rfc9162v2.txt		rfc9162.txt
	Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) B. Laurie		Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) B. Laurie
	Request for Comments: 9162 A. Langley		Request for Comments: 9162 E. Messeri
	Obsoletes: 6962 E. Kasper		Obsoletes: 6962 Google
	Category: Experimental E. Messeri		Category: Experimental R. Stradling
	ISSN: 2070-1721 Google		ISSN: 2070-1721 Sectigo
	R. Stradling		November 2021
	Sectigo
	October 2021
	Certificate Transparency Version 2.0		Certificate Transparency Version 2.0
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes version 2.0 of the Certificate Transparency		This document describes version 2.0 of the Certificate Transparency
	(CT) protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer		(CT) protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer
	Security (TLS) server certificates as they are issued or observed, in		Security (TLS) server certificates as they are issued or observed, in
	a manner that allows anyone to audit certification authority (CA)		a manner that allows anyone to audit certification authority (CA)
	activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as		activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as
	skipping to change at line 60 ¶		skipping to change at line 58 ¶
	Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		in the Revised BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	1.1. Requirements Language		1.1. Requirements Language
	1.2. Data Structures		1.2. Data Structures
	1.3. Major Differences from CT 1.0		1.3. Major Differences from CT 1.0
	2. Cryptographic Components		2. Cryptographic Components
	2.1. Merkle Trees		2.1. Merkle Trees
	2.1.1. Definition of the Merkle Tree		2.1.1. Definition of the Merkle Tree
	skipping to change at line 2401 ¶		skipping to change at line 2399 ¶
	The designated expert(s) should review the public specification to		The designated expert(s) should review the public specification to
	ensure that it is detailed enough to ensure implementation		ensure that it is detailed enough to ensure implementation
	interoperability. They should also verify that the extension is		interoperability. They should also verify that the extension is
	appropriate to the contexts in which it is specified to be used (SCT,		appropriate to the contexts in which it is specified to be used (SCT,
	STH, or both).		STH, or both).
	10.2.5. Log IDs		10.2.5. Log IDs
	IANA has established a registry of Log IDs, named "Log IDs".		IANA has established a registry of Log IDs, named "Log IDs".
	The registry's registraton procedure is First Come First Served.		The registry's registration procedure is First Come First Served.
	The "Log IDs" registry initially consists of:		The "Log IDs" registry initially consists of:
	+================+==============+==============+===========+		+================+==============+==============+===========+
	| Log ID | Log Base URL | Log Operator | Reference |		| Log ID | Log Base URL | Log Operator | Reference |
	+================+==============+==============+===========+		+================+==============+==============+===========+
	| 1.3.101.8192 - | Unassigned | Unassigned | |		| 1.3.101.8192 - | Unassigned | Unassigned | |
	| 1.3.101.16383 | | | |		| 1.3.101.16383 | | | |
	+----------------+--------------+--------------+-----------+		+----------------+--------------+--------------+-----------+
	| 1.3.101.80.0 - | Unassigned | Unassigned | |		| 1.3.101.80.0 - | Unassigned | Unassigned | |
	skipping to change at line 2479 ¶		skipping to change at line 2477 ¶
	The initial values of the "Error Types" registry, which are taken		The initial values of the "Error Types" registry, which are taken
	from the text in Section 5, are as follows:		from the text in Section 5, are as follows:
	+===================+===================================+===========+		+===================+===================================+===========+
	| Identifier | Meaning | Reference |		| Identifier | Meaning | Reference |
	+===================+===================================+===========+		+===================+===================================+===========+
	| malformed | The request could not be | RFC 9162 |		| malformed | The request could not be | RFC 9162 |
	| | parsed. | |		| | parsed. | |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
	| badSubmission | submission is neither a valid | RFC 9162 |		| badSubmission | submission is neither a | RFC 9162 |
	| | certificate nor a valid | |		| | valid certificate nor a | |
	| | precertificate. | |		| | valid precertificate. | |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
	| badType | type is neither 1 nor 2. | RFC 9162 |		| badType | type is neither 1 nor 2. | RFC 9162 |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
	| badChain | The first element of chain is | RFC 9162 |		| badChain | The first element of chain | RFC 9162 |
