Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Marin-Lopez
Request for Comments: 9061 G. Lopez-Millan
Category: Standards Track University of Murcia
ISSN: 2070-1721 F. Pereniguez-Garcia
University Defense Center
June 2021
A YANG Data Model for IPsec Flow Protection Based on Software-Defined
Networking (SDN)
Abstract
This document describes how to provide IPsec-based flow protection
(integrity and confidentiality) by means of an Interface to Network
Security Function (I2NSF) Controller. It considers two main well-
known scenarios in IPsec: gateway-to-gateway and host-to-host. The
service described in this document allows the configuration and
monitoring of IPsec Security Associations (IPsec SAs) from an I2NSF
Controller to one or several flow-based Network Security Functions
(NSFs) that rely on IPsec to protect data traffic.
This document focuses on the I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface by providing
YANG data models for configuring the IPsec databases, namely Security
Policy Database (SPD), Security Association Database (SAD), Peer
Authorization Database (PAD), and Internet Key Exchange Version 2
(IKEv2). This allows IPsec SA establishment with minimal
intervention by the network administrator. This document defines
three YANG modules, but it does not define any new protocol.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9061.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Terminology
2.1. Requirements Language
3. SDN-Based IPsec Management Description
3.1. IKE Case: IKEv2/IPsec in the NSF
3.2. IKE-less Case: IPsec (No IKEv2) in the NSF
4. IKE Case vs. IKE-less Case
4.1. Rekeying Process
4.2. NSF State Loss
4.3. NAT Traversal
4.4. NSF Registration and Discovery
5. YANG Configuration Data Models
5.1. The 'ietf-i2nsf-ikec' Module
5.1.1. Data Model Overview
5.1.2. YANG Module
5.2. The 'ietf-i2nsf-ike' Module
5.2.1. Data Model Overview
5.2.2. Example Usage
5.2.3. YANG Module
5.3. The 'ietf-i2nsf-ikeless' Module
5.3.1. Data Model Overview
5.3.2. Example Usage
5.3.3. YANG Module
6. IANA Considerations
7. Security Considerations
7.1. IKE Case
7.2. IKE-less Case
7.3. YANG Modules
8. References
8.1. Normative References
8.2. Informative References
Appendix A. XML Configuration Example for IKE Case
(Gateway-to-Gateway)
Appendix B. XML Configuration Example for IKE-less Case
(Host-to-Host)
Appendix C. XML Notification Examples
Appendix D. Operational Use Case Examples
D.1. Example of IPsec SA Establishment
D.1.1. IKE Case
D.1.2. IKE-less Case
D.2. Example of the Rekeying Process in IKE-less Case
D.3. Example of Managing NSF State Loss in the IKE-less Case
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is an architecture that enables
administrators to directly program, orchestrate, control, and manage
network resources through software. The SDN paradigm relocates the
control of network resources to a centralized entity, namely the SDN
Controller. SDN Controllers configure and manage distributed network
resources and provide an abstracted view of the network resources to
SDN applications. SDN applications can customize and automate the
operations (including management) of the abstracted network resources
in a programmable manner via this interface [RFC7149] [ITU-T.Y.3300]
[ONF-SDN-Architecture] [ONF-OpenFlow].
Recently, several network scenarios now demand a centralized way of
managing different security aspects, for example, Software-Defined
WANs (SD-WANs). SD-WANs are SDN extensions providing software
abstractions to create secure network overlays over traditional WAN
and branch networks. SD-WANs utilize IPsec [RFC4301] as an
underlying security protocol. The goal of SD-WANs is to provide
flexible and automated deployment from a centralized point to enable
on-demand network security services, such as IPsec Security
Association (IPsec SA) management. Additionally, Section 4.3.3
("Client-Specific Security Policy in Cloud VPNs") of [RFC8192]
describes another example use case for a cloud data center scenario.
The use case in [RFC8192] states that "dynamic key management is
critical for securing the VPN and the distribution of policies".
These VPNs can be established using IPsec. The management of IPsec
SAs in data centers using a centralized entity is a scenario where
the current specification may be applicable.
Therefore, with the growth of SDN-based scenarios where network
resources are deployed in an autonomous manner, a mechanism to manage
IPsec SAs from a centralized entity becomes more relevant in the
industry.
In response to this need, the Interface to Network Security Functions
(I2NSF) charter states that the goal of this working group is "to
define a set of software interfaces and data models for controlling
and monitoring aspects of physical and virtual NSFs". As defined in
[RFC8192], a Network Security Function (NSF) is "a function that is
used to ensure integrity, confidentiality, or availability of network
communication; to detect unwanted network activity; or to block, or
at least mitigate, the effects of unwanted activity". This document
pays special attention to flow-based NSFs that ensure integrity and
confidentiality by means of IPsec.
In fact, Section 3.1.9 of [RFC8192] states that "there is a need for
a controller to create, manage, and distribute various keys to
distributed NSFs"; however, "there is a lack of a standard interface
to provision and manage security associations". Inspired by the SDN
paradigm, the I2NSF framework [RFC8329] defines a centralized entity,
the I2NSF Controller, which manages one or multiple NSFs through an
I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface. In this document, an architecture is
defined for allowing the I2NSF Controller to carry out the key
management procedures. More specifically, three YANG data models are
defined for the I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface, which allows the I2NSF
Controller to configure and monitor IPsec-enabled, flow-based NSFs.
The IPsec architecture [RFC4301] defines a clear separation between
the processing to provide security services to IP packets and the key
management procedures to establish the IPsec SAs, which allows
centralizing the key management procedures in the I2NSF Controller.
This document considers two typical scenarios to autonomously manage
IPsec SAs: gateway-to-gateway and host-to-host [RFC6071]. In these
cases, hosts, gateways, or both may act as NSFs. Due to its
complexity, consideration for the host-to-gateway scenario is out of
scope. The source of this complexity comes from the fact that, in
this scenario, the host may not be under the control of the I2NSF
Controller and, therefore, it is not configurable. Nevertheless, the
I2NSF interfaces defined in this document can be considered as a
starting point to analyze and provide a solution for the host-to-
gateway scenario.
For the definition of the YANG data models for the I2NSF NSF-Facing
Interface, this document considers two general cases, namely:
1. IKE case. The NSF implements the Internet Key Exchange Version 2
(IKEv2) protocol and the IPsec databases: the Security Policy
Database (SPD), the Security Association Database (SAD), and the
Peer Authorization Database (PAD). The I2NSF Controller is in
charge of provisioning the NSF with the required information in
the SPD and PAD (e.g., IKE credentials) and the IKE protocol
itself (e.g., parameters for the IKE_SA_INIT negotiation).
2. IKE-less case. The NSF only implements the IPsec databases (no
IKE implementation). The I2NSF Controller will provide the
required parameters to create valid entries in the SPD and the
SAD of the NSF. Therefore, the NSF will only have support for
IPsec whereas key management functionality is moved to the I2NSF
Controller.
In both cases, a YANG data model for the I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface
is required to carry out this provisioning in a secure manner between
the I2NSF Controller and the NSF. Using YANG data modeling language
version 1.1 [RFC7950] and based on YANG data models defined in
[netconf-vpn] and [TRAN-IPSECME-YANG] and the data structures defined
in [RFC4301] and [RFC7296], this document defines the required
interfaces with a YANG data model for configuration and state data
for IKE, PAD, SPD, and SAD (see Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3). The
proposed YANG data model conforms to the Network Management Datastore
Architecture (NMDA) defined in [RFC8342]. Examples of the usage of
these data models can be found in Appendices A, B, and C.
In summary, the objectives of this document are:
* To describe the architecture for I2NSF-based IPsec management,
which allows for the establishment and management of IPsec
Security Associations from the I2NSF Controller in order to
protect specific data flows between two flow-based NSFs
implementing IPsec.
* To map this architecture to the I2NSF framework.
* To define the interfaces required to manage and monitor the IPsec
SAs in the NSF from an I2NSF Controller. YANG data models are
defined for configuration and state data for IPsec and IKEv2
management through the I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface. The YANG data
models can be used via existing protocols, such as the Network
Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040].
Thus, this document defines three YANG modules (see Section 5) but
does not define any new protocol.
2. Terminology
This document uses the terminology described in [ITU-T.Y.3300],
[RFC8192], [RFC4301], [RFC6437], [RFC7296], [RFC6241], and [RFC8329].
The following term is defined in [ITU-T.Y.3300]:
* Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
The following terms are defined in [RFC8192]:
* Network Security Function (NSF)
* flow-based NSF
The following terms are defined in [RFC4301]:
* Peer Authorization Database (PAD)
* Security Association Database (SAD)
* Security Policy Database (SPD)
The following two terms are related or have identical definition/
usage in [RFC6437]:
* flow
* traffic flow
The following term is defined in [RFC7296]:
* Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
The following terms are defined in [RFC6241]:
* configuration data
* configuration datastore
* state data
* startup configuration datastore
* running configuration datastore
2.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. SDN-Based IPsec Management Description
As mentioned in Section 1, two cases are considered, depending on
whether the NSF implements IKEv2 or not: the IKE case and the IKE-
less case.
3.1. IKE Case: IKEv2/IPsec in the NSF
In this case, the NSF implements IPsec with IKEv2 support. The I2NSF
Controller is in charge of managing and applying IPsec connection
information (determining which nodes need to start an IKEv2/IPsec
session, identifying the type of traffic to be protected, and
deriving and delivering IKEv2 credentials, such as a pre-shared key
(PSK), certificates, etc.) and applying other IKEv2 configuration
parameters (e.g., cryptographic algorithms for establishing an IKEv2
SA) to the NSF necessary for the IKEv2 negotiation.
With these entries, the IKEv2 implementation can operate to establish
the IPsec SAs. The I2NSF User establishes the IPsec requirements and
information about the endpoints (through the I2NSF Consumer-Facing
Interface [RFC8329]), and the I2NSF Controller translates these
requirements into IKEv2, SPD, and PAD entries that will be installed
into the NSF (through the I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface). With that
information, the NSF can just run IKEv2 to establish the required
IPsec SA (when the traffic flow needs protection). Figure 1 shows
the different layers and corresponding functionality.
+-------------------------------------------+
| IPsec Management System | I2NSF User
+-------------------------------------------+
|
| I2NSF Consumer-Facing
| Interface
+-------------------------------------------+
| IKEv2 Configuration, PAD and SPD Entries | I2NSF
| Distribution | Controller
+-------------------------------------------+
|
| I2NSF NSF-Facing
| Interface
+-------------------------------------------+
| IKEv2 | IPsec(PAD, SPD) | Network
|-------------------------------------------| Security
| IPsec Data Protection and Forwarding | Function
+-------------------------------------------+
Figure 1: IKE Case: IKE/IPsec in the NSF
I2NSF-based IPsec flow protection services provide dynamic and
flexible management of IPsec SAs in flow-based NSFs. In order to
support this capability in the IKE case, a YANG data model for IKEv2,
SPD, and PAD configuration data and for IKEv2 state data needs to be
defined for the I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface (see Section 5).
3.2. IKE-less Case: IPsec (No IKEv2) in the NSF
In this case, the NSF does not deploy IKEv2 and, therefore, the I2NSF
Controller has to perform the IKEv2 security functions and management
of IPsec SAs by populating and managing the SPD and the SAD.
As shown in Figure 2, when an I2NSF User enforces flow-based
protection policies through the Consumer-Facing Interface, the I2NSF
Controller translates these requirements into SPD and SAD entries,
which are installed in the NSF. PAD entries are not required, since
there is no IKEv2 in the NSF.
+-----------------------------------------+
| IPsec Management System | I2NSF User
+-----------------------------------------+
|
| I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface
|
+-----------------------------------------+
| SPD and SAD Entries | I2NSF
| Distribution | Controller
+-----------------------------------------+
|
| I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface
|
+-----------------------------------------+
| IPsec (SPD, SAD) | Network
|-----------------------------------------| Security
| IPsec Data Protection and Forwarding | Function
+-----------------------------------------+
Figure 2: IKE-less Case: IPsec (No IKEv2) in the NSF
In order to support the IKE-less case, a YANG data model for SPD and
SAD configuration data and SAD state data MUST be defined for the
NSF-Facing Interface (see Section 5).
Specifically, the IKE-less case assumes that the I2NSF Controller has
to perform some security functions that IKEv2 typically does, namely
(non-exhaustive list):
* Initialization Vector (IV) generation
* prevention of counter resets for the same key
* generation of pseudorandom cryptographic keys for the IPsec SAs
* generation of the IPsec SAs when required based on notifications
(i.e., sadb-acquire) from the NSF
* rekey of the IPsec SAs based on notifications from the NSF (i.e.,
expire)
* NAT traversal discovery and management
Additionally to these functions, another set of tasks must be
performed by the I2NSF Controller (non-exhaustive list):
* IPsec SA's Security Parameter Index (SPI) random generation
* cryptographic algorithm selection
* usage of extended sequence numbers
* establishment of proper Traffic Selectors
4. IKE Case vs. IKE-less Case
In principle, the IKE case is easier to deploy than the IKE-less case
because current flow-based NSFs (either hosts or gateways) have
access to IKEv2 implementations. While gateways typically deploy an
IKEv2/IPsec implementation, hosts can easily install it. As a
downside, the NSF needs more resources to use IKEv2, such as memory
for the IKEv2 implementation and computation, since each IPsec
Security Association rekeying MAY involve a Diffie-Hellman (DH)
exchange.
Alternatively, the IKE-less case benefits the deployment in resource-
constrained NSFs. Moreover, IKEv2 does not need to be performed in
gateway-to-gateway and host-to-host scenarios under the same I2NSF
Controller (see Appendix D.1). On the contrary, the complexity of
creating and managing IPsec SAs is shifted to the I2NSF Controller
since IKEv2 is not in the NSF. As a consequence, this may result in
a more complex implementation in the controller side in comparison
with the IKE case. For example, the I2NSF Controller has to deal
with the latency existing in the path between the I2NSF Controller
and the NSF (in order to solve tasks, such as rekey) or creation and
installation of new IPsec SAs. However, this is not specific to this
contribution but a general aspect in any SDN-based network. In
summary, this complexity may create some scalability and performance
issues when the number of NSFs is high.
Nevertheless, literature around SDN-based network management using a
centralized controller (like the I2NSF Controller) is aware of
scalability and performance issues, and solutions have been already
provided and discussed (e.g., hierarchical controllers, having
multiple replicated controllers, dedicated high-speed management
networks, etc.). In the context of I2NSF-based IPsec management, one
way to reduce the latency and alleviate some performance issues can
be to install the IPsec policies and IPsec SAs at the same time
(proactive mode, as described in Appendix D.1) instead of waiting for
notifications (e.g., a sadb-acquire notification received from an NSF
requiring a new IPsec SA) to proceed with the IPsec SA installation
(reactive mode). Another way to reduce the overhead and the
potential scalability and performance issues in the I2NSF Controller
is to apply the IKE case described in this document since the IPsec
SAs are managed between NSFs without the involvement of the I2NSF
Controller at all, except by the initial configuration (i.e., IKEv2,
PAD, and SPD entries) provided by the I2NSF Controller. Other
solutions, such as Controller-IKE [IPSECME-CONTROLLER-IKE], have
proposed that NSFs provide their DH public keys to the I2NSF
Controller so that the I2NSF Controller distributes all public keys
to all peers. All peers can calculate a unique pairwise secret for
each other peer, and there is no inter-NSF messages. A rekey
mechanism is further described in [IPSECME-CONTROLLER-IKE].
