rfc9312.alt-original   rfc9312.txt 
Network Working Group M. Kuehlewind Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Kühlewind
Internet-Draft Ericsson Request for Comments: 9312 Ericsson
Intended status: Informational B. Trammell Category: Informational B. Trammell
Expires: 16 January 2023 Google Switzerland GmbH ISSN: 2070-1721 Google Switzerland GmbH
15 July 2022 September 2022
Manageability of the QUIC Transport Protocol Manageability of the QUIC Transport Protocol
draft-ietf-quic-manageability-18
Abstract Abstract
This document discusses manageability of the QUIC transport protocol, This document discusses manageability of the QUIC transport protocol
focusing on the implications of QUIC's design and wire image on and focuses on the implications of QUIC's design and wire image on
network operations involving QUIC traffic. It is intended as a network operations involving QUIC traffic. It is intended as a
"user's manual" for the wire image, providing guidance for network "user's manual" for the wire image to provide guidance for network
operators and equipment vendors who rely on the use of transport- operators and equipment vendors who rely on the use of transport-
aware network functions. aware network functions.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. published for informational purposes.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
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approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 January 2023. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9312.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction
2. Features of the QUIC Wire Image . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Features of the QUIC Wire Image
2.1. QUIC Packet Header Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. QUIC Packet Header Structure
2.2. Coalesced Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2. Coalesced Packets
2.3. Use of Port Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.3. Use of Port Numbers
2.4. The QUIC Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4. The QUIC Handshake
2.5. Integrity Protection of the Wire Image . . . . . . . . . 12 2.5. Integrity Protection of the Wire Image
2.6. Connection ID and Rebinding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.6. Connection ID and Rebinding
2.7. Packet Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.7. Packet Numbers
2.8. Version Negotiation and Greasing . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.8. Version Negotiation and Greasing
3. Network-Visible Information about QUIC Flows . . . . . . . . 14 3. Network-Visible Information about QUIC Flows
3.1. Identifying QUIC Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.1. Identifying QUIC Traffic
3.1.1. Identifying Negotiated Version . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.1.1. Identifying Negotiated Version
3.1.2. First Packet Identification for Garbage Rejection . . 15 3.1.2. First Packet Identification for Garbage Rejection
3.2. Connection Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.2. Connection Confirmation
3.3. Distinguishing Acknowledgment Traffic . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.3. Distinguishing Acknowledgment Traffic
3.4. Server Name Indication (SNI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.4. Server Name Indication (SNI)
3.4.1. Extracting Server Name Indication (SNI) 3.4.1. Extracting Server Name Indication (SNI) Information
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.5. Flow Association
3.5. Flow Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.6. Flow Teardown
3.6. Flow Teardown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.7. Flow Symmetry Measurement
3.7. Flow Symmetry Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.8. Round-Trip Time (RTT) Measurement
3.8. Round-Trip Time (RTT) Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.8.1. Measuring Initial RTT
3.8.1. Measuring Initial RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.8.2. Using the Spin Bit for Passive RTT Measurement
3.8.2. Using the Spin Bit for Passive RTT Measurement . . . 20 4. Specific Network Management Tasks
4. Specific Network Management Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.1. Passive Network Performance Measurement and Troubleshooting
4.1. Passive Network Performance Measurement and 4.2. Stateful Treatment of QUIC Traffic
Troubleshooting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.3. Address Rewriting to Ensure Routing Stability
4.2. Stateful Treatment of QUIC Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.4. Server Cooperation with Load Balancers
4.3. Address Rewriting to Ensure Routing Stability . . . . . . 23 4.5. Filtering Behavior
4.4. Server Cooperation with Load Balancers . . . . . . . . . 24 4.6. UDP Blocking, Throttling, and NAT Binding
4.5. Filtering Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.7. DDoS Detection and Mitigation
4.6. UDP Blocking, Throttling, and NAT Binding . . . . . . . . 24 4.8. Quality of Service Handling and ECMP Routing
4.7. DDoS Detection and Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.9. Handling ICMP Messages
4.8. Quality of Service Handling and ECMP Routing . . . . . . 27 4.10. Guiding Path MTU
4.9. Handling ICMP Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 5. IANA Considerations
4.10. Guiding Path MTU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6. Security Considerations
7. References
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 7.1. Normative References
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 7.2. Informative References
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Acknowledgments
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Contributors
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Authors' Addresses
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
QUIC [QUIC-TRANSPORT] is a new transport protocol that is QUIC [QUIC-TRANSPORT] is a new transport protocol that is
encapsulated in UDP. QUIC integrates TLS [QUIC-TLS] to encrypt all encapsulated in UDP. QUIC integrates TLS [QUIC-TLS] to encrypt all
payload data and most control information. QUIC version 1 was payload data and most control information. QUIC version 1 was
designed primarily as a transport for HTTP, with the resulting designed primarily as a transport for HTTP with the resulting
protocol being known as HTTP/3 [QUIC-HTTP]. protocol being known as HTTP/3 [QUIC-HTTP].
This document provides guidance for network operations that manage This document provides guidance for network operations that manage
QUIC traffic. This includes guidance on how to interpret and utilize QUIC traffic. This includes guidance on how to interpret and utilize
information that is exposed by QUIC to the network, requirements and information that is exposed by QUIC to the network, requirements and
assumptions of the QUIC design with respect to network treatment, and assumptions of the QUIC design with respect to network treatment, and
a description of how common network management practices will be a description of how common network management practices will be
impacted by QUIC. impacted by QUIC.
QUIC is an end-to-end transport protocol; therefore, no information QUIC is an end-to-end transport protocol; therefore, no information
skipping to change at page 3, line 41 skipping to change at line 123
This property is enforced through integrity protection of the wire This property is enforced through integrity protection of the wire
image [WIRE-IMAGE]. Encryption of most transport-layer control image [WIRE-IMAGE]. Encryption of most transport-layer control
signaling means that less information is visible to the network than signaling means that less information is visible to the network than
is the case with TCP. is the case with TCP.
Integrity protection can also simplify troubleshooting at the end Integrity protection can also simplify troubleshooting at the end
points as none of the nodes on the network path can modify transport points as none of the nodes on the network path can modify transport
layer information. However, it means in-network operations that layer information. However, it means in-network operations that
depend on modification of data (for examples, see [RFC9065]) are not depend on modification of data (for examples, see [RFC9065]) are not
possible without the cooperation of a QUIC endpoint. Such possible without the cooperation of a QUIC endpoint. Such
cooperation might be possible with the introduction of a proxy which cooperation might be possible with the introduction of a proxy that
authenticates as an endpoint. Proxy operations are not in scope for authenticates as an endpoint. Proxy operations are not in scope for
this document. this document.
Network management is not a one-size-fits-all endeavour: practices Network management is not a one-size-fits-all endeavor; for example,
considered necessary or even mandatory within enterprise networks practices considered necessary or even mandatory within enterprise
with certain compliance requirements, for example, would be networks with certain compliance requirements would be impermissible
impermissible on other networks without those requirements. The on other networks without those requirements. Therefore, presence of
presence of a particular practice in this document should therefore a particular practice in this document should not be construed as a
not be construed as a recommendation to apply it. For each practice, recommendation to apply it. For each practice, this document
this document describes what is and is not possible with the QUIC describes what is and is not possible with the QUIC transport
transport protocol as defined. protocol as defined.
This document focuses solely on network management practices that This document focuses solely on network management practices that
observe traffic on the wire. Replacement of troubleshooting based on observe traffic on the wire. For example, replacement of
observation with active measurement techniques, for example, is troubleshooting based on observation with active measurement
therefore out of scope. A more generalized treatment of network techniques is therefore out of scope. A more generalized treatment
management operations on encrypted transports is given in [RFC9065]. of network management operations on encrypted transports is given in
[RFC9065].
QUIC-specific terminology used in this document is defined in QUIC-specific terminology used in this document is defined in
[QUIC-TRANSPORT]. [QUIC-TRANSPORT].
2. Features of the QUIC Wire Image 2. Features of the QUIC Wire Image
This section discusses those aspects of the QUIC transport protocol This section discusses aspects of the QUIC transport protocol that
that have an impact on the design and operation of devices that have an impact on the design and operation of devices that forward
forward QUIC packets. This section is therefore primarily QUIC packets. Therefore, this section is primarily considering the
considering the unencrypted part of QUIC's wire image [WIRE-IMAGE], unencrypted part of QUIC's wire image [WIRE-IMAGE], which is defined
which is defined as the information available in the packet header in as the information available in the packet header in each QUIC
each QUIC packet, and the dynamics of that information. Since QUIC packet, and the dynamics of that information. Since QUIC is a
is a versioned protocol, the wire image of the header format can also versioned protocol, the wire image of the header format can also
change from version to version. However, the field that identifies change from version to version. However, the field that identifies
the QUIC version in some packets, and the format of the Version the QUIC version in some packets and the format of the Version
Negotiation Packet, are both inspectable and invariant Negotiation packet are both inspectable and invariant
[QUIC-INVARIANTS]. [QUIC-INVARIANTS].
This document addresses version 1 of the QUIC protocol, whose wire This document addresses version 1 of the QUIC protocol, whose wire
image is fully defined in [QUIC-TRANSPORT] and [QUIC-TLS]. Features image is fully defined in [QUIC-TRANSPORT] and [QUIC-TLS]. Features
of the wire image described herein may change in future versions of of the wire image described herein may change in future versions of
the protocol, except when specified as an invariant the protocol except when specified as an invariant [QUIC-INVARIANTS]
[QUIC-INVARIANTS], and cannot be used to identify QUIC as a protocol and cannot be used to identify QUIC as a protocol or to infer the
or to infer the behavior of future versions of QUIC. behavior of future versions of QUIC.
2.1. QUIC Packet Header Structure 2.1. QUIC Packet Header Structure
QUIC packets may have either a long header or a short header. The QUIC packets may have either a long header or a short header. The
first bit of the QUIC header is the Header Form bit, and indicates first bit of the QUIC header is the Header Form bit and indicates
which type of header is present. The purpose of this bit is which type of header is present. The purpose of this bit is
invariant across QUIC versions. invariant across QUIC versions.
The long header exposes more information. It contains a version The long header exposes more information. It contains a version
number, as well as source and destination connection IDs for number, as well as Source and Destination Connection IDs for
associating packets with a QUIC connection. The definition and associating packets with a QUIC connection. The definition and
location of these fields in the QUIC long header are invariant for location of these fields in the QUIC long header are invariant for
future versions of QUIC, although future versions of QUIC may provide future versions of QUIC, although future versions of QUIC may provide
additional fields in the long header [QUIC-INVARIANTS]. additional fields in the long header [QUIC-INVARIANTS].
In version 1 of QUIC, the long header is used during connection In version 1 of QUIC, the long header is used during connection
establishment to transmit crypto handshake data, perform version establishment to transmit CRYPTO handshake data, perform version
negotiation, retry, and send 0-RTT data. negotiation, retry, and send 0-RTT data.
Short headers are used after connection establishment in version 1 of Short headers are used after a connection establishment in version 1
QUIC, and expose only an optional destination connection ID and the of QUIC and expose only an optional Destination Connection ID and the
initial flags byte with the spin bit for RTT measurement. initial flags byte with the spin bit for RTT measurement.
The following information is exposed in QUIC packet headers in all The following information is exposed in QUIC packet headers in all
versions of QUIC (as specified in [QUIC-INVARIANTS]): versions of QUIC (as specified in [QUIC-INVARIANTS]):
* version number: the version number is present in the long header, version number: The version number is present in the long header and
and identifies the version used for that packet. During Version identifies the version used for that packet. During Version
Negotiation (see Section 17.2.1 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT] and Negotiation (see Section 17.2.1 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT] and
Section 2.8), the version number field has a special value Section 2.8), the version number field has a special value
(0x00000000) that identifies the packet as a Version Negotiation (0x00000000) that identifies the packet as a Version Negotiation
packet. QUIC version 1 uses version 0x00000001. Operators should packet. QUIC version 1 uses version 0x00000001. Operators should
expect to observe packets with other version numbers as a result expect to observe packets with other version numbers as a result
of various Internet experiments, future standards, and greasing of various Internet experiments, future standards, and greasing
([RFC7801]). An IANA registry contains the values of all [RFC7801]. An IANA registry contains the values of all
standardized versions of QUIC, and may contain some proprietary standardized versions of QUIC, and may contain some proprietary
versions (see Section 22.2 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]). However, other versions (see Section 22.2 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]). However, other
versions of QUIC can be expected to be seen in the Internet at any versions of QUIC can be expected to be seen in the Internet at any
given time. given time.
* source and destination connection ID: short and long headers carry Source and Destination Connection ID: Short and long headers carry a
a destination connection ID, a variable-length field which, if not Destination Connection ID, which is a variable-length field. If
zero-length, can be used to identify the connection associated the Destination Connection ID is not zero length, it can be used
with a QUIC packet, for load-balancing and NAT rebinding purposes; to identify the connection associated with a QUIC packet for load
see Section 4.4 and Section 2.6. Long packet headers additionally balancing and NAT rebinding purposes; see Sections 4.4 and 2.6.
carry a source connection ID. The source connection ID Long packet headers additionally carry a Source Connection ID.
corresponds to the destination connection ID the source would like The Source Connection ID corresponds to the Destination Connection
to have on packets sent to it, and is only present on long ID the source would like to have on packets sent to it, and is
headers. On long header packets, the length of the connection IDs only present on long headers. On long header packets, the length
is also present; on short header packets, the length of the of the connection IDs is also present; on short header packets,
destination connection ID is implicit and as such need to be known the length of the Destination Connection ID is implicit and as
from the long header packets. such need to be known from the long header packets.
In version 1 of QUIC, the following additional information is In version 1 of QUIC, the following additional information is
exposed: exposed:
* "fixed bit": The second-most-significant bit of the first octet of "Fixed Bit": The second-most-significant bit of the first octet of
most QUIC packets of the current version is set to 1, enabling most QUIC packets of the current version is set to 1, enabling
endpoints to demultiplex with other UDP-encapsulated protocols. endpoints to demultiplex with other UDP-encapsulated protocols.
