rfc9325.original   rfc9325.txt 
UTA Working Group Y. Sheffer Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Y. Sheffer
Internet-Draft Intuit Request for Comments: 9325 Intuit
Obsoletes: 7525 (if approved) P. Saint-Andre BCP: 195 P. Saint-Andre
Updates: 5288, 6066 (if approved) independent Obsoletes: 7525 independent
Intended status: Best Current Practice T. Fossati Updates: 5288, 6066 T. Fossati
Expires: 17 February 2023 arm Category: Best Current Practice ARM Limited
16 August 2022 ISSN: 2070-1721 November 2022
Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-11
Abstract Abstract
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) are used to protect data exchanged over a wide range of (DTLS) are used to protect data exchanged over a wide range of
application protocols, and can also form the basis for secure application protocols and can also form the basis for secure
transport protocols. Over the years, the industry has witnessed transport protocols. Over the years, the industry has witnessed
several serious attacks on TLS and DTLS, including attacks on the several serious attacks on TLS and DTLS, including attacks on the
most commonly used cipher suites and their modes of operation. This most commonly used cipher suites and their modes of operation. This
document provides the latest recommendations for ensuring the document provides the latest recommendations for ensuring the
security of deployed services that use TLS and DTLS. These security of deployed services that use TLS and DTLS. These
recommendations are applicable to the majority of use cases. recommendations are applicable to the majority of use cases.
An earlier version of this document was published as RFC 7525 when RFC 7525, an earlier version of the TLS recommendations, was
the industry was in the midst of its transition to TLS 1.2. Years published when the industry was transitioning to TLS 1.2. Years
later this transition is largely complete and TLS 1.3 is widely later, this transition is largely complete, and TLS 1.3 is widely
available. This document updates the guidance given the new available. This document updates the guidance given the new
environment and obsoletes RFC 7525. In addition, the document environment and obsoletes RFC 7525. In addition, this document
updates RFC 5288 and RFC 6066 in view of recent attacks. updates RFCs 5288 and 6066 in view of recent attacks.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 February 2023. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Terminology
3. General Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. General Recommendations
3.1. Protocol Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1. Protocol Versions
3.1.1. SSL/TLS Protocol Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.1. SSL/TLS Protocol Versions
3.1.2. DTLS Protocol Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.2. DTLS Protocol Versions
3.1.3. Fallback to Lower Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.3. Fallback to Lower Versions
3.2. Strict TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2. Strict TLS
3.3. Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.3. Compression
3.3.1. Certificate Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.3.1. Certificate Compression
3.4. TLS Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.4. TLS Session Resumption
3.5. Renegotiation in TLS 1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.5. Renegotiation in TLS 1.2
3.6. Post-Handshake Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.6. Post-Handshake Authentication
3.7. Server Name Indication (SNI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.7. Server Name Indication (SNI)
3.8. Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) . . . . . . 13 3.8. Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)
3.9. Multi-Server Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.9. Multi-Server Deployment
3.10. Zero Round Trip Time (0-RTT) Data in TLS 1.3 . . . . . . 14 3.10. Zero Round-Trip Time (0-RTT) Data in TLS 1.3
4. Recommendations: Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4. Recommendations: Cipher Suites
4.1. General Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.1. General Guidelines
4.2. Cipher Suites for TLS 1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.2. Cipher Suites for TLS 1.2
4.2.1. Implementation Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.2.1. Implementation Details
4.3. Cipher Suites for TLS 1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.3. Cipher Suites for TLS 1.3
4.4. Limits on Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.4. Limits on Key Usage
4.5. Public Key Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.5. Public Key Length
4.6. Truncated HMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.6. Truncated HMAC
5. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5. Applicability Statement
5.1. Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.1. Security Services
5.2. Opportunistic Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.2. Opportunistic Security
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6. IANA Considerations
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 7. Security Considerations
7.1. Host Name Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 7.1. Host Name Validation
7.2. AES-GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 7.2. AES-GCM
7.2.1. Nonce Reuse in TLS 1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7.2.1. Nonce Reuse in TLS 1.2
7.3. Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7.3. Forward Secrecy
7.4. Diffie-Hellman Exponent Reuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 7.4. Diffie-Hellman Exponent Reuse
7.5. Certificate Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 7.5. Certificate Revocation
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 8. References
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 8.1. Normative References
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 8.2. Informative References
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Appendix A. Differences from RFC 7525
Appendix A. Differences from RFC 7525 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Acknowledgments
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Authors' Addresses
B.1. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
B.2. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
B.3. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
B.4. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
B.5. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
B.6. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
B.7. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
B.8. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
B.9. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
B.10. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
B.11. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
B.12. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
B.13. draft-sheffer-uta-rfc7525bis-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
B.14. draft-sheffer-uta-bcp195bis-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) are used to protect data exchanged over a wide variety of (DTLS) are used to protect data exchanged over a wide variety of
application protocols, including HTTP [HTTP1.1] [HTTP2], IMAP application protocols, including HTTP [RFC9112] [RFC9113], IMAP
[RFC9051], POP [STD53], SIP [RFC3261], SMTP [RFC5321], and XMPP [RFC9051], Post Office Protocol (POP) [STD53], SIP [RFC3261], SMTP
[RFC5321], and the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)
[RFC6120]. Such protocols use both the TLS or DTLS handshake [RFC6120]. Such protocols use both the TLS or DTLS handshake
protocol and the TLS or DTLS record layer. Although the TLS protocol and the TLS or DTLS record layer. Although the TLS
handshake protocol can also be used with different record layers to handshake protocol can also be used with different record layers to
define secure transport protocols - the most prominent example is define secure transport protocols (the most prominent example is QUIC
QUIC [RFC9000] - such transport protocols are not directly in scope [RFC9000]), such transport protocols are not directly in scope for
for this document; nevertheless, many of the recommendations here this document; nevertheless, many of the recommendations here might
might apply insofar as such protocols use the TLS handshake protocol. apply insofar as such protocols use the TLS handshake protocol.
Over the years leading to 2015, the industry had witnessed serious Over the years leading to 2015, the industry had witnessed serious
attacks on TLS and DTLS, including attacks on the most commonly used attacks on TLS and DTLS, including attacks on the most commonly used
cipher suites and their modes of operation. For instance, both the cipher suites and their modes of operation. For instance, both the
AES-CBC [RFC3602] and RC4 [RFC7465] encryption algorithms, which AES-CBC [RFC3602] and RC4 [RFC7465] encryption algorithms, which
together were once the most widely deployed ciphers, were attacked in together were once the most widely deployed ciphers, were attacked in
the context of TLS. Detailed information about the attacks known the context of TLS. Detailed information about the attacks known
prior to 2015 is provided in a companion document ([RFC7457]) to the prior to 2015 is provided in a companion document [RFC7457] to the
previous version of this specification, which will help the reader previous version of the TLS recommendations [RFC7525], which will
understand the rationale behind the recommendations provided here. help the reader understand the rationale behind the recommendations
That document has not been updated in concert with this one; instead, provided here. That document has not been updated in concert with
newer attacks are described in this document, as are mitigations for this one; instead, newer attacks are described in this document, as
those attacks. are mitigations for those attacks.
The TLS community reacted to the attacks described in [RFC7457] in The TLS community reacted to the attacks described in [RFC7457] in
several ways: several ways:
* Detailed guidance was published on the use of TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] * Detailed guidance was published on the use of TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]
and DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347], along with earlier protocol versions. and DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347] along with earlier protocol versions. This
This guidance is included in the original [RFC7525] and mostly guidance is included in the original [RFC7525] and mostly retained
retained in this revised version; note that this guidance was in this revised version; note that this guidance was mostly
mostly adopted by the industry since the publication of RFC 7525 adopted by the industry since the publication of RFC 7525 in 2015.
in 2015.
* Versions of TLS earlier than 1.2 were deprecated [RFC8996]. * Versions of TLS earlier than 1.2 were deprecated [RFC8996].
* Version 1.3 of TLS [RFC8446] was released, followed by version 1.3 * Version 1.3 of TLS [RFC8446] was released, followed by version 1.3
of DTLS [RFC9147]; these versions largely mitigate or resolve the of DTLS [RFC9147]; these versions largely mitigate or resolve the
described attacks. described attacks.
Those who implement and deploy TLS and TLS-based protocols need Those who implement and deploy TLS and TLS-based protocols need
guidance on how they can be used securely. This document provides guidance on how they can be used securely. This document provides
guidance for deployed services as well as for software guidance for deployed services as well as for software
implementations, assuming the implementer expects their code to be implementations, assuming the implementer expects their code to be
deployed in the environments defined in Section 5. Concerning deployed in the environments defined in Section 5. Concerning
deployment, this document targets a wide audience -- namely, all deployment, this document targets a wide audience, namely all
deployers who wish to add authentication (be it one-way only or deployers who wish to add authentication (be it one-way only or
mutual), confidentiality, and data integrity protection to their mutual), confidentiality, and data integrity protection to their
communications. communications.
The recommendations herein take into consideration the security of The recommendations herein take into consideration the security of
various mechanisms, their technical maturity and interoperability, various mechanisms, their technical maturity and interoperability,
and their prevalence in implementations at the time of writing. and their prevalence in implementations at the time of writing.
Unless it is explicitly called out that a recommendation applies to Unless it is explicitly called out that a recommendation applies to
TLS alone or to DTLS alone, each recommendation applies to both TLS TLS alone or to DTLS alone, each recommendation applies to both TLS
and DTLS. and DTLS.
This document attempts to minimize new guidance to TLS 1.2 This document attempts to minimize new guidance to TLS 1.2
implementations, and the overall approach is to encourage systems to implementations, and the overall approach is to encourage systems to
move to TLS 1.3. However, this is not always practical. Newly move to TLS 1.3. However, this is not always practical. Newly
discovered attacks, as well as ecosystem changes, necessitated some discovered attacks, as well as ecosystem changes, necessitated some
new requirements that apply to TLS 1.2 environments. Those are new requirements that apply to TLS 1.2 environments. Those are
summarized in Appendix A. summarized in Appendix A.
Naturally, future attacks are likely, and this document does not Naturally, future attacks are likely, and this document cannot
address them. Those who implement and deploy TLS/DTLS and protocols address them. Those who implement and deploy TLS/DTLS and protocols
based on TLS/DTLS are strongly advised to pay attention to future based on TLS/DTLS are strongly advised to pay attention to future
developments. In particular, although it is known that the creation developments. In particular, although it is known that the creation
of quantum computers will have a significant impact on the security of quantum computers will have a significant impact on the security
of cryptographic primitives and the technologies that use them, of cryptographic primitives and the technologies that use them,
currently post-quantum cryptography is a work in progress and it is currently post-quantum cryptography is a work in progress and it is
too early to make recommendations; once the relevant specifications too early to make recommendations; once the relevant specifications
are standardized in the IETF or elsewhere, this document should be are standardized in the IETF or elsewhere, this document should be
updated to reflect best practices at that time. updated to reflect best practices at that time.
skipping to change at page 5, line 23 skipping to change at line 195
vulnerabilities listed in this document. A system that deploys TLS vulnerabilities listed in this document. A system that deploys TLS
1.3 should have fewer vulnerabilities than TLS 1.2 or below. 1.3 should have fewer vulnerabilities than TLS 1.2 or below.
Therefore, this document replaces [RFC7525], with an explicit goal to Therefore, this document replaces [RFC7525], with an explicit goal to
encourage migration of most uses of TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3. encourage migration of most uses of TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3.
These are minimum recommendations for the use of TLS in the vast These are minimum recommendations for the use of TLS in the vast
majority of implementation and deployment scenarios, with the majority of implementation and deployment scenarios, with the
exception of unauthenticated TLS (see Section 5). Other exception of unauthenticated TLS (see Section 5). Other
specifications that reference this document can have stricter specifications that reference this document can have stricter
requirements related to one or more aspects of the protocol, based on requirements related to one or more aspects of the protocol, based on
their particular circumstances (e.g., for use with a particular their particular circumstances (e.g., for use with a specific
application protocol); when that is the case, implementers are application protocol); when that is the case, implementers are
advised to adhere to those stricter requirements. Furthermore, this advised to adhere to those stricter requirements. Furthermore, this
document provides a floor, not a ceiling: where feasible, document provides a floor, not a ceiling: where feasible,
administrators of services are encouraged to go beyond the minimum administrators of services are encouraged to go beyond the minimum
support available in implementations to provide the strongest support available in implementations to provide the strongest
security possible. For example, based on knowledge about the security possible. For example, based on knowledge about the
deployed base for an existing application protocol and a cost-benefit deployed base for an existing application protocol and a cost-benefit
analysis regarding security strength vs. interoperability, a given analysis regarding security strength vs. interoperability, a given
service provider might decide to disable TLS 1.2 entirely and offer service provider might decide to disable TLS 1.2 entirely and offer
only TLS 1.3. only TLS 1.3.
skipping to change at page 6, line 44 skipping to change at line 258
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate SSL version 2. * Implementations MUST NOT negotiate SSL version 2.
Rationale: Today, SSLv2 is considered insecure [RFC6176]. Rationale: Today, SSLv2 is considered insecure [RFC6176].
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate SSL version 3. * Implementations MUST NOT negotiate SSL version 3.
Rationale: SSLv3 [RFC6101] was an improvement over SSLv2 and Rationale: SSLv3 [RFC6101] was an improvement over SSLv2 and
plugged some significant security holes but did not support strong plugged some significant security holes but did not support strong
cipher suites. SSLv3 does not support TLS extensions, some of cipher suites. SSLv3 does not support TLS extensions, some of
which (e.g., renegotiation_info [RFC5746]) are security-critical. which (e.g., renegotiation_info [RFC5746]) are security critical.
In addition, with the emergence of the POODLE attack [POODLE], In addition, with the emergence of the Padding Oracle On
SSLv3 is now widely recognized as fundamentally insecure. See Downgraded Legacy Encryption (POODLE) attack [POODLE], SSLv3 is
[DEP-SSLv3] for further details. now widely recognized as fundamentally insecure. See [RFC7568]
for further details.
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS version 1.0 [RFC2246]. * Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS version 1.0 [RFC2246].
Rationale: TLS 1.0 (published in 1999) does not support many Rationale: TLS 1.0 (published in 1999) does not support many
modern, strong cipher suites. In addition, TLS 1.0 lacks a per- modern, strong cipher suites. In addition, TLS 1.0 lacks a per-
record Initialization Vector (IV) for CBC-based cipher suites and record Initialization Vector (IV) for cipher suites based on
does not warn against common padding errors. This and other cipher block chaining (CBC) and does not warn against common
recommendations in this section are in line with [RFC8996]. padding errors. This and other recommendations in this section
are in line with [RFC8996].
