messages from its
peer at that encryption level and its peer has done the same.
Different methods for determining this are provided for Initial keys
(Section 4.9.1) and Handshake keys (Section 4.9.2). These methods do
not prevent packets from being received or sent at that encryption
level because a peer might not have received all the acknowledgments
necessary.
Though an endpoint might retain older keys, new data MUST be sent at
the highest currently available encryption level. Only ACK frames
and retransmissions of data in CRYPTO frames are sent at a previous
encryption level. These packets MAY also include PADDING frames.
4.9.1. Discarding Initial Keys
Packets protected with Initial secrets (Section 5.2) are not
authenticated, meaning that an attacker could spoof packets with the
intent to disrupt a connection. To limit these attacks, Initial
packet protection keys are discarded more aggressively than other
keys.
The successful use of Handshake packets indicates that no more
Initial packets need to be exchanged, as these keys can only be
produced after receiving all CRYPTO frames from Initial packets.
Thus, a client MUST discard Initial keys when it first sends a
Handshake packet and a server MUST discard Initial keys when it first
successfully processes a Handshake packet. Endpoints MUST NOT send
Initial packets after this point.
This results in abandoning loss recovery state for the Initial
encryption level and ignoring any outstanding Initial packets.
4.9.2. Discarding Handshake Keys
An endpoint MUST discard its Handshake keys when the TLS handshake is
confirmed (Section 4.1.2).
4.9.3. Discarding 0-RTT Keys
0-RTT and 1-RTT packets share the same packet number space, and
clients do not send 0-RTT packets after sending a 1-RTT packet
(Section 5.6).
Therefore, a client SHOULD discard 0-RTT keys as soon as it installs
1-RTT keys since as they have no use after that moment.
Additionally, a server MAY discard 0-RTT keys as soon as it receives
a 1-RTT packet. However, due to packet reordering, a 0-RTT packet
could arrive after a 1-RTT packet. Servers MAY temporarily retain
0-RTT keys to allow decrypting reordered packets without requiring
their contents to be retransmitted with 1-RTT keys. After receiving
a 1-RTT packet, servers MUST discard 0-RTT keys within a short time;
the RECOMMENDED time period is three times the Probe Timeout (PTO,
see [RFC9002]). [QUIC-RECOVERY]). A server MAY discard 0-RTT keys earlier if it
determines that it has received all 0-RTT packets, which can be done
by keeping track of missing packet numbers.
5. Packet Protection
As with TLS over TCP, QUIC protects packets with keys derived from
the TLS handshake, using the AEAD algorithm [AEAD] negotiated by TLS.
QUIC packets have varying protections depending on their type:
* Version Negotiation packets have no cryptographic protection.
* Retry packets use AEAD_AES_128_GCM to provide protection against
accidental modification and to limit the entities that can produce
a valid Retry; see Section 5.8.
* Initial packets use AEAD_AES_128_GCM with keys derived from the
Destination Connection ID field of the first Initial packet sent
by the client; see Section 5.2.
* All other packets have strong cryptographic protections for
confidentiality and integrity, using keys and algorithms
negotiated by TLS.
This section describes how packet protection is applied to Handshake
packets, 0-RTT packets, and 1-RTT packets. The same packet
protection process is applied to Initial packets. However, as it is
trivial to determine the keys used for Initial packets, these packets
are not considered to have confidentiality or integrity protection.
Retry packets use a fixed key and so similarly lack confidentiality
and integrity protection.
5.1. Packet Protection Keys
QUIC derives packet protection keys in the same way that TLS derives
record protection keys.
Each encryption level has separate secret values for protection of
packets sent in each direction. These traffic secrets are derived by
TLS (see Section 7.1 of [TLS13]) and are used by QUIC for all
encryption levels except the Initial encryption level. The secrets
for the Initial encryption level are computed based on the client's
initial Destination Connection ID, as described in Section 5.2.
The keys used for packet protection are computed from the TLS secrets
using the KDF provided by TLS. In TLS 1.3, the HKDF-Expand-Label
function described in Section 7.1 of [TLS13] is used, using used with the hash
function from the negotiated cipher suite. All uses of HKDF-Expand-
Label in QUIC use a zero-length Context.
Note that labels, which are described using strings, are encoded as
bytes using ASCII [ASCII] without quotes or any trailing NUL byte.
Other versions of TLS MUST provide a similar function in order to be
used with QUIC.
The current encryption level secret and the label "quic key" are
input to the KDF to produce the AEAD key; the label "quic iv" is used
to derive the Initialization Vector (IV); see Section 5.3. The
header protection key uses the "quic hp" label; see Section 5.4.
Using these labels provides key separation between QUIC and TLS; see
Section 9.6.
Both "quic key" and "quic hp" are used to produce keys, so the Length
provided to HKDF-Expand-Label along with these labels is determined
by the size of keys in the AEAD or header protection algorithm. The
Length provided with "quic iv" is the minimum length of the AEAD
nonce or 8 bytes if that is larger; see [AEAD].
The KDF used for initial secrets is always the HKDF-Expand-Label
function from TLS 1.3; see Section 5.2.
5.2. Initial Secrets
Initial packets apply the packet protection process, but use a secret
derived from the Destination Connection ID field from the client's
first Initial packet.
This secret is determined by using HKDF-Extract (see Section 2.2 of
[HKDF]) with a salt of 0x38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a and
the input keying material (IKM) of the Destination Connection ID
field. This produces an intermediate pseudorandom key (PRK) that is
used to derive two separate secrets for sending and receiving.
The secret used by clients to construct Initial packets uses the PRK
and the label "client in" as input to the HKDF-Expand-Label function
from TLS [TLS13] to produce a 32-byte secret. Packets constructed by
the server use the same process with the label "server in". The hash
function for HKDF when deriving initial secrets and keys is SHA-256
[SHA].
This process in pseudocode is:
initial_salt = 0x38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a
initial_secret = HKDF-Extract(initial_salt,
client_dst_connection_id)
client_initial_secret = HKDF-Expand-Label(initial_secret,
"client in", "",
Hash.length)
server_initial_secret = HKDF-Expand-Label(initial_secret,
"server in", "",
Hash.length)
The connection ID used with HKDF-Expand-Label is the Destination
Connection ID in the Initial packet sent by the client. This will be
a randomly selected value unless the client creates the Initial
packet after receiving a Retry packet, where the Destination
Connection ID is selected by the server.
Future versions of QUIC SHOULD generate a new salt value, thus
ensuring that the keys are different for each version of QUIC. This
prevents a middlebox that recognizes only one version of QUIC from
seeing or modifying the contents of packets from future versions.
The HKDF-Expand-Label function defined in TLS 1.3 MUST be used for
Initial packets even where the TLS versions offered do not include
TLS 1.3.
The secrets used for constructing subsequent Initial packets change
when a server sends a Retry packet to use the connection ID value
selected by the server. The secrets do not change when a client
changes the Destination Connection ID it uses in response to an
Initial packet from the server.
| Note: The Destination Connection ID field could be any length
| up to 20 bytes, including zero length if the server sends a
| Retry packet with a zero-length Source Connection ID field.
| After a Retry, the Initial keys provide the client no assurance
| that the server received its packet, so the client has to rely
| on the exchange that included the Retry packet to validate the
| server address; see Section 8.1 of [RFC9000]. [QUIC-TRANSPORT].
Appendix A contains sample Initial packets.
5.3. AEAD Usage
The Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) function
(see [AEAD]) used for QUIC packet protection is the AEAD that is
negotiated for use with the TLS connection. For example, if TLS is
using the TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher suite, the AEAD_AES_128_GCM
function is used.
QUIC can use any of the cipher suites defined in [TLS13] with the
exception of TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256. A cipher suite MUST NOT be
negotiated unless a header protection scheme is defined for the
cipher suite. This document defines a header protection scheme for
all cipher suites defined in [TLS13] aside from
TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256. These cipher suites have a 16-byte
authentication tag and produce an output 16 bytes larger than their
input.
Note:
An endpoint MUST NOT reject a ClientHello that offers a cipher suite
that it does not support, or it would be impossible to deploy a new
cipher suite. This also applies to TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256.
When constructing packets, the AEAD function is applied prior to
applying header protection; see Section 5.4. The unprotected packet
header is part of the associated data (A). When processing packets,
an endpoint first removes the header protection.
The key and IV for the packet are computed as described in
Section 5.1. The nonce, N, is formed by combining the packet
protection IV with the packet number. The 62 bits of the
reconstructed QUIC packet number in network byte order are left-
padded with zeros to the size of the IV. The exclusive OR of the
padded packet number and the IV forms the AEAD nonce.
The associated data, A, for the AEAD is the contents of the QUIC
header, starting from the first byte of either the short or long
header, up to and including the unprotected packet number.