	| | not the certifier of the | |		| | is not the certifier of the | |
	| | submission, or the second | |		| | submission, or the second | |
	| | element does not certify the | |		| | element does not certify the | |
	| | first, etc. | |		| | first, etc. | |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
	| badCertificate | One or more certificates in | RFC 9162 |		| badCertificate | One or more certificates in | RFC 9162 |
	| | chain are not valid (e.g., | |		| | chain are not valid (e.g., | |
	| | not properly encoded). | |		| | not properly encoded). | |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
	| unknownAnchor | The last element of chain | RFC 9162 |		| unknownAnchor | The last element of chain | RFC 9162 |
	| | (or, if chain is an empty | |		| | (or, if chain is an empty | |
	| | array, the submission) both | |		| | array, the submission) is | |
	| | is not, and is not certified | |		| | not, nor is it certified by, | |
	| | by, an accepted trust anchor. | |		| | an accepted trust anchor. | |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
	| shutdown | The log is no longer | RFC 9162 |		| shutdown | The log is no longer | RFC 9162 |
	| | accepting submissions. | |		| | accepting submissions. | |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
	| firstUnknown | first is before the latest | RFC 9162 |		| firstUnknown | first is before the latest | RFC 9162 |
	| | known STH but is not from an | |		| | known STH but is not from an | |
	| | existing STH. | |		| | existing STH. | |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
	| secondUnknown | second is before the latest | RFC 9162 |		| secondUnknown | second is before the latest | RFC 9162 |
	| | known STH but is not from an | |		| | known STH but is not from an | |
	| | existing STH. | |		| | existing STH. | |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
	| secondBeforeFirst | second is smaller than first. | RFC 9162 |		| secondBeforeFirst | second is smaller than | RFC 9162 |
			| | first. | |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
	| hashUnknown | hash is not the hash of a | RFC 9162 |		| hashUnknown | hash is not the hash of a | RFC 9162 |
	| | known leaf (may be caused by | |		| | known leaf (may be caused by | |
	| | skew or by a known | |		| | skew or by a known | |
	| | certificate not yet merged). | |		| | certificate not yet merged). | |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
	| treeSizeUnknown | hash is before the latest | RFC 9162 |		| treeSizeUnknown | hash is before the latest | RFC 9162 |
	| | known STH but is not from an | |		| | known STH but is not from an | |
	| | existing STH. | |		| | existing STH. | |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
	skipping to change at line 2932 ¶		skipping to change at line 2931 ¶
	SignedCertificateTimestampList ::= OCTET STRING		SignedCertificateTimestampList ::= OCTET STRING
	END		END
	Acknowledgements		Acknowledgements
	The authors would like to thank Erwann Abelea, Robin Alden, Andrew		The authors would like to thank Erwann Abelea, Robin Alden, Andrew
	Ayer, Richard Barnes, Al Cutter, David Drysdale, Francis Dupont, Adam		Ayer, Richard Barnes, Al Cutter, David Drysdale, Francis Dupont, Adam
	Eijdenberg, Stephen Farrell, Daniel Kahn Gillmor, Paul Hadfield, Brad		Eijdenberg, Stephen Farrell, Daniel Kahn Gillmor, Paul Hadfield, Brad
	Hill, Jeff Hodges, Paul Hoffman, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Kat Joyce,		Hill, Jeff Hodges, Paul Hoffman, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Kat Joyce, Emilia
	Stephen Kent, SM, Alexey Melnikov, Linus Nordberg, Chris Palmer,		Kasper, Stephen Kent, Adam Langley, SM, Alexey Melnikov, Linus
	Trevor Perrin, Pierre Phaneuf, Eric Rescorla, Rich Salz, Melinda		Nordberg, Chris Palmer, Trevor Perrin, Pierre Phaneuf, Eric Rescorla,
	Shore, Ryan Sleevi, Martin Smith, Carl Wallace, and Paul Wouters for		Rich Salz, Melinda Shore, Ryan Sleevi, Martin Smith, Carl Wallace,
	their valuable contributions.		and Paul Wouters for their valuable contributions.
	A big thank you to Symantec for kindly donating the OIDs from the		A big thank you to Symantec for kindly donating the OIDs from the
	1.3.101 arc that are used in this document.		1.3.101 arc that are used in this document.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Ben Laurie		Ben Laurie
	Google UK Ltd.		Google UK Ltd.
	Email: benl@google.com		Email: benl@google.com
	Adam Langley
	Google Inc.
	Email: agl@google.com
	Emilia Kasper
	Google Switzerland GmbH
	Email: ekasper@google.com
	Eran Messeri		Eran Messeri
	Google UK Ltd.		Google UK Ltd.
	Email: eranm@google.com		Email: eranm@google.com
	Rob Stradling		Rob Stradling
	Sectigo Ltd.		Sectigo Ltd.
	Email: rob@sectigo.com		Email: rob@sectigo.com
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