3.1. Packet Loss

DTLS uses a simple retransmission timer to handle packet loss. Figure 1 demonstrates the basic concept, using the first phase of the DTLS handshake:¶

         Client                                   Server
         ------                                   ------
         ClientHello           ------>

                                 X<-- HelloRetryRequest
                                                  (lost)

         [Timer Expires]

         ClientHello           ------>
         (retransmit)

Once the client has transmitted the ClientHello message, it expects to see a HelloRetryRequest or a ServerHello from the server. However, if the timer expires, the client knows that either the ClientHello or the response from the server has been lost, which causes the client to retransmit the ClientHello. When the server receives the retransmission, it knows to retransmit its HelloRetryRequest or ServerHello.¶

The server also maintains a retransmission timer for messages it sends (other than HelloRetryRequest) and retransmits when that timer expires. Not applying retransmissions to the HelloRetryRequest avoids the need to create state on the server. The HelloRetryRequest is designed to be small enough that it will not itself be fragmented, thus avoiding concerns about interleaving multiple HelloRetryRequests.¶

For more detail on timeouts and retransmission, see Section 5.8.¶

3.2. Reordering

In DTLS, each handshake message is assigned a specific sequence number. When a peer receives a handshake message, it can quickly determine whether that message is the next message it expects. If it is, then it processes it. If not, it queues it for future handling once all previous messages have been received.¶

3.3. Fragmentation

TLS and DTLS handshake messages can be quite large (in theory up to 2^24-1 bytes, in practice many kilobytes). By contrast, UDP datagrams are often limited to less than 1500 bytes if IP fragmentation is not desired. In order to compensate for this limitation, each DTLS handshake message may be fragmented over several DTLS records, each of which is intended to fit in a single UDP datagram (see Section 4.4 for guidance). Each DTLS handshake message contains both a fragment offset and a fragment length. Thus, a recipient in possession of all bytes of a handshake message can reassemble the original unfragmented message.¶

3.4. Replay Detection

DTLS optionally supports record replay detection. The technique used is the same as in IPsec AH/ESP, by maintaining a bitmap window of received records. Records that are too old to fit in the window and records that have previously been received are silently discarded. The replay detection feature is optional, since packet duplication is not always malicious but can also occur due to routing errors. Applications may conceivably detect duplicate packets and accordingly modify their data transmission strategy.¶

4.1. Demultiplexing DTLS Records

DTLS 1.3's header format is more complicated to demux than DTLS 1.2, which always carried the content type as the first byte. As described in Figure 5, the first byte determines how an incoming DTLS record is demultiplexed. The first 3 bits of the first byte distinguish a DTLS 1.3 encrypted record from record types used in previous DTLS versions and plaintext DTLS 1.3 record types. Hence, the range 32 (0b0010 0000) to 63 (0b0011 1111) needs to be excluded from future allocations by IANA to avoid problems while demultiplexing; see Section 14. Implementations can demultiplex DTLS 1.3 records by examining the first byte as follows:¶

• If the first byte is alert(21), handshake(22), or ack(proposed, 26), the record MUST be interpreted as a DTLSPlaintext record.¶
• If the first byte is any other value, then receivers MUST check to see if the leading bits of the first byte are 001. If so, the implementation MUST process the record as DTLSCiphertext; the true content type will be inside the protected portion.¶
• Otherwise, the record MUST be rejected as if it had failed deprotection, as described in Section 4.5.2.¶

Figure 5 shows this demultiplexing procedure graphically, taking DTLS 1.3 and earlier versions of DTLS into account.¶

             +----------------+
             | Outer Content  |
             |   Type (OCT)   |
             |                |
             |   OCT == 20   -+--> ChangeCipherSpec (DTLS <1.3)
             |   OCT == 21   -+--> Alert (Plaintext)
             |   OCT == 22   -+--> DTLSHandshake (Plaintext)
             |   OCT == 23   -+--> Application Data (DTLS <1.3)
             |   OCT == 24   -+--> Heartbeat (DTLS <1.3)
packet  -->  |   OCT == 25   -+--> DTLSCiphertext with CID (DTLS 1.2)
             |   OCT == 26   -+--> ACK (DTLS 1.3, Plaintext)
             |                |
             |                |   /+----------------+\
             | 31 < OCT < 64 -+--> |DTLSCiphertext  |
             |                |    |(header bits    |
             |      else      |    | start with 001)|
             |       |        |   /+-------+--------+\
             +-------+--------+            |
                     |                     |
                     v          Decryption |
               +---------+          +------+
               |  Reject |          |
               +---------+          v
                            +----------------+
                            | Decrypted      |
                            | Content Type   |
                            | (DCT)          |
                            |                |
                            |     DCT == 21 -+--> Alert
                            |     DCT == 22 -+--> DTLSHandshake
                            |     DCT == 23 -+--> Application Data
                            |     DCT == 24 -+--> Heartbeat
                            |     DCT == 26 -+--> ACK
                            |     else ------+--> Error
                            +----------------+

4.2. Sequence Number and Epoch

DTLS uses an explicit or partly explicit sequence number, rather than an implicit one, carried in the sequence_number field of the record. Sequence numbers are maintained separately for each epoch, with each sequence_number initially being 0 for each epoch.¶

The epoch number is initially zero and is incremented each time keying material changes and a sender aims to rekey. More details are provided in Section 6.1.¶

  Mask = AES-ECB(sn_key, Ciphertext[0..15])

  Mask = ChaCha20(sn_key, Ciphertext[0..3], Ciphertext[4..15])

  [sender]_sn_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, "sn", "", key_length)

4.3. Transport Layer Mapping

DTLS messages MAY be fragmented into multiple DTLS records. Each DTLS record MUST fit within a single datagram. In order to avoid IP fragmentation, clients of the DTLS record layer SHOULD attempt to size records so that they fit within any Path MTU (PMTU) estimates obtained from the record layer. For more information about PMTU issues, see Section 4.4.¶