The input plaintext, P, for the AEAD is the payload of the QUIC
packet, as described in [RFC9000]. [QUIC-TRANSPORT].
The output ciphertext, C, of the AEAD is transmitted in place of P.
Some AEAD functions have limits for how many packets can be encrypted
under the same key and IV; see Section 6.6. This might be lower than
the packet number limit. An endpoint MUST initiate a key update
(Section 6) prior to exceeding any limit set for the AEAD that is in
use.
5.4. Header Protection
Parts of QUIC packet headers, in particular the Packet Number field,
are protected using a key that is derived separately from the packet
protection key and IV. The key derived using the "quic hp" label is
used to provide confidentiality protection for those fields that are
not exposed to on-path elements.
This protection applies to the least significant bits of the first
byte, plus the Packet Number field. The four least significant bits
of the first byte are protected for packets with long headers; the
five least significant bits of the first byte are protected for
packets with short headers. For both header forms, this covers the
reserved bits and the Packet Number Length field; the Key Phase bit
is also protected for packets with a short header.
The same header protection key is used for the duration of the
connection, with the value not changing after a key update (see
Section 6). This allows header protection to be used to protect the
key phase.
This process does not apply to Retry or Version Negotiation packets,
which do not contain a protected payload or any of the fields that
are protected by this process.
5.4.1. Header Protection Application
Header protection is applied after packet protection is applied (see
Section 5.3). The ciphertext of the packet is sampled and used as
input to an encryption algorithm. The algorithm used depends on the
negotiated AEAD.
The output of this algorithm is a 5-byte mask that is applied to the
protected header fields using exclusive OR. The least significant
bits of the first byte of the packet are masked by the least
significant bits of the first mask byte, and the packet number is
masked with the remaining bytes. Any unused bytes of mask that might
result from a shorter packet number encoding are unused.
Figure 6 shows a sample algorithm for applying header protection.
Removing header protection only differs in the order in which the
packet number length (pn_length) is determined (here "^" is used to
represent exclusive OR).
mask = header_protection(hp_key, sample)
pn_length = (packet[0] & 0x03) + 1
if (packet[0] & 0x80) == 0x80:
# Long header: 4 bits masked
packet[0] ^= mask[0] & 0x0f
else:
# Short header: 5 bits masked
packet[0] ^= mask[0] & 0x1f
# pn_offset is the start of the Packet Number field.
packet[pn_offset:pn_offset+pn_length] ^= mask[1:1+pn_length]
Figure 6: Header Protection Pseudocode
Specific header protection functions are defined based on the
selected cipher suite; see Section 5.4.3 and Section 5.4.4.
Figure 7 shows an example long header packet (Initial) and a short
header packet (1-RTT). Figure 7 shows the fields in each header that
are covered by header protection and the portion of the protected
packet payload that is sampled.
Initial Packet {
Header Form (1) = 1,
Fixed Bit (1) = 1,
Long Packet Type (2) = 0,
Reserved Bits (2), # Protected
Packet Number Length (2), # Protected
Version (32),
DCID Len (8),
Destination Connection ID (0..160),
SCID Len (8),
Source Connection ID (0..160),
Token Length (i),
Token (..),
Length (i),
Packet Number (8..32), # Protected
Protected Payload (0..24), # Skipped Part
Protected Payload (128), # Sampled Part
Protected Payload (..) # Remainder
}
1-RTT Packet {
Header Form (1) = 0,
Fixed Bit (1) = 1,
Spin Bit (1),
Reserved Bits (2), # Protected
Key Phase (1), # Protected
Packet Number Length (2), # Protected
Destination Connection ID (0..160),
Packet Number (8..32), # Protected
Protected Payload (0..24), # Skipped Part
Protected Payload (128), # Sampled Part
Protected Payload (..), # Remainder
}
Figure 7: Header Protection and Ciphertext Sample
Before a TLS cipher suite can be used with QUIC, a header protection
algorithm MUST be specified for the AEAD used with that cipher suite.
This document defines algorithms for AEAD_AES_128_GCM,
AEAD_AES_128_CCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM (all these AES AEADs are defined
in [AEAD]), and AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 (defined in [CHACHA]). Prior
to TLS selecting a cipher suite, AES header protection is used
(Section 5.4.3), matching the AEAD_AES_128_GCM packet protection.
5.4.2. Header Protection Sample
The header protection algorithm uses both the header protection key
and a sample of the ciphertext from the packet Payload field.
The same number of bytes are always sampled, but an allowance needs
to be made for the endpoint removing protection, removal of protection by a receiving endpoint,
which will not know the length of the Packet Number field. The
sample of ciphertext is taken starting from an offset of 4 bytes
after the start of the Packet Number field. That is, in sampling
packet ciphertext for header protection, the Packet Number field is
assumed to be 4 bytes long (its maximum possible encoded length).
An endpoint MUST discard packets that are not long enough to contain
a complete sample.
To ensure that sufficient data is available for sampling, packets are
padded so that the combined lengths of the encoded packet number and
protected payload is at least 4 bytes longer than the sample required
for header protection. The cipher suites defined in [TLS13] -- other
than TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, for which a header protection scheme
is not defined in this document -- have 16-byte expansions and
16-byte header protection samples. This results in needing at least
3 bytes of frames in the unprotected payload if the packet number is
encoded on a single byte, or 2 bytes of frames for a 2-byte packet
number encoding.
The sampled ciphertext can be determined by the following pseudocode:
# pn_offset is the start of the Packet Number field.
sample_offset = pn_offset + 4
sample = packet[sample_offset..sample_offset+sample_length]
Where the packet number offset of a short header packet can be
calculated as:
pn_offset = 1 + len(connection_id)
And the packet number offset of a long header packet can be
calculated as:
pn_offset = 7 + len(destination_connection_id) +
len(source_connection_id) +
len(payload_length)
if packet_type == Initial:
pn_offset += len(token_length) +
len(token)
For example, for a packet with a short header, an 8-byte connection
ID, and protected with AEAD_AES_128_GCM, the sample takes bytes 13 to
28 inclusive (using zero-based indexing).
Multiple QUIC packets might be included in the same UDP datagram.
Each packet is handled separately.
5.4.3. AES-Based Header Protection
This section defines the packet protection algorithm for
AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_128_CCM, and AEAD_AES_256_GCM.
AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_128_CCM use 128-bit AES in Electronic
Codebook (ECB) mode. AEAD_AES_256_GCM uses 256-bit AES in ECB mode.
AES is defined in [AES].
This algorithm samples 16 bytes from the packet ciphertext. This
value is used as the input to AES-ECB. In pseudocode, the header
protection function is defined as:
header_protection(hp_key, sample):
mask = AES-ECB(hp_key, sample)
5.4.4. ChaCha20-Based Header Protection
When AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is in use, header protection uses the raw
ChaCha20 function as defined in Section 2.4 of [CHACHA]. This uses a
256-bit key and 16 bytes sampled from the packet protection output.
The first 4 bytes of the sampled ciphertext are the block counter. A
ChaCha20 implementation could take a 32-bit integer in place of a
byte sequence, in which case, the byte sequence is interpreted as a
little-endian value.
The remaining 12 bytes are used as the nonce. A ChaCha20
implementation might take an array of three 32-bit integers in place
of a byte sequence, in which case, the nonce bytes are interpreted as
a sequence of 32-bit little-endian integers.
The encryption mask is produced by invoking ChaCha20 to protect 5
zero bytes. In pseudocode, the header protection function is defined
as:
header_protection(hp_key, sample):
counter = sample[0..3]
nonce = sample[4..15]
mask = ChaCha20(hp_key, counter, nonce, {0,0,0,0,0})
5.5. Receiving Protected Packets
Once an endpoint successfully receives a packet with a given packet
number, it MUST discard all packets in the same packet number space
with higher packet numbers if they cannot be successfully unprotected
with either the same key, or -- if there is a key update -- a
subsequent packet protection key; see Section 6. Similarly, a packet
that appears to trigger a key update but cannot be unprotected
successfully MUST be discarded.
Failure to unprotect a packet does not necessarily indicate the
existence of a protocol error in a peer or an attack. The truncated
packet number encoding used in QUIC can cause packet numbers to be
decoded incorrectly if they are delayed significantly.
5.6. Use of 0-RTT Keys
If 0-RTT keys are available (see Section 4.6.1), the lack of replay
protection means that restrictions on their use are necessary to
avoid replay attacks on the protocol.
Of the frames defined in [RFC9000], [QUIC-TRANSPORT], the STREAM, RESET_STREAM,
STOP_SENDING, and CONNECTION_CLOSE frames are potentially unsafe for
use with 0-RTT as they carry application data. Application data that
is received in 0-RTT could cause an application at the server to
process the data multiple times rather than just once. Additional
actions taken by a server as a result of processing replayed
application data could have unwanted consequences. A client
therefore MUST NOT use 0-RTT for application data unless specifically
requested by the application that is in use.
