rfc9116.original   rfc9116.txt 
Network Working Group E. Foudil Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) E. Foudil
Internet-Draft Request for Comments: 9116
Intended status: Informational Y. Shafranovich Category: Informational Y. Shafranovich
Expires: 25 November 2021 Nightwatch Cybersecurity ISSN: 2070-1721 Nightwatch Cybersecurity
24 May 2021 April 2022
A File Format to Aid in Security Vulnerability Disclosure A File Format to Aid in Security Vulnerability Disclosure
draft-foudil-securitytxt-12
Abstract Abstract
When security vulnerabilities are discovered by researchers, proper When security vulnerabilities are discovered by researchers, proper
reporting channels are often lacking. As a result, vulnerabilities reporting channels are often lacking. As a result, vulnerabilities
may be left unreported. This document defines a machine-parsable may be left unreported. This document defines a machine-parsable
format ("security.txt") to help organizations describe their format ("security.txt") to help organizations describe their
vulnerability disclosure practices to make it easier for researchers vulnerability disclosure practices to make it easier for researchers
to report vulnerabilities. to report vulnerabilities.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. published for informational purposes.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 November 2021. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9116.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights publication of this document. Please review these documents
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extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation, Prior Work and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Motivation, Prior Work, and Scope
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Terminology
2. Note to Readers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. The Specification
3. The Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Comments
3.1. Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Line Separator
3.2. Line Separator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. Digital Signature
3.3. Digital signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.4. Extensibility
3.4. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5. Field Definitions
3.5. Field Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5.1. Acknowledgments
3.5.1. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5.2. Canonical
3.5.2. Canonical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.5.3. Contact
3.5.3. Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.5.4. Encryption
3.5.4. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.5.5. Expires
3.5.5. Expires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.5.6. Hiring
3.5.6. Hiring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.5.7. Policy
3.5.7. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.5.8. Preferred-Languages
3.5.8. Preferred-Languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.6. Example of an Unsigned "security.txt" File
3.6. Example of an unsigned "security.txt" file . . . . . . . 10 2.7. Example of a Signed "security.txt" File
3.7. Example of a signed "security.txt" file . . . . . . . . . 10 3. Location of the security.txt File
4. Location of the security.txt file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.1. Scope of the File
4.1. Scope of the File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. File Format Description and ABNF Grammar
5. File Format Description and ABNF Grammar . . . . . . . . . . 12 5. Security Considerations
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.1. Compromised Files and Incident Response
6.1. Compromised Files and Incident Response . . . . . . . . . 14 5.2. Redirects
6.2. Redirects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.3. Incorrect or Stale Information
6.3. Incorrect or Stale Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.4. Intentionally Malformed Files, Resources, and Reports
6.4. Intentionally Malformed Files, Resources and Reports . . 15 5.5. No Implied Permission for Testing
6.5. No Implied Permission for Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.6. Multi-User Environments
6.6. Multi-user Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.7. Protecting Data in Transit
6.7. Protecting Data in Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.8. Spam and Spurious Reports
6.8. Spam and Spurious Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6. IANA Considerations
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.1. Well-Known URIs Registry
7.1. Well-Known URIs registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.2. Registry for security.txt Fields
7.2. Registry for security.txt Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7. References
8. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7.1. Normative References
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7.2. Informative References
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Acknowledgments
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Authors' Addresses
Appendix A. Note to Readers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B.1. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B.2. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B.3. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B.4. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
B.5. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
B.6. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
B.7. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
B.8. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
B.9. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-08 . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B.10. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-09 . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B.11. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B.12. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation, Prior Work and Scope 1.1. Motivation, Prior Work, and Scope
Many security researchers encounter situations where they are unable Many security researchers encounter situations where they are unable
to report security vulnerabilities to organizations because there are to report security vulnerabilities to organizations because there are
no reporting channels to contact the owner of a particular resource no reporting channels to contact the owner of a particular resource,
and no information available about the vulnerability disclosure and no information is available about the vulnerability disclosure
practices of such owner. practices of such owner.
As per section 4 of [RFC2142], there is an existing convention of As per Section 4 of [RFC2142], there is an existing convention of
using the <SECURITY@domain> email address for communications using the <SECURITY@domain> email address for communications
regarding security issues. That convention provides only a single, regarding security issues. That convention provides only a single,
email-based channel of communication per domain, and does not provide email-based channel of communication per domain and does not provide
a way for domain owners to publish information about their security a way for domain owners to publish information about their security
disclosure practices. disclosure practices.
There are also contact conventions prescribed for Internet Service There are also contact conventions prescribed for Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) in section 2 of [RFC3013], for Computer Security Providers (ISPs) in Section 2 of [RFC3013], for Computer Security
Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) in section 3.2 of [RFC2350] and for Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) in Section 3.2 of [RFC2350], and for
site operators in section 5.2 of [RFC2196]. As per [RFC7485], there site operators in Section 5.2 of [RFC2196]. As per [RFC7485], there
is also contact information provided by Regional Internet Registries is also contact information provided by Regional Internet Registries
(RIRs) and domain registries for owners of IP addresses, autonomous (RIRs) and domain registries for owners of IP addresses, Autonomous
system numbers (ASNs), and domain names. However, none of these System Numbers (ASNs), and domain names. However, none of these
tackle the issue of how security researchers can locate contact tackle the issue of how security researchers can locate contact
information and vulnerability disclosure practices for organizations information and vulnerability disclosure practices for organizations
in order to report vulnerabilities. in order to report vulnerabilities.
In this document, we define a richer, machine-parsable and more In this document, we define a richer, machine-parsable, and more
extensible way for organizations to communicate information about extensible way for organizations to communicate information about
their security disclosure practices and ways to contact them. Other their security disclosure practices and ways to contact them. Other
details of vulnerability disclosure are outside the scope of this details of vulnerability disclosure are outside the scope of this
document. Readers are encouraged to consult other documents such as document. Readers are encouraged to consult other documents such as
[ISO.29147.2018] or [CERT.CVD]. [ISO.29147.2018] or [CERT.CVD].
As per [CERT.CVD], "vulnerability response" refers to reports of As per [CERT.CVD], "vulnerability response" refers to reports of
product vulnerabilities which is related but distinct from reports of product vulnerabilities, which is related to but distinct from
network intrusions and compromised websites ("incident response"). reports of network intrusions and compromised websites ("incident
The mechanism defined in this document is intended to be used for the response"). The mechanism defined in this document is intended to be
former ("vulnerability response"). If implementors want to utilize used for the former ("vulnerability response"). If implementors want
this mechanism for incident response, they should be aware of to utilize this mechanism for incident response, they should be aware
additional security considerations discussed in Section 6.1. of additional security considerations discussed in Section 5.1.
The "security.txt" file is intended to be complementary and not as a The "security.txt" file is intended to be complementary and not a
substitute or replacement for other public resources maintained by substitute or replacement for other public resources maintained by
organizations regarding their security disclosure practices. organizations regarding their security disclosure practices.
1.2. Terminology 1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
The term "researcher" corresponds to the terms "finder" and The term "researcher" corresponds to the terms "finder" and
"reporter" in [ISO.29147.2018] and [CERT.CVD]. The term "reporter" in [ISO.29147.2018] and [CERT.CVD]. The term
"organization" corresponds to the term "vendor" in [ISO.29147.2018] "organization" corresponds to the term "vendor" in [ISO.29147.2018]
and [CERT.CVD]. and [CERT.CVD].