Even though this bit is fixed in the version 1 specification, Even though this bit is fixed in the version 1 specification,
endpoints might use an extension that varies the bit endpoints might use an extension that varies the bit
[QUIC-GREASE]. Therefore, observers cannot reliably use it as an [QUIC-GREASE]. Therefore, observers cannot reliably use it as an
identifier for QUIC. identifier for QUIC.
* latency spin bit: The third-most-significant bit of the first latency spin bit: The third-most-significant bit of the first octet
octet in the short header for version 1. The spin bit is set by in the short header for version 1. The spin bit is set by
endpoints such that tracking edge transitions can be used to endpoints such that tracking edge transitions can be used to
passively observe end-to-end RTT. See Section 3.8.2 for further passively observe end-to-end RTT. See Section 3.8.2 for further
details. details.
* header type: The long header has a 2 bit packet type field header type: The long header has a 2-bit packet type field following
following the Header Form and fixed bits. Header types correspond the Header Form and Fixed Bits. Header types correspond to stages
to stages of the handshake; see Section 17.2 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT] of the handshake; see Section 17.2 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT] for
for details. details.
* length: The length of the remaining QUIC packet after the length length: The length of the remaining QUIC packet after the Length
field, present on long headers. This field is used to implement field present on long headers. This field is used to implement
coalesced packets during the handshake (see Section 2.2). coalesced packets during the handshake (see Section 2.2).
* token: Initial packets may contain a token, a variable-length token: Initial packets may contain a token, a variable-length opaque
opaque value optionally sent from client to server, used for value optionally sent from client to server, used for validating
validating the client's address. Retry packets also contain a the client's address. Retry packets also contain a token, which
token, which can be used by the client in an Initial packet on a can be used by the client in an Initial packet on a subsequent
subsequent connection attempt. The length of the token is connection attempt. The length of the token is explicit in both
explicit in both cases. cases.
Retry (Section 17.2.5 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]) and Version Negotiation Retry (Section 17.2.5 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]) and Version Negotiation
(Section 17.2.1 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]) packets are not encrypted. (Section 17.2.1 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]) packets are not encrypted.
Retry packets are (forgibly) integrity protected. Transport Retry packets are (forgibly) integrity protected. Transport
parameters are used authenticate the contents of Retry packets later parameters are used to authenticate the contents of Retry packets
in the handshake. For other kinds of packets, version 1 of QUIC later in the handshake. For other kinds of packets, version 1 of
cryptographically protects other information in the packet headers: QUIC cryptographically protects other information in the packet
headers:
* packet number: All packets except Version Negotiation and Retry Packet Number: All packets except Version Negotiation and Retry
packets have an associated packet number; however, this packet packets have an associated packet number; however, this packet
number is encrypted, and therefore not of use to on-path number is encrypted, and therefore not of use to on-path
observers. The offset of the packet number can be decoded in long observers. The offset of the packet number can be decoded in long
headers, while it is implicit (depending on destination connection headers while it is implicit (depending on Destination Connection
ID length) in short headers. The length of the packet number is ID length) in short headers. The length of the packet number is
cryptographically protected. cryptographically protected.
* key phase: The Key Phase bit, present in short headers, specifies Key Phase: The Key Phase bit (present in short headers) specifies
the keys used to encrypt the packet to support key rotation. The the keys used to encrypt the packet to support key rotation. The
Key Phase bit is cryptographically protected. Key Phase bit is cryptographically protected.
2.2. Coalesced Packets 2.2. Coalesced Packets
Multiple QUIC packets may be coalesced into a single UDP datagram, Multiple QUIC packets may be coalesced into a single UDP datagram
with a datagram carrying one or more long header packets followed by with a datagram carrying one or more long header packets followed by
zero or one short header packets. When packets are coalesced, the zero or one short header packets. When packets are coalesced, the
Length fields in the long headers are used to separate QUIC packets; Length fields in the long headers are used to separate QUIC packets;
see Section 12.2 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]. The Length field is variable see Section 12.2 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]. The Length field is a
length, and its position in the header is also variable depending on variable-length field, and its position in the header also varies
the length of the source and destination connection ID; see depending on the lengths of the Source and Destination Connection
Section 17.2 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]. IDs; see Section 17.2 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT].
2.3. Use of Port Numbers 2.3. Use of Port Numbers
Applications that have a mapping for TCP as well as QUIC are expected Applications that have a mapping for TCP and QUIC are expected to use
to use the same port number for both services. However, as for all the same port number for both services. However, as for all other
other IETF transports [RFC7605], there is no guarantee that a IETF transports [RFC7605], there is no guarantee that a specific
specific application will use a given registered port, or that a application will use a given registered port or that a given port
given port carries traffic belonging to the respective registered carries traffic belonging to the respective registered service,
service, especially when application layer information is encrypted. especially when application layer information is encrypted. For
For example, [QUIC-HTTP] specifies the use of the HTTP Alternative example, [QUIC-HTTP] specifies the use of the HTTP Alternative
Services mechanism [RFC7838] for discovery of HTTP/3 services on Services mechanism [RFC7838] for discovery of HTTP/3 services on
other ports. other ports.
Further, as QUIC has a connection ID, it is also possible to maintain Further, as QUIC has a connection ID, it is also possible to maintain
multiple QUIC connections over one 5-tuple (protocol, source and multiple QUIC connections over one 5-tuple (protocol, source, and
destination IP address, and source and destination port). However, destination IP address and source and destination port). However, if
if the connection ID is zero-length, all packets of the 5-tuple the connection ID is zero length, all packets of the 5-tuple likely
likely belong to the same QUIC connection. belong to the same QUIC connection.
2.4. The QUIC Handshake 2.4. The QUIC Handshake
New QUIC connections are established using a handshake, which is New QUIC connections are established using a handshake that is
distinguishable on the wire (see Section 3.1 for details), and distinguishable on the wire (see Section 3.1 for details) and
contains some information that can be passively observed. contains some information that can be passively observed.
To illustrate the information visible in the QUIC wire image during To illustrate the information visible in the QUIC wire image during
the handshake, we first show the general communication pattern the handshake, we first show the general communication pattern
visible in the UDP datagrams containing the QUIC handshake, then visible in the UDP datagrams containing the QUIC handshake. Then, we
examine each of the datagrams in detail. examine each of the datagrams in detail.
The QUIC handshake can normally be recognized on the wire through The QUIC handshake can normally be recognized on the wire through
four flights of datagrams labelled "Client Initial", "Server four flights of datagrams labeled "Client Initial", "Server Initial",
Initial", "Client Completion", and "Server Completion", as "Client Completion", and "Server Completion" as illustrated in
illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1.
A handshake starts with the client sending one or more datagrams A handshake starts with the client sending one or more datagrams
containing Initial packets, detailed in Figure 2, which elicits the containing Initial packets (detailed in Figure 2), which elicits the
Server Initial response detailed in Figure 3 typically containing Server Initial response (detailed in Figure 3), which typically
three types of packets: Initial packet(s) with the beginning of the contains three types of packets: Initial packet(s) with the beginning
server's side of the TLS handshake, Handshake packet(s) with the rest of the server's side of the TLS handshake, Handshake packet(s) with
of the server's portion of the TLS handshake, and 1-RTT packet(s), if the rest of the server's portion of the TLS handshake, and 1-RTT
present. packet(s), if present.
Client Server Client Server
| | | |
+----Client Initial----------------------->| +----Client Initial----------------------->|
+----(zero or more 0-RTT)----------------->| +----(zero or more 0-RTT)----------------->|
| | | |
|<-----------------------Server Initial----+ |<-----------------------Server Initial----+
|<--------(1-RTT encrypted data starts)----+ |<--------(1-RTT encrypted data starts)----+
| | | |
+----Client Completion-------------------->| +----Client Completion-------------------->|
+----(1-RTT encrypted data starts)-------->| +----(1-RTT encrypted data starts)-------->|
| | | |
|<--------------------Server Completion----+ |<--------------------Server Completion----+
| | | |
Figure 1: General communication pattern visible in the QUIC handshake Figure 1: General Communication Pattern Visible in the QUIC Handshake
As shown here, the client can send 0-RTT data as soon as it has sent As shown here, the client can send 0-RTT data as soon as it has sent
its Client Hello, and the server can send 1-RTT data as soon as it its ClientHello and the server can send 1-RTT data as soon as it has
has sent its Server Hello. The Client Completion flight contains at sent its ServerHello. The Client Completion flight contains at least
least one Handshake packet and could also include an Initial packet. one Handshake packet and could also include an Initial packet.
QUIC packets in separate contexts during the handshake can be During the handshake, QUIC packets in separate contexts can be
coalesced (see Section 2.2) in order to reduce the number of UDP coalesced (see Section 2.2) in order to reduce the number of UDP
datagrams sent during the handshake. datagrams sent during the handshake.
Handshake packets can arrive out-of-order without impacting the Handshake packets can arrive out-of-order without impacting the
handshake as long as the reordering was not accompanied by extensive handshake as long as the reordering was not accompanied by extensive
delays that trigger a spurious Probe Timeout ({Section 6.2 of delays that trigger a spurious Probe Timeout (Section 6.2 of
RFC9002}). If QUIC packets get lost or reordered, packets belonging [QUIC-RECOVERY]). If QUIC packets get lost or reordered, packets
to the same flight might not be observed in close time succession, belonging to the same flight might not be observed in close time
though the sequence of the flights will not change, because one succession, though the sequence of the flights will not change
flight depends upon the peer's previous flight. because one flight depends upon the peer's previous flight.
Datagrams that contain an Initial packet (Client Initial, Server Datagrams that contain an Initial packet (Client Initial, Server
Initial, and some Client Completion) contain at least 1200 octets of Initial, and some Client Completion) contain at least 1200 octets of
UDP payload. This protects against amplification attacks and UDP payload. This protects against amplification attacks and
verifies that the network path meets the requirements for the minimum verifies that the network path meets the requirements for the minimum
QUIC IP packet size; see Section 14 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]. This is QUIC IP packet size; see Section 14 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]. This is
accomplished by either adding PADDING frames within the Initial accomplished by either adding PADDING frames within the Initial
packet, coalescing other packets with the Initial packet, or leaving packet, coalescing other packets with the Initial packet, or leaving
unused payload in the UDP packet after the Initial packet. A network unused payload in the UDP packet after the Initial packet. A network
path needs to be able to forward at least this size of packet for path needs to be able to forward at least this size of packet for
QUIC to be used. QUIC to be used.
The content of Initial packets is encrypted using Initial Secrets, The content of Initial packets is encrypted using Initial Secrets,
which are derived from a per-version constant and the client's which are derived from a per-version constant and the client's
destination connection ID. That content is therefore observable by Destination Connection ID. That content is therefore observable by
any on-path device that knows the per-version constant and is any on-path device that knows the per-version constant and is
considered visible in this illustration. The content of QUIC considered visible in this illustration. The content of QUIC
Handshake packets is encrypted using keys established during the Handshake packets is encrypted using keys established during the
initial handshake exchange, and is therefore not visible. initial handshake exchange and is therefore not visible.
Initial, Handshake, and 1-RTT packets belong to different Initial, Handshake, and 1-RTT packets belong to different
cryptographic and transport contexts. The Client Completion cryptographic and transport contexts. The Client Completion
(Figure 4) and the Server Completion (Figure 5) flights conclude the (Figure 4) and the Server Completion (Figure 5) flights conclude the
Initial and Handshake contexts, by sending final acknowledgments and Initial and Handshake contexts by sending final acknowledgments and
CRYPTO frames. CRYPTO frames.
+----------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------------------------------+
| UDP header (source and destination UDP ports) | | UDP header (source and destination UDP ports) |
+----------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------------------------------+
| QUIC long header (type = Initial, Version, DCID, SCID) (Length) | QUIC long header (type = Initial, Version, DCID, SCID) (Length)
+----------------------------------------------------------+ | +----------------------------------------------------------+ |
| QUIC CRYPTO frame header | | | QUIC CRYPTO frame header | |
+----------------------------------------------------------+ | +----------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | TLS Client Hello (incl. TLS SNI) | | | | | TLS ClientHello (incl. TLS SNI) | | |
+----------------------------------------------------------+ | +----------------------------------------------------------+ |
| QUIC PADDING frames | | | QUIC PADDING frames | |
+----------------------------------------------------------+<-+ +----------------------------------------------------------+<-+
Figure 2: Example Client Initial datagram without 0-RTT Figure 2: Example Client Initial Datagram Without 0-RTT
A Client Initial packet exposes the version, source and destination A Client Initial packet exposes the Version, Source, and Destination
connection IDs without encryption. The payload of the Initial packet Connection IDs without encryption. The payload of the Initial packet
is protected using the Initial secret. The complete TLS Client is protected using the Initial secret. The complete TLS ClientHello,
Hello, including any TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) present, is including any TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) present, is sent in
sent in one or more CRYPTO frames across one or more QUIC Initial one or more CRYPTO frames across one or more QUIC Initial packets.
packets.
+------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------+
| UDP header (source and destination UDP ports) | | UDP header (source and destination UDP ports) |
+------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------+
| QUIC long header (type = Initial, Version, DCID, SCID) (Length) | QUIC long header (type = Initial, Version, DCID, SCID) (Length)
+------------------------------------------------------------+ | +------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| QUIC CRYPTO frame header | | | QUIC CRYPTO frame header | |
+------------------------------------------------------------+ | +------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| TLS Server Hello | | | TLS ServerHello | |
+------------------------------------------------------------+ | +------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| QUIC ACK frame (acknowledging client hello) | | | QUIC ACK frame (acknowledging client hello) | |
+------------------------------------------------------------+<-+ +------------------------------------------------------------+<-+
| QUIC long header (type = Handshake, Version, DCID, SCID) (Length) | QUIC long header (type = Handshake, Version, DCID, SCID) (Length)
+------------------------------------------------------------+ | +------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| encrypted payload (presumably CRYPTO frames) | | | encrypted payload (presumably CRYPTO frames) | |
+------------------------------------------------------------+<-+ +------------------------------------------------------------+<-+
| QUIC short header | | QUIC short header |
+------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1-RTT encrypted payload | | 1-RTT encrypted payload |
+------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 3: Coalesced Server Initial datagram pattern Figure 3: Coalesced Server Initial Datagram Pattern
The Server Initial datagram also exposes version number, source and The Server Initial datagram also exposes the version number and the
destination connection IDs in the clear; the payload of the Initial Source and Destination Connection IDs in the clear; the payload of
packet(s) is protected using the Initial secret. the Initial packet is protected using the Initial secret.