An application protocol that uses QUIC MUST include a profile that
defines acceptable use of 0-RTT; otherwise, 0-RTT can only be used to
carry QUIC frames that do not carry application data. For example, a
profile for HTTP is described in [HTTP-REPLAY] and used for HTTP/3;
see Section 10.9 of [QUIC-HTTP].
Though replaying packets might result in additional connection
attempts, the effect of processing replayed frames that do not carry
application data is limited to changing the state of the affected
connection. A TLS handshake cannot be successfully completed using
replayed packets.
A client MAY wish to apply additional restrictions on what data it
sends prior to the completion of the TLS handshake.
A client otherwise treats 0-RTT keys as equivalent to 1-RTT keys,
except that it cannot send certain frames with 0-RTT keys; see
Section 12.5 of [RFC9000]. [QUIC-TRANSPORT].
A client that receives an indication that its 0-RTT data has been
accepted by a server can send 0-RTT data until it receives all of the
server's handshake messages. A client SHOULD stop sending 0-RTT data
if it receives an indication that 0-RTT data has been rejected.
A server MUST NOT use 0-RTT keys to protect packets; it uses 1-RTT
keys to protect acknowledgments of 0-RTT packets. A client MUST NOT
attempt to decrypt 0-RTT packets it receives and instead MUST discard
them.
Once a client has installed 1-RTT keys, it MUST NOT send any more
0-RTT packets.
| Note: 0-RTT data can be acknowledged by the server as it
| receives it, but any packets containing acknowledgments of
| 0-RTT data cannot have packet protection removed by the client
| until the TLS handshake is complete. The 1-RTT keys necessary
| to remove packet protection cannot be derived until the client
| receives all server handshake messages.
5.7. Receiving Out-of-Order Protected Packets
Due to reordering and loss, protected packets might be received by an
endpoint before the final TLS handshake messages are received. A
client will be unable to decrypt 1-RTT packets from the server,
whereas a server will be able to decrypt 1-RTT packets from the
client. Endpoints in either role MUST NOT decrypt 1-RTT packets from
their peer prior to completing the handshake.
Even though 1-RTT keys are available to a server after receiving the
first handshake messages from a client, it is missing assurances on
the client state:
* The client is not authenticated, unless the server has chosen to
use a pre-shared key and validated the client's pre-shared key
binder; see Section 4.2.11 of [TLS13].
* The client has not demonstrated liveness, unless the server has
validated the client's address with a Retry packet or other means;
see Section 8.1 of [RFC9000]. [QUIC-TRANSPORT].
* Any received 0-RTT data that the server responds to might be due
to a replay attack.
Therefore, the server's use of 1-RTT keys before the handshake is
complete is limited to sending data. A server MUST NOT process
incoming 1-RTT protected packets before the TLS handshake is
complete. Because sending acknowledgments indicates that all frames
in a packet have been processed, a server cannot send acknowledgments
for 1-RTT packets until the TLS handshake is complete. Received
packets protected with 1-RTT keys MAY be stored and later decrypted
and used once the handshake is complete.
| Note: TLS implementations might provide all 1-RTT secrets prior
| to handshake completion. Even where QUIC implementations have
| 1-RTT read keys, those keys are not to be used prior to
| completing the handshake.
The requirement for the server to wait for the client Finished
message creates a dependency on that message being delivered. A
client can avoid the potential for head-of-line blocking that this
implies by sending its 1-RTT packets coalesced with a Handshake
packet containing a copy of the CRYPTO frame that carries the
Finished message, until one of the Handshake packets is acknowledged.
This enables immediate server processing for those packets.
A server could receive packets protected with 0-RTT keys prior to
receiving a TLS ClientHello. The server MAY retain these packets for
later decryption in anticipation of receiving a ClientHello.
A client generally receives 1-RTT keys at the same time as the
handshake completes. Even if it has 1-RTT secrets, a client MUST NOT
process incoming 1-RTT protected packets before the TLS handshake is
complete.
5.8. Retry Packet Integrity
Retry packets (see Section 17.2.5 of [RFC9000]) [QUIC-TRANSPORT]) carry a Retry
Integrity Tag that provides two properties: it allows the discarding
of packets that have accidentally been corrupted by the network, and
only an entity that observes an Initial packet can send a valid Retry
packet.
The Retry Integrity Tag is a 128-bit field that is computed as the
output of AEAD_AES_128_GCM [AEAD] used with the following inputs:
* The secret key, K, is 128 bits equal to
0xbe0c690b9f66575a1d766b54e368c84e.
* The nonce, N, is 96 bits equal to 0x461599d35d632bf2239825bb.
* The plaintext, P, is empty.
* The associated data, A, is the contents of the Retry Pseudo-
Packet, as illustrated in Figure 8:
The secret key and the nonce are values derived by calling HKDF-
Expand-Label using
0xd9c9943e6101fd200021506bcc02814c73030f25c79d71ce876eca876e6fca8e as
the secret, with labels being "quic key" and "quic iv" (Section 5.1).
Retry Pseudo-Packet {
ODCID Length (8),
Original Destination Connection ID (0..160),
Header Form (1) = 1,
Fixed Bit (1) = 1,
Long Packet Type (2) = 3,
Unused (4),
Version (32),
DCID Len (8),
Destination Connection ID (0..160),
SCID Len (8),
Source Connection ID (0..160),
Retry Token (..),
}
Figure 8: Retry Pseudo-Packet
The Retry Pseudo-Packet is not sent over the wire. It is computed by
taking the transmitted Retry packet, removing the Retry Integrity
Tag, and prepending the two following fields:
ODCID Length: The ODCID Length field contains the length in bytes of
the Original Destination Connection ID field that follows it,
encoded as an 8-bit unsigned integer.
Original Destination Connection ID: The Original Destination
Connection ID contains the value of the Destination Connection ID
from the Initial packet that this Retry is in response to. The
length of this field is given in ODCID Length. The presence of
this field ensures that a valid Retry packet can only be sent by
an entity that observes the Initial packet.
6. Key Update
Once the handshake is confirmed (see Section 4.1.2), an endpoint MAY
initiate a key update.
The Key Phase bit indicates which packet protection keys are used to
protect the packet. The Key Phase bit is initially set to 0 for the
first set of 1-RTT packets and toggled to signal each subsequent key
update.
The Key Phase bit allows a recipient to detect a change in keying
material without needing to receive the first packet that triggered
the change. An endpoint that notices a changed Key Phase bit updates
keys and decrypts the packet that contains the changed value.
Initiating a key update results in both endpoints updating keys.
This differs from TLS where endpoints can update keys independently.
This mechanism replaces the key update mechanism of TLS, which relies
on KeyUpdate messages sent using 1-RTT encryption keys. Endpoints
MUST NOT send a TLS KeyUpdate message. Endpoints MUST treat the
receipt of a TLS KeyUpdate message as a connection error of type
0x10a,
0x010a, equivalent to a fatal TLS alert of unexpected_message; see
Section 4.8.
Figure 9 shows a key update process, where the initial set of keys
used (identified with @M) are replaced by updated keys (identified
with @N). The value of the Key Phase bit is indicated in brackets
[].
Initiating Peer Responding Peer
@M [0] QUIC Packets
... Update to @N
@N [1] QUIC Packets
-------->
Update to @N ...
QUIC Packets [1] @N
<--------
QUIC Packets [1] @N
containing ACK
<--------
... Key Update Permitted
@N [1] QUIC Packets
containing ACK for @N packets
-------->
Key Update Permitted ...
Figure 9: Key Update
6.1. Initiating a Key Update
Endpoints maintain separate read and write secrets for packet
protection. An endpoint initiates a key update by updating its
packet protection write secret and using that to protect new packets.
The endpoint creates a new write secret from the existing write
secret as performed in Section 7.2 of [TLS13]. This uses the KDF
function provided by TLS with a label of "quic ku". The
corresponding key and IV are created from that secret as defined in
Section 5.1. The header protection key is not updated.
For example, to update write keys with TLS 1.3, HKDF-Expand-Label is
used as:
secret_<n+1> = HKDF-Expand-Label(secret_<n>, "quic ku",
"", Hash.length)
The endpoint toggles the value of the Key Phase bit and uses the
updated key and IV to protect all subsequent packets.
An endpoint MUST NOT initiate a key update prior to having confirmed
the handshake (Section 4.1.2). An endpoint MUST NOT initiate a
subsequent key update unless it has received an acknowledgment for a
packet that was sent protected with keys from the current key phase.