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346]. * Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346].
Rationale: TLS 1.1 (published in 2006) is a security improvement Rationale: TLS 1.1 (published in 2006) is a security improvement
over TLS 1.0 but still does not support certain stronger cipher over TLS 1.0 but still does not support certain stronger cipher
suites that were introduced with the standardization of TLS 1.2 in suites that were introduced with the standardization of TLS 1.2 in
2008, including the cipher suites recommended for TLS 1.2 by this 2008, including the cipher suites recommended for TLS 1.2 by this
document (see Section 4.2 below). document (see Section 4.2 below).
* Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]. * Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246].
Rationale: TLS 1.2 is implemented and deployed more widely than Rationale: TLS 1.2 is implemented and deployed more widely than
TLS 1.3 at this time and, when the recommendations in this TLS 1.3 at this time, and when the recommendations in this
document are followed to mitigate known attacks, the use of TLS document are followed to mitigate known attacks, the use of TLS
1.2 is as safe as the use of TLS 1.3. In most application 1.2 is as safe as the use of TLS 1.3. In most application
protocols that re-use TLS and DTLS, there is no immediate need to protocols that reuse TLS and DTLS, there is no immediate need to
migrate solely to TLS 1.3 and proactively deprecate TLS 1.2, migrate solely to TLS 1.3. Indeed, because many application
especially because the existence of large numbers of application clients are dependent on TLS libraries or operating systems that
clients dependent on TLS libraries or operating systems that do do not yet support TLS 1.3, proactively deprecating TLS 1.2 would
not yet support TLS 1.3 would introduce significant introduce significant interoperability issues, thus harming
interoperability issues, thus harming security more than helping security more than helping it. Nevertheless, it is expected that
it. Nevertheless, it is expected that a future version of this a future version of this BCP will deprecate the use of TLS 1.2
BCP will deprecate the use of TLS 1.2 when it is appropriate to do when it is appropriate to do so.
so.
* Implementations SHOULD support TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] and, if * Implementations SHOULD support TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] and, if
implemented, MUST prefer to negotiate TLS 1.3 over earlier implemented, MUST prefer to negotiate TLS 1.3 over earlier
versions of TLS. versions of TLS.
Rationale: TLS 1.3 is a major overhaul to the protocol and Rationale: TLS 1.3 is a major overhaul to the protocol and
resolves many of the security issues with TLS 1.2. To the extent resolves many of the security issues with TLS 1.2. To the extent
that an implementation supports TLS 1.2 (even if it defaults to that an implementation supports TLS 1.2 (even if it defaults to
TLS 1.3), it MUST follow the recommendations regarding TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3), it MUST follow the recommendations regarding TLS 1.2
specified in this document. specified in this document.
skipping to change at page 8, line 6 skipping to change at line 316
* New transport protocols that integrate the TLS/DTLS handshake * New transport protocols that integrate the TLS/DTLS handshake
protocol and/or record layer MUST use only TLS/DTLS 1.3 (for protocol and/or record layer MUST use only TLS/DTLS 1.3 (for
instance, QUIC [RFC9001] took this approach). New application instance, QUIC [RFC9001] took this approach). New application
protocols that employ TLS/DTLS for channel or session encryption protocols that employ TLS/DTLS for channel or session encryption
MUST integrate with both TLS/DTLS versions 1.2 and 1.3; MUST integrate with both TLS/DTLS versions 1.2 and 1.3;
nevertheless, in rare cases where broad interoperability is not a nevertheless, in rare cases where broad interoperability is not a
concern, application protocol designers MAY choose to forego TLS concern, application protocol designers MAY choose to forego TLS
1.2. 1.2.
Rationale: Secure deployment of TLS 1.3 is significantly easier Rationale: Secure deployment of TLS 1.3 is significantly easier
and less error-prone than secure deployment of TLS 1.2. When and less error prone than secure deployment of TLS 1.2. When
designing a new secure transport protocol such as QUIC, there is designing a new secure transport protocol such as QUIC, there is
no reason to support TLS 1.2. By contrast, new application no reason to support TLS 1.2. By contrast, new application
protocols that re-use TLS MAY support both TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2 in protocols that reuse TLS need to support both TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2
order to take advantage of underlying library or operating system in order to take advantage of underlying library or operating
support for both versions. system support for both versions.
This BCP applies to TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2, and earlier versions. It is This BCP applies to TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2, and earlier versions. It is
not safe for readers to assume that the recommendations in this BCP not safe for readers to assume that the recommendations in this BCP
apply to any future version of TLS. apply to any future version of TLS.
3.1.2. DTLS Protocol Versions 3.1.2. DTLS Protocol Versions
DTLS, an adaptation of TLS for UDP datagrams, was introduced when TLS DTLS, an adaptation of TLS for UDP datagrams, was introduced when TLS
1.1 was published. The following are the recommendations with 1.1 was published. The following are the recommendations with
respect to DTLS: respect to DTLS:
skipping to change at page 8, line 41 skipping to change at line 351
* Implementations SHOULD support DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147] and, if * Implementations SHOULD support DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147] and, if
implemented, MUST prefer to negotiate DTLS version 1.3 over implemented, MUST prefer to negotiate DTLS version 1.3 over
earlier versions of DTLS. earlier versions of DTLS.
Version 1.3 of DTLS correlates to version 1.3 of TLS (see above). Version 1.3 of DTLS correlates to version 1.3 of TLS (see above).
3.1.3. Fallback to Lower Versions 3.1.3. Fallback to Lower Versions
TLS/DTLS 1.2 clients MUST NOT fall back to earlier TLS versions, TLS/DTLS 1.2 clients MUST NOT fall back to earlier TLS versions,
since those versions have been deprecated [RFC8996]. We note that as since those versions have been deprecated [RFC8996]. As a result,
a result of that, the downgrade-protection SCSV (Signaling Cipher the downgrade-protection Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV)
Suite Value) mechanism [RFC7507] is no longer needed for clients. In mechanism [RFC7507] is no longer needed for clients. In addition,
addition, TLS 1.3 implements a new version negotiation mechanism. TLS 1.3 implements a new version-negotiation mechanism.
3.2. Strict TLS 3.2. Strict TLS
The following recommendations are provided to help prevent SSL The following recommendations are provided to help prevent "SSL
Stripping and STARTTLS Command Injection (attacks that are summarized Stripping" and STARTTLS command injection (attacks that are
in [RFC7457]): summarized in [RFC7457]):
* Many existing application protocols were designed before the use * Many existing application protocols were designed before the use
of TLS became common. These protocols typically support TLS in of TLS became common. These protocols typically support TLS in
one of two ways: either via a separate port for TLS-only one of two ways: either via a separate port for TLS-only
communication (e.g., port 443 for HTTPS) or via a method for communication (e.g., port 443 for HTTPS) or via a method for
dynamically upgrading a channel from unencrypted to TLS-protected dynamically upgrading a channel from unencrypted to TLS protected
(e.g., STARTTLS, which is used in protocols such as IMAP and (e.g., STARTTLS, which is used in protocols such as IMAP and
XMPP). Regardless of the mechanism for protecting the XMPP). Regardless of the mechanism for protecting the
communication channel (TLS-only port or dynamic upgrade), what communication channel (TLS-only port or dynamic upgrade), what
matters is the end state of the channel. When a protocol defines matters is the end state of the channel. When a protocol defines
both a dynamic upgrade method and a separate TLS-only method, then both a dynamic upgrade method and a separate TLS-only method, then
the separate TLS-only method MUST be supported by implementations the separate TLS-only method MUST be supported by implementations
and MUST be configured by administrators to be used in preference and MUST be configured by administrators to be used in preference
to the dynamic upgrade method. When a protocol supports only a to the dynamic upgrade method. When a protocol supports only a
dynamic upgrade, implementations MUST provide a way for dynamic upgrade method, implementations MUST provide a way for
administrators to set a strict local policy that forbids use of administrators to set a strict local policy that forbids use of
plaintext in the absence of a negotiated TLS channel, and plaintext in the absence of a negotiated TLS channel, and
administrators MUST use this policy. administrators MUST use this policy.
* HTTP client and server implementations intended for use in the * HTTP client and server implementations intended for use in the
World Wide Web (see Section 5) MUST support the HTTP Strict World Wide Web (see Section 5) MUST support the HTTP Strict
Transport Security (HSTS) header field [RFC6797], so that Web Transport Security (HSTS) header field [RFC6797] so that web
servers can advertise that they are willing to accept TLS-only servers can advertise that they are willing to accept TLS-only
clients. Web servers SHOULD use HSTS to indicate that they are clients. Web servers SHOULD use HSTS to indicate that they are
willing to accept TLS-only clients, unless they are deployed in willing to accept TLS-only clients, unless they are deployed in
such a way that using HSTS would in fact weaken overall security such a way that using HSTS would in fact weaken overall security
(e.g., it can be problematic to use HSTS with self-signed (e.g., it can be problematic to use HSTS with self-signed
certificates, as described in Section 11.3 of [RFC6797]). Similar certificates, as described in Section 11.3 of [RFC6797]). Similar
technologies exist for non-HTTP application protocols, such as technologies exist for non-HTTP application protocols, such as
MTA-STS for mail transfer agents [RFC8461] and methods based on Mail Transfer Agent Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS) for mail
DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) [RFC6698] for transfer agents [RFC8461] and methods based on DNS-Based
SMTP [DANE-SMTP] and XMPP [RFC7712]. Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) [RFC6698] for SMTP
[RFC7672] and XMPP [RFC7712].
Rationale: Combining unprotected and TLS-protected communication Rationale: Combining unprotected and TLS-protected communication
opens the way to SSL Stripping and similar attacks, since an initial opens the way to SSL Stripping and similar attacks, since an initial
part of the communication is not integrity protected and therefore part of the communication is not integrity protected and therefore
can be manipulated by an attacker whose goal is to keep the can be manipulated by an attacker whose goal is to keep the
communication in the clear. communication in the clear.
3.3. Compression 3.3. Compression
In order to help prevent compression-related attacks (summarized in In order to help prevent compression-related attacks (summarized in
Section 2.6 of [RFC7457]), when using TLS 1.2 implementations and Section 2.6 of [RFC7457]) when using TLS 1.2, implementations and
deployments SHOULD NOT support TLS-level compression (Section 6.2.2 deployments SHOULD NOT support TLS-level compression (Section 6.2.2
of [RFC5246]); the only exception is when the application protocol in of [RFC5246]); the only exception is when the application protocol in
question has been proved not to be open to such attacks, however even question has been proven not to be open to such attacks. However,
in this case extreme caution is warranted because of the potential even in this case, extreme caution is warranted because of the
for future attacks related to TLS compression. More specifically, potential for future attacks related to TLS compression. More
the HTTP protocol is known to be vulnerable to compression-related specifically, the HTTP protocol is known to be vulnerable to
attacks. Note: this recommendation applies to TLS 1.2 only, because compression-related attacks. (This recommendation applies to TLS 1.2
compression has been removed from TLS 1.3. only, because compression has been removed from TLS 1.3.)
Rationale: TLS compression has been subject to security attacks, such Rationale: TLS compression has been subject to security attacks such
as the CRIME attack. as the Compression Ratio Info-leak Made Easy (CRIME) attack.
Implementers should note that compression at higher protocol levels Implementers should note that compression at higher protocol levels
can allow an active attacker to extract cleartext information from can allow an active attacker to extract cleartext information from
the connection. The BREACH attack is one such case. These issues the connection. The Browser Reconnaissance and Exfiltration via
can only be mitigated outside of TLS and are thus outside the scope Adaptive Compression of Hypertext (BREACH) attack is one such case.
of this document. See Section 2.6 of [RFC7457] for further details. These issues can only be mitigated outside of TLS and are thus
outside the scope of this document. See Section 2.6 of [RFC7457] for
further details.
3.3.1. Certificate Compression 3.3.1. Certificate Compression
Certificate chains often take up the majority of the bytes Certificate chains often take up most of the bytes transmitted during
transmitted during the handshake. In order to manage their size, the handshake. In order to manage their size, some or all of the
some or all of the following methods can be employed (see also following methods can be employed (see also Section 4 of [RFC9191]
Section 4 of [RFC9191] for further suggestions): for further suggestions):
* Limit the number of names or extensions; * Limit the number of names or extensions.
* Use keys with small public key representations, like ECDSA; * Use keys with small public key representations, like the Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).
* Use certificate compression. * Use certificate compression.
To achieve the latter, TLS 1.3 defines the compress_certificate To achieve the latter, TLS 1.3 defines the compress_certificate
extension in [RFC8879]. See also Section 5 of [RFC8879] for security extension in [RFC8879]. See also Section 5 of [RFC8879] for security
and privacy considerations associated with its use. For the and privacy considerations associated with its use. For the
avoidance of doubt, CRIME-style attacks on TLS compression do not avoidance of doubt, CRIME-style attacks on TLS compression do not
apply to certificate compression. apply to certificate compression.
Due to the strong likelihood of middlebox interference, RFC8879-style Due to the strong likelihood of middlebox interference, compression
compression has not been made available in TLS 1.2. In theory, the in the style of [RFC8879] has not been made available in TLS 1.2. In
cached_info extension defined in [RFC7924] could be used, but it is theory, the cached_info extension defined in [RFC7924] could be used,
not widely enough supported to be considered a practical alternative. but it is not supported widely enough to be considered a practical
alternative.
3.4. TLS Session Resumption 3.4. TLS Session Resumption
Session resumption drastically reduces the number of full TLS Session resumption drastically reduces the number of full TLS
handshakes and thus is an essential performance feature for most handshakes and thus is an essential performance feature for most
deployments. deployments.
Stateless session resumption with session tickets is a popular Stateless session resumption with session tickets is a popular
strategy. For TLS 1.2, it is specified in [RFC5077]. For TLS 1.3, a strategy. For TLS 1.2, it is specified in [RFC5077]. For TLS 1.3, a
more secure PSK-based mechanism is described in Section 4.6.1 of more secure mechanism based on the use of a pre-shared key (PSK) is
[RFC8446]. See [Springall16] for a quantitative study of the risks described in Section 4.6.1 of [RFC8446]. See [Springall16] for a
induced by TLS cryptographic "shortcuts", including session quantitative study of the risks induced by TLS cryptographic
resumption. "shortcuts", including session resumption.
When it is used, the resumption information MUST be authenticated and When it is used, the resumption information MUST be authenticated and
encrypted to prevent modification or eavesdropping by an attacker. encrypted to prevent modification or eavesdropping by an attacker.