+------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------+
| UDP header (source and destination UDP ports) | | UDP header (source and destination UDP ports) |
+------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------+
| QUIC long header (type = Initial, Version, DCID, SCID) (Length) | QUIC long header (type = Initial, Version, DCID, SCID) (Length)
+------------------------------------------------------------+ | +------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| QUIC ACK frame (acknowledging Server Initial) | | | QUIC ACK frame (acknowledging Server Initial) | |
+------------------------------------------------------------+<-+ +------------------------------------------------------------+<-+
| QUIC long header (type = Handshake, Version, DCID, SCID) (Length) | QUIC long header (type = Handshake, Version, DCID, SCID) (Length)
+------------------------------------------------------------+ | +------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| encrypted payload (presumably CRYPTO/ACK frames) | | | encrypted payload (presumably CRYPTO/ACK frames) | |
+------------------------------------------------------------+<-+ +------------------------------------------------------------+<-+
| QUIC short header | | QUIC short header |
+------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1-RTT encrypted payload | | 1-RTT encrypted payload |
+------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 4: Coalesced Client Completion datagram pattern Figure 4: Coalesced Client Completion Datagram Pattern
The Client Completion flight does not expose any additional The Client Completion flight does not expose any additional
information; however, as the destination connection ID is server- information; however, as the Destination Connection ID is server-
selected, it usually is not the same ID that is sent in the Client selected, it usually is not the same ID that is sent in the Client
Initial. Client Completion flights contain 1-RTT packets which Initial. Client Completion flights contain 1-RTT packets that
indicate the handshake has completed (see Section 3.2) on the client, indicate the handshake has completed (see Section 3.2) on the client
and for three-way handshake RTT estimation as in Section 3.8. and for three-way handshake RTT estimation as in Section 3.8.
+------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------+
| UDP header (source and destination UDP ports) | | UDP header (source and destination UDP ports) |
+------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------+
| QUIC long header (type = Handshake, Version, DCID, SCID) (Length) | QUIC long header (type = Handshake, Version, DCID, SCID) (Length)
+------------------------------------------------------------+ | +------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| encrypted payload (presumably ACK frame) | | | encrypted payload (presumably ACK frame) | |
+------------------------------------------------------------+<-+ +------------------------------------------------------------+<-+
| QUIC short header | | QUIC short header |
+------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1-RTT encrypted payload | | 1-RTT encrypted payload |
+------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 5: Coalesced Server Completion datagram pattern Figure 5: Coalesced Server Completion Datagram Pattern
Similar to Client Completion, Server Completion also exposes no Similar to Client Completion, Server Completion does not expose
additional information; observing it serves only to determine that additional information; observing it serves only to determine that
the handshake has completed. the handshake has completed.
When the client uses 0-RTT data, the Client Initial flight can also When the client uses 0-RTT data, the Client Initial flight can also
include one or more 0-RTT packets, as shown in Figure 6. include one or more 0-RTT packets as shown in Figure 6.
+----------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------------------------------+
| UDP header (source and destination UDP ports) | | UDP header (source and destination UDP ports) |
+----------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------------------------------+
| QUIC long header (type = Initial, Version, DCID, SCID) (Length) | QUIC long header (type = Initial, Version, DCID, SCID) (Length)
+----------------------------------------------------------+ | +----------------------------------------------------------+ |
| QUIC CRYPTO frame header | | | QUIC CRYPTO frame header | |
+----------------------------------------------------------+ | +----------------------------------------------------------+ |
| TLS Client Hello (incl. TLS SNI) | | | TLS ClientHello (incl. TLS SNI) | |
+----------------------------------------------------------+<-+ +----------------------------------------------------------+<-+
| QUIC long header (type = 0-RTT, Version, DCID, SCID) (Length) | QUIC long header (type = 0-RTT, Version, DCID, SCID) (Length)
+----------------------------------------------------------+ | +----------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 0-RTT encrypted payload | | | 0-RTT encrypted payload | |
+----------------------------------------------------------+<-+ +----------------------------------------------------------+<-+
Figure 6: Coalesced 0-RTT Client Initial datagram Figure 6: Coalesced 0-RTT Client Initial Datagram
When a 0-RTT packet is coalesced with an Initial packet, the datagram When a 0-RTT packet is coalesced with an Initial packet, the datagram
will be padded to 1200 bytes. Additional datagrams containing only will be padded to 1200 bytes. Additional datagrams containing only
0-RTT packets with long headers can be sent after the client Initial 0-RTT packets with long headers can be sent after the client Initial
packet(s), containing more 0-RTT data. The amount of 0-RTT protected packet, which contains more 0-RTT data. The amount of 0-RTT
data that can be sent in the first flight is limited by the initial protected data that can be sent in the first flight is limited by the
congestion window, typically to around 10 packets (see Section 7.2 of initial congestion window, typically to around 10 packets (see
[QUIC-RECOVERY]). Section 7.2 of [QUIC-RECOVERY]).
2.5. Integrity Protection of the Wire Image 2.5. Integrity Protection of the Wire Image
As soon as the cryptographic context is established, all information As soon as the cryptographic context is established, all information
in the QUIC header, including exposed information, is integrity in the QUIC header, including exposed information, is integrity
protected. Further, information that was exposed in packets sent protected. Further, information that was exposed in packets sent
before the cryptographic context was established is validated during before the cryptographic context was established is validated during
the cryptographic handshake. Therefore, devices on path cannot alter the cryptographic handshake. Therefore, devices on path cannot alter
any information or bits in QUIC packets. Such alterations would any information or bits in QUIC packets. Such alterations would
cause the integrity check to fail, which results in the receiver cause the integrity check to fail, which results in the receiver
discarding the packet. Some parts of Initial packets could be discarding the packet. Some parts of Initial packets could be
altered by removing and re-applying the authenticated encryption altered by removing and reapplying the authenticated encryption
without immediate discard at the receiver. However, the without immediate discard at the receiver. However, the
cryptographic handshake validates most fields and any modifications cryptographic handshake validates most fields and any modifications
in those fields will result in connection establishment failing in those fields will result in a connection establishment failure
later. later.
2.6. Connection ID and Rebinding 2.6. Connection ID and Rebinding
The connection ID in the QUIC packet headers allows association of The connection ID in the QUIC packet headers allows association of
QUIC packets using information independent of the 5-tuple. This QUIC packets using information independent of the 5-tuple. This
allows rebinding of a connection after one of the endpoints - usually allows rebinding of a connection after one of the endpoints (usually
the client - has experienced an address change. Further it can be the client) has experienced an address change. Further, it can be
used by in-network devices to ensure that related 5-tuple flows are used by in-network devices to ensure that related 5-tuple flows are
appropriately balanced together (see Section Section 4.4). appropriately balanced together (see Section 4.4).
Client and server each choose a connection ID during the handshake; Client and server each choose a connection ID during the handshake;
for example, a server might request that a client use a connection for example, a server might request that a client use a connection
ID, whereas the client might choose a zero-length value. Connection ID, whereas the client might choose a zero-length value. Connection
IDs for either endpoint may change during the lifetime of a IDs for either endpoint may change during the lifetime of a
connection, with the new connection ID being supplied via encrypted connection, with the new connection ID being supplied via encrypted
frames (see Section 5.1 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]). Therefore, observing a frames (see Section 5.1 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]). Therefore, observing a
new connection ID does not necessarily indicate a new connection. new connection ID does not necessarily indicate a new connection.
[QUIC-LB] specifies algorithms for encoding the server mapping in a [QUIC-LB] specifies algorithms for encoding the server mapping in a
skipping to change at page 13, line 9 skipping to change at line 546
supports migration that opens an attack vector on specific servers or supports migration that opens an attack vector on specific servers or
pools. The best way to obscure an encoding is to appear random to pools. The best way to obscure an encoding is to appear random to
any other observers, which is most rigorously achieved with any other observers, which is most rigorously achieved with
encryption. As a result, any attempt to infer information from encryption. As a result, any attempt to infer information from
specific parts of a connection ID is unlikely to be useful. specific parts of a connection ID is unlikely to be useful.
2.7. Packet Numbers 2.7. Packet Numbers
The Packet Number field is always present in the QUIC packet header The Packet Number field is always present in the QUIC packet header
in version 1; however, it is always encrypted. The encryption key in version 1; however, it is always encrypted. The encryption key
for packet number protection on Initial packets -- which are sent for packet number protection on Initial packets (which are sent
before cryptographic context establishment -- is specific to the QUIC before cryptographic context establishment) is specific to the QUIC
version, while packet number protection on subsequent packets uses version while packet number protection on subsequent packets uses
secrets derived from the end-to-end cryptographic context. Packet secrets derived from the end-to-end cryptographic context. Packet
numbers are therefore not part of the wire image that is visible to numbers are therefore not part of the wire image that is visible to
on-path observers. on-path observers.
2.8. Version Negotiation and Greasing 2.8. Version Negotiation and Greasing
Version Negotiation packets are used by the server to indicate that a Version Negotiation packets are used by the server to indicate that a
requested version from the client is not supported (see Section 6 of requested version from the client is not supported (see Section 6 of
[QUIC-TRANSPORT]. Version Negotiation packets are not intrinsically [QUIC-TRANSPORT]). Version Negotiation packets are not intrinsically
protected, but future QUIC versions could use later encrypted protected, but future QUIC versions could use later encrypted
messages to verify that they were authentic. Therefore, any messages to verify that they were authentic. Therefore, any
modification of this list will be detected and may cause the modification of this list will be detected and may cause the
endpoints to terminate the connection attempt. endpoints to terminate the connection attempt.
Also note that the list of versions in the Version Negotiation packet Also note that the list of versions in the Version Negotiation packet
may contain reserved versions. This mechanism is used to avoid may contain reserved versions. This mechanism is used to avoid
ossification in the implementation of the selection mechanism. ossification in the implementation of the selection mechanism.
Further, a client may send an Initial packet with a reserved version Further, a client may send an Initial packet with a reserved version
number to trigger version negotiation. In the Version Negotiation number to trigger version negotiation. In the Version Negotiation
packet, the connection IDs of the client's Initial packet are packet, the connection IDs of the client's Initial packet are
reflected to provide a proof of return-routability. Therefore, reflected to provide a proof of return-routability. Therefore,
changing this information will also cause the connection to fail. changing this information will also cause the connection to fail.
QUIC is expected to evolve rapidly, so new versions, both QUIC is expected to evolve rapidly. Therefore, new versions (both
experimental and IETF standard versions, will be deployed on the experimental and IETF standard versions) will be deployed on the
Internet more often than with other commonly deployed Internet- and Internet more often than with other commonly deployed Internet and
transport-layer protocols. Use of the version number field for transport-layer protocols. Use of the version number field for
traffic recognition will therefore behave differently than with these traffic recognition will therefore behave differently than with these
protocols. Using a particular version number to recognize valid QUIC protocols. Using a particular version number to recognize valid QUIC
traffic is likely to persistently miss a fraction of QUIC flows, and traffic is likely to persistently miss a fraction of QUIC flows and
completely fail in the near future. Reliance on the version number completely fail in the near future. Reliance on the version number
field for the purposes of admission control is similarly likely to field for the purposes of admission control is similarly likely to
rapidly lead to unintended failure modes. Admission of QUIC traffic rapidly lead to unintended failure modes. Admission of QUIC traffic
regardless of version avoids these failure modes, avoids unnecessary regardless of version avoids these failure modes, avoids unnecessary
deployment delays, and supports continuous version-based evolution. deployment delays, and supports continuous version-based evolution.
3. Network-Visible Information about QUIC Flows 3. Network-Visible Information about QUIC Flows
This section addresses the different kinds of observations and This section addresses the different kinds of observations and
inferences that can be made about QUIC flows by a passive observer in inferences that can be made about QUIC flows by a passive observer in
the network based on the wire image in Section 2. Here we assume a the network based on the wire image in Section 2. Here, we assume a
bidirectional observer (one that can see packets in both directions bidirectional observer (one that can see packets in both directions
in the sequence in which they are carried on the wire) unless noted, in the sequence in which they are carried on the wire) unless noted,
but typically without access to any keying information. but typically without access to any keying information.
3.1. Identifying QUIC Traffic 3.1. Identifying QUIC Traffic
The QUIC wire image is not specifically designed to be The QUIC wire image is not specifically designed to be
distinguishable from other UDP traffic by a passive observer in the distinguishable from other UDP traffic by a passive observer in the
network. While certain QUIC applications may be heuristically network. While certain QUIC applications may be heuristically
identifiable on a per-application basis, there is no general method identifiable on a per-application basis, there is no general method
for distinguishing QUIC traffic from otherwise-unclassifiable UDP for distinguishing QUIC traffic from otherwise unclassifiable UDP
traffic on a given link. Any unrecognized UDP traffic may therefore traffic on a given link. Therefore, any unrecognized UDP traffic may
be QUIC traffic. be QUIC traffic.
At the time of writing, two application bindings for QUIC have been At the time of writing, two application bindings for QUIC have been
published or adopted by the IETF: HTTP/3 [QUIC-HTTP] and DNS over published or adopted by the IETF: HTTP/3 [QUIC-HTTP] and DNS over
Dedicated QUIC Connections [I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic]. These are Dedicated QUIC Connections [RFC9250]. These are both known to have
both known at the time of writing to have active Internet active Internet deployments, so an assumption that all QUIC traffic
deployments, so an assumption that all QUIC traffic is HTTP/3 is not is HTTP/3 is not valid. HTTP/3 uses UDP port 443 by convention but
valid. HTTP/3 uses UDP port 443 by convention but various methods various methods can be used to specify alternate port numbers. Other
can be used to specify alternate port numbers. Other applications applications (e.g., Microsoft's SMB over QUIC) also use UDP port 443
(e.g., Microsoft's SMB over QUIC) also use UDP port 443 by default. by default. Therefore, simple assumptions about whether a given flow
Therefore, simple assumptions about whether a given flow is using is using QUIC (or indeed which application might be using QUIC) based
QUIC, or indeed which application it might be using QUIC, based solely upon a UDP port number may not hold; see Section 5 of
solely upon a UDP port number may not hold; see also Section 5 of
[RFC7605]. [RFC7605].