This ensures that keys are available to both peers before another key
update can be initiated. This can be implemented by tracking the
lowest packet number sent with each key phase and the highest
acknowledged packet number in the 1-RTT space: once the latter is
higher than or equal to the former, another key update can be
initiated.
| Note: Keys of packets other than the 1-RTT packets are never
| updated; their keys are derived solely from the TLS handshake
| state.
The endpoint that initiates a key update also updates the keys that
it uses for receiving packets. These keys will be needed to process
packets the peer sends after updating.
An endpoint MUST retain old keys until it has successfully
unprotected a packet sent using the new keys. An endpoint SHOULD
retain old keys for some time after unprotecting a packet sent using
the new keys. Discarding old keys too early can cause delayed
packets to be discarded. Discarding packets will be interpreted as
packet loss by the peer and could adversely affect performance.
6.2. Responding to a Key Update
A peer is permitted to initiate a key update after receiving an
acknowledgment of a packet in the current key phase. An endpoint
detects a key update when processing a packet with a key phase that
differs from the value used to protect the last packet it sent. To
process this packet, the endpoint uses the next packet protection key
and IV. See Section 6.3 for considerations about generating these
keys.
If a packet is successfully processed using the next key and IV, then
the peer has initiated a key update. The endpoint MUST update its
send keys to the corresponding key phase in response, as described in
Section 6.1. Sending keys MUST be updated before sending an
acknowledgment for the packet that was received with updated keys.
By acknowledging the packet that triggered the key update in a packet
protected with the updated keys, the endpoint signals that the key
update is complete.
An endpoint can defer sending the packet or acknowledgment according
to its normal packet sending behavior; it is not necessary to
immediately generate a packet in response to a key update. The next
packet sent by the endpoint will use the updated keys. The next
packet that contains an acknowledgment will cause the key update to
be completed. If an endpoint detects a second update before it has
sent any packets with updated keys containing an acknowledgment for
the packet that initiated the key update, it indicates that its peer
has updated keys twice without awaiting confirmation. An endpoint
MAY treat such consecutive key updates as a connection error of type
KEY_UPDATE_ERROR.
An endpoint that receives an acknowledgment that is carried in a
packet protected with old keys where any acknowledged packet was
protected with newer keys MAY treat that as a connection error of
type KEY_UPDATE_ERROR. This indicates that a peer has received and
acknowledged a packet that initiates a key update, but has not
updated keys in response.
6.3. Timing of Receive Key Generation
Endpoints responding to an apparent key update MUST NOT generate a
timing side-channel signal that might indicate that the Key Phase bit
was invalid (see Section 9.5). Endpoints can use dummy randomized packet
protection keys in place of discarded keys when key updates are not
yet permitted. Using dummy randomized keys will generate no variation in the
timing signal produced by ensures that attempting to
remove packet protection, protection does not result in timing variations, and
results in all packets with an invalid Key Phase bit being rejected.
The process of creating new packet protection keys for receiving
packets could reveal that a key update has occurred. An endpoint MAY
generate new keys as part of packet processing, but this creates a
timing signal that could be used by an attacker to learn when key
updates happen and thus leak the value of the Key Phase bit.
Endpoints are generally expected to have current and next receive
packet protection keys available. For a short period after a key
update completes, up to the PTO, endpoints MAY defer generation of
the next set of receive packet protection keys. This allows
endpoints to retain only two sets of receive keys; see Section 6.5.
Once generated, the next set of packet protection keys SHOULD be
retained, even if the packet that was received was subsequently
discarded. Packets containing apparent key updates are easy to
forge, and while the process of key update does not require
significant effort, triggering this process could be used by an
attacker for DoS.
For this reason, endpoints MUST be able to retain two sets of packet
protection keys for receiving packets: the current and the next.
Retaining the previous keys in addition to these might improve
performance, but this is not essential.
6.4. Sending with Updated Keys
An endpoint never sends packets that are protected with old keys.
Only the current keys are used. Keys used for protecting packets can
be discarded immediately after switching to newer keys.
Packets with higher packet numbers MUST be protected with either the
same or newer packet protection keys than packets with lower packet
numbers. An endpoint that successfully removes protection with old
keys when newer keys were used for packets with lower packet numbers
MUST treat this as a connection error of type KEY_UPDATE_ERROR.
6.5. Receiving with Different Keys
For receiving packets during a key update, packets protected with
older keys might arrive if they were delayed by the network.
Retaining old packet protection keys allows these packets to be
successfully processed.
As packets protected with keys from the next key phase use the same
Key Phase value as those protected with keys from the previous key
phase, it is necessary to distinguish between the two if packets
protected with old keys are to be processed. This can be done using
packet numbers. A recovered packet number that is lower than any
packet number from the current key phase uses the previous packet
protection keys; a recovered packet number that is higher than any
packet number from the current key phase requires the use of the next
packet protection keys.
Some care is necessary to ensure that any process for selecting
between previous, current, and next packet protection keys does not
expose a timing side channel that might reveal which keys were used
to remove packet protection. See Section 9.5 for more information.
Alternatively, endpoints can retain only two sets of packet
protection keys, swapping previous for next after enough time has
passed to allow for reordering in the network. In this case, the Key
Phase bit alone can be used to select keys.
An endpoint MAY allow a period of approximately the Probe Timeout
(PTO; see [RFC9002]) [QUIC-RECOVERY]) after promoting the next set of receive
keys to be current before it creates the subsequent set of packet
protection keys. These updated keys MAY replace the previous keys at
that time. With the caveat that PTO is a subjective measure -- that
is, a peer could have a different view of the RTT -- this time is
expected to be long enough that any reordered packets would be
declared lost by a peer even if they were acknowledged and short
enough to allow a peer to initiate further key updates.
Endpoints need to allow for the possibility that a peer might not be
able to decrypt packets that initiate a key update during the period
when the peer retains old keys. Endpoints SHOULD wait three times
the PTO before initiating a key update after receiving an
acknowledgment that confirms that the previous key update was
received. Failing to allow sufficient time could lead to packets
being discarded.
An endpoint SHOULD retain old read keys for no more than three times
the PTO after having received a packet protected using the new keys.
After this period, old read keys and their corresponding secrets
SHOULD be discarded.
6.6. Limits on AEAD Usage
This document sets usage limits for AEAD algorithms to ensure that
overuse does not give an adversary a disproportionate advantage in
attacking the confidentiality and integrity of communications when
using QUIC.
The usage limits defined in TLS 1.3 exist for protection against
attacks on confidentiality and apply to successful applications of
AEAD protection. The integrity protections in authenticated
encryption also depend on limiting the number of attempts to forge
packets. TLS achieves this by closing connections after any record
fails an authentication check. In comparison, QUIC ignores any
packet that cannot be authenticated, allowing multiple forgery
attempts.
QUIC accounts for AEAD confidentiality and integrity limits
separately. The confidentiality limit applies to the number of
packets encrypted with a given key. The integrity limit applies to
the number of packets decrypted within a given connection. Details
on enforcing these limits for each AEAD algorithm follow below.
Endpoints MUST count the number of encrypted packets for each set of
keys. If the total number of encrypted packets with the same key
exceeds the confidentiality limit for the selected AEAD, the endpoint
MUST stop using those keys. Endpoints MUST initiate a key update
before sending more protected packets than the confidentiality limit
for the selected AEAD permits. If a key update is not possible or
integrity limits are reached, the endpoint MUST stop using the
connection and only send stateless resets in response to receiving
packets. It is RECOMMENDED that endpoints immediately close the
connection with a connection error of type AEAD_LIMIT_REACHED before
reaching a state where key updates are not possible.
For AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM, the confidentiality limit
is 2^23 encrypted packets; see Appendix B.1. For
AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305, the confidentiality limit is greater than the
number of possible packets (2^62) and so can be disregarded. For
AEAD_AES_128_CCM, the confidentiality limit is 2^21.5 encrypted
packets; see Appendix B.2. Applying a limit reduces the probability
that an attacker can distinguish the AEAD in use from a random
permutation; see [AEBounds], [ROBUST], and [GCM-MU].
In addition to counting packets sent, endpoints MUST count the number
of received packets that fail authentication during the lifetime of a
connection. If the total number of received packets that fail
authentication within the connection, across all keys, exceeds the
integrity limit for the selected AEAD, the endpoint MUST immediately
close the connection with a connection error of type
AEAD_LIMIT_REACHED and not process any more packets.
For AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM, the integrity limit is
2^52 invalid packets; see Appendix B.1. For AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
the integrity limit is 2^36 invalid packets; see [AEBounds]. For
AEAD_AES_128_CCM, the integrity limit is 2^21.5 invalid packets; see
Appendix B.2. Applying this limit reduces the probability that an
attacker can successfully forge a packet; see [AEBounds], [ROBUST],
and [GCM-MU].