Multiple DTLS records MAY be placed in a single datagram. Records are encoded consecutively. The length field from DTLS records containing that field can be used to determine the boundaries between records. The final record in a datagram can omit the length field. The first byte of the datagram payload MUST be the beginning of a record. Records MUST NOT span datagrams.¶

DTLS records without CIDs do not contain any association identifiers, and applications must arrange to multiplex between associations. With UDP, the host/port number is used to look up the appropriate security association for incoming records without CIDs.¶

Some transports, such as DCCP [RFC4340], provide their own sequence numbers. When carried over those transports, both the DTLS and the transport sequence numbers will be present. Although this introduces a small amount of inefficiency, the transport layer and DTLS sequence numbers serve different purposes; therefore, for conceptual simplicity, it is superior to use both sequence numbers.¶

Some transports provide congestion control for traffic carried over them. If the congestion window is sufficiently narrow, DTLS handshake retransmissions may be held rather than transmitted immediately, potentially leading to timeouts and spurious retransmission. When DTLS is used over such transports, care should be taken not to overrun the likely congestion window. [RFC5238] defines a mapping of DTLS to DCCP that takes these issues into account.¶

4.4. PMTU Issues

In general, DTLS's philosophy is to leave PMTU discovery to the application. However, DTLS cannot completely ignore the PMTU for three reasons:¶

• The DTLS record framing expands the datagram size, thus lowering the effective PMTU from the application's perspective.¶
• In some implementations, the application may not directly talk to the network, in which case the DTLS stack may absorb ICMP "Datagram Too Big" indications [RFC1191] or ICMPv6 "Packet Too Big" indications [RFC4443].¶
• The DTLS handshake messages can exceed the PMTU.¶

In order to deal with the first two issues, the DTLS record layer SHOULD behave as described below.¶

If PMTU estimates are available from the underlying transport protocol, they should be made available to upper layer protocols. In particular:¶

• For DTLS over UDP, the upper layer protocol SHOULD be allowed to obtain the PMTU estimate maintained in the IP layer.¶
• For DTLS over DCCP, the upper layer protocol SHOULD be allowed to obtain the current estimate of the PMTU.¶
• For DTLS over TCP or SCTP, which automatically fragment and reassemble datagrams, there is no PMTU limitation. However, the upper layer protocol MUST NOT write any record that exceeds the maximum record size of 2^14 bytes.¶

The DTLS record layer SHOULD also allow the upper layer protocol to discover the amount of record expansion expected by the DTLS processing; alternately, it MAY report PMTU estimates minus the estimated expansion from the transport layer and DTLS record framing.¶

Note that DTLS does not defend against spoofed ICMP messages; implementations SHOULD ignore any such messages that indicate PMTUs below the IPv4 and IPv6 minimums of 576 and 1280 bytes, respectively.¶

If there is a transport protocol indication that the PMTU was exceeded (either via ICMP or via a refusal to send the datagram as in Section 14 of [RFC4340]), then the DTLS record layer MUST inform the upper layer protocol of the error.¶

The DTLS record layer SHOULD NOT interfere with upper layer protocols performing PMTU discovery, whether via [RFC1191] and [RFC4821] for IPv4 or via [RFC8201] for IPv6. In particular:¶

• Where allowed by the underlying transport protocol, the upper layer protocol SHOULD be allowed to set the state of the Don't Fragment (DF) bit (in IPv4) or prohibit local fragmentation (in IPv6).¶
• If the underlying transport protocol allows the application to request PMTU probing (e.g., DCCP), the DTLS record layer SHOULD honor this request.¶

The final issue is the DTLS handshake protocol. From the perspective of the DTLS record layer, this is merely another upper layer protocol. However, DTLS handshakes occur infrequently and involve only a few round trips; therefore, the handshake protocol PMTU handling places a premium on rapid completion over accurate PMTU discovery. In order to allow connections under these circumstances, DTLS implementations SHOULD follow the following rules:¶

• If the DTLS record layer informs the DTLS handshake layer that a message is too big, the handshake layer SHOULD immediately attempt to fragment the message, using any existing information about the PMTU.¶
• If repeated retransmissions do not result in a response, and the PMTU is unknown, subsequent retransmissions SHOULD back off to a smaller record size, fragmenting the handshake message as appropriate. This specification does not specify an exact number of retransmits to attempt before backing off, but 2-3 seems appropriate.¶

4.5. Record Payload Protection

Like TLS, DTLS transmits data as a series of protected records. The rest of this section describes the details of that format.¶

5.1. Denial-of-Service Countermeasures

Datagram security protocols are extremely susceptible to a variety of DoS attacks. Two attacks are of particular concern:¶

1. An attacker can consume excessive resources on the server by transmitting a series of handshake initiation requests, causing the server to allocate state and potentially to perform expensive cryptographic operations.¶
2. An attacker can use the server as an amplifier by sending connection initiation messages with a forged source address that belongs to a victim. The server then sends its response to the victim machine, thus flooding it. Depending on the selected parameters, this response message can be quite large, as is the case for a Certificate message.¶

In order to counter both of these attacks, DTLS borrows the stateless cookie technique used by Photuris [RFC2522] and IKE [RFC7296]. When the client sends its ClientHello message to the server, the server MAY respond with a HelloRetryRequest message. The HelloRetryRequest message, as well as the "cookie" extension, is defined in TLS 1.3. The HelloRetryRequest message contains a stateless cookie (see [TLS13], Section 4.2.2). The client MUST send a new ClientHello with the cookie added as an extension. The server then verifies the cookie and proceeds with the handshake only if it is valid. This mechanism forces the attacker/client to be able to receive the cookie, which makes DoS attacks with spoofed IP addresses difficult. This mechanism does not provide any defense against DoS attacks mounted from valid IP addresses.¶