While the second-most-significant bit (0x40) of the first octet is While the second-most-significant bit (0x40) of the first octet is
set to 1 in most QUIC packets of the current version (see Section 2.1 set to 1 in most QUIC packets of the current version (see Section 2.1
and Section 17 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]), this method of recognizing QUIC and Section 17 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]), this method of recognizing QUIC
traffic is not reliable. First, it only provides one bit of traffic is not reliable. First, it only provides one bit of
information and is prone to collision with UDP-based protocols other information and is prone to collision with UDP-based protocols other
than those considered in [RFC7983]. Second, this feature of the wire than those considered in [RFC7983]. Second, this feature of the wire
image is not invariant [QUIC-INVARIANTS] and may change in future image is not invariant [QUIC-INVARIANTS] and may change in future
versions of the protocol, or even be negotiated during the handshake versions of the protocol or even be negotiated during the handshake
via the use of an extension [QUIC-GREASE]. via the use of an extension [QUIC-GREASE].
Even though transport parameters transmitted in the client's Initial Even though transport parameters transmitted in the client's Initial
packet are observable by the network, they cannot be modified by the packet are observable by the network, they cannot be modified by the
network without causing connection failure. Further, the reply from network without causing a connection failure. Further, the reply
the server cannot be observed, so observers on the network cannot from the server cannot be observed, so observers on the network
know which parameters are actually in use. cannot know which parameters are actually in use.
3.1.1. Identifying Negotiated Version 3.1.1. Identifying Negotiated Version
An in-network observer assuming that a set of packets belongs to a An in-network observer assuming that a set of packets belongs to a
QUIC flow might infer the version number in use by observing the QUIC flow might infer the version number in use by observing the
handshake. If the version number in an Initial packet of the server handshake. If the version number in an Initial packet of the server
response is subsequently seen in a packet from the client, that response is subsequently seen in a packet from the client, that
version has been accepted by both endpoints to be used for the rest version has been accepted by both endpoints to be used for the rest
of the connection (see Section 2 of of the connection (see Section 2 of [QUIC-VERSION-NEGOTIATION]).
[I-D.ietf-quic-version-negotiation]).
The negotiated version cannot be identified for flows for which a The negotiated version cannot be identified for flows in which a
handshake is not observed, such as in the case of connection handshake is not observed, such as in the case of connection
migration; however, it might be possible to associate a flow with a migration. However, it might be possible to associate a flow with a
flow for which a version has been identified; see Section 3.5. flow for which a version has been identified; see Section 3.5.
3.1.2. First Packet Identification for Garbage Rejection 3.1.2. First Packet Identification for Garbage Rejection
A related question is whether the first packet of a given flow on a A related question is whether the first packet of a given flow on a
port known to be associated with QUIC is a valid QUIC packet. This port known to be associated with QUIC is a valid QUIC packet. This
determination supports in-network filtering of garbage UDP packets determination supports in-network filtering of garbage UDP packets
(reflection attacks, random backscatter, etc.). While heuristics (reflection attacks, random backscatter, etc.). While heuristics
based on the first byte of the packet (packet type) could be used to based on the first byte of the packet (packet type) could be used to
separate valid from invalid first packet types, the deployment of separate valid from invalid first packet types, the deployment of
such heuristics is not recommended, as bits in the first byte may such heuristics is not recommended as bits in the first byte may have
have different meanings in future versions of the protocol. different meanings in future versions of the protocol.
3.2. Connection Confirmation 3.2. Connection Confirmation
This document focuses on QUIC version 1, and this Connection This document focuses on QUIC version 1, and this Connection
Confirmation section applies only to packets belonging to QUIC Confirmation section applies only to packets belonging to QUIC
version 1 flows; for purposes of on-path observation, it assumes that version 1 flows; for purposes of on-path observation, it assumes that
these packets have been identified as such through the observation of these packets have been identified as such through the observation of
a version number exchange as described above. a version number exchange as described above.
Connection establishment uses Initial and Handshake packets Connection establishment uses Initial and Handshake packets
containing a TLS handshake, and Retry packets that do not contain containing a TLS handshake and Retry packets that do not contain
parts of the handshake. Connection establishment can therefore be parts of the handshake. Connection establishment can therefore be
detected using heuristics similar to those used to detect TLS over detected using heuristics similar to those used to detect TLS over
TCP. A client initiating a connection may also send data in 0-RTT TCP. A client initiating a connection may also send data in 0-RTT
packets directly after the Initial packet containing the TLS Client packets directly after the Initial packet containing the TLS
Hello. Since packets may be reordered or lost in the network, 0-RTT ClientHello. Since packets may be reordered or lost in the network,
packets could be seen before the Initial packet. 0-RTT packets could be seen before the Initial packet.
Note that in this version of QUIC, clients send Initial packets Note that in this version of QUIC, clients send Initial packets
before servers do, servers send Handshake packets before clients do, before servers do, servers send Handshake packets before clients do,
and only clients send Initial packets with tokens. Therefore, an and only clients send Initial packets with tokens. Therefore, an
endpoint can be identified as a client or server by an on-path endpoint can be identified as a client or server by an on-path
observer. An attempted connection after Retry can be detected by observer. An attempted connection after Retry can be detected by
correlating the contents of the Retry packet with the Token and the correlating the contents of the Retry packet with the Token and the
Destination Connection ID fields of the new Initial packet. Destination Connection ID fields of the new Initial packet.
3.3. Distinguishing Acknowledgment Traffic 3.3. Distinguishing Acknowledgment Traffic
Some deployed in-network functions distinguish packets that carry Some deployed in-network functions distinguish packets that carry
only acknowledgment (ACK-only) information from packets carrying only acknowledgment (ACK-only) information from packets carrying
upper-layer data in order to attempt to enhance performance, for upper-layer data in order to attempt to enhance performance (for
example by queueing ACKs differently or manipulating ACK signaling example, by queuing ACKs differently or manipulating ACK signaling
[RFC3449]. Distinguishing ACK packets is possible in TCP, but is not [RFC3449]). Distinguishing ACK packets is possible in TCP, but is
supported by QUIC, since acknowledgment signaling is carried inside not supported by QUIC since acknowledgment signaling is carried
QUIC's encrypted payload, and ACK manipulation is impossible. inside QUIC's encrypted payload and ACK manipulation is impossible.
Specifically, heuristics attempting to distinguish ACK-only packets Specifically, heuristics attempting to distinguish ACK-only packets
from payload-carrying packets based on packet size are likely to from payload-carrying packets based on packet size are likely to fail
fail, and are not recommended to use as a way to construe internals and are not recommended to use as a way to construe internals of
of QUIC's operation as those mechanisms can change, e.g., due to the QUIC's operation as those mechanisms can change, e.g., due to the use
use of extensions. of extensions.
3.4. Server Name Indication (SNI) 3.4. Server Name Indication (SNI)
The client's TLS ClientHello may contain a Server Name Indication The client's TLS ClientHello may contain a Server Name Indication
(SNI) [RFC6066] extension, by which the client reveals the name of (SNI) extension [RFC6066] by which the client reveals the name of the
the server it intends to connect to, in order to allow the server to server it intends to connect to in order to allow the server to
present a certificate based on that name. SNI information is present a certificate based on that name. If present, SNI
available to unidirectional observers on the client-to-server path, information is available to unidirectional observers on the client-
if present. to-server path if it.
The TLS ClientHello may also contain an Application-Layer Protocol The TLS ClientHello may also contain an Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation (ALPN) [RFC7301] extension, by which the client exposes Negotiation (ALPN) extension [RFC7301], by which the client exposes
the names of application-layer protocols it supports; an observer can the names of application-layer protocols it supports; an observer can
deduce that one of those protocols will be used if the connection deduce that one of those protocols will be used if the connection
continues. continues.
Work is currently underway in the TLS working group to encrypt the Work is currently underway in the TLS working group to encrypt the
contents of the ClientHello in TLS 1.3 [TLS-ECH]. This would make contents of the ClientHello in TLS 1.3 [TLS-ECH]. This would make
SNI-based application identification impossible by on-path SNI-based application identification impossible by on-path
observation for QUIC and other protocols that use TLS. observation for QUIC and other protocols that use TLS.
3.4.1. Extracting Server Name Indication (SNI) Information 3.4.1. Extracting Server Name Indication (SNI) Information
If the ClientHello is not encrypted, SNI can be derived from the If the ClientHello is not encrypted, SNI can be derived from the
client's Initial packet(s) by calculating the Initial secret to client's Initial packets by calculating the Initial secret to decrypt
decrypt the packet payload and parsing the QUIC CRYPTO frame(s) the packet payload and parsing the QUIC CRYPTO frames containing the
containing the TLS ClientHello. TLS ClientHello.
As both the derivation of the Initial secret and the structure of the As both the derivation of the Initial secret and the structure of the
Initial packet itself are version-specific, the first step is always Initial packet itself are version specific, the first step is always
to parse the version number (the second through fifth bytes of the to parse the version number (the second through fifth bytes of the
long header). Note that only long header packets carry the version long header). Note that only long header packets carry the version
number, so it is necessary to also check if the first bit of the QUIC number, so it is necessary to also check if the first bit of the QUIC
packet is set to 1, indicating a long header. packet is set to 1, which indicates a long header.
Note that proprietary QUIC versions, that have been deployed before Note that proprietary QUIC versions that have been deployed before
standardization, might not set the first bit in a QUIC long header standardization might not set the first bit in a QUIC long header
packet to 1. However, it is expected that these versions will packet to 1. However, it is expected that these versions will
gradually disappear over time and therefore do not require any gradually disappear over time and therefore do not require any
special consideration or treatment. special consideration or treatment.
When the version has been identified as QUIC version 1, the packet When the version has been identified as QUIC version 1, the packet
type needs to be verified as an Initial packet by checking that the type needs to be verified as an Initial packet by checking that the
third and fourth bits of the header are both set to 0. Then the third and fourth bits of the header are both set to 0. Then, the
Destination Connection ID needs to be extracted from the packet. The Destination Connection ID needs to be extracted from the packet. The
Initial secret is calculated using the version-specific Initial salt, Initial secret is calculated using the version-specific Initial salt
as described in Section 5.2 of [QUIC-TLS]. The length of the as described in Section 5.2 of [QUIC-TLS]. The length of the
connection ID is indicated in the 6th byte of the header followed by connection ID is indicated in the 6th byte of the header followed by
the connection ID itself. the connection ID itself.
Note that subsequent Initial packets might contain a Destination Note that subsequent Initial packets might contain a Destination
Connection ID other than the one used to generate the Initial secret. Connection ID other than the one used to generate the Initial secret.
Therefore, attempts to decrypt these packets using the procedure Therefore, attempts to decrypt these packets using the procedure
above might fail unless the Initial secret is retained by the above might fail unless the Initial secret is retained by the
observer. observer.
To determine the end of the packet header and find the start of the To determine the end of the packet header and find the start of the
payload, the packet number length, the source connection ID length, payload, the Packet Number Length, the Source Connection ID Length,
and the token length need to be extracted. The packet number length and the Token Length need to be extracted. The Packet Number Length
is defined by the seventh and eight bits of the header as described is defined by the seventh and eighth bits of the header as described
in Section 17.2 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT], but is protected as described in in Section 17.2 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT], but is protected as described in
Section 5.4 of [QUIC-TLS]. The source connection ID length is Section 5.4 of [QUIC-TLS]. The Source Connection ID Length is
specified in the byte after the destination connection ID. The token specified in the byte after the Destination Connection ID. The Token
length, which follows the source connection ID, is a variable-length Length, which follows the Source Connection ID, is a variable-length
integer as specified in Section 16 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]. integer as specified in Section 16 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT].
After decryption, the client's Initial packet(s) can be parsed to After decryption, the client's Initial packets can be parsed to
detect the CRYPTO frame(s) that contains the TLS ClientHello, which detect the CRYPTO frames that contain the TLS ClientHello, which then
then can be parsed similarly to TLS over TCP connections. Note that can be parsed similarly to TLS over TCP connections. Note that there
there can be multiple CRYPTO frames spread out over one or more can be multiple CRYPTO frames spread out over one or more Initial
Initial packets, and they might not be in order, so reassembling the packets and they might not be in order, so reassembling the CRYPTO
CRYPTO stream by parsing offsets and lengths is required. Further, stream by parsing offsets and lengths is required. Further, the
the client's Initial packet(s) may contain other frames, so the first client's Initial packets may contain other frames, so the first bytes
bytes of each frame need to be checked to identify the frame type and of each frame need to be checked to identify the frame type and
determine whether the frame can be skipped over. Note that the determine whether the frame can be skipped over. Note that the
length of the frames is dependent on the frame type; see Section 18 length of the frames is dependent on the frame type; see Section 18
of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]. E.g., PADDING frames, each consisting of a of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]. For example, PADDING frames (each consisting of
single zero byte, may occur before, after, or between CRYPTO frames. a single zero byte) may occur before, after, or between CRYPTO
However, extensions might define additional frame types. If an frames. However, extensions might define additional frame types. If
unknown frame type is encountered, it is impossible to know the an unknown frame type is encountered, it is impossible to know the
length of that frame which prevents skipping over it, and therefore length of that frame, which prevents skipping over it; therefore,
parsing fails. parsing fails.
3.5. Flow Association 3.5. Flow Association
The QUIC connection ID (see Section 2.6) is designed to allow a The QUIC connection ID (see Section 2.6) is designed to allow a
coordinating on-path device, such as a load-balancer, to associate coordinating on-path device, such as a load balancer, to associate
two flows when one of the endpoints changes address. This change can two flows when one of the endpoints changes address. This change can
be due to NAT rebinding or address migration. be due to NAT rebinding or address migration.
The connection ID must change upon intentional address change by an The connection ID must change upon intentional address change by an
endpoint, and connection ID negotiation is encrypted, so it is not endpoint and connection ID negotiation is encrypted; therefore, it is
possible for a passive observer to link intended changes of address not possible for a passive observer to link intended changes of
using the connection ID. address using the connection ID.