Further recommendations apply to session tickets: Further recommendations apply to session tickets:
* A strong cipher MUST be used when encrypting the ticket (at least * A strong cipher MUST be used when encrypting the ticket (at least
as strong as the main TLS cipher suite). as strong as the main TLS cipher suite).
* Ticket-encryption keys MUST be changed regularly, e.g., once every * Ticket-encryption keys MUST be changed regularly, e.g., once every
week, so as not to negate the benefits of forward secrecy (see week, so as not to negate the benefits of forward secrecy (see
skipping to change at page 11, line 26 skipping to change at line 485
period. period.
* For similar reasons, session ticket validity MUST be limited to a * For similar reasons, session ticket validity MUST be limited to a
reasonable duration (e.g., half as long as ticket-encryption key reasonable duration (e.g., half as long as ticket-encryption key
validity). validity).
* TLS 1.2 does not roll the session key forward within a single * TLS 1.2 does not roll the session key forward within a single
session. Thus, to prevent an attack where the server's ticket- session. Thus, to prevent an attack where the server's ticket-
encryption key is stolen and used to decrypt the entire content of encryption key is stolen and used to decrypt the entire content of
a session (negating the concept of forward secrecy), a TLS 1.2 a session (negating the concept of forward secrecy), a TLS 1.2
server SHOULD NOT resume sessions that are too old, e.g. sessions server SHOULD NOT resume sessions that are too old, e.g., sessions
that have been open longer than two ticket-encryption key rotation that have been open longer than two ticket-encryption key rotation
periods. periods.
Rationale: session resumption is another kind of TLS handshake, and Rationale: Session resumption is another kind of TLS handshake and
therefore must be as secure as the initial handshake. This document therefore must be as secure as the initial handshake. This document
(Section 4) recommends the use of cipher suites that provide forward (Section 4) recommends the use of cipher suites that provide forward
secrecy, i.e. that prevent an attacker who gains momentary access to secrecy, i.e., that prevent an attacker who gains momentary access to
the TLS endpoint (either client or server) and its secrets from the TLS endpoint (either client or server) and its secrets from
reading either past or future communication. The tickets must be reading either past or future communication. The tickets must be
managed so as not to negate this security property. managed so as not to negate this security property.
TLS 1.3 provides the powerful option of forward secrecy even within a TLS 1.3 provides the powerful option of forward secrecy even within a
long-lived connection that is periodically resumed. Section 2.2 of long-lived connection that is periodically resumed. Section 2.2 of
[RFC8446] recommends that clients SHOULD send a "key_share" when [RFC8446] recommends that clients SHOULD send a "key_share" when
initiating session resumption. In order to gain forward secrecy, initiating session resumption. In order to gain forward secrecy,
this document recommends that server implementations SHOULD select this document recommends that server implementations SHOULD select
the "psk_dhe_ke" PSK key exchange mode and respond with a the "psk_dhe_ke" PSK key exchange mode and respond with a "key_share"
"key_share", to complete an ECDHE exchange on each session to complete an Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE)
resumption. As a more performant alternative, server implementations exchange on each session resumption. As a more performant
MAY refrain from responding with a "key_share" until a certain amount alternative, server implementations MAY refrain from responding with
of time (e.g., measured in hours) has passed since the last ECDHE a "key_share" until a certain amount of time (e.g., measured in
exchange; this implies that the "key_share" operation would not occur hours) has passed since the last ECDHE exchange; this implies that
for the presumed majority of session resumption requests occurring the "key_share" operation would not occur for the presumed majority
within a few hours, while still ensuring forward secrecy for longer- of session resumption requests (which would occur within a few hours)
lived sessions. while still ensuring forward secrecy for longer-lived sessions.
TLS session resumption introduces potential privacy issues where the TLS session resumption introduces potential privacy issues where the
server is able to track the client, in some cases indefinitely. See server is able to track the client, in some cases indefinitely. See
[Sy2018] for more details. [Sy2018] for more details.
3.5. Renegotiation in TLS 1.2 3.5. Renegotiation in TLS 1.2
The recommendations in this section apply to TLS 1.2 only, because The recommendations in this section apply to TLS 1.2 only, because
renegotiation has been removed from TLS 1.3. renegotiation has been removed from TLS 1.3.
Renegotiation in TLS 1.2 is a handshake that establishes new Renegotiation in TLS 1.2 is a handshake that establishes new
cryptographic parameters for an existing session. The mechanism cryptographic parameters for an existing session. The mechanism
existed in TLS 1.2 and in earlier protocol versions, and was improved existed in TLS 1.2 and in earlier protocol versions and was improved
following several major attacks including a plaintext injection following several major attacks including a plaintext injection
attack, CVE-2009-3555 [CVE]. attack, CVE-2009-3555 [CVE].
TLS 1.2 clients and servers MUST implement the renegotiation_info TLS 1.2 clients and servers MUST implement the renegotiation_info
extension, as defined in [RFC5746]. extension, as defined in [RFC5746].
TLS 1.2 clients MUST send renegotiation_info in the Client Hello. If TLS 1.2 clients MUST send renegotiation_info in the Client Hello. If
the server does not acknowledge the extension, the client MUST the server does not acknowledge the extension, the client MUST
generate a fatal handshake_failure alert prior to terminating the generate a fatal handshake_failure alert prior to terminating the
connection. connection.
Rationale: It is not safe for a client to connect to a TLS 1.2 server Rationale: It is not safe for a client to connect to a TLS 1.2 server
that does not support renegotiation_info, regardless of whether that does not support renegotiation_info regardless of whether either
either endpoint actually implements renegotiation. See also endpoint actually implements renegotiation. See also Section 4.1 of
Section 4.1 of [RFC5746]. [RFC5746].
A related attack resulting from TLS session parameters not being A related attack resulting from TLS session parameters not being
properly authenticated is Triple Handshake [triple-handshake]. To properly authenticated is a Triple Handshake [Triple-Handshake]. To
address this attack, TLS 1.2 implementations MUST support the address this attack, TLS 1.2 implementations MUST support the
extended_master_secret extension defined in [RFC7627]. extended_master_secret extension defined in [RFC7627].
3.6. Post-Handshake Authentication 3.6. Post-Handshake Authentication
Renegotiation in TLS 1.2 was (partially) replaced in TLS 1.3 by Renegotiation in TLS 1.2 was (partially) replaced in TLS 1.3 by
separate post-handshake authentication and key update mechanisms. In separate post-handshake authentication and key update mechanisms. In
the context of protocols that multiplex requests over a single the context of protocols that multiplex requests over a single
connection (such as HTTP/2 [HTTP2]), post-handshake authentication connection (such as HTTP/2 [RFC9113]), post-handshake authentication
has the same problems as TLS 1.2 renegotiation. Multiplexed has the same problems as TLS 1.2 renegotiation. Multiplexed
protocols SHOULD follow the advice provided for HTTP/2 in protocols SHOULD follow the advice provided for HTTP/2 in
Section 9.3.2 of [HTTP2]. Section 9.2.3 of [RFC9113].
3.7. Server Name Indication (SNI) 3.7. Server Name Indication (SNI)
TLS implementations MUST support the Server Name Indication (SNI) TLS implementations MUST support the Server Name Indication (SNI)
extension defined in Section 3 of [RFC6066] for those higher-level extension defined in Section 3 of [RFC6066] for those higher-level
protocols that would benefit from it, including HTTPS. However, the protocols that would benefit from it, including HTTPS. However, the
actual use of SNI in particular circumstances is a matter of local actual use of SNI in particular circumstances is a matter of local
policy. At the time of writing, a technology for encrypting the SNI policy. At the time of writing, a technology for encrypting the SNI
(called Encrypted Client Hello) is being worked on in the TLS Working (called Encrypted Client Hello) is being worked on in the TLS Working
Group [I-D.ietf-tls-esni]. Once that method has been standardized Group [TLS-ECH]. Once that method has been standardized and widely
and widely implemented, it will likely be appropriate to recommend implemented, it will likely be appropriate to recommend its usage in
its usage in a future version of this BCP. a future version of this BCP.
Rationale: SNI supports deployment of multiple TLS-protected virtual Rationale: SNI supports deployment of multiple TLS-protected virtual
servers on a single address, and therefore enables fine-grained servers on a single address, and therefore enables fine-grained
security for these virtual servers, by allowing each one to have its security for these virtual servers, by allowing each one to have its
own certificate. However, SNI also leaks the target domain for a own certificate. However, SNI also leaks the target domain for a
given connection; this information leak will be closed by use of TLS given connection; this information leak will be closed by use of TLS
Encrypted Client Hello once that method has been standardized. Encrypted Client Hello once that method has been standardized.
In order to prevent the attacks described in [ALPACA], a server that In order to prevent the attacks described in [ALPACA], a server that
does not recognize the presented server name SHOULD NOT continue the does not recognize the presented server name SHOULD NOT continue the
handshake and instead SHOULD fail with a fatal-level handshake and instead SHOULD fail with a fatal-level
unrecognized_name(112) alert. Note that this recommendation updates unrecognized_name(112) alert. Note that this recommendation updates
Section 3 of [RFC6066]: "If the server understood the ClientHello Section 3 of [RFC6066], which stated:
extension but does not recognize the server name, the server SHOULD
take one of two actions: either abort the handshake by sending a | If the server understood the ClientHello extension but does not
fatal-level unrecognized_name(112) alert or continue the handshake." | recognize the server name, the server SHOULD take one of two
| actions: either abort the handshake by sending a fatal-level
| unrecognized_name(112) alert or continue the handshake.
Clients SHOULD abort the handshake if the server acknowledges the SNI Clients SHOULD abort the handshake if the server acknowledges the SNI
extension, but presents a certificate with a different hostname than extension but presents a certificate with a different hostname than
the one sent by the client. the one sent by the client.
3.8. Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) 3.8. Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)
TLS implementations (both client- and server-side) MUST support the TLS implementations (both client- and server-side) MUST support the
Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) extension [RFC7301]. Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) extension [RFC7301].
In order to prevent "cross-protocol" attacks resulting from failure In order to prevent "cross-protocol" attacks resulting from failure
to ensure that a message intended for use in one protocol cannot be to ensure that a message intended for use in one protocol cannot be
mistaken for a message for use in another protocol, servers are mistaken for a message for use in another protocol, servers are
advised to strictly enforce the behavior prescribed in Section 3.2 of advised to strictly enforce the behavior prescribed in Section 3.2 of
[RFC7301]: "In the event that the server supports no protocols that [RFC7301]:
the client advertises, then the server SHALL respond with a fatal
no_application_protocol alert." Clients SHOULD abort the handshake | In the event that the server supports no protocols that the client
if the server acknowledges the ALPN extension, but does not select a | advertises, then the server SHALL respond with a fatal
protocol from the client list. Failure to do so can result in | 'no_application_protocol' alert.
attacks such those described in [ALPACA].
Clients SHOULD abort the handshake if the server acknowledges the
ALPN extension but does not select a protocol from the client list.
Failure to do so can result in attacks such those described in
[ALPACA].
Protocol developers are strongly encouraged to register an ALPN Protocol developers are strongly encouraged to register an ALPN
identifier for their protocols. This applies both to new protocols identifier for their protocols. This applies both to new protocols
and to well-established protocols; however, because the latter might and to well-established protocols; however, because the latter might
have a large deployed base, strict enforcement of ALPN usage may not have a large deployed base, strict enforcement of ALPN usage may not
be feasible when an ALPN identifier is registered for a well- be feasible when an ALPN identifier is registered for a well-
established protocol. established protocol.
3.9. Multi-Server Deployment 3.9. Multi-Server Deployment
Deployments that involve multiple servers or services can increase Deployments that involve multiple servers or services can increase
the size of the attack surface for TLS. Two scenarios are of the size of the attack surface for TLS. Two scenarios are of
interest: interest:
1. Deployments in which multiple services handle the same domain 1. Deployments in which multiple services handle the same domain
name via different protocols (e.g., HTTP and IMAP). In this case name via different protocols (e.g., HTTP and IMAP). In this
an attacker might be able to direct a connecting endpoint to the case, an attacker might be able to direct a connecting endpoint
service offering a different protocol and mount a cross-protocol to the service offering a different protocol and mount a cross-
attack. In a cross-protocol attack, the client and server protocol attack. In a cross-protocol attack, the client and
believe they are using different protocols, which the attacker server believe they are using different protocols, which the
might exploit if messages sent in one protocol are interpreted as attacker might exploit if messages sent in one protocol are
messages in the other protocol with undesirable effects (see interpreted as messages in the other protocol with undesirable
[ALPACA] for more detailed information about this class of effects (see [ALPACA] for more detailed information about this
attacks). To mitigate this threat, service providers SHOULD class of attacks). To mitigate this threat, service providers
deploy ALPN (see Section 3.8 immediately above) and to the extent SHOULD deploy ALPN (see Section 3.8). In addition, to the extent
possible ensure that multiple services handling the same domain possible, they SHOULD ensure that multiple services handling the
name provide equivalent levels of security (including both the same domain name provide equivalent levels of security that are
TLS configuration and protections against compromise of server consistent with the recommendations in this document; such
credentials) that are consistent with the recommendations in this measures SHOULD include the handling of configurations across
document. multiple TLS servers and protections against compromise of
credentials held by those servers.
2. Deployments in which multiple servers providing the same service 2. Deployments in which multiple servers providing the same service
have different TLS configurations. In this case, an attacker have different TLS configurations. In this case, an attacker
might be able to direct a connecting endpoint to a server with a might be able to direct a connecting endpoint to a server with a
TLS configuration that is more easily exploitable (see [DROWN] TLS configuration that is more easily exploitable (see [DROWN]
for more detailed information about this class of attacks). To for more detailed information about this class of attacks). To
mitigate this threat, service providers SHOULD ensure that all mitigate this threat, service providers SHOULD ensure that all
servers providing the same service provide equivalent levels of servers providing the same service provide equivalent levels of
security that are consistent with the recommendations in this security that are consistent with the recommendations in this
document. document.
3.10. Zero Round Trip Time (0-RTT) Data in TLS 1.3 3.10. Zero Round-Trip Time (0-RTT) Data in TLS 1.3
The 0-RTT early data feature is new in TLS 1.3. It provides reduced The 0-RTT early data feature is new in TLS 1.3. It provides reduced
latency when TLS connections are resumed, at the potential cost of latency when TLS connections are resumed, at the potential cost of
certain security properties. As a result, it requires special certain security properties. As a result, it requires special
attention from implementers on both the server and the client side. attention from implementers on both the server and the client side.
Typically, this extends to both the TLS library as well as protocol Typically, this extends to the TLS library as well as protocol layers
layers above it. above it.