In terms of security, the IKE case provides better security
properties than the IKE-less case, as discussed in Section 7. The
main reason is that the NSFs generate the session keys and not the
I2NSF Controller.
4.1. Rekeying Process
Performing a rekey for IPsec SAs is an important operation during the
IPsec SAs management. With the YANG data models defined in this
document the I2NSF Controller can configure parameters of the rekey
process (IKE case) or conduct the rekey process (IKE-less case).
Indeed, depending on the case, the rekey process is different.
For the IKE case, the rekeying process is carried out by IKEv2,
following the information defined in the SPD and SAD (i.e., based on
the IPsec SA lifetime established by the I2NSF Controller using the
YANG data model defined in this document). Therefore, IPsec
connections will live unless something different is required by the
I2NSF User or the I2NSF Controller detects something wrong.
For the IKE-less case, the I2NSF Controller MUST take care of the
rekeying process. When the IPsec SA is going to expire (e.g., IPsec
SA soft lifetime), it MUST create a new IPsec SA and it MAY remove
the old one (e.g., when the lifetime of the old IPsec SA has not been
defined). This rekeying process starts when the I2NSF Controller
receives a sadb-expire notification or, on the I2NSF Controller's
initiative, based on lifetime state data obtained from the NSF. How
the I2NSF Controller implements an algorithm for the rekey process is
out of the scope of this document. Nevertheless, an example of how
this rekey could be performed is described in Appendix D.2.
4.2. NSF State Loss
If one of the NSF restarts, it will lose the IPsec state (affected
NSF). By default, the I2NSF Controller can assume that all the state
has been lost and, therefore, it will have to send IKEv2, SPD, and
PAD information to the NSF in the IKE case and SPD and SAD
information in the IKE-less case.
In both cases, the I2NSF Controller is aware of the affected NSF
(e.g., the NETCONF/TCP connection is broken with the affected NSF,
the I2NSF Controller is receiving a sadb-bad-spi notification from a
particular NSF, etc.). Moreover, the I2NSF Controller keeps a list
of NSFs that have IPsec SAs with the affected NSF. Therefore, it
knows the affected IPsec SAs.
In the IKE case, the I2NSF Controller may need to configure the
affected NSF with the new IKEv2, SPD, and PAD information.
Alternatively, IKEv2 configuration MAY be made permanent between NSF
reboots without compromising security by means of the startup
configuration datastore in the NSF. This way, each time an NSF
reboots, it will use that configuration for each rebooting. It would
imply avoiding contact with the I2NSF Controller. Finally, the I2NSF
Controller may also need to send new parameters (e.g., a new fresh
PSK for authentication) to the NSFs that had IKEv2 SAs and IPsec SAs
with the affected NSF.
In the IKE-less case, the I2NSF Controller SHOULD delete the old
IPsec SAs in the non-failed nodes established with the affected NSF.
Once the affected node restarts, the I2NSF Controller MUST take the
necessary actions to reestablish IPsec-protected communication
between the failed node and those others having IPsec SAs with the
affected NSF. How the I2NSF Controller implements an algorithm for
managing a potential NSF state loss is out of the scope of this
document. Nevertheless, an example of how this could be performed is
described in Appendix D.3.
4.3. NAT Traversal
In the IKE case, IKEv2 already provides a mechanism to detect whether
some of the peers or both are located behind a NAT. In this case,
UDP or TCP encapsulation for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
packets [RFC3948] [RFC8229] is required. Note that IPsec transport
mode MUST NOT be used in this specification when NAT is required.
In the IKE-less case, the NSF does not have the assistance of the
IKEv2 implementation to detect if it is located behind a NAT. If the
NSF does not have any other mechanism to detect this situation, the
I2NSF Controller SHOULD implement a mechanism to detect that case.
The SDN paradigm generally assumes the I2NSF Controller has a view of
the network under its control. This view is built either by
requesting information from the NSFs under its control or information
pushed from the NSFs to the I2NSF Controller. Based on this
information, the I2NSF Controller MAY guess if there is a NAT
configured between two hosts and apply the required policies to both
NSFs besides activating the usage of UDP or TCP encapsulation of ESP
packets [RFC3948] [RFC8229]. The interface for discovering if the
NSF is behind a NAT is out of scope of this document.
If the I2NSF Controller does not have any mechanism to know whether a
host is behind a NAT or not, then the IKE case MUST be used and not
the IKE-less case.
4.4. NSF Registration and Discovery
NSF registration refers to the process of providing the I2NSF
Controller information about a valid NSF, such as certificate, IP
address, etc. This information is incorporated in a list of NSFs
under its control.
The assumption in this document is that, for both cases, before an
NSF can operate in this system, it MUST be registered in the I2NSF
Controller. In this way, when the NSF starts and establishes a
connection to the I2NSF Controller, it knows that the NSF is valid
for joining the system.
Either during this registration process or when the NSF connects with
the I2NSF Controller, the I2NSF Controller MUST discover certain
capabilities of this NSF, such as what are the cryptographic suites
supported, the authentication method, the support of the IKE case
and/or the IKE-less case, etc.
The registration and discovery processes are out of the scope of this
document.
5. YANG Configuration Data Models
In order to support the IKE and IKE-less cases, models are provided
for the different parameters and values that must be configured to
manage IPsec SAs. Specifically, the IKE case requires modeling IKEv2
configuration parameters, SPD and PAD, while the IKE-less case
requires configuration YANG data models for the SPD and SAD. Three
modules have been defined: ietf-i2nsf-ikec (Section 5.1, common to
both cases), ietf-i2nsf-ike (Section 5.2, IKE case), and ietf-i2nsf-
ikeless (Section 5.3, IKE-less case). Since the module ietf-i2nsf-
ikec has only typedef and groupings common to the other modules, a
simplified view of the ietf-i2nsf-ike and ietf-i2nsf-ikeless modules
is shown.
5.1. The 'ietf-i2nsf-ikec' Module
5.1.1. Data Model Overview
The module ietf-i2nsf-ikec only has definitions of data types
(typedef) and groupings that are common to the other modules.
5.1.2. YANG Module
This module has normative references to [RFC3947], [RFC4301],
[RFC4303], [RFC8174], [RFC8221], [RFC3948], [RFC8229], [RFC6991],
[IANA-Protocols-Number], [IKEv2-Parameters],
[IKEv2-Transform-Type-1], and [IKEv2-Transform-Type-3].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-i2nsf-ikec@2021-06-09.yang"
module ietf-i2nsf-ikec {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-ikec";
prefix nsfikec;
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix inet;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types.";
}
organization
"IETF I2NSF Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/i2nsf/>
WG List: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
Author: Rafael Marin-Lopez
<mailto:rafa@um.es>
Author: Gabriel Lopez-Millan
<mailto:gabilm@um.es>
Author: Fernando Pereniguez-Garcia
<mailto:fernando.pereniguez@cud.upct.es>
";
description
"Common data model for the IKE and IKE-less cases
defined by the SDN-based IPsec flow protection service.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14
(RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear
in all capitals, as shown here.
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons
identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9061; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2021-06-09 {
description
"Initial version.";
reference
"RFC 9061: Software-Defined Networking
(SDN)-based A YANG Data Model for IPsec Flow Protection."; Protection
Based on Software-Defined Networking (SDN).";
}
typedef encr-alg-t {
type uint16;
description
"The encryption algorithm is specified with a 16-bit
number extracted from the IANA registry. The acceptable
values MUST follow the requirement levels for
encryption algorithms for ESP and IKEv2.";
reference
"IANA: Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters,
IKEv2 Transform Attribute Types, Transform Type 1 -
Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs
RFC 8221: Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header
(AH)
RFC 8247: Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage
Guidance for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol
Version 2 (IKEv2).";
}
typedef intr-alg-t {
type uint16;
description
"The integrity algorithm is specified with a 16-bit
number extracted from the IANA registry.
The acceptable values MUST follow the requirement
levels for integrity algorithms for ESP and IKEv2.";
reference
"IANA: Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters,
IKEv2 Transform Attribute Types, Transform Type 3 -
Integrity Algorithm Transform IDs
RFC 8221: Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header
(AH)
RFC 8247: Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage
Guidance for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol
Version 2 (IKEv2).";
}
typedef ipsec-mode {
type enumeration {
enum transport {
description
"IPsec transport mode. No Network Address
Translation (NAT) support.";
}
enum tunnel {
description
"IPsec tunnel mode.";
}
}
description
"Type definition of IPsec mode: transport or
tunnel.";
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,
Section 3.2.";
}
typedef esp-encap {
type enumeration {
enum espintcp {
description
"ESP in TCP encapsulation.";
reference
"RFC 8229: TCP Encapsulation of IKE and
IPsec Packets.";
}
enum espinudp {
description
"ESP in UDP encapsulation.";
reference
"RFC 3948: UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP
Packets.";
}
enum none {
description
"No ESP encapsulation.";
}
}
description
"Types of ESP encapsulation when Network Address
Translation (NAT) may be present between two NSFs.";
reference
"RFC 8229: TCP Encapsulation of IKE and IPsec Packets
RFC 3948: UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets.";
}
typedef ipsec-protocol-params {
type enumeration {
enum esp {
description
"IPsec ESP protocol.";
}
}
description
"Only the Encapsulation Security Protocol (ESP) is
supported, but it could be extended in the future.";
reference
"RFC 4303: IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).";
}
typedef lifetime-action {
type enumeration {
enum terminate-clear {
description
"Terminates the IPsec SA and allows the
packets through.";
}
enum terminate-hold {
description
"Terminates the IPsec SA and drops the
packets.";
}
enum replace {
description
"Replaces the IPsec SA with a new one:
rekey.";
}
}
description
"When the lifetime of an IPsec SA expires, an action
needs to be performed for the IPsec SA that
reached the lifetime. There are three possible
options: terminate-clear, terminate-hold, and
replace.";
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,
Section 4.5.";
}
typedef ipsec-traffic-direction {
type enumeration {
enum inbound {
description
"Inbound traffic.";
}
enum outbound {
description
"Outbound traffic.";
}
}
description
"IPsec traffic direction is defined in
two directions: inbound and outbound.
From an NSF perspective, inbound and
outbound are defined as mentioned
in Section 3.1 in RFC 4301.";
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,
Section 3.1.";
}
typedef ipsec-spd-action {
type enumeration {
enum protect {
description
"PROTECT the traffic with IPsec.";
}
enum bypass {
description
"BYPASS the traffic. The packet is forwarded
without IPsec protection.";
}
enum discard {
description
"DISCARD the traffic. The IP packet is
discarded.";
}
}
description
"The action when traffic matches an IPsec security
policy. According to RFC 4301, there are three
possible values: BYPASS, PROTECT, and DISCARD.";
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,
Section 4.4.1.";
}
typedef ipsec-inner-protocol {
type union {
type uint8;
type enumeration {
enum any {
value 256;
description
"Any IP protocol number value.";
}
}
}
default "any";
description
"IPsec protection can be applied to specific IP
traffic and Layer 4 traffic (TCP, UDP, SCTP, etc.)
or ANY protocol in the IP packet payload.
The IP protocol number is specified with a uint8
or ANY defining an enumerate with value 256 to
indicate the protocol number. Note that in case
of IPv6, the protocol in the IP packet payload
is indicated in the Next Header field of the IPv6
packet.";
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,
Section 4.4.1.1
IANA: Protocol Numbers.";
}
grouping encap {
description
"This group of nodes allows defining of the type of
encapsulation in case NAT traversal is
required and includes port information.";
leaf espencap {
type esp-encap;
default "none";
description
"ESP in TCP, ESP in UDP, or ESP in TLS.";
}
leaf sport {
type inet:port-number;
default "4500";
description
"Encapsulation source port.";
}
leaf dport {
type inet:port-number;
default "4500";
description
"Encapsulation destination port.";
}
leaf-list oaddr {
type inet:ip-address;
description
"If required, this is the original address that
was used before NAT was applied over the packet.";
}
reference
"RFC 3947: Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE
RFC 8229: TCP Encapsulation of IKE and IPsec Packets.";
}
grouping lifetime {
description
"Different lifetime values limited to an IPsec SA.";
leaf time {
type uint32;
units "seconds";
default "0";
description
"Time in seconds since the IPsec SA was added.
For example, if this value is 180 seconds, it
means the IPsec SA expires in 180 seconds since
it was added. The value 0 implies infinite.";
}
leaf bytes {
type uint64;
default "0";
description
"If the IPsec SA processes the number of bytes
expressed in this leaf, the IPsec SA expires and
SHOULD be rekeyed. The value 0 implies
infinite.";
}
leaf packets {
type uint32;
default "0";
description
"If the IPsec SA processes the number of packets
expressed in this leaf, the IPsec SA expires and
SHOULD be rekeyed. The value 0 implies
infinite.";
}
leaf idle {
type uint32;
units "seconds";
default "0";
description
"When an NSF stores an IPsec SA, it
consumes system resources. For an idle IPsec SA, this
is a waste of resources. If the IPsec SA is idle
during this number of seconds, the IPsec SA
SHOULD be removed. The value 0 implies
infinite.";
}
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,
Section 4.4.2.1.";
}
grouping port-range {
description
"This grouping defines a port range, such as that
expressed in RFC 4301, for example, 1500 (Start
Port Number)-1600 (End Port Number).
A port range is used in the Traffic Selector.";
leaf start {
type inet:port-number;
description
"Start port number.";
}
leaf end {
type inet:port-number;
must '. >= ../start' {
error-message
"The end port number MUST be equal or greater
than the start port number.";
}
description
"End port number. To express a single port, set
the same value as start and end.";
}
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,
Section 4.4.1.2.";
}
grouping tunnel-grouping {
description
"The parameters required to define the IP tunnel
endpoints when IPsec SA requires tunnel mode. The
tunnel is defined by two endpoints: the local IP
address and the remote IP address.";
leaf local {
type inet:ip-address;
mandatory true;
description
"Local IP address' tunnel endpoint.";
}
leaf remote {
type inet:ip-address;
mandatory true;
description
"Remote IP address' tunnel endpoint.";
}
leaf df-bit {
type enumeration {
enum clear {
description
"Disable the Don't Fragment (DF) bit
in the outer header. This is the
default value.";
}
enum set {
description
"Enable the DF bit in the outer header.";
}
enum copy {
description
"Copy the DF bit to the outer header.";
}
}
default "clear";
description
"Allow configuring the DF bit when encapsulating
tunnel mode IPsec traffic. RFC 4301 describes
three options to handle the DF bit during
tunnel encapsulation: clear, set, and copy from
the inner IP header. This MUST be ignored or
has no meaning when the local/remote
IP addresses are IPv6 addresses.";
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,
Section 8.1.";
}
leaf bypass-dscp {
type boolean;
default "true";
description
"If true, to copy the Differentiated Services Code
Point (DSCP) value from inner header to outer header.