When one endpoint's address unintentionally changes, as is the case When one endpoint's address unintentionally changes, as is the case
with NAT rebinding, an on-path observer may be able to use the with NAT rebinding, an on-path observer may be able to use the
connection ID to associate the flow on the new address with the flow connection ID to associate the flow on the new address with the flow
on the old address. on the old address.
A network function that attempts to use the connection ID to A network function that attempts to use the connection ID to
associate flows must be robust to the failure of this technique. associate flows must be robust to the failure of this technique.
Since the connection ID may change multiple times during the lifetime Since the connection ID may change multiple times during the lifetime
of a connection, packets with the same 5-tuple but different of a connection, packets with the same 5-tuple but different
connection IDs might or might not belong to the same connection. connection IDs might or might not belong to the same connection.
Likewise, packets with the same connection ID but different 5-tuples Likewise, packets with the same connection ID but different 5-tuples
might not belong to the same connection, either. might not belong to the same connection either.
Connection IDs should be treated as opaque; see Section 4.4 for Connection IDs should be treated as opaque; see Section 4.4 for
caveats regarding connection ID selection at servers. caveats regarding connection ID selection at servers.
3.6. Flow Teardown 3.6. Flow Teardown
QUIC does not expose the end of a connection; the only indication to QUIC does not expose the end of a connection; the only indication to
on-path devices that a flow has ended is that packets are no longer on-path devices that a flow has ended is that packets are no longer
observed. Stateful devices on path such as NATs and firewalls must observed. Therefore, stateful devices on path such as NATs and
therefore use idle timeouts to determine when to drop state for QUIC firewalls must use idle timeouts to determine when to drop state for
flows; see Section 4.2. QUIC flows; see Section 4.2.
3.7. Flow Symmetry Measurement 3.7. Flow Symmetry Measurement
QUIC explicitly exposes which side of a connection is a client and QUIC explicitly exposes which side of a connection is a client and
which side is a server during the handshake. In addition, the which side is a server during the handshake. In addition, the
symmetry of a flow (whether primarily client-to-server, primarily symmetry of a flow (whether it is primarily client-to-server,
server-to-client, or roughly bidirectional, as input to basic traffic primarily server-to-client, or roughly bidirectional, as input to
classification techniques) can be inferred through the measurement of basic traffic classification techniques) can be inferred through the
data rate in each direction. Note that QUIC packets containing only measurement of data rate in each direction. Note that QUIC packets
control frames (such as ACK-only packets) may be padded. Padding, containing only control frames (such as ACK-only packets) may be
though optional, may conceal connection roles or flow symmetry padded. Padding, though optional, may conceal connection roles or
information. flow symmetry information.
3.8. Round-Trip Time (RTT) Measurement 3.8. Round-Trip Time (RTT) Measurement
The round-trip time (RTT) of QUIC flows can be inferred by The round-trip time (RTT) of QUIC flows can be inferred by
observation once per flow, during the handshake, as in passive TCP observation once per flow during the handshake in passive TCP
measurement; this requires parsing of the QUIC packet header and measurement; this requires parsing of the QUIC packet header and
recognition of the handshake, as illustrated in Section 2.4. It can recognition of the handshake, as illustrated in Section 2.4. It can
also be inferred during the flow's lifetime, if the endpoints use the also be inferred during the flow's lifetime if the endpoints use the
spin bit facility described below and in Section 17.3.1 of spin bit facility described below and in Section 17.3.1 of
[QUIC-TRANSPORT]. RTT measurement is available to unidirectional [QUIC-TRANSPORT]. RTT measurement is available to unidirectional
observers when the spin bit is enabled. observers when the spin bit is enabled.
3.8.1. Measuring Initial RTT 3.8.1. Measuring Initial RTT
In the common case, the delay between the client's Initial packet In the common case, the delay between the client's Initial packet
(containing the TLS ClientHello) and the server's Initial packet (containing the TLS ClientHello) and the server's Initial packet
(containing the TLS ServerHello) represents the RTT component on the (containing the TLS ServerHello) represents the RTT component on the
path between the observer and the server. The delay between the path between the observer and the server. The delay between the
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observer-to-server RTT components together. This measurement observer-to-server RTT components together. This measurement
necessarily includes all transport- and application-layer delay at necessarily includes all transport- and application-layer delay at
both endpoints. both endpoints.
3.8.2. Using the Spin Bit for Passive RTT Measurement 3.8.2. Using the Spin Bit for Passive RTT Measurement
The spin bit provides a version-specific method to measure per-flow The spin bit provides a version-specific method to measure per-flow
RTT from observation points on the network path throughout the RTT from observation points on the network path throughout the
duration of a connection. See Section 17.4 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT] for duration of a connection. See Section 17.4 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT] for
the definition of the spin bit in Version 1 of QUIC. Endpoint the definition of the spin bit in Version 1 of QUIC. Endpoint
participation in spin bit signaling is optional. That is, while its participation in spin bit signaling is optional. While its location
location is fixed in this version of QUIC, an endpoint can is fixed in this version of QUIC, an endpoint can unilaterally choose
unilaterally choose to not support "spinning" the bit. to not support "spinning" the bit.
Use of the spin bit for RTT measurement by devices on path is only Use of the spin bit for RTT measurement by devices on path is only
possible when both endpoints enable it. Some endpoints may disable possible when both endpoints enable it. Some endpoints may disable
use of the spin bit by default, others only in specific deployment use of the spin bit by default, others only in specific deployment
scenarios, e.g., for servers and clients where the RTT would reveal scenarios, e.g., for servers and clients where the RTT would reveal
the presence of a VPN or proxy. To avoid making these connections the presence of a VPN or proxy. To avoid making these connections
identifiable based on the usage of the spin bit, all endpoints identifiable based on the usage of the spin bit, all endpoints
randomly disable "spinning" for at least one eighth of connections, randomly disable "spinning" for at least one eighth of connections,
even if otherwise enabled by default. An endpoint not participating even if otherwise enabled by default. An endpoint not participating
in spin bit signaling for a given connection can use a fixed spin in spin bit signaling for a given connection can use a fixed spin
value for the duration of the connection, or can set the bit randomly value for the duration of the connection or can set the bit randomly
on each packet sent. on each packet sent.
When in use, the latency spin bit in each direction changes value When in use, the latency spin bit in each direction changes value
once per RTT any time that both endpoints are sending packets once per RTT any time that both endpoints are sending packets
continuously. An on-path observer can observe the time difference continuously. An on-path observer can observe the time difference
between edges (changes from 1 to 0 or 0 to 1) in the spin bit signal between edges (changes from 1 to 0 or 0 to 1) in the spin bit signal
in a single direction to measure one sample of end-to-end RTT. This in a single direction to measure one sample of end-to-end RTT. This
mechanism follows the principles of protocol measurability laid out mechanism follows the principles of protocol measurability laid out
in [IPIM]. in [IPIM].
Note that this measurement, as with passive RTT measurement for TCP, Note that this measurement, as with passive RTT measurement for TCP,
includes all transport protocol delay (e.g., delayed sending of includes all transport protocol delay (e.g., delayed sending of
acknowledgments) and/or application layer delay (e.g., waiting for a acknowledgments) and/or application layer delay (e.g., waiting for a
response to be generated). It therefore provides devices on path a response to be generated). It therefore provides devices on path a
good instantaneous estimate of the RTT as experienced by the good instantaneous estimate of the RTT as experienced by the
application. application.
However, application-limited and flow-control-limited senders can However, application-limited and flow-control-limited senders can
have application and transport layer delay, respectively, that are have application- and transport-layer delay, respectively, that are
much greater than network RTT. When the sender is application- much greater than network RTT. When the sender is application-
limited and e.g., only sends small amount of periodic application limited and e.g., only sends small amount of periodic application
traffic, where that period is longer than the RTT, measuring the spin traffic, where that period is longer than the RTT, measuring the spin
bit provides information about the application period, not the bit provides information about the application period, not the
network RTT. network RTT.
Since the spin bit logic at each endpoint considers only samples from Since the spin bit logic at each endpoint considers only samples from
packets that advance the largest packet number, signal generation packets that advance the largest packet number, signal generation
itself is resistant to reordering. However, reordering can cause itself is resistant to reordering. However, reordering can cause
problems at an observer by causing spurious edge detection and problems at an observer by causing spurious edge detection and
therefore inaccurate (i.e., lower) RTT estimates, if reordering therefore inaccurate (i.e., lower) RTT estimates, if reordering
occurs across a spin-bit flip in the stream. occurs across a spin bit flip in the stream.
Simple heuristics based on the observed data rate per flow or changes Simple heuristics based on the observed data rate per flow or changes
in the RTT series can be used to reject bad RTT samples due to lost in the RTT series can be used to reject bad RTT samples due to lost
or reordered edges in the spin signal, as well as application or flow or reordered edges in the spin signal, as well as application or flow
control limitation; for example, QoF [TMA-QOF] rejects component RTTs control limitation; for example, QoF [TMA-QOF] rejects component RTTs
significantly higher than RTTs over the history of the flow. These significantly higher than RTTs over the history of the flow. These
heuristics may use the handshake RTT as an initial RTT estimate for a heuristics may use the handshake RTT as an initial RTT estimate for a
given flow. Usually such heuristics would also detect if the spin is given flow. Usually such heuristics would also detect if the spin is
either constant or randomly set for a connection. either constant or randomly set for a connection.
An on-path observer that can see traffic in both directions (from An on-path observer that can see traffic in both directions (from
client to server and from server to client) can also use the spin bit client to server and from server to client) can also use the spin bit
to measure "upstream" and "downstream" component RTT; i.e, the to measure "upstream" and "downstream" component RTT; i.e, the
component of the end-to-end RTT attributable to the paths between the component of the end-to-end RTT attributable to the paths between the
observer and the server and the observer and the client, observer and the server and between the observer and the client,
respectively. It does this by measuring the delay between a spin respectively. It does this by measuring the delay between a spin
edge observed in the upstream direction and that observed in the edge observed in the upstream direction and that observed in the
downstream direction, and vice versa. downstream direction, and vice versa.
Raw RTT samples generated using these techniques can be processed in Raw RTT samples generated using these techniques can be processed in
various ways to generate useful network performance metrics. A various ways to generate useful network performance metrics. A
simple linear smoothing or moving minimum filter can be applied to simple linear smoothing or moving minimum filter can be applied to
the stream of RTT samples to get a more stable estimate of the stream of RTT samples to get a more stable estimate of
application-experienced RTT. RTT samples measured from the spin bit application-experienced RTT. RTT samples measured from the spin bit
can also be used to generate RTT distribution information, including can also be used to generate RTT distribution information, including
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4.1. Passive Network Performance Measurement and Troubleshooting 4.1. Passive Network Performance Measurement and Troubleshooting
Limited RTT measurement is possible by passive observation of QUIC Limited RTT measurement is possible by passive observation of QUIC
traffic; see Section 3.8. No passive measurement of loss is possible traffic; see Section 3.8. No passive measurement of loss is possible
with the present wire image. Limited observation of upstream with the present wire image. Limited observation of upstream
congestion may be possible via the observation of Congestion congestion may be possible via the observation of Congestion
Experienced (CE) markings in the IP header [RFC3168] on ECN-enabled Experienced (CE) markings in the IP header [RFC3168] on ECN-enabled
QUIC traffic. QUIC traffic.
On-path devices can also make measurements of RTT, loss and other On-path devices can also make measurements of RTT, loss, and other
performance metrics when information is carried in an additional performance metrics when information is carried in an additional
network-layer packet header (Section 6 of [RFC9065] describes use of network-layer packet header (Section 6 of [RFC9065] describes the use
operations, administration and management (OAM) information). Using of Operations, Administration, and Management (OAM) information).
network-layer approaches also has the advantage that common Using network-layer approaches also has the advantage that common
observation and analysis tools can be consistently used for multiple observation and analysis tools can be consistently used for multiple
transport protocols, however, these techniques are often limited to transport protocols; however, these techniques are often limited to
measurements within one or multiple cooperating domains. measurements within one or multiple cooperating domains.
4.2. Stateful Treatment of QUIC Traffic 4.2. Stateful Treatment of QUIC Traffic
Stateful treatment of QUIC traffic (e.g., at a firewall or NAT Stateful treatment of QUIC traffic (e.g., at a firewall or NAT
middlebox) is possible through QUIC traffic and version middlebox) is possible through QUIC traffic and version
identification (Section 3.1) and observation of the handshake for identification (Section 3.1) and observation of the handshake for
connection confirmation (Section 3.2). The lack of any visible end- connection confirmation (Section 3.2). The lack of any visible end-
of-flow signal (Section 3.6) means that this state must be purged of-flow signal (Section 3.6) means that this state must be purged
either through timers or through least-recently-used eviction, either through timers or least-recently-used eviction depending on
depending on application requirements. application requirements.
While QUIC has no clear network-visible end-of-flow signal and While QUIC has no clear network-visible end-of-flow signal and
therefore does require timer-based state removal, the QUIC handshake therefore does require timer-based state removal, the QUIC handshake
indicates confirmation by both ends of a valid bidirectional indicates confirmation by both ends of a valid bidirectional
transmission. As soon as the handshake completed, timers should be transmission. As soon as the handshake completed, timers should be
set long enough to also allow for short idle time during a valid set long enough to also allow for short idle time during a valid
transmission. transmission.
[RFC4787] requires a network state timeout that is not less than 2 [RFC4787] requires a network state timeout that is not less than 2
minutes for most UDP traffic. However, in practice, a QUIC endpoint minutes for most UDP traffic. However, in practice, a QUIC endpoint
can experience lower timeouts, in the range of 30 to 60 seconds can experience lower timeouts in the range of 30 to 60 seconds
[QUIC-TIMEOUT]. [QUIC-TIMEOUT].
In contrast, [RFC5382] recommends a state timeout of more than 2 In contrast, [RFC5382] recommends a state timeout of more than 2
hours for TCP, given that TCP is a connection-oriented protocol with hours for TCP given that TCP is a connection-oriented protocol with
well-defined closure semantics. Even though QUIC has explicitly been well-defined closure semantics. Even though QUIC has explicitly been
designed to tolerate NAT rebindings, decreasing the NAT timeout is designed to tolerate NAT rebindings, decreasing the NAT timeout is
not recommended, as it may negatively impact application performance not recommended as it may negatively impact application performance
or incentivize endpoints to send very frequent keep-alive packets. or incentivize endpoints to send very frequent keep-alive packets.