The DTLS 1.3 specification changes how cookies are exchanged compared to DTLS 1.2. DTLS 1.3 reuses the HelloRetryRequest message and conveys the cookie to the client via an extension. The client receiving the cookie uses the same extension to place the cookie subsequently into a ClientHello message. DTLS 1.2, on the other hand, used a separate message, namely the HelloVerifyRequest, to pass a cookie to the client and did not utilize the extension mechanism. For backwards compatibility reasons, the cookie field in the ClientHello is present in DTLS 1.3 but is ignored by a DTLS 1.3-compliant server implementation.¶

The exchange is shown in Figure 6. Note that the figure focuses on the cookie exchange; all other extensions are omitted.¶

      Client                                   Server
      ------                                   ------
      ClientHello           ------>

                            <----- HelloRetryRequest
                                    + cookie

      ClientHello           ------>
       + cookie

      [Rest of handshake]

The "cookie" extension is defined in Section 4.2.2 of [TLS13]. When sending the initial ClientHello, the client does not have a cookie yet. In this case, the "cookie" extension is omitted and the legacy_cookie field in the ClientHello message MUST be set to a zero-length vector (i.e., a zero-valued single byte length field).¶

When responding to a HelloRetryRequest, the client MUST create a new ClientHello message following the description in Section 4.1.2 of [TLS13].¶

If the HelloRetryRequest message is used, the initial ClientHello and the HelloRetryRequest are included in the calculation of the transcript hash. The computation of the message hash for the HelloRetryRequest is done according to the description in Section 4.4.1 of [TLS13].¶

The handshake transcript is not reset with the second ClientHello, and a stateless server-cookie implementation requires the content or hash of the initial ClientHello (and HelloRetryRequest) to be stored in the cookie. The initial ClientHello is included in the handshake transcript as a synthetic "message_hash" message, so only the hash value is needed for the handshake to complete, though the complete HelloRetryRequest contents are needed.¶

When the second ClientHello is received, the server can verify that the cookie is valid and that the client can receive packets at the given IP address. If the client's apparent IP address is embedded in the cookie, this prevents an attacker from generating an acceptable ClientHello apparently from another user.¶

One potential attack on this scheme is for the attacker to collect a number of cookies from different addresses where it controls endpoints and then reuse them to attack the server. The server can defend against this attack by changing the secret value frequently, thus invalidating those cookies. If the server wishes to allow legitimate clients to handshake through the transition (e.g., a client received a cookie with Secret 1 and then sent the second ClientHello after the server has changed to Secret 2), the server can have a limited window during which it accepts both secrets. [RFC7296] suggests adding a key identifier to cookies to detect this case. An alternative approach is simply to try verifying with both secrets. It is RECOMMENDED that servers implement a key rotation scheme that allows the server to manage keys with overlapping lifetimes.¶

Alternatively, the server can store timestamps in the cookie and reject cookies that were generated outside a certain interval of time.¶

DTLS servers SHOULD perform a cookie exchange whenever a new handshake is being performed. If the server is being operated in an environment where amplification is not a problem, e.g., where ICE [RFC8445] has been used to establish bidirectional connectivity, the server MAY be configured not to perform a cookie exchange. The default SHOULD be that the exchange is performed, however. In addition, the server MAY choose not to do a cookie exchange when a session is resumed or, more generically, when the DTLS handshake uses a PSK-based key exchange and the IP address matches one associated with the PSK. Servers which process 0-RTT requests and send 0.5-RTT responses without a cookie exchange risk being used in an amplification attack if the size of outgoing messages greatly exceeds the size of those that are received. A server SHOULD limit the amount of data it sends toward a client address to three times the amount of data sent by the client before it verifies that the client is able to receive data at that address. A client address is valid after a cookie exchange or handshake completion. Clients MUST be prepared to do a cookie exchange with every handshake. Note that cookies are only valid for the existing handshake and cannot be stored for future handshakes.¶

If a server receives a ClientHello with an invalid cookie, it MUST terminate the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. This allows the client to restart the connection from scratch without a cookie.¶

As described in Section 4.1.4 of [TLS13], clients MUST abort the handshake with an "unexpected_message" alert in response to any second HelloRetryRequest which was sent in the same connection (i.e., where the ClientHello was itself in response to a HelloRetryRequest).¶

DTLS clients which do not want to receive a Connection ID SHOULD still offer the "connection_id" extension [RFC9146] unless there is an application profile to the contrary. This permits a server which wants to receive a CID to negotiate one.¶

5.2. DTLS Handshake Message Format

DTLS uses the same Handshake messages as TLS 1.3. However, prior to transmission they are converted to DTLSHandshake messages, which contain extra data needed to support message loss, reordering, and message fragmentation.¶

    enum {
        client_hello(1),
        server_hello(2),
        new_session_ticket(4),
        end_of_early_data(5),
        encrypted_extensions(8),
        request_connection_id(9),           /* New */
        new_connection_id(10),              /* New */
        certificate(11),
        certificate_request(13),
        certificate_verify(15),
        finished(20),
        key_update(24),
        message_hash(254),
        (255)
    } HandshakeType;

    struct {
        HandshakeType msg_type;    /* handshake type */
        uint24 length;             /* bytes in message */
        uint16 message_seq;        /* DTLS-required field */
        uint24 fragment_offset;    /* DTLS-required field */
        uint24 fragment_length;    /* DTLS-required field */
        select (msg_type) {
            case client_hello:          ClientHello;
            case server_hello:          ServerHello;
            case end_of_early_data:     EndOfEarlyData;
            case encrypted_extensions:  EncryptedExtensions;
            case certificate_request:   CertificateRequest;
            case certificate:           Certificate;
            case certificate_verify:    CertificateVerify;
            case finished:              Finished;
            case new_session_ticket:    NewSessionTicket;
            case key_update:            KeyUpdate;
            case request_connection_id: RequestConnectionId;
            case new_connection_id:     NewConnectionId;
        } body;
    } DTLSHandshake;