For use in HTTP-over-TLS, readers are referred to [RFC8470] for For HTTP over TLS, refer to [RFC8470] for guidance.
guidance.
For QUIC-on-TLS, refer to Section 9.2 of [RFC9001]. For QUIC on TLS, refer to Section 9.2 of [RFC9001].
For other protocols, generic guidance is given in Section 8 and For other protocols, generic guidance is given in Section 8 and
Appendix E.5 of [RFC8446]. To paraphrase Appendix E.5, applications Appendix E.5 of [RFC8446]. To paraphrase Appendix E.5, applications
MUST avoid this feature unless an explicit specification exists for MUST avoid this feature unless an explicit specification exists for
the application protocol in question to clarify when 0-RTT is the application protocol in question to clarify when 0-RTT is
appropriate and secure. This can take the form of an IETF RFC, a appropriate and secure. This can take the form of an IETF RFC, a
non-IETF standard, or even documentation associated with a non- non-IETF standard, or documentation associated with a non-standard
standard protocol. protocol.
4. Recommendations: Cipher Suites 4. Recommendations: Cipher Suites
TLS 1.2 provided considerable flexibility in the selection of cipher TLS 1.2 provided considerable flexibility in the selection of cipher
suites. Unfortunately, the security of some of these cipher suites suites. Unfortunately, the security of some of these cipher suites
has degraded over time to the point where some are known to be has degraded over time to the point where some are known to be
insecure (this is one reason why TLS 1.3 restricted such insecure (this is one reason why TLS 1.3 restricted such
flexibility). Incorrectly configuring a server leads to no or flexibility). Incorrectly configuring a server leads to no or
reduced security. This section includes recommendations on the reduced security. This section includes recommendations on the
selection and negotiation of cipher suites. selection and negotiation of cipher suites.
4.1. General Guidelines 4.1. General Guidelines
Cryptographic algorithms weaken over time as cryptanalysis improves: Cryptographic algorithms weaken over time as cryptanalysis improves:
algorithms that were once considered strong become weak. algorithms that were once considered strong become weak.
Consequently, they need to be phased out over time and replaced with Consequently, cipher suites using weak algorithms need to be phased
more secure cipher suites. This helps to ensure that the desired out and replaced with more secure cipher suites. This helps to
security properties still hold. SSL/TLS has been in existence for ensure that the desired security properties still hold. SSL/TLS has
almost 20 years and many of the cipher suites that have been been in existence for well over 20 years and many of the cipher
recommended in various versions of SSL/TLS are now considered weak or suites that have been recommended in various versions of SSL/TLS are
at least not as strong as desired. Therefore, this section now considered weak or at least not as strong as desired. Therefore,
modernizes the recommendations concerning cipher suite selection. this section modernizes the recommendations concerning cipher suite
selection.
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate the cipher suites with NULL * Implementations MUST NOT negotiate the cipher suites with NULL
encryption. encryption.
Rationale: The NULL cipher suites do not encrypt traffic and so Rationale: The NULL cipher suites do not encrypt traffic and so
provide no confidentiality services. Any entity in the network provide no confidentiality services. Any entity in the network
with access to the connection can view the plaintext of contents with access to the connection can view the plaintext of contents
being exchanged by the client and server. being exchanged by the client and server. Nevertheless, this
Nevertheless, this document does not discourage software from document does not discourage software from implementing NULL
implementing NULL cipher suites, since they can be useful for cipher suites, since they can be useful for testing and debugging.
testing and debugging.
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate RC4 cipher suites. * Implementations MUST NOT negotiate RC4 cipher suites.
Rationale: The RC4 stream cipher has a variety of cryptographic Rationale: The RC4 stream cipher has a variety of cryptographic
weaknesses, as documented in [RFC7465]. Note that DTLS weaknesses, as documented in [RFC7465]. Note that DTLS
specifically forbids the use of RC4 already. specifically forbids the use of RC4 already.
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate cipher suites offering less * Implementations MUST NOT negotiate cipher suites offering less
than 112 bits of security, including so-called "export-level" than 112 bits of security, including so-called "export-level"
encryption (which provide 40 or 56 bits of security). encryption (which provides 40 or 56 bits of security).
Rationale: Based on [RFC3766], at least 112 bits of security is Rationale: Based on [RFC3766], at least 112 bits of security is
needed. 40-bit and 56-bit security (found in so-called "export needed. 40-bit and 56-bit security (found in so-called "export
ciphers") are considered insecure today. ciphers") are considered insecure today.
* Implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate cipher suites that use * Implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate cipher suites that use
algorithms offering less than 128 bits of security. algorithms offering less than 128 bits of security.
Rationale: Cipher suites that offer 112 or more bits but less than Rationale: Cipher suites that offer 112 or more bits but less than
128 bits of security are not considered weak at this time; 128 bits of security are not considered weak at this time;
however, it is expected that their useful lifespan is short enough however, it is expected that their useful lifespan is short enough
to justify supporting stronger cipher suites at this time. to justify supporting stronger cipher suites at this time.
128-bit ciphers are expected to remain secure for at least several 128-bit ciphers are expected to remain secure for at least several
years, and 256-bit ciphers until the next fundamental technology years and 256-bit ciphers until the next fundamental technology
breakthrough. Note that, because of so-called "meet-in-the- breakthrough. Note that, because of so-called "meet-in-the-
middle" attacks [Multiple-Encryption], some legacy cipher suites middle" attacks [Multiple-Encryption], some legacy cipher suites
(e.g., 168-bit 3DES) have an effective key length that is smaller (e.g., 168-bit Triple DES (3DES)) have an effective key length
than their nominal key length (112 bits in the case of 3DES). that is smaller than their nominal key length (112 bits in the
Such cipher suites should be evaluated according to their case of 3DES). Such cipher suites should be evaluated according
effective key length. to their effective key length.
* Implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate cipher suites based on RSA * Implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate cipher suites based on RSA
key transport, a.k.a. "static RSA". key transport, a.k.a. "static RSA".
Rationale: These cipher suites, which have assigned values Rationale: These cipher suites, which have assigned values
starting with the string "TLS_RSA_WITH_*", have several drawbacks, starting with the string "TLS_RSA_WITH_*", have several drawbacks,
especially the fact that they do not support forward secrecy. especially the fact that they do not support forward secrecy.
* Implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate cipher suites based on non- * Implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate cipher suites based on non-
ephemeral (static) finite-field Diffie-Hellman key agreement. ephemeral (static) finite-field Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement.
Similarly, implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate non-ephemeral Similarly, implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate non-ephemeral
elliptic curve DH key agreement. Elliptic Curve DH key agreement.
Rationale: The former cipher suites, which have assigned values Rationale: The former cipher suites, which have assigned values
prefixed by "TLS_DH_*", have several drawbacks, especially the prefixed by "TLS_DH_*", have several drawbacks, especially the
fact that they do not support forward secrecy. The latter fact that they do not support forward secrecy. The latter
("TLS_ECDH_*") also lack forward secrecy, and are subject to ("TLS_ECDH_*") also lack forward secrecy and are subject to
invalid curve attacks [Jager2015]. invalid curve attacks [Jager2015].
* Implementations MUST support and prefer to negotiate cipher suites * Implementations MUST support and prefer to negotiate cipher suites
offering forward secrecy. However, TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD offering forward secrecy. However, TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD
NOT negotiate cipher suites based on ephemeral finite-field NOT negotiate cipher suites based on ephemeral finite-field
Diffie-Hellman key agreement (i.e., "TLS_DHE_*" suites). This is Diffie-Hellman key agreement (i.e., "TLS_DHE_*" suites). This is
justified by the known fragility of the construction (see justified by the known fragility of the construction (see
[RACCOON]) and the limitation around negotiation -- including [RACCOON]) and the limitation around negotiation, including using
using [RFC7919], which has seen very limited uptake. [RFC7919], which has seen very limited uptake.
Rationale: Forward secrecy (sometimes called "perfect forward Rationale: Forward secrecy (sometimes called "perfect forward
secrecy") prevents the recovery of information that was encrypted secrecy") prevents the recovery of information that was encrypted
with older session keys, thus limiting how far back in time data with older session keys, thus limiting how far back in time data
can be decrypted when an attack is successful. See Section 7.3 can be decrypted when an attack is successful. See Sections 7.3
and Section 7.4 for a detailed discussion. and 7.4 for a detailed discussion.
4.2. Cipher Suites for TLS 1.2 4.2. Cipher Suites for TLS 1.2
Given the foregoing considerations, implementation and deployment of Given the foregoing considerations, implementation and deployment of
the following cipher suites is RECOMMENDED: the following cipher suites is RECOMMENDED:
* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
As these are authenticated encryption (AEAD) algorithms [RFC5116], As these are Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)
these cipher suites are supported only in TLS 1.2 and not in earlier algorithms [RFC5116], these cipher suites are supported only in TLS
protocol versions. 1.2 and not in earlier protocol versions.
Typically, in order to prefer these suites, the order of suites needs Typically, to prefer these suites, the order of suites needs to be
to be explicitly configured in server software. It would be ideal if explicitly configured in server software. It would be ideal if
server software implementations were to prefer these suites by server software implementations were to prefer these suites by
default. default.
Some devices have hardware support for AES-CCM but not AES-GCM, so Some devices have hardware support for AES Counter Mode with CBC-MAC
they are unable to follow the foregoing recommendations regarding (AES-CCM) but not AES Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM), so they are
cipher suites. There are even devices that do not support public key unable to follow the foregoing recommendations regarding cipher
suites. There are even devices that do not support public key
cryptography at all, but these are out of scope entirely. cryptography at all, but these are out of scope entirely.
A cipher suite that operates in CBC (cipher block chaining) mode A cipher suite that operates in CBC (cipher block chaining) mode
(e.g., TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) SHOULD NOT be used (e.g., TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) SHOULD NOT be used
unless the encrypt_then_mac extension [RFC7366] is also successfully unless the encrypt_then_mac extension [RFC7366] is also successfully
negotiated. This requirement applies to both client and server negotiated. This requirement applies to both client and server
implementations. implementations.
When using ECDSA signatures for authentication of TLS peers, it is When using ECDSA signatures for authentication of TLS peers, it is
RECOMMENDED that implementations use the NIST curve P-256. In RECOMMENDED that implementations use the NIST curve P-256. In
addition, to avoid predictable or repeated nonces (that would allow addition, to avoid predictable or repeated nonces (which could reveal
revealing the long term signing key), it is RECOMMENDED that the long-term signing key), it is RECOMMENDED that implementations
implementations implement "deterministic ECDSA" as specified in implement "deterministic ECDSA" as specified in [RFC6979] and in line
[RFC6979] and in line with the recommendations in [RFC8446]. with the recommendations in [RFC8446].
Note that implementations of "deterministic ECDSA" may be vulnerable Note that implementations of "deterministic ECDSA" may be vulnerable
to certain side-channel and fault injection attacks precisely because to certain side-channel and fault injection attacks precisely because
of their determinism. While most fault attacks described in the of their determinism. While most fault injection attacks described
literature assume physical access to the device (and therefore are in the literature assume physical access to the device (and therefore
more relevant in IoT deployments with poor or non-existent physical are more relevant in Internet of Things (IoT) deployments with poor
security), some can be carried out remotely [Poddebniak2017], e.g., or non-existent physical security), some can be carried out remotely
as Rowhammer [Kim2014] variants. In deployments where side-channel [Poddebniak2017], e.g., as Rowhammer [Kim2014] variants. In
attacks and fault injection attacks are a concern, implementation deployments where side-channel attacks and fault injection attacks
strategies combining both randomness and determinism (for example, as are a concern, implementation strategies combining both randomness
described in [I-D.mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise]) can be used to and determinism (for example, as described in [CFRG-DET-SIGS]) can be
avoid the risk of successful extraction of the signing key. used to avoid the risk of successful extraction of the signing key.
4.2.1. Implementation Details 4.2.1. Implementation Details
Clients SHOULD include TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as the Clients SHOULD include TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as the
first proposal to any server. Servers MUST prefer this cipher suite first proposal to any server. Servers MUST prefer this cipher suite
over weaker cipher suites whenever it is proposed, even if it is not over weaker cipher suites whenever it is proposed, even if it is not
the first proposal. Clients are of course free to offer stronger the first proposal. Clients are of course free to offer stronger
cipher suites, e.g., using AES-256; when they do, the server SHOULD cipher suites, e.g., using AES-256; when they do, the server SHOULD
prefer the stronger cipher suite unless there are compelling reasons prefer the stronger cipher suite unless there are compelling reasons
(e.g., seriously degraded performance) to choose otherwise. (e.g., seriously degraded performance) to choose otherwise.
The previous version of this document implicitly allowed the old RFC The previous version of the TLS recommendations [RFC7525] implicitly
5246 mandatory-to-implement cipher suite, allowed the old RFC 5246 mandatory-to-implement cipher suite,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. At the time of writing, this cipher TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. At the time of writing, this cipher
suite does not provide additional interoperability, except with very suite does not provide additional interoperability, except with very
old clients. As with other cipher suites that do not provide forward old clients. As with other cipher suites that do not provide forward
secrecy, implementations SHOULD NOT support this cipher suite. Other secrecy, implementations SHOULD NOT support this cipher suite. Other
application protocols specify other cipher suites as mandatory to application protocols specify other cipher suites as mandatory to
implement (MTI). implement (MTI).
[RFC8422] allows clients and servers to negotiate ECDH parameters [RFC8422] allows clients and servers to negotiate ECDH parameters
(curves). Both clients and servers SHOULD include the "Supported (curves). Both clients and servers SHOULD include the "Supported
Elliptic Curves" extension [RFC8422]. Clients and servers SHOULD Elliptic Curves Extension" [RFC8422]. Clients and servers SHOULD
support the NIST P-256 (secp256r1) [RFC8422] and X25519 (x25519) support the NIST P-256 (secp256r1) [RFC8422] and X25519 (x25519)
[RFC7748] curves. Note that [RFC8422] deprecates all but the [RFC7748] curves. Note that [RFC8422] deprecates all but the
uncompressed point format. Therefore, if the client sends an uncompressed point format. Therefore, if the client sends an
ec_point_formats extension, the ECPointFormatList MUST contain a ec_point_formats extension, the ECPointFormatList MUST contain a
single element, "uncompressed". single element, "uncompressed".
4.3. Cipher Suites for TLS 1.3 4.3. Cipher Suites for TLS 1.3
This document does not specify any cipher suites for TLS 1.3. This document does not specify any cipher suites for TLS 1.3.