Endpoints that limit the size of packets MAY use higher
confidentiality and integrity limits; see Appendix B for details.
Future analyses and specifications MAY relax confidentiality or
integrity limits for an AEAD.
Any TLS cipher suite that is specified for use with QUIC MUST define
limits on the use of the associated AEAD function that preserves
margins for confidentiality and integrity. That is, limits MUST be
specified for the number of packets that can be authenticated and for
the number of packets that can fail authentication. Providing a
reference to any analysis upon which values are based -- and any
assumptions used in that analysis -- allows limits to be adapted to
varying usage conditions.
6.7. Key Update Error Code
The KEY_UPDATE_ERROR error code (0xe) (0x0e) is used to signal errors
related to key updates.
7. Security of Initial Messages
Initial packets are not protected with a secret key, so they are
subject to potential tampering by an attacker. QUIC provides
protection against attackers that cannot read packets but does not
attempt to provide additional protection against attacks where the
attacker can observe and inject packets. Some forms of tampering --
such as modifying the TLS messages themselves -- are detectable, but
some -- such as modifying ACKs -- are not.
For example, an attacker could inject a packet containing an ACK
frame to make it appear that a packet had not been received or to
create a false impression of the state of the connection (e.g., by
modifying the ACK Delay). Note that such a packet could cause a
legitimate packet to be dropped as a duplicate. Implementations
SHOULD use caution in relying on any data that is contained in
Initial packets that is not otherwise authenticated.
It is also possible for the attacker to tamper with data that is
carried in Handshake packets, but because that sort of tampering
requires modifying TLS handshake messages, that any such tampering will
cause the TLS handshake to fail.
8. QUIC-Specific Adjustments to the TLS Handshake
Certain aspects of the TLS handshake are different when used with
QUIC.
QUIC also requires additional features from TLS. In addition to
negotiation of cryptographic parameters, the TLS handshake carries
and authenticates values for QUIC transport parameters.
8.1. Protocol Negotiation
QUIC requires that the cryptographic handshake provide authenticated
protocol negotiation. TLS uses Application Layer Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation [ALPN] to select an application protocol. Unless another
mechanism is used for agreeing on an application protocol, endpoints
MUST use ALPN for this purpose.
When using ALPN, endpoints MUST immediately close a connection (see
Section 10.2 of [RFC9000]) [QUIC-TRANSPORT]) with a no_application_protocol TLS
alert (QUIC error code 0x178; 0x0178; see Section 4.8) if an application
protocol is not negotiated. While [ALPN] only specifies that servers
use this alert, QUIC clients MUST use error 0x178 0x0178 to terminate a
connection when ALPN negotiation fails.
An application protocol MAY restrict the QUIC versions that it can
operate over. Servers MUST select an application protocol compatible
with the QUIC version that the client has selected. The server MUST
treat the inability to select a compatible application protocol as a
connection error of type 0x178 0x0178 (no_application_protocol).
Similarly, a client MUST treat the selection of an incompatible
application protocol by a server as a connection error of type 0x178.
0x0178.
8.2. QUIC Transport Parameters Extension
QUIC transport parameters are carried in a TLS extension. Different
versions of QUIC might define a different method for negotiating
transport configuration.
Including transport parameters in the TLS handshake provides
integrity protection for these values.
enum {
quic_transport_parameters(0x39), (65535)
} ExtensionType;
The extension_data field of the quic_transport_parameters extension
contains a value that is defined by the version of QUIC that is in
use.
The quic_transport_parameters extension is carried in the ClientHello
and the EncryptedExtensions messages during the handshake. Endpoints
MUST send the quic_transport_parameters extension; endpoints that
receive ClientHello or EncryptedExtensions messages without the
quic_transport_parameters extension MUST close the connection with an
error of type 0x16d 0x016d (equivalent to a fatal TLS missing_extension
alert, see Section 4.8).
Transport parameters become available prior to the completion of the
handshake. A server might use these values earlier than handshake
completion. However, the value of transport parameters is not
authenticated until the handshake completes, so any use of these
parameters cannot depend on their authenticity. Any tampering with
transport parameters will cause the handshake to fail.
Endpoints MUST NOT send this extension in a TLS connection that does
not use QUIC (such as the use of TLS with TCP defined in [TLS13]). A
fatal unsupported_extension alert MUST be sent by an implementation
that supports this extension if the extension is received when the
transport is not QUIC.
Negotiating the quic_transport_parameters extension causes the
EndOfEarlyData to be removed; see Section 8.3.
8.3. Removing the EndOfEarlyData Message
The TLS EndOfEarlyData message is not used with QUIC. QUIC does not
rely on this message to mark the end of 0-RTT data or to signal the
change to Handshake keys.
Clients MUST NOT send the EndOfEarlyData message. A server MUST
treat receipt of a CRYPTO frame in a 0-RTT packet as a connection
error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
As a result, EndOfEarlyData does not appear in the TLS handshake
transcript.
8.4. Prohibit TLS Middlebox Compatibility Mode
Appendix D.4 of [TLS13] describes an alteration to the TLS 1.3
handshake as a workaround for bugs in some middleboxes. The TLS 1.3
middlebox compatibility mode involves setting the legacy_session_id
field to a 32-byte value in the ClientHello and ServerHello, then
sending a change_cipher_spec record. Both field and record carry no
semantic content and are ignored.
This mode has no use in QUIC as it only applies to middleboxes that
interfere with TLS over TCP. QUIC also provides no means to carry a
change_cipher_spec record. A client MUST NOT request the use of the
TLS 1.3 compatibility mode. A server SHOULD treat the receipt of a
TLS ClientHello with a non-empty legacy_session_id field as a
connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
9. Security Considerations
All of the security considerations that apply to TLS also apply to
the use of TLS in QUIC. Reading all of [TLS13] and its appendices is
the best way to gain an understanding of the security properties of
QUIC.
This section summarizes some of the more important security aspects
specific to the TLS integration, though there are many security-
relevant details in the remainder of the document.
9.1. Session Linkability
Use of TLS session tickets allows servers and possibly other entities
to correlate connections made by the same client; see Section 4.5 for
details.
9.2. Replay Attacks with 0-RTT
As described in Section 8 of [TLS13], use of TLS early data comes
with an exposure to replay attack. The use of 0-RTT in QUIC is
similarly vulnerable to replay attack.
Endpoints MUST implement and use the replay protections described in
[TLS13], however it is recognized that these protections are
imperfect. Therefore, additional consideration of the risk of replay
is needed.
QUIC is not vulnerable to replay attack, except via the application
protocol information it might carry. The management of QUIC protocol
state based on the frame types defined in [RFC9000] [QUIC-TRANSPORT] is not
vulnerable to replay. Processing of QUIC frames is idempotent and
cannot result in invalid connection states if frames are replayed,
reordered, or lost. QUIC connections do not produce effects that
last beyond the lifetime of the connection, except for those produced
by the application protocol that QUIC serves.
Note:
TLS session tickets and address validation tokens are used to carry
QUIC configuration information between connections,
specifically specifically, to
enable a server to efficiently recover state that is used in
connection establishment and address validation. These MUST NOT be
used to communicate application semantics between endpoints; clients
MUST treat them as opaque values. The potential for reuse of these
tokens means that they require stronger protections against replay.
A server that accepts 0-RTT on a connection incurs a higher cost than
accepting a connection without 0-RTT. This includes higher
processing and computation costs. Servers need to consider the
probability of replay and all associated costs when accepting 0-RTT.
Ultimately, the responsibility for managing the risks of replay
attacks with 0-RTT lies with an application protocol. An application
protocol that uses QUIC MUST describe how the protocol uses 0-RTT and
the measures that are employed to protect against replay attack. An
analysis of replay risk needs to consider all QUIC protocol features
that carry application semantics.
Disabling 0-RTT entirely is the most effective defense against replay
attack.
QUIC extensions MUST either describe how replay attacks affect their
operation or prohibit the use of the extension in 0-RTT. Application
protocols MUST either prohibit the use of extensions that carry
application semantics in 0-RTT or provide replay mitigation
strategies.
9.3. Packet Reflection Attack Mitigation
A small ClientHello that results in a large block of handshake
messages from a server can be used in packet reflection attacks to
amplify the traffic generated by an attacker.
QUIC includes three defenses against this attack. First, the packet
containing a ClientHello MUST be padded to a minimum size. Second,
if responding to an unverified source address, the server is
forbidden to send more than three times as many bytes as the number
of bytes it has received (see Section 8.1 of [RFC9000]). [QUIC-TRANSPORT]).
Finally, because acknowledgments of Handshake packets are
authenticated, a blind attacker cannot forge them. Put together,
these defenses limit the level of amplification.