If false, to map DSCP values
from an inner header to values in an outer header
following ../dscp-mapping.";
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,
Section 4.4.1.2.";
}
list dscp-mapping {
must '../bypass-dscp = "false"';
key "id";
ordered-by user;
leaf id {
type uint8;
description
"The index of list with the
different mappings.";
}
leaf inner-dscp {
type inet:dscp;
description
"The DSCP value of the inner IP packet. If this
leaf is not defined, it means ANY inner DSCP value.";
}
leaf outer-dscp {
type inet:dscp;
default "0";
description
"The DSCP value of the outer IP packet.";
}
description
"A list that represents an array with the mapping from the
inner DSCP value to outer DSCP value when bypass-dscp is
false. To express a default mapping in the list where any
other inner dscp value is not matching a node in the list,
a new node has to be included at the end of the list where
the leaf inner-dscp is not defined (ANY) and the leaf
outer-dscp includes the value of the mapping. If there is
no value set in the leaf outer-dscp, the default value for
this leaf is 0.";
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,
Section 4.4.1.2 and Appendix C.";
}
}
grouping selector-grouping {
description
"This grouping contains the definition of a Traffic
Selector, which is used in the IPsec policies and
IPsec SAs.";
leaf local-prefix {
type inet:ip-prefix;
mandatory true;
description
"Local IP address prefix.";
}
leaf remote-prefix {
type inet:ip-prefix;
mandatory true;
description
"Remote IP address prefix.";
}
leaf inner-protocol {
type ipsec-inner-protocol;
default "any";
description
"Inner protocol that is going to be
protected with IPsec.";
}
list local-ports {
key "start end";
uses port-range;
description
"List of local ports. When the inner
protocol is ICMP, this 16-bit value
represents code and type.
If this list is not defined,
it is assumed that start and
end are 0 by default (any port).";
}
list remote-ports {
key "start end";
uses port-range;
description
"List of remote ports. When the upper layer
protocol is ICMP, this 16-bit value represents
code and type. If this list is not defined,
it is assumed that start and end are 0 by
default (any port).";
}
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,
Section 4.4.1.2.";
}
grouping ipsec-policy-grouping {
description
"Holds configuration information for an IPsec SPD
entry.";
leaf anti-replay-window-size {
type uint32;
default "64";
description
"To set the anti-replay window size.
The default value is set
to 64, following the recommendation in RFC 4303.";
reference
"RFC 4303: IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),
Section 3.4.3.";
}
container traffic-selector {
description
"Packets are selected for
processing actions based on Traffic Selector
values, which refer to IP and inner protocol
header information.";
uses selector-grouping;
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,
Section 4.4.4.1.";
}
container processing-info {
description
"SPD processing. If the required processing
action is protect, it contains the required
information to process the packet.";
leaf action {
type ipsec-spd-action;
default "discard";
description
"If bypass or discard, container
ipsec-sa-cfg is empty.";
}
container ipsec-sa-cfg {
when "../action = 'protect'";
description
"IPsec SA configuration included in the SPD
entry.";
leaf pfp-flag {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"Each selector has a Populate From
Packet (PFP) flag. If asserted for a
given selector X, the flag indicates
that the IPsec SA to be created should
take its value (local IP address,
remote IP address, Next Layer
Protocol, etc.) for X from the value
in the packet. Otherwise, the IPsec SA
should take its value(s) for X from
the value(s) in the SPD entry.";
}
leaf ext-seq-num {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"True if this IPsec SA is using extended
sequence numbers. If true, the 64-bit
extended sequence number counter is used;
if false, the normal 32-bit sequence
number counter is used.";
}
leaf seq-overflow {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"The flag indicating whether
overflow of the sequence number
counter should prevent transmission
of additional packets on the IPsec
SA (false) and, therefore, needs to
be rekeyed or whether rollover is
permitted (true). If Authenticated
Encryption with Associated Data
(AEAD) is used (leaf
esp-algorithms/encryption/algorithm-type),
this flag MUST be false. Setting this
flag to true is strongly discouraged.";
}
leaf stateful-frag-check {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"Indicates whether (true) or not (false)
stateful fragment checking applies to
the IPsec SA to be created.";
}
leaf mode {
type ipsec-mode;
default "transport";
description
"IPsec SA has to be processed in
transport or tunnel mode.";
}
leaf protocol-parameters {
type ipsec-protocol-params;
default "esp";
description
"Security protocol of the IPsec SA.
Only ESP is supported, but it could be
extended in the future.";
}
container esp-algorithms {
when "../protocol-parameters = 'esp'";
description
"Configuration of Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP) parameters and
algorithms.";
leaf-list integrity {
type intr-alg-t;
default "0";
ordered-by user;
description
"Configuration of ESP authentication
based on the specified integrity
algorithm. With AEAD encryption
algorithms, the integrity node is
not used.";
reference
"RFC 4303: IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),
Section 3.2.";
}
list encryption {
key "id";
ordered-by user;
leaf id {
type uint16;
description
"An identifier that unequivocally identifies each
entry of the list, i.e., an encryption algorithm
and its key length (if required).";
}
leaf algorithm-type {
type encr-alg-t;
default "20";
description
"Default value 20 (ENCR_AES_GCM_16).";
}
leaf key-length {
type uint16;
default "128";
description
"By default, key length is 128
bits.";
}
description
"Encryption or AEAD algorithm for the
IPsec SAs. This list is ordered
following from the higher priority to
lower priority. First node of the
list will be the algorithm with
higher priority. In case the list
is empty, then no encryption algorithm
is applied (NULL).";
reference
"RFC 4303: IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),
Section 3.2.";
}
leaf tfc-pad {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"If Traffic Flow Confidentiality
(TFC) padding for ESP encryption
can be used (true) or not (false).";
reference
"RFC 4303: IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),
Section 2.7.";
}
reference
"RFC 4303: IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).";
}
container tunnel {
when "../mode = 'tunnel'";
uses tunnel-grouping;
description
"IPsec tunnel endpoints definition.";
}
}
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,
Section 4.4.1.2.";
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
5.2. The 'ietf-i2nsf-ike' Module
In this section, the YANG module for the IKE case is described.
5.2.1. Data Model Overview
The model related to IKEv2 has been extracted from reading the IKEv2
standard in [RFC7296] and observing some open source implementations,
such as strongSwan [strongswan] or Libreswan [libreswan].
The definition of the PAD model has been extracted from the
specification in Section 4.4.3 of [RFC4301]. (Note that many
implementations integrate PAD configuration as part of the IKEv2
configuration.)
The definition of the SPD model has been mainly extracted from the
specification in Section 4.4.1 and Appendix D of [RFC4301].
The YANG data model for the IKE case is defined by the module "ietf-
i2nsf-ike". Its structure is depicted in the following diagram,
using the notation syntax for YANG tree diagrams [RFC8340].
module: ietf-i2nsf-ike
+--rw ipsec-ike
+--rw pad
| +--rw pad-entry* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw (identity)
| | +--:(ipv4-address)
| | | +--rw ipv4-address? inet:ipv4-address
| | +--:(ipv6-address)
| | | +--rw ipv6-address? inet:ipv6-address
| | +--:(fqdn-string)
| | | +--rw fqdn-string? inet:domain-name
| | +--:(rfc822-address-string)
| | | +--rw rfc822-address-string? string
| | +--:(dnx509)
| | | +--rw dnx509? binary
| | +--:(gnx509)
| | | +--rw gnx509? binary
| | +--:(id-key)
| | | +--rw id-key? binary
| | +--:(id-null)
| | +--rw id-null? empty
| +--rw auth-protocol? auth-protocol-type
| +--rw peer-authentication
| +--rw auth-method? auth-method-type
| +--rw eap-method
| | +--rw eap-type uint64
| +--rw pre-shared
| | +--rw secret? yang:hex-string
| +--rw digital-signature
| +--rw ds-algorithm? uint8
| +--rw (public-key)?
| | +--:(raw-public-key)
| | | +--rw raw-public-key? binary
| | +--:(cert-data)
| | +--rw cert-data? binary
| +--rw private-key? binary
| +--rw ca-data* binary
| +--rw crl-data? binary
| +--rw crl-uri? inet:uri
| +--rw oscp-uri? inet:uri
+--rw conn-entry* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw autostartup? autostartup-type
| +--rw initial-contact? boolean
| +--rw version? auth-protocol-type
| +--rw fragmentation
| | +--rw enabled? boolean
| | +--rw mtu? uint16
| +--rw ike-sa-lifetime-soft
| | +--rw rekey-time? uint32
| | +--rw reauth-time? uint32
| +--rw ike-sa-lifetime-hard
| | +--rw over-time? uint32
| +--rw ike-sa-intr-alg* nsfikec:intr-alg-t
| +--rw ike-sa-encr-alg* [id]
| | +--rw id uint16
| | +--rw algorithm-type? nsfikec:encr-alg-t
| | +--rw key-length? uint16
| +--rw dh-group? fs-group
| +--rw half-open-ike-sa-timer? uint32
| +--rw half-open-ike-sa-cookie-threshold? uint32
| +--rw local
| | +--rw local-pad-entry-name string
| +--rw remote
| | +--rw remote-pad-entry-name string
| +--rw encapsulation-type
| | +--rw espencap? esp-encap
| | +--rw sport? inet:port-number
| | +--rw dport? inet:port-number
| | +--rw oaddr* inet:ip-address
| +--rw spd
| | +--rw spd-entry* [name]
| | +--rw name string
| | +--rw ipsec-policy-config
| | +--rw anti-replay-window-size? uint32
| | +--rw traffic-selector
| | | +--rw local-prefix inet:ip-prefix
| | | +--rw remote-prefix inet:ip-prefix
| | | +--rw inner-protocol? ipsec-inner-protocol
| | | +--rw local-ports* [start end]
| | | | +--rw start inet:port-number
| | | | +--rw end inet:port-number
| | | +--rw remote-ports* [start end]
| | | +--rw start inet:port-number
| | | +--rw end inet:port-number
| | +--rw processing-info
| | +--rw action? ipsec-spd-action
| | +--rw ipsec-sa-cfg
| | +--rw pfp-flag? boolean
| | +--rw ext-seq-num? boolean
| | +--rw seq-overflow? boolean
| | +--rw stateful-frag-check? boolean
| | +--rw mode? ipsec-mode
| | +--rw protocol-parameters? ipsec-protocol-params
| | +--rw esp-algorithms
| | | +--rw integrity* intr-alg-t
| | | +--rw encryption* [id]
| | | | +--rw id uint16
| | | | +--rw algorithm-type? encr-alg-t
| | | | +--rw key-length? uint16
| | | +--rw tfc-pad? boolean
| | +--rw tunnel
| | +--rw local inet:ip-address
| | +--rw remote inet:ip-address
| | +--rw df-bit? enumeration
| | +--rw bypass-dscp? boolean
| | +--rw dscp-mapping* [id]
| | +--rw id uint8
| | +--rw inner-dscp? inet:dscp
| | +--rw outer-dscp? inet:dscp
| +--rw child-sa-info
| | +--rw fs-groups* fs-group
| | +--rw child-sa-lifetime-soft
| | | +--rw time? uint32
| | | +--rw bytes? yang:counter64
| | | +--rw packets? uint32
| | | +--rw idle? uint32
| | | +--rw action? nsfikec:lifetime-action
| | +--rw child-sa-lifetime-hard
| | +--rw time? uint32
| | +--rw bytes? yang:counter64
| | +--rw packets? uint32
| | +--rw idle? uint32
| +--ro state
| +--ro initiator? boolean
| +--ro initiator-ikesa-spi? ike-spi
| +--ro responder-ikesa-spi? ike-spi
| +--ro nat-local? boolean
| +--ro nat-remote? boolean
| +--ro encapsulation-type
| | +--ro espencap? esp-encap
| | +--ro sport? inet:port-number
| | +--ro dport? inet:port-number
| | +--ro oaddr* inet:ip-address
| +--ro established? uint64
| +--ro current-rekey-time? uint64
| +--ro current-reauth-time? uint64
+--ro number-ike-sas
+--ro total? yang:gauge64
+--ro half-open? yang:gauge64
+--ro half-open-cookies? yang:gauge64
The YANG data model consists of a unique "ipsec-ike" container
defined as follows. Firstly, it contains a "pad" container that
serves to configure the Peer Authentication Database with
authentication information about local and remote peers (NSFs). More
precisely, it consists of a list of entries, each one indicating the
identity, authentication method, and credentials that a particular
peer (local or remote) will use. Therefore, each entry contains
identity, authentication information, and credentials of either the
local NSF or the remote NSF. As a consequence, the I2NF Controller
can store identity, authentication information, and credentials for
the local NSF and the remote NSF.
Next, a list "conn-entry" is defined with information about the
different IKE connections a peer can maintain with others. Each
connection entry is composed of a wide number of parameters to
configure different aspects of a particular IKE connection between
two peers: local and remote peer authentication information, IKE SA
configuration (soft and hard lifetimes, cryptographic algorithms,
etc.), a list of IPsec policies describing the type of network
traffic to be secured (local/remote subnet and ports, etc.) and how
it must be protected (ESP, tunnel/transport, cryptographic
algorithms, etc.), Child SA configuration (soft and hard lifetimes),
and state information of the IKE connection (SPIs, usage of NAT,
current expiration times, etc.).
Lastly, the "ipsec-ike" container declares a "number-ike-sas"
container to specify state information reported by the IKE software
related to the amount of IKE connections established.
5.2.2. Example Usage
Appendix A shows an example of IKE case configuration for an NSF, in
tunnel mode (gateway-to-gateway), with NSF authentication based on
X.509 certificates.
5.2.3. YANG Module
This YANG module has normative references to [RFC2247], [RFC5280], [RFC4301],
[RFC5915], [RFC6991], [RFC7296], [RFC7383], [RFC7427], [RFC7619],
[RFC8017], [ITU-T.X.690], [RFC5322], [RFC8229], [RFC8174],
[RFC2560], [RFC6960],
[IKEv2-Auth-Method], [IKEv2-Transform-Type-4], [IKEv2-Parameters],
and [IANA-Method-Type].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-i2nsf-ike@2021-06-09.yang"
module ietf-i2nsf-ike {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-ike";
prefix nsfike;
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix inet;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types.";
}
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types.";
}
import ietf-i2nsf-ikec {
prefix nsfikec;
reference
"RFC 9061: Software-Defined Networking
(SDN)-based A YANG Data Model for IPsec Flow Protection."; Protection
Based on Software-Defined Networking (SDN).";
}
import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm;
reference
"RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control
Model.";
}
organization
"IETF I2NSF Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/i2nsf/>
WG List: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
Author: Rafael Marin-Lopez
<mailto:rafa@um.es>
Author: Gabriel Lopez-Millan
<mailto:gabilm@um.es>
Author: Fernando Pereniguez-Garcia
<mailto:fernando.pereniguez@cud.upct.es>
";
description
"This module contains the IPsec IKE case model for the SDN-based
IPsec flow protection service.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14
(RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear
in all capitals, as shown here.