The term "implementors" includes all parties involved in the The term "implementors" includes all parties involved in the
vulnerability disclosure process. vulnerability disclosure process.
2. Note to Readers 2. The Specification
*Note to the RFC Editor:* Please remove this section prior to
publication.
Development of this draft takes place on Github at:
https://github.com/securitytxt/security-txt
3. The Specification
This document defines a text file to be placed in a known location This document defines a text file to be placed in a known location
that provides information about vulnerability disclosure practices of that provides information about vulnerability disclosure practices of
a particular organization. The format of this file is machine- a particular organization. The format of this file is machine
parsable and MUST follow the ABNF grammar defined in Section 5. This parsable and MUST follow the ABNF grammar defined in Section 4. This
file is intended to help security researchers when disclosing file is intended to help security researchers when disclosing
security vulnerabilities. security vulnerabilities.
By convention, the file is named "security.txt". Location and scope By convention, the file is named "security.txt". The location and
are described in Section 4. scope are described in Section 3.
This text file contains multiple fields with different values. A This text file contains multiple fields with different values. A
field contains a "name" which is the first part of a field all the field contains a "name", which is the first part of a field all the
way up to the colon (for example: "Contact:") and follows the syntax way up to the colon (for example: "Contact:") and follows the syntax
defined for "field-name" in section 3.6.8 of [RFC5322]. Field names defined for "field-name" in Section 3.6.8 of [RFC5322]. Field names
are case-insensitive (as per section 2.3 of [RFC5234]). The "value" are case insensitive (as per Section 2.3 of [RFC5234]). The "value"
comes after the field name (for example: comes after the field name (for example:
"mailto:security@example.com") and follows the syntax defined for "mailto:security@example.com") and follows the syntax defined for
"unstructured" in section 3.2.5 of [RFC5322]. The file MAY also "unstructured" in Section 3.2.5 of [RFC5322]. The file MAY also
contain blank lines. contain blank lines.
A field MUST always consist of a name and a value (for example: A field MUST always consist of a name and a value (for example:
"Contact: mailto:security@example.com"). A "security.txt" file can "Contact: mailto:security@example.com"). A "security.txt" file can
have an unlimited number of fields. Each field MUST appear on its have an unlimited number of fields. Each field MUST appear on its
own line. Unless specified otherwise by the field definition, own line. Unless otherwise specified by the field definition,
multiple values MUST NOT be chained together for a single field. multiple values MUST NOT be chained together for a single field.
Unless otherwise indicated in a definition of a particular field, a Unless otherwise indicated in a definition of a particular field, a
field MAY appear multiple times. field MAY appear multiple times.
Implementors should be aware that some of the fields may contain URIs Implementors should be aware that some of the fields may contain URIs
using percent-encoding (as per section 2.1 of [RFC3986]). using percent-encoding (as per Section 2.1 of [RFC3986]).
3.1. Comments 2.1. Comments
Any line beginning with the "#" (%x23) symbol MUST be interpreted as Any line beginning with the "#" (%x23) symbol MUST be interpreted as
a comment. The content of the comment may contain any ASCII or a comment. The content of the comment may contain any ASCII or
Unicode characters in the %x21-7E and %x80-FFFFF ranges plus the tab Unicode characters in the %x21-7E and %x80-FFFFF ranges plus the tab
(%x09) and space (%x20) characters. (%x09) and space (%x20) characters.
Example: Example:
# This is a comment. # This is a comment.
3.2. Line Separator 2.2. Line Separator
Every line MUST end either with a carriage return and line feed Every line MUST end with either a carriage return and line feed
characters (CRLF / %x0D %x0A) or just a line feed character (LF / characters (CRLF / %x0D %x0A) or just a line feed character (LF /
%x0A). %x0A).
3.3. Digital signature 2.3. Digital Signature
It is RECOMMENDED that a "security.txt" file be digitally signed It is RECOMMENDED that a "security.txt" file be digitally signed
using an OpenPGP cleartext signature as described in section 7 of using an OpenPGP cleartext signature as described in Section 7 of
[RFC4880]. When digital signatures are used, it is also RECOMMENDED [RFC4880]. When digital signatures are used, it is also RECOMMENDED
that organizations use the "Canonical" field (as per Section 3.5.2), that organizations use the "Canonical" field (as per Section 2.5.2),
thus allowing the digital signature to authenticate the location of thus allowing the digital signature to authenticate the location of
the file. the file.
When it comes to verifying the key used to generate the signature, it When it comes to verifying the key used to generate the signature, it
is always the security researcher's responsibility to make sure the is always the security researcher's responsibility to make sure the
key being used is indeed one they trust. key being used is indeed one they trust.
3.4. Extensibility 2.4. Extensibility
Like many other formats and protocols, this format may need to be Like many other formats and protocols, this format may need to be
extended over time to fit the ever-changing landscape of the changed over time to fit the ever-changing landscape of the Internet.
Internet. Therefore, extensibility is provided via an IANA registry Therefore, extensibility is provided via an IANA registry for fields
for fields as defined in Section 7.2. Any fields registered via that as defined in Section 6.2. Any fields registered via that process
process MUST be considered optional. To encourage extensibility and MUST be considered optional. To encourage extensibility and
interoperability, researchers MUST ignore any fields they do not interoperability, researchers MUST ignore any fields they do not
explicitly support. explicitly support.
In general, implementors should "be conservative in what you do, be In general, implementors should "be conservative in what you do, be
liberal in what you accept from others" (as per [RFC0793]). liberal in what you accept from others" (as per [RFC0793]).
3.5. Field Definitions 2.5. Field Definitions
Unless otherwise stated, all fields MUST be considered optional. Unless otherwise stated, all fields MUST be considered optional.
3.5.1. Acknowledgments 2.5.1. Acknowledgments
This field indicates a link to a page where security researchers are The "Acknowledgments" field indicates a link to a page where security
recognized for their reports. The page being referenced should list researchers are recognized for their reports. The page being
security researchers that reported security vulnerabilities and referenced should list security researchers that reported security
collaborated to remediate them. Organizations should be careful to vulnerabilities and collaborated to remediate them. Organizations
limit the vulnerability information being published in order to should be careful to limit the vulnerability information being
prevent future attacks. published in order to prevent future attacks.
If this field indicates a web URI, then it MUST begin with "https://" If this field indicates a web URI, then it MUST begin with "https://"
(as per section 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]). (as per Section 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]).
Example: Example:
Acknowledgments: https://example.com/hall-of-fame.html Acknowledgments: https://example.com/hall-of-fame.html
Example security acknowledgments page: Example security acknowledgments page:
We would like to thank the following researchers: We would like to thank the following researchers:
(2017-04-15) Frank Denis - Reflected cross-site scripting (2017-04-15) Frank Denis - Reflected cross-site scripting
(2017-01-02) Alice Quinn - SQL injection (2017-01-02) Alice Quinn - SQL injection
(2016-12-24) John Buchner - Stored cross-site scripting (2016-12-24) John Buchner - Stored cross-site scripting
(2016-06-10) Anna Richmond - A server configuration issue (2016-06-10) Anna Richmond - A server configuration issue
3.5.2. Canonical 2.5.2. Canonical
This field indicates the canonical URIs where the "security.txt" file The "Canonical" field indicates the canonical URIs where the
is located, which is usually something like "security.txt" file is located, which is usually something like
"https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt". If this field "https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt". If this field
indicates a web URI, then it MUST begin with "https://" (as per indicates a web URI, then it MUST begin with "https://" (as per
section 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]). Section 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]).
