rfc9255v1.txt | rfc9255.txt | |||
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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bush | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bush | |||
Request for Comments: 9255 Arrcus & Internet Initiative Japan | Request for Comments: 9255 Arrcus & IIJ | |||
Category: Standards Track R. Housley | Category: Standards Track R. Housley | |||
ISSN: 2070-1721 Vigil Security | ISSN: 2070-1721 Vigil Security | |||
June 2022 | June 2022 | |||
The 'I' in RPKI Does Not Stand for Identity | The 'I' in RPKI Does Not Stand for Identity | |||
Abstract | Abstract | |||
There is a false notion that Internet Number Resources (INRs) in the | There is a false notion that Internet Number Resources (INRs) in the | |||
RPKI can be associated with the real-world identity of the 'holder' | RPKI can be associated with the real-world identity of the 'holder' | |||
skipping to change at line 143 ¶ | skipping to change at line 143 ¶ | |||
document or transaction. Given such external, i.e. non-RPKI, | document or transaction. Given such external, i.e. non-RPKI, | |||
verification of authority, the use of RPKI-based credentials adds no | verification of authority, the use of RPKI-based credentials adds no | |||
authenticity. | authenticity. | |||
3. Discussion | 3. Discussion | |||
Section 2.1 of the RPKI base document [RFC6480] says explicitly "An | Section 2.1 of the RPKI base document [RFC6480] says explicitly "An | |||
important property of this PKI is that certificates do not attest to | important property of this PKI is that certificates do not attest to | |||
the identity of the subject." | the identity of the subject." | |||
Section 3.1.2 of "Template for a Certification Practice Statement | Section 3.1 of "Template for a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) | |||
(CPS) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)" [RFC7382] makes very clear that | for the Resource PKI (RPKI)" [RFC7382] states that the Subject name | |||
"The Subject name in each certificate SHOULD NOT be 'meaningful'" and | in each certificate SHOULD NOT be meaningful and goes on to explain | |||
goes on to do so at some length. | this at some length. | |||
Normally, the INR holder does not hold the private key attesting to | Normally, the INR holder does not hold the private key attesting to | |||
their resources; the CA does. The INR holder has a real-world | their resources; the CA does. The INR holder has a real-world | |||
business relationship with the CA for which they have likely signed | business relationship with the CA for which they have likely signed | |||
real-world documents. | real-world documents. | |||
As the INR holder does not have the keying material, they rely on the | As the INR holder does not have the keying material, they rely on the | |||
CA, to which they presumably present credentials, to manipulate their | CA, to which they presumably present credentials, to manipulate their | |||
INRs. These credentials may be user ID and password (with two-factor | INRs. These credentials may be user ID and password (with two-factor | |||
authentication one hopes), a hardware token, client browser | authentication one hopes), a hardware token, client browser | |||
certificates, etc. | certificates, etc. | |||
Hence schemes such as [RPKI-RTA] and [RPKI-RSC] must go to great | Hence schemes such as Resource Tagged Attestations [RPKI-RTA] and | |||
lengths to extract the supposedly relevant keys from the CA. | Signed Checklists [RPKI-RSC] must go to great lengths to extract the | |||
supposedly relevant keys from the CA. | ||||
For some particular INR, say, Bill's Bait and Sushi's Autonomous | For some particular INR, say, Bill's Bait and Sushi's Autonomous | |||
System (AS) number, someone out on the net probably has the | System (AS) number, someone out on the net probably has the | |||
credentials to the CA account in which BB&S's INRs are registered. | credentials to the CA account in which BB&S's INRs are registered. | |||
That could be the owner of BB&S, Roberto's Taco Stand, an IT vendor, | That could be the owner of BB&S, Roberto's Taco Stand (in San Diego), | |||
or the Government of Elbonia. One simply can not know. | an IT vendor, or the Government of Elbonia. One simply can not know. | |||
In large organizations, INR management is often compartmentalized | In large organizations, INR management is often compartmentalized | |||
with no authority over anything beyond dealing with INR registration. | with no authority over anything beyond dealing with INR registration. | |||
The INR manager for Bill's Bait and Sushi is unlikely to be | The INR manager for Bill's Bait and Sushi is unlikely to be | |||
authorized to conduct bank transactions for BB&S, or even to | authorized to conduct bank transactions for BB&S, or even to | |||
authorize access to BB&S's servers in some colocation facility. | authorize access to BB&S's servers in some colocation facility. | |||
Then there is the temporal issue. The holder of that AS may be BB&S | Then there is the temporal issue. The holder of that AS may be BB&S | |||
today when some document was signed, and could be the Government of | today when some document was signed, and could be the Government of | |||
Elbonia tomorrow. Or the resource could have been administratively | Elbonia tomorrow. Or the resource could have been administratively | |||
skipping to change at line 195 ¶ | skipping to change at line 196 ¶ | |||
Usually, before registering INRs, CAs require proof of an INR holding | Usually, before registering INRs, CAs require proof of an INR holding | |||
via external documentation and authorities. It is somewhat droll | via external documentation and authorities. It is somewhat droll | |||
that the CPS Template [RFC7382] does not mention any diligence the CA | that the CPS Template [RFC7382] does not mention any diligence the CA | |||
must, or even might, conduct to assure the INRs are in fact owned by | must, or even might, conduct to assure the INRs are in fact owned by | |||
a registrant. | a registrant. | |||
That someone can provide 'proof of possession' of the private key | That someone can provide 'proof of possession' of the private key | |||
signing over a particular INR should not be taken to imply that they | signing over a particular INR should not be taken to imply that they | |||
are a valid legal representative of the organization in possession of | are a valid legal representative of the organization in possession of | |||
that INR. They could be just an INR administrative person. | that INR. They could be in an INR administrative role, and not be a | |||
formal representative of the organization. | ||||
Autonomous System Numbers do not identify real-world entities. They | Autonomous System Numbers do not identify real-world entities. They | |||
are identifiers some network operators 'own' and are only used for | are identifiers some network operators 'own' and are only used for | |||
loop detection in routing. They have no inherent semantics other | loop detection in routing. They have no inherent semantics other | |||
than uniqueness. | than uniqueness. | |||
4. Security Considerations | 4. Security Considerations | |||
Attempts to use RPKI data to authenticate real-world documents or | Attempts to use RPKI data to authenticate real-world documents or | |||
other artifacts requiring identity, while possibly cryptographically | other artifacts requiring identity, while possibly cryptographically | |||
End of changes. 5 change blocks. | ||||
10 lines changed or deleted | 12 lines changed or added | |||
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