9.4. Header Protection Analysis
[NAN] analyzes authenticated encryption algorithms that provide nonce
privacy, referred to as "Hide Nonce" (HN) transforms. The general
header protection construction in this document is one of those
algorithms (HN1). Header protection is applied after the packet
protection AEAD, sampling a set of bytes ("sample") from the AEAD
output and encrypting the header field using a pseudorandom function
(PRF) as follows:
protected_field = field XOR PRF(hp_key, sample)
The header protection variants in this document use a pseudorandom
permutation (PRP) in place of a generic PRF. However, since all PRPs
are also PRFs [IMC], these variants do not deviate from the HN1
construction.
As "hp_key" is distinct from the packet protection key, it follows
that header protection achieves AE2 security as defined in [NAN] and
therefore guarantees privacy of "field", the protected packet header.
Future header protection variants based on this construction MUST use
a PRF to ensure equivalent security guarantees.
Use of the same key and ciphertext sample more than once risks
compromising header protection. Protecting two different headers
with the same key and ciphertext sample reveals the exclusive OR of
the protected fields. Assuming that the AEAD acts as a PRF, if L
bits are sampled, the odds of two ciphertext samples being identical
approach 2^(-L/2), that is, the birthday bound. For the algorithms
described in this document, that probability is one in 2^64.
To prevent an attacker from modifying packet headers, the header is
transitively authenticated using packet protection; the entire packet
header is part of the authenticated additional data. Protected
fields that are falsified or modified can only be detected once the
packet protection is removed.
9.5. Header Protection Timing Side Channels
An attacker could guess values for packet numbers or Key Phase and
have an endpoint confirm guesses through timing side channels.
Similarly, guesses for the packet number length can be tried and
exposed. If the recipient of a packet discards packets with
duplicate packet numbers without attempting to remove packet
protection, they could reveal through timing side channels that the
packet number matches a received packet. For authentication to be
free from side channels, the entire process of header protection
removal, packet number recovery, and packet protection removal MUST
be applied together without timing and other side channels.
For the sending of packets, construction and protection of packet
payloads and packet numbers MUST be free from side channels that
would reveal the packet number or its encoded size.
During a key update, the time taken to generate new keys could reveal
through timing side channels that a key update has occurred.
Alternatively, where an attacker injects packets, this side channel
could reveal the value of the Key Phase on injected packets. After
receiving a key update, an endpoint SHOULD generate and save the next
set of receive packet protection keys, as described in Section 6.3.
By generating new keys before a key update is received, receipt of
packets will not create timing signals that leak the value of the Key
Phase.
This depends on not doing this key generation during packet
processing, and it can require that endpoints maintain three sets of
packet protection keys for receiving: for the previous key phase, for
the current key phase, and for the next key phase. Endpoints can
instead choose to defer generation of the next receive packet
protection keys until they discard old keys so that only two sets of
receive keys need to be retained at any point in time.
9.6. Key Diversity
In using TLS, the central key schedule of TLS is used. As a result
of the TLS handshake messages being integrated into the calculation
of secrets, the inclusion of the QUIC transport parameters extension
ensures that the handshake and 1-RTT keys are not the same as those
that might be produced by a server running TLS over TCP. To avoid
the possibility of cross-protocol key synchronization, additional
measures are provided to improve key separation.
The QUIC packet protection keys and IVs are derived using a different
label than the equivalent keys in TLS.
To preserve this separation, a new version of QUIC SHOULD define new
labels for key derivation for packet protection key and IV, plus the
header protection keys. This version of QUIC uses the string "quic".
Other versions can use a version-specific label in place of that
string.
The initial secrets use a key that is specific to the negotiated QUIC
version. New QUIC versions SHOULD define a new salt value used in
calculating initial secrets.
9.7. Randomness
QUIC depends on endpoints being able to generate secure random
numbers, both directly for protocol values such as the connection ID,
and transitively via TLS. See [RFC4086] for guidance on secure
random number generation.
10. IANA Considerations
IANA has registered a codepoint of 57 (or 0x39) for the
quic_transport_parameters extension (defined in Section 8.2) in the
"TLS ExtensionType Values" registry [TLS-REGISTRIES].
The Recommended column for this extension is marked Yes. The TLS 1.3
Column includes CH (ClientHello) and EE (EncryptedExtensions).
+=======+===========================+=====+=============+===========+
| Value | Extension Name | TLS | Recommended | Reference |
| | | 1.3 | | |
+=======+===========================+=====+=============+===========+
| 57 | quic_transport_parameters | CH, | Y | This |
| | | EE | | document |
+-------+---------------------------+-----+-------------+-----------+
Table 2: TLS ExtensionType Values Registry Entry
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[AEAD] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
[AES] "Advanced encryption standard (AES)", National Institute
of Standards and Technology report,
DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.197, November 2001,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.197>.
[ALPN] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[CHACHA] Nir, Y. and A. Langley, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF
Protocols", RFC 8439, DOI 10.17487/RFC8439, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8439>.
[HKDF] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[QUIC-RECOVERY]
Iyengar, J., Ed. and I. Swett, Ed., "QUIC Loss Detection
and Congestion Control", RFC 9002, DOI 10.17487/RFC9002,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9002>.
[QUIC-TRANSPORT]
Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, April 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
[RFC9002] Iyengar, J., Ed. and I. Swett, Ed., "QUIC Loss Detection
and Congestion Control", RFC 9002, DOI 10.17487/RFC9002,
April 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9002>.
[SHA] Dang, Q., "Secure Hash Standard", National Institute of
Standards and Technology report,
DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.180-4, July 2015,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.180-4>.
[TLS-REGISTRIES]
Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8447>.
[TLS13] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
11.2. Informative References
[AEBounds] Luykx, A. and K. Paterson, "Limits on Authenticated
Encryption Use in TLS", 28 August 2017,
<https://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/TLS-AEbounds.pdf>.
[ASCII] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for network interchange", STD 80,
RFC 20, DOI 10.17487/RFC0020, October 1969,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc20>.
[CCM-ANALYSIS]
Jonsson, J., "On the Security of CTR + CBC-MAC", Selected
Areas in Cryptography, SAC 2002, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol 2595, pp. 76-93, DOI 10.1007/3-540-36492-7_7,
2003, <https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36492-7_7>.
[COMPRESS] Ghedini, A. and V. Vasiliev, "TLS Certificate
Compression", RFC 8879, DOI 10.17487/RFC8879, December
2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8879>.
[GCM-MU] Hoang, V., Tessaro, S., and A. Thiruvengadam, "The Multi-
user Security of GCM, Revisited: Tight Bounds for Nonce
Randomization", CCS '18: Proceedings of the 2018 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
pp. 1429-1440, DOI 10.1145/3243734.3243816, October 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243816>.
[HTTP-REPLAY]
Thomson, M., Nottingham, M., and W. Tarreau, "Using Early
Data in HTTP", RFC 8470, DOI 10.17487/RFC8470, September
2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8470>.
[HTTP2-TLS13]
Benjamin, D., "Using TLS 1.3 with HTTP/2", RFC 8740,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8740, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8740>.
[IMC] Katz, J. and Y. Lindell, "Introduction to Modern
Cryptography, Second Edition", ISBN 978-1466570269, 6
November 2014.
[NAN] Bellare, M., Ng, R., and B. Tackmann, "Nonces Are Noticed:
AEAD Revisited", Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2019,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 11692, pp. 235-265,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9, 2019,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9>.
[QUIC-HTTP]
Bishop, M., Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 3
(HTTP/3)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
quic-http-34,
quic-http, 2 February 2021,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-http-34>.
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-http>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[ROBUST] Fischlin, M., Günther, F., and C. Janson, "Robust
Channels: Handling Unreliable Networks in the Record
Layers of QUIC and DTLS 1.3", 16 May 2020,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/718>.
Appendix A. Sample Packet Protection
This section shows examples of packet protection so that
implementations can be verified incrementally. Samples of Initial
packets from both client and server plus a Retry packet are defined.
These packets use an 8-byte client-chosen Destination Connection ID
of 0x8394c8f03e515708. Some intermediate values are included. All
values are shown in hexadecimal.