While this field indicates that a "security.txt" retrieved from a While this field indicates that a "security.txt" retrieved from a
given URI is intended to apply to that URI, it MUST NOT be given URI is intended to apply to that URI, it MUST NOT be
interpreted to apply to all canonical URIs listed within the file. interpreted to apply to all canonical URIs listed within the file.
Researchers SHOULD use an additional trust mechanism such as a Researchers SHOULD use an additional trust mechanism such as a
digital signature (as per Section 3.3) to make the determination that digital signature (as per Section 2.3) to make the determination that
a particular canonical URI is applicable. a particular canonical URI is applicable.
If this field appears within a "security.txt" file, and the URI used If this field appears within a "security.txt" file and the URI used
to retrieve that file is not listed within any canonical fields, then to retrieve that file is not listed within any canonical fields, then
the contents of the file SHOULD NOT be trusted. the contents of the file SHOULD NOT be trusted.
Canonical: https://www.example.com/.well-known/security.txt Canonical: https://www.example.com/.well-known/security.txt
Canonical: https://someserver.example.com/.well-known/security.txt Canonical: https://someserver.example.com/.well-known/security.txt
3.5.3. Contact 2.5.3. Contact
This field indicates an address that researchers should use for The "Contact" field indicates a method that researchers should use
reporting security vulnerabilities such as an email address, a phone for reporting security vulnerabilities such as an email address, a
number and/or a web page with contact information. The "Contact" phone number, and/or a web page with contact information. This field
field MUST always be present in a "security.txt" file. If this field MUST always be present in a "security.txt" file. If this field
indicates a web URI, then it MUST begin with "https://" (as per indicates a web URI, then it MUST begin with "https://" (as per
section 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]). Security email addresses should use the Section 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]). Security email addresses should use the
conventions defined in section 4 of [RFC2142]. conventions defined in Section 4 of [RFC2142].
The value MUST follow the URI syntax described in section 3 of The value MUST follow the URI syntax described in Section 3 of
[RFC3986]. This means that "mailto" and "tel" URI schemes must be [RFC3986]. This means that "mailto" and "tel" URI schemes must be
used when specifying email addresses and telephone numbers, as used when specifying email addresses and telephone numbers, as
defined in [RFC6068] and [RFC3966]. When the value of this field is defined in [RFC6068] and [RFC3966]. When the value of this field is
an email address, it is RECOMMENDED that encryption be used (as per an email address, it is RECOMMENDED that encryption be used (as per
Section 3.5.4). Section 2.5.4).
The precedence SHOULD be in listed order. The first occurrence is These SHOULD be listed in order of preference, with the first
the preferred method of contact. In the example below, the first occurrence being the preferred method of contact, the second
email address ("security@example.com") is the preferred method of occurrence being the second most preferred method of contact, etc.
contact. In the example below, the first email address
("security@example.com") is the preferred method of contact.
Contact: mailto:security@example.com Contact: mailto:security@example.com
Contact: mailto:security%2Buri%2Bencoded@example.com Contact: mailto:security%2Buri%2Bencoded@example.com
Contact: tel:+1-201-555-0123 Contact: tel:+1-201-555-0123
Contact: https://example.com/security-contact.html Contact: https://example.com/security-contact.html
3.5.4. Encryption 2.5.4. Encryption
This field indicates an encryption key that security researchers The "Encryption" field indicates an encryption key that security
should use for encrypted communication. Keys MUST NOT appear in this researchers should use for encrypted communication. Keys MUST NOT
field - instead the value of this field MUST be a URI pointing to a appear in this field. Instead, the value of this field MUST be a URI
location where the key can be retrieved. If this field indicates a pointing to a location where the key can be retrieved. If this field
web URI, then it MUST begin with "https://" (as per section 2.7.2 of indicates a web URI, then it MUST begin with "https://" (as per
[RFC7230]). Section 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]).
When it comes to verifying the authenticity of the key, it is always When it comes to verifying the authenticity of the key, it is always
the security researcher's responsibility to make sure the key being the security researcher's responsibility to make sure the key being
specified is indeed one they trust. Researchers must not assume that specified is indeed one they trust. Researchers must not assume that
this key is used to generate the digital signature referenced in this key is used to generate the digital signature referenced in
Section 3.3. Section 2.3.
Example of an OpenPGP key available from a web server: Example of an OpenPGP key available from a web server:
Encryption: https://example.com/pgp-key.txt Encryption: https://example.com/pgp-key.txt
Example of an OpenPGP key available from an OPENPGPKEY DNS record: Example of an OpenPGP key available from an OPENPGPKEY DNS record:
Encryption: dns:5d2d37ab76d47d36._openpgpkey.example.com?type=OPENPGPKEY Encryption: dns:5d2d37ab76d47d36._openpgpkey.example.com?type=OPENPGPKEY
Example of an OpenPGP key being referenced by its fingerprint: Example of an OpenPGP key being referenced by its fingerprint:
Encryption: openpgp4fpr:5f2de5521c63a801ab59ccb603d49de44b29100f Encryption: openpgp4fpr:5f2de5521c63a801ab59ccb603d49de44b29100f
3.5.5. Expires 2.5.5. Expires
This field indicates the date and time after which the data contained The "Expires" field indicates the date and time after which the data
in the "security.txt" file is considered stale and should not be used contained in the "security.txt" file is considered stale and should
(as per Section 6.3). The value of this field is formatted according not be used (as per Section 5.3). The value of this field is
to the Internet profile of [ISO.8601] as defined in [RFC3339]. It is formatted according to the Internet profiles of [ISO.8601-1] and
RECOMMENDED that the value of this field be less than a year into the [ISO.8601-2] as defined in [RFC3339]. It is RECOMMENDED that the
future to avoid staleness. value of this field be less than a year into the future to avoid
staleness.
This field MUST always be present and MUST NOT appear more than once. This field MUST always be present and MUST NOT appear more than once.
Expires: 2021-12-31T18:37:07z Expires: 2021-12-31T18:37:07z
3.5.6. Hiring 2.5.6. Hiring
The "Hiring" field is used for linking to the vendor's security- The "Hiring" field is used for linking to the vendor's security-
related job positions. If this field indicates a web URI, then it related job positions. If this field indicates a web URI, then it
MUST begin with "https://" (as per section 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]). MUST begin with "https://" (as per Section 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]).
Hiring: https://example.com/jobs.html Hiring: https://example.com/jobs.html
3.5.7. Policy 2.5.7. Policy
This field indicates a link to where the vulnerability disclosure The "Policy" field indicates a link to where the vulnerability
policy is located. This can help security researchers understand the disclosure policy is located. This can help security researchers
organization's vulnerability reporting practices. If this field understand the organization's vulnerability reporting practices. If
indicates a web URI, then it MUST begin with "https://" (as per this field indicates a web URI, then it MUST begin with "https://"
section 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]). (as per Section 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]).