In DTLS 1.3, the message transcript is computed over the original TLS 1.3-style Handshake messages without the message_seq, fragment_offset, and fragment_length values. Note that this is a change from DTLS 1.2 where those values were included in the transcript.¶

The first message each side transmits in each association always has message_seq = 0. Whenever a new message is generated, the message_seq value is incremented by one. When a message is retransmitted, the old message_seq value is reused, i.e., not incremented. From the perspective of the DTLS record layer, the retransmission is a new record. This record will have a new DTLSPlaintext.sequence_number value.¶

Note: In DTLS 1.2, the message_seq was reset to zero in case of a rehandshake (i.e., renegotiation). On the surface, a rehandshake in DTLS 1.2 shares similarities with a post-handshake message exchange in DTLS 1.3. However, in DTLS 1.3 the message_seq is not reset, to allow distinguishing a retransmission from a previously sent post-handshake message from a newly sent post-handshake message.¶

DTLS implementations maintain (at least notionally) a next_receive_seq counter. This counter is initially set to zero. When a handshake message is received, if its message_seq value matches next_receive_seq, next_receive_seq is incremented and the message is processed. If the sequence number is less than next_receive_seq, the message MUST be discarded. If the sequence number is greater than next_receive_seq, the implementation SHOULD queue the message but MAY discard it. (This is a simple space/bandwidth trade-off).¶

In addition to the handshake messages that are deprecated by the TLS 1.3 specification, DTLS 1.3 furthermore deprecates the HelloVerifyRequest message originally defined in DTLS 1.0. DTLS 1.3-compliant implementations MUST NOT use the HelloVerifyRequest to execute a return-routability check. A dual-stack DTLS 1.2 / DTLS 1.3 client MUST, however, be prepared to interact with a DTLS 1.2 server.¶

5.3. ClientHello Message

The format of the ClientHello used by a DTLS 1.3 client differs from the TLS 1.3 ClientHello format, as shown below.¶

    uint16 ProtocolVersion;
    opaque Random[32];

    uint8 CipherSuite[2];    /* Cryptographic suite selector */

    struct {
        ProtocolVersion legacy_version = { 254,253 }; // DTLSv1.2
        Random random;
        opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>;
        opaque legacy_cookie<0..2^8-1>;                  // DTLS
        CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>;
        opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
        Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>;
    } ClientHello;

legacy_version:

In previous versions of DTLS, this field was used for version negotiation and represented the highest version number supported by the client. Experience has shown that many servers do not properly implement version negotiation, leading to "version intolerance" in which the server rejects an otherwise acceptable ClientHello with a version number higher than it supports. In DTLS 1.3, the client indicates its version preferences in the "supported_versions" extension (see Section 4.2.1 of [TLS13]) and the legacy_version field MUST be set to {254, 253}, which was the version number for DTLS 1.2. The supported_versions entries for DTLS 1.0 and DTLS 1.2 are 0xfeff and 0xfefd (to match the wire versions). The value 0xfefc is used to indicate DTLS 1.3.¶

random:

Same as for TLS 1.3, except that the downgrade sentinels described in Section 4.1.3 of [TLS13] when TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.1 and below are negotiated apply to DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.0, respectively.¶

legacy_session_id:

Versions of TLS and DTLS before version 1.3 supported a "session resumption" feature, which has been merged with pre-shared keys (PSK) in version 1.3. A client which has a cached session ID set by a pre-DTLS 1.3 server SHOULD set this field to that value. Otherwise, it MUST be set as a zero-length vector (i.e., a zero-valued single byte length field).¶

legacy_cookie:

A DTLS 1.3-only client MUST set the legacy_cookie field to zero length. If a DTLS 1.3 ClientHello is received with any other value in this field, the server MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.¶

cipher_suites:

Same as for TLS 1.3; only suites with DTLS-OK=Y may be used.¶

legacy_compression_methods:

Same as for TLS 1.3.¶

extensions:

Same as for TLS 1.3.¶

5.4. ServerHello Message

The DTLS 1.3 ServerHello message is the same as the TLS 1.3 ServerHello message, except that the legacy_version field is set to 0xfefd, indicating DTLS 1.2.¶

5.5. Handshake Message Fragmentation and Reassembly

As described in Section 4.3, one or more handshake messages may be carried in a single datagram. However, handshake messages are potentially bigger than the size allowed by the underlying datagram transport. DTLS provides a mechanism for fragmenting a handshake message over a number of records, each of which can be transmitted in separate datagrams, thus avoiding IP fragmentation.¶

When transmitting the handshake message, the sender divides the message into a series of N contiguous data ranges. The ranges MUST NOT overlap. The sender then creates N DTLSHandshake messages, all with the same message_seq value as the original DTLSHandshake message. Each new message is labeled with the fragment_offset (the number of bytes contained in previous fragments) and the fragment_length (the length of this fragment). The length field in all messages is the same as the length field of the original message. An unfragmented message is a degenerate case with fragment_offset=0 and fragment_length=length. Each handshake message fragment that is placed into a record MUST be delivered in a single UDP datagram.¶

When a DTLS implementation receives a handshake message fragment corresponding to the next expected handshake message sequence number, it MUST process it, either by buffering it until it has the entire handshake message or by processing any in-order portions of the message. The transcript consists of complete TLS Handshake messages (reassembled as necessary). Note that this requires removing the message_seq, fragment_offset, and fragment_length fields to create the Handshake structure.¶