A.1. Keys
The labels generated during the execution of the HKDF-Expand-Label
function (that is, HkdfLabel.label) and part of the value given to
the HKDF-Expand function in order to produce its output are:
client in: 00200f746c73313320636c69656e7420696e00
server in: 00200f746c7331332073657276657220696e00
quic key: 00100e746c7331332071756963206b657900
quic iv: 000c0d746c733133207175696320697600
quic hp: 00100d746c733133207175696320687000
The initial secret is common:
initial_secret = HKDF-Extract(initial_salt, cid)
= 7db5df06e7a69e432496adedb0085192
3595221596ae2ae9fb8115c1e9ed0a44
The secrets for protecting client packets are:
client_initial_secret
= HKDF-Expand-Label(initial_secret, "client in", "", 32)
= c00cf151ca5be075ed0ebfb5c80323c4
2d6b7db67881289af4008f1f6c357aea
key = HKDF-Expand-Label(client_initial_secret, "quic key", "", 16)
= 1f369613dd76d5467730efcbe3b1a22d
iv = HKDF-Expand-Label(client_initial_secret, "quic iv", "", 12)
= fa044b2f42a3fd3b46fb255c
hp = HKDF-Expand-Label(client_initial_secret, "quic hp", "", 16)
= 9f50449e04a0e810283a1e9933adedd2
The secrets for protecting server packets are:
server_initial_secret
= HKDF-Expand-Label(initial_secret, "server in", "", 32)
= 3c199828fd139efd216c155ad844cc81
fb82fa8d7446fa7d78be803acdda951b
key = HKDF-Expand-Label(server_initial_secret, "quic key", "", 16)
= cf3a5331653c364c88f0f379b6067e37
iv = HKDF-Expand-Label(server_initial_secret, "quic iv", "", 12)
= 0ac1493ca1905853b0bba03e
hp = HKDF-Expand-Label(server_initial_secret, "quic hp", "", 16)
= c206b8d9b9f0f37644430b490eeaa314
A.2. Client Initial
The client sends an Initial packet. The unprotected payload of this
packet contains the following CRYPTO frame, plus enough PADDING
frames to make a 1162-byte payload:
060040f1010000ed0303ebf8fa56f129 39b9584a3896472ec40bb863cfd3e868
04fe3a47f06a2b69484c000004130113 02010000c000000010000e00000b6578
616d706c652e636f6dff01000100000a 00080006001d00170018001000070005
04616c706e0005000501000000000033 00260024001d00209370b2c9caa47fba
baf4559fedba753de171fa71f50f1ce1 5d43e994ec74d748002b000302030400
0d0010000e0403050306030203080408 050806002d00020101001c0002400100
3900320408ffffffffffffffff050480 00ffff07048000ffff08011001048000
75300901100f088394c8f03e51570806 048000ffff
The unprotected header indicates a length of 1182 bytes: the 4-byte
packet number, 1162 bytes of frames, and the 16-byte authentication
tag. The header includes the connection ID and a packet number of 2:
c300000001088394c8f03e5157080000449e00000002
Protecting the payload produces output that is sampled for header
protection. Because the header uses a 4-byte packet number encoding,
the first 16 bytes of the protected payload is sampled and then
applied to the header: header as follows:
sample = d1b1c98dd7689fb8ec11d242b123dc9b
mask = AES-ECB(hp, sample)[0..4]
= 437b9aec36
header[0] ^= mask[0] & 0x0f
= c0
header[18..21] ^= mask[1..4]
= 7b9aec34
header = c000000001088394c8f03e5157080000449e7b9aec34
The resulting protected packet is:
c000000001088394c8f03e5157080000 449e7b9aec34d1b1c98dd7689fb8ec11
d242b123dc9bd8bab936b47d92ec356c 0bab7df5976d27cd449f63300099f399
1c260ec4c60d17b31f8429157bb35a12 82a643a8d2262cad67500cadb8e7378c
8eb7539ec4d4905fed1bee1fc8aafba1 7c750e2c7ace01e6005f80fcb7df6212
30c83711b39343fa028cea7f7fb5ff89 eac2308249a02252155e2347b63d58c5
457afd84d05dfffdb20392844ae81215 4682e9cf012f9021a6f0be17ddd0c208
4dce25ff9b06cde535d0f920a2db1bf3 62c23e596d11a4f5a6cf3948838a3aec
4e15daf8500a6ef69ec4e3feb6b1d98e 610ac8b7ec3faf6ad760b7bad1db4ba3
485e8a94dc250ae3fdb41ed15fb6a8e5 eba0fc3dd60bc8e30c5c4287e53805db
059ae0648db2f64264ed5e39be2e20d8 2df566da8dd5998ccabdae053060ae6c
7b4378e846d29f37ed7b4ea9ec5d82e7 961b7f25a9323851f681d582363aa5f8
9937f5a67258bf63ad6f1a0b1d96dbd4 faddfcefc5266ba6611722395c906556
be52afe3f565636ad1b17d508b73d874 3eeb524be22b3dcbc2c7468d54119c74
68449a13d8e3b95811a198f3491de3e7 fe942b330407abf82a4ed7c1b311663a
c69890f4157015853d91e923037c227a 33cdd5ec281ca3f79c44546b9d90ca00
f064c99e3dd97911d39fe9c5d0b23a22 9a234cb36186c4819e8b9c5927726632
291d6a418211cc2962e20fe47feb3edf 330f2c603a9d48c0fcb5699dbfe58964
25c5bac4aee82e57a85aaf4e2513e4f0 5796b07ba2ee47d80506f8d2c25e50fd
14de71e6c418559302f939b0e1abd576 f279c4b2e0feb85c1f28ff18f58891ff
ef132eef2fa09346aee33c28eb130ff2 8f5b766953334113211996d20011a198
e3fc433f9f2541010ae17c1bf202580f 6047472fb36857fe843b19f5984009dd
c324044e847a4f4a0ab34f719595de37 252d6235365e9b84392b061085349d73
203a4a13e96f5432ec0fd4a1ee65accd d5e3904df54c1da510b0ff20dcc0c77f
cb2c0e0eb605cb0504db87632cf3d8b4 dae6e705769d1de354270123cb11450e
fc60ac47683d7b8d0f811365565fd98c 4c8eb936bcab8d069fc33bd801b03ade
a2e1fbc5aa463d08ca19896d2bf59a07 1b851e6c239052172f296bfb5e724047
90a2181014f3b94a4e97d117b4381303 68cc39dbb2d198065ae3986547926cd2
162f40a29f0c3c8745c0f50fba3852e5 66d44575c29d39a03f0cda721984b6f4
40591f355e12d439ff150aab7613499d bd49adabc8676eef023b15b65bfc5ca0
6948109f23f350db82123535eb8a7433 bdabcb909271a6ecbcb58b936a88cd4e
8f2e6ff5800175f113253d8fa9ca8885 c2f552e657dc603f252e1a8e308f76f0
be79e2fb8f5d5fbbe2e30ecadd220723 c8c0aea8078cdfcb3868263ff8f09400
54da48781893a7e49ad5aff4af300cd8 04a6b6279ab3ff3afb64491c85194aab
760d58a606654f9f4400e8b38591356f bf6425aca26dc85244259ff2b19c41b9
f96f3ca9ec1dde434da7d2d392b905dd f3d1f9af93d1af5950bd493f5aa731b4
056df31bd267b6b90a079831aaf579be 0a39013137aac6d404f518cfd4684064
7e78bfe706ca4cf5e9c5453e9f7cfd2b 8b4c8d169a44e55c88d4a9a7f9474241
e221af44860018ab0856972e194cd934
A.3. Server Initial
The server sends the following payload in response, including an ACK
frame, a CRYPTO frame, and no PADDING frames:
02000000000600405a020000560303ee fce7f7b37ba1d1632e96677825ddf739
88cfc79825df566dc5430b9a045a1200 130100002e00330024001d00209d3c94
0d89690b84d08a60993c144eca684d10 81287c834d5311bcf32bb9da1a002b00
020304
The header from the server includes a new connection ID and a 2-byte
packet number encoding for a packet number of 1:
c1000000010008f067a5502a4262b50040750001
As a result, after protection, the header protection sample is taken
starting from the third protected byte:
sample = 2cd0991cd25b0aac406a5816b6394100
mask = 2ec0d8356a
header = cf000000010008f067a5502a4262b5004075c0d9
The final protected packet is then:
cf000000010008f067a5502a4262b500 4075c0d95a482cd0991cd25b0aac406a
5816b6394100f37a1c69797554780bb3 8cc5a99f5ede4cf73c3ec2493a1839b3
dbcba3f6ea46c5b7684df3548e7ddeb9 c3bf9c73cc3f3bded74b562bfb19fb84
022f8ef4cdd93795d77d06edbb7aaf2f 58891850abbdca3d20398c276456cbc4
2158407dd074ee
A.4. Retry
This shows a Retry packet that might be sent in response to the
Initial packet in Appendix A.2. The integrity check includes the
client-chosen connection ID value of 0x8394c8f03e515708, but that
value is not included in the final Retry packet:
ff000000010008f067a5502a4262b574 6f6b656e04a265ba2eff4d829058fb3f
0f2496ba
A.5. ChaCha20-Poly1305 Short Header Packet
This example shows some of the steps required to protect a packet
with a short header. This example uses AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305.