Example: Example:
Policy: https://example.com/disclosure-policy.html Policy: https://example.com/disclosure-policy.html
3.5.8. Preferred-Languages 2.5.8. Preferred-Languages
This field can be used to indicate a set of natural languages that The "Preferred-Languages" field can be used to indicate a set of
are preferred when submitting security reports. This set MAY list natural languages that are preferred when submitting security
multiple values, separated by commas. If this field is included then reports. This set MAY list multiple values, separated by commas. If
at least one value MUST be listed. The values within this set are this field is included, then at least one value MUST be listed. The
language tags (as defined in [RFC5646]). If this field is absent, values within this set are language tags (as defined in [RFC5646]).
security researchers may assume that English is the language to be If this field is absent, security researchers may assume that English
used (as per section 4.5 of [RFC2277]). is the language to be used (as per Section 4.5 of [RFC2277]).
The order in which they appear is not an indication of priority; the The order in which they appear is not an indication of priority; the
listed languages are intended to have equal priority. listed languages are intended to have equal priority.
This field MUST NOT appear more than once. This field MUST NOT appear more than once.
Example (English, Spanish and French): Example (English, Spanish and French):
Preferred-Languages: en, es, fr Preferred-Languages: en, es, fr
3.6. Example of an unsigned "security.txt" file 2.6. Example of an Unsigned "security.txt" File
# Our security address # Our security address
Contact: mailto:security@example.com Contact: mailto:security@example.com
# Our OpenPGP key # Our OpenPGP key
Encryption: https://example.com/pgp-key.txt Encryption: https://example.com/pgp-key.txt
# Our security policy # Our security policy
Policy: https://example.com/security-policy.html Policy: https://example.com/security-policy.html
# Our security acknowledgments page # Our security acknowledgments page
Acknowledgments: https://example.com/hall-of-fame.html Acknowledgments: https://example.com/hall-of-fame.html
Expires: 2021-12-31T18:37:07z Expires: 2021-12-31T18:37:07z
3.7. Example of a signed "security.txt" file 2.7. Example of a Signed "security.txt" File
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256 Hash: SHA256
# Canonical URI # Canonical URI
Canonical: https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt Canonical: https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt
# Our security address # Our security address
Contact: mailto:security@example.com Contact: mailto:security@example.com
skipping to change at page 11, line 5 skipping to change at line 433
# Our security acknowledgments page # Our security acknowledgments page
Acknowledgments: https://example.com/hall-of-fame.html Acknowledgments: https://example.com/hall-of-fame.html
Expires: 2021-12-31T18:37:07z Expires: 2021-12-31T18:37:07z
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.2 Version: GnuPG v2.2
[signature] [signature]
-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
4. Location of the security.txt file 3. Location of the security.txt File
For web-based services, organizations MUST place the "security.txt" For web-based services, organizations MUST place the "security.txt"
file under the "/.well-known/" path; e.g. https://example.com/.well- file under the "/.well-known/" path, e.g., https://example.com/.well-
known/security.txt as per [RFC8615] of a domain name or IP address. known/security.txt as per [RFC8615] of a domain name or IP address.
For legacy compatibility, a security.txt file might be placed at the For legacy compatibility, a "security.txt" file might be placed at
top-level path or redirect (as per section 6.4 of [RFC7231]) to the the top-level path or redirect (as per Section 6.4 of [RFC7231]) to
"security.txt" file under the "/.well-known/" path. If a the "security.txt" file under the "/.well-known/" path. If a
"security.txt" file is present in both locations, the one in the "security.txt" file is present in both locations, the one in the
"/.well-known/" path MUST be used. "/.well-known/" path MUST be used.
The file MUST be accessed via HTTP 1.0 or a higher version and the The file MUST be accessed via HTTP 1.0 or a higher version, and the
file access MUST use "https" scheme (as per section 2.7.2 of file access MUST use the "https" scheme (as per Section 2.7.2 of
[RFC7230]). It MUST have a Content-Type of "text/plain" with the [RFC7230]). It MUST have a Content-Type of "text/plain" with the
default charset parameter set to "utf-8" (as per section 4.1.3 of default charset parameter set to "utf-8" (as per Section 4.1.3 of
[RFC2046]). [RFC2046]).
Retrieval of "security.txt" files and resources indicated within such Retrieval of "security.txt" files and resources indicated within such
files may result in a redirect (as per section 6.4 of [RFC7231]). files may result in a redirect (as per Section 6.4 of [RFC7231]).
Researchers should perform additional analysis (as per Section 6.2) Researchers should perform additional analysis (as per Section 5.2)
to make sure these redirects are not malicious or pointing to to make sure these redirects are not malicious or pointing to
resources controlled by an attacker. resources controlled by an attacker.
4.1. Scope of the File 3.1. Scope of the File
A "security.txt" file MUST only apply to the domain or IP address in A "security.txt" file MUST only apply to the domain or IP address in
the URI used to retrieve it, not to any of its subdomains or parent the URI used to retrieve it, not to any of its subdomains or parent
domains. A "security.txt" file MAY also apply to products and domains. A "security.txt" file MAY also apply to products and
services provided by the organization publishing the file. services provided by the organization publishing the file.
As per Section 1.1, this specification is intended for vulnerability As per Section 1.1, this specification is intended for a
response. If implementors want to use this for incident response, vulnerability response. If implementors want to use this for an
they should be aware of additional security considerations discussed incident response, they should be aware of additional security
in Section 6.1. considerations discussed in Section 5.1.
Organizations SHOULD use the policy directive (as per Section 3.5.7) Organizations SHOULD use the policy directive (as per Section 2.5.7)
to provide additional details regarding scope and details of their to provide additional details regarding the scope and details of
vulnerability disclosure process. their vulnerability disclosure process.
Some examples appear below: Some examples appear below:
# The following only applies to example.com. # The following only applies to example.com.
https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt
# This only applies to subdomain.example.com. # This only applies to subdomain.example.com.
https://subdomain.example.com/.well-known/security.txt https://subdomain.example.com/.well-known/security.txt
# This security.txt file applies to IPv4 address of 192.0.2.0. # This security.txt file applies to IPv4 address of 192.0.2.0.
https://192.0.2.0/.well-known/security.txt https://192.0.2.0/.well-known/security.txt
# This security.txt file applies to IPv6 address of 2001:db8:8:4::2. # This security.txt file applies to IPv6 address of 2001:db8:8:4::2.
https://[2001:db8:8:4::2]/.well-known/security.txt https://[2001:db8:8:4::2]/.well-known/security.txt
5. File Format Description and ABNF Grammar 4. File Format Description and ABNF Grammar
The file format of the "security.txt" file MUST be plain text (MIME The file format of the "security.txt" file MUST be plain text (MIME
type "text/plain") as defined in section 4.1.3 of [RFC2046] and MUST type "text/plain") as defined in Section 4.1.3 of [RFC2046] and MUST
be encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629] in Net-Unicode form [RFC5198]. be encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629] in Net-Unicode form [RFC5198].