DTLS implementations MUST be able to handle overlapping fragment ranges. This allows senders to retransmit handshake messages with smaller fragment sizes if the PMTU estimate changes. Senders MUST NOT change handshake message bytes upon retransmission. Receivers MAY check that retransmitted bytes are identical and SHOULD abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert if the value of a byte changes.¶

Note that as with TLS, multiple handshake messages may be placed in the same DTLS record, provided that there is room and that they are part of the same flight. Thus, there are two acceptable ways to pack two DTLS handshake messages into the same datagram: in the same record or in separate records.¶

5.6. EndOfEarlyData Message

The DTLS 1.3 handshake has one important difference from the TLS 1.3 handshake: the EndOfEarlyData message is omitted both from the wire and the handshake transcript. Because DTLS records have epochs, EndOfEarlyData is not necessary to determine when the early data is complete, and because DTLS is lossy, attackers can trivially mount the deletion attacks that EndOfEarlyData prevents in TLS. Servers SHOULD NOT accept records from epoch 1 indefinitely once they are able to process records from epoch 3. Though reordering of IP packets can result in records from epoch 1 arriving after records from epoch 3, this is not likely to persist for very long relative to the round trip time. Servers could discard epoch 1 keys after the first epoch 3 data arrives, or retain keys for processing epoch 1 data for a short period. (See Section 6.1 for the definitions of each epoch.)¶

5.7. DTLS Handshake Flights

DTLS handshake messages are grouped into a series of message flights. A flight starts with the handshake message transmission of one peer and ends with the expected response from the other peer. Table 1 contains a complete list of message combinations that constitute flights.¶

Remarks:¶

• Table 1 does not highlight any of the optional messages.¶
• Regarding note (1): When a handshake flight is sent without any expected response, as is the case with the client's final flight or with the NewSessionTicket message, the flight must be acknowledged with an ACK message.¶

Below are several example message exchanges illustrating the flight concept. The notational conventions from [TLS13] are used.¶

Client                                            Server

                                                           +--------+
 ClientHello                                               | Flight |
                       -------->                           +--------+

                                                           +--------+
                       <--------        HelloRetryRequest  | Flight |
                                         + cookie          +--------+


                                                           +--------+
ClientHello                                                | Flight |
 + cookie              -------->                           +--------+



                                              ServerHello
                                    {EncryptedExtensions}  +--------+
                                    {CertificateRequest*}  | Flight |
                                           {Certificate*}  +--------+
                                     {CertificateVerify*}
                                               {Finished}
                       <--------      [Application Data*]



 {Certificate*}                                            +--------+
 {CertificateVerify*}                                      | Flight |
 {Finished}            -------->                           +--------+
 [Application Data]
                                                           +--------+
                       <--------                    [ACK]  | Flight |
                                      [Application Data*]  +--------+

 [Application Data]    <------->      [Application Data]

 ClientHello                                              +--------+
  + pre_shared_key                                        | Flight |
  + psk_key_exchange_modes                                +--------+
  + key_share*         -------->


                                             ServerHello
                                        + pre_shared_key  +--------+
                                            + key_share*  | Flight |
                                   {EncryptedExtensions}  +--------+
                       <--------              {Finished}
                                     [Application Data*]
                                                          +--------+
 {Finished}            -------->                          | Flight |
 [Application Data*]                                      +--------+

                                                          +--------+
                       <--------                   [ACK]  | Flight |
                                     [Application Data*]  +--------+

 [Application Data]    <------->      [Application Data]

Client                                            Server

 ClientHello
  + early_data
  + psk_key_exchange_modes                                +--------+
  + key_share*                                            | Flight |
  + pre_shared_key                                        +--------+
 (Application Data*)     -------->

                                             ServerHello
                                        + pre_shared_key
                                            + key_share*  +--------+
                                   {EncryptedExtensions}  | Flight |
                                              {Finished}  +--------+
                       <--------     [Application Data*]


                                                          +--------+
 {Finished}            -------->                          | Flight |
 [Application Data*]                                      +--------+

                                                          +--------+
                       <--------                   [ACK]  | Flight |
                                     [Application Data*]  +--------+

 [Application Data]    <------->      [Application Data]

Client                                            Server

                                                          +--------+
                       <--------       [NewSessionTicket] | Flight |
                                                          +--------+

                                                          +--------+
[ACK]                  -------->                          | Flight |
                                                          +--------+

KeyUpdate, NewConnectionId, and RequestConnectionId follow a similar pattern to NewSessionTicket: a single message sent by one side followed by an ACK by the other.¶

5.8. Timeout and Retransmission

                             +-----------+
                             | PREPARING |
                +----------> |           |
                |            |           |
                |            +-----------+
                |                  |
                |                  | Buffer next flight
                |                  |
                |                 \|/
                |            +-----------+
                |            |           |
                |            |  SENDING  |<------------------+
                |            |           |                   |
                |            +-----------+                   |
        Receive |                  |                         |
           next |                  | Send flight or partial  |
         flight |                  | flight                  |
                |                  |                         |
                |                  | Set retransmit timer    |
                |                 \|/                        |
                |            +-----------+                   |
                |            |           |                   |
                +------------|  WAITING  |-------------------+
                |     +----->|           |   Timer expires   |
                |     |      +-----------+                   |
                |     |          |  |   |                    |
                |     |          |  |   |                    |
                |     +----------+  |   +--------------------+
                |    Receive record |   Read retransmit or ACK
        Receive |  (Maybe Send ACK) |
           last |                   |
         flight |                   | Receive ACK
                |                   | for last flight
               \|/                  |
                                    |
            +-----------+           |
            |           | <---------+
            | FINISHED  |
            |           |
            +-----------+
                |  /|\
                |   |
                |   |
                +---+