In this example, TLS produces an application write secret from which
a server uses HKDF-Expand-Label to produce four values: a key, an IV,
a header protection key, and the secret that will be used after keys
are updated (this last value is not used further in this example).
secret
= 9ac312a7f877468ebe69422748ad00a1
5443f18203a07d6060f688f30f21632b
key = HKDF-Expand-Label(secret, "quic key", "", 32)
= c6d98ff3441c3fe1b2182094f69caa2e
d4b716b65488960a7a984979fb23e1c8
iv = HKDF-Expand-Label(secret, "quic iv", "", 12)
= e0459b3474bdd0e44a41c144
hp = HKDF-Expand-Label(secret, "quic hp", "", 32)
= 25a282b9e82f06f21f488917a4fc8f1b
73573685608597d0efcb076b0ab7a7a4
ku = HKDF-Expand-Label(secret, "quic ku", "", 32)
= 1223504755036d556342ee9361d25342
1a826c9ecdf3c7148684b36b714881f9
The following shows the steps involved in protecting a minimal packet
with an empty Destination Connection ID. This packet contains a
single PING frame (that is, a payload of just 0x01) and has a packet
number of 654360564. In this example, using a packet number of
length 3 (that is, 49140 is encoded) avoids having to pad the payload
of the packet; PADDING frames would be needed if the packet number is
encoded on fewer bytes.
pn = 654360564 (decimal)
nonce = e0459b3474bdd0e46d417eb0
unprotected header = 4200bff4
payload plaintext = 01
payload ciphertext = 655e5cd55c41f69080575d7999c25a5bfb
The resulting ciphertext is the minimum size possible. One byte is
skipped to produce the sample for header protection.
sample = 5e5cd55c41f69080575d7999c25a5bfb
mask = aefefe7d03
header = 4cfe4189
The protected packet is the smallest possible packet size of 21
bytes.
packet = 4cfe4189655e5cd55c41f69080575d7999c25a5bfb
Appendix B. AEAD Algorithm Analysis
This section documents analyses used in deriving AEAD algorithm
limits for AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_128_CCM, and AEAD_AES_256_GCM.
The analyses that follow use symbols for multiplication (*), division
(/), and exponentiation (^), plus parentheses for establishing
precedence. The following symbols are also used:
t: The size of the authentication tag in bits. For these ciphers, t
is 128.
n: The size of the block function in bits. For these ciphers, n is
128.
k: The size of the key in bits. This is 128 for AEAD_AES_128_GCM
and AEAD_AES_128_CCM; 256 for AEAD_AES_256_GCM.
l: The number of blocks in each packet (see below).
q: The number of genuine packets created and protected by endpoints.
This value is the bound on the number of packets that can be
protected before updating keys.
v: The number of forged packets that endpoints will accept. This
value is the bound on the number of forged packets that an
endpoint can reject before updating keys.
o: The amount of offline ideal cipher queries made by an adversary.
The analyses that follow rely on a count of the number of block
operations involved in producing each message. This analysis is
performed for packets of size up to 2^11 (l = 2^7) and 2^16 (l =
2^12). A size of 2^11 is expected to be a limit that matches common
deployment patterns, whereas the 2^16 is the maximum possible size of
a QUIC packet. Only endpoints that strictly limit packet size can
use the larger confidentiality and integrity limits that are derived
using the smaller packet size.
For AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM, the message length (l) is
the length of the associated data in blocks plus the length of the
plaintext in blocks.
For AEAD_AES_128_CCM, the total number of block cipher operations is
the sum of the following: the length of the associated data in
blocks, the length of the ciphertext in blocks, the length of the
plaintext in blocks, plus 1. In this analysis, this is simplified to
a value of twice the length of the packet in blocks (that is, "2l =
2^8" for packets that are limited to 2^11 bytes, or "2l = 2^13"
otherwise). This simplification is based on the packet containing
all of the associated data and ciphertext. This results in a one to
three block overestimation of the number of operations per packet.
B.1. Analysis of AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM Usage Limits
[GCM-MU] specifies concrete bounds for AEAD_AES_128_GCM and
AEAD_AES_256_GCM as used in TLS 1.3 and QUIC. This section documents
this analysis using several simplifying assumptions:
* The number of ciphertext blocks an attacker uses in forgery
attempts is bounded by v * l, which is the number of forgery
attempts multiplied by the size of each packet (in blocks).
* The amount of offline work done by an attacker does not dominate
other factors in the analysis.
The bounds in [GCM-MU] are tighter and more complete than those used
in [AEBounds], which allows for larger limits than those described in
[TLS13].
B.1.1. Confidentiality Limit
For confidentiality, Theorem (4.3) in [GCM-MU] establishes that, for
a single user that does not repeat nonces, the dominant term in
determining the distinguishing advantage between a real and random
AEAD algorithm gained by an attacker is:
2 * (q * l)^2 / 2^n
For a target advantage of 2^-57, this results in the relation:
q <= 2^35 / l
Thus, endpoints that do not send packets larger than 2^11 bytes
cannot protect more than 2^28 packets in a single connection without
causing an attacker to gain a larger more significant advantage than the
target of 2^-
57. 2^-57. The limit for endpoints that allow for the packet
size to be as large as 2^16 is instead 2^23.
B.1.2. Integrity Limit
For integrity, Theorem (4.3) in [GCM-MU] establishes that an attacker
gains an advantage in successfully forging a packet of no more than
the following:
(1 / 2^(8 * n)) + ((2 * v) / 2^(2 * n))
+ ((2 * o * v) / 2^(k + n)) + (n * (v + (v * l)) / 2^k)
The goal is to limit this advantage to 2^-57. For AEAD_AES_128_GCM,
the fourth term in this inequality dominates the rest, so the others
can be removed without significant effect on the result. This
produces the following approximation:
v <= 2^64 / l
Endpoints that do not attempt to remove protection from packets
larger than 2^11 bytes can attempt to remove protection from at most
2^57 packets. Endpoints that do not restrict the size of processed
packets can attempt to remove protection from at most 2^52 packets.
For AEAD_AES_256_GCM, the same term dominates, but the larger value
of k produces the following approximation:
v <= 2^192 / l
This is substantially larger than the limit for AEAD_AES_128_GCM.
However, this document recommends that the same limit be applied to
both functions as either limit is acceptably large.
B.2. Analysis of AEAD_AES_128_CCM Usage Limits
TLS [TLS13] and [AEBounds] do not specify limits on usage for
AEAD_AES_128_CCM. However, any AEAD that is used with QUIC requires
limits on use that ensure that both confidentiality and integrity are
preserved. This section documents that analysis.
[CCM-ANALYSIS] is used as the basis of this analysis. The results of
that analysis are used to derive usage limits that are based on those
chosen in [TLS13].
For confidentiality, Theorem 2 in [CCM-ANALYSIS] establishes that an
attacker gains a distinguishing advantage over an ideal pseudorandom
permutation (PRP) of no more than the following:
(2l * q)^2 / 2^n
The integrity limit in Theorem 1 in [CCM-ANALYSIS] provides an
attacker a strictly higher advantage for the same number of messages.
As the targets for the confidentiality advantage and the integrity
advantage are the same, only Theorem 1 needs to be considered.
Theorem 1 establishes that an attacker gains an advantage over an
ideal PRP of no more than the following:
v / 2^t + (2l * (v + q))^2 / 2^n
As "t" and "n" are both 128, the first term is negligible relative to
the second, so that term can be removed without a significant effect
on the result.
This produces a relation that combines both encryption and decryption
attempts with the same limit as that produced by the theorem for
confidentiality alone. For a target advantage of 2^-57, this results
in the following:
v + q <= 2^34.5 / l
By setting "q = v", values for both confidentiality and integrity
limits can be produced. Endpoints that limit packets to 2^11 bytes
therefore have both confidentiality and integrity limits of 2^26.5
packets. Endpoints that do not restrict packet size have a limit of
2^21.5.
Contributors
The IETF QUIC Working Group received an enormous amount of support
from many people. The following people provided substantive
contributions to this document:
* Adam Langley
* Alessandro Ghedini
* Christian Huitema
* Christopher Wood
* David Schinazi
* Dragana Damjanovic
* Eric Rescorla
* Felix Guenther Günther
* Ian Swett
* Jana Iyengar
* 奥 一穂 (Kazuho Oku)
* Marten Seemann
* Martin Duke
* Mike Bishop
* Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
* Nick Banks
* Nick Harper
* Roberto Peon
* Rui Paulo
* Ryan Hamilton
* Victor Vasiliev
Authors' Addresses
Martin Thomson (editor)
Mozilla
Email: mt@lowentropy.net
Sean Turner (editor)
sn3rd
Email: sean@sn3rd.com