The format of this file MUST follow the ABNF definition below (using The format of this file MUST follow the ABNF definition below (which
the conventions defined in [RFC5234]). incorporates the core ABNF rules from [RFC5234] and uses the case-
sensitive string support from [RFC7405]).
body = signed / unsigned
signed = sign-header unsigned sign-footer
sign-header = < headers and line from section 7 of [RFC4880] >
sign-footer = < OpenPGP signature from section 7 of [RFC4880] > body = signed / unsigned
unsigned = *line (contact-field eol) ; one or more required unsigned = *line (contact-field eol) ; one or more required
*line (expires-field eol) ; exactly one required *line (expires-field eol) ; exactly one required
*line [lang-field eol] *line ; exactly one optional *line [lang-field eol] *line ; exactly one optional
; order of fields within the file is not important ; order of fields within the file is not important
; except that if contact-field appears more ; except that if contact-field appears more
; than once the order of those indicates ; than once, the order of those indicates
; priority (see Section 3.5.3) ; priority (see Section 3.5.3)
line = [ (field / comment) ] eol ; signed is the production that should match the OpenPGP clearsigned
; document
signed = cleartext-header
1*(hash-header)
CRLF
cleartext
signature
eol = *WSP [CR] LF cleartext-header = %s"-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" CRLF
field = ; optional fields hash-header = %s"Hash: " hash-alg *("," hash-alg) CRLF
ack-field /
can-field /
contact-field / ; optional repeated instances
encryption-field /
hiring-field /
policy-field /
ext-field
fs = ":" hash-alg = token
; imported from RFC 2045; see RFC 4880 Section
; 10.3.3 for a pointer to the registry of
; valid values
comment = "#" *(WSP / VCHAR / %x80-FFFFF) ;cleartext = 1*( UTF8-octets [CR] LF)
; dash-escaped per RFC 4880 Section 7.1
ack-field = "Acknowledgments" fs SP uri cleartext = *((line-dash / line-from / line-nodash) [CR] LF)
can-field = "Canonical" fs SP uri line-dash = ("- ") "-" *UTF8-char-not-cr
; MUST include initial "- "
contact-field = "Contact" fs SP uri line-from = ["- "] "From " *UTF8-char-not-cr
; SHOULD include initial "- "
expires-field = "Expires" fs SP date-time line-nodash = ["- "] *UTF8-char-not-cr
; MAY include initial "- "
encryption-field = "Encryption" fs SP uri UTF8-char-not-dash = UTF8-1-not-dash / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4
UTF8-1-not-dash = %x00-2C / %x2E-7F
UTF8-char-not-cr = UTF8-1-not-cr / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4
UTF8-1-not-cr = %x00-0C / %x0E-7F
hiring-field = "Hiring" fs SP uri ; UTF8 rules from RFC 3629
UTF8-octets = *( UTF8-char )
UTF8-char = UTF8-1 / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4
UTF8-1 = %x00-7F
UTF8-2 = %xC2-DF UTF8-tail
UTF8-3 = %xE0 %xA0-BF UTF8-tail / %xE1-EC 2( UTF8-tail ) /
%xED %x80-9F UTF8-tail / %xEE-EF 2( UTF8-tail )
UTF8-4 = %xF0 %x90-BF 2( UTF8-tail ) /
%xF1-F3 3( UTF8-tail ) /
%xF4 %x80-8F 2( UTF8-tail )
UTF8-tail = %x80-BF
lang-field = "Preferred-Languages" fs SP lang-values signature = armor-header
armor-keys
CRLF
signature-data
armor-tail
policy-field = "Policy" fs SP uri armor-header = %s"-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----" CRLF
date-time = < imported from section 5.6 of [RFC3339] > armor-keys = *(token ": " *( VCHAR / WSP ) CRLF)
; Armor Header Keys from RFC 4880
lang-tag = < Language-Tag from section 2.1 of [RFC5646] > armor-tail = %s"-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----" CRLF
lang-values = lang-tag *(*WSP "," *WSP lang-tag) signature-data = 1*(1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "=" / "+" / "/") CRLF)
; base64; see RFC 4648
; includes RFC 4880 checksum
uri = < URI as per section 3 of [RFC3986] > line = [ (field / comment) ] eol
ext-field = field-name fs SP unstructured eol = *WSP [CR] LF
field-name = < imported from section 3.6.8 of [RFC5322] > field = ; optional fields
ack-field /
can-field /
contact-field / ; optional repeated instances
encryption-field /
hiring-field /
policy-field /
ext-field
unstructured = < imported from section 3.2.5 of [RFC5322] > fs = ":"
comment = "#" *(WSP / VCHAR / %x80-FFFFF)
ack-field = "Acknowledgments" fs SP uri
can-field = "Canonical" fs SP uri
contact-field = "Contact" fs SP uri
expires-field = "Expires" fs SP date-time
encryption-field = "Encryption" fs SP uri
hiring-field = "Hiring" fs SP uri
lang-field = "Preferred-Languages" fs SP lang-values
policy-field = "Policy" fs SP uri
date-time = < imported from Section 5.6 of [RFC3339] >
lang-tag = < Language-Tag from Section 2.1 of [RFC5646] >
lang-values = lang-tag *(*WSP "," *WSP lang-tag)
uri = < URI as per Section 3 of [RFC3986] >
ext-field = field-name fs SP unstructured
field-name = < imported from Section 3.6.8 of [RFC5322] >
unstructured = < imported from Section 3.2.5 of [RFC5322] >
token = < imported from Section 5.1 of [RFC2045] >
ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; A-Z / a-z
BIT = "0" / "1"
CHAR = %x01-7F
; any 7-bit US-ASCII character,
; excluding NUL
CR = %x0D
; carriage return
CRLF = CR LF
; Internet standard newline
CTL = %x00-1F / %x7F
; controls
DIGIT = %x30-39
; 0-9
DQUOTE = %x22
; " (Double Quote)
HEXDIG = DIGIT / "A" / "B" / "C" / "D" / "E" / "F"
HTAB = %x09
; horizontal tab
LF = %x0A
; linefeed
LWSP = *(WSP / CRLF WSP)
; Use of this linear-white-space rule
; permits lines containing only white
; space that are no longer legal in
; mail headers and have caused
; interoperability problems in other
; contexts.
; Do not use when defining mail
; headers and use with caution in
; other contexts.
OCTET = %x00-FF
; 8 bits of data
SP = %x20
VCHAR = %x21-7E
; visible (printing) characters
WSP = SP / HTAB
; white space
"ext-field" refers to extension fields, which are discussed in "ext-field" refers to extension fields, which are discussed in
Section 3.4 Section 2.4.
6. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
Because of the use of URIs and well-known resources, security Because of the use of URIs and well-known resources, security
considerations of [RFC3986] and [RFC8615] apply here, in addition to considerations of [RFC3986] and [RFC8615] apply here, in addition to
the considerations outlined below. the considerations outlined below.
6.1. Compromised Files and Incident Response 5.1. Compromised Files and Incident Response
An attacker that has compromised a website is able to compromise the An attacker that has compromised a website is able to compromise the
"security.txt" file as well or setup a redirect to their own site. "security.txt" file as well or set up a redirect to their own site.
This can result in security reports not being received by the This can result in security reports not being received by the
organization or sent to the attacker. organization or being sent to the attacker.
To protect against this, organizations should use the "Canonical" To protect against this, organizations should use the "Canonical"
field to indicate the locations of the file (as per Section 3.5.2), field to indicate the locations of the file (as per Section 2.5.2),
digitally sign their "security.txt" files (as per Section 3.3), and digitally sign their "security.txt" files (as per Section 2.3), and
regularly monitor the file and the referenced resources to detect regularly monitor the file and the referenced resources to detect
tampering. tampering.
Security researchers should validate the "security.txt" file Security researchers should validate the "security.txt" file,
including verifying the digital signature and checking any available including verifying the digital signature and checking any available
historical records before using the information contained in the historical records before using the information contained in the
file. If the "security.txt" file looks suspicious or compromised, it file. If the "security.txt" file looks suspicious or compromised, it
should not be used. should not be used.
While it is not recommended, implementors may choose to use the While it is not recommended, implementors may choose to use the
information published within a "security.txt" file for incident information published within a "security.txt" file for an incident
response. In such cases, extreme caution should be taken before response. In such cases, extreme caution should be taken before
trusting such information, since it may have been compromised by an trusting such information, since it may have been compromised by an
attacker. Researchers should use additional methods to verify such attacker. Researchers should use additional methods to verify such
data including out of band verification of the PGP signature, DNSSEC- data including out-of-band verification of the Pretty Good Privacy
based approaches, etc. (PGP) signature, DNSSEC-based approaches, etc.
6.2. Redirects 5.2. Redirects
When retrieving the file and any resources referenced in the file, When retrieving the file and any resources referenced in the file,
researchers should record any redirects since they can lead to a researchers should record any redirects since they can lead to a
different domain or IP address controlled by an attacker. Further different domain or IP address controlled by an attacker. Further
inspections of such redirects is recommended before using the inspection of such redirects is recommended before using the
information contained within the file. information contained within the file.
6.3. Incorrect or Stale Information 5.3. Incorrect or Stale Information
If information and resources referenced in a "security.txt" file are If information and resources referenced in a "security.txt" file are
incorrect or not kept up to date, this can result in security reports incorrect or not kept up to date, this can result in security reports
not being received by the organization or sent to incorrect contacts, not being received by the organization or sent to incorrect contacts,
thus exposing possible security issues to third parties. Not having thus exposing possible security issues to third parties. Not having
a "security.txt" file may be preferable to having stale information a "security.txt" file may be preferable to having stale information
in this file. Organizations must use the "Expires" field (see in this file. Organizations must use the "Expires" field (see
Section 3.5.5) to indicate to researchers when the data in the file Section 2.5.5) to indicate to researchers when the data in the file
is no longer valid. is no longer valid.
Organizations should ensure that information in this file and any Organizations should ensure that information in this file and any
referenced resources such as web pages, email addresses, and referenced resources such as web pages, email addresses, and
telephone numbers are kept current, are accessible, controlled by the telephone numbers are kept current, are accessible, are controlled by
organization, and are kept secure. the organization, and are kept secure.
6.4. Intentionally Malformed Files, Resources and Reports 5.4. Intentionally Malformed Files, Resources, and Reports
It is possible for compromised or malicious sites to create files It is possible for compromised or malicious sites to create files
that are extraordinarily large or otherwise malformed in an attempt that are extraordinarily large or otherwise malformed in an attempt
to discover or exploit weaknesses in parsing code. Researchers to discover or exploit weaknesses in the parsing code. Researchers
should make sure that any such code is robust against large or should make sure that any such code is robust against large or
malformed files and fields, and may choose not to parse files larger malformed files and fields, and they may choose to have the code not
than 32 KBs, having fields longer than 2,048 characters or containing parse files larger than 32 KBs, those with fields longer than 2,048
more than 1,000 lines. The ABNF grammar (as defined in Section 5) characters, or those containing more than 1,000 lines. The ABNF
can also be used as a way to verify these files. grammar (as defined in Section 4) can also be used as a way to verify
these files.
The same concerns apply to any other resources referenced within The same concerns apply to any other resources referenced within
"security.txt" files, as well as any security reports received as a "security.txt" files, as well as any security reports received as a
result of publishing this file. Such resources and reports may be result of publishing this file. Such resources and reports may be
hostile, malformed or malicious. hostile, malformed, or malicious.
6.5. No Implied Permission for Testing 5.5. No Implied Permission for Testing
The presence of a "security.txt" file might be interpreted by The presence of a "security.txt" file might be interpreted by
researchers as providing permission to do security testing against researchers as providing permission to do security testing against
the domain or IP address where it is published, or products and the domain or IP address where it is published or against products
services provided by the organization publishing the file. This and services provided by the organization publishing the file. This
might result in increased testing against an organization by might result in increased testing against an organization by
researchers. On the other hand, a decision not to publish a researchers. On the other hand, a decision not to publish a
"security.txt" file might be interpreted by the organization "security.txt" file might be interpreted by the organization
operating that website to be a way to signal to researchers that operating that website to be a way to signal to researchers that
permission to test that particular site or project is denied. This permission to test that particular site or project is denied. This
might result in pushback against researchers reporting security might result in pushback against researchers reporting security
issues to that organization. issues to that organization.
Therefore, researchers shouldn't assume that presence or absence of a Therefore, researchers shouldn't assume that the presence or absence
"security.txt" file grants or denies permission for security testing. of a "security.txt" file grants or denies permission for security
Any such permission may be indicated in the company's vulnerability testing. Any such permission may be indicated in the company's
disclosure policy (as per Section 3.5.7) or a new field (as per vulnerability disclosure policy (as per Section 2.5.7) or a new field
Section 3.4). (as per Section 2.4).
6.6. Multi-user Environments 5.6. Multi-User Environments
In multi-user / multi-tenant environments, it may possible for a user In multi-user / multi-tenant environments, it may be possible for a
to take over the location of the "security.txt" file. Organizations user to take over the location of the "security.txt" file.
should reserve the "security.txt" namespace at the root to ensure no Organizations should reserve the "security.txt" namespace at the root
third-party can create a page with the "security.txt" AND "/.well- to ensure no third party can create a page with the "security.txt"
known/security.txt" names. AND "/.well-known/security.txt" names.
6.7. Protecting Data in Transit 5.7. Protecting Data in Transit
To protect a "security.txt" file from being tampered with in transit, To protect a "security.txt" file from being tampered with in transit,
implementors MUST use HTTPS (as per section 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]) when implementors MUST use HTTPS (as per Section 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]) when
serving the file itself and for retrieval of any web URIs referenced serving the file itself and for retrieval of any web URIs referenced
in it (except when otherwise noted in this specification). As part in it (except when otherwise noted in this specification). As part
of the TLS handshake, researchers should validate the provided X.509 of the TLS handshake, researchers should validate the provided X.509
certificate in accordance with [RFC6125] and the following certificate in accordance with [RFC6125] and the following
considerations: considerations:
* Matching is performed only against the DNS-ID identifiers. * Matching is performed only against the DNS-ID identifiers.
* DNS domain names in server certificates MAY contain the wildcard * DNS domain names in server certificates MAY contain the wildcard
character '*' as the complete left-most label within the character '*' as the complete leftmost label within the
identifier. identifier.
The certificate may also be checked for revocation via the Online The certificate may also be checked for revocation via the Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC6960], certificate revocation Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC6960], certificate revocation
lists (CRLs), or similar mechanisms. lists (CRLs), or similar mechanisms.
In cases where the "security.txt" file cannot be served via HTTPS In cases where the "security.txt" file cannot be served via HTTPS
(such as localhost) or is being served with an invalid certificate, (such as localhost) or is being served with an invalid certificate,
additional human validation is recommended since the contents may additional human validation is recommended since the contents may
have been modified while in transit. have been modified while in transit.
As an additional layer of protection, it is also recommended that As an additional layer of protection, it is also recommended that
organizations digitally sign their "security.txt" file with OpenPGP organizations digitally sign their "security.txt" file with OpenPGP
(as per Section 3.3). Also, to protect security reports from being (as per Section 2.3). Also, to protect security reports from being
tampered with or observed while in transit, organizations should tampered with or observed while in transit, organizations should
specify encryption keys (as per Section 3.5.4) unless HTTPS is being specify encryption keys (as per Section 2.5.4) unless HTTPS is being
used for report submission. used for report submission.
However, the determination of validity of such keys is out of scope However, the determination of validity of such keys is out of scope
for this specification. Security researchers need to establish other for this specification. Security researchers need to establish other
secure means to verify them. secure means to verify them.
6.8. Spam and Spurious Reports 5.8. Spam and Spurious Reports
Similar to concerns in [RFC2142], denial of service attacks via spam Similar to concerns in [RFC2142], denial-of-service attacks via spam
reports would become easier once a "security.txt" file is published reports would become easier once a "security.txt" file is published
by an organization. In addition, there is an increased likelihood of by an organization. In addition, there is an increased likelihood of
reports being sent in an automated fashion and/or as result of reports being sent in an automated fashion and/or as a result of
automated scans without human analysis. Attackers can also use this automated scans without human analysis. Attackers can also use this
file as a way to spam unrelated third parties by listing their file as a way to spam unrelated third parties by listing their
resources and/or contact information. resources and/or contact information.
Organizations need to weigh the advantages of publishing this file Organizations need to weigh the advantages of publishing this file
versus the possible disadvantages and increased resources required to versus the possible disadvantages and increased resources required to
analyze security reports. analyze security reports.
Security researchers should review all information within the Security researchers should review all information within the
"security.txt" file before submitting reports in an automated fashion "security.txt" file before submitting reports in an automated fashion
or as resulting from automated scans. or reports resulting from automated scans.
7. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
Implementors should be aware that any resources referenced within a Implementors should be aware that any resources referenced within a
"security.txt" file MUST NOT point to the Well-Known URIs namespace "security.txt" file MUST NOT point to the Well-Known URIs namespace
unless they are registered with IANA (as per [RFC8615]). unless they are registered with IANA (as per [RFC8615]).
7.1. Well-Known URIs registry 6.1. Well-Known URIs Registry
The "Well-Known URIs" registry should be updated with the following IANA has updated the "Well-Known URIs" registry with the following
additional values (using the template from [RFC8615]): additional values (using the template from [RFC8615]):
URI suffix: security.txt URI suffix: security.txt
Change controller: IETF
Change controller: IETF Specification document(s): RFC 9116
Status: permanent
Specification document(s): this document
Status: permanent
7.2. Registry for security.txt Fields 6.2. Registry for security.txt Fields
IANA is requested to create the "security.txt Fields" registry in IANA has created the "security.txt Fields" registry in accordance
accordance with [RFC8126]. This registry will contain fields for use with [RFC8126]. This registry contains fields for use in
in "security.txt" files, defined by this specification. "security.txt" files, defined by this specification.
New registrations or updates MUST be published in accordance with the New registrations or updates MUST be published in accordance with the
"Expert Review" guidelines as described in sections 4.5 and 5 of "Expert Review" guidelines as described in Sections 4.5 and 5 of
[RFC8126]. Any new field thus registered is considered optional by [RFC8126]. Any new field thus registered is considered optional by
this specification unless a new version of this specification is this specification unless a new version of this specification is
published. published.
Designated Experts are expected to check whether a proposed Designated experts should determine whether a proposed registration
registration or update makes sense in the context of industry or update provides value to organizations and researchers using this
accepted vulnerability disclosure processes such as [ISO.29147.2018] format and makes sense in the context of industry-accepted
and [CERT.CVD], and provides value to organizations and researchers vulnerability disclosure processes such as [ISO.29147.2018] and
using this format. [CERT.CVD].
New registrations and updates MUST contain the following information: New registrations and updates MUST contain the following information:
1. Name of the field being registered or updated 1. Name of the field being registered or updated
2. Short description of the field 2. Short description of the field
3. Whether the field can appear more than once 3. Whether the field can appear more than once
4. The document in which the specification of the field is published 4. New or updated status, which MUST be one of the following:
(if available)
5. New or updated status, which MUST be one of:
* current: The field is in current use
* deprecated: The field has been in use, but new usage is current: The field is in current use.
discouraged deprecated: The field has been in use, but new usage is
discouraged.
historic: The field is no longer in current use.
* historic: The field is no longer in current use 5. Change controller
6. Change controller 6. The document in which the specification of the field is published
(if available)
An update may make a notation on an existing registration indicating Existing registrations may be marked historic or deprecated, as
that a registered field is historical or deprecated if appropriate. appropriate, by a future update to this document.
The initial registry contains these values: The initial registry contains these values:
Field Name: Acknowledgments Field Name: Acknowledgments
Description: link to page where security researchers are recognized Description: link to page where security researchers are recognized
Multiple Appearances: Yes Multiple Appearances: yes
Published in: this document Status: current
Status: current Change controller: IETF
Change controller: IETF Reference: RFC 9116
Field Name: Canonical
Description: canonical URI for this file
Multiple Appearances: Yes
Published in: this document
Status: current
Change controller: IETF
Field Name: Contact
Description: contact information to use for reporting vulnerabilities
Multiple Appearances: Yes
Published in: this document
Status: current
Change controller: IETF
Field Name: Expires
Description: date and time after which this file is considered stale
Multiple Appearances: No
Published in: this document
Status: current
Change controller: IETF
Field Name: Encryption
Description: link to a key to be used for encrypted communication
Multiple Appearances: Yes
Published in: this document
Status: current
Change controller: IETF
Field Name: Hiring Field Name: Canonical
Description: link to the vendor's security-related job positions Description: canonical URI for this file
Multiple Appearances: Yes Multiple Appearances: yes
Published in: this document Status: current
Status: current Change controller: IETF
Change controller: IETF Reference: RFC 9116
Field Name: Policy Field Name: Contact
Description: link to security policy page Description: contact information to use for reporting
Multiple Appearances: Yes vulnerabilities
Published in: this document Multiple Appearances: yes
Status: current Status: current
Change controller: IETF Change controller: IETF
Reference: RFC 9116
Field Name: Preferred-Languages Field Name: Expires
Description: list of preferred languages for security reports Description: date and time after which this file is considered stale
Multiple Appearances: No Multiple Appearances: no
Published in: this document Status: current
Status: current Change controller: IETF
Change controller: IETF Reference: RFC 9116
8. Contributors Field Name: Encryption
Description: link to a key to be used for encrypted communication
Multiple Appearances: yes
Status: current
Change controller: IETF
Reference: RFC 9116
The authors would like to acknowledge the help provided during the Field Name: Hiring
development of this document by Tom Hudson, Jobert Abma, Gerben Description: link to the vendor's security-related job positions
Janssen van Doorn, Austin Heap, Stephane Bortzmeyer, Max Smith, Multiple Appearances: yes
Eduardo Vela, and Krzysztof Kotowicz. Status: current
Change controller: IETF
Reference: RFC 9116
The authors would also like to acknowledge the feedback provided by Field Name: Policy
multiple members of IETF's LAST CALL, SAAG, and SECDISPATCH lists. Description: link to security policy page
Multiple Appearances: yes
Status: current
Change controller: IETF
Reference: RFC 9116
Yakov would like to also thank L.T.S. (for everything). Field Name: Preferred-Languages
Description: list of preferred languages for security reports
Multiple Appearances: no
Status: current
Change controller: IETF
Reference: RFC 9116
9. References 7. References
9.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
skipping to change at page 21, line 40 skipping to change at line 1036
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7405] Kyzivat, P., "Case-Sensitive String Support in ABNF",
RFC 7405, DOI 10.17487/RFC7405, December 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7405>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers [RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019, (URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615>.
9.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[CERT.CVD] Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon [CERT.CVD] Software Engineering Institute, "The CERT Guide to
University, "The CERT Guide to Coordinated Vulnerability Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure", Carnegie Mellon
Disclosure (CMU/SEI-2017-SR-022)", 2017. University, CMU/SEI-2017-SR-022, August 2017.
[ISO.29147.2018] [ISO.29147.2018]
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), ISO, "Information technology - Security techniques -
"ISO/IEC 29147:2018, Information technology - Security Vulnerability disclosure", ISO/IEC 29147:2018, October
techniques - Vulnerability disclosure", 2018. 2018.
[ISO.8601] International Organization for Standardization (ISO), [ISO.8601-1]
"ISO/IEC 8601, Date and time - Representations for ISO, "Date and time - Representations for information
information interchange - Parts 1 and 2", 2019. interchange - Part 1: Basic rules", ISO 8601-1:2019,
February 2019.
[ISO.8601-2]
ISO, "Date and time - Representations for information
interchange - Part 2: Extensions", ISO 8601-2:2019,
February 2019.
[RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, [RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981, RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.
[RFC2196] Fraser, B., "Site Security Handbook", FYI 8, RFC 2196, [RFC2196] Fraser, B., "Site Security Handbook", FYI 8, RFC 2196,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2196, September 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2196, September 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2196>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2196>.
[RFC2350] Brownlee, N. and E. Guttman, "Expectations for Computer [RFC2350] Brownlee, N. and E. Guttman, "Expectations for Computer
skipping to change at page 22, line 42 skipping to change at line 1097
[RFC7485] Zhou, L., Kong, N., Shen, S., Sheng, S., and A. Servin, [RFC7485] Zhou, L., Kong, N., Shen, S., Sheng, S., and A. Servin,
"Inventory and Analysis of WHOIS Registration Objects", "Inventory and Analysis of WHOIS Registration Objects",
RFC 7485, DOI 10.17487/RFC7485, March 2015, RFC 7485, DOI 10.17487/RFC7485, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7485>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7485>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
Appendix A. Note to Readers Acknowledgments
*Note to the RFC Editor:* Please remove this section prior to
publication.
Development of this draft takes place on Github at
https://github.com/securitytxt/security-txt
Appendix B. Document History
*Note to the RFC Editor:* Please remove this section prior to
publication.
B.1. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-00
* Moved to use IETF's markdown tools for draft updates
* Added table of contents and a fuller list of references
* Moved file to .well-known URI and added IANA registration (#3)
* Added extensibility with an IANA registry for fields (#34)
* Added text explaining relationship to RFC 2142 / security@ email
address (#25)
* Scope expanded to include internal hosts, domains, IP addresses
and file systems
* Support for digital signatures added (#19)
The full list of changes can be viewed via the IETF document tracker:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-foudil-securitytxt-01
B.2. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-01
* Added appendix with pointer to Github and document history
* Added external signature file to the well known URI registry (#59)
* Added policy field (#53)
* Added diagram explaining the location of the file on public vs.
internal systems
* Added recommendation that external signature files should use
HTTPS (#55)
* Added recommendation that organizations should monitor their
security.txt files (#14)
The full list of changes can be viewed via the IETF document tracker:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-foudil-securitytxt-02
B.3. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-02
* Use "mailto" and "tel" (#62)
* Fix typo in the "Example" section (#64)
* Clarified that the root directory is a fallback option (#72)
* Defined content-type for the response (#68)
* Clarify the scope of the security.txt file (#69)
* Cleaning up text based on the NITS tools suggestions (#82)
* Added clarification for newline values
* Clarified the encryption field language, added examples of DNS-
stored encryption keys (#28 and #94)
* Added "Hiring" field
B.4. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-03
* Added "Hiring" field to the registry section
* Added an encryption example using a PGP fingerprint (#107)
* Added reference to the mailing list (#111)
* Added a section referencing related work (#113)
* Fixes for idnits (#82)
* Changing some references to informative instead of normative
* Adding "Permission" field (#30)
* Fixing remaining ABNF issues (#83)
* Additional editorial changes and edits
B.5. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-04
* Addressing IETF feedback (#118)
* Case sensitivity clarification (#127)
* Syntax fixes (#133, #135 and #136)
* Removed permission field (#30)
* Removed signature field and switched to inline signatures (#93 and
#128)
* Adding canonical field (#100)
* Text and ABNF grammar improvements plus ABNF changes for comments
(#123)
* Changed ".security.txt" to "security.txt" to be consistent
B.6. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-05
* Changing HTTPS to MUST (#55)
* Adding language recommending encryption for email reports (#134)
* Added language handling redirects (#143)
* Expanded security considerations section and fixed typos (#30,
#73, #103, #112)
B.7. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-06
* Fixed ABNF grammar for non-chainable fields (#150)
* Clarified ABNF grammar (#152)
* Clarified redirect logic (#143)
* Clarified comments (#158)
* Updated references and template for well-known URI to RFC 8615
* Fixed nits from the IETF validator
B.8. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-07
* Addressing AD feedback (#165)
* Fix for ABNF grammar in lang-values (#164)
* Fixing idnits warnings
* Adding guidance for designated experts
B.9. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-08
* Added language and example regarding URI encoding (#176)
* Add "Expires" field (#181)
* Changed language from "directive" to "field" (#182)
* Addressing last call feedback (#179, #180 and #183)
* Clarifying order of fields (#174)
* Revert comment/field association (#158)
B.10. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-09
* Adjust ABNF to allow blank lines between directives (#191)
* Make "Expires" field required (#190)
* Adding a warning about the well-known URI namespace (#188)
* Adding scope language around products/services (#185)
* Addressing last call feedback (#189)
B.11. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-10
* Changes addressing IESG feedback
* Removed language regarding file systems (#201)
* Adding language to explain alignment with the CERT CVD guide
(#202)
B.12. Since draft-foudil-securitytxt-11
* Changed date format from RFC 5322 to RFC 3339 / ISO 8601 (#208)
* Added clarification in "canonical" field regarding the URI used to
retrieve the file
* Added language about machine-parsability The authors would like to acknowledge the help provided during the
development of this document by Tom Hudson, Jobert Abma, Gerben
Janssen van Doorn, Austin Heap, Stephane Bortzmeyer, Max Smith,
Eduardo Vela, and Krzysztof Kotowicz.
* Added quotes around "security.txt" for consistency The authors would also like to acknowledge the feedback provided by
multiple members of the IETF's LAST CALL, SAAG, and SECDISPATCH
lists.
Full list of changes can be viewed via the IETF document tracker: Yakov Shafranovich would like to also thank L.T.S. (for everything).
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-foudil-securitytxt
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Edwin Foudil Edwin Foudil
Email: contact@edoverflow.com Email: contact@edoverflow.com
Yakov Shafranovich Yakov Shafranovich
Nightwatch Cybersecurity Nightwatch Cybersecurity
Email: yakov+ietf@nightwatchcybersecurity.com Email: yakov+ietf@nightwatchcybersecurity.com
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