The recommendation is therefore that, even when lower state timeouts The recommendation is therefore that, even when lower state timeouts
are used for other UDP traffic, a state timeout of at least two are used for other UDP traffic, a state timeout of at least two
minutes ought to be used for QUIC traffic. minutes ought to be used for QUIC traffic.
If state is removed too early, this could lead to black-holing of If state is removed too early, this could lead to black-holing of
incoming packets after a short idle period. To detect this incoming packets after a short idle period. To detect this
situation, a timer at the client needs to expire before a re- situation, a timer at the client needs to expire before a re-
establishment can happen (if at all), which would lead to establishment can happen (if at all), which would lead to
unnecessarily long delays in an otherwise working connection. unnecessarily long delays in an otherwise working connection.
Furthermore, not all endpoints use routing architectures where Furthermore, not all endpoints use routing architectures where
connections will survive a port or address change. So even when the connections will survive a port or address change. Even when the
client revives the connection, a NAT rebinding can cause a routing client revives the connection, a NAT rebinding can cause a routing
mismatch where a packet is not even delivered to the server that mismatch where a packet is not even delivered to the server that
might support address migration. For these reasons, the limits in might support address migration. For these reasons, the limits in
[RFC4787] are important to avoid black-holing of packets (and hence [RFC4787] are important to avoid black-holing of packets (and hence
avoid interrupting the flow of data to the client), especially where avoid interrupting the flow of data to the client), especially where
devices are able to distinguish QUIC traffic from other UDP payloads. devices are able to distinguish QUIC traffic from other UDP payloads.
The QUIC header optionally contains a connection ID which could The QUIC header optionally contains a connection ID, which could
provide additional entropy beyond the 5-tuple. The QUIC handshake provide additional entropy beyond the 5-tuple. The QUIC handshake
needs to be observed in order to understand whether the connection ID needs to be observed in order to understand whether the connection ID
is present and what length it has. However, connection IDs may be is present and what length it has. However, connection IDs may be
renegotiated after the handshake, and this renegotiation is not renegotiated after the handshake, and this renegotiation is not
visible to the path. Therefore, using the connection ID as a flow visible to the path. Therefore, using the connection ID as a flow
key field for stateful treatment of flows is not recommended as key field for stateful treatment of flows is not recommended as
connection ID changes will cause undetectable and unrecoverable loss connection ID changes will cause undetectable and unrecoverable loss
of state in the middle of a connection. In particular, the use of of state in the middle of a connection. In particular, the use of
the connection ID for functions that require state to make a the connection ID for functions that require state to make a
forwarding decision is not viable as it will break connectivity, or forwarding decision is not viable as it will break connectivity, or
at minimum cause long timeout-based delays before this problem is at minimum, cause long timeout-based delays before this problem is
detected by the endpoints and the connection can potentially be re- detected by the endpoints and the connection can potentially be re-
established. established.
Use of connection IDs is specifically discouraged for NAT Use of connection IDs is specifically discouraged for NAT
applications. If a NAT hits an operational limit, it is recommended applications. If a NAT hits an operational limit, it is recommended
to rather drop the initial packets of a flow (see also Section 4.5), to rather drop the initial packets of a flow (see also Section 4.5),
which potentially triggers TCP fallback. Use of the connection ID to which potentially triggers TCP fallback. Use of the connection ID to
multiplex multiple connections on the same IP address/port pair is multiplex multiple connections on the same IP address/port pair is
not a viable solution as it risks connectivity breakage, in case the not a viable solution as it risks connectivity breakage in case the
connection ID changes. connection ID changes.
4.3. Address Rewriting to Ensure Routing Stability 4.3. Address Rewriting to Ensure Routing Stability
While QUIC's migration capability makes it possible for a connection While QUIC's migration capability makes it possible for a connection
to survive client address changes, this does not work if the routers to survive client address changes, this does not work if the routers
or switches in the server infrastructure route using the address-port or switches in the server infrastructure route using the address-port
4-tuple. If infrastructure routes on addresses only, NAT rebinding 4-tuple. If infrastructure routes on addresses only, NAT rebinding
or address migration will cause packets to be delivered to the wrong or address migration will cause packets to be delivered to the wrong
server. [QUIC-LB] describes a way to addresses this problem by server. [QUIC-LB] describes a way to addresses this problem by
coordinating the selection and use of connection IDs between load- coordinating the selection and use of connection IDs between load
balancers and servers. balancers and servers.
Applying address translation at a middlebox to maintain a stable Applying address translation at a middlebox to maintain a stable
address-port mapping for flows based on connection ID might seem like address-port mapping for flows based on connection ID might seem like
a solution to this problem. However, hiding information about the a solution to this problem. However, hiding information about the
change of the IP address or port conceals important and security- change of the IP address or port conceals important and security-
relevant information from QUIC endpoints and as such would facilitate relevant information from QUIC endpoints, and as such, would
amplification attacks (see Section 8 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]). A NAT facilitate amplification attacks (see Section 8 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]).
function that hides peer address changes prevents the other end from A NAT function that hides peer address changes prevents the other end
detecting and mitigating attacks as the endpoint cannot verify from detecting and mitigating attacks as the endpoint cannot verify
connectivity to the new address using QUIC PATH_CHALLENGE and connectivity to the new address using QUIC PATH_CHALLENGE and
PATH_RESPONSE frames. PATH_RESPONSE frames.
In addition, a change of IP address or port is also an input signal In addition, a change of IP address or port is also an input signal
to other internal mechanisms in QUIC. When a path change is to other internal mechanisms in QUIC. When a path change is
detected, path-dependent variables like congestion control parameters detected, path-dependent variables like congestion control parameters
will be reset protecting the new path from overload. will be reset, which protects the new path from overload.
4.4. Server Cooperation with Load Balancers 4.4. Server Cooperation with Load Balancers
In the case of networking architectures that include load balancers, In the case of networking architectures that include load balancers,
the connection ID can be used as a way for the server to signal the connection ID can be used as a way for the server to signal
information about the desired treatment of a flow to the load information about the desired treatment of a flow to the load
balancers. Guidance on assigning connection IDs is given in balancers. Guidance on assigning connection IDs is given in
[QUIC-APPLICABILITY]. [QUIC-LB] describes a system for coordinating [QUIC-APPLICABILITY]. [QUIC-LB] describes a system for coordinating
selection and use of connection IDs between load-balancers and selection and use of connection IDs between load balancers and
servers. servers.
4.5. Filtering Behavior 4.5. Filtering Behavior
[RFC4787] describes possible packet filtering behaviors that relate [RFC4787] describes possible packet-filtering behaviors that relate
to NATs but is often also used is other scenarios where packet to NATs but are often also used in other scenarios where packet
filtering is desired. Though the guidance there holds, a filtering is desired. Though the guidance there holds, a
particularly unwise behavior admits a handful of UDP packets and then particularly unwise behavior admits a handful of UDP packets and then
makes a decision to whether or not filter later packets in the same makes a decision to whether or not filter later packets in the same
connection. QUIC applications are encouraged to fall back to TCP if connection. QUIC applications are encouraged to fall back to TCP if
early packets do not arrive at their destination early packets do not arrive at their destination
[QUIC-APPLICABILITY], as QUIC is based on UDP and there are known [QUIC-APPLICABILITY], as QUIC is based on UDP and there are known
blocks of UDP traffic (see Section 4.6). Admitting a few packets blocks of UDP traffic (see Section 4.6). Admitting a few packets
allows the QUIC endpoint to determine that the path accepts QUIC. allows the QUIC endpoint to determine that the path accepts QUIC.
Sudden drops afterwards will result in slow and costly timeouts Sudden drops afterwards will result in slow and costly timeouts
before abandoning the connection. before abandoning the connection.
4.6. UDP Blocking, Throttling, and NAT Binding 4.6. UDP Blocking, Throttling, and NAT Binding
Today, UDP is the most prevalent DDoS vector, since it is easy for Today, UDP is the most prevalent DDoS vector, since it is easy for
compromised non-admin applications to send a flood of large UDP compromised non-admin applications to send a flood of large UDP
packets (while with TCP the attacker gets throttled by the congestion packets (while with TCP the attacker gets throttled by the congestion
controller) or to craft reflection and amplification attacks. Some controller) or to craft reflection and amplification attacks;
networks therefore block UDP traffic. With increased deployment of therefore, some networks block UDP traffic. With increased
QUIC, there is also an increased need to allow UDP traffic on ports deployment of QUIC, there is also an increased need to allow UDP
used for QUIC. However, if UDP is generally enabled on these ports, traffic on ports used for QUIC. However, if UDP is generally enabled
UDP flood attacks may also use the same ports. One possible response on these ports, UDP flood attacks may also use the same ports. One
to this threat is to throttle UDP traffic on the network, allocating possible response to this threat is to throttle UDP traffic on the
a fixed portion of the network capacity to UDP and blocking UDP network, allocating a fixed portion of the network capacity to UDP
datagrams over that cap. As the portion of QUIC traffic compared to and blocking UDP datagrams over that cap. As the portion of QUIC
TCP is also expected to increase over time, using such a limit is not traffic compared to TCP is also expected to increase over time, using
recommended but if done, limits might need to be adapted dynamically. such a limit is not recommended; if this is done, limits might need
to be adapted dynamically.
Further, if UDP traffic is desired to be throttled, it is recommended Further, if UDP traffic is desired to be throttled, it is recommended
to block individual QUIC flows entirely rather than dropping packets to block individual QUIC flows entirely rather than dropping packets
indiscriminately. When the handshake is blocked, QUIC-capable indiscriminately. When the handshake is blocked, QUIC-capable
applications may fall back to TCP. However, blocking a random applications may fall back to TCP. However, blocking a random
fraction of QUIC packets across 4-tuples will allow many QUIC fraction of QUIC packets across 4-tuples will allow many QUIC
handshakes to complete, preventing TCP fallback, but these handshakes to complete, preventing TCP fallback, but these
connections will suffer from severe packet loss (see also connections will suffer from severe packet loss (see also
Section 4.5). Therefore, UDP throttling should be realized by per- Section 4.5). Therefore, UDP throttling should be realized by per-
flow policing, as opposed to per-packet policing. Note that this flow policing as opposed to per-packet policing. Note that this per-
per-flow policing should be stateless to avoid problems with stateful flow policing should be stateless to avoid problems with stateful
treatment of QUIC flows (see Section 4.2), for example blocking a treatment of QUIC flows (see Section 4.2), for example, blocking a
portion of the space of values of a hash function over the addresses portion of the space of values of a hash function over the addresses
and ports in the UDP datagram. While QUIC endpoints are often able and ports in the UDP datagram. While QUIC endpoints are often able
to survive address changes, e.g., by NAT rebindings, blocking a to survive address changes, e.g., by NAT rebindings, blocking a
portion of the traffic based on 5-tuple hashing increases the risk of portion of the traffic based on 5-tuple hashing increases the risk of
black-holing an active connection when the address changes. black-holing an active connection when the address changes.
Note that some source ports are assumed to be reflection attack Note that some source ports are assumed to be reflection attack
vectors by some servers; see Section 8.1 of [QUIC-APPLICABILITY]. As vectors by some servers; see Section 8.1 of [QUIC-APPLICABILITY]. As
a result, NAT binding to these source ports can result in that a result, NAT binding to these source ports can result in that
traffic being blocked. traffic being blocked.
4.7. DDoS Detection and Mitigation 4.7. DDoS Detection and Mitigation
On-path observation of the transport headers of packets can be used On-path observation of the transport headers of packets can be used
for various security functions. For example, Denial of Service (DoS) for various security functions. For example, Denial of Service (DoS)
and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks against the infrastructure or and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks against the infrastructure or
against an endpoint can be detected and mitigated by characterising against an endpoint can be detected and mitigated by characterizing
anomalous traffic. Other uses include support for security audits anomalous traffic. Other uses include support for security audits
(e.g., verifying the compliance with ciphersuites); client and (e.g., verifying the compliance with cipher suites), client and
application fingerprinting for inventory; and to provide alerts for application fingerprinting for inventory, and providing alerts for
network intrusion detection and other next generation firewall network intrusion detection and other next-generation firewall
functions. functions.
Current practices in detection and mitigation of DDoS attacks Current practices in detection and mitigation of DDoS attacks
generally involve classification of incoming traffic (as packets, generally involve classification of incoming traffic (as packets,
flows, or some other aggregate) into "good" (productive) and "bad" flows, or some other aggregate) into "good" (productive) and "bad"
(DDoS) traffic, and then differential treatment of this traffic to (DDoS) traffic, and then differential treatment of this traffic to
forward only good traffic. This operation is often done in a forward only good traffic. This operation is often done in a
separate specialized mitigation environment through which all traffic separate specialized mitigation environment through which all traffic
is filtered; a generalized architecture for separation of concerns in is filtered; a generalized architecture for separation of concerns in
mitigation is given in [DOTS-ARCH]. mitigation is given in [DOTS-ARCH].
Efficient classification of this DDoS traffic in the mitigation Efficient classification of this DDoS traffic in the mitigation
environment is key to the success of this approach. Limited first- environment is key to the success of this approach. Limited first
packet garbage detection as in Section 3.1.2 and stateful tracking of packet garbage detection as in Section 3.1.2 and stateful tracking of
QUIC traffic as in Section 4.2 above may be useful during QUIC traffic as mentioned in Section 4.2 above may be useful during
classification. classification.
Note that the use of a connection ID to support connection migration Note that using a connection ID to support connection migration
renders 5-tuple based filtering insufficient to detect active flows renders 5-tuple-based filtering insufficient to detect active flows
and requires more state to be maintained by DDoS defense systems if and requires more state to be maintained by DDoS defense systems if
support of migration of QUIC flows is desired. For the common case support of migration of QUIC flows is desired. For the common case
of NAT rebinding, where the client's address changes without the of NAT rebinding, where the client's address changes without the
client's intent or knowledge, DDoS defense systems can detect a client's intent or knowledge, DDoS defense systems can detect a
change in the client's endpoint address by linking flows based on the change in the client's endpoint address by linking flows based on the
server's connection IDs. However, QUIC's linkability resistance server's connection IDs. However, QUIC's linkability resistance
ensures that a deliberate connection migration is accompanied by a ensures that a deliberate connection migration is accompanied by a
change in the connection ID. In this case, the connection ID can not change in the connection ID. In this case, the connection ID cannot
be used to distinguish valid, active traffic from new attack traffic. be used to distinguish valid, active traffic from new attack traffic.
It is also possible for endpoints to directly support security It is also possible for endpoints to directly support security
functions such as DoS classification and mitigation. Endpoints can functions such as DoS classification and mitigation. Endpoints can
cooperate with an in-network device directly by e.g., sharing cooperate with an in-network device directly by e.g., sharing
information about connection IDs. information about connection IDs.
Another potential method could use an on-path network device that Another potential method could use an on-path network device that
relies on pattern inferences in the traffic and heuristics or machine relies on pattern inferences in the traffic and heuristics or machine
learning instead of processing observed header information. learning instead of processing observed header information.
However, it is questionable whether connection migrations must be However, it is questionable whether connection migrations must be
supported during a DDoS attack. While unintended migration without a supported during a DDoS attack. While unintended migration without a
connection ID change can be more easily supported, it might be connection ID change can be supported much easier, it might be
acceptable to not support migrations of active QUIC connections that acceptable to not support migrations of active QUIC connections that
are not visible to the network functions performing the DDoS are not visible to the network functions performing the DDoS
detection. As soon as the connection blocking is detected by the detection. As soon as the connection blocking is detected by the
client, the client may be able to rely on the 0-RTT data mechanism client, the client may be able to rely on the 0-RTT data mechanism
provided by QUIC. When clients migrate to a new path, they should be provided by QUIC. When clients migrate to a new path, they should be
prepared for the migration to fail and attempt to reconnect quickly. prepared for the migration to fail and attempt to reconnect quickly.
Beyond in-network DDoS protection mechanisms, TCP syncookies Beyond in-network DDoS protection mechanisms, TCP SYN cookies
[RFC4937] are a well-established method of mitigating some kinds of [RFC4987] are a well-established method of mitigating some kinds of
TCP DDoS attacks. QUIC Retry packets are the functional analogue to TCP DDoS attacks. QUIC Retry packets are the functional analogue to
syncookies, forcing clients to prove possession of their IP address SYN cookies, forcing clients to prove possession of their IP address
before committing server state. However, there are safeguards in before committing server state. However, there are safeguards in
QUIC against unsolicited injection of these packets by intermediaries QUIC against unsolicited injection of these packets by intermediaries
who do not have consent of the end server. See [QUIC-RETRY] for who do not have consent of the end server. See [QUIC-RETRY] for
standard ways for intermediaries to send Retry packets on behalf of standard ways for intermediaries to send Retry packets on behalf of
consenting servers. consenting servers.
4.8. Quality of Service Handling and ECMP Routing 4.8. Quality of Service Handling and ECMP Routing
It is expected that any QoS handling in the network, e.g., based on It is expected that any QoS handling in the network, e.g., based on
use of DiffServ Code Points (DSCPs) [RFC2475] as well as Equal-Cost use of Diffserv Code Points (DSCPs) [RFC2475] as well as Equal-Cost
Multi-Path (ECMP) routing, is applied on a per flow-basis (and not Multi-Path (ECMP) routing, is applied on a per-flow basis (and not
per-packet) and as such that all packets belonging to the same active per-packet) and as such that all packets belonging to the same active
QUIC connection get uniform treatment. QUIC connection get uniform treatment.
Using ECMP to distribute packets from a single flow across multiple Using ECMP to distribute packets from a single flow across multiple
network paths or any other non-uniform treatment of packets belong to network paths or any other nonuniform treatment of packets belong to
the same connection could result in variations in order, delivery the same connection could result in variations in order, delivery
rate, and drop rate. As feedback about loss or delay of each packet rate, and drop rate. As feedback about loss or delay of each packet
is used as input to the congestion controller, these variations could is used as input to the congestion controller, these variations could
adversely affect performance. Depending on the loss recovery adversely affect performance. Depending on the loss recovery
mechanism implemented, QUIC may be more tolerant of packet re- mechanism that is implemented, QUIC may be more tolerant of packet
ordering than typical TCP traffic (see Section 2.7). However, the reordering than typical TCP traffic (see Section 2.7). However, the
recovery mechanism used by a flow cannot be known by the network and recovery mechanism used by a flow cannot be known by the network and
therefore reordering tolerance should be considered as unknown. therefore reordering tolerance should be considered as unknown.
Note that the 5-tuple of a QUIC connection can change due to Note that the 5-tuple of a QUIC connection can change due to
migration. In this case different flows are observed by the path and migration. In this case different flows are observed by the path and
maybe be treated differently, as congestion control is usually reset may be treated differently, as congestion control is usually reset on
on migration (see also Section 3.5). migration (see also Section 3.5).
4.9. Handling ICMP Messages 4.9. Handling ICMP Messages
Datagram Packetization Layer PMTU Discovery (PLPMTUD) can be used by Datagram Packetization Layer PMTU Discovery (PLPMTUD) can be used by
QUIC to probe for the supported PMTU. PLPMTUD optionally uses ICMP QUIC to probe for the supported PMTU. PLPMTUD optionally uses ICMP
messages (e.g., IPv6 Packet Too Big messages). Given known attacks messages (e.g., IPv6 Packet Too Big (PTB) messages). Given known
with the use of ICMP messages, the use of PLPMTUD in QUIC has been attacks with the use of ICMP messages, the use of PLPMTUD in QUIC has
designed to safely use but not rely on receiving ICMP feedback (see been designed to safely use but not rely on receiving ICMP feedback
Section 14.2.1. of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]). (see Section 14.2.1 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]).
Networks are recommended to forward these ICMP messages and retain as Networks are recommended to forward these ICMP messages and retain as
much of the original packet as possible without exceeding the minimum much of the original packet as possible without exceeding the minimum
MTU for the IP version when generating ICMP messages as recommended MTU for the IP version when generating ICMP messages as recommended
in [RFC1812] and [RFC4443]. in [RFC1812] and [RFC4443].
4.10. Guiding Path MTU 4.10. Guiding Path MTU
Some network segments support 1500-byte packets, but can only do so Some network segments support 1500-byte packets, but can only do so
by fragmenting at a lower layer before traversing a network segment by fragmenting at a lower layer before traversing a network segment
with a smaller MTU, and then reassembling within the network segment. with a smaller MTU, and then reassembling within the network segment.
This is permissible even when the IP layer is IPv6 or IPv4 with the This is permissible even when the IP layer is IPv6 or IPv4 with the
DF bit set, because fragmentation occurs below the IP layer. Don't Fragment (DF) bit set, because fragmentation occurs below the
However, this process can add to compute and memory costs, leading to IP layer. However, this process can add to compute and memory costs,
a bottleneck that limits network capacity. In such networks this leading to a bottleneck that limits network capacity. In such
generates a desire to influence a majority of senders to use smaller networks, this generates a desire to influence a majority of senders
packets, to avoid exceeding limited reassembly capacity. to use smaller packets to avoid exceeding limited reassembly
capacity.
For TCP, MSS clamping (Section 3.2 of [RFC4459]) is often used to For TCP, Maximum Segment Size (MSS) clamping (Section 3.2 of
change the sender's TCP maximum segment size, but QUIC requires a [RFC4459]) is often used to change the sender's TCP maximum segment
different approach. Section 14 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT] advises senders size, but QUIC requires a different approach. Section 14 of
to probe larger sizes using Datagram Packetization Layer PMTU [QUIC-TRANSPORT] advises senders to probe larger sizes using DPLPMTUD
Discovery ([DPLPMTUD]) or Path Maximum Transmission Unit Discovery [DPLPMTUD] or Path Maximum Transmission Unit Discovery (PMTUD)
(PMTUD: [RFC1191] and [RFC8201]). This mechanism encourages senders [RFC1191] [RFC8201]. This mechanism encourages senders to approach
to approach the maximum packet size, which could then cause the maximum packet size, which could then cause fragmentation within
fragmentation within a network segment of which they may not be a network segment of which they may not be aware.
aware.
If path performance is limited when forwarding larger packets, an on- If path performance is limited when forwarding larger packets, an on-
path device should support a maximum packet size for a specific path device should support a maximum packet size for a specific
transport flow and then consistently drop all packets that exceed the transport flow and then consistently drop all packets that exceed the
configured size when the inner IPv4 packet has DF set, or IPv6 is configured size when the inner IPv4 packet has DF set or IPv6 is
used. used.
Networks with configurations that would lead to fragmentation of Networks with configurations that would lead to fragmentation of
large packets within a network segment should drop such packets large packets within a network segment should drop such packets
rather than fragmenting them. Network operators who plan to rather than fragmenting them. Network operators who plan to
implement a more selective policy may start by focusing on QUIC. implement a more selective policy may start by focusing on QUIC.
QUIC flows cannot always be easily distinguished from other UDP QUIC flows cannot always be easily distinguished from other UDP
traffic, but we assume at least some portion of QUIC traffic can be traffic, but we assume at least some portion of QUIC traffic can be
identified (see Section 3.1). For networks supporting QUIC, it is identified (see Section 3.1). For networks supporting QUIC, it is
recommended that a path drops any packet larger than the recommended that a path drops any packet larger than the
fragmentation size. When a QUIC endpoint uses DPLPMTUD, it will use fragmentation size. When a QUIC endpoint uses DPLPMTUD, it will use
a QUIC probe packet to discover the PMTU. If this probe is lost, it a QUIC probe packet to discover the PMTU. If this probe is lost, it
will not impact the flow of QUIC data. will not impact the flow of QUIC data.
IPv4 routers generate an ICMP message when a packet is dropped IPv4 routers generate an ICMP message when a packet is dropped
because the link MTU was exceeded. [RFC8504] specifies how an IPv6 because the link MTU was exceeded. [RFC8504] specifies how an IPv6
node generates an ICMPv6 Packet Too Big message (PTB) in this case. node generates an ICMPv6 PTB in this case. PMTUD relies upon an
PMTUD relies upon an endpoint receiving such PTB messages [RFC8201], endpoint receiving such PTB messages [RFC8201], whereas DPLPMTUD does
whereas DPLPMTUD does not reply upon these messages, but still can not reply upon these messages, but can still optionally use these to
optionally use these to improve performance Section 4.6 of improve performance Section 4.6 of [DPLPMTUD].
[DPLPMTUD].
A network cannot know in advance which discovery method is used by a A network cannot know in advance which discovery method is used by a
QUIC endpoint, so it should send a PTB message in addition to QUIC endpoint, so it should send a PTB message in addition to
dropping an oversized packet. A generated PTB message should be dropping an oversized packet. A generated PTB message should be
compliant with the validation requirements of Section 14.2.1 of compliant with the validation requirements of Section 14.2.1 of
[QUIC-TRANSPORT], otherwise it will be ignored for PMTU discovery. [QUIC-TRANSPORT], otherwise it will be ignored for PMTU discovery.
This provides a signal to the endpoint to prevent the packet size This provides a signal to the endpoint to prevent the packet size
from growing too large, which can entirely avoid network segment from growing too large, which can entirely avoid network segment
fragmentation for that flow. fragmentation for that flow.
Endpoints can cache PMTU information, in the IP-layer cache. This Endpoints can cache PMTU information in the IP-layer cache. This
short-term consistency between the PMTU for flows can help avoid an short-term consistency between the PMTU for flows can help avoid an
endpoint using a PMTU that is inefficient. The IP cache can also endpoint using a PMTU that is inefficient. The IP cache can also
influence the PMTU value of other IP flows that use the same path influence the PMTU value of other IP flows that use the same path
[RFC8201][DPLPMTUD], including IP packets carrying protocols other [RFC8201] [DPLPMTUD], including IP packets carrying protocols other
than QUIC. The representation of an IP path is implementation- than QUIC. The representation of an IP path is implementation
specific [RFC8201]. specific [RFC8201].
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA. This document has no actions for IANA.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
QUIC is an encrypted and authenticated transport. That means, once QUIC is an encrypted and authenticated transport. That means once
the cryptographic handshake is complete, QUIC endpoints discard most the cryptographic handshake is complete, QUIC endpoints discard most
packets that are not authenticated, greatly limiting the ability of packets that are not authenticated, greatly limiting the ability of
an attacker to interfere with existing connections. an attacker to interfere with existing connections.
However, some information is still observable, as supporting However, some information is still observable as supporting
manageability of QUIC traffic inherently involves tradeoffs with the manageability of QUIC traffic inherently involves trade-offs with the
confidentiality of QUIC's control information; this entire document confidentiality of QUIC's control information; this entire document
is therefore security-relevant. is therefore security-relevant.
More security considerations for QUIC are discussed in More security considerations for QUIC are discussed in
[QUIC-TRANSPORT] and [QUIC-TLS], generally considering active or [QUIC-TRANSPORT] and [QUIC-TLS], which generally consider active or
passive attackers in the network as well as attacks on specific QUIC passive attackers in the network as well as attacks on specific QUIC
mechanism. mechanism.
Version Negotiation packets do not contain any mechanism to prevent Version Negotiation packets do not contain any mechanism to prevent
version downgrade attacks. However, future versions of QUIC that use version downgrade attacks. However, future versions of QUIC that use
Version Negotiation packets are required to define a mechanism that Version Negotiation packets are required to define a mechanism that
is robust against version downgrade attacks. Therefore, a network is robust against version downgrade attacks. Therefore, a network
node should not attempt to impact version selection, as version node should not attempt to impact version selection, as version
downgrade may result in connection failure. downgrade may result in connection failure.
9. References 7. References
9.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[QUIC-TLS] Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using TLS to Secure [QUIC-TLS] Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using TLS to Secure
QUIC", RFC 9001, DOI 10.17487/RFC9001, May 2021, QUIC", RFC 9001, DOI 10.17487/RFC9001, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9001>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9001>.
[QUIC-TRANSPORT] [QUIC-TRANSPORT]
Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000, Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021, DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
9.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[DOTS-ARCH] [DOTS-ARCH]
Mortensen, A., Ed., Reddy.K, T., Ed., Andreasen, F., Mortensen, A., Ed., Reddy.K, T., Ed., Andreasen, F.,
Teague, N., and R. Compton, "DDoS Open Threat Signaling Teague, N., and R. Compton, "DDoS Open Threat Signaling
(DOTS) Architecture", RFC 8811, DOI 10.17487/RFC8811, (DOTS) Architecture", RFC 8811, DOI 10.17487/RFC8811,
August 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8811>. August 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8811>.
[DPLPMTUD] Fairhurst, G., Jones, T., Tüxen, M., Rüngeler, I., and T. [DPLPMTUD] Fairhurst, G., Jones, T., Tüxen, M., Rüngeler, I., and T.
Völker, "Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery for Völker, "Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery for
Datagram Transports", RFC 8899, DOI 10.17487/RFC8899, Datagram Transports", RFC 8899, DOI 10.17487/RFC8899,
September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8899>. September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8899>.
[IPIM] Allman, M., Beverly, R., and B. Trammell, "In-Protocol [IPIM] Allman, M., Beverly, R., and B. Trammell, "In-Protocol
Internet Measurement (arXiv preprint 1612.02902)", 9 Internet Measurement (arXiv preprint 1612.02902)", 9
December 2016, <https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.02902>. December 2016, <https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.02902>.
[QUIC-APPLICABILITY] [QUIC-APPLICABILITY]
Kuehlewind, M. and B. Trammell, "Applicability of the QUIC Kuehlewind, M. and B. Trammell, "Applicability of the QUIC
Transport Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, Transport Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-quic-applicability-17, 11 July 2022, draft-ietf-quic-applicability-18, 15 July 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-quic- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-quic-
applicability-17>. applicability-18>.
[QUIC-GREASE] [QUIC-GREASE]
Thomson, M., "Greasing the QUIC Bit", Work in Progress, Thomson, M., "Greasing the QUIC Bit", RFC 9287,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-quic-bit-grease-04, 8 June DOI 10.17487/RFC9287, August 2022,
2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf- <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9287>.
quic-bit-grease-04>.
[QUIC-HTTP] [QUIC-HTTP]
Bishop, M., "HTTP/3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, Bishop, M., Ed., "HTTP/3", RFC 9114, DOI 10.17487/RFC9114,
draft-ietf-quic-http-34, 2 February 2021, June 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9114>.
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-quic-
http-34>.
[QUIC-INVARIANTS] [QUIC-INVARIANTS]
Thomson, M., "Version-Independent Properties of QUIC", Thomson, M., "Version-Independent Properties of QUIC",
RFC 8999, DOI 10.17487/RFC8999, May 2021, RFC 8999, DOI 10.17487/RFC8999, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8999>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8999>.
[QUIC-LB] Duke, M., Banks, N., and C. Huitema, "QUIC-LB: Generating [QUIC-LB] Duke, M., Banks, N., and C. Huitema, "QUIC-LB: Generating
Routable QUIC Connection IDs", Work in Progress, Internet- Routable QUIC Connection IDs", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-14, 11 July 2022, Draft, draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-14, 11 July 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-quic- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-quic-
load-balancers-14>. load-balancers-14>.
[QUIC-RECOVERY] [QUIC-RECOVERY]
Iyengar, J., Ed. and I. Swett, Ed., "QUIC Loss Detection Iyengar, J., Ed. and I. Swett, Ed., "QUIC Loss Detection
and Congestion Control", RFC 9002, DOI 10.17487/RFC9002, and Congestion Control", RFC 9002, DOI 10.17487/RFC9002,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9002>. May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9002>.
[QUIC-RETRY] [QUIC-RETRY]
Duke, M. and N. Banks, "QUIC Retry Offload", Work in Duke, M. and N. Banks, "QUIC Retry Offload", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-duke-quic-retry-offload- Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-quic-retry-offload-
00, 28 March 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/ 00, 25 May 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-duke-quic-retry-offload-00>. draft-ietf-quic-retry-offload-00>.
[QUIC-TIMEOUT] [QUIC-TIMEOUT]
Roskind, J., "QUIC (IETF-88 TSV Area Presentation)", 7 Roskind, J., "QUIC", IETF-88 TSV Area Presentation, 7
November 2013, November 2013,
<https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/88/slides/slides-88- <https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/88/slides/slides-88-
tsvarea-10.pdf>. tsvarea-10.pdf>.
[I-D.ietf-quic-version-negotiation] [QUIC-VERSION-NEGOTIATION]
Schinazi, D. and E. Rescorla, "Compatible Version Schinazi, D. and E. Rescorla, "Compatible Version
Negotiation for QUIC", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, Negotiation for QUIC", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-quic-version-negotiation-09, 11 July 2022, draft-ietf-quic-version-negotiation-09, 11 July 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-quic- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-quic-
version-negotiation-09>. version-negotiation-09>.
[RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191, [RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990, DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1191>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>.
[RFC1812] Baker, F., Ed., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers", [RFC1812] Baker, F., Ed., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers",
RFC 1812, DOI 10.17487/RFC1812, June 1995, RFC 1812, DOI 10.17487/RFC1812, June 1995,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1812>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1812>.
[RFC2475] Blake, S., Black, D., Carlson, M., Davies, E., Wang, Z., [RFC2475] Blake, S., Black, D., Carlson, M., Davies, E., Wang, Z.,
and W. Weiss, "An Architecture for Differentiated and W. Weiss, "An Architecture for Differentiated
Services", RFC 2475, DOI 10.17487/RFC2475, December 1998, Services", RFC 2475, DOI 10.17487/RFC2475, December 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2475>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2475>.
[RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition [RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP", of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",
RFC 3168, DOI 10.17487/RFC3168, September 2001, RFC 3168, DOI 10.17487/RFC3168, September 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3168>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3168>.
[RFC3449] Balakrishnan, H., Padmanabhan, V., Fairhurst, G., and M. [RFC3449] Balakrishnan, H., Padmanabhan, V., Fairhurst, G., and M.
Sooriyabandara, "TCP Performance Implications of Network Sooriyabandara, "TCP Performance Implications of Network
Path Asymmetry", BCP 69, RFC 3449, DOI 10.17487/RFC3449, Path Asymmetry", BCP 69, RFC 3449, DOI 10.17487/RFC3449,
December 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3449>. December 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3449>.
[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet [RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89, Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89,
RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006, RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4443>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.
[RFC4459] Savola, P., "MTU and Fragmentation Issues with In-the- [RFC4459] Savola, P., "MTU and Fragmentation Issues with In-the-
Network Tunneling", RFC 4459, DOI 10.17487/RFC4459, April Network Tunneling", RFC 4459, DOI 10.17487/RFC4459, April
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4459>. 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4459>.
[RFC4787] Audet, F., Ed. and C. Jennings, "Network Address [RFC4787] Audet, F., Ed. and C. Jennings, "Network Address
Translation (NAT) Behavioral Requirements for Unicast Translation (NAT) Behavioral Requirements for Unicast
UDP", BCP 127, RFC 4787, DOI 10.17487/RFC4787, January UDP", BCP 127, RFC 4787, DOI 10.17487/RFC4787, January
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4787>. 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4787>.
[RFC4937] Arberg, P. and V. Mammoliti, "IANA Considerations for PPP [RFC4987] Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common
over Ethernet (PPPoE)", RFC 4937, DOI 10.17487/RFC4937, Mitigations", RFC 4987, DOI 10.17487/RFC4987, August 2007,
June 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4937>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4987>.
[RFC5382] Guha, S., Ed., Biswas, K., Ford, B., Sivakumar, S., and P. [RFC5382] Guha, S., Ed., Biswas, K., Ford, B., Sivakumar, S., and P.
Srisuresh, "NAT Behavioral Requirements for TCP", BCP 142, Srisuresh, "NAT Behavioral Requirements for TCP", BCP 142,
RFC 5382, DOI 10.17487/RFC5382, October 2008, RFC 5382, DOI 10.17487/RFC5382, October 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5382>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5382>.
[RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6066>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.
[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan, [RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301, Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7301>. July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[RFC7605] Touch, J., "Recommendations on Using Assigned Transport [RFC7605] Touch, J., "Recommendations on Using Assigned Transport
Port Numbers", BCP 165, RFC 7605, DOI 10.17487/RFC7605, Port Numbers", BCP 165, RFC 7605, DOI 10.17487/RFC7605,
August 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7605>. August 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7605>.
[RFC7801] Dolmatov, V., Ed., "GOST R 34.12-2015: Block Cipher [RFC7801] Dolmatov, V., Ed., "GOST R 34.12-2015: Block Cipher
"Kuznyechik"", RFC 7801, DOI 10.17487/RFC7801, March 2016, "Kuznyechik"", RFC 7801, DOI 10.17487/RFC7801, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7801>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7801>.
[RFC7838] Nottingham, M., McManus, P., and J. Reschke, "HTTP [RFC7838] Nottingham, M., McManus, P., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
Alternative Services", RFC 7838, DOI 10.17487/RFC7838, Alternative Services", RFC 7838, DOI 10.17487/RFC7838,
April 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7838>. April 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7838>.
[RFC7983] Petit-Huguenin, M. and G. Salgueiro, "Multiplexing Scheme [RFC7983] Petit-Huguenin, M. and G. Salgueiro, "Multiplexing Scheme
Updates for Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) Updates for Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)
Extension for Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", Extension for Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)",
RFC 7983, DOI 10.17487/RFC7983, September 2016, RFC 7983, DOI 10.17487/RFC7983, September 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7983>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7983>.
[RFC8201] McCann, J., Deering, S., Mogul, J., and R. Hinden, Ed., [RFC8201] McCann, J., Deering, S., Mogul, J., and R. Hinden, Ed.,
"Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6", STD 87, RFC 8201, "Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6", STD 87, RFC 8201,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8201, July 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8201, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8201>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8201>.
[RFC8504] Chown, T., Loughney, J., and T. Winters, "IPv6 Node [RFC8504] Chown, T., Loughney, J., and T. Winters, "IPv6 Node
Requirements", BCP 220, RFC 8504, DOI 10.17487/RFC8504, Requirements", BCP 220, RFC 8504, DOI 10.17487/RFC8504,
January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8504>. January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8504>.
[RFC9065] Fairhurst, G. and C. Perkins, "Considerations around [RFC9065] Fairhurst, G. and C. Perkins, "Considerations around
Transport Header Confidentiality, Network Operations, and Transport Header Confidentiality, Network Operations, and
the Evolution of Internet Transport Protocols", RFC 9065, the Evolution of Internet Transport Protocols", RFC 9065,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9065, July 2021, DOI 10.17487/RFC9065, July 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9065>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9065>.
[I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic] [RFC9250] Huitema, C., Dickinson, S., and A. Mankin, "DNS over
Huitema, C., Dickinson, S., and A. Mankin, "DNS over Dedicated QUIC Connections", RFC 9250,
Dedicated QUIC Connections", Work in Progress, Internet- DOI 10.17487/RFC9250, May 2022,
Draft, draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic-12, 20 April 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9250>.
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dprive-
dnsoquic-12>.
[TLS-ECH] Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. A. Wood, "TLS [TLS-ECH] Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. A. Wood, "TLS
Encrypted Client Hello", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, Encrypted Client Hello", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, 13 February 2022, draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, 13 February 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
esni-14>. esni-14>.
[TMA-QOF] Trammell, B., Gugelmann, D., and N. Brownlee, "Inline Data [TMA-QOF] Trammell, B., Gugelmann, D., and N. Brownlee, "Inline Data
Integrity Signals for Passive Measurement (in Proc. TMA Integrity Signals for Passive Measurement", Sixth
2014)", April 2014. International Workshop on Traffic Measurement and
Analysis, April 2014,
<https://trammell.ch/publication/qof-tma-2014>.
[WIRE-IMAGE] [WIRE-IMAGE]
Trammell, B. and M. Kuehlewind, "The Wire Image of a Trammell, B. and M. Kuehlewind, "The Wire Image of a
Network Protocol", RFC 8546, DOI 10.17487/RFC8546, April Network Protocol", RFC 8546, DOI 10.17487/RFC8546, April
2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8546>. 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8546>.
Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
Special thanks to last call reviewers Elwyn Davies, Barry Leiba, Al Special thanks to last call reviewers Elwyn Davies, Barry Leiba, Al
Morton, and Peter Saint-Andre. Morton, and Peter Saint-Andre.
This work was partially supported by the European Commission under This work was partially supported by the European Commission under
Horizon 2020 grant agreement no. 688421 Measurement and Architecture Horizon 2020 grant agreement no. 688421 Measurement and Architecture
for a Middleboxed Internet (MAMI), and by the Swiss State Secretariat for a Middleboxed Internet (MAMI), and by the Swiss State Secretariat
for Education, Research, and Innovation under contract no. 15.0268. for Education, Research, and Innovation under contract no. 15.0268.
This support does not imply endorsement. This support does not imply endorsement.
Contributors Contributors
The following people have contributed significant text to and/or The following people have contributed significant text to and/or
feedback on this document: feedback on this document:
* Chris Box Chris Box
* Dan Druta Dan Druta
* David Schinazi David Schinazi
* Gorry Fairhurst Gorry Fairhurst
* Ian Swett Ian Swett
* Igor Lubashev Igor Lubashev
* Jana Iyengar Jana Iyengar
* Jared Mauch Jared Mauch
* Lars Eggert Lars Eggert
* Lucas Purdue Lucas Purdue
* Marcus Ihlar Marcus Ihlar
* Mark Nottingham Mark Nottingham
* Martin Duke Martin Duke
* Martin Thomson Martin Thomson
* Matt Joras Matt Joras
* Mike Bishop Mike Bishop
* Nick Banks Nick Banks
* Thomas Fossati Thomas Fossati
* Sean Turner Sean Turner
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Mirja Kuehlewind Mirja Kühlewind
Ericsson Ericsson
Email: mirja.kuehlewind@ericsson.com Email: mirja.kuehlewind@ericsson.com
Brian Trammell Brian Trammell
Google Switzerland GmbH Google Switzerland GmbH
Gustav-Gull-Platz 1 Gustav-Gull-Platz 1
CH- 8004 Zurich CH-8004 Zurich
Switzerland Switzerland
Email: ietf@trammell.ch Email: ietf@trammell.ch
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