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9061; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2021-06-09 {
description
"Initial version.";
reference
"RFC 9061: Software-Defined Networking
(SDN)-based A YANG Data Model for IPsec Flow Protection."; Protection
Based on Software-Defined Networking (SDN).";
}
typedef ike-spi {
type uint64 {
range "0..max";
}
description
"Security Parameter Index (SPI)'s IKE SA.";
reference
"RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2), Section 2.6.";
}
typedef autostartup-type {
type enumeration {
enum add {
description
"IKE/IPsec configuration is only loaded into
IKE implementation, but IKE/IPsec SA is not
started.";
}
enum on-demand {
description
"IKE/IPsec configuration is loaded
into IKE implementation. The IPsec policies
are transferred to the NSF, but the
IPsec SAs are not established immediately.
The IKE implementation will negotiate the
IPsec SAs when they are required
(i.e., through an ACQUIRE notification).";
}
enum start {
description
"IKE/IPsec configuration is loaded
and transferred to the NSF's kernel, and the
IKEv2-based IPsec SAs are established
immediately without waiting for any packet.";
}
}
description
"Different policies to set IPsec SA configuration
into NSF's kernel when IKEv2 implementation has
started.";
}
typedef fs-group {
type uint16;
description
"DH groups for IKE and IPsec SA rekey.";
reference
"IANA: Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters,
IKEv2 Transform Attribute Types, Transform Type 4 -
Diffie-Hellman Group Transform IDs
RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2), Section 3.3.2.";
}
typedef auth-protocol-type {
type enumeration {
enum ikev2 {
value 2;
description
"IKEv2 authentication protocol. It is the
only one defined right now. An enum is
used for further extensibility.";
}
}
description
"IKE authentication protocol version specified in the
Peer Authorization Database (PAD). It is defined as
enumerated to allow new IKE versions in the
future.";
reference
"RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2).";
}
typedef auth-method-type {
type enumeration {
enum pre-shared {
description
"Select pre-shared key as the
authentication method.";
reference
"RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2).";
}
enum eap {
description
"Select the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) as
the authentication method.";
reference
"RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2).";
}
enum digital-signature {
description
"Select digital signature as the authentication method.";
reference
"RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)
RFC 7427: Signature Authentication in the Internet Key
Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2).";
}
enum null {
description
"Null authentication.";
reference
"RFC 7619: The NULL Authentication Method in the Internet
Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2).";
}
}
description
"Peer authentication method specified in the Peer
Authorization Database (PAD).";
}
container ipsec-ike {
description
"IKE configuration for an NSF. It includes PAD
parameters, IKE connection information, and state
data.";
container pad {
description
"Configuration of the Peer Authorization Database
(PAD). Each entry of PAD contains authentication
information of either the local peer or the remote peer.
Therefore, the I2NSF Controller stores authentication
information (and credentials) not only for the remote NSF
but also for the local NSF. The local NSF MAY use the
same identity for different types of authentication
and credentials. Pointing to the entry for a local NSF
(e.g., A) and the entry for remote NSF (e.g., B)
is possible to specify all the required information to
carry out the authentication between A and B (see
../conn-entry/local and ../conn-entry/remote).";
list pad-entry {
key "name";
ordered-by user;
description
"Peer Authorization Database (PAD) entry. It
is a list of PAD entries ordered by the
I2NSF Controller, and each entry is
unequivocally identified by a name.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"PAD-unique name to identify this
entry.";
}
choice identity {
mandatory true;
description
"A particular IKE peer will be
identified by one of these identities.
This peer can be a remote peer or local
peer (this NSF).";
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol, Section 4.4.3.1.";
case ipv4-address {
leaf ipv4-address {
type inet:ipv4-address;
description
"Specifies the identity as
a single 4-octet IPv4 address.";
}
}
case ipv6-address {
leaf ipv6-address {
type inet:ipv6-address;
description
"Specifies the identity as a
single 16-octet IPv6
address. An example is
2001:db8::8:800:200c:417a.";
}
}
case fqdn-string {
leaf fqdn-string {
type inet:domain-name;
description
"Specifies the identity as a
Fully Qualified Domain Name
(FQDN) string. An example is
example.com. The string MUST
NOT contain any terminators
(e.g., NULL, Carriage Return
(CR), etc.).";
}
}
case rfc822-address-string {
leaf rfc822-address-string {
type string;
description
"Specifies the identity as a
fully qualified email address
string (RFC 5322). An example is
jsmith@example.com. The string
MUST NOT contain any
terminators (e.g., NULL, CR,
etc.).";
reference
"RFC 5322: Internet Message Format.";
}
}
case dnx509 {
leaf dnx509 {
type binary;
description
"The binary
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
encoding of an ASN.1 X.500
Distinguished Name, as specified in IKEv2.";
reference
"RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile
RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2), Section 3.5.";
}
}
case gnx509 {
leaf gnx509 {
type binary;
description
"ASN.1 X.509 GeneralName structure,
as specified in RFC 5280, encoded
using ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile.";
}
}
case id-key {
leaf id-key {
type binary;
description
"Opaque octet stream that may be
used to pass vendor-specific
information for proprietary
types of identification.";
reference
"RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2), Section 3.5.";
}
}
case id-null {
leaf id-null {
type empty;
description
"The ID_NULL identification is used
when the IKE identification payload
is not used.";
reference
"RFC 7619: The NULL Authentication Method in the
Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2).";
}
}
}
leaf auth-protocol {
type auth-protocol-type;
default "ikev2";
description
"Only IKEv2 is supported right now, but
other authentication protocols may be
supported in the future.";
}
container peer-authentication {
description
"This container allows the security
controller to configure the
authentication method (pre-shared key,
eap, digital-signature, null) that
will be used with a particular peer and
the credentials to use, which will
depend on the selected authentication
method.";
leaf auth-method {
type auth-method-type;
default "pre-shared";
description
"Type of authentication method
(pre-shared key, eap, digital signature,
null).";
reference
"RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2), Section 2.15.";
}
container eap-method {
when "../auth-method = 'eap'";
leaf eap-type {
type uint32 {
range "1 .. 4294967295";
}
mandatory true;
description
"EAP method type specified with
a value extracted from the
IANA registry. This
information provides the
particular EAP method to be
used. Depending on the EAP
method, pre-shared keys or
certificates may be used.";
}
description
"EAP method description used when
authentication method is 'eap'.";
reference
"IANA: Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
Registry, Method Types
RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2), Section 2.16.";
}
container pre-shared {
when "../auth-method[.='pre-shared' or
.='eap']";
leaf secret {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type yang:hex-string;
description
"Pre-shared secret value. The
NSF has to prevent read access
to this value for security
reasons. This value MUST be
set if the EAP method uses a
pre-shared key or pre-shared
authentication has been chosen.";
}
description
"Shared secret value for PSK or
EAP method authentication based on
PSK.";
}
container digital-signature {
when "../auth-method[.='digital-signature'
or .='eap']";
leaf ds-algorithm {
type uint8;
default "14";
description
"The digital signature
algorithm is specified with a
value extracted from the IANA
registry. Default is the generic
digital signature method. Depending
on the algorithm, the following leafs
MUST contain information. For
example, if digital signature or the
EAP method involves a certificate,
then leaves 'cert-data' and 'private-key'
will contain this information.";
reference
"IANA: Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
Parameters, IKEv2 Authentication Method.";
}
choice public-key {
leaf raw-public-key {
type binary;
description
"A binary that contains the
value of the public key. The
interpretation of the content
is defined by the digital
signature algorithm. For
example, an RSA key is
represented as RSAPublicKey, as
defined in RFC 8017, and an
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) key is represented
using the 'publicKey'
described in RFC 5915.";
reference
"RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key
Structure
RFC 8017: PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.2.";
}
leaf cert-data {
type binary;
description
"X.509 certificate data in DER
format. If raw-public-key is
defined, this leaf is empty.";
reference
"RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile.";
}
description
"If the I2NSF Controller
knows that the NSF
already owns a private key
associated to this public key
(e.g., the NSF generated the pair
public key/private key out of
band), it will only configure
one of the leaves of this
choice but not the leaf
private-key. The NSF, based on
the public key value, can know
the private key to be used.";
}
leaf private-key {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type binary;
description
"A binary that contains the
value of the private key. The
interpretation of the content
is defined by the digital
signature algorithm. For
example, an RSA key is
represented as RSAPrivateKey, as
defined in RFC 8017, and an
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) key is represented as
ECPrivateKey, as defined in RFC
5915. This value is set
if public key is defined and the
I2NSF Controller is in charge
of configuring the
private key. Otherwise, it is
not set and the value is
kept in secret.";
reference
"RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key
Structure
RFC 8017: PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.2.";
}
leaf-list ca-data {
type binary;
description
"List of trusted Certification
Authorities (CAs) certificates
encoded using ASN.1
Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER). If it is not defined,
the default value is empty.";
}
leaf crl-data {
type binary;
description
"A CertificateList structure, as
specified in RFC 5280,
encoded using ASN.1
Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T
X.690. If it is not defined,
the default value is empty.";
reference
"RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile.";
}
leaf crl-uri {
type inet:uri;
description
"X.509 Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) certificate URI.
If it is not defined,
the default value is empty.";
reference
"RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile.";
}
leaf oscp-uri {
type inet:uri;
description
"Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP) URI. If it is not defined,
the default value is empty.";
reference
"RFC 2560: 6960: X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure
Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP
RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile.";
}
description
"digital-signature container.";
} /*container digital-signature*/
} /*container peer-authentication*/
}
}
list conn-entry {
key "name";
description
"IKE peer connection information. This list
contains the IKE connection for this peer
with other peers. This will create, in
real time, IKE Security Associations
established with these nodes.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"Identifier for this connection
entry.";
}
leaf autostartup {
type autostartup-type;
default "add";
description
"By default, only add configuration
without starting the security
association.";
}
leaf initial-contact {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"The goal of this value is to deactivate the
usage of INITIAL_CONTACT notification
(true). If this flag remains set to false, it
means the usage of the INITIAL_CONTACT
notification will depend on the IKEv2
implementation.";
}
leaf version {
type auth-protocol-type;
default "ikev2";
description
"IKE version. Only version 2 is supported.";
}
container fragmentation {
leaf enabled {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"Whether or not to enable IKEv2
fragmentation (true or false).";
reference
"RFC 7383: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2) Message Fragmentation.";
}
leaf mtu {
when "../enabled='true'";
type uint16 {
range "68..65535";
}
description
"MTU that IKEv2 can use
for IKEv2 fragmentation.";
reference
"RFC 7383: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2) Message Fragmentation.";
}
description
"IKEv2 fragmentation, as per RFC 7383. If the
IKEv2 fragmentation is enabled, it is possible
to specify the MTU.";
}
container ike-sa-lifetime-soft {
description
"IKE SA lifetime soft. Two lifetime values
can be configured: either rekey time of the
IKE SA or reauth time of the IKE SA. When
the rekey lifetime expires, a rekey of the
IKE SA starts. When reauth lifetime
expires, an IKE SA reauthentication starts.";
leaf rekey-time {
type uint32;
units "seconds";
default "0";
description
"Time in seconds between each IKE SA
rekey. The value 0 means infinite.";
}
leaf reauth-time {
type uint32;
units "seconds";
default "0";
description
"Time in seconds between each IKE SA
reauthentication. The value 0 means
infinite.";
}
reference
"RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2), Section 2.8.";
}
container ike-sa-lifetime-hard {
description
"Hard IKE SA lifetime. When this
time is reached, the IKE SA is removed.";
leaf over-time {
type uint32;
units "seconds";
default "0";
description
"Time in seconds before the IKE SA is
removed. The value 0 means infinite.";
}
reference
"RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2).";
}
leaf-list ike-sa-intr-alg {
type nsfikec:intr-alg-t;
default "12";
ordered-by user;
description
"Integrity algorithm for establishing
the IKE SA. This list is ordered following
from the higher priority to lower priority.
The first node of the list will be the
algorithm with higher priority.
Default value 12 (AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128).";
}
list ike-sa-encr-alg {
key "id";
min-elements 1;
ordered-by user;
leaf id {
type uint16;
description
"An identifier that unequivocally
identifies each entry of the list,
i.e., an encryption algorithm and
its key length (if required).";
}
leaf algorithm-type {
type nsfikec:encr-alg-t;
default "12";
description
"Default value 12 (ENCR_AES_CBC).";
}
leaf key-length {
type uint16;
default "128";
description
"By default, key length is 128 bits.";
}
description
"Encryption or AEAD algorithm for the IKE
SAs. This list is ordered following
from the higher priority to lower priority.
The first node of the list will be the
algorithm with higher priority.";
}
leaf dh-group {
type fs-group;
default "14";
description
"Group number for Diffie-Hellman
Exponentiation used during IKE_SA_INIT
for the IKE SA key exchange.";
}
leaf half-open-ike-sa-timer {
type uint32;
units "seconds";
default "0";
description
"Set the half-open IKE SA timeout
duration. The value 0 implies infinite.";
reference
"RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2), Section 2.";
}
leaf half-open-ike-sa-cookie-threshold {
type uint32;
default "0";
description
"Number of half-open IKE SAs that activate
the cookie mechanism. The value 0 implies
infinite.";
reference
"RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2), Section 2.6.";
}
container local {
leaf local-pad-entry-name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"Local peer authentication information.
This node points to a specific entry in
the PAD where the authorization
information about this particular local
peer is stored. It MUST match a
pad-entry-name.";
}
description
"Local peer authentication information.";
}
container remote {
leaf remote-pad-entry-name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"Remote peer authentication information.
This node points to a specific entry in
the PAD where the authorization
information about this particular
remote peer is stored. It MUST match a
pad-entry-name.";
}
description
"Remote peer authentication information.";
}
container encapsulation-type {
uses nsfikec:encap;
description
"This container carries configuration
information about the source and destination
ports of encapsulation that IKE should use
and the type of encapsulation that
should be used when NAT traversal is required.
However, this is just a best effort since
the IKE implementation may need to use a
different encapsulation, as described in
RFC 8229.";
reference
"RFC 8229: TCP Encapsulation of IKE and IPsec
Packets.";
}
container spd {
description
"Configuration of the Security Policy
Database (SPD). This main information is
placed in the grouping
ipsec-policy-grouping.";
list spd-entry {
key "name";
ordered-by user;
leaf name {
type string;
description
"SPD-entry-unique name to identify
the IPsec policy.";
}
container ipsec-policy-config {
description
"This container carries the
configuration of an IPsec policy.";
uses nsfikec:ipsec-policy-grouping;
}
description
"List of entries that will constitute
the representation of the SPD. In this
case, since the NSF implements IKE, it
is only required to send an IPsec policy
from this NSF where 'local' is this NSF
and 'remote' the other NSF. The IKE
implementation will install IPsec
policies in the NSF's kernel in both
directions (inbound and outbound) and
their corresponding IPsec SAs based on
the information in this SPD entry.";
}
reference
"RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2), Section 2.9.";
}
container child-sa-info {
leaf-list fs-groups {
type fs-group;
default "0";
ordered-by user;
description
"If non-zero, forward secrecy is
required when a new IPsec SA is being
created, the (non-zero) value indicates
the group number to use for the key
exchange process used to achieve forward
secrecy.
This list is ordered following from the
higher priority to lower priority. The
first node of the list will be the
algorithm with higher priority.";
}
container child-sa-lifetime-soft {
description
"Soft IPsec SA lifetime.