Readers are referred to Section 9.1 of [RFC8446] for cipher suite Readers are referred to Section 9.1 of [RFC8446] for cipher suite
skipping to change at page 19, line 47 skipping to change at line 889
be able to emulate that method given their more constrained be able to emulate that method given their more constrained
interaction with TLS/DTLS. As a result of these complexities, these interaction with TLS/DTLS. As a result of these complexities, these
recommendations are not mandatory. recommendations are not mandatory.
For all TLS 1.3 cipher suites, readers are referred to Section 5.5 of For all TLS 1.3 cipher suites, readers are referred to Section 5.5 of
[RFC8446] for the values of CL and IL. For all DTLS 1.3 cipher [RFC8446] for the values of CL and IL. For all DTLS 1.3 cipher
suites, readers are referred to Section 4.5.3 of [RFC9147]. suites, readers are referred to Section 4.5.3 of [RFC9147].
For all AES-GCM cipher suites recommended for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 in For all AES-GCM cipher suites recommended for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 in
this document, CL can be derived by plugging the corresponding this document, CL can be derived by plugging the corresponding
parameters into the inequalities in Section 6.1 of parameters into the inequalities in Section 6.1 of [AEAD-LIMITS] that
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits] that apply to random, partially implicit apply to random, partially implicit nonces, i.e., the nonce
nonces, i.e., the nonce construction used in TLS 1.2. Although the construction used in TLS 1.2. Although the obtained figures are
obtained figures are slightly higher than those for TLS 1.3, it is slightly higher than those for TLS 1.3, it is RECOMMENDED that the
RECOMMENDED that the same limit of 2^24.5 records is used for both same limit of 2^24.5 records is used for both versions.
versions.
For all AES-GCM cipher suites recommended for DTLS 1.2, IL (obtained For all AES-GCM cipher suites recommended for DTLS 1.2, IL (obtained
from the same inequalities referenced above) is 2^28. from the same inequalities referenced above) is 2^28.
4.5. Public Key Length 4.5. Public Key Length
When using the cipher suites recommended in this document, two public When using the cipher suites recommended in this document, two public
keys are normally used in the TLS handshake: one for the Diffie- keys are normally used in the TLS handshake: one for the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement and one for server authentication. Where a Hellman key agreement and one for server authentication. Where a
client certificate is used, a third public key is added. client certificate is used, a third public key is added.
skipping to change at page 20, line 27 skipping to change at line 917
bits are REQUIRED. bits are REQUIRED.
Rationale: For various reasons, in practice, DH keys are typically Rationale: For various reasons, in practice, DH keys are typically
generated in lengths that are powers of two (e.g., 2^10 = 1024 bits, generated in lengths that are powers of two (e.g., 2^10 = 1024 bits,
2^11 = 2048 bits, 2^12 = 4096 bits). Because a DH key of 1228 bits 2^11 = 2048 bits, 2^12 = 4096 bits). Because a DH key of 1228 bits
would be roughly equivalent to only an 80-bit symmetric key would be roughly equivalent to only an 80-bit symmetric key
[RFC3766], it is better to use keys longer than that for the "DHE" [RFC3766], it is better to use keys longer than that for the "DHE"
family of cipher suites. A DH key of 1926 bits would be roughly family of cipher suites. A DH key of 1926 bits would be roughly
equivalent to a 100-bit symmetric key [RFC3766]. A DH key of 2048 equivalent to a 100-bit symmetric key [RFC3766]. A DH key of 2048
bits (equivalent to a 112-bit symmetric key) is the minimum allowed bits (equivalent to a 112-bit symmetric key) is the minimum allowed
by the latest revision of [NIST.SP.800-56A], as of this writing (see by the latest revision of [NIST.SP.800-56A] as of this writing (see
in particular Appendix D). in particular Appendix D of that document).
As noted in [RFC3766], correcting for the emergence of a TWIRL As noted in [RFC3766], correcting for the emergence of The Weizmann
machine [TWIRL] would imply that 1024-bit DH keys yield about 61 bits Institute Relation Locator (TWIRL) machine [TWIRL] would imply that
of equivalent strength and that a 2048-bit DH key would yield about 1024-bit DH keys yield about 61 bits of equivalent strength and that
92 bits of equivalent strength. The Logjam attack [Logjam] further a 2048-bit DH key would yield about 92 bits of equivalent strength.
demonstrates that 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman parameters should be The Logjam attack [Logjam] further demonstrates that 1024-bit Diffie-
avoided. Hellman parameters should be avoided.
With regard to ECDH keys, implementers are referred to the IANA With regard to ECDH keys, implementers are referred to the IANA "TLS
"Supported Groups Registry" (former "EC Named Curve Registry"), Supported Groups" registry (formerly known as the "EC Named Curve
within the "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters" registry Registry") within the "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters"
[IANA_TLS], and in particular to the "recommended" groups. Curves of registry [IANA_TLS] and in particular to the "recommended" groups.
less than 224 bits MUST NOT be used. This recommendation is in-line Curves of less than 224 bits MUST NOT be used. This recommendation
with the latest revision of [NIST.SP.800-56A]. is in line with the latest revision of [NIST.SP.800-56A].
When using RSA, servers MUST authenticate using certificates with at When using RSA, servers MUST authenticate using certificates with at
least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key. In addition, the use of least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key. In addition, the use of
the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT
be used ([RFC9155], and see [CAB-Baseline] for more details). be used [RFC9155] (for more details, see also [CAB-Baseline], for
Clients MUST indicate to servers that they request SHA-256, by using which the current version at the time of writing is 1.8.4). Clients
the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS 1.2. For TLS MUST indicate to servers that they request SHA-256 by using the
1.3, the same requirement is already specified by [RFC8446]. "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS 1.2. For TLS 1.3,
the same requirement is already specified by [RFC8446].
// Note to RFC Editor: we are looking for advice on how to best
// handle this constantly updated guidance from the CA/Browser Forum.
// In particular: which URL to use, which (if any) version to
// reference
4.6. Truncated HMAC 4.6. Truncated HMAC
Implementations MUST NOT use the Truncated HMAC extension, defined in Implementations MUST NOT use the Truncated HMAC Extension, defined in
Section 7 of [RFC6066]. Section 7 of [RFC6066].
Rationale: the extension does not apply to the AEAD cipher suites Rationale: The extension does not apply to the AEAD cipher suites
recommended above. However, it does apply to most other TLS cipher recommended above. However, it does apply to most other TLS cipher
suites. Its use has been shown to be insecure in [PatersonRS11]. suites. Its use has been shown to be insecure in [PatersonRS11].
5. Applicability Statement 5. Applicability Statement
The recommendations of this document primarily apply to the The recommendations of this document primarily apply to the
implementation and deployment of application protocols that are most implementation and deployment of application protocols that are most
commonly used with TLS and DTLS on the Internet today. Examples commonly used with TLS and DTLS on the Internet today. Examples
include, but are not limited to: include, but are not limited to:
* Web software and services that wish to protect HTTP traffic with * Web software and services that wish to protect HTTP traffic with
TLS. TLS.
* Email software and services that wish to protect IMAP, POP3, or * Email software and services that wish to protect IMAP, Post Office
SMTP traffic with TLS. Protocol version 3 (POP3), or SMTP traffic with TLS.
* Instant-messaging software and services that wish to protect * Instant-messaging software and services that wish to protect
Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) or Internet Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) or Internet
Relay Chat (IRC) traffic with TLS. Relay Chat (IRC) traffic with TLS.
* Realtime media software and services that wish to protect Secure * Realtime media software and services that wish to protect Secure
Realtime Transport Protocol (SRTP) traffic with DTLS. Realtime Transport Protocol (SRTP) traffic with DTLS.
This document does not modify the implementation and deployment This document does not modify the implementation and deployment
recommendations (e.g., mandatory-to-implement cipher suites) recommendations (e.g., mandatory-to-implement cipher suites)
skipping to change at page 22, line 13 skipping to change at line 989
which updates [RFC6120]). which updates [RFC6120]).
Designers of new application protocols developed through the Internet Designers of new application protocols developed through the Internet
Standards Process [RFC2026] are expected at minimum to conform to the Standards Process [RFC2026] are expected at minimum to conform to the
best practices recommended here, unless they provide documentation of best practices recommended here, unless they provide documentation of
compelling reasons that would prevent such conformance (e.g., compelling reasons that would prevent such conformance (e.g.,
widespread deployment on constrained devices that lack support for widespread deployment on constrained devices that lack support for
the necessary algorithms). the necessary algorithms).
Although many of the recommendations provided here might also apply Although many of the recommendations provided here might also apply
to QUIC insofar it uses the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol, QUIC and to QUIC insofar that it uses the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol, QUIC and
other such secure transport protocols are out of scope of this other such secure transport protocols are out of scope of this
document. For QUIC specifically, readers are referred to Section 9.2 document. For QUIC specifically, readers are referred to Section 9.2
of [RFC9001]. of [RFC9001].
This document does not address the use of TLS in constrained-node This document does not address the use of TLS in constrained-node
networks [RFC7228]. For recommendations regarding the profiling of networks [RFC7228]. For recommendations regarding the profiling of
TLS and DTLS for small devices with severe constraints on power, TLS and DTLS for small devices with severe constraints on power,
memory, and processing resources, the reader is referred to [RFC7925] memory, and processing resources, the reader is referred to [RFC7925]
and [I-D.ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile]. and [IOT-PROFILE].
5.1. Security Services 5.1. Security Services
This document provides recommendations for an audience that wishes to This document provides recommendations for an audience that wishes to
secure their communication with TLS to achieve the following: secure their communication with TLS to achieve the following:
* Confidentiality: all application-layer communication is encrypted Confidentiality: all application-layer communication is encrypted
with the goal that no party should be able to decrypt it except with the goal that no party should be able to decrypt it except
the intended receiver. the intended receiver.
* Data integrity: any changes made to the communication in transit Data integrity: any changes made to the communication in transit are
are detectable by the receiver. detectable by the receiver.
* Authentication: an endpoint of the TLS communication is Authentication: an endpoint of the TLS communication is
authenticated as the intended entity to communicate with. authenticated as the intended entity to communicate with.
With regard to authentication, TLS enables authentication of one or With regard to authentication, TLS enables authentication of one or
both endpoints in the communication. In the context of opportunistic both endpoints in the communication. In the context of opportunistic
security [RFC7435], TLS is sometimes used without authentication. As security [RFC7435], TLS is sometimes used without authentication. As
discussed in Section 5.2, considerations for opportunistic security discussed in Section 5.2, considerations for opportunistic security
are not in scope for this document. are not in scope for this document.
If deployers deviate from the recommendations given in this document, If deployers deviate from the recommendations given in this document,
they need to be aware that they might lose access to one of the they need to be aware that they might lose access to one of the
skipping to change at page 23, line 16 skipping to change at line 1040
one of the goals of a deployment. In cases where integrity is not one of the goals of a deployment. In cases where integrity is not
required, it does not make sense to employ TLS in the first place. required, it does not make sense to employ TLS in the first place.
There are attacks against confidentiality-only protection that There are attacks against confidentiality-only protection that
utilize the lack of integrity to also break confidentiality (see, for utilize the lack of integrity to also break confidentiality (see, for
instance, [DegabrieleP07] in the context of IPsec). instance, [DegabrieleP07] in the context of IPsec).
This document addresses itself to application protocols that are most This document addresses itself to application protocols that are most
commonly used on the Internet with TLS and DTLS. Typically, all commonly used on the Internet with TLS and DTLS. Typically, all
communication between TLS clients and TLS servers requires all three communication between TLS clients and TLS servers requires all three
of the above security services. This is particularly true where TLS of the above security services. This is particularly true where TLS
clients are user agents like Web browsers or email software. clients are user agents like web browsers or email clients.
This document does not address the rarer deployment scenarios where This document does not address the rarer deployment scenarios where
one of the above three properties is not desired, such as the use one of the above three properties is not desired, such as the use
case described in Section 5.2 below. As another scenario where case described in Section 5.2. As another scenario where
confidentiality is not needed, consider a monitored network where the confidentiality is not needed, consider a monitored network where the
authorities in charge of the respective traffic domain require full authorities in charge of the respective traffic domain require full
access to unencrypted (plaintext) traffic, and where users access to unencrypted (plaintext) traffic and where users collaborate
collaborate and send their traffic in the clear. and send their traffic in the clear.
5.2. Opportunistic Security 5.2. Opportunistic Security
There are several important scenarios in which the use of TLS is There are several important scenarios in which the use of TLS is
optional, i.e., the client decides dynamically ("opportunistically") optional, i.e., the client decides dynamically ("opportunistically")
whether to use TLS with a particular server or to connect in the whether to use TLS with a particular server or to connect in the
clear. This practice, often called "opportunistic security", is clear. This practice, often called "opportunistic security", is
described at length in [RFC7435] and is often motivated by a desire described at length in [RFC7435] and is often motivated by a desire
for backward compatibility with legacy deployments. for backward compatibility with legacy deployments.
skipping to change at page 23, line 51 skipping to change at line 1075
This document has no IANA actions. This document has no IANA actions.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
This entire document discusses the security practices directly This entire document discusses the security practices directly
affecting applications using the TLS protocol. This section contains affecting applications using the TLS protocol. This section contains
broader security considerations related to technologies used in broader security considerations related to technologies used in
conjunction with or by TLS. The reader is referred to the Security conjunction with or by TLS. The reader is referred to the Security
Considerations sections of TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147], TLS Considerations sections of TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147], TLS
1.2 [RFC5246] and DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347] for further context. 1.2 [RFC5246], and DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347] for further context.
7.1. Host Name Validation 7.1. Host Name Validation
Application authors should take note that some TLS implementations do Application authors should take note that some TLS implementations do
not validate host names. If the TLS implementation they are using not validate host names. If the TLS implementation they are using
does not validate host names, authors might need to write their own does not validate host names, authors might need to write their own
validation code or consider using a different TLS implementation. validation code or consider using a different TLS implementation.
It is noted that the requirements regarding host name validation It is noted that the requirements regarding host name validation
(and, in general, binding between the TLS layer and the protocol that (and, in general, binding between the TLS layer and the protocol that
runs above it) vary between different protocols. For HTTPS, these runs above it) vary between different protocols. For HTTPS, these
requirements are defined by Sections 4.3.3, 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 of requirements are defined by Sections 4.3.3, 4.3.4, and 4.3.5 of
[HTTP-SEMA]. [RFC9110].
