rfc9075.original | rfc9075.txt | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Network Working Group J. Arkko | Internet Architecture Board (IAB) J. Arkko | |||
Internet-Draft Ericsson | Request for Comments: 9075 S. Farrell | |||
Intended status: Informational S. Farrell | Category: Informational M. Kühlewind | |||
Expires: 6 November 2021 Trinity College Dublin | ISSN: 2070-1721 C. Perkins | |||
M. Kühlewind | July 2021 | |||
Ericsson | ||||
C. Perkins | ||||
University of Glasgow | ||||
5 May 2021 | ||||
Report from the IAB COVID-19 Network Impacts Workshop 2020 | Report from the IAB COVID-19 Network Impacts Workshop 2020 | |||
draft-iab-covid19-workshop-03 | ||||
Abstract | Abstract | |||
The COVID-19 pandemic caused changes in Internet user behavior, | The Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic caused changes in | |||
particularly during the introduction of the initial quarantine and | Internet user behavior, particularly during the introduction of | |||
work-from-home arrangements. These behavior changes drove changes in | initial quarantine and work-from-home arrangements. These behavior | |||
Internet traffic. | changes drove changes in Internet traffic. | |||
The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) held a workshop to discuss | The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) held a workshop to discuss | |||
network impacts of the pandemic on November 9-13, 2020. The workshop | network impacts of the pandemic on November 9-13, 2020. The workshop | |||
was held to convene interested researchers, network operators, | was held to convene interested researchers, network operators, | |||
network management experts, and Internet technologists to share their | network management experts, and Internet technologists to share their | |||
experiences. The meeting was held online given the on-going travel | experiences. The meeting was held online given the ongoing travel | |||
and contact restrictions at that time. | and contact restrictions at that time. | |||
Discussion Venues | Note that this document is a report on the proceedings of the | |||
workshop. The views and positions documented in this report are | ||||
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. | those of the workshop participants and do not necessarily reflect IAB | |||
views and positions. | ||||
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at | ||||
https://github.com/intarchboard/covid19-workshop. | ||||
Status of This Memo | Status of This Memo | |||
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the | This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is | |||
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. | published for informational purposes. | |||
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | ||||
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | ||||
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | ||||
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | ||||
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | This document is a product of the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) | |||
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | and represents information that the IAB has deemed valuable to | |||
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | provide for permanent record. It represents the consensus of the | |||
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | Internet Architecture Board (IAB). Documents approved for | |||
publication by the IAB are not candidates for any level of Internet | ||||
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841. | ||||
This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 November 2021. | Information about the current status of this document, any errata, | |||
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at | ||||
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9075. | ||||
Copyright Notice | Copyright Notice | |||
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | |||
document authors. All rights reserved. | document authors. All rights reserved. | |||
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | |||
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ | Provisions Relating to IETF Documents | |||
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. | (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of | |||
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights | publication of this document. Please review these documents | |||
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components | carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect | |||
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text | to this document. | |||
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are | ||||
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. | ||||
Table of Contents | Table of Contents | |||
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 | 1. Introduction | |||
2. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 | 2. Scope | |||
3. Workshop Topics and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | 3. Workshop Topics and Discussion | |||
3.1. Measurement-based Observations on Network Traffic | 3.1. Measurement-Based Observations on Network Traffic Dynamics | |||
Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | 3.1.1. Overall Traffic Growth | |||
3.1.1. Overall Traffic Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | 3.1.2. Changes in Application Use | |||
3.1.2. Changes in Application Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | 3.1.3. Mobile Networks and Mobility | |||
3.1.3. Mobile Networks and Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | 3.1.4. A Deeper Look at Interconnections | |||
3.1.4. A Deeper Look at Interconnections . . . . . . . . . . 9 | 3.1.5. Cloud Platforms | |||
3.1.5. Cloud Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | 3.1.6. Last-Mile Congestion | |||
3.1.6. Last-Mile Congestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | 3.1.7. User Behavior | |||
3.1.7. User Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | 3.2. Operational Practices and Architectural Considerations | |||
3.2. Operational Practices and Architectural Considerations . 11 | 3.2.1. Digital Divide | |||
3.2.1. Digital Divide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 | 3.2.2. Applications | |||
3.2.2. Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 | 3.2.3. Observability | |||
3.2.3. Observability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | 3.2.4. Security | |||
3.2.4. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | 3.2.5. Discussion | |||
3.2.5. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | 3.3. Conclusions | |||
3.3. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | 4. Feedback on Meeting Format | |||
4. Feedback on Meeting Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | 5. Position Papers | |||
5. Position Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | 6. Program Committee | |||
6. Workshop participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | 7. Informative References | |||
7. Program Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 | Appendix A. Workshop Participants | |||
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 | IAB Members at the Time of Approval | |||
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 | Acknowledgments | |||
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 | Authors' Addresses | |||
1. Introduction | 1. Introduction | |||
The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) held a workshop to discuss | The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) held a workshop to discuss | |||
network impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, on November 9-13, 2020. | network impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on November 9-13, 2020. The | |||
The workshop was held to convene interested researchers, network | workshop was held to convene interested researchers, network | |||
operators, network management experts, and Internet technologists to | operators, network management experts, and Internet technologists to | |||
share their experiences. The meeting was held online given the on- | share their experiences. The meeting was held online given the | |||
going travel and contact restrictions at that time. | ongoing travel and contact restrictions at that time. | |||
COVID-19 has caused changes in user behavior, which in turn drove | COVID-19 has caused changes in user behavior, which in turn drove | |||
change to Internet traffic. These changes in user behavior appeared | changes in Internet traffic. These changes in user behavior appeared | |||
rather abruptly and were significant, in particular during the | rather abruptly and were significant, in particular during the | |||
introduction of the initial quarantine and work-from-home | introduction of initial quarantine and work-from-home arrangements. | |||
arrangements. This caused changes to Internet traffic in terms of | This caused changes in Internet traffic in terms of volume and | |||
volumes, location, as well as shifts in the type of applications | location, as well as shifts in the types of applications used. This | |||
used. This shift in traffic as well as user behavior created also a | shift in traffic and user behavior also created a shift in security | |||
shift in security partices as well as attack patterns that made use | practices as well as attack patterns that made use of the attack | |||
of the attack surface resulting from the shift to home-working in a | surface, resulting from the shift to working from home in a global | |||
global crisis. | crisis. | |||
Announcement for the workshop was sent out in July 2020, requesting | An announcement for the workshop was sent out in July 2020 requesting | |||
interested parties to submit position papers for the workshop program | that interested parties submit position papers to the workshop | |||
committee. A total of 15 position papers were received from | program committee. A total of 15 position papers were received from | |||
altogether 33 authors. The papers are listed in Section 5. In | 33 authors in total. The papers are listed in Section 5. In | |||
addition, several other types of contributions and pointers to | addition, several other types of contributions and pointers to | |||
existing work were provided. A number of position papers referred to | existing work were provided. A number of position papers referred to | |||
parallel work being published in measurement-related academic | parallel work being published in measurement-related academic | |||
conferences. | conferences. | |||
Invitations for the workshop were sent out based on the position | Invitations for the workshop were sent out based on the position | |||
papers and other expressions of interest. On the workshop conference | papers and other expressions of interest. On the workshop conference | |||
calls were 45 participants, listed in Section 6. | calls were 46 participants, listed in Appendix A. | |||
The workshop was held over one week hosting three sessions covering | The workshop was held over the course of one week and hosted three | |||
i) measurements and observations, ii) operational and security | sessions covering i) measurements and observations, ii) operational | |||
issues, and iii) future consideration and conclusions. As these | and security issues, and iii) future consideration and conclusions. | |||
three sessions were scheduled Monday, Wednesday, and Friday a | As these three sessions were scheduled on Monday, Wednesday, and | |||
positive side effect was that the time in between could be used for | Friday, a positive side effect was that the time in between the | |||
mailing list discussion and compilation of additional workshop | sessions could be used for mailing list discussion and compilation of | |||
material. | additional workshop material. | |||
2. Scope | 2. Scope | |||
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a tremendous impact on people's lives | The COVID-19 pandemic has had a tremendous impact on people's lives | |||
and the societies and economies around the globe. But it also had a | as well as societies and economies around the globe. But it also had | |||
big impact on networking. With large numbers of people working from | a big impact on networking. With large numbers of people working | |||
home or otherwise depending on the network for their daily lives, | from home or otherwise depending on the network for their daily | |||
network traffic volume has surged. Internet service providers and | lives, network traffic volume has surged. Internet service providers | |||
operators have reported a 20% traffic growth or more in a matter of | and operators have reported 20% or more traffic growth in a matter of | |||
weeks. Traffic at Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) is similarly on | weeks. Traffic at Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) is similarly on | |||
the rise. Most forms of network traffic have seen an increase, with | the rise. Most forms of network traffic have seen an increase, with | |||
conversational multimedia traffic growing in some cases more than | conversational multimedia traffic growing, in some cases, by more | |||
200%. And user time spent on conferencing services has risen by an | than 200%. And user time spent on conferencing services has risen by | |||
order of magnitude on some conferencing platforms. | an order of magnitude on some conferencing platforms. | |||
In general, the Internet has coped relatively well with this traffic | In general, the Internet has coped relatively well with this traffic | |||
growth. The situation is not perfect: there has also been some | growth. The situation is not perfect: there have also been some | |||
outages, video quality reduction, and other issues. Nevertheless, it | outages, video quality reduction, and other issues. Nevertheless, it | |||
is interesting to see how the technology, operators and service | is interesting to see how the technology, operators, and service | |||
providers have been able to respond to large changes in traffic | providers have been able to respond to large changes in traffic | |||
patterns. | patterns. | |||
Understanding what actually happened with Internet traffic is of | Understanding what actually happened with Internet traffic is, of | |||
course interesting by its own right. How that impacted user | course, interesting in its own right. How that impacted the user | |||
experience or the intended function of the services is equally | experience or the intended function of the services is equally | |||
interesting. Measurements of and reports on Internet traffic in 2020 | interesting. Measurements of and reports on Internet traffic in 2020 | |||
are therefore valuable. But it would also be interesting to | are therefore valuable. But it would also be interesting to | |||
understand what types of network management and capacity expansion | understand what types of network management and capacity expansion | |||
actions were taken in general. Anecdotal evidence points to Internet | actions were taken in general. Anecdotal evidence points to Internet | |||
and service providers tracking how their services are used, and in | and service providers tracking how their services are used and, in | |||
many cases adjusting services to accommodate the new traffic | many cases, adjusting services to accommodate the new traffic | |||
patterns, from dynamic allocation of compute resources to more | patterns, from dynamic allocation of computing resources to more | |||
complex changes. | complex changes. | |||
The impacts of this crisis are also a potential opportunity to | The impacts of this crisis are also a potential opportunity to | |||
understand the impact of traffic shifts and growth more generally, or | understand the impact of traffic shifts and growth more generally to | |||
to prepare for future situations -- crises or otherwise - that impact | prepare for future situations -- crises or otherwise -- that impact | |||
networking. Or even allow us to adjust the technology to be even | networking, or to allow us to adjust the technology to be even better | |||
better suited to respond to changes. | suited to respond to changes. | |||
The scope of this workshop, based on the call for contributions, | The scope of this workshop, based on the call for contributions, | |||
included: | included: | |||
* measurements about traffic changes, user experience and problems, | * measurements of traffic changes, user experience and problems, | |||
service performance, and other relevant aspects | service performance, and other relevant aspects | |||
* discussion about the behind the scenes network management and | * discussion about the behind-the-scenes network management and | |||
expansion activities | expansion activities | |||
* experiences in the fields of general Internet connectivity, | * sharing experiences in the fields of general Internet | |||
conferencing, media/entertainment, and Internet infrastructure | connectivity, conferencing, media/entertainment, and Internet | |||
infrastructure | ||||
* lessons learned for preparedness and operations | * lessons learned on preparedness and operations | |||
* lessons learned for Internet technology and architecture | * lessons learned on Internet technology and architecture | |||
3. Workshop Topics and Discussion | 3. Workshop Topics and Discussion | |||
3.1. Measurement-based Observations on Network Traffic Dynamics | 3.1. Measurement-Based Observations on Network Traffic Dynamics | |||
The workshop started with a focus on measurements. A large portion | The workshop started with a focus on measurements. A large portion | |||
of the submitted papers presented and discussed measurement data and | of the submitted papers presented and discussed measurement data, and | |||
these submissions provided a good basis get a better understanding of | these submissions provided a good basis for a better understanding of | |||
the situation, covering different angles and aspects of network | the situation, covering different angles and aspects of network | |||
traffic and kind of networks. | traffic and different kinds of networks. | |||
Changes in Internet traffic due to the COVID-19 pandemic affected | Changes in Internet traffic due to the COVID-19 pandemic affected | |||
different networks in various ways. Yet all networks observed some | different networks in various ways. Yet all networks saw some form | |||
form of change, be it a reduction in traffic, an increase in traffic, | of change, be it a reduction in traffic, an increase in traffic, a | |||
a change in working days and weekend days patterns, or a change in | change in workday and weekend diurnal patterns, or a change in | |||
traffic classes. Traffic volume, directionality ratios, and its | traffic classes. Traffic volume, directionality ratios, and traffic | |||
source and destination are radically different than from before | origins and destinations were radically different than from before | |||
COVID-19. | COVID-19. | |||
At a high level, while traffic from home networks increased | At a high level, while traffic from home networks increased | |||
significantly, the traffic in mobile networks decreased as a result | significantly, for the traffic in mobile networks different trends | |||
of reduced population mobility. The observed behavior in mobile | were observed. Either the traffic increased as well -- for instance, | |||
networks is antagonistic, yet complementary, to the one observed in | in locations where use of residential ISP services is less common -- | |||
residential ISPs. In residential networks there was a strong | traffic decreased as a result of reduced population mobility. This | |||
increase in video conferencing and remote learning application | observed traffic decrease in mobile networks reflected rather the | |||
traffic due to the shift for working and learning at home. With that | opposite trend than what was observed in residential ISPs. | |||
shift, the typical diurnal usage patterns in network traffic also | ||||
changed, with peak times occuring earlier in the day and lasting | ||||
longer over the day - reflecting the start of the work or school day | ||||
from home. This behavior is antagonistic, yet complementary, to the | ||||
one observed in residential ISPs. | ||||
While diurnal congestion at interconnect point as well in certain | While diurnal congestion at interconnect points as well in certain | |||
last mile network was reported, mainly in March, no persitent | last-mile networks was reported, mainly in March, no persistent | |||
congestion was observed. Further, a downward trends in download | congestion was observed. Further, a downward trend in download | |||
throughput to certain cloud regions was measured, which can probably | throughput to certain cloud regions was measured, which can probably | |||
explained with the increase use of cloud services. This gives | be explained by the increased use of cloud services. This gives | |||
another indication that the scalng of shared resources in the | another indication that the scaling of shared resources in the | |||
Internet is working reasonably well enough to handle even larger | Internet is working reasonably well enough to handle even larger | |||
changes in traffic as experience during the first nearly global | changes in traffic as experienced during the first nearly global | |||
lockdown of the COVID-19 pandemic. | lockdown of the COVID-19 pandemic. | |||
3.1.1. Overall Traffic Growth | 3.1.1. Overall Traffic Growth | |||
The global pandemic has significantly accelerated the growth of data | The global pandemic has significantly accelerated the growth of data | |||
traffic worldwide. Based on the measurement data of one ISP, three | traffic worldwide. Based on the measurement data of one ISP, three | |||
IXPs, a metropolitan educational network, and a mobile operator, it | IXPs, a metropolitan educational network, and a mobile operator, it | |||
was observed at the beginning of the workshop [Feldmann2020] that | was observed at the beginning of the workshop [Feldmann2020] that, | |||
overall the network was able to handle the situation well, despite a | overall, the network was able to handle the situation well despite a | |||
significant and sudden increase in traffic growth rate in March and | significant and sudden increase in the traffic growth rate in March | |||
April. That is, after the lockdown was implemented in March, a | and April. That is, after the lockdown was implemented in March, a | |||
traffic increase of 15-20% at the ISP as well as the three IXPs was | traffic increase of 15-20% was observed at the ISP as well as at the | |||
observed. That represents the traffic growth expected in a typical | three IXPs. This traffic growth, which would typically occur over a | |||
year which now took place in the matter of a few weeks only---a | year, took place over a few weeks -- a substantial increase. At DE- | |||
substantial increase. At DE-CIX Frankfurt, the world's largest | CIX Frankfurt, the world's largest Internet Exchange Point in terms | |||
Internet Exchange Point in terms of data throughput, the year 2020 | of data throughput, the year 2020 saw the largest increase in peak | |||
has seen the largest increase in peak traffic within a single year | traffic within a single year since the IXP was founded in 1995. | |||
since the IXP was founded in 1995. Additionally, mobile traffic has | Additionally, mobile traffic has slightly receded. In access | |||
slightly receded. In access networks, the growth rate of upstream | networks, the growth rate of upstream traffic also exceeded the | |||
traffic also exceeded the growth in downstream traffic, reflecting | growth in downstream traffic, reflecting increased adoption and use | |||
increased adoption and use of video conferencing and other remote | of videoconferencing and other remote work and school applications. | |||
work and school applications. | ||||
Most traffic increases happened during non-traditional peak hours: | Most traffic increases happened outside of pre-pandemic peak hours. | |||
Before the first COVID-19 lockdowns, the main time of use was in the | Before the first COVID-19 lockdowns, the main time of use was in the | |||
evening hours during the week, whereas since March it has been spread | evening hours during the week, whereas, since March, it has been | |||
more equally across the day. That is, the increase in usage has | spread more equally across the day. That is, the increase in usage | |||
mainly occurred outside the previous peak usage times (e.g. during | has mainly occurred outside the previous peak usage times (e.g., | |||
the day while working from home). This means that, for the first | during the day while working from home). This means that, for the | |||
time, network utilization on weekdays resembled that on weekends. | first time, network utilization on weekdays resembled that on | |||
The effects of the increased traffic volume could easily be absorbed: | weekends. The effects of the increased traffic volume could easily | |||
either by using existing reserve capacity, or by quickly switching | be absorbed, either by using existing reserve capacity or by quickly | |||
additional bandwidth. This is one reason why the Internet was able | switching additional bandwidth. This is one reason why the Internet | |||
to cope well with the pandemic during the first lockdown period. | was able to cope well with the pandemic during the first lockdown | |||
period. | ||||
Some of the lockdowns were lifted or relaxed around May 2020. As | Some of the lockdowns were lifted or relaxed around May 2020. As | |||
people were allowed to perform some of their daily habits outside of | people were allowed to resume some of their daily activities outside | |||
their home again, as expected, there was a decrease of the traffic | of their home again, as expected, there was a decrease in the traffic | |||
observed at the IXPs and the ISP; instead mobile traffic began to | observed at the IXPs and the ISP; instead, mobile traffic began to | |||
grow again. | grow again. | |||
3.1.2. Changes in Application Use | 3.1.2. Changes in Application Use | |||
The composition of data traffic has changed since the beginning of | The composition of data traffic has changed since the beginning of | |||
the pandemic: the use of videoconferencing services and virtual | the pandemic: the use of videoconferencing services and virtual | |||
private networks (VPNs) for access to company resources from the home | private networks (VPNs) for access to company resources from the home | |||
environment has risen sharply. In ISP and IXP network it was | environment has risen sharply. In ISP and IXP networks, it was | |||
observed [Feldmann2020] that traffic associated with web | observed [Feldmann2020] that traffic associated with web | |||
conferencing, video, and gaming increased largely in March 2020 as a | conferencing, video, and gaming increased significantly in March 2020 | |||
result of the increasing user demand for solutions like Zoom or | as a result of the increasing user demand for solutions like Zoom or | |||
Microsoft Teams. For example, the relative traffic share of many | Microsoft Teams. For example, the relative traffic share of many | |||
"essential" applications like VPN and conferencing tools increased by | "essential" applications like VPN and conferencing tools increased by | |||
more than 200%. | more than 200%. | |||
Also, as people spent more hours at home, they tended to watch videos | Also, as people spent more hours at home, they tended to watch videos | |||
or play games, thus increasing entertainment traffic demands. At the | or play games, thus increasing entertainment traffic demands. At the | |||
same time, the traffic share for other traffic classes decreased | same time, the traffic share for other traffic classes decreased | |||
substantially, e.g., traffic related to education, social media, and | substantially, e.g., traffic related to education, social media, and, | |||
---for some periods---CDNs. In April and June, web conferencing | for some periods, content delivery networks (CDNs). In April and | |||
traffic was still high compared to the pre-pandemic scenario, while a | June, web conferencing traffic was still high compared to the pre- | |||
slight decrease in CDN and social media traffic was observed. During | pandemic scenario, while a slight decrease in CDN and social media | |||
these months many people were still working from home, but | traffic was observed. During these months, many people were still | |||
restrictions had been lifted or relaxed, which likely led to an | working from home, but restrictions had been lifted or relaxed, which | |||
increase in in-person social activities and a decrease in online | likely led to an increase in in-person social activities and a | |||
ones. | decrease in online social activities. | |||
3.1.2.1. Example Campus Networks | 3.1.2.1. Example Campus Networks | |||
Changes in traffic have been observed at University campus networks | Changes in traffic have been observed at university campus networks | |||
as well, especially due to the necessary adoption of remote teaching. | as well, especially due to the necessary adoption of remote teaching. | |||
The Politecnico di Torino University (Italy) deployed its in-house | The Politecnico di Torino (Italy) deployed its in-house solution for | |||
solution for remote teaching, which caused the outgoing traffic to | remote teaching, which caused the outgoing traffic to grow by 2.5 | |||
grow by 2.5 times, driven by more than 600 daily online classes. | times, driven by more than 600 daily online classes. Incoming | |||
Incoming traffic, instead, decreased by a factor of 10 due to the | traffic instead decreased by a factor of 10 due to the cessation of | |||
cessation of any in-person activity. Based on their measurements, | any in-person activity. Based on their measurements, this change in | |||
this change in traffic and network usage did however not lead to | traffic and network usage did not, however, lead to noticeable | |||
noticeable performance impairments, nor have significantly poor | performance impairments, nor has significantly poor performance been | |||
performance been observed for students in remote regions of Italy. | observed in students in remote regions of Italy. Outgoing traffic | |||
Outgoing traffic also increased due to other remote working | also increased due to other remote working solutions, such as | |||
solutions, such as collaboration platforms, VPNs, and remote | collaboration platforms, VPNs, and remote desktops. | |||
desktops. | ||||
Similar changes were observed by measuring REDIMadrid [Feldmann2020], | Similar changes were observed by measuring REDIMadrid [Feldmann2020], | |||
a European educational and research network, which connects 16 | a European educational and research network that connects 16 | |||
independent universities and research centers in the metropolitan | independent universities and research centers in the metropolitan | |||
region of Madrid. A drop of up to 55% in traffic volume on working | region of Madrid. A drop of up to 55% in traffic volume on working | |||
days during the pandemic was observed. Similar to findings for ISP/ | days during the pandemic was observed. Similar to findings for ISP/ | |||
IXP networks, it was observed that working days and weekend days are | IXP networks, it was observed that working days and weekend days are | |||
becoming more similar in terms of total traffic. The hourly traffic | becoming more similar in terms of total traffic. The hourly traffic | |||
patterns reveal a traffic increase between 9 pm and 7 am. This could | patterns reveal a traffic increase between 9 pm and 7 am. This could | |||
be due to users working more frequently at unusual times, but also | be due to users working more frequently at unusual times but could | |||
potentially caused by overseas students (mainly from Latin America | also potentially be caused by overseas students (mainly from Latin | |||
and East Asia as suggested by the AS numbers from which these | America and East Asia as suggested by the Autonomous System (AS) | |||
connections came from) who accessed university network resources from | numbers from which these connections came) who accessed university | |||
their home countries. | network resources from their home countries. | |||
Given the fact that the users of the academic network (e.g., students | Given the fact that the users of the academic network (e.g., students | |||
and research staff) had to leave the campus as a response to lockdown | and research staff) had to leave campus as a response to lockdown | |||
measures, also the traffic in and out (i.e., ingress and egress) | measures, the traffic in-and-out (i.e., ingress and egress) ratio | |||
ratio changed drastically. Prior to the lockdown, the incoming | also changed drastically. Prior to the lockdown, the incoming | |||
traffic was much larger then the outgoing traffic. This changed to a | traffic volume was much larger than the outgoing traffic volume. | |||
more balanced ratio. This change of traffic asymmetry can be | This changed to a more balanced ratio. This change of traffic | |||
explained by the nature of remote work. On the one end, users | asymmetry can be explained by the nature of remote work. On the one | |||
connected to the network services mainly to access resources, hence | hand, users connected to the network services mainly to access | |||
the increase in outgoing traffic. On the other end, all external | resources, hence the increase in outgoing traffic. On the other | |||
(i.e., Internet-based) resources requested during work were no longer | hand, all external (i.e., Internet-based) resources requested during | |||
accessed from the educational network but from the users' homes. | work were no longer accessed from the educational network but from | |||
the users' homes. | ||||
3.1.3. Mobile Networks and Mobility | 3.1.3. Mobile Networks and Mobility | |||
Mobile network data usage appeared to decline following the | Mobile network data usage appeared to decline following the | |||
imposition of localized lockdown measures, as these reduced typical | imposition of localized lockdown measures as these reduced typical | |||
levels of mobility and roaming. | levels of mobility and roaming. | |||
[Lutu2020] measured the cellular network of O2 UK to evaluate how the | [Lutu2020] measured the cellular network of O2 UK to evaluate how the | |||
changes in people's mobility impacted traffic patterns. By analyzing | changes in people's mobility impacted traffic patterns. By analyzing | |||
cellular network signalling information regarding users' device | cellular network signaling information regarding users' device | |||
mobility activity, they observed a decrease of 50% in mobility | mobility activity, they observed a decrease of 50% in mobility | |||
(according to different mobility metrics) in the UK during the | (according to different mobility metrics) in the UK during the | |||
lockdown period. As they found no correlation between this reduction | lockdown period. As they found no correlation between this reduction | |||
in mobility and the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases, only the | in mobility and the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases, only the | |||
enforced government order was effective in significantly reducing | enforced government order was effective in significantly reducing | |||
mobility and this reduction was more significant in densely populated | mobility, and this reduction was more significant in densely | |||
urban areas than in rural areas. For London, specifically, it could | populated urban areas than in rural areas. For London specifically, | |||
be observed from the mobile network data that approximately 10% of | it could be observed from the mobile network data that approximately | |||
the residents temporarily relocated during the lockdown. | 10% of residents temporarily relocated during the lockdown. | |||
These mobility changes had immediate implications in traffic patterns | These mobility changes had immediate implications in the traffic | |||
of the cellular network. The downlink data traffic volume aggregated | patterns of the cellular network. The downlink data traffic volume | |||
for all bearers (including conversational voice) decreased for all UK | aggregated for all bearers (including conversational voice) decreased | |||
by up to 25% during the lockdown period. This correlates with the | for the entire UK by up to 25% during the lockdown period. This | |||
reduction in mobility that was observed country-wide, which likely | correlates with the reduction in mobility that was observed | |||
resulted in people relying more on broadband residential Internet | countrywide, which likely resulted in people relying more on | |||
access to run download intensive applications such as video | residential broadband Internet access to run download-intensive | |||
streaming. The observed decrease in the radio cell load, with a | applications such as video streaming. The observed decrease in the | |||
reduction of approximately 15% across the UK after the stay-at-home | radio cell load, with a reduction of approximately 15% across the UK | |||
order, further corroborates the drop in cellular connectivity usage. | after the stay-at-home order was enacted, further corroborates the | |||
drop in cellular connectivity usage. | ||||
The total uplink data traffic volume, on the other hand, experienced | The total uplink data traffic volume, on the other hand, experienced | |||
little changes (between -7% and +1,5%) during lockdown. This was | little change (between -7% and +1.5%) during lockdown. This was | |||
mainly due to the increase of 4G voice traffic (i.e., VoLTE) across | mainly due to the increase of 4G voice traffic (i.e., Voice over LTE | |||
the UK that peaked at 150% after the lockdown compared to the | (VoLTE)) across the UK that peaked at 150% after the lockdown | |||
national medial value before the pandemic, thus compensating for the | compared to the national median value before the pandemic, thus | |||
decrease in data traffic in the uplink. | compensating for the decrease in data traffic in the uplink. | |||
Finally, it was also observed that mobility changes have a different | Finally, it was also observed that mobility changes have a different | |||
impact on network usage in geodemographic area clusters. In densely | impact on network usage in geodemographic area clusters. In densely | |||
populated urban areas, a significantly higher decrease of mobile | populated urban areas, a significantly higher decrease of mobile | |||
network usage (i.e., downlink and uplink traffic volumes, radio load | network usage (i.e., downlink and uplink traffic volume, radio load, | |||
and active users) was observed than in rural areas. In the case of | and active users) was observed compared to rural areas. In the case | |||
London, this was likely due to geodemographics of the central | of London, this was likely due to the geodemographics of the central | |||
districts, which include many seasonal residents (e.g., tourists), | districts, which include many seasonal residents (e.g., tourists) and | |||
business and commercial areas. | business and commercial areas. | |||
3.1.4. A Deeper Look at Interconnections | 3.1.4. A Deeper Look at Interconnections | |||
Traffic at points of network interconnection noticeably increased, | Traffic at points of network interconnection noticeably increased, | |||
but most operators reacted quickly by rapidly adding additional | but most operators reacted quickly by rapidly adding additional | |||
capacity [Feldmann2020]. The amount of increases varied, with some | capacity [Feldmann2020]. The amount of increase varied, with some | |||
networks that hosted popular applications such as video conferencing | networks that hosted popular applications such as videoconferencing | |||
experiencing traffic growth of several hundred to several thousand | experiencing traffic growth of several hundred to several thousand | |||
percent. At the IXP-level, it was observed that port utilization | percent. At the IXP level, it was observed that port utilization | |||
increased. This phenomenon is mostly explained by a higher traffic | increased. This phenomenon is mostly explained by higher traffic | |||
demand from residential users. | demand from residential users. | |||
Measurements of interconnection links at major US ISPs by CAIDA and | Measurements of interconnection links at major US ISPs by the Center | |||
MIT found some evidence of diurnal congestion around the March 2020 | for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) and the Massachusetts | |||
timeframe [Clark2020], but most of this congestion disappeared in a | Institute of Technology (MIT) found some evidence of diurnal | |||
few weeks, which suggests that operators indeed took steps to add | congestion around the March 2020 time frame [Clark2020], but most of | |||
capacity or otherwise mitigate the congestion. | this congestion disappeared in a few weeks, which suggests that | |||
operators indeed took steps to add capacity or otherwise mitigate the | ||||
congestion. | ||||
3.1.5. Cloud Platforms | 3.1.5. Cloud Platforms | |||
Cloud infrastructure played a key role in supporting bandwidth- | Cloud infrastructure played a key role in supporting bandwidth- | |||
intensive video conferencing and remote learning tools to practise | intensive videoconferencing and remote learning tools to practice | |||
social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic. Network congestion | social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic. Network congestion | |||
between cloud platforms and access networks could impact the quality | between cloud platforms and access networks could impact the quality | |||
of experience of these cloud-based applications. CAIDA leveraged | of experience of these cloud-based applications. CAIDA leveraged | |||
web-based speed test servers to perform download and upload | web-based speed test servers to take download and upload throughput | |||
throughput measurements from virtual machines in public cloud | measurements from virtual machines in public cloud platforms to | |||
platforms to various access ISPs in the United States [Mok2020]. | various access ISPs in the United States [Mok2020]. | |||
The key findings included: | The key findings included the following: | |||
* Persistent congestion events were not widely observed between | * Persistent congestion events were not widely observed between | |||
cloud platforms and these networks, particular for large-scale | cloud platforms and these networks, particular for large-scale | |||
ISPs, but we could observe large diurnal download throughput | ISPs, but we could observe large diurnal download throughput | |||
variations in peak hours from some locations to the cloud. | variations in peak hours from some locations to the cloud. | |||
* There was evidence of persistent congestion in the egress | * There was evidence of persistent congestion in the egress | |||
direction to regional ISPs serving suburban areas in the U.S. | direction to regional ISPs serving suburban areas in the US. | |||
Their users could have suffered from poor video streaming or file | Their users could have suffered from poor video streaming or file | |||
download performance from the cloud. | download performance from the cloud. | |||
* The macroscopic analysis over 3 months (June-August, 2020) | * The macroscopic analysis over 3 months (June-August 2020) revealed | |||
revealed downward trends in download throughput from ISPs and | downward trends in download throughput from ISPs and educational | |||
educational networks to certain cloud regions. We believe that | networks to certain cloud regions. We believe that increased use | |||
increased use of the cloud in the pandemic could be one of the | of the cloud in the pandemic could be one of the factors that | |||
factors that contributed to the decreased performance. | contributed to the decreased performance. | |||
3.1.6. Last-Mile Congestion | 3.1.6. Last-Mile Congestion | |||
The last mile is the centerpiece of broadband connectivity, where | The last mile is the centerpiece of broadband connectivity, where | |||
poor last-mile performance generally translates to poor quality of | poor last-mile performance generally translates to poor quality of | |||
experience. In a recent IMC'20 research paper Fontugne et al. | experience. In a recent Internet Measurement Conference (IMC '20) | |||
investigated last-mile latency using traceroute data from RIPE Atlas | research paper, Fontugne et al. investigated last-mile latency using | |||
probes located in 646 ASes and looked for recurrent performance | traceroute data from Reseaux IP Europeens (RIPE) Atlas probes located | |||
degradation [Fontugne2020-1]. They found that in normal times Atlas | in 646 ASes and looked for recurrent performance degradation | |||
probes in only 10% ASes experience persistent last-mile congestion, | [Fontugne2020-1]. They found that, in normal times, Atlas probes | |||
but they recorded 55% more congested ASes during the COVID-19 | experience persistent last-mile congestion in only 10% of ASes, but | |||
outbreak. This deterioration caused by stay-at-home measures is | they recorded 55% more congested ASes during the COVID-19 outbreak. | |||
particularly marked in networks with a very large number of users and | This deterioration caused by stay-at-home measures is particularly | |||
certain parts of the world. They found Japan to be the most impacted | marked in networks with a very large number of users and in certain | |||
country in their study looking specifically at NTT OCN, but noting | parts of the world. They found Japan to be the most impacted country | |||
similar observations for several Japanese networks, including IIJ | in their study, looking specifically at the Nippon Telegraph and | |||
(AS2497). | Telephone (NTT) Corporation Open Computer Network (OCN) but noting | |||
similar observations for several Japanese networks, including | ||||
Internet Initiative Japan (IIJ) (AS2497). | ||||
From mid-2020 onwards, they however observed better performance than | From mid-2020 onward, however, they observed better performance than | |||
before the pandemic. In Japan, this was partly due to the | before the pandemic. In Japan, this was partly due to the | |||
deployments originally planned for accommodating the Tokyo Olympics, | deployments originally planned for accommodating the Tokyo Olympics, | |||
and more generally, it reflects the efforts of network operators to | and, more generally, it reflects the efforts of network operators to | |||
cope with these exceptional circumstances. The pandemic has | cope with these exceptional circumstances. The pandemic has | |||
demonstrated that its adaptive design and proficient community can | demonstrated that its adaptive design and proficient community can | |||
keep the Internet operational during such unprecedented events. | keep the Internet operational during such unprecedented events. | |||
Also, from the numerous research and operational reports recently | Also, from the numerous research and operational reports recently | |||
published, the pandemic is apparently shaping a more resilient | published, the pandemic is apparently shaping a more resilient | |||
Internet, as Nietzsche wrote, "What does not kill me makes me | Internet; as Nietzsche wrote, "What does not kill me makes me | |||
stronger". | stronger". | |||
3.1.7. User Behaviour | 3.1.7. User Behavior | |||
The type of traffic needed by the users also changed in 2020. | The type of traffic needed by the users also changed in 2020. | |||
Upstream traffic increased due the use of video conferences, remote | Upstream traffic increased due the use of videoconferences, remote | |||
schooling, and similar applications. The NCTA and Comcast reported | schooling, and similar applications. The National Cable & | |||
that while downstream traffic grew 20%, upstream traffic grew as much | Telecommunications Association (NCTA) and Comcast reported that while | |||
as 30% to 37% [NCTA2020] [Comcast2020]. Vodafone reported that | downstream traffic grew 20%, upstream traffic grew by as much as | |||
upstream traffic grew 100% in some markets [Vodafone2020]. | 30-37% [NCTA2020] [Comcast2020]. Vodafone reported that upstream | |||
traffic grew by 100% in some markets [Vodafone2020]. | ||||
Ericsson's Consumer Lab surveyed users for their usage and | Ericsson's ConsumerLab surveyed users regarding their usage and | |||
experiences during the crisis. Some of the key findings in | experiences during the crisis. Some of the key findings in | |||
[ConsumerlabReport2020] were: | [ConsumerlabReport2020] were as follows: | |||
* 9 in 10 users increased Internet activities, and time spent | * 9 in 10 users increased Internet activities, and time spent | |||
connected increased. In addition, 1 in 5 started new online | connected increased. In addition, 1 in 5 started new online | |||
activities, many in the older generation felt that they were | activities; many in the older generation felt that they were | |||
helped by video calling, parents felt that their children's | helped by video calling; parents felt that their children's | |||
education was helped, and so on. | education was helped; and so on. | |||
* Network performance was, in general, found satisfactory. 6 in 10 | * Network performance was, in general, found satisfactory. 6 in 10 | |||
were very satisfied with fixed broadband, and 3 in 4 felt that | were very satisfied with fixed broadband, and 3 in 4 felt that | |||
mobile broadband was the same or better compared to before the | mobile broadband was the same or better compared to before the | |||
crisis. Consumers valued resilience and quality of service as the | crisis. Consumers valued resilience and quality of service as the | |||
most important task for network operators. | most important responsibility for network operators. | |||
* Smartphone application usage changed, with fastest growth in apps | * Smartphone application usage changed, with the fastest growth in | |||
related to COVID-19 tracking and information, remote working, | apps related to COVID-19 tracking and information, remote working, | |||
e-learning, wellness, education, remote health consultation, and | e-learning, wellness, education, remote health consultation, and | |||
social shared experience applications. Biggest decreases were in | social shared experience applications. The biggest decreases were | |||
travel and booking, ride hailing, location, and parking | in travel and booking, ride hailing, location, and parking | |||
applications. | applications. | |||
Some of the behaviours are likely permanent changes | Some of the behaviors are likely permanent changes | |||
[ConsumerlabReport2020]. The adoption of video calls and other new | [ConsumerlabReport2020]. The adoption of video calls and other new | |||
services by many consumers, such as the older generation, is likely | services by many consumers, such as the older generation, is likely | |||
going to have a long-lasting effect. Surveys in various | going to have a long-lasting effect. Surveys in various | |||
organizations point to a likely long-term increase in the number of | organizations point to a likely long-term increase in the number of | |||
people interested in remote work [WorkplaceAnalytics2020] | people interested in remote work [WorkplaceAnalytics2020] | |||
[McKinsey2020]. | [McKinsey2020]. | |||
3.2. Operational Practices and Architectural Considerations | 3.2. Operational Practices and Architectural Considerations | |||
The second and third day of the workshop were held based on more open | The second and third days of the workshop focused on open discussions | |||
discussions focussed on operational issues and the architectural | of arising operational and architectural issues and the conclusions | |||
issues arising or other conclusions that could be reached. | that could be reached from previous discussions and other issues | |||
raised in the position papers. | ||||
3.2.1. Digital Divide | 3.2.1. Digital Divide | |||
Measurements from Fastly confirmed that Internet traffic volume, in | Measurements from Fastly confirmed that Internet traffic volume in | |||
multiple countries, rose rapidly at the same time as COVID cases | multiple countries rose rapidly while COVID cases were increasing and | |||
increased and lockdown policies came into effect. Download speeds | lockdown policies were coming into effect. Download speeds also | |||
also decreased, but in a much less dramatic fashion than overall | decreased but in a much less dramatic fashion than when overall | |||
bandwidth usage increased. School closures led to a dramatic | bandwidth usage increased. School closures led to a dramatic | |||
increase in traffic volume in many regions, and other public policy | increase in traffic volume in many regions, and other public policy | |||
announcements triggered large traffic shifts. This suggests that | announcements triggered large traffic shifts. This suggests that | |||
governments might usefully coordinate with operators to allow time | governments should coordinate with operators to allow time for | |||
for pre-emptive operational changes, in some cases. | preemptive operational changes in some cases. | |||
Measurements from the US showed that download rates correlate with | Measurements from the US showed that download rates correlate with | |||
income levels. However, download rates in the lowest income zip | income levels. However, download rates in the lowest income zip | |||
codes increased as the pandemic progressed, closing the divide with | codes increased as the pandemic progressed, closing the divide with | |||
higher income areas. One possible reason for this in the data is | higher income areas. One possible reason for this in the data is | |||
decisions by some ISPs, such as Comcast and Cox, that increased | decisions by some ISPs, such as Comcast and Cox, that increased | |||
speeds for users on lower-cost certain plans and in certain areas. | speeds for users on certain lower-cost plans and in certain areas. | |||
This suggests that network capacity was available, and that the | This suggests that network capacity was available and that the | |||
correlation between income and download rates was not necessarily due | correlation between income and download rates was not necessarily due | |||
to differences in the deployed infrastructure in different regions; | to differences in the deployed infrastructure in different regions, | |||
although it was noted that certain access link technologies provide | although it was noted that certain access link technologies provide | |||
more flexibility than others in this regard. | more flexibility than others in this regard. | |||
3.2.2. Applications | 3.2.2. Applications | |||
The web conferencing systems (e.g., Microsoft Teams, Zoom, Webex) saw | Web conferencing systems (e.g., Microsoft Teams, Zoom, Webex) saw | |||
incredible growth, with overnight traffic increases of 15-20% in | incredible growth, with overnight traffic increases of 15-20% in | |||
response to public policy changes, such as lockdowns. This required | response to public policy changes, such as lockdowns. This required | |||
significant and rapid changes in infrastructure provisioning. | significant and rapid changes in infrastructure provisioning. | |||
Major video providers (YouTube, etc.) reduced bandwidth by 25% in | Major video providers (YouTube, etc.) reduced bandwidth by 25% in | |||
some regions. It was suggested that this had a huge impact on | some regions. It was suggested that this had a huge impact on the | |||
quality of videoconferencing systems until networks could scale to | quality of videoconferencing systems until networks could scale to | |||
handle full bit-rate, but other operators of some other services saw | handle the full bit rate, but other operators of some other services | |||
limited impact. | saw limited impact. | |||
Updates to popular games has a significant impact on network load. | Updates to popular games have a significant impact on network load. | |||
Some discussions were reported between ISPs, CDNs, and the gaming | Some discussions were reported between ISPs, CDNs, and the gaming | |||
industry on possibly coordinating various high-bandwidth update | industry on possibly coordinating various high-bandwidth update | |||
events, similar to what was done for entertainment/video download | events, similar to what was done for entertainment/video download | |||
speeds. There was an apparently difficult interplay between bulk | speeds. There was an apparently difficult interplay between bulk | |||
download and interactive real-time applications, potentially due to | download and interactive real-time applications, potentially due to | |||
buffer bloat and queuing delays. | buffer bloat and queuing delays. | |||
It was noted that operators have experience of rapid growth of | It was noted that operators have experience with rapid growth of | |||
Internet traffic. New applications with exponential growth are not | Internet traffic. New applications with exponential growth are not | |||
that unusual in the network, and the traffic spike due to the | that unusual in the network, and the traffic spike due to the | |||
lockdown was not that unprecedented for many. Many operators have | lockdown was not that unprecedented for many. Many operators have | |||
tools and mechanisms to deal with this. Ensuring that knowledge if | tools and mechanisms to deal with this. Ensuring that knowledge is | |||
shared is a challenge. | shared is a challenge. | |||
Following these observations traffic prioritisation was discussed, | Following these observations, traffic prioritization was discussed, | |||
starting from DSCP marking, basically wondering if a minimal priority | starting from Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) marking. The | |||
marking scheme would have helped during the pandemic, e.g. by | question arose as to whether a minimal priority-marking scheme would | |||
allowing marking of less-than-best-effort traffic. That discussion | have helped during the pandemic, e.g., by allowing marking of less- | |||
quickly devolved into a more general QoS and observability | than-best-effort traffic. That discussion quickly devolved into a | |||
discussion, and as such also touching on the effects of increased | more general QoS and observability discussion and, as such, also | |||
encryption. The group was not, unsurprisingly, able to resolve the | touched on the effects of increased encryption. The group was not, | |||
different perspectives and interests involved in that, but the | unsurprisingly, able to resolve the different perspectives and | |||
discussion demonstrated that progress is made (and being less | interests involved, but the discussion demonstrated that progress was | |||
heated). | made. | |||
3.2.3. Observability | 3.2.3. Observability | |||
It is clear that there is a contrast in experience. Many operators | It is clear that there is a contrast in experience. Many operators | |||
reported few problems, in terms of metrics such as measured download | reported few problems in terms of metrics, such as measured download | |||
bandwidth, while video conferencing applications experienced | bandwidth, while videoconferencing applications experienced | |||
significant usability problems running on those networks. The | significant usability problems running on those networks. The | |||
interaction between application providers and network providers | interaction between application providers and network providers | |||
worked very smoothly to resolve these issues, supported by strong | worked very smoothly to resolve these issues, supported by strong | |||
personal contacts and relationships. But it seems clear that the | personal contacts and relationships. But it seems clear that the | |||
metrics used by many operators to understand their network | metrics used by many operators to understand their network | |||
performance don't fully capture the impact on certain applications, | performance don't fully capture the impact on certain applications, | |||
and there is an observability gap. Do we need more tools to figure | and there is an observability gap. Do we need more tools to figure | |||
out the various impacts on user experience? | out the various impacts on user experience? | |||
These types of applications use surprising amounts of Forward Error | These types of applications use surprising amounts of Forward Error | |||
Correction (FEC). Applications hide lots of loss to ensure a good | Correction (FEC). Applications hide lots of loss to ensure a good | |||
user experience. This makes it harder to observe problems. The | user experience. This makes it harder to observe problems. The | |||
network can be behaving poorly, but experience can be good enough. | network can be behaving poorly, but the experience can be good | |||
Resiliency measures can improve the user experience but hide severe | enough. Resiliency measures can improve the user experience but hide | |||
problems. There may be a missing feedback loop between application | severe problems. There may be a missing feedback loop between | |||
developers and operators. | application developers and operators. | |||
It's clear that it's difficult for application providers and | It's clear that it's difficult for application providers and | |||
operators to isolate problems. Is a problem due to the local WiFi, | operators to isolate problems. Is a problem due to the local Wi-Fi, | |||
the access network, cloud network, etc.? Metrics from access points | the access network, the cloud network, etc.? Metrics from access | |||
would help, but in general lack of observability into the network as | points would help, but in general, lack of observability into the | |||
a whole is a real concern when it comes to debugging performance | network as a whole is a real concern when it comes to debugging | |||
issues. | performance issues. | |||
Further, it's clear that it can be difficult to route problem reports | Further, it's clear that it can be difficult to route problem reports | |||
to the person who can fix them, across multiple networks in the | to the person who can fix them, especially if the reported | |||
information needs to be shared across multiple networks in the | ||||
Internet. COVID-enhanced cooperation made it easier to debug | Internet. COVID-enhanced cooperation made it easier to debug | |||
problems; lines of communication are important. | problems; lines of communication are important. | |||
3.2.4. Security | 3.2.4. Security | |||
The increased threats and network security impacts arising from | The increased threats and network security impacts arising from | |||
COVID-19 fall into two areas: (1) the agility of malicious actors to | COVID-19 fall into two areas: (1) the agility of malicious actors to | |||
spin up new campaigns using COVID-19 as a lure, and (2) the increased | spin up new campaigns using COVID-19 as a lure, and (2) the increased | |||
threat surface from a rapid shift towards home working. | threat surface from a rapid shift towards working from home. | |||
During 2020, there was a shift to home working generally, and in the | During 2020, there was a shift to home working generally, and in the | |||
way in which people use the network, with IT departments rolling out | way in which people used the network. IT departments rolled out new | |||
new equipment quickly and using technologies like VPNs for the first | equipment quickly and used technologies like VPNs for the first time, | |||
time, while others put existing solutions under much greater load. | while others put existing solutions under much greater load. As VPN | |||
As VPN technology became more widespread and more used, it arguably | technology became more widespread and more widely used, it arguably | |||
became a more valuable target; one Advanced (APT29) was successful in | became a more valuable target; one Advanced Persistent Threat group | |||
using recently published exploits in a range of VPN software to gain | (APT29) was successful in using recently published exploits in a | |||
initial footholds[Kirsty2020]. | range of VPN software to gain initial footholds [Kirsty2020]. | |||
Of all scams detected by the UK NCSC (United Kingdom National Cyber | Of all scams detected by the United Kingdom National Cyber Security | |||
Security Centre) that purported to originate from UK Government, more | Centre (UK NCSC) that purported to originate from the UK Government, | |||
related to COVID-19 than any other subject. There are other reports | more related to COVID-19 than any other subject. There are other | |||
of a strong rise in phishing, fraud, and scams related to COVID | reports of a strong rise in phishing, fraud, and scams related to | |||
[Kirsty2020]. Although, from the data seen to date, the overall | COVID [Kirsty2020]. Although the overall levels of cybercrime have | |||
levels of cyber crime have not increased, there was certainly a shift | not increased from the data seen to date, there was certainly a shift | |||
in activity - as both the NCSC and CISA (DHS Cybersecurity and | in activity as both the NCSC and the Department of Homeland Security | |||
Infrastructure Security Agency) saw a growing use of COVID-19 related | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (DHS CISA) saw | |||
themes by malicious cyber actors as a lure. Attackers used COVID-19 | growing use of COVID-19-related themes by malicious cyber actors as a | |||
related scams and phishing emails to target: individuals, small and | lure. Attackers used COVID-19-related scams and phishing emails to | |||
medium businesses, large organisations, and organisations involved in | target individuals, small and medium businesses, large organizations, | |||
both national and international COVID-19 responses (healthcare | and organizations involved in both national and international | |||
bodies, pharmaceutical companies, academia and medical research | COVID-19 responses (healthcare bodies, pharmaceutical companies, | |||
organisations). New targets, for example organisations involved in | academia, and medical research organizations). New targets (for | |||
COVID-19 vaccine development were attacked using VPN exploits, | example, organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine development) were | |||
highlighting the potential consequences of vulnerable infrastructure. | attacked using VPN exploits, highlighting the potential consequences | |||
of vulnerable infrastructure. | ||||
It's unclear how to effectively detect and counter these attacks at | It's unclear how to effectively detect and counter these attacks at | |||
scale. Approaches such as using Indicators of Compromise and crowd- | scale. Approaches such as using Indicators of Compromise and | |||
sourced flagging of suspicious emails were found to be effective in | crowdsourced flagging of suspicious emails were found to be effective | |||
the response to COVID-19-related scams[Kirsty2020], and observing DNS | in response to COVID-19-related scams [Kirsty2020], and observing the | |||
to detect malicious use is widespread and effective. The use of DNS | DNS to detect malicious use is widespread and effective. The use of | |||
over HTTPS offers privacy benefits but current deployment models can | DNS over HTTPS offers privacy benefits, but current deployment models | |||
bypass these existing protective DNS measures. | can bypass these existing protective DNS measures. | |||
It was also noted that when everyone moves to performing their job | It was also noted that when everyone moves to performing their job | |||
online, lack of understanding of security becomes a bigger issue. Is | online, lack of understanding of security becomes a bigger issue. Is | |||
it reasonable to expect every user of the Internet to take password | it reasonable to expect every user of the Internet to have password | |||
training? Or is there a fundamental problem with a technical | training? Or is there a fundamental problem with a technical | |||
solution? Modern advice advocates a layered approach to security | solution? Modern advice advocates a layered approach to security | |||
defences, with user education forming just one of those layers. | defenses, with user education forming just one of those layers. | |||
Communication platforms such as Zoom are not new: many people have | Communication platforms such as Zoom are not new: many people have | |||
used them for years, but as COVID-19 saw an increasing number of | used them for years, but as COVID-19 saw an increasing number of | |||
organisations and individuals turning to these technologies, they | organizations and individuals turning to these technologies, they | |||
became an attractive target, due to increased usage. In turn, there | became an attractive target due to increased usage. In turn, there | |||
was an increase in malicious cyber actor activity, either hijacking | was an increase in malicious cyber actor activity, either through | |||
online meetings that were not secured with passwords or leveraging | hijacking online meetings that were not secured with passwords or | |||
unpatched software as an attack vector. How can new or existing | leveraging unpatched software as an attack vector. How can new or | |||
measures protect users from the attacks levied against the next | existing measures protect users from the attacks levied against the | |||
vulnerable service? | next vulnerable service? | |||
Overall, it may be that there were fewer security challenges than | Overall, it may be that there were fewer security challenges than | |||
expected arising from many people suddenly working from home. | expected arising from many people suddenly working from home. | |||
However, the agility of attackers, the importance of robust and | However, the agility of attackers, the importance of robust and | |||
scalable defence mechanisms, and some existing security problems and | scalable defense mechanisms, and some existing security problems and | |||
challenges may have become even more obvious and acute with an | challenges may have become even more obvious and acute with an | |||
increased use of Internet-based services, particularly in a pandemic | increased use of Internet-based services, particularly in a pandemic | |||
situation and times of uncertainty, where users can be more | situation and in times of uncertainty, where users can be more | |||
vulnerable to social engineering techniques and attacks. | vulnerable to social engineering techniques and attacks. | |||
3.2.5. Discussion | 3.2.5. Discussion | |||
There is a concern that we're missing observability for the network | There is a concern that we're missing observability for the network | |||
as a whole. Each application provider and operator has their own | as a whole. Each application provider and operator has their own | |||
little lens. No-one has the big-picture view of the network. | little lens. No one has the big-picture view of the network. | |||
How much of a safety margin do we need? Some of the resiliency comes | How much of a safety margin do we need? Some of the resiliency comes | |||
from us not running the network too close to its limit. This allows | from us not running the network too close to its limit. This allows | |||
traffic to shift, and gives headroom for the network to cope. The | traffic to shift and gives headroom for the network to cope. The | |||
best effort nature of the network may help here. Techniques to run | best-effort nature of the network may help here. Using techniques to | |||
the network closer to its limits improve performance in the usual | run the network closer to its limits usually improves performance, | |||
case, but highly optimised networks may be less robust. | but highly optimized networks may be less robust. | |||
Finally, it was observed that we get what we measure. There may be | Finally, it was observed that we get what we measure. There may be | |||
an argument for operators to shift their measurement focus perhaps | an argument for operators to perhaps shift their measurement focus | |||
away from pure capacity, to rather measure QoE or resilience. The | away from pure capacity to instead measure Quality of Experience | |||
Internet is a critical infrastructure, and people are realising that | (QoE) or resilience. The Internet is a critical infrastructure, and | |||
now. We should use this as a wake-up-call to improve resilience, | people are realizing that now. We should use this as a wake-up call | |||
both in protocol design and operational practice, not necessarily to | to improve resilience, both in protocol design and operational | |||
optimise for absolute performance or quality of experience. | practice, not necessarily to optimize for absolute performance or | |||
quality of experience. | ||||
3.3. Conclusions | 3.3. Conclusions | |||
There is a wealth of data about the performance of the Internet | There is a wealth of data about the performance of the Internet | |||
during the crisis. The main conclusion from the various measurements | during the COVID-19 crisis. The main conclusion from the various | |||
is that fairly large shifts occurred. And those shifts were not | measurements is that fairly large shifts occurred. And those shifts | |||
merely about changing one application for another, they actually | were not merely about exchanging one application for another; they | |||
impacted traffic flows and directions, and caused in many cases a | actually impacted traffic flows and directions and caused, in many | |||
significant traffic increase. Early reports also seem to indicate | cases, a significant traffic increase. Early reports also seem to | |||
that the shifts have gone relatively smoothly from the point of view | indicate that the shifts have gone relatively smoothly from the point | |||
of overall consumer experience. | of view of overall consumer experience. | |||
An important but not so visible factor that led to this was that many | An important but not so visible factor that led to running smoothly | |||
people and organizations where highly motivated to ensure good | was that many people and organizations were highly motivated to | |||
experience. A lot of collaboration happened in the background, | ensure good user experience. A lot of collaboration happened in the | |||
problems were corrected, many providers significantly increased their | background, problems were corrected, many providers significantly | |||
capacity, and so on. | increased their capacity, and so on. | |||
On the security front, the COVID-19 crisis showcased the agility with | On the security front, the COVID-19 crisis showcased the agility with | |||
which malicious actors can move in response to a shift in user | which malicious actors can move in response to a shift in user | |||
Internet usage, and the vast potential of the disruption and damage | Internet usage and the vast potential of the disruption and damage | |||
that they can inflict. Equally, it showed the agility of defenders, | that they can inflict. Equally, it showed the agility of defenders | |||
when they have access to the tools and information they need to | when they have access to the tools and information they need to | |||
protect users and networks, and showcased the power of Indicators of | protect users and networks, and it showcased the power of Indicators | |||
Compromise when defenders around the world are working together | of Compromise when defenders around the world are working together | |||
against the same problem. | against the same problem. | |||
In general, the Internet also seems well suited for adapting to new | In general, the Internet also seems well suited for adapting to new | |||
situations, at least within some bounds. The Internet is designed | situations, at least within some bounds. The Internet is designed | |||
for flexibility and extensibility, rather than optimized for today's | for flexibility and extensibility, rather than being optimized for | |||
particular traffic. This makes it possible to use it for many | today's particular traffic types. This makes it possible to use it | |||
applications, in many deployment situations, and make changes as | for many applications and in many deployment situations and to make | |||
needed. The generality is present in many parts of the overall | changes as needed. The generality is present in many parts of the | |||
system, from basic Internet technology to browsers, from name servers | overall system, from basic Internet technology to browsers and from | |||
to content delivery networks and cloud platforms. When usage | name servers to content delivery networks and cloud platforms. When | |||
changes, what is needed is often merely different services, perhaps | usage changes, what is needed is often merely different services, | |||
some re-allocation of resources, as well as consequent application | perhaps some reallocation of resources as well as consequent | |||
and continuation of existing security defences, but not fundamental | application and continuation of existing security defenses, but not | |||
technology or hardware changes. | fundamental technology or hardware changes. | |||
On the other hand, this is not to say that no improvements are | On the other hand, this is not to say that no improvements are | |||
needed: | needed: | |||
* We need a better understanding of the health of the Internet. | * We need a better understanding of the health of the Internet. | |||
Going forward, the critical nature that the Internet plays in our | Going forward, the critical nature that the Internet plays in our | |||
lives means that the health of the Internet needs to receive | lives means that the health of the Internet needs to receive | |||
significant attention. Understanding how well networks work is | significant attention. Understanding how well networks work is | |||
not just a technical matter, it is also of crucial importance to | not just a technical matter; it is also of crucial importance to | |||
the people and economy of the societies using it. Projects and | the people and economies of the societies using it. Projects and | |||
research that monitor Internet and services performance in a broad | research that monitor Internet and services performance on a broad | |||
scale and across different networks are therefore important. | scale and across different networks are therefore important. | |||
* We need to maintain defensive mechanisms to be used in times of | * We need to maintain defensive mechanisms to be used in times of | |||
crisis. Malicious cyber actors are continually adjusting their | crisis. Malicious cyber actors are continually adjusting their | |||
tactics to take advantage of new situations, and the COVID-19 | tactics to take advantage of new situations, and the COVID-19 | |||
pandemic is no exception. Malicious actors used the high appetite | pandemic is no exception. Malicious actors used the strong | |||
for COVID-19 related information as an opportunity to deliver | appetite for COVID-19-related information as an opportunity to | |||
malware and ransomware, and to steal user credentials. Against | deliver malware and ransomware and to steal user credentials. | |||
the landscape of a shift to working from home and an increase in | Against the landscape of a shift to working from home and an | |||
users vulnerable to attack, and as IT departments were often | increase in users vulnerable to attack, and as IT departments were | |||
overwhelmed by rolling out new infrastructure and devices, IoC | often overwhelmed by rolling out new infrastructure and devices, | |||
sharing was a vital part of the response to COVID-19 related scams | sharing Indicators of Compromise (IoC) was a vital part of the | |||
and attacks. | response to COVID-19-related scams and attacks. | |||
* We need to ensure that broadband is available to all, and that | * We need to ensure that broadband is available to all and that | |||
Internet services equally serve different groups. The pandemic | Internet services equally serve different groups. The pandemic | |||
has shown how the effects of the digital divide can be amplified | has shown how the effects of the digital divide can be amplified | |||
during a crisis, and has further highlighted the importance of | during a crisis and has further highlighted the importance of | |||
equitable Internet access. | equitable Internet access. | |||
* We need to continue to work on all the other improvements that are | * We need to continue to work on all the other improvements that are | |||
seen as necessary anyway, such as further improvements in | seen as necessary anyway, such as further improvements in | |||
security, ability for networks and applications to collaborate | security, the ability for networks and applications to collaborate | |||
better, etc. | better, etc. | |||
* We need to ensure that informal collaboration between different | * We need to ensure that informal collaboration between different | |||
parties involved in the operation of the network continues and is | parties involved in the operation of the network continues and is | |||
strengthened, to ensure continued operational resilience. | strengthened to ensure continued operational resilience. | |||
4. Feedback on Meeting Format | 4. Feedback on Meeting Format | |||
While there are frequently virtual participants in IAB workshops, the | While there are frequently virtual participants in IAB workshops, the | |||
IAB had no experience running workshops entirely virtually. | IAB had no experience running workshops entirely virtually. | |||
Feedback on this event format was largely positive, however. It was | Feedback on this event format was largely positive, however. It was | |||
particularly useful that as the three sessions were scheduled Monday, | particularly useful that as the three sessions were scheduled on | |||
Wednesday, and Friday, the time in between could be used for mailing | Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, the time in between the sessions could | |||
list discussion and compilation of additional workshop material. The | be used for mailing list discussion and compilation of additional | |||
positive feedback was likely at least partly due to the fact that | workshop material. The positive feedback was likely at least partly | |||
many of the workshop participants knew one another from previous | due to the fact that many of the workshop participants knew one | |||
face-to-face events (primarily IETF meetings). | another from previous face-to-face events (primarily IETF meetings). | |||
The process for sending invitations to the workshop should be | The process for sending invitations to the workshop should be | |||
improved for next time, however, as a few invitations were initially | improved for next time, however, as a few invitations were initially | |||
lost, and in a virtual meeting it may be more reasonable to invite | lost. In a virtual meeting, it may be more reasonable to invite not | |||
not just one person but all co-authors of a paper, for instance. At | just one person but all coauthors of a paper, for instance. At least | |||
least for this workshop, we did not appear to suffer from too many | for this workshop, we did not appear to suffer from having too many | |||
participants, and in many cases there may be some days when a | participants, and in many cases, there may be some days when a | |||
particular participant may not be able to attend a session. | particular participant may not be able to attend a session. | |||
5. Position Papers | 5. Position Papers | |||
The following position papers were received, in alphabetical order: | The following position papers were received, in alphabetical order: | |||
* Afxanasyev, A., Wang, L., Yeh, E., Zhang, B., and Zhang, L.: | * Afanasyev, A., Wang, L., Yeh, E., Zhang, B., and Zhang, L.: | |||
Identifying the Disease from the Symptoms: Lessons for Networking | Identifying the Disease from the Symptoms: Lessons for Networking | |||
in the COVID-19 Era [Afxanasyev2020] | in the COVID-19 Era [Afxanasyev2020] | |||
* Arkko, Jari: Observations on Network User Behaviour During | * Arkko, J.: Observations on Network User Behaviour During COVID-19 | |||
COVID-19 [Arkko2020] | [Arkko2020] | |||
* Bronzino, F., Culley, E., Feamster, N. Liu. S., Livingood. J., | * Bronzino, F., Culley, E., Feamster, N., Liu, S., Livingood, J., | |||
and Schmitt, P.: IAB COVID-19 Workshop: Interconnection Changes in | and Schmitt, P.: IAB COVID-19 Workshop: Interconnection Changes in | |||
the United States [Bronzino2020] | the United States [Bronzino2020] | |||
* Campling, Andrew and Lazanski, Dominique: Will the Internet Still | * Campling, A. and Lazanski, D.: Will the Internet Still Be | |||
Be Resilient During the Next Black Swan Event? [Campling2020] | Resilient During the Next Black Swan Event? [Campling2020] | |||
* Cho, Kenjiro: On the COVID-19 Impact to broadband traffic in Japan | * Cho, K.: On the COVID-19 Impact to broadband traffic in Japan | |||
[Cho2020] | [Cho2020] | |||
* Clark, D.: Measurement of congestion on ISP interconnection links | * Clark, D.: Measurement of congestion on ISP interconnection links | |||
[Clark2020] | [Clark2020] | |||
* Favale, T., Soro, F., Trevisan, M., Drago, I., and Mellia, M.: | * Favale, T., Soro, F., Trevisan, M., Drago, I., and Mellia, M.: | |||
Campus traffic and e-Learning during COVID-19 pandemic | Campus traffic and e-Learning during COVID-19 pandemic | |||
[Favale2020] | [Favale2020] | |||
* Feldmann, A., Gasser, O., Lichtblau, F., Pujol, E., Poese, I., | * Feldmann, A., Gasser, O., Lichtblau, F., Pujol, E., Poese, I., | |||
skipping to change at page 18, line 41 ¶ | skipping to change at line 826 ¶ | |||
Rodriguez, N., Hohlfeld, O., and Smaragdakis, G.: A view of | Rodriguez, N., Hohlfeld, O., and Smaragdakis, G.: A view of | |||
Internet Traffic Shifts at ISP and IXPs during the COVID-19 | Internet Traffic Shifts at ISP and IXPs during the COVID-19 | |||
Pandemic [Feldmann2020] | Pandemic [Feldmann2020] | |||
* Fontugne, R., Shah, A., and Cho, K.: The Impact of COVID-19 on | * Fontugne, R., Shah, A., and Cho, K.: The Impact of COVID-19 on | |||
Last-mile Latency [Fontugne2020] | Last-mile Latency [Fontugne2020] | |||
* Gillmor, D.: Vaccines, Privacy, Software Updates, and Trust | * Gillmor, D.: Vaccines, Privacy, Software Updates, and Trust | |||
[Gillmor2020] | [Gillmor2020] | |||
* Gu, Y. and Li, Z. Covid 19 Impact on China ISP's Network Traffic | * Gu, Y. and Li, Z.: Covid 19 Impact on China ISP's Network Traffic | |||
Pattern and Solution Discussion [Gu2020] | Pattern and Solution Discussion [Gu2020] | |||
* Jennings, C. and Kozanian, P.: WebEx Scaling During Covid | * Jennings, C. and Kozanian, P.: WebEx Scaling During Covid | |||
[Jennings2020] | [Jennings2020] | |||
* Lutu, A., Perino, D., Bagnulo, M., Frias-Martinez, E., and | * Lutu, A., Perino, D., Bagnulo, M., Frias-Martinez, E., and | |||
Khangosstar, J.: A Characterization of the COVID-19 Pandemic | Khangosstar, J.: A Characterization of the COVID-19 Pandemic | |||
Impact on a Mobile Network Operator Traffic [Lutu2020] | Impact on a Mobile Network Operator Traffic [Lutu2020] | |||
* Mok, Ricky, and claffy, kc: Measuring the impact of COVID-19 on | * Mok, R., and claffy, kc: Measuring the impact of COVID-19 on cloud | |||
cloud network performance [Mok2020] | network performance [Mok2020] | |||
* Kirsty P: IAB COVID-19 Network Impacts [Kirsty2020] | * Paine, K.: IAB COVID-19 Network Impacts [Kirsty2020] | |||
6. Workshop participants | 6. Program Committee | |||
The workshop program committee members were Jari Arkko, Stephen | ||||
Farrell, Cullen Jennings, Colin Perkins, Ben Campbell, and Mirja | ||||
Kühlewind. | ||||
7. Informative References | ||||
[Afxanasyev2020] | ||||
Afanasyev, A., Wang, L., Yeh, E., Zhang, B., and L. Zhang, | ||||
"Identifying the Disease from the Symptoms: Lessons for | ||||
Networking in the COVID-19 Era", October 2020, | ||||
<https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2020/12/IAB- | ||||
COVID-19-WS_102820.pdf>. | ||||
[Arkko2020] | ||||
Arkko, J., "Observations on Network User Behaviour During | ||||
COVID-19", October 2020, <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/ | ||||
IAB-uploads/2020/10/covid19-arkko.pdf>. | ||||
[Bronzino2020] | ||||
Bronzino, F., Culley, E., Feamster, N., Liu, S., | ||||
Livingood, J., and P. Schmitt, "IAB COVID-19 Workshop: | ||||
Interconnection Changes in the United States", Work in | ||||
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-feamster-livingood-iab- | ||||
covid19-workshop-01, 28 October 2020, | ||||
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-feamster- | ||||
livingood-iab-covid19-workshop-01>. | ||||
[Campling2020] | ||||
Campling, A. and D. Lazanski, "Will the Internet Still Be | ||||
Resilient During the Next Black Swan Event?", October | ||||
2020, <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2020/10/ | ||||
covid19-campling.pdf>. | ||||
[Cho2020] Cho, K., "On the COVID-19 Impact to broadband traffic in | ||||
Japan", October 2020, <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB- | ||||
uploads/2020/10/covid19-cho.pdf>. | ||||
[Clark2020] | ||||
Clark, D., "Measurement of congestion on ISP | ||||
interconnection links", October 2020, | ||||
<https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2020/10/ | ||||
covid19-clark.pdf>. | ||||
[Comcast2020] | ||||
Comcast, "COVID-19 Network Update", May 2020, | ||||
<https://corporate.comcast.com/covid-19/network/may- | ||||
20-2020>. | ||||
[ConsumerlabReport2020] | ||||
Ericsson ConsumerLab, "Connectivity in a COVID-19 world: | ||||
Keeping consumers connected in a global crisis", | ||||
<https://www.ericsson.com/en/reports-and- | ||||
papers/consumerlab/reports/keeping-consumers-connected- | ||||
during-the-covid-19-crisis>. | ||||
[Favale2020] | ||||
Favale, T., Soro, F., Trevisan, M., Drago, I., and M. | ||||
Mellia, "Campus traffic and e-Learning during COVID-19 | ||||
pandemic", DOI 10.1016/j.comnet.2020.107290, October 2020, | ||||
<https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2020/10/ | ||||
covid19-favale.pdf>. | ||||
[Feldmann2020] | ||||
Feldmann, A., Gasser, O., Lichtblau, F., Pujol, E., Poese, | ||||
I., Dietzel, C., Wagner, D., Wichtlhuber, M., Tapiador, | ||||
J., Vallina-Rodriguez, N., Hohlfeld, O., and G. | ||||
Smaragdakis, "A view of Internet Traffic Shifts at ISP and | ||||
IXPs during the COVID-19 Pandemic", October 2020, | ||||
<https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2020/10/ | ||||
covid19-feldmann.pdf>. | ||||
[Fontugne2020] | ||||
Fontugne, R., Shah, A., and K. Cho, "The Impact of | ||||
COVID-19 on Last-mile Latency", October 2020, | ||||
<https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2020/10/ | ||||
covid19-fontugne.pdf>. | ||||
[Fontugne2020-1] | ||||
Fontugne, R., Shah, A., and K. Cho, "Persistent Last-mile | ||||
Congestion: Not so Uncommon", Proceedings of the ACM | ||||
Internet Measurement Conference (IMC '20), | ||||
DOI 10.1145/3419394.3423648, October 2020, | ||||
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3419394.3423648>. | ||||
[Gillmor2020] | ||||
Gillmor, D., "Vaccines, Privacy, Software Updates, and | ||||
Trust", October 2020, <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB- | ||||
uploads/2020/10/covid19-gillmor.pdf>. | ||||
[Gu2020] Gu, Y. and Z. Li, "Covid 19 Impact on China ISP's Network | ||||
Traffic Pattern and Solution Discussion", October 2020, | ||||
<https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2020/10/ | ||||
covid19-gu.pdf>. | ||||
[Jennings2020] | ||||
Jennings, C. and P. Kozanian, "WebEx Scaling During | ||||
Covid", October 2020, <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB- | ||||
uploads/2020/10/covid19-jennings.pdf>. | ||||
[Kirsty2020] | ||||
Paine, K., "IAB COVID-19 Network Impacts", October 2020, | ||||
<https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2020/10/ | ||||
covid19-kirstyp.pdf>. | ||||
[Lutu2020] Lutu, A., Perino, D., Bagnulo, M., Frias-Martinez, E., and | ||||
J. Khangosstar, "A Characterization of the COVID-19 | ||||
Pandemic Impact on a Mobile Network Operator Traffic", | ||||
DOI 10.1145/3419394.3423655, October 2020, | ||||
<https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2020/10/ | ||||
covid19-lutu.pdf>. | ||||
[McKinsey2020] | ||||
Boland, B., De Smet, A., Palter, R., and A. Sanghvi, | ||||
"Reimagining the office and work life after COVID-19", | ||||
June 2020, <https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Busi | ||||
ness%20Functions/Organization/Our%20Insights/Reimagining%2 | ||||
0the%20office%20and%20work%20life%20after%20COVID%2019/ | ||||
Reimagining-the-office-and-work-life-after-COVID- | ||||
19-final.pdf>. | ||||
[Mok2020] Mok, R. and kc. claffy, "Measuring the impact of COVID-19 | ||||
on cloud network performance", October 2020, | ||||
<https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2020/10/ | ||||
covid19-mok.pdf>. | ||||
[NCTA2020] NCTA, "COVID-19: How Cable's Internet Networks Are | ||||
Performing: Metrics, Trends & Observations", | ||||
<https://www.ncta.com/COVIDdashboard>. | ||||
[Vodafone2020] | ||||
Vodafone, "An update on Vodafone's networks", April 2020, | ||||
<https://www.vodafone.com/covid19/news/update-on-vodafone- | ||||
networks>. | ||||
[WorkplaceAnalytics2020] | ||||
Lister, K., "Work-at-Home After Covid-19--Our Forecast", | ||||
March 2020, <https://globalworkplaceanalytics.com/work-at- | ||||
home-after-covid-19-our-forecast>. | ||||
Appendix A. Workshop Participants | ||||
The following is an alphabetical list of participants in the | The following is an alphabetical list of participants in the | |||
workshop. | workshop. | |||
* Jari Arkko (Ericsson/IAB) | * Jari Arkko (Ericsson/IAB) | |||
* Ben Campbell (Independent/IAB) | * Ben Campbell (Independent/IAB) | |||
* Andrew Campling (419 Consulting) | * Andrew Campling (419 Consulting) | |||
* Kenjiro Cho (IIJ) | * Kenjiro Cho (IIJ) | |||
* kc Claffy (CAIDA) | * kc claffy (CAIDA) | |||
* David Clark (MIT CSAIL) | * David Clark (MIT CSAIL) | |||
* Chris Dietzel (DE-CIX) | * Chris Dietzel (DE-CIX) | |||
* Idilio Drago (University of Turin) | * Idilio Drago (University of Turin) | |||
* Stephen Farrell (Trinity College Dublin/IAB) | * Stephen Farrell (Trinity College Dublin/IAB) | |||
* Nick Feamster (University of Chicago) | * Nick Feamster (University of Chicago) | |||
skipping to change at page 19, line 42 ¶ | skipping to change at line 1017 ¶ | |||
* Anja Feldmann (Max Planck Institute for Informatics) | * Anja Feldmann (Max Planck Institute for Informatics) | |||
* Romain Fontugne (IIJ Research Lab) | * Romain Fontugne (IIJ Research Lab) | |||
* Oliver Gasser (Max Planck Institute for Informatics) | * Oliver Gasser (Max Planck Institute for Informatics) | |||
* Daniel Kahn Gillmor (ACLU) | * Daniel Kahn Gillmor (ACLU) | |||
* Yunan Gu (Huawei) | * Yunan Gu (Huawei) | |||
* Oliver Hohlfeld (Brandenburg University of Technology, BTU) | * Oliver Hohlfeld (Brandenburg University of Technology (BTU)) | |||
* Jana Iyengar (Fastly) | * Jana Iyengar (Fastly) | |||
* Cullen Jennings (Cisco/IAB) | * Cullen Jennings (Cisco/IAB) | |||
* Mirja Kuhlewind (Ericsson/IAB) | * Mirja Kühlewind (Ericsson/IAB) | |||
* Franziska Lichtblau (Max Planck Institute for Informatics) | ||||
* Dominique Lazanski | * Dominique Lazanski | |||
* Zhenbin Li (Huawei/IAB) | * Zhenbin Li (Huawei/IAB) | |||
* Franziska Lichtblau (Max Planck Institute for Informatics) | ||||
* Jason Livingood (Comcast) | * Jason Livingood (Comcast) | |||
* Andra Lutu (Telefonica Research) | * Andra Lutu (Telefonica Research) | |||
* Vesna Manojlovic (RIPE NCC) | * Vesna Manojlovic (RIPE NCC) | |||
* R Martin EC (?) | * Rüdiger Martin (EC) | |||
* Matt Matthis (Google) | ||||
* Larry Masinter (Retired) | * Larry Masinter (Retired) | |||
* Matt Matthis (Google) | ||||
* Jared Mauch (Akamai/IAB) | * Jared Mauch (Akamai/IAB) | |||
* Deep Medhi (NSF) | * Deep Medhi (NSF) | |||
* Marco Mellia (Politecnico di Torino) | * Marco Mellia (Politecnico di Torino) | |||
* Ricky Mok (CAIDA) | * Ricky Mok (CAIDA) | |||
* Karen O'Donoghue (Internet Society) | * Karen O'Donoghue (Internet Society) | |||
* Kirsty P (NCSC) | * Kirsty Paine (NCSC) | |||
* Diego Perino (Telefonica Research) | * Diego Perino (Telefonica Research) | |||
* Colin Perkins (University of Glasgow/IRTF/IAB) | * Colin Perkins (University of Glasgow/IRTF/IAB) | |||
* Enric Pujol (Benocs) | * Enric Pujol (Benocs) | |||
* Anant Shah (Verizon Media Platform) | * Anant Shah (Verizon Media Platform) | |||
* Francesca Soro (Politecnico di Torino) | * Francesca Soro (Politecnico di Torino) | |||
* Brian Trammell (Google) | * Brian Trammell (Google) | |||
* Gergios Tselentis (European Commission) | ||||
* Martino Trevisan | * Martino Trevisan | |||
* Georgios Tselentis (European Commission) | ||||
* Lan Wang (University of Memphis) | * Lan Wang (University of Memphis) | |||
* Rob Wilton (Cisco) | * Rob Wilton (Cisco) | |||
* Jiankang Yao (CNNIC) | * Jiankang Yao (CNNIC) | |||
* Lixia Zhang (UCLA) | * Lixia Zhang (UCLA) | |||
7. Program Committee | IAB Members at the Time of Approval | |||
The workshop Program Committee members were Jari Arkko, Stephen | Internet Architecture Board members at the time this document was | |||
Farrell, Cullen Jennings, Colin Perkins, Ben Campbell, and Mirja | approved for publication were: | |||
Kuehlewind. | ||||
8. Acknowledgments | Jari Arkko | |||
Deborah Brungard | ||||
Ben Campbell | ||||
Lars Eggert | ||||
Wes Hardaker | ||||
Cullen Jennings | ||||
Mirja Kühlewind | ||||
Zhenbin Li | ||||
Jared Mauch | ||||
Tommy Pauly | ||||
David Schinazi | ||||
Russ White | ||||
Jiankang Yao | ||||
Acknowledgments | ||||
The authors would like to thank the workshop participants, the | The authors would like to thank the workshop participants, the | |||
members of the IAB, the program committee, the participants in the | members of the IAB, the program committee, the participants in the | |||
architecture discussion list for interesting discussions, and Cindy | architecture discussion list for the interesting discussions, and | |||
Morgan for the practical arrangements. | Cindy Morgan for the practical arrangements. | |||
Further special thanks to those participants who also contributed to | Further special thanks to those participants who also contributed to | |||
this report: Romain Fontugne provided text based on his blog post at | this report: Romain Fontugne provided text based on his blog post at | |||
https://eng-blog.iij.ad.jp/archives/7722; Ricky Mok for text on cloud | <https://eng-blog.iij.ad.jp/archives/7722>; Ricky Mok for text on | |||
platform; Martino Trevisan for text on campus networks; David Clark | cloud platforms; Martino Trevisan for text on campus networks; David | |||
on congestion measurements at interconnects; Oliver Hohlfeld for the | Clark on congestion measurements at interconnects; Oliver Hohlfeld | |||
text on traffic growth, changes in traffic shifts, campus networks, | for the text on traffic growth, changes in traffic shifts, campus | |||
and interconnections; Andra Lutu on mobile networks; Kirsty Paine for | networks, and interconnections; Andra Lutu on mobile networks; and | |||
text on security impacts; and thanks to Jason Livingood for his | Kirsty Paine for text on security impacts. Thanks to Jason Livingood | |||
review and additions. | for his review and additions. | |||
9. Informative References | ||||
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Authors' Addresses | Authors' Addresses | |||
Jari Arkko | Jari Arkko | |||
Ericsson | Ericsson | |||
Email: jari.arkko@ericsson.com | Email: jari.arkko@ericsson.com | |||
Stephen Farrell | Stephen Farrell | |||
Trinity College Dublin | Trinity College Dublin | |||
End of changes. 142 change blocks. | ||||
593 lines changed or deleted | 618 lines changed or added | |||
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