After the lifetime, the action is
defined in this container
in the leaf action.";
uses nsfikec:lifetime;
leaf action {
type nsfikec:lifetime-action;
default "replace";
description
"When the lifetime of an IPsec SA
expires, an action needs to be
performed over the IPsec SA that
reached the lifetime. There are
three possible options:
terminate-clear, terminate-hold, and
replace.";
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol, Section 4.5
RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2), Section 2.8.";
}
}
container child-sa-lifetime-hard {
description
"IPsec SA lifetime hard. The action will
be to terminate the IPsec SA.";
uses nsfikec:lifetime;
reference
"RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2), Section 2.8.";
}
description
"Specific information for IPsec SAs.
It includes the Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)
group and IPsec SAs rekey lifetimes.";
}
container state {
config false;
leaf initiator {
type boolean;
description
"It is acting as an initiator for this
connection.";
}
leaf initiator-ikesa-spi {
type ike-spi;
description
"Initiator's IKE SA SPI.";
}
leaf responder-ikesa-spi {
type ike-spi;
description
"Responder's IKE SA SPI.";
}
leaf nat-local {
type boolean;
description
"True if local endpoint is behind a
NAT.";
}
leaf nat-remote {
type boolean;
description
"True if remote endpoint is behind
a NAT.";
}
container encapsulation-type {
uses nsfikec:encap;
description
"This container provides information
about the source and destination
ports of encapsulation that IKE is
using and the type of encapsulation
when NAT traversal is required.";
reference
"RFC 8229: TCP Encapsulation of IKE and IPsec Packets.";
}
leaf established {
type uint64;
units "seconds";
description
"Seconds since this IKE SA has been
established.";
}
leaf current-rekey-time {
type uint64;
units "seconds";
description
"Seconds before IKE SA is rekeyed.";
}
leaf current-reauth-time {
type uint64;
units "seconds";
description
"Seconds before IKE SA is
reauthenticated.";
}
description
"IKE state data for a particular
connection.";
} /* ike-sa-state */
} /* ike-conn-entries */
container number-ike-sas {
config false;
leaf total {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"Total number of active IKE SAs.";
}
leaf half-open {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"Number of half-open active IKE SAs.";
}
leaf half-open-cookies {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"Number of half-open active IKE SAs with
cookie activated.";
}
description
"General information about the IKE SAs. In
particular, it provides the current number of
IKE SAs.";
}
} /* container ipsec-ike */
}
<CODE ENDS>
5.3. The 'ietf-i2nsf-ikeless' Module
In this section, the YANG module for the IKE-less case is described.
5.3.1. Data Model Overview
For this case, the definition of the SPD model has been mainly
extracted from the specification in Section 4.4.1 and Appendix D in
[RFC4301], though with some changes, namely:
* For simplicity, each IPsec policy (spd-entry) contains one Traffic
Selector, instead of a list of them. The reason is that actual
kernel implementations only admit a single Traffic Selector per
IPsec policy.
* Each IPsec policy contains an identifier (reqid) to relate the
policy with the IPsec SA. This is common in Linux-based systems.
* Each IPsec policy has only one name and not a list of names.
* Combined algorithms have been removed because encryption
algorithms MAY include Authenticated Encryption with Associated
Data (AEAD).
* Tunnel information has been extended with information about DSCP
mapping. The reason is that certain kernel implementations accept
configuration of these values.
The definition of the SAD model has been mainly extracted from the
specification in Section 4.4.2 of [RFC4301], though with some
changes, namely:
* For simplicity, each IPsec SA (sad-entry) contains one Traffic
Selector, instead of a list of them. The reason is that actual
kernel implementations only admit a single Traffic Selector per
IPsec SA.
* Each IPsec SA contains an identifier (reqid) to relate the IPsec
SA with the IPsec policy. The reason is that real kernel
implementations allow this value to be included.
* Each IPsec SA is also named in the same way as IPsec policies.
* The model allows specifying the algorithm for encryption. This
can be Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) or
non-AEAD. If an AEAD algorithm is specified, the integrity
algorithm is not required. If a non-AEAD algorithm is specified,
the integrity algorithm is required [RFC8221].
* Tunnel information has been extended with information about
Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) mapping. It is assumed
that NSFs involved in this document provide ECN full functionality
to prevent discarding of ECN congestion indications [RFC6040].
* The lifetime of the IPsec SAs also includes idle time and the
number of IP packets as a threshold to trigger the lifetime. The
reason is that actual kernel implementations allow for setting
these types of lifetimes.
* Information to configure the type of encapsulation (encapsulation-
type) for IPsec ESP packets in UDP [RFC3948] or TCP [RFC8229] has
been included.
The notifications model has been defined using, as reference, the
PF_KEYv2 specification in [RFC2367].
The YANG data model for the IKE-less case is defined by the module
"ietf-i2nsf-ikeless". Its structure is depicted in the following
diagram, using the notation syntax for YANG tree diagrams [RFC8340].
module: ietf-i2nsf-ikeless
+--rw ipsec-ikeless
+--rw spd
| +--rw spd-entry* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw direction nsfikec:ipsec-traffic-direction
| +--rw reqid? uint64
| +--rw ipsec-policy-config
| +--rw anti-replay-window-size? uint32
| +--rw traffic-selector
| | +--rw local-prefix inet:ip-prefix
| | +--rw remote-prefix inet:ip-prefix
| | +--rw inner-protocol? ipsec-inner-protocol
| | +--rw local-ports* [start end]
| | | +--rw start inet:port-number
| | | +--rw end inet:port-number
| | +--rw remote-ports* [start end]
| | +--rw start inet:port-number
| | +--rw end inet:port-number
| +--rw processing-info
| +--rw action? ipsec-spd-action
| +--rw ipsec-sa-cfg
| +--rw pfp-flag? boolean
| +--rw ext-seq-num? boolean
| +--rw seq-overflow? boolean
| +--rw stateful-frag-check? boolean
| +--rw mode? ipsec-mode
| +--rw protocol-parameters? ipsec-protocol-params
| +--rw esp-algorithms
| | +--rw integrity* intr-alg-t
| | +--rw encryption* [id]
| | | +--rw id uint16
| | | +--rw algorithm-type? encr-alg-t
| | | +--rw key-length? uint16
| | +--rw tfc-pad? boolean
| +--rw tunnel
| +--rw local inet:ip-address
| +--rw remote inet:ip-address
| +--rw df-bit? enumeration
| +--rw bypass-dscp? boolean
| +--rw dscp-mapping* [id]
| +--rw id uint8
| +--rw inner-dscp? inet:dscp
| +--rw outer-dscp? inet:dscp
+--rw sad
+--rw sad-entry* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw reqid? uint64
+--rw ipsec-sa-config
| +--rw spi uint32
| +--rw ext-seq-num? boolean
| +--rw seq-overflow? boolean
| +--rw anti-replay-window-size? uint32
| +--rw traffic-selector
| | +--rw local-prefix inet:ip-prefix
| | +--rw remote-prefix inet:ip-prefix
| | +--rw inner-protocol? ipsec-inner-protocol
| | +--rw local-ports* [start end]
| | | +--rw start inet:port-number
| | | +--rw end inet:port-number
| | +--rw remote-ports* [start end]
| | +--rw start inet:port-number
| | +--rw end inet:port-number
| +--rw protocol-parameters? nsfikec:ipsec-protocol-params
| +--rw mode? nsfikec:ipsec-mode
| +--rw esp-sa
| | +--rw encryption
| | | +--rw encryption-algorithm? nsfikec:encr-alg-t
| | | +--rw key? yang:hex-string
| | | +--rw iv? yang:hex-string
| | +--rw integrity
| | +--rw integrity-algorithm? nsfikec:intr-alg-t
| | +--rw key? yang:hex-string
| +--rw sa-lifetime-hard
| | +--rw time? uint32
| | +--rw bytes? yang:counter64
| | +--rw packets? uint32
| | +--rw idle? uint32
| +--rw sa-lifetime-soft
| | +--rw time? uint32
| | +--rw bytes? yang:counter64
| | +--rw packets? uint32
| | +--rw idle? uint32
| | +--rw action? nsfikec:lifetime-action
| +--rw tunnel
| | +--rw local inet:ip-address
| | +--rw remote inet:ip-address
| | +--rw df-bit? enumeration
| | +--rw bypass-dscp? boolean
| | +--rw dscp-mapping* [id]
| | | +--rw id uint8
| | | +--rw inner-dscp? inet:dscp
| | | +--rw outer-dscp? inet:dscp
| | +--rw dscp-values* inet:dscp
| +--rw encapsulation-type
| +--rw espencap? esp-encap
| +--rw sport? inet:port-number
| +--rw dport? inet:port-number
| +--rw oaddr* inet:ip-address
+--ro ipsec-sa-state
+--ro sa-lifetime-current
| +--ro time? uint32
| +--ro bytes? yang:counter64
| +--ro packets? uint32
| +--ro idle? uint32
+--ro replay-stats
+--ro replay-window
| +--ro w? uint32
| +--ro t? uint64
| +--ro b? uint64
+--ro packet-dropped? yang:counter64
+--ro failed? yang:counter64
+--ro seq-number-counter? uint64
notifications:
+---n sadb-acquire {ikeless-notification}?
| +--ro ipsec-policy-name string
| +--ro traffic-selector
| +--ro local-prefix inet:ip-prefix
| +--ro remote-prefix inet:ip-prefix
| +--ro inner-protocol? ipsec-inner-protocol
| +--ro local-ports* [start end]
| | +--ro start inet:port-number
| | +--ro end inet:port-number
| +--ro remote-ports* [start end]
| +--ro start inet:port-number
| +--ro end inet:port-number
+---n sadb-expire {ikeless-notification}?
| +--ro ipsec-sa-name string
| +--ro soft-lifetime-expire? boolean
| +--ro lifetime-current
| +--ro time? uint32
| +--ro bytes? yang:counter64
| +--ro packets? uint32
| +--ro idle? uint32
+---n sadb-seq-overflow {ikeless-notification}?
| +--ro ipsec-sa-name string
+---n sadb-bad-spi {ikeless-notification}?
+--ro spi uint32
The YANG data model consists of a unique "ipsec-ikeless" container,
which, in turn, is composed of two additional containers: "spd" and
"sad". The "spd" container consists of a list of entries that form
the Security Policy Database. Compared to the IKE case YANG data
model, this part specifies a few additional parameters necessary due
to the absence of an IKE software in the NSF: traffic direction to
apply the IPsec policy and a "reqid" value to link an IPsec policy
with its associated IPsec SAs since it is otherwise a little hard to
find by searching. The "sad" container is a list of entries that
form the Security Association Database. In general, each entry
allows specifying both configuration information (SPI, Traffic
Selectors, tunnel/transport mode, cryptographic algorithms and keying
material, soft/hard lifetimes, etc.) as well as stating information
(time to expire, replay statistics, etc.) of a concrete IPsec SA.
In addition, the module defines a set of notifications to allow the
NSF to inform the I2NSF Controller about relevant events, such as
IPsec SA expiration, sequence number overflow, or bad SPI in a
received packet.
5.3.2. Example Usage
Appendix B shows an example of an IKE-less case configuration for an
NSF in transport mode (host-to-host). Additionally, Appendix C shows
examples of IPsec SA expire, acquire, sequence number overflow, and
bad SPI notifications.
5.3.3. YANG Module
This YANG module has normative references to [RFC4301], [RFC4303],
[RFC6991], [RFC8174] and [RFC8341].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-i2nsf-ikeless@2021-06-09.yang"
module ietf-i2nsf-ikeless {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-ikeless";
prefix nsfikels;
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix inet;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types.";
}
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types.";
}
import ietf-i2nsf-ikec {
prefix nsfikec;
reference
"RFC 9061: Software-Defined Networking
(SDN)-based A YANG Data Model for IPsec Flow Protection."; Protection
Based on Software-Defined Networking (SDN).";
}
import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm;
reference
"RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control
Model.";
}
organization
"IETF I2NSF Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/i2nsf/>
WG List: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
Author: Rafael Marin-Lopez
<mailto:rafa@um.es>
Author: Gabriel Lopez-Millan
<mailto:gabilm@um.es>
Author: Fernando Pereniguez-Garcia
<mailto:fernando.pereniguez@cud.upct.es>
";
description
"Data model for IKE-less case in the SDN-based IPsec flow
protection service.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14
(RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear
in all capitals, as shown here.
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons
identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9061; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2021-06-09 {
description
"Initial version.";
reference
"RFC 9061: Software-Defined Networking
(SDN)-based A YANG Data Model for IPsec Flow Protection."; Protection
Based on Software-Defined Networking (SDN).";
}
feature ikeless-notification {
description
"This feature indicates that the server supports
generating notifications in the ikeless module.
To ensure broader applicability of this module,
the notifications are marked as a feature.
For the implementation of the IKE-less case,
the NSF is expected to implement this
feature.";
}
container ipsec-ikeless {
description
"Container for configuration of the IKE-less
case. The container contains two additional
containers: 'spd' and 'sad'. The first allows the
I2NSF Controller to configure IPsec policies in
the Security Policy Database (SPD), and the second
allows the I2NSF Controller to configure IPsec
Security Associations (IPsec SAs) in the Security
Association Database (SAD).";
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol.";
container spd {
description
"Configuration of the Security Policy Database
(SPD).";
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,
Section 4.4.1.2.";
list spd-entry {
key "name";
ordered-by user;
leaf name {
type string;
description
"SPD-entry-unique name to identify this
entry.";
}
leaf direction {
type nsfikec:ipsec-traffic-direction;
mandatory true;
description
"Inbound traffic or outbound
traffic. In the IKE-less case, the
I2NSF Controller needs to
specify the policy direction to be
applied in the NSF. In the IKE case,
this direction does not need to be
specified, since IKE
will determine the direction that the
IPsec policy will require.";
}
leaf reqid {
type uint64;
default "0";
description
"This value allows linking this
IPsec policy with IPsec SAs with the
same reqid. It is only required in
the IKE-less model since, in the IKE
case, this link is handled internally
by IKE.";
}
container ipsec-policy-config {
description
"This container carries the
configuration of an IPsec policy.";
uses nsfikec:ipsec-policy-grouping;
}
description
"The SPD is represented as a list of SPD
entries, where each SPD entry represents an
IPsec policy.";
} /*list spd-entry*/
} /*container spd*/
container sad {
description
"Configuration of the IPsec Security Association
Database (SAD).";
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,
Section 4.4.2.1.";
list sad-entry {
key "name";
ordered-by user;
leaf name {
type string;
description
"SAD-entry-unique name to identify this
entry.";
}
leaf reqid {
type uint64;
default "0";
description
"This value allows linking this
IPsec SA with an IPsec policy with
the same reqid.";
}
container ipsec-sa-config {
description
"This container allows configuring
details of an IPsec SA.";
leaf spi {
type uint32 {
range "0..max";
}
mandatory true;
description
"IPsec SA of Security Parameter Index (SPI).";
}
leaf ext-seq-num {
type boolean;
default "true";
description
"True if this IPsec SA is using extended
sequence numbers. If true, the 64-bit
extended sequence number counter is used;
if false, the normal 32-bit sequence
number counter is used.";
}
leaf seq-overflow {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"The flag indicating whether
overflow of the sequence number
counter should prevent transmission
of additional packets on the IPsec
SA (false) and, therefore, needs to
be rekeyed or whether rollover is
permitted (true). If Authenticated
Encryption with Associated Data
(AEAD) is used (leaf
esp-algorithms/encryption/algorithm-type),
this flag MUST BE false. Setting this
flag to true is strongly discouraged.";
}
leaf anti-replay-window-size {
type uint32;
default "64";
description
"To set the anti-replay window size.
The default value is set to 64,
following the recommendation in RFC 4303.";
reference
"RFC 4303: IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),
Section 3.4.3.";
}
container traffic-selector {
uses nsfikec:selector-grouping;
description
"The IPsec SA Traffic Selector.";
}
leaf protocol-parameters {
type nsfikec:ipsec-protocol-params;
default "esp";
description
"Security protocol of IPsec SA, only
ESP so far.";
}
leaf mode {
type nsfikec:ipsec-mode;
default "transport";
description
"Tunnel or transport mode.";
}
container esp-sa {
when "../protocol-parameters = 'esp'";
description
"In case the IPsec SA is an
Encapsulation Security Payload
(ESP), it is required to specify
encryption and integrity
algorithms and key materials.";
container encryption {
description
"Configuration of encryption or
AEAD algorithm for IPsec
Encapsulation Security Payload
(ESP).";
leaf encryption-algorithm {
type nsfikec:encr-alg-t;
default "12";
description
"Configuration of ESP
encryption. With AEAD
algorithms, the integrity-algorithm
leaf is not used.";
}
leaf key {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type yang:hex-string;
description
"ESP encryption key value.
If this leaf is not defined,
the key is not defined
(e.g., encryption is NULL).
The key length is
determined by the
length of the key set in
this leaf. By default, it is
128 bits.";
}
leaf iv {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type yang:hex-string;
description
"ESP encryption IV value. If
this leaf is not defined, the
IV is not defined (e.g.,
encryption is NULL).";
}
}
container integrity {
description
"Configuration of integrity for
IPsec Encapsulation Security
Payload (ESP). This container
allows configuration of integrity
algorithms when no AEAD
algorithms are used and
integrity is required.";
leaf integrity-algorithm {
type nsfikec:intr-alg-t;
default "12";
description
"Message Authentication Code
(MAC) algorithm to provide
integrity in ESP (default
AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128).
With AEAD algorithms,
the integrity leaf is not
used.";
}
leaf key {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type yang:hex-string;
description
"ESP integrity key value.
If this leaf is not defined,
the key is not defined (e.g.,
AEAD algorithm is chosen and
integrity algorithm is not
required). The key length is
determined by the length of
the key configured.";
}
}
} /*container esp-sa*/
container sa-lifetime-hard {
description
"IPsec SA hard lifetime. The action
associated is terminate and hold.";
uses nsfikec:lifetime;
}
container sa-lifetime-soft {
description
"IPsec SA soft lifetime.";
uses nsfikec:lifetime;
leaf action {
type nsfikec:lifetime-action;
description
"Action lifetime: terminate-clear,
terminate-hold, or replace.";
}
}
container tunnel {
when "../mode = 'tunnel'";
uses nsfikec:tunnel-grouping;
leaf-list dscp-values {
type inet:dscp;
description
"DSCP values allowed for ingress packets carried
over this IPsec SA. If no values are specified, no
DSCP-specific filtering is applied. When
../bypass-dscp is false and a dscp-mapping is
defined, each value here would be the same as the
'inner' DSCP value for the DSCP mapping (list
dscp-mapping).";
reference
"RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol, Section 4.4.2.1.";
}
description
"Endpoints of the IPsec tunnel.";
}
container encapsulation-type {
uses nsfikec:encap;
description
"This container carries
configuration information about
the source and destination ports
that will be used for ESP
encapsulation of ESP packets and
the type of encapsulation when NAT
traversal is in place.";
}
} /*ipsec-sa-config*/
container ipsec-sa-state {
config false;
description
"Container describing IPsec SA state
data.";
container sa-lifetime-current {
uses nsfikec:lifetime;
description
"SAD lifetime current.";
}
container replay-stats {
description
"State data about the anti-replay
window.";
container replay-window {
leaf w {
type uint32;
description
"Size of the replay window.";
}
leaf t {
type uint64;
description
"Highest sequence number
authenticated so far,
upper bound of window.";
}
leaf b {
type uint64;
description
"Lower bound of window.";
}
description
"This container contains three
parameters that define the state
of the replay window: window size (w),
highest sequence number authenticated (t),
and lower bound of the window (b), according
to Appendix A2.1 in RFC 4303 (w = t - b + 1).";
reference
"RFC 4303: IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),
Appendix A.";
}
leaf packet-dropped {
type yang:counter64;
description
"Packets dropped
because they are
replay packets.";
}
leaf failed {
type yang:counter64;
description
"Number of packets detected out
of the replay window.";
}
leaf seq-number-counter {
type uint64;
description
"A 64-bit counter when this
IPsec SA is using Extended
Sequence Number or 32-bit
counter when it is not.
Current value of sequence
number.";
}
} /* container replay-stats*/
} /*ipsec-sa-state*/
description
"List of SAD entries that form the SAD.";
} /*list sad-entry*/
} /*container sad*/
} /*container ipsec-ikeless*/
/* Notifications */
notification sadb-acquire {
if-feature "ikeless-notification";
description
"The NSF detects and notifies that
an IPsec SA is required for an
outbound IP packet that has matched an SPD entry.
The traffic-selector container in this
notification contains information about
the IP packet that triggered this
notification.";
leaf ipsec-policy-name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"It contains the SPD entry name (unique) of
the IPsec policy that hits the IP-packet-required
IPsec SA. It is assumed the
I2NSF Controller will have a copy of the
information of this policy so it can
extract all the information with this
unique identifier. The type of IPsec SA is
defined in the policy so the security
controller can also know the type of IPsec
SA that MUST be generated.";
}
container traffic-selector {
description
"The IP packet that triggered the acquire
and requires an IPsec SA. Specifically, it
will contain the IP source/mask and IP
destination/mask, protocol (udp, tcp,
etc.), and source and destination
ports.";
uses nsfikec:selector-grouping;
}
}
notification sadb-expire {
if-feature "ikeless-notification";
description
"An IPsec SA expiration (soft or hard).";
leaf ipsec-sa-name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"It contains the SAD entry name (unique) of
the IPsec SA that is about to expire. It is assumed
the I2NSF Controller will have a copy of the
IPsec SA information (except the cryptographic
material and state data) indexed by this name
(unique identifier) so it can know all the
information (crypto algorithms, etc.) about
the IPsec SA that has expired in order to
perform a rekey (soft lifetime) or delete it
(hard lifetime) with this unique identifier.";
}
leaf soft-lifetime-expire {
type boolean;
default "true";
description
"If this value is true, the lifetime expired is
soft. If it is false, the lifetime is hard.";
}
container lifetime-current {
description
"IPsec SA current lifetime. If
soft-lifetime-expired is true,
this container is set with the
lifetime information about current
soft lifetime.
It can help the NSF Controller
to know which of the (soft) lifetime
limits raised the event: time, bytes,
packets, or idle.";
uses nsfikec:lifetime;
}
}
notification sadb-seq-overflow {
if-feature "ikeless-notification";
description
"Sequence overflow notification.";
leaf ipsec-sa-name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"It contains the SAD entry name (unique) of
the IPsec SA that is about to have a sequence
number overflow, and rollover is not permitted.
When the NSF issues this event before reaching
a sequence number, overflow is implementation
specific and out of scope of this specification.
It is assumed the I2NSF Controller will have a
copy of the IPsec SA information (except the
cryptographic material and state data) indexed
by this name (unique identifier) so it can
know all the information (crypto algorithms,
etc.) about the IPsec SA in
order to perform a rekey of the IPsec SA.";
}
}
notification sadb-bad-spi {
if-feature "ikeless-notification";
description
"Notify when the NSF receives a packet with an
incorrect SPI (i.e., not present in the SAD).";
leaf spi {
type uint32 {
range "0..max";
}
mandatory true;
description
"SPI number contained in the erroneous IPsec
packet.";
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
6. IANA Considerations
IANA has registered the following namespaces in the "ns" subregistry
within the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-ikec
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-ike
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-ikeless
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
IANA has registered the following YANG modules in the "YANG Module
Names" registry [RFC6020]:
Name: ietf-i2nsf-ikec
Maintained by IANA: N
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-ikec
Prefix: nsfikec
Reference: RFC 9061
Name: ietf-i2nsf-ike
Maintained by IANA: N
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-ike
Prefix: nsfike
Reference: RFC 9061
Name: ietf-i2nsf-ikeless
Maintained by IANA: N
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-ikeless
Prefix: nsfikels
Reference: RFC 9061
7. Security Considerations
First of all, this document shares all the security issues of SDN
that are specified in the Security Considerations sections of
[ITU-T.Y.3300] and [RFC7426].
On the one hand, it is important to note that there MUST exist a
security association between the I2NSF Controller and the NSFs to
protect the critical information (cryptographic keys, configuration
parameter, etc.) exchanged between these entities. The nature of and
means to create that security association is out of the scope of this
document (i.e., it is part of device provisioning or onboarding).
On the other hand, if encryption is mandatory for all traffic of an
NSF, its default policy MUST be to drop (DISCARD) packets to prevent
cleartext packet leaks. This default policy MUST be preconfigured in
the startup configuration datastore in the NSF before the NSF
contacts the I2NSF Controller. Moreover, the startup configuration
datastore MUST be also preconfigured with the required ALLOW policies
that allow the NSF to communicate with the I2NSF Controller once the
NSF is deployed. This preconfiguration step is not carried out by
the I2NSF Controller but by some other entity before the NSF
deployment. In this manner, when the NSF starts/reboots, it will
always first apply the configuration in the startup configuration
before contacting the I2NSF Controller.
Finally, this section is divided in two parts in order to analyze
different security considerations for both cases: NSF with IKEv2 (IKE
case) and NSF without IKEv2 (IKE-less case). In general, the I2NSF
Controller, as typically in the SDN paradigm, is a target for
different type of attacks; see [SDNSecServ] and [SDNSecurity]. Thus,
the I2NSF Controller is a key entity in the infrastructure and MUST
be protected accordingly. In particular, the I2NSF Controller will
handle cryptographic material; thus, the attacker may try to access
this information. The impact is different depending on the IKE case
or the IKE-less case.
7.1. IKE Case
In the IKE case, the I2NSF Controller sends IKEv2 credentials (PSK,
public/private keys, certificates, etc.) to the NSFs using the
security association between the I2NSF Controller and NSFs. The
I2NSF Controller MUST NOT store the IKEv2 credentials after
distributing them. Moreover, the NSFs MUST NOT allow the reading of
these values once they have been applied by the I2NSF Controller
(i.e., write-only operations). One option is to always return the
same value (i.e., all 0s) if a read operation is carried out.
If the attacker has access to the I2NSF Controller during the period
of time that key material is generated, it might have access to the
key material. Since these values are used during NSF authentication
in IKEv2, it may impersonate the affected NSFs. Several
recommendations are important.
* IKEv2 configurations SHOULD adhere to the recommendations in
[RFC8247].
* If PSK authentication is used in IKEv2, the I2NSF Controller MUST
remove the PSK immediately after generating and distributing it.
* When public/private keys are used, the I2NSF Controller MAY
generate both public key and private key. In such a case, the
I2NSF Controller MUST remove the associated private key
immediately after distributing them to the NSFs. Alternatively,
the NSF MAY generate the private key and export only the public
key to the I2NSF Controller. How the NSF generates these
cryptographic materials (public key/ private keys) and exports the
public key is out of scope of this document.
* If certificates are used, the NSF MAY generate the private key and
export the public key for certification to the I2NSF Controller.
How the NSF generates these cryptographic material (public key/
private keys) and exports the public key is out of scope of this
document.
7.2. IKE-less Case
In the IKE-less case, the I2NSF Controller sends the IPsec SA
information to the NSF's SAD that includes the private session keys
required for integrity and encryption. The I2NSF Controller MUST NOT
store the keys after distributing them. Moreover, the NSFs receiving
private key material MUST NOT allow the reading of these values by
any other entity (including the I2NSF Controller itself) once they
have been applied (i.e., write-only operations) into the NSFs.
Nevertheless, if the attacker has access to the I2NSF Controller
during the period of time that key material is generated, it may
obtain these values. In other words, the attacker might be able to
observe the IPsec traffic and decrypt, or even modify and re-encrypt,
the traffic between peers.
Finally, the security association between the I2NSF Controller and
the NSFs MUST provide, at least, the same degree of protection as the
one achieved by the IPsec SAs configured in the NSFs. In particular,
the security association between the I2NSF Controller and the NSFs
MUST provide forward secrecy if this property is to be achieved in
the IPsec SAs that the I2NSF Controller configures in the NSFs.
Similarly, the encryption algorithms used in the security association
between the I2NSF Controller and the NSF MUST have, at least, the
same strength (minimum strength of a 128-bit key) as the algorithms
used to establish the IPsec SAs.
7.3. YANG Modules
The YANG modules specified in this document define a schema for data
that is designed to be accessed via network management protocols such
as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer
is the secure transport layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure
transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer
is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS
[RFC8446].
The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341]
provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or
RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or
RESTCONF protocol operations and content.
There are a number of data nodes defined in these YANG modules that
are writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the
default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config)
to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative
effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes
and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
For the IKE case (ietf-i2nsf-ike):
/ipsec-ike: The entire container in this module is sensitive to
write operations. An attacker may add/modify the credentials
to be used for the authentication (e.g., to impersonate an
NSF), for the trust root (e.g., changing the trusted CA
certificates), for the cryptographic algorithms (allowing a
downgrading attack), for the IPsec policies (e.g., by allowing
leaking of data traffic by changing to an allow policy), and in
general, changing the IKE SA conditions and credentials between
any NSF.
For the IKE-less case (ietf-i2nsf-ikeless):
/ipsec-ikeless: The entire container in this module is sensitive
to write operations. An attacker may add/modify/delete any
IPsec policies (e.g., by allowing leaking of data traffic by
changing to an allow policy) in the /ipsec-ikeless/spd
container, add/modify/delete any IPsec SAs between two NSF by
means of /ipsec-ikeless/sad container, and, in general, change
any IPsec SAs and IPsec policies between any NSF.
Some of the readable data nodes in these YANG modules may be
considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It
is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config,
or notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and
data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
For the IKE case (ietf-i2nsf-ike):
/ipsec-ike/pad: This container includes sensitive information to
read operations. This information MUST NOT be returned to a
client. For example, cryptographic material configured in the
NSFs (peer-authentication/pre-shared/secret and peer-
authentication/digital-signature/private-key) are already
protected by the NACM extension "default-deny-all" in this
document.
For the IKE-less case (ietf-i2nsf-ikeless):
/ipsec-ikeless/sad/sad-entry/ipsec-sa-config/esp-sa: This
container includes symmetric keys for the IPsec SAs. For
example, encryption/key contains an ESP encryption key value
and encryption/iv contains an Initialization Vector value.
Similarly, integrity/key has an ESP integrity key value. Those
values MUST NOT be read by anyone and are protected by the NACM
extension "default-deny-all" in this document.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[IANA-Method-Type]
IANA, "Method Type",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/eap-numbers/>.
[IANA-Protocols-Number]
IANA, "Protocol Numbers",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.
[IKEv2-Auth-Method]
IANA, "IKEv2 Authentication Method",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/>.
[IKEv2-Parameters]
IANA, "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
Parameters",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/>.
[IKEv2-Transform-Type-1]
IANA, "Transform Type 1 - Encryption Algorithm Transform
IDs",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/>.
[IKEv2-Transform-Type-3]
IANA, "Transform Type 3 - Integrity Algorithm Transform
IDs",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/>.
[IKEv2-Transform-Type-4]
IANA, "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group Transform
IDs",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/>.
[ITU-T.X.690]
International Telecommunication Untion, Union, "Information
Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1, February 2021.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2247] Kille, S., Wahl, M., Grimstad, A., Huber, R., and S.
Sataluri, "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished
Names", RFC 2247, DOI 10.17487/RFC2247, January 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2247>.
[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2560, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2560>.
[RFC3947] Kivinen, T., Swander, B., Huttunen, A., and V. Volpe,
"Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE", RFC 3947,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3947, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3947>.
[RFC3948] Huttunen, A., Swander, B., Volpe, V., DiBurro, L., and M.
Stenberg, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets",
RFC 3948, DOI 10.17487/RFC3948, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3948>.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5322] Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5322, October 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5322>.
[RFC5915] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Elliptic Curve Private Key
Structure", RFC 5915, DOI 10.17487/RFC5915, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5915>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC7383] Smyslov, V., "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2) Message Fragmentation", RFC 7383,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7383, November 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7383>.
[RFC7427] Kivinen, T. and J. Snyder, "Signature Authentication in
the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 7427,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7427, January 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7427>.
[RFC7619] Smyslov, V. and P. Wouters, "The NULL Authentication
Method in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", RFC 7619, DOI 10.17487/RFC7619, August 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7619>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8221] Wouters, P., Migault, D., Mattsson, J., Nir, Y., and T.
Kivinen, "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 8221,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8221, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8221>.
[RFC8229] Pauly, T., Touati, S., and R. Mantha, "TCP Encapsulation
of IKE and IPsec Packets", RFC 8229, DOI 10.17487/RFC8229,
August 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8229>.
[RFC8247] Nir, Y., Kivinen, T., Wouters, P., and D. Migault,
"Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance
for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
RFC 8247, DOI 10.17487/RFC8247, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8247>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
[RFC8342] Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K.,
and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture
(NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
8.2. Informative References
[IPSECME-CONTROLLER-IKE]
Carrel, D. and B. Weis, "IPsec Key Exchange using a
Controller", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
carrel-ipsecme-controller-ike-01, 10 March 2019,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-carrel-ipsecme-
controller-ike-01>.
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-carrel-
ipsecme-controller-ike-01>.
[ITU-T.Y.3300]
International Telecommunications Union, "Y.3300: Framework
of software-defined networking", June 2014,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-Y.3300/en>.
[libreswan]
The Libreswan Project, "Libreswan VPN software",
<https://libreswan.org/>.
[netconf-vpn]
Stefan Wallin, "Tutorial: NETCONF and YANG", January 2014,
<https://ripe68.ripe.net/presentations/181-NETCONF-YANG-
tutorial-43.pdf>.
[ONF-OpenFlow]
Open Networking Foundation, "OpenFlow Switch
Specification", Version 1.4.0 (Wire Protocol 0x05),
October 2013, <https://www.opennetworking.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/openflow-spec-v1.4.0.pdf>.
[ONF-SDN-Architecture]
Open Networking Foundation, "SDN architecture", Issue 1,
June 2014, <https://www.opennetworking.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/TR_SDN_ARCH_1.0_06062014.pdf>.
[RFC2367] McDonald, D., Metz, C., and B. Phan, "PF_KEY Key
Management API, Version 2", RFC 2367,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2367, July 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2367>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC6040] Briscoe, B., "Tunnelling of Explicit Congestion
Notification", RFC 6040, DOI 10.17487/RFC6040, November
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6040>.
[RFC6071] Frankel, S. and S. Krishnan, "IP Security (IPsec) and
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Document Roadmap", RFC 6071,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6071, February 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6071>.
[RFC6437] Amante, S., Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and J. Rajahalme,
"IPv6 Flow Label Specification", RFC 6437,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6437, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6437>.
[RFC7149] Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet, "Software-Defined
Networking: A Perspective from within a Service Provider
Environment", RFC 7149, DOI 10.17487/RFC7149, March 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7149>.
[RFC7426] Haleplidis, E., Ed., Pentikousis, K., Ed., Denazis, S.,
Hadi Salim, J., Meyer, D., and O. Koufopavlou, "Software-
Defined Networking (SDN): Layers and Architecture
Terminology", RFC 7426, DOI 10.17487/RFC7426, January
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7426>.
[RFC8192] Hares, S., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Kumar, R.,
and J. Jeong, "Interface to Network Security Functions
(I2NSF): Problem Statement and Use Cases", RFC 8192,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8192, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8192>.
[RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R.
Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions", RFC 8329, DOI 10.17487/RFC8329, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8329>.
[SDNSecServ]
Scott-Hayward, S., O'Callaghan, G., and P. Sezer, "Sdn
Security: A Survey", 2013 IEEE SDN for Future Networks and
Services (SDN4FNS), pp. 1-7,
DOI 10.1109/SDN4FNS.2013.6702553, November 2013,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/SDN4FNS.2013.6702553>.
[SDNSecurity]
Kreutz, D., Ramos, F., and P. Verissimo, "Towards secure
and dependable software-defined networks", Proceedings of
the second ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Hot Topics in software
defined networking, pp. 55-60,
DOI 10.1145/2491185.2491199, August 2013,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/2491185.2491199>.
[strongswan]
CESNET, "strongSwan: the OpenSource IPsec-based VPN
Solution", <https://www.strongswan.org/>.
[TRAN-IPSECME-YANG]
Tran, K., Wang, H., Nagaraj, V. K., and X. Chen, "Yang
Data Model for Internet Protocol Security (IPsec)", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-tran-ipsecme-yang-01,
18 March 2016,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tran-ipsecme-yang-01>. <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-tran-ipsecme-yang-01>.
Appendix A. XML Configuration Example for IKE Case (Gateway-to-Gateway)
This example shows an XML configuration file sent by the I2NSF
Controller to establish an IPsec SA between two NSFs (see Figure 3)
in tunnel mode (gateway-to-gateway) with ESP, with authentication
based on X.509 certificates (simplified for brevity with
"base64encodedvalue==") and applying the IKE case.
+------------------+
| I2NSF Controller |
+------------------+
I2NSF NSF-Facing |
Interface |
/-----------------+---------------\
/ \
/ \
+----+ +--------+ +--------+ +----+
| h1 |--| nsf_h1 |== IPsec_ESP_Tunnel_mode == | nsf_h2 |--| h2 |
+----+ +--------+ +--------+ +----+
:1 :100 :200 :1
(2001:db8:1:/64) (2001:db8:123:/64) (2001:db8:2:/64)
Figure 3: IKE Case, Tunnel Mode, X.509 Certificate Authentication
<ipsec-ike xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-ike"
xmlns:nc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<pad>
<pad-entry>
<name>nsf_h1_pad</name>
<ipv6-address>2001:db8:123::100</ipv6-address>
<peer-authentication>
<auth-method>digital-signature</auth-method>
<digital-signature>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<ca-data>base64encodedvalue==</ca-data>
</digital-signature>
</peer-authentication>
</pad-entry>
<pad-entry>
<name>nsf_h2_pad</name>
<ipv6-address>2001:db8:123::200</ipv6-address>
<auth-protocol>ikev2</auth-protocol>
<peer-authentication>
<auth-method>digital-signature</auth-method>
<digital-signature>
<!-- RSA Digital Signature -->
<ds-algorithm>1</ds-algorithm>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
<ca-data>base64encodedvalue==</ca-data>
</digital-signature>
</peer-authentication>
</pad-entry>
</pad>
<conn-entry>
<name>nsf_h1-nsf_h2</name>
<autostartup>start</autostartup>
<version>ikev2</version>
<initial-contact>false</initial-contact>
<fragmentation><enabled>false</enabled></fragmentation>
<ike-sa-lifetime-soft>
<rekey-time>60</rekey-time>
<reauth-time>120</reauth-time>
</ike-sa-lifetime-soft>
<ike-sa-lifetime-hard>
<over-time>3600</over-time>
</ike-sa-lifetime-hard>
<!--AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256-->
<ike-sa-intr-alg>14</ike-sa-intr-alg>
<!--ENCR_AES_CBC - 128 bits-->
<ike-sa-encr-alg>
<id>1</id>
</ike-sa-encr-alg>
<!--8192-bit MODP Group-->
<dh-group>18</dh-group>
<half-open-ike-sa-timer>30</half-open-ike-sa-timer>
<half-open-ike-sa-cookie-threshold>
15
</half-open-ike-sa-cookie-threshold>
<local>
<local-pad-entry-name>nsf_h1_pad</local-pad-entry-name>
</local>
<remote>
<remote-pad-entry-name>nsf_h2_pad</remote-pad-entry-name>
</remote>
<spd>
<spd-entry>
<name>nsf_h1-nsf_h2</name>
<ipsec-policy-config>
<anti-replay-window-size>64</anti-replay-window-size>
<traffic-selector>
<local-prefix>2001:db8:1::0/64</local-prefix>
<remote-prefix>2001:db8:2::0/64</remote-prefix>
<inner-protocol>any</inner-protocol>
</traffic-selector>
<processing-info>
<action>protect</action>
<ipsec-sa-cfg>
<pfp-flag>false</pfp-flag>
<ext-seq-num>true</ext-seq-num>
<seq-overflow>false</seq-overflow>
<stateful-frag-check>false</stateful-frag-check>
<mode>tunnel</mode>
<protocol-parameters>esp</protocol-parameters>
<esp-algorithms>
<!-- AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 -->
<integrity>2</integrity>
<encryption>
<!-- ENCR_AES_CBC -->
<id>1</id>
<algorithm-type>12</algorithm-type>
<key-length>128</key-length>
</encryption>
<encryption>
<!-- ENCR_3DES-->
<id>2</id>
<algorithm-type>3</algorithm-type>
</encryption>
<tfc-pad>false</tfc-pad>
</esp-algorithms>
<tunnel>
<local>2001:db8:123::100</local>
<remote>2001:db8:123::200</remote>
<df-bit>clear</df-bit>
<bypass-dscp>true</bypass-dscp>
</tunnel>
</ipsec-sa-cfg>
</processing-info>
</ipsec-policy-config>
</spd-entry>
</spd>
<child-sa-info>
<!--8192-bit MODP Group -->
<fs-groups>18</fs-groups>
<child-sa-lifetime-soft>
<bytes>1000000</bytes>
<packets>1000</packets>
<time>30</time>
<idle>60</idle>
<action>replace</action>
</child-sa-lifetime-soft>
<child-sa-lifetime-hard>
<bytes>2000000</bytes>
<packets>2000</packets>
<time>60</time>
<idle>120</idle>
</child-sa-lifetime-hard>
</child-sa-info>
</conn-entry>
</ipsec-ike>
Appendix B. XML Configuration Example for IKE-less Case (Host-to-Host)
This example shows an XML configuration file sent by the I2NSF
Controller to establish an IPsec SA between two NSFs (see Figure 4)
in transport mode (host-to-host) with ESP in the IKE-less case.
+------------------+
| I2NSF Controller |
+------------------+
I2NSF NSF-Facing |
Interface |
/--------------------+-------------------\
/ \
/ \
+--------+ +--------+
| nsf_h1 |===== IPsec_ESP_Transport_mode =====| nsf_h2 |
+--------+ +--------+
:100 (2001:db8:123:/64) :200
Figure 4: IKE-less Case, Transport Mode
<ipsec-ikeless
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-ikeless"
xmlns:nc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<spd>
<spd-entry>
<name>
in/trans/2001:db8:123::200/2001:db8:123::100
</name>
<direction>inbound</direction>
<reqid>1</reqid>
<ipsec-policy-config>
<traffic-selector>
<local-prefix>2001:db8:123::200/128</local-prefix>
<remote-prefix>2001:db8:123::100/128</remote-prefix>
<inner-protocol>any</inner-protocol>
</traffic-selector>
<processing-info>
<action>protect</action>
<ipsec-sa-cfg>
<ext-seq-num>true</ext-seq-num>
<seq-overflow>false</seq-overflow>
<mode>transport</mode>
<protocol-parameters>esp</protocol-parameters>
<esp-algorithms>
<!--AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96-->
<integrity>2</integrity>
<!--ENCR_AES_CBC -->
<encryption>
<id>1</id>
<algorithm-type>12</algorithm-type>
<key-length>128</key-length>
</encryption>
<encryption>
<id>2</id>
<algorithm-type>3</algorithm-type>
</encryption>
</esp-algorithms>
</ipsec-sa-cfg>
</processing-info>
</ipsec-policy-config>
</spd-entry>
<spd-entry>
<name>out/trans/2001:db8:123::100/2001:db8:123::200</name>
<direction>outbound</direction>
<reqid>1</reqid>
<ipsec-policy-config>
<traffic-selector>
<local-prefix>2001:db8:123::100/128</local-prefix>
<remote-prefix>2001:db8:123::200/128</remote-prefix>
<inner-protocol>any</inner-protocol>
</traffic-selector>
<processing-info>
<action>protect</action>
<ipsec-sa-cfg>
<ext-seq-num>true</ext-seq-num>
<seq-overflow>false</seq-overflow>
<mode>transport</mode>
<protocol-parameters>esp</protocol-parameters>
<esp-algorithms>
<!-- AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 -->
<integrity>2</integrity>
<!-- ENCR_AES_CBC -->
<encryption>
<id>1</id>
<algorithm-type>12</algorithm-type>
<key-length>128</key-length>
</encryption>
<encryption>
<id>2</id>
<algorithm-type>3</algorithm-type>
</encryption>
</esp-algorithms>
</ipsec-sa-cfg>
</processing-info>
</ipsec-policy-config>
</spd-entry>
</spd>
<sad>
<sad-entry>
<name>out/trans/2001:db8:123::100/2001:db8:123::200</name>
<reqid>1</reqid>
<ipsec-sa-config>
<spi>34501</spi>
<ext-seq-num>true</ext-seq-num>
<seq-overflow>false</seq-overflow>
<anti-replay-window-size>64</anti-replay-window-size>
<traffic-selector>
<local-prefix>2001:db8:123::100/128</local-prefix>
<remote-prefix>2001:db8:123::200/128</remote-prefix>
<inner-protocol>any</inner-protocol>
</traffic-selector>
<protocol-parameters>esp</protocol-parameters>
<mode>transport</mode>
<esp-sa>
<encryption>
<!-- //ENCR_AES_CBC -->
<encryption-algorithm>12</encryption-algorithm>
<key>01:23:45:67:89:AB:CE:DF</key>
<iv>01:23:45:67:89:AB:CE:DF</iv>
</encryption>
<integrity>
<!-- //AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 -->
<integrity-algorithm>2</integrity-algorithm>
<key>01:23:45:67:89:AB:CE:DF</key>
</integrity>
</esp-sa>
</ipsec-sa-config>
</sad-entry>
<sad-entry>
<name>in/trans/2001:db8:123::200/2001:db8:123::100</name>
<reqid>1</reqid>
<ipsec-sa-config>
<spi>34502</spi>
<ext-seq-num>true</ext-seq-num>
<seq-overflow>false</seq-overflow>
<anti-replay-window-size>64</anti-replay-window-size>
<traffic-selector>
<local-prefix>2001:db8:123::200/128</local-prefix>
<remote-prefix>2001:db8:123::100/128</remote-prefix>
<inner-protocol>any</inner-protocol>
</traffic-selector>
<protocol-parameters>esp</protocol-parameters>
<mode>transport</mode>
<esp-sa>
<encryption>
<!-- //ENCR_AES_CBC -->
<encryption-algorithm>12</encryption-algorithm>
<key>01:23:45:67:89:AB:CE:DF</key>
<iv>01:23:45:67:89:AB:CE:DF</iv>
</encryption>
<integrity>
<!-- //AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 -->
<integrity-algorithm>2</integrity-algorithm>
<key>01:23:45:67:89:AB:CE:DF</key>
</integrity>
</esp-sa>
<sa-lifetime-hard>
<bytes>2000000</bytes>
<packets>2000</packets>
<time>60</time>
<idle>120</idle>
</sa-lifetime-hard>
<sa-lifetime-soft>
<bytes>1000000</bytes>
<packets>1000</packets>
<time>30</time>
<idle>60</idle>
<action>replace</action>
</sa-lifetime-soft>
</ipsec-sa-config>
</sad-entry>
</sad>
</ipsec-ikeless>
Appendix C. XML Notification Examples
In the following, several XML files are shown to illustrate different
types of notifications defined in the IKE-less YANG data model, which
are sent by the NSF to the I2NSF Controller. The notifications
happen in the IKE-less case.
<sadb-expire xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-ikeless">
<ipsec-sa-name>in/trans/2001:db8:123::200/2001:db8:123::100
</ipsec-sa-name>
<soft-lifetime-expire>true</soft-lifetime-expire>
<lifetime-current>
<bytes>1000000</bytes>
<packets>1000</packets>
<time>30</time>
<idle>60</idle>
</lifetime-current>
</sadb-expire>
Figure 5: Example of the sadb-expire Notification
<sadb-acquire xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-ikeless">
<ipsec-policy-name>in/trans/2001:db8:123::200/2001:db8:123::100
</ipsec-policy-name>
<traffic-selector>
<local-prefix>2001:db8:123::200/128</local-prefix>
<remote-prefix>2001:db8:123::100/128</remote-prefix>
<inner-protocol>any</inner-protocol>
<local-ports>
<start>0</start>
<end>0</end>
</local-ports>
<remote-ports>
<start>0</start>
<end>0</end>
</remote-ports>
</traffic-selector>
</sadb-acquire>
Figure 6: Example of the sadb-acquire Notification
<sadb-seq-overflow
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-ikeless">
<ipsec-sa-name>in/trans/2001:db8:123::200/2001:db8:123::100
</ipsec-sa-name>
</sadb-seq-overflow>
Figure 7: Example of the sadb-seq-overflow Notification
<sadb-bad-spi
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-ikeless">
<spi>666</spi>
</sadb-bad-spi>
Figure 8: Example of the sadb-bad-spi Notification
Appendix D. Operational Use Case Examples
D.1. Example of IPsec SA Establishment
This appendix exemplifies the applicability of the IKE case and IKE-
less case to traditional IPsec configurations, that is, host-to-host
and gateway-to-gateway. The following examples assume the existence
of two NSFs needing to establish an end-to-end IPsec SA to protect
their communications. Both NSFs could be two hosts that exchange
traffic (host-to-host) or gateways (gateway-to-gateway), for example,
within an enterprise that needs to protect the traffic between the
networks of two branch offices.
Applicability of these configurations appear in current and new
networking scenarios. For example, SD-WAN technologies are providing
dynamic and on-demand VPN connections between branch offices or
between branches and Software as a Service (SaaS) cloud services.
Besides, Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) services providing
virtualization environments are deployments that often rely on IPsec
to provide secure channels between virtual instances (host-to-host)
and providing VPN solutions for virtualized networks (gateway-to-
gateway).
As can be observed in the following, the I2NSF-based IPsec management
system (for IKE and IKE-less cases) exhibits various advantages:
1. It allows creating IPsec SAs among two NSFs, based only on the
application of general flow-based protection policies at the
I2NSF User. Thus, administrators can manage all security
associations in a centralized point with an abstracted view of
the network.
2. Any NSF deployed in the system does not need manual
configuration, therefore, allowing its deployment in an automated
manner.
D.1.1. IKE Case
+----------------------------------------+
| I2NSF User (IPsec Management System) |
+----------------------------------------+
|
(1) Flow-based I2NSF Consumer-Facing
Protection Policy Interface
|
+---------|------------------------------+
| | |
| | I2NSF Controller |
| V |
| +--------------+ (2)+--------------+ |
| |Translate into|--->| NETCONF/ | |
| |IPsec Policies| | RESTCONF | |
| +--------------+ +--------------+ |
| | | |
| | | |
+--------------------------|-----|-------+
| |
I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface | |
| (3) |
|-------------------------+ +---|
V V
+----------------------+ +----------------------+
| NSF A | | NSF B |
| IKEv2/IPsec(SPD/PAD) | | IKEv2/IPsec(SPD/PAD) |
+----------------------+ +----------------------+
Figure 9: Host-to-Host/Gateway-to-Gateway for the IKE Case
Figure 9 describes the application of the IKE case when a data packet
needs to be protected in the path between NSF A and NSF B:
1. The I2NSF User defines a general flow-based protection policy
(e.g., protect data traffic between NSF A and B). The I2NSF
Controller looks for the NSFs involved (NSF A and NSF B).
2. The I2NSF Controller generates IKEv2 credentials for them and
translates the policies into SPD and PAD entries.
3. The I2NSF Controller inserts an IKEv2 configuration that includes
the SPD and PAD entries in both NSF A and NSF B. If some of
operations with NSF A and NSF B fail, the I2NSF Controller will
stop the process and perform a rollback operation by deleting any
IKEv2, SPD, and PAD configuration that had been successfully
installed in NSF A or B.
If the previous steps are successful, the flow is protected by means
of the IPsec SA established with IKEv2 between NSF A and NSF B.
D.1.2. IKE-less Case
+----------------------------------------+
| I2NSF User (IPsec Management System) |
+----------------------------------------+
|
(1) Flow-based I2NSF Consumer-Facing
Protection Policy Interface
|
+---------|------------------------------+
| | |
| | I2NSF Controller |
| V |
| +--------------+ (2) +--------------+ |
| |Translate into|---->| NETCONF/ | |
| |IPsec Policies| | RESTCONF | |
| +--------------+ +--------------+ |
| | | |
+-------------------------|-----|--------+
| |
I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface | |
| (3) |
|----------------------+ +--|
V V
+----------------+ +----------------+
| NSF A | | NSF B |
| IPsec(SPD/SAD) | | IPsec(SPD/SAD) |
+----------------+ +----------------+
Figure 10: Host-to-Host/Gateway-to-Gateway for the IKE-less Case
Figure 10 describes the application of the IKE-less case when a data
packet needs to be protected in the path between NSF A and NSF B:
1. The I2NSF User establishes a general flow-based protection
policy, and the I2NSF Controller looks for the involved NSFs.
2. The I2NSF Controller translates the flow-based security policies
into IPsec SPD and SAD entries.
3. The I2NSF Controller inserts these entries in both NSF A and NSF
B IPsec databases (i.e., SPD and SAD). The following text
describes how this would happen:
* The I2NSF Controller chooses two random values as SPIs, for
example, SPIa1 for the inbound IPsec SA in NSF A and SPIb1 for
the inbound IPsec SA in NSF B. The value of the SPIa1 MUST
NOT be the same as any inbound SPI in A. In the same way, the
value of the SPIb1 MUST NOT be the same as any inbound SPI in
B. Moreover, the SPIa1 MUST be used in B for the outbound
IPsec SA to A, while SPIb1 MUST be used in A for the outbound
IPsec SA to B. It also generates fresh cryptographic material
for the new inbound/outbound IPsec SAs and their parameters.
* After that, the I2NSF Controller simultaneously sends the new
inbound IPsec SA with SPIa1 and new outbound IPsec SA with
SPIb1 to NSF A and the new inbound IPsec SA with SPIb1 and new
outbound IPsec SA with SPIa1 to B, together with the
corresponding IPsec policies.
* Once the I2NSF Controller receives confirmation from NSF A and
NSF B, it knows that the IPsec SAs are correctly installed and
ready.
Another alternative to this operation is the I2NSF Controller
first sends the IPsec policies and new inbound IPsec SAs to A and
B. Once it obtains a successful confirmation of these operations
from NSF A and NSF B, it proceeds with installing the new
outbound IPsec SAs. Even though this procedure may increase the
latency to complete the process, no traffic is sent over the
network until the IPsec SAs are completely operative. In any
case, other alternatives MAY be possible to implement step 3.
4. If some of the operations described above fail (e.g., NSF A
reports an error when the I2NSF Controller is trying to install
the SPD entry, the new inbound or outbound IPsec SAs), the I2NSF
Controller MUST perform rollback operations by deleting any new
inbound or outbound IPsec SA and SPD entry that had been
successfully installed in any of the NSFs (e.g., NSF B) and stop
the process. Note that the I2NSF Controller MAY retry several
times before giving up.
5. Otherwise, if the steps 1 to 3 are successful, the flow between
NSF A and NSF B is protected by means of the IPsec SAs
established by the I2NSF Controller. It is worth mentioning that
the I2NSF Controller associates a lifetime to the new IPsec SAs.
When this lifetime expires, the NSF will send a sadb-expire
notification to the I2NSF Controller in order to start the
rekeying process.
Instead of installing IPsec policies (in the SPD) and IPsec SAs (in
the SAD) in step 3 (proactive mode), it is also possible that the
I2NSF Controller only installs the SPD entries in step 3 (reactive
mode). In such a case, when a data packet requires to be protected
with IPsec, the NSF that first saw the data packet will send a sadb-
acquire notification that informs the I2NSF Controller that needs SAD
entries with the IPsec SAs to process the data packet. Again, if
some of the operations installing the new inbound/outbound IPsec SAs
fail, the I2NSF Controller stops the process and performs a rollback
operation by deleting any new inbound/outbound SAs that had been
successfully installed.
D.2. Example of the Rekeying Process in IKE-less Case
To explain an example of the rekeying process between two IPsec NSFs,
A and B, assume that SPIa1 identifies the inbound IPsec SA in A and
SPIb1 identifies the inbound IPsec SA in B. The rekeying process
will take the following steps:
1. The I2NSF Controller chooses two random values as SPI for the new
inbound IPsec SAs, for example, SPIa2 for the inbound IPsec SA in
A and SPIb2 for the inbound IPsec SA in B. The value of the
SPIa1 MUST NOT be the same as any inbound SPI in A. In the same
way, the value of the SPIb1 MUST NOT be the same as any inbound
SPI in B. Then, the I2NSF Controller creates an inbound IPsec SA
with SPIa2 in A and another inbound IPsec SA in B with SPIb2. It
can send this information simultaneously to A and B.
2. Once the I2NSF Controller receives confirmation from A and B, the
controller knows that the inbound IPsec SAs are correctly
installed. Then, it proceeds to send, in parallel to A and B,
the outbound IPsec SAs: the outbound IPsec SA to A with SPIb2 and
the outbound IPsec SA to B with SPIa2. At this point, the new
IPsec SAs are ready.
3. Once the I2NSF Controller receives confirmation from A and B that
the outbound IPsec SAs have been installed, the I2NSF Controller,
in parallel, deletes the old IPsec SAs from A (inbound SPIa1 and
outbound SPIb1) and B (outbound SPIa1 and inbound SPIb1).
If some of the operations in step 1 fail (e.g., NSF A reports an
error when the I2NSF Controller is trying to install a new inbound
IPsec SA), the I2NSF Controller MUST perform rollback operations by
removing any new inbound SA that had been successfully installed
during step 1.
If step 1 is successful but some of the operations in step 2 fail
(e.g., NSF A reports an error when the I2NSF Controller is trying to
install the new outbound IPsec SA), the I2NSF Controller MUST perform
a rollback operation by deleting any new outbound SA that had been
successfully installed during step 2 and by deleting the inbound SAs
created in step 1, in that order.
If the steps 1 and 2 are successful but the step 3 fails, the I2NSF
Controller will avoid any rollback of the operations carried out in
steps 1 and 2, since new and valid IPsec SAs were created and are
functional. The I2NSF Controller MAY reattempt to remove the old
inbound and outbound IPsec SAs in NSF A and NSF B several times until
it receives a success or it gives up. In the last case, the old
IPsec SAs will be removed when their corresponding hard lifetime is
reached.
D.3. Example of Managing NSF State Loss in the IKE-less Case
In the IKE-less case, if the I2NSF Controller detects that an NSF has
lost the IPsec state, it could follow the next steps:
1. The I2NSF Controller SHOULD delete the old IPsec SAs on the non-
failed nodes, established with the failed node. This prevents
the non-failed nodes from leaking plaintext.
2. If the affected node restarts, the I2NSF Controller configures
the new inbound IPsec SAs between the affected node and all the
nodes it was talking to.
3. After these inbound IPsec SAs have been established, the I2NSF
Controller configures the outbound IPsec SAs in parallel.
Steps 2 and 3 can be performed at the same time at the cost of a
potential packet loss. If this is not critical, then it is an
optimization since the number of exchanges between the I2NSF
Controller and NSFs is lower.
Acknowledgements
Authors want to thank Paul Wouters, Valery Smyslov,Sowmini Varadhan,
David Carrel, Yoav Nir, Tero Kivinen, Martin Bjorklund, Graham
Bartlett, Sandeep Kampati, Linda Dunbar, Mohit Sethi, Martin
Bjorklund, Tom Petch, Christian Hopps, Rob Wilton, Carlos
J. Bernardos, Alejandro Perez-Mendez, Alejandro Abad-Carrascosa,
Ignacio Martinez, Ruben Ricart, and all IESG members that have
reviewed this document for their valuable comments.
Authors' Addresses
Rafa Marin-Lopez
University of Murcia
Faculty of Computer Science
Campus de Espinardo S/N
30100 Murcia
Spain
Phone: +34 868 88 85 01
Email: rafa@um.es
Gabriel Lopez-Millan
University of Murcia
Faculty of Computer Science
Campus de Espinardo S/N
30100 Murcia
Spain
Phone: +34 868 88 85 04
Email: gabilm@um.es
Fernando Pereniguez-Garcia
University Defense Center
Spanish Air Force Academy
MDE-UPCT
30720 San Javier Murcia
Spain
Phone: +34 968 18 99 46
Email: fernando.pereniguez@cud.upct.es