Host name validation is security-critical for all common TLS use Host name validation is security-critical for all common TLS use
cases. Without it, TLS ensures that the certificate is valid and cases. Without it, TLS ensures that the certificate is valid and
guarantees possession of the private key, but does not ensure that guarantees possession of the private key but does not ensure that the
the connection terminates at the desired endpoint. Readers are connection terminates at the desired endpoint. Readers are referred
referred to [RFC6125] for further details regarding generic host name to [RFC6125] for further details regarding generic host name
validation in the TLS context. In addition, that RFC contains a long validation in the TLS context. In addition, that RFC contains a long
list of example protocols, some of which implement a policy very list of application protocols, some of which implement a policy very
different from HTTPS. different from HTTPS.
If the host name is discovered indirectly and insecurely (e.g., by a If the host name is discovered indirectly and insecurely (e.g., by a
clear-text DNS query for an SRV or MX record), it SHOULD NOT be used cleartext DNS query for an SRV or Mail Exchange (MX) record), it
as a reference identifier [RFC6125] even when it matches the SHOULD NOT be used as a reference identifier [RFC6125] even when it
presented certificate. This proviso does not apply if the host name matches the presented certificate. This proviso does not apply if
is discovered securely (for further discussion, see [DANE-SRV] and the host name is discovered securely (for further discussion, see
[DANE-SMTP]). [RFC7673] and [RFC7672]).
Host name validation typically applies only to the leaf "end entity" Host name validation typically applies only to the leaf "end entity"
certificate. Naturally, in order to ensure proper authentication in certificate. Naturally, in order to ensure proper authentication in
the context of the PKI, application clients need to verify the entire the context of the PKI, application clients need to verify the entire
certification path in accordance with [RFC5280]. certification path in accordance with [RFC5280].
7.2. AES-GCM 7.2. AES-GCM
Section 4.2 above recommends the use of the AES-GCM authenticated Section 4.2 recommends the use of the AES-GCM authenticated
encryption algorithm. Please refer to Section 6 of [RFC5288] for encryption algorithm. Please refer to Section 6 of [RFC5288] for
security considerations that apply specifically to AES-GCM when used security considerations that apply specifically to AES-GCM when used
with TLS. with TLS.
7.2.1. Nonce Reuse in TLS 1.2 7.2.1. Nonce Reuse in TLS 1.2
The existence of deployed TLS stacks that mistakenly reuse the AES- The existence of deployed TLS stacks that mistakenly reuse the AES-
GCM nonce is documented in [Boeck2016], showing there is an actual GCM nonce is documented in [Boeck2016], showing there is an actual
risk of AES-GCM getting implemented insecurely and thus making TLS risk of AES-GCM getting implemented insecurely and thus making TLS
sessions that use an AES-GCM cipher suite vulnerable to attacks such sessions that use an AES-GCM cipher suite vulnerable to attacks such
as [Joux2006]. (See [CVE] records: CVE-2016-0270, CVE-2016-10213, as [Joux2006]. (See [CVE] records: CVE-2016-0270, CVE-2016-10213,
CVE-2016-10212, CVE-2017-5933.) CVE-2016-10212, and CVE-2017-5933.)
While this problem has been fixed in TLS 1.3, which enforces a While this problem has been fixed in TLS 1.3, which enforces a
deterministic method to generate nonces from record sequence numbers deterministic method to generate nonces from record sequence numbers
and shared secrets for all of its AEAD cipher suites (including AES- and shared secrets for all its AEAD cipher suites (including AES-
GCM), TLS 1.2 implementations could still choose their own GCM), TLS 1.2 implementations could still choose their own
(potentially insecure) nonce generation methods. (potentially insecure) nonce generation methods.
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that TLS 1.2 implementations use the It is therefore RECOMMENDED that TLS 1.2 implementations use the
64-bit sequence number to populate the nonce_explicit part of the GCM 64-bit sequence number to populate the nonce_explicit part of the GCM
nonce, as described in the first two paragraphs of Section 5.3 of nonce, as described in the first two paragraphs of Section 5.3 of
[RFC8446]. This stronger recommendation updates Section 3 of [RFC8446]. This stronger recommendation updates Section 3 of
[RFC5288], which specified that the use of 64-bit sequence numbers to [RFC5288], which specifies that the use of 64-bit sequence numbers to
populate the nonce_explicit field was optional. populate the nonce_explicit field is optional.
We note that at the time of writing there are no cipher suites We note that at the time of writing, there are no cipher suites
defined for nonce reuse resistant algorithms such as AES-GCM-SIV defined for nonce-reuse-resistant algorithms such as AES-GCM-SIV
[RFC8452]. [RFC8452].
7.3. Forward Secrecy 7.3. Forward Secrecy
Forward secrecy (also called "perfect forward secrecy" or "PFS" and Forward secrecy (also called "perfect forward secrecy" or "PFS" and
defined in [RFC4949]) is a defense against an attacker who records defined in [RFC4949]) is a defense against an attacker who records
encrypted conversations where the session keys are only encrypted encrypted conversations where the session keys are only encrypted
with the communicating parties' long-term keys. with the communicating parties' long-term keys.
Should the attacker be able to obtain these long-term keys at some Should the attacker be able to obtain these long-term keys at some
skipping to change at page 26, line 5 skipping to change at line 1166
not entirely implausible. It can happen, for example, due to: not entirely implausible. It can happen, for example, due to:
* A client or server being attacked by some other attack vector, and * A client or server being attacked by some other attack vector, and
the private key retrieved. the private key retrieved.
* A long-term key retrieved from a device that has been sold or * A long-term key retrieved from a device that has been sold or
otherwise decommissioned without prior wiping. otherwise decommissioned without prior wiping.
* A long-term key used on a device as a default key [Heninger2012]. * A long-term key used on a device as a default key [Heninger2012].
* A key generated by a trusted third party like a CA, and later * A key generated by a trusted third party like a CA and later
retrieved from it either by extortion or compromise retrieved from it by either extortion or compromise
[Soghoian2011]. [Soghoian2011].
* A cryptographic break-through, or the use of asymmetric keys with * A cryptographic breakthrough or the use of asymmetric keys with
insufficient length [Kleinjung2010]. insufficient length [Kleinjung2010].
* Social engineering attacks against system administrators. * Social engineering attacks against system administrators.
* Collection of private keys from inadequately protected backups. * Collection of private keys from inadequately protected backups.
Forward secrecy ensures in such cases that it is not feasible for an Forward secrecy ensures in such cases that it is not feasible for an
attacker to determine the session keys even if the attacker has attacker to determine the session keys even if the attacker has
obtained the long-term keys some time after the conversation. It obtained the long-term keys some time after the conversation. It
also protects against an attacker who is in possession of the long- also protects against an attacker who is in possession of the long-
skipping to change at page 26, line 31 skipping to change at line 1192
Forward secrecy is generally achieved by using the Diffie-Hellman Forward secrecy is generally achieved by using the Diffie-Hellman
scheme to derive session keys. The Diffie-Hellman scheme has both scheme to derive session keys. The Diffie-Hellman scheme has both
parties maintain private secrets and send parameters over the network parties maintain private secrets and send parameters over the network
as modular powers over certain cyclic groups. The properties of the as modular powers over certain cyclic groups. The properties of the
so-called Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) allow the parties to so-called Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) allow the parties to
derive the session keys without an eavesdropper being able to do so. derive the session keys without an eavesdropper being able to do so.
There is currently no known attack against DLP if sufficiently large There is currently no known attack against DLP if sufficiently large
parameters are chosen. A variant of the Diffie-Hellman scheme uses parameters are chosen. A variant of the Diffie-Hellman scheme uses
elliptic curves instead of the originally proposed modular elliptic curves instead of the originally proposed modular
arithmetic. Given the current state of the art, elliptic-curve arithmetic. Given the current state of the art, Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman appears to be more efficient, permits shorter key Diffie-Hellman appears to be more efficient, permits shorter key
lengths, and allows less freedom for implementation errors than lengths, and allows less freedom for implementation errors than
finite-field Diffie-Hellman. finite-field Diffie-Hellman.
Unfortunately, many TLS/DTLS cipher suites were defined that do not Unfortunately, many TLS/DTLS cipher suites were defined that do not
feature forward secrecy, e.g., TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256. This feature forward secrecy, e.g., TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256. This
document therefore advocates strict use of forward-secrecy-only document therefore advocates strict use of forward-secrecy-only
ciphers. ciphers.
7.4. Diffie-Hellman Exponent Reuse 7.4. Diffie-Hellman Exponent Reuse
skipping to change at page 27, line 18 skipping to change at line 1227
time of writing, although general guidance in this area is time of writing, although general guidance in this area is
provided by [NIST.SP.800-56A] and available in many protocol provided by [NIST.SP.800-56A] and available in many protocol
implementations. implementations.
* Under certain conditions, the use of static finite-field DH keys, * Under certain conditions, the use of static finite-field DH keys,
or of ephemeral finite-field DH keys that are reused across or of ephemeral finite-field DH keys that are reused across
multiple connections, can lead to timing attacks (such as those multiple connections, can lead to timing attacks (such as those
described in [RACCOON]) on the shared secrets used in Diffie- described in [RACCOON]) on the shared secrets used in Diffie-
Hellman key exchange. Hellman key exchange.
* An "invalid curve" attack can be mounted against elliptic-curve DH * An "invalid curve" attack can be mounted against Elliptic Curve DH
if the victim does not verify that the received point lies on the if the victim does not verify that the received point lies on the
correct curve. If the victim is reusing the DH secrets, the correct curve. If the victim is reusing the DH secrets, the
attacker can repeat the probe varying the points to recover the attacker can repeat the probe varying the points to recover the
full secret (see [Antipa2003] and [Jager2015]). full secret (see [Antipa2003] and [Jager2015]).
To address these concerns: To address these concerns:
* TLS implementations SHOULD NOT use static finite-field DH keys and * TLS implementations SHOULD NOT use static finite-field DH keys and
SHOULD NOT reuse ephemeral finite-field DH keys across multiple SHOULD NOT reuse ephemeral finite-field DH keys across multiple
connections. connections.
* Server implementations that want to reuse elliptic-curve DH keys * Server implementations that want to reuse Elliptic Curve DH keys
SHOULD either use a "safe curve" [SAFECURVES] (e.g., X25519), or SHOULD either use a "safe curve" [SAFECURVES] (e.g., X25519) or
perform the checks described in [NIST.SP.800-56A] on the received perform the checks described in [NIST.SP.800-56A] on the received
points. points.
7.5. Certificate Revocation 7.5. Certificate Revocation
The following considerations and recommendations represent the The following considerations and recommendations represent the
current state of the art regarding certificate revocation, even current state of the art regarding certificate revocation, even
though no complete and efficient solution exists for the problem of though no complete and efficient solution exists for the problem of
checking the revocation status of common public key certificates checking the revocation status of common public key certificates
[RFC5280]: [RFC5280]:
* Certificate revocation is an important tool when recovering from * Certificate revocation is an important tool when recovering from
attacks on the TLS implementation, as well as cases of misissued attacks on the TLS implementation as well as cases of misissued
certificates. TLS implementations MUST implement a strategy to certificates. TLS implementations MUST implement a strategy to
distrust revoked certificates. distrust revoked certificates.
* Although Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are the most widely * Although Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are the most widely
supported mechanism for distributing revocation information, they supported mechanism for distributing revocation information, they
have known scaling challenges that limit their usefulness, despite have known scaling challenges that limit their usefulness, despite
workarounds such as partitioned CRLs and delta CRLs. The more workarounds such as partitioned CRLs and delta CRLs. The more
modern [CRLite] and the follow-on Let's Revoke [LetsRevoke] build modern [CRLite] and the follow-on Let's Revoke [LetsRevoke] build
on the availability of Certificate Transparency [RFC9162] logs and on the availability of Certificate Transparency [RFC9162] logs and
aggressive compression to allow practical use of the CRL aggressive compression to allow practical use of the CRL
infrastructure, but at the time of writing, neither solution is infrastructure, but at the time of writing, neither solution is
deployed for client-side revocation processing at scale. deployed for client-side revocation processing at scale.
* Proprietary mechanisms that embed revocation lists in the Web * Proprietary mechanisms that embed revocation lists in the web
browser's configuration database cannot scale beyond the few, most browser's configuration database cannot scale beyond the few most
heavily used Web servers. heavily used web servers.
* The On-Line Certification Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC6960] in its * The Online Certification Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC6960] in its
basic form presents both scaling and privacy issues. In addition, basic form presents both scaling and privacy issues. In addition,
clients typically "soft-fail", meaning that they do not abort the clients typically "soft-fail", meaning that they do not abort the
TLS connection if the OCSP server does not respond. (However, TLS connection if the OCSP server does not respond. (However,
this might be a workaround to avoid denial-of-service attacks if this might be a workaround to avoid denial-of-service attacks if
an OCSP responder is taken offline.). For an up-to-date survey of an OCSP responder is taken offline.) For a recent survey of the
the status of OCSP deployment in the Web PKI see [Chung18]. status of OCSP deployment in the web PKI, see [Chung18].
* The TLS Certificate Status Request extension (Section 8 of * The TLS Certificate Status Request extension (Section 8 of
[RFC6066]), commonly called "OCSP stapling", resolves the [RFC6066]), commonly called "OCSP stapling", resolves the
operational issues with OCSP. However, it is still ineffective in operational issues with OCSP. However, it is still ineffective in
the presence of a MITM attacker because the attacker can simply the presence of an active on-path attacker because the attacker
ignore the client's request for a stapled OCSP response. can simply ignore the client's request for a stapled OCSP
response.
* [RFC7633] defines a certificate extension that indicates that * [RFC7633] defines a certificate extension that indicates that
clients must expect stapled OCSP responses for the certificate and clients must expect stapled OCSP responses for the certificate and
must abort the handshake ("hard-fail") if such a response is not must abort the handshake ("hard-fail") if such a response is not
available. available.
* OCSP stapling as used in TLS 1.2 does not extend to intermediate * OCSP stapling as used in TLS 1.2 does not extend to intermediate
certificates within a certificate chain. The Multiple Certificate certificates within a certificate chain. The Multiple Certificate
Status extension [RFC6961] addresses this shortcoming, but it has Status extension [RFC6961] addresses this shortcoming, but it has
seen little deployment and had been deprecated by [RFC8446]. As a seen little deployment and had been deprecated by [RFC8446]. As a
result, we no longer recommend this extension for TLS 1.2. result, although this extension was recommended for TLS 1.2 in
[RFC7525], it is no longer recommended by this document.
* TLS 1.3 (Section 4.4.2.1 of [RFC8446]) allows the association of * TLS 1.3 (Section 4.4.2.1 of [RFC8446]) allows the association of
OCSP information with intermediate certificates by using an OCSP information with intermediate certificates by using an
extension to the CertificateEntry structure. However, using this extension to the CertificateEntry structure. However, using this
facility remains impractical because many CAs either do not facility remains impractical because many certification
publish OCSP for CA certificates or publish OCSP reports with a authorities (CAs) either do not publish OCSP for CA certificates
lifetime that is too long to be useful. or publish OCSP reports with a lifetime that is too long to be
useful.
* Both CRLs and OCSP depend on relatively reliable connectivity to * Both CRLs and OCSP depend on relatively reliable connectivity to
the Internet, which might not be available to certain kinds of the Internet, which might not be available to certain kinds of
nodes. A common example is newly provisioned devices that need to nodes. A common example is newly provisioned devices that need to
establish a secure connection in order to boot up for the first establish a secure connection in order to boot up for the first
time. time.
For the common use cases of public key certificates in TLS, servers For the common use cases of public key certificates in TLS, servers
SHOULD support the following as a best practice given the current SHOULD support the following as a best practice given the current
state of the art and as a foundation for a possible future solution: state of the art and as a foundation for a possible future solution:
OCSP [RFC6960] and OCSP stapling using the status_request extension OCSP [RFC6960] and OCSP stapling using the status_request extension
defined in [RFC6066]. Note that the exact mechanism for embedding defined in [RFC6066]. Note that the exact mechanism for embedding
the status_request extension differs between TLS 1.2 and 1.3. As a the status_request extension differs between TLS 1.2 and 1.3. As a
matter of local policy, server operators MAY request that CAs issue matter of local policy, server operators MAY request that CAs issue
must-staple [RFC7633] certificates for the server and/or for client must-staple [RFC7633] certificates for the server and/or for client
authentication, but we recommend to review the operational conditions authentication, but we recommend reviewing the operational conditions
before deciding on this approach. before deciding on this approach.
The considerations in this section do not apply to scenarios where The considerations in this section do not apply to scenarios where
the DANE-TLSA resource record [RFC6698] is used to signal to a client the DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA resource
which certificate a server considers valid and good to use for TLS record [RFC6698] is used to signal to a client which certificate a
connections. server considers valid and good to use for TLS connections.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Alexey Melnikov, Alvaro Retana, Andrei Popov, Ben Kaduk,
Christian Huitema, Corey Bonnell, Cullen Jennings, Daniel Kahn
Gillmor, David Benjamin, Eric Rescorla, Éric Vyncke, Francesca
Palombini, Hannes Tschofenig, Hubert Kario, Ilari Liusvaara, John
Mattsson, John R Levine, Julien Élie, Lars Eggert, Leif Johansson,
Magnus Westerlund, Martin Duke, Martin Thomson, Mohit Sahni, Nick
Sullivan, Nimrod Aviram, Paul Wouters, Peter Gutmann, Rich Salz,
Robert Sayre, Robert Wilton, Roman Danyliw, Ryan Sleevi, Sean Turner,
Stephen Farrell, Tim Evans, Valery Smyslov, Viktor Dukhovni and
Warren Kumari for helpful comments and discussions that have shaped
this document.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Ralph Holz,
who was a coauthor of RFC 7525, the previous version of this
document.
See RFC 7525 for additional acknowledgments for the previous revision
of this document.
References 8. References
Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For [RFC3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For
Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP 86, Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP 86,
RFC 3766, DOI 10.17487/RFC3766, April 2004, RFC 3766, DOI 10.17487/RFC3766, April 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3766>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3766>.
skipping to change at page 32, line 10 skipping to change at line 1434
[RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The [RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022, 1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147>.
[RFC9155] Velvindron, L., Moriarty, K., and A. Ghedini, "Deprecating [RFC9155] Velvindron, L., Moriarty, K., and A. Ghedini, "Deprecating
MD5 and SHA-1 Signature Hashes in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2", MD5 and SHA-1 Signature Hashes in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2",
RFC 9155, DOI 10.17487/RFC9155, December 2021, RFC 9155, DOI 10.17487/RFC9155, December 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9155>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9155>.
Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[AEAD-LIMITS]
Günther, F., Thomson, M., and C. A. Wood, "Usage Limits on
AEAD Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
irtf-cfrg-aead-limits-05, 11 July 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-
aead-limits-05>.
[ALPACA] Brinkmann, M., Dresen, C., Merget, R., Poddebniak, D., [ALPACA] Brinkmann, M., Dresen, C., Merget, R., Poddebniak, D.,
Müller, J., Somorovsky, J., Schwenk, J., and S. Schinzel, Müller, J., Somorovsky, J., Schwenk, J., and S. Schinzel,
"ALPACA: Application Layer Protocol Confusion - Analyzing "ALPACA: Application Layer Protocol Confusion - Analyzing
and Mitigating Cracks in TLS Authentication", 30th USENIX and Mitigating Cracks in TLS Authentication", 30th USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21) , 2021, Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21), August 2021,
<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/ <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/
presentation/brinkmann>. presentation/brinkmann>.
[Antipa2003] [Antipa2003]
Antipa, A., Brown, D. R. L., Menezes, A., Struik, R., and Antipa, A., Brown, D. R. L., Menezes, A., Struik, R., and
S. A. Vanstone, "Validation of Elliptic Curve Public S. Vanstone, "Validation of Elliptic Curve Public Keys",
Keys", Public Key Cryptography - PKC 2003 , 2003. Public Key Cryptography - PKC 2003, December 2003,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36288-6_16>.
[Boeck2016] [Boeck2016]
Böck, H., Zauner, A., Devlin, S., Somorovsky, J., and P. Böck, H., Zauner, A., Devlin, S., Somorovsky, J., and P.
Jovanovic, "Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries: Practical Jovanovic, "Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries: Practical
Forgery Attacks on GCM in TLS", May 2016, Forgery Attacks on GCM in TLS", May 2016,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/475.pdf>. <https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/475.pdf>.
[CAB-Baseline] [CAB-Baseline]
CA/Browser Forum, "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance CA/Browser Forum, "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance
and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates Version and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates",
1.1.6", 2013, <https://cabforum.org/documents/>. Version 1.8.4, April 2022,
<https://cabforum.org/documents/>.
[CFRG-DET-SIGS]
Preuß Mattsson, J., Thormarker, E., and S. Ruohomaa,
"Deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures with Additional
Randomness", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-
cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-00, 8 August 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-
det-sigs-with-noise-00>.
[Chung18] Chung, T., Lok, J., Chandrasekaran, B., Choffnes, D., [Chung18] Chung, T., Lok, J., Chandrasekaran, B., Choffnes, D.,
Levin, D., Maggs, B., Mislove, A., Rula, J., Sullivan, N., Levin, D., Maggs, B., Mislove, A., Rula, J., Sullivan, N.,
and C. Wilson, "Is the Web Ready for OCSP Must-Staple?", and C. Wilson, "Is the Web Ready for OCSP Must-Staple?",
Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018, Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018,
DOI 10.1145/3278532.3278543, October 2018, DOI 10.1145/3278532.3278543, October 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3278532.3278543>. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3278532.3278543>.
[CRLite] Larisch, J., Choffnes, D., Levin, D., Maggs, B., Mislove, [CRLite] Larisch, J., Choffnes, D., Levin, D., Maggs, B., Mislove,
A., and C. Wilson, "CRLite: A Scalable System for Pushing A., and C. Wilson, "CRLite: A Scalable System for Pushing
All TLS Revocations to All Browsers", 2017 IEEE Symposium All TLS Revocations to All Browsers", 2017 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy (SP), DOI 10.1109/sp.2017.17, May on Security and Privacy (SP), DOI 10.1109/sp.2017.17, May
2017, <https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2017.17>. 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2017.17>.
[CVE] MITRE, "Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures", [CVE] Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, "CVE Program",
<https://cve.mitre.org>. MITRE, <https://cve.mitre.org>.
[DANE-SMTP]
Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "SMTP Security via
Opportunistic DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities
(DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7672,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7672, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7672>.
[DANE-SRV] Finch, T., Miller, M., and P. Saint-Andre, "Using DNS-
Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA Records
with SRV Records", RFC 7673, DOI 10.17487/RFC7673, October
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7673>.
[DegabrieleP07] [DegabrieleP07]
Degabriele, J. and K. Paterson, "Attacking the IPsec Degabriele, J. and K. Paterson, "Attacking the IPsec
Standards in Encryption-only Configurations", 2007 IEEE Standards in Encryption-only Configurations", 2007 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07), Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07),
DOI 10.1109/sp.2007.8, May 2007, DOI 10.1109/sp.2007.8, May 2007,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2007.8>. <https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2007.8>.
[DEP-SSLv3]
Barnes, R., Thomson, M., Pironti, A., and A. Langley,
"Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0", RFC 7568,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7568, June 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7568>.
[DROWN] Aviram, N., Schinzel, S., Somorovsky, J., Heninger, N., [DROWN] Aviram, N., Schinzel, S., Somorovsky, J., Heninger, N.,
Dankel, M., Steube, J., Valenta, L., Adrian, D., Dankel, M., Steube, J., Valenta, L., Adrian, D.,
Halderman, J., Dukhovni, V., Käsper, E., Cohney, S., Halderman, J., Dukhovni, V., Käsper, E., Cohney, S.,
Engels, S., Paar, C., and Y. Shavitt, "DROWN: Breaking TLS Engels, S., Paar, C., and Y. Shavitt, "DROWN: Breaking TLS
using SSLv2", 25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX using SSLv2", 25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 16) , 2016, Security 16), August 2016,
<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/ <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/
technical-sessions/presentation/aviram>. technical-sessions/presentation/aviram>.
[Heninger2012] [Heninger2012]
Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., and J. A. Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., and J. A.
Halderman, "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread Halderman, "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread
Weak Keys in Network Devices", Usenix Security Weak Keys in Network Devices", 21st Usenix Security
Symposium 2012, 2012. Symposium, August 2012.
[HTTP-SEMA]
Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.
[HTTP1.1] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP/1.1", STD 99, RFC 9112, DOI 10.17487/RFC9112,
June 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9112>.
[HTTP2] Thomson, M., Ed. and C. Benfield, Ed., "HTTP/2", RFC 9113,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9113, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9113>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-esni] [IANA_TLS] IANA, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters",
Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. A. Wood, "TLS <https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters>.
Encrypted Client Hello", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, 13 February 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-esni-
14.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile] [IOT-PROFILE]
Tschofenig, H. and T. Fossati, "TLS/DTLS 1.3 Profiles for Tschofenig, H. and T. Fossati, "TLS/DTLS 1.3 Profiles for
the Internet of Things", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, the Internet of Things", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile-05, 6 July 2022, draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile-05, 6 July 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-uta-
profile-05.txt>. tls13-iot-profile-05>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits]
Günther, F., Thomson, M., and C. A. Wood, "Usage Limits on
AEAD Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
irtf-cfrg-aead-limits-05, 11 July 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-
limits-05.txt>.
[I-D.mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise]
Mattsson, J. P., Thormarker, E., and S. Ruohomaa,
"Deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures with Additional
Randomness", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-04, 15 February 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-
sigs-with-noise-04.txt>.
[IANA_TLS] IANA, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters", 23
August 2005,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters>.
[Jager2015] [Jager2015]
Jager, T., Schwenk, J., and J. Somorovsky, "Practical Jager, T., Schwenk, J., and J. Somorovsky, "Practical
Invalid Curve Attacks on TLS-ECDH", Computer Security -- Invalid Curve Attacks on TLS-ECDH", Computer Security --
ESORICS 2015 pp. 407-425, ESORICS 2015, pp. 407-425,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24174-6_21, 2015, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24174-6_21, 2015,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24174-6_21>. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24174-6_21>.
[Joux2006] Joux, A., "Authentication Failures in NIST version of [Joux2006] Joux, A., "Authentication Failures in NIST version of
GCM", 2006, <https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/ GCM", 2006, <https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/
block-cipher-techniques/documents/bcm/comments/800-38- block-cipher-techniques/documents/bcm/comments/800-38-
series-drafts/gcm/joux_comments.pdf>. series-drafts/gcm/joux_comments.pdf>.
[Kim2014] Kim, Y., Daly, R., Kim, J., Fallin, C., Lee, J. H., Lee, [Kim2014] Kim, Y., Daly, R., Kim, J., Fallin, C., Lee, J. H., Lee,
D., Wilkerson, C., Lai, K., and O. Mutlu, "Flipping Bits D., Wilkerson, C., Lai, K., and O. Mutlu, "Flipping Bits
in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of
DRAM Disturbance Errors", 2014, DRAM Disturbance Errors", DOI 10.1109/ISCA.2014.6853210,
<https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~yoonguk/papers/kim- July 2014, <https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~yoonguk/papers/kim-
isca14.pdf>. isca14.pdf>.
[Kleinjung2010] [Kleinjung2010]
Kleinjung, T., Aoki, K., Franke, J., Lenstra, A., Thomé, Kleinjung, T., Aoki, K., Franke, J., Lenstra, A., Thomé,
E., Bos, J., Gaudry, P., Kruppa, A., Montgomery, P., E., Bos, J., Gaudry, P., Kruppa, A., Montgomery, P.,
Osvik, D., te Riele, H., Timofeev, A., and P. Zimmermann, Osvik, D., te Riele, H., Timofeev, A., and P. Zimmermann,
"Factorization of a 768-Bit RSA Modulus", Advances in "Factorization of a 768-Bit RSA Modulus", Advances in
Cryptology - CRYPTO 2010 pp. 333-350, Cryptology - CRYPTO 2010, pp. 333-350,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-14623-7_18, 2010, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-14623-7_18, 2010,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14623-7_18>. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14623-7_18>.
[LetsRevoke] [LetsRevoke]
Smith, T., Dickinson, L., and K. Seamons, "Let's Revoke: Smith, T., Dickinson, L., and K. Seamons, "Let's Revoke:
Scalable Global Certificate Revocation", Proceedings 2020 Scalable Global Certificate Revocation", Proceedings 2020
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, Network and Distributed System Security Symposium,
DOI 10.14722/ndss.2020.24084, 2020, DOI 10.14722/ndss.2020.24084, February 2020,
<https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2020.24084>. <https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2020.24084>.
[Logjam] Adrian, D., Bhargavan, K., Durumeric, Z., Gaudry, P., [Logjam] Adrian, D., Bhargavan, K., Durumeric, Z., Gaudry, P.,
Green, M., Halderman, J., Heninger, N., Springall, D., Green, M., Halderman, J., Heninger, N., Springall, D.,
Thomé, E., Valenta, L., VanderSloot, B., Wustrow, E., Thomé, E., Valenta, L., VanderSloot, B., Wustrow, E.,
Zanella-Béguelin, S., and P. Zimmermann, "Imperfect Zanella-Béguelin, S., and P. Zimmermann, "Imperfect
Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice", Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice",
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, DOI 10.1145/2810103.2813707, and Communications Security, pp. 5-17,
October 2015, <https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813707>. DOI 10.1145/2810103.2813707, October 2015,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813707>.
[Multiple-Encryption] [Multiple-Encryption]
Merkle, R. and M. Hellman, "On the security of multiple Merkle, R. and M. Hellman, "On the security of multiple
encryption", Communications of the ACM vol. 24, no. 7, pp. encryption", Communications of the ACM, Vol. 24, Issue 7,
465-467, DOI 10.1145/358699.358718, July 1981, pp. 465-467, DOI 10.1145/358699.358718, July 1981,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/358699.358718>. <https://doi.org/10.1145/358699.358718>.
[NIST.SP.800-56A] [NIST.SP.800-56A]
Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., and R. National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Davis, "Recommendation for pair-wise key-establishment "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes
schemes using discrete logarithm cryptography", National Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", Revision 3, NIST
Institute of Standards and Technology report, Special Publication 800-56A,
DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-56ar3, April 2018, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3, April 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-56ar3>. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3>.
[PatersonRS11] [PatersonRS11]
Paterson, K., Ristenpart, T., and T. Shrimpton, "Tag Size Paterson, K., Ristenpart, T., and T. Shrimpton, "Tag Size
Does Matter: Attacks and Proofs for the TLS Record Does Matter: Attacks and Proofs for the TLS Record
Protocol", Lecture Notes in Computer Science pp. 372-389, Protocol", Proceedings of the 17th International
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0_20, 2011, conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and
Information Security, pp. 372-389,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0_20, December 2011,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0_20>. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0_20>.
[Poddebniak2017] [Poddebniak2017]
Poddebniak, D., Somorovsky, J., Schinzel, S., Lochter, M., Poddebniak, D., Somorovsky, J., Schinzel, S., Lochter, M.,
and P. Rösler, "Attacking Deterministic Signature Schemes and P. Rösler, "Attacking Deterministic Signature Schemes
using Fault Attacks", 2017, using Fault Attacks", Conference: 2018 IEEE European
Symposium on Security and Privacy,
DOI 10.1109/EuroSP.2018.00031, April 2018,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1014.pdf>. <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1014.pdf>.
[POODLE] US-CERT, "SSL 3.0 Protocol Vulnerability and POODLE [POODLE] US-CERT, "SSL 3.0 Protocol Vulnerability and POODLE
Attack", October 2014, Attack", October 2014,
<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-290A>. <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-290A>.
[RACCOON] Merget, R., Brinkmann, M., Aviram, N., Somorovsky, J., [RACCOON] Merget, R., Brinkmann, M., Aviram, N., Somorovsky, J.,
Mittmann, J., and J. Schwenk, "Raccoon Attack: Finding and Mittmann, J., and J. Schwenk, "Raccoon Attack: Finding and
Exploiting Most-Significant-Bit-Oracles in TLS-DH(E)", Exploiting Most-Significant-Bit-Oracles in TLS-DH(E)",
30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21) , 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21), 2021,
2021, <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/ <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/
presentation/merget>. presentation/merget>.
[RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision [RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, DOI 10.17487/RFC2026, October 1996, 3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, DOI 10.17487/RFC2026, October 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2026>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2026>.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", [RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999, RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>.
skipping to change at page 39, line 5 skipping to change at line 1718
Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade
Attacks", RFC 7507, DOI 10.17487/RFC7507, April 2015, Attacks", RFC 7507, DOI 10.17487/RFC7507, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7507>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7507>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC7568] Barnes, R., Thomson, M., Pironti, A., and A. Langley,
"Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0", RFC 7568,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7568, June 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7568>.
[RFC7590] Saint-Andre, P. and T. Alkemade, "Use of Transport Layer [RFC7590] Saint-Andre, P. and T. Alkemade, "Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP)", RFC 7590, DOI 10.17487/RFC7590, June Protocol (XMPP)", RFC 7590, DOI 10.17487/RFC7590, June
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7590>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7590>.
[RFC7633] Hallam-Baker, P., "X.509v3 Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC7633] Hallam-Baker, P., "X.509v3 Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Feature Extension", RFC 7633, DOI 10.17487/RFC7633, Feature Extension", RFC 7633, DOI 10.17487/RFC7633,
October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7633>. October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7633>.
[RFC7672] Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "SMTP Security via
Opportunistic DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities
(DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7672,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7672, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7672>.
[RFC7673] Finch, T., Miller, M., and P. Saint-Andre, "Using DNS-
Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA Records
with SRV Records", RFC 7673, DOI 10.17487/RFC7673, October
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7673>.
[RFC7712] Saint-Andre, P., Miller, M., and P. Hancke, "Domain Name [RFC7712] Saint-Andre, P., Miller, M., and P. Hancke, "Domain Name
Associations (DNA) in the Extensible Messaging and Associations (DNA) in the Extensible Messaging and
Presence Protocol (XMPP)", RFC 7712, DOI 10.17487/RFC7712, Presence Protocol (XMPP)", RFC 7712, DOI 10.17487/RFC7712,
November 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7712>. November 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7712>.
[RFC7919] Gillmor, D., "Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman [RFC7919] Gillmor, D., "Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman
Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 7919, DOI 10.17487/RFC7919, August 2016, RFC 7919, DOI 10.17487/RFC7919, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7919>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7919>.
skipping to change at page 40, line 19 skipping to change at line 1796
[RFC9001] Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using TLS to Secure [RFC9001] Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using TLS to Secure
QUIC", RFC 9001, DOI 10.17487/RFC9001, May 2021, QUIC", RFC 9001, DOI 10.17487/RFC9001, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9001>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9001>.
[RFC9051] Melnikov, A., Ed. and B. Leiba, Ed., "Internet Message [RFC9051] Melnikov, A., Ed. and B. Leiba, Ed., "Internet Message
Access Protocol (IMAP) - Version 4rev2", RFC 9051, Access Protocol (IMAP) - Version 4rev2", RFC 9051,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9051, August 2021, DOI 10.17487/RFC9051, August 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9051>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9051>.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.
[RFC9112] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP/1.1", STD 99, RFC 9112, DOI 10.17487/RFC9112,
June 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9112>.
[RFC9113] Thomson, M., Ed. and C. Benfield, Ed., "HTTP/2", RFC 9113,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9113, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9113>.
[RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate [RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate
Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162, Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162,
December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162>. December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162>.
[RFC9191] Sethi, M., Preuß Mattsson, J., and S. Turner, "Handling [RFC9191] Sethi, M., Preuß Mattsson, J., and S. Turner, "Handling
Large Certificates and Long Certificate Chains in TLS- Large Certificates and Long Certificate Chains in TLS-
Based EAP Methods", RFC 9191, DOI 10.17487/RFC9191, Based EAP Methods", RFC 9191, DOI 10.17487/RFC9191,
February 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9191>. February 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9191>.
[SAFECURVES] [SAFECURVES]
Bernstein, D. J. and T. Lange, "SafeCurves: Choosing Safe Bernstein, D. J. and T. Lange, "SafeCurves: choosing safe
Curves for Elliptic-Curve Cryptography", December 2014, curves for elliptic-curve cryptography", December 2014,
<https://safecurves.cr.yp.to>. <https://safecurves.cr.yp.to>.
[Soghoian2011] [Soghoian2011]
Soghoian, C. and S. Stamm, "Certified Lies: Detecting and Soghoian, C. and S. Stamm, "Certified Lies: Detecting and
Defeating Government Interception Attacks Against SSL", Defeating Government Interception Attacks Against SSL",
SSRN Electronic Journal, DOI 10.2139/ssrn.1591033, 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal, DOI 10.2139/ssrn.1591033, April
<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1591033>. 2010, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1591033>.
[Springall16] [Springall16]
Springall, D., Durumeric, Z., and J. Halderman, "Measuring Springall, D., Durumeric, Z., and J. Halderman, "Measuring
the Security Harm of TLS Crypto Shortcuts", Proceedings of the Security Harm of TLS Crypto Shortcuts", Proceedings of
the 2016 Internet Measurement Conference, the 2016 Internet Measurement Conference, pp. 33-47,
DOI 10.1145/2987443.2987480, November 2016, DOI 10.1145/2987443.2987480, November 2016,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/2987443.2987480>. <https://doi.org/10.1145/2987443.2987480>.
[STD53] Myers, J. and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3", [STD53] Myers, J. and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3",
STD 53, RFC 1939, May 1996. STD 53, RFC 1939, May 1996.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std53> <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std53>
[Sy2018] Sy, E., Burkert, C., Federrath, H., and M. Fischer, [Sy2018] Sy, E., Burkert, C., Federrath, H., and M. Fischer,
"Tracking Users across the Web via TLS Session "Tracking Users across the Web via TLS Session
Resumption", Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer Resumption", Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer
Security Applications Conference, Security Applications Conference, pp. 289-299,
DOI 10.1145/3274694.3274708, December 2018, DOI 10.1145/3274694.3274708, December 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3274694.3274708>. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3274694.3274708>.
[triple-handshake] [TLS-ECH] Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. A. Wood, "TLS
Encrypted Client Hello", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-tls-esni-15, 3 October 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
esni-15>.
[Triple-Handshake]
Bhargavan, K., Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti, A., and Bhargavan, K., Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti, A., and
P. Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters: Breaking P. Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters: Breaking
and Fixing Authentication over TLS", 2014 IEEE Symposium and Fixing Authentication over TLS", 2014 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, DOI 10.1109/sp.2014.14, May 2014, on Security and Privacy, DOI 10.1109/sp.2014.14, May 2014,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2014.14>. <https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2014.14>.
[TWIRL] Shamir, A. and E. Tromer, "Factoring Large Numbers with [TWIRL] Shamir, A. and E. Tromer, "Factoring Large Numbers with
the TWIRL Device", proc. Crypto 2003, LNCS 2729, 1-26, the TWIRL Device", 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Springer-Verlag , 2003, Privacy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_1, 2004,
<http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/twirl.pdf>. <https://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/twirl.pdf>.
Appendix A. Differences from RFC 7525 Appendix A. Differences from RFC 7525
This revision of the Best Current Practices contains numerous This revision of the Best Current Practices contains numerous
changes, and this section is focused on the normative changes. changes, and this section is focused on the normative changes.
* High level differences: * High-level differences:
- Described the expectations from new TLS-incorporating transport - Described the expectations from new TLS-incorporating transport
protocols and from new application protocols layered on TLS. protocols and from new application protocols layered on TLS.
- Clarified items (e.g. renegotiation) that only apply to TLS - Clarified items (e.g., renegotiation) that only apply to TLS
1.2. 1.2.
- Changed status of TLS 1.0 and 1.1 from SHOULD NOT to MUST NOT. - Changed the status of TLS 1.0 and 1.1 from "SHOULD NOT" to
"MUST NOT".
- Added TLS 1.3 at a SHOULD level. - Added TLS 1.3 at a "SHOULD" level.
- Similar changes to DTLS. - Made similar changes to DTLS.
- Specific guidance for multiplexed protocols. - Included specific guidance for multiplexed protocols.
- MUST-level implementation requirement for ALPN, and more - MUST-level implementation requirement for ALPN and more
specific SHOULD-level guidance for ALPN and SNI. specific SHOULD-level guidance for ALPN and SNI.
- Clarified discussion of strict TLS policies, including MUST- - Clarified discussion of strict TLS policies, including MUST-
level recommendations. level recommendations.
- Limits on key usage. - Limits on key usage.
- New attacks since [RFC7457]: ALPACA, Raccoon, Logjam, "Nonce- - New attacks since [RFC7457]: ALPACA, Raccoon, Logjam, and
Disrespecting Adversaries". "Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries".
- RFC 6961 (OCSP status_request_v2) has been deprecated. - RFC 6961 (OCSP status_request_v2) has been deprecated.
- MUST-level requirement for server-side RSA certificates to have - MUST-level requirement for server-side RSA certificates to have
2048-bit modulus at a minimum, replacing a SHOULD. a 2048-bit modulus at a minimum, replacing a "SHOULD".
* Differences specific to TLS 1.2: * Differences specific to TLS 1.2:
- SHOULD-level guidance on AES-GCM nonce generation. - SHOULD-level guidance on AES-GCM nonce generation.
- SHOULD NOT use (static or ephemeral) finite-field DH key - SHOULD NOT use (static or ephemeral) finite-field DH key
agreement. agreement.
- SHOULD NOT reuse ephemeral finite-field DH keys across multiple - SHOULD NOT reuse ephemeral finite-field DH keys across multiple
connections. connections.
- SHOULD NOT use static elliptic curve DH key exchange. - SHOULD NOT use static Elliptic Curve DH key exchange.
- 2048-bit DH now a MUST, ECDH minimal curve size is 224, vs. 192 - 2048-bit DH is now a "MUST" and ECDH minimal curve size is 224
previously. (vs. 192 previously).
- Support for extended_master_secret is now a MUST (previously it - Support for extended_master_secret is now a "MUST" (previously
was a soft recommendation, as the RFC had not been published at it was a soft recommendation, as the RFC had not been published
the time). Also removed other, more complicated, related at the time). Also removed other, more complicated, related
mitigations. mitigations.
- MUST-level restriction on session ticket validity, replacing a - MUST-level restriction on session ticket validity, replacing a
SHOULD. "SHOULD".
- SHOULD-level restriction on the TLS session duration, depending - SHOULD-level restriction on the TLS session duration, depending
on the rotation period of an [RFC5077] ticket key. on the rotation period of an [RFC5077] ticket key.
- Drop TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES from the recommended ciphers - Dropped TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES from the recommended ciphers.
- Add TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES to the recommended ciphers - Added TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES to the recommended ciphers.
- SHOULD NOT use the old MTI cipher suite, - SHOULD NOT use the old MTI cipher suite,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.
- Recommend curve X25519 alongside NIST P-256 - Recommended curve X25519 alongside NIST P-256.
* Differences specific to TLS 1.3: * Differences specific to TLS 1.3:
- New TLS 1.3 capabilities: 0-RTT. - New TLS 1.3 capabilities: 0-RTT.
- Removed capabilities: renegotiation, compression. - Removed capabilities: renegotiation and compression.
- Added mention of TLS Encrypted Client Hello, but no - Added mention of TLS Encrypted Client Hello, but no
recommendation to use until it is finalized. recommendation for use until it is finalized.
- SHOULD-level requirement for forward secrecy in TLS 1.3 session
resumption.
- Generic SHOULD-level guidance to avