rfc9077.original   rfc9077.txt 
dnsop P. van Dijk Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. van Dijk
Internet-Draft PowerDNS Request for Comments: 9077 PowerDNS
Updates: 4034, 4035, 5155, 8198 (if approved) 20 May 2021 Updates: 4034, 4035, 5155, 8198 July 2021
Intended status: Standards Track Category: Standards Track
Expires: 21 November 2021 ISSN: 2070-1721
NSEC and NSEC3 TTLs and NSEC Aggressive Use NSEC and NSEC3: TTLs and Aggressive Use
draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-05
Abstract Abstract
Due to a combination of unfortunate wording in earlier documents, Due to a combination of unfortunate wording in earlier documents,
aggressive use of NSEC and NSEC3 records may deny the existence of aggressive use of NSEC and NSEC3 records may deny the existence of
names far beyond the intended lifetime of a denial. This document names far beyond the intended lifetime of a denial. This document
changes the definition of the NSEC and NSEC3 TTL (Time To Live) to changes the definition of the NSEC and NSEC3 TTL to correct that
correct that situation. This document updates RFC 4034, RFC 4035, situation. This document updates RFCs 4034, 4035, 5155, and 8198.
RFC 5155, and RFC 8198.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 November 2021. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9077.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Conventions and Definitions
3. NSEC and NSEC3 TTL changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. NSEC and NSEC3 TTL Changes
3.1. Updates to RFC4034 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Updates to RFC 4034
3.2. Updates to RFC4035 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Updates to RFC 4035
3.3. Updates to RFC5155 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. Updates to RFC 5155
3.4. Updates to RFC8198 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.4. Updates to RFC 8198
4. Zone Operator Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Zone Operator Considerations
4.1. A Note On Wildcards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1. A Note on Wildcards
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Security Considerations
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. IANA Considerations
7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. Normative References
Appendix A. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Acknowledgements
Appendix B. Document history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Author's Address
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
[RFC editor: please remove this block before publication. [RFC2308] defines the TTL of the Start of Authority (SOA) record that
Earlier notes on this:
* https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/29/sessions/98/#20181013
(https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/29/sessions/98/#20181013)
* https://lists.dns-oarc.net/pipermail/dns-operations/2018-April/
thread.html#17420 (https://lists.dns-oarc.net/pipermail/dns-
operations/2018-April/thread.html#17420)
* https://lists.dns-oarc.net/pipermail/dns-
operations/2018-March/017416.html (https://lists.dns-
oarc.net/pipermail/dns-operations/2018-March/017416.html)
This document lives on GitHub (https://github.com/PowerDNS/draft-
dnsop-nsec-ttl); proposed text and editorial changes are very much
welcomed there, but any functional changes should always first be
discussed on the IETF DNSOP WG mailing list.
]
[RFC2308] defines the TTL of the SOA (Start Of Authority) record that
must be returned in negative answers (NXDOMAIN or NODATA): must be returned in negative answers (NXDOMAIN or NODATA):
| The TTL of this record is set from the minimum of the MINIMUM | The TTL of this record is set from the minimum of the MINIMUM
| field of the SOA record and the TTL of the SOA itself, and | field of the SOA record and the TTL of the SOA itself, and
| indicates how long a resolver may cache the negative answer. | indicates how long a resolver may cache the negative answer.
Thus, if the TTL of the SOA in the zone is lower than the SOA MINIMUM Thus, if the TTL of the SOA in the zone is lower than the SOA MINIMUM
value (the last number in the SOA record), the authoritative server value (the last number in the SOA record), the authoritative server
sends that lower value as the TTL of the returned SOA record. The sends that lower value as the TTL of the returned SOA record. The
resolver always uses the TTL of the returned SOA record when setting resolver always uses the TTL of the returned SOA record when setting
the negative TTL in its cache. the negative TTL in its cache.
However, [RFC4034] section 4 has this unfortunate text: However, [RFC4034], Section 4 has this unfortunate text:
| The NSEC RR SHOULD have the same TTL value as the SOA minimum TTL | The NSEC RR SHOULD have the same TTL value as the SOA minimum TTL
| field. This is in the spirit of negative caching ([RFC2308]). | field. This is in the spirit of negative caching ([RFC2308]).
This text, while referring to RFC2308, can cause NSEC records to have This text, while referring to [RFC2308], can cause NSEC records to
much higher TTLs than the appropriate negative TTL for a zone. have much higher TTLs than the appropriate negative TTL for a zone.
[RFC5155] contains equivalent text. [RFC5155] contains equivalent text.
[RFC8198] section 5.4 tries to correct this: [RFC8198], Section 5.4 tries to correct this:
| Section 5 of [RFC2308] also states that a negative cache entry TTL | Section 5 of [RFC2308] also states that a negative cache entry TTL
| is taken from the minimum of the SOA.MINIMUM field and SOA's TTL. | is taken from the minimum of the SOA.MINIMUM field and SOA's TTL.
| This can be less than the TTL of an NSEC or NSEC3 record, since | This can be less than the TTL of an NSEC or NSEC3 record, since
| their TTL is equal to the SOA.MINIMUM field (see [RFC4035], | their TTL is equal to the SOA.MINIMUM field (see [RFC4035],
| Section 2.3 and [RFC5155], Section 3). | Section 2.3 and [RFC5155], Section 3).
| |
| A resolver that supports aggressive use of NSEC and NSEC3 SHOULD | A resolver that supports aggressive use of NSEC and NSEC3 SHOULD
| reduce the TTL of NSEC and NSEC3 records to match the SOA.MINIMUM | reduce the TTL of NSEC and NSEC3 records to match the SOA.MINIMUM
| field in the authority section of a negative response, if | field in the authority section of a negative response, if
| SOA.MINIMUM is smaller. | SOA.MINIMUM is smaller.
But the NSEC and NSEC3 RRs should, according to RFC4034 and RFC5155, But the NSEC and NSEC3 RRs should, according to [RFC4034] and
already be at the value of the MINIMUM field in the SOA. Thus, the [RFC5155], already be at the value of the MINIMUM field in the SOA.
advice from RFC8198 would not actually change the TTL used for the Thus, the advice from [RFC8198] would not actually change the TTL
NSEC and NSEC3 RRs for authoritative servers that follow the RFCs. used for the NSEC and NSEC3 RRs for authoritative servers that follow
the RFCs.
As a theoretical exercise, consider a TLD named ".example" with a SOA As a theoretical exercise, consider a top-level domain (TLD) named
record like this: .example with an SOA record like this:
"example. 900 IN SOA primary.example. hostmaster.example. 1 1800 900 example. 900 IN SOA primary.example. dnsadmin.example. (
604800 86400" 1 1800 900 604800 86400 )
The SOA record has a 900 second TTL, and a 86400 MINIMUM TTL. The SOA record has a 900-second TTL and an 86400-second MINIMUM TTL.
Negative responses from this zone have a 900 second TTL, but the NSEC Negative responses from this zone have a 900-second TTL, but the NSEC
or NSEC3 records in those negative responses have a 86400 TTL. If a or NSEC3 records in those negative responses have an 86400-second
resolver were to use those NSEC or NSEC3 records aggressively, they TTL. If a resolver were to use those NSEC or NSEC3 records
would be considered valid for a day, instead of the intended 15 aggressively, they would be considered valid for a day instead of the
minutes. intended 15 minutes.
2. Conventions and Definitions 2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. NSEC and NSEC3 TTL changes 3. NSEC and NSEC3 TTL Changes
The existing texts in [RFC4034], [RFC4035], and [RFC5155] use the [RFC4034], [RFC4035], and [RFC5155] use the SHOULD requirement level,
SHOULD requirement level, but they were written when [RFC4035] still but they were written prior to the publication of [RFC8198] when
said 'However, it seems prudent for resolvers to avoid blocking new [RFC4035] still said:
authoritative data or synthesizing new data on their own'. [RFC8198]
updated that text to contain 'DNSSEC-enabled validating resolvers
SHOULD use wildcards and NSEC/NSEC3 resource records to generate
positive and negative responses until the effective TTLs or
signatures for those records expire'. This means that correctness of
NSEC and NSEC3 records, and their TTLs, has become much more
important. Because of that, the updates in this document upgrade the
requirement level to MUST.
3.1. Updates to RFC4034 | However, it seems prudent for resolvers to avoid blocking new
| authoritative data or synthesizing new data on their own.
Where [RFC4034] says: [RFC8198] updated that text to contain:
| ...DNSSEC-enabled validating resolvers SHOULD use wildcards and
| NSEC/NSEC3 resource records to generate positive and negative
| responses until the effective TTLs or signatures for those records
| expire.
This means that the correctness of NSEC and NSEC3 records and their
TTLs has become much more important. Because of that, the updates in
this document upgrade the requirement level to MUST.
3.1. Updates to RFC 4034
[RFC4034] says:
| The NSEC RR SHOULD have the same TTL value as the SOA minimum TTL | The NSEC RR SHOULD have the same TTL value as the SOA minimum TTL
| field. This is in the spirit of negative caching ([RFC2308]). | field. This is in the spirit of negative caching ([RFC2308]).
This is updated to say: This is updated to say:
| The TTL of the NSEC RR that is returned MUST be the lesser of the | The TTL of the NSEC RR that is returned MUST be the lesser of the
| MINIMUM field of the SOA record and the TTL of the SOA itself. | MINIMUM field of the SOA record and the TTL of the SOA itself.
| This matches the definition of the TTL for negative responses in | This matches the definition of the TTL for negative responses in
| [RFC2308]. Because some signers incrementally update the NSEC | [RFC2308]. Because some signers incrementally update the NSEC
| chain, a transient inconsistency between the observed and expected | chain, a transient inconsistency between the observed and expected
| TTL MAY exist. | TTL MAY exist.
3.2. Updates to RFC4035 3.2. Updates to RFC 4035
Where [RFC4035] says: [RFC4035] says:
| The TTL value for any NSEC RR SHOULD be the same as the minimum | The TTL value for any NSEC RR SHOULD be the same as the minimum
| TTL value field in the zone SOA RR. | TTL value field in the zone SOA RR.
This is updated to say: This is updated to say:
| The TTL of the NSEC RR that is returned MUST be the lesser of the | The TTL of the NSEC RR that is returned MUST be the lesser of the
| MINIMUM field of the SOA record and the TTL of the SOA itself. | MINIMUM field of the SOA record and the TTL of the SOA itself.
| This matches the definition of the TTL for negative responses in | This matches the definition of the TTL for negative responses in
| [RFC2308]. Because some signers incrementally update the NSEC | [RFC2308]. Because some signers incrementally update the NSEC
| chain, a transient inconsistency between the observed and expected | chain, a transient inconsistency between the observed and expected
| TTL MAY exist. | TTL MAY exist.
3.3. Updates to RFC5155 3.3. Updates to RFC 5155
Where [RFC5155] says: [RFC5155] says:
| The NSEC3 RR SHOULD have the same TTL value as the SOA minimum TTL | The NSEC3 RR SHOULD have the same TTL value as the SOA minimum TTL
| field. This is in the spirit of negative caching [RFC2308]. | field. This is in the spirit of negative caching [RFC2308].
This is updated to say: This is updated to say:
| The TTL of the NSEC3 RR that is returned MUST be the lesser of the | The TTL of the NSEC3 RR that is returned MUST be the lesser of the
| MINIMUM field of the SOA record and the TTL of the SOA itself. | MINIMUM field of the SOA record and the TTL of the SOA itself.
| This matches the definition of the TTL for negative responses in | This matches the definition of the TTL for negative responses in
| [RFC2308]. Because some signers incrementally update the NSEC3 | [RFC2308]. Because some signers incrementally update the NSEC3
| chain, a transient inconsistency between the observed and expected | chain, a transient inconsistency between the observed and expected
| TTL MAY exist. | TTL MAY exist.
Where [RFC5155] says: Where [RFC5155] says:
| o The TTL value for any NSEC3 RR SHOULD be the same as the minimum | * The TTL value for any NSEC3 RR SHOULD be the same as the
| TTL value field in the zone SOA RR. | minimum TTL value field in the zone SOA RR.
This is updated to say: This is updated to say:
| o The TTL value for each NSEC3 RR MUST be the lesser of the | * The TTL value for each NSEC3 RR MUST be the lesser of the
| MINIMUM field of the zone SOA RR and the TTL of the zone SOA RR | MINIMUM field of the zone SOA RR and the TTL of the zone SOA RR
| itself. Because some signers incrementally update the NSEC3 | itself. Because some signers incrementally update the NSEC3
| chain, a transient inconsistency between the observed and expected | chain, a transient inconsistency between the observed and
| TTL MAY exist. | expected TTL MAY exist.
3.4. Updates to RFC8198 3.4. Updates to RFC 8198
[RFC8198] section 5.4 (Consideration on TTL) is completely replaced [RFC8198], Section 5.4 ("Consideration on TTL") is completely
by the following text: replaced by the following text:
| The TTL value of negative information is especially important, | The TTL value of negative information is especially important,
| because newly added domain names cannot be used while the negative | because newly added domain names cannot be used while the negative
| information is effective. | information is effective.
| |
| Section 5 of [RFC2308] suggests a maximum default negative cache | Section 5 of [RFC2308] suggests a maximum default negative cache
| TTL value of 3 hours (10800). It is RECOMMENDED that validating | TTL value of 3 hours (10800). It is RECOMMENDED that validating
| resolvers limit the maximum effective TTL value of negative | resolvers limit the maximum effective TTL value of negative
| responses (NSEC/NSEC3 RRs) to this same value. | responses (NSEC/NSEC3 RRs) to this same value.
| |
skipping to change at page 7, line 5 skipping to change at line 245
If signers and DNS servers for a zone cannot immediately be updated If signers and DNS servers for a zone cannot immediately be updated
to conform to this document, zone operators are encouraged to to conform to this document, zone operators are encouraged to
consider setting their SOA record TTL and the SOA MINIMUM field to consider setting their SOA record TTL and the SOA MINIMUM field to
the same value. That way, the TTL used for aggressive NSEC and NSEC3 the same value. That way, the TTL used for aggressive NSEC and NSEC3
use matches the SOA TTL for negative responses. use matches the SOA TTL for negative responses.
Note that some signers might use the SOA TTL or MINIMUM as a default Note that some signers might use the SOA TTL or MINIMUM as a default
for other values, such as the TTL for DNSKEY records. Operators for other values, such as the TTL for DNSKEY records. Operators
should consult documentation before changing values. should consult documentation before changing values.
4.1. A Note On Wildcards 4.1. A Note on Wildcards
Validating resolvers consider an expanded wildcard valid for the Validating resolvers consider an expanded wildcard valid for the
wildcard's TTL, capped by the TTLs of the NSEC or NSEC3 proof that wildcard's TTL, capped by the TTLs of the NSEC or NSEC3 proof that
shows that the wildcard expansion is legal. Thus, changing the TTL shows that the wildcard expansion is legal. Thus, changing the TTL
of NSEC or NSEC3 records (explicitly, or by implementation of this of NSEC or NSEC3 records (explicitly, or by implementation of this
document, implicitly) might affect (shorten) the lifetime of document implicitly) might affect (shorten) the lifetime of
wildcards. wildcards.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
An attacker can delay future records from appearing in a cache by An attacker can delay future records from appearing in a cache by
seeding the cache with queries that cause NSEC or NSEC3 responses to seeding the cache with queries that cause NSEC or NSEC3 responses to
be cached for aggressive use purposes. This document reduces the be cached for aggressive use purposes. This document reduces the
impact of that attack in cases where the NSEC or NSEC3 TTL is higher impact of that attack in cases where the NSEC or NSEC3 TTL is higher
than the zone operator intended. than the zone operator intended.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to add a reference to this document in the IANA has added a reference to this document in the "Resource Record
"Resource Record (RR) TYPEs" subregistry of the "Domain Name System (RR) TYPEs" subregistry of the "Domain Name System (DNS) Parameters"
(DNS) Parameters" registry, for the NSEC and NSEC3 types. registry for the NSEC and NSEC3 types.
7. Normative References 7. Normative References
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS [RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998, NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005, RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.
[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS [RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008, Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8198] Fujiwara, K., Kato, A., and W. Kumari, "Aggressive Use of [RFC8198] Fujiwara, K., Kato, A., and W. Kumari, "Aggressive Use of
DNSSEC-Validated Cache", RFC 8198, DOI 10.17487/RFC8198, DNSSEC-Validated Cache", RFC 8198, DOI 10.17487/RFC8198,
July 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8198>. July 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8198>.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
Appendix A. Implementation Status
[RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication]
Implemented in PowerDNS Authoritative Server 4.3.0
https://doc.powerdns.com/authoritative/dnssec/
operational.html?highlight=ttl#some-notes-on-ttl-usage
(https://doc.powerdns.com/authoritative/dnssec/
operational.html?highlight=ttl#some-notes-on-ttl-usage) .
Implemented in BIND 9.16 and up, to be released early 2021
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/ga41J2PPUbmc21--
dqf3i7_IY6M (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/
ga41J2PPUbmc21--dqf3i7_IY6M) https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/
bind9/-/merge_requests/4506 (https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/
bind9/-/merge_requests/4506) .
Implemented in Knot DNS 3.1, to be released in 2021
https://gitlab.nic.cz/knot/knot-dns/-/merge_requests/1219
(https://gitlab.nic.cz/knot/knot-dns/-/merge_requests/1219) .
Implemented in ldns, patch under review
https://github.com/NLnetLabs/ldns/pull/118
(https://github.com/NLnetLabs/ldns/pull/118)
Implementation status is tracked at
https://trac.ietf.org/trac/dnsop/wiki/draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl
(https://trac.ietf.org/trac/dnsop/wiki/draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl)
Appendix B. Document history
[RFC editor: please remove this section before publication.]
From draft-vandijk-dnsop-nsec-ttl-00 to draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-00:
* document was adopted
* various minor editorial changes
* now also updates 4035
* use .example instead of .com for the example
* more words on 8198
* a note on wildcards
From draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-00 to draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-01:
* various wording improvements
* added Implementation note from Knot, expanded the BIND one with
the GitLab MR URL
* reduced requirement level from MUST to SHOULD, like the original
texts
From draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-01 to draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-02:
* updated the second bit of wrong text in 5155
From draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-02 to draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-03:
* document now updates resolver behaviour in 8198
* lots of extra text to clarify what behaviour goes where (thanks
Paul Hoffman)
* replace 'any' with 'each' (thanks Duane)
* upgraded requirement level to MUST, plus a note on incremental
signers
From draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-03 to draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-04:
* the 'incremental signer exception' is now part of all relevant
document updates
* added an explanation for the upgraded requirement level
From draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-04 to draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-05:
* various minor rewordings (from IESG review, and things I spotted
while handling IESG review comments)
* added a note on the secondary impact of changing the SOA TTL and/
or MINIMUM (IESG review)
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
This document was made possible with the help of the following This document was made possible with the help of the following
people: people:
* Ralph Dolmans * Ralph Dolmans
* Warren Kumari * Warren Kumari
* Matthijs Mekking * Matthijs Mekking
* Vladimir Cunat * Vladimir Cunat
* Matt Nordhoff * Matt Nordhoff
* Josh Soref * Josh Soref
* Tim Wicinski * Tim Wicinski
The author would like to explicitly thank Paul Hoffman for extensive The author would like to explicitly thank Paul Hoffman for the
reviews, text contributions, and help in navigating WG comments. extensive reviews, text contributions, and help in navigating WG
comments.
Author's Address Author's Address
Peter van Dijk Peter van Dijk
PowerDNS PowerDNS
Den Haag Den Haag
Netherlands Netherlands
Email: peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com Email: peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com
 End of changes. 37 change blocks. 
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