          Server read retransmit
              Retransmit ACK

5.9. Cryptographic Label Prefix

Section 7.1 of [TLS13] specifies that HKDF-Expand-Label uses a label prefix of "tls13 ". For DTLS 1.3, that label SHALL be "dtls13". This ensures key separation between DTLS 1.3 and TLS 1.3. Note that there is no trailing space; this is necessary in order to keep the overall label size inside of one hash iteration because "DTLS" is one letter longer than "TLS".¶

5.10. Alert Messages

Note that alert messages are not retransmitted at all, even when they occur in the context of a handshake. However, a DTLS implementation which would ordinarily issue an alert SHOULD generate a new alert message if the offending record is received again (e.g., as a retransmitted handshake message). Implementations SHOULD detect when a peer is persistently sending bad messages and terminate the local connection state after such misbehavior is detected. Note that alerts are not reliably transmitted; implementations SHOULD NOT depend on receiving alerts in order to signal errors or connection closure.¶

Any data received with an epoch/sequence number pair after that of a valid received closure alert MUST be ignored. Note: this is a change from TLS 1.3 which depends on the order of receipt rather than the epoch and sequence number.¶

5.11. Establishing New Associations with Existing Parameters

If a DTLS client-server pair is configured in such a way that repeated connections happen on the same host/port quartet, then it is possible that a client will silently abandon one connection and then initiate another with the same parameters (e.g., after a reboot). This will appear to the server as a new handshake with epoch=0. In cases where a server believes it has an existing association on a given host/port quartet and it receives an epoch=0 ClientHello, it SHOULD proceed with a new handshake but MUST NOT destroy the existing association until the client has demonstrated reachability either by completing a cookie exchange or by completing a complete handshake including delivering a verifiable Finished message. After a correct Finished message is received, the server MUST abandon the previous association to avoid confusion between two valid associations with overlapping epochs. The reachability requirement prevents off-path/blind attackers from destroying associations merely by sending forged ClientHellos.¶

Note: It is not always possible to distinguish which association a given record is from. For instance, if the client performs a handshake, abandons the connection, and then immediately starts a new handshake, it may not be possible to tell which connection a given protected record is for. In these cases, trial decryption may be necessary, though implementations could use CIDs to avoid the 5-tuple-based ambiguity.¶

6.1. Epoch Values and Rekeying

A recipient of a DTLS message needs to select the correct keying material in order to process an incoming message. With the possibility of message loss and reordering, an identifier is needed to determine which cipher state has been used to protect the record payload. The epoch value fulfills this role in DTLS. In addition to the TLS 1.3-defined key derivation steps (see Section 7 of [TLS13]), a sender may want to rekey at any time during the lifetime of the connection. It therefore needs to indicate that it is updating its sending cryptographic keys.¶

This version of DTLS assigns dedicated epoch values to messages in the protocol exchange to allow identification of the correct cipher state:¶

• Epoch value (0) is used with unencrypted messages. There are three unencrypted messages in DTLS, namely ClientHello, ServerHello, and HelloRetryRequest.¶
• Epoch value (1) is used for messages protected using keys derived from client_early_traffic_secret. Note that this epoch is skipped if the client does not offer early data.¶
• Epoch value (2) is used for messages protected using keys derived from [sender]_handshake_traffic_secret. Messages transmitted during the initial handshake, such as EncryptedExtensions, CertificateRequest, Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finished, belong to this category. Note, however, that post-handshake messages are protected under the appropriate application traffic key and are not included in this category.¶
• Epoch value (3) is used for payloads protected using keys derived from the initial [sender]_application_traffic_secret_0. This may include handshake messages, such as post-handshake messages (e.g., a NewSessionTicket message).¶
• Epoch values (4 to 2^64-1) are used for payloads protected using keys from the [sender]_application_traffic_secret_N (N>0).¶

Using these reserved epoch values, a receiver knows what cipher state has been used to encrypt and integrity protect a message. Implementations that receive a record with an epoch value for which no corresponding cipher state can be determined SHOULD handle it as a record which fails deprotection.¶

Note that epoch values do not wrap. If a DTLS implementation would need to wrap the epoch value, it MUST terminate the connection.¶

The traffic key calculation is described in Section 7.3 of [TLS13].¶

Figure 13 illustrates the epoch values in an example DTLS handshake.¶

Client                                             Server
------                                             ------

 Record 0
 ClientHello
 (epoch=0)
                            -------->
                                                     Record 0
                            <--------       HelloRetryRequest
                                                    (epoch=0)
 Record 1
 ClientHello                -------->
 (epoch=0)
                                                     Record 1
                            <--------             ServerHello
                                                    (epoch=0)
                                        {EncryptedExtensions}
                                                    (epoch=2)
                                                {Certificate}
                                                    (epoch=2)
                                          {CertificateVerify}
                                                    (epoch=2)
                                                   {Finished}
                                                    (epoch=2)
 Record 2
 {Certificate}              -------->
 (epoch=2)
 {CertificateVerify}
 (epoch=2)
 {Finished}
 (epoch=2)
                                                     Record 2
                            <--------                   [ACK]
                                                    (epoch=3)
 Record 3
 [Application Data]         -------->
 (epoch=3)
                                                     Record 3
                            <--------      [Application Data]
                                                    (epoch=3)

                         Some time later ...
                 (Post-Handshake Message Exchange)
                                                     Record 4
                            <--------      [NewSessionTicket]
                                                    (epoch=3)
 Record 4
 [ACK]                      -------->
 (epoch=3)

                         Some time later ...
                           (Rekeying)
                                                     Record 5
                            <--------      [Application Data]
                                                    (epoch=4)
 Record 5
 [Application Data]         -------->
 (epoch=4)

7.1. Sending ACKs

When an implementation detects a disruption in the receipt of the current incoming flight, it SHOULD generate an ACK that covers the messages from that flight which it has received and processed so far. Implementations have some discretion about which events to treat as signs of disruption, but it is RECOMMENDED that they generate ACKs under two circumstances:¶

• When they receive a message or fragment which is out of order, either because it is not the next expected message or because it is not the next piece of the current message.¶
• When they have received part of a flight and do not immediately receive the rest of the flight (which may be in the same UDP datagram). "Immediately" is hard to define. One approach is to set a timer for 1/4 the current retransmit timer value when the first record in the flight is received and then send an ACK when that timer expires. Note: The 1/4 value here is somewhat arbitrary. Given that the round trip estimates in the DTLS handshake are generally very rough (or the default), any value will be an approximation, and there is an inherent compromise due to competition between retransmission due to over-aggressive ACKing and over-aggressive timeout-based retransmission. As a comparison point, QUIC's loss-based recovery algorithms ([RFC9002], Section 6.1.2) work out to a delay of about 1/3 of the retransmit timer.¶

In general, flights MUST be ACKed unless they are implicitly acknowledged. In the present specification, the following flights are implicitly acknowledged by the receipt of the next flight, which generally immediately follows the flight:¶

1. Handshake flights other than the client's final flight of the main handshake.¶
2. The server's post-handshake CertificateRequest.¶

ACKs SHOULD NOT be sent for these flights unless the responding flight cannot be generated immediately. All other flights MUST be ACKed. In this case, implementations MAY send explicit ACKs for the complete received flight even though it will eventually also be implicitly acknowledged through the responding flight. A notable example for this is the case of client authentication in constrained environments, where generating the CertificateVerify message can take considerable time on the client. Implementations MAY acknowledge the records corresponding to each transmission of each flight or simply acknowledge the most recent one. In general, implementations SHOULD ACK as many received packets as can fit into the ACK record, as this provides the most complete information and thus reduces the chance of spurious retransmission; if space is limited, implementations SHOULD favor including records which have not yet been acknowledged.¶

Note: While some post-handshake messages follow a request/response pattern, this does not necessarily imply receipt. For example, a KeyUpdate sent in response to a KeyUpdate with request_update set to "update_requested" does not implicitly acknowledge the earlier KeyUpdate message because the two KeyUpdate messages might have crossed in flight.¶

ACKs MUST NOT be sent for records of any content type other than handshake or for records which cannot be deprotected.¶

Note that in some cases it may be necessary to send an ACK which does not contain any record numbers. For instance, a client might receive an EncryptedExtensions message prior to receiving a ServerHello. Because it cannot decrypt the EncryptedExtensions, it cannot safely acknowledge it (as it might be damaged). If the client does not send an ACK, the server will eventually retransmit its first flight, but this might take far longer than the actual round trip time between client and server. Having the client send an empty ACK shortcuts this process.¶

7.2. Receiving ACKs

When an implementation receives an ACK, it SHOULD record that the messages or message fragments sent in the records being ACKed were received and omit them from any future retransmissions. Upon receipt of an ACK that leaves it with only some messages from a flight having been acknowledged, an implementation SHOULD retransmit the unacknowledged messages or fragments. Note that this requires implementations to track which messages appear in which records. Once all the messages in a flight have been acknowledged, the implementation MUST cancel all retransmissions of that flight. Implementations MUST treat a record as having been acknowledged if it appears in any ACK; this prevents spurious retransmission in cases where a flight is very large and the receiver is forced to elide acknowledgements for records which have already been ACKed. As noted above, the receipt of any record responding to a given flight MUST be taken as an implicit acknowledgement for the entire flight to which it is responding.¶

7.3. Design Rationale

ACK messages are used in two circumstances, namely:¶

• On sign of disruption, or lack of progress; and¶
• To indicate complete receipt of the last flight in a handshake.¶

In the first case, the use of the ACK message is optional, because the peer will retransmit in any case and therefore the ACK just allows for selective or early retransmission, as opposed to the timeout-based whole flight retransmission in previous versions of DTLS. When DTLS 1.3 is used in deployments with lossy networks, such as low-power, long-range radio networks as well as low-power mesh networks, the use of ACKs is recommended.¶

The use of the ACK for the second case is mandatory for the proper functioning of the protocol. For instance, the ACK message sent by the client in Figure 13 acknowledges receipt and processing of Record 4 (containing the NewSessionTicket message), and if it is not sent, the server will continue retransmission of the NewSessionTicket indefinitely until its maximum retransmission count is reached.¶

9.1. Connection ID Example

Below is an example exchange for DTLS 1.3 using a single CID in each direction.¶

Note: The "connection_id" extension, which is used in ClientHello and ServerHello messages, is defined in [RFC9146].¶

Client                                             Server
------                                             ------

ClientHello
(connection_id=5)
                            -------->


                            <--------       HelloRetryRequest
                                                     (cookie)

ClientHello                 -------->
(connection_id=5)
  + cookie

                            <--------             ServerHello
                                          (connection_id=100)
                                          EncryptedExtensions
                                                      (cid=5)
                                                  Certificate
                                                      (cid=5)
                                            CertificateVerify
                                                      (cid=5)
                                                     Finished
                                                      (cid=5)

Certificate                -------->
(cid=100)
CertificateVerify
(cid=100)
Finished
(cid=100)
                           <--------                      ACK
                                                      (cid=5)

Application Data           ========>
(cid=100)
                           <========         Application Data
                                                      (cid=5)

If no CID is negotiated, then the receiver MUST reject any records it receives that contain a CID.¶

A.1. Record Layer

    struct {
        ContentType type;
        ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version;
        uint16 epoch = 0
        uint48 sequence_number;
        uint16 length;
        opaque fragment[DTLSPlaintext.length];
    } DTLSPlaintext;

    struct {
         opaque content[DTLSPlaintext.length];
         ContentType type;
         uint8 zeros[length_of_padding];
    } DTLSInnerPlaintext;

    struct {
        opaque unified_hdr[variable];
        opaque encrypted_record[length];
    } DTLSCiphertext;

    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |0|0|1|C|S|L|E E|
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | Connection ID |   Legend:
    | (if any,      |
    /  length as    /   C   - Connection ID (CID) present
    |  negotiated)  |   S   - Sequence number length
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   L   - Length present
    |  8 or 16 bit  |   E   - Epoch
    |Sequence Number|
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | 16 bit Length |
    | (if present)  |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

    struct {
        uint64 epoch;
        uint64 sequence_number;
    } RecordNumber;

A.2. Handshake Protocol

    enum {
        hello_request_RESERVED(0),
        client_hello(1),
        server_hello(2),
        hello_verify_request_RESERVED(3),
        new_session_ticket(4),
        end_of_early_data(5),
        hello_retry_request_RESERVED(6),
        encrypted_extensions(8),
        request_connection_id(9),           /* New */
        new_connection_id(10),              /* New */
        certificate(11),
        server_key_exchange_RESERVED(12),
        certificate_request(13),
        server_hello_done_RESERVED(14),
        certificate_verify(15),
        client_key_exchange_RESERVED(16),
        finished(20),
        certificate_url_RESERVED(21),
        certificate_status_RESERVED(22),
        supplemental_data_RESERVED(23),
        key_update(24),
        message_hash(254),
        (255)
    } HandshakeType;

    struct {
        HandshakeType msg_type;    /* handshake type */
        uint24 length;             /* bytes in message */
        uint16 message_seq;        /* DTLS-required field */
        uint24 fragment_offset;    /* DTLS-required field */
        uint24 fragment_length;    /* DTLS-required field */
        select (msg_type) {
            case client_hello:          ClientHello;
            case server_hello:          ServerHello;
            case end_of_early_data:     EndOfEarlyData;
            case encrypted_extensions:  EncryptedExtensions;
            case certificate_request:   CertificateRequest;
            case certificate:           Certificate;
            case certificate_verify:    CertificateVerify;
            case finished:              Finished;
            case new_session_ticket:    NewSessionTicket;
            case key_update:            KeyUpdate;
            case request_connection_id: RequestConnectionId;
            case new_connection_id:     NewConnectionId;
        } body;
    } Handshake;

    uint16 ProtocolVersion;
    opaque Random[32];

    uint8 CipherSuite[2];    /* Cryptographic suite selector */

    struct {
        ProtocolVersion legacy_version = { 254,253 }; // DTLSv1.2
        Random random;
        opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>;
        opaque legacy_cookie<0..2^8-1>;                  // DTLS
        CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>;
        opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
        Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>;
    } ClientHello;

A.3. ACKs

    struct {
        RecordNumber record_numbers<0..2^16-1>;
    } ACK;

A.4. Connection ID Management

    enum {
        cid_immediate(0), cid_spare(1), (255)
    } ConnectionIdUsage;

    opaque ConnectionId<0..2^8-1>;

    struct {
        ConnectionId cids<0..2^16-1>;
        ConnectionIdUsage usage;
    } NewConnectionId;

    struct {
      uint8 num_cids;
    } RequestConnectionId;

B.1. Confidentiality Limits

For confidentiality, Theorem 2 in [CCM-ANALYSIS] establishes that an attacker gains a distinguishing advantage over an ideal pseudorandom permutation (PRP) of no more than:¶

(2l * q)^2 / 2^n

For a target advantage in a single-key setting of 2^-60, which matches that used by TLS 1.3, as summarized in [AEAD-LIMITS], this results in the relation:¶

q <= 2^23

That is, endpoints cannot protect more than 2^23 packets with the same set of keys without causing an attacker to gain a larger advantage than the target of 2^-60.¶

B.2. Integrity Limits

For integrity, Theorem 1 in [CCM-ANALYSIS] establishes that an attacker gains an advantage over an ideal PRP of no more than:¶

v / 2^t + (2l * (v + q))^2 / 2^n

The goal is to limit this advantage to 2^-57, to match the target in TLS 1.3, as summarized in [AEAD-LIMITS]. As t and n are both 128, the first term is negligible relative to the second, so that term can be removed without a significant effect on the result. This produces the relation:¶

v + q <= 2^24.5

Using the previously established value of 2^23 for q and rounding, this leads to an upper limit on v of 2^23.5. That is, endpoints cannot attempt to authenticate more than 2^23.5 packets with the same set of keys without causing an attacker to gain a larger advantage than the target of 2^-57.¶

B.3. Limits for AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8

The TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 cipher suite uses the AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 function, which uses a short authentication tag (that is, t=64).¶

The confidentiality limits of AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 are the same as those for AEAD_AES_128_CCM, as this does not depend on the tag length; see Appendix B.1.¶

The shorter tag length of 64 bits means that the simplification used in Appendix B.2 does not apply to AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8. If the goal is to preserve the same margins as other cipher suites, then the limit on forgeries is largely dictated by the first term of the advantage formula:¶

v <= 2^7

As this represents attempts that fail authentication, applying this limit might be feasible in some environments. However, applying this limit in an implementation intended for general use exposes connections to an inexpensive denial-of-service attack.¶

This analysis supports the view that TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 is not suitable for general use. Specifically, TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 cannot be used without additional measures to prevent forgery of records, or to mitigate the effect of forgeries. This might require understanding the constraints that exist in a particular deployment or application. For instance, it might be possible to set a different target for the advantage an attacker gains based on an understanding of the constraints imposed on a specific usage of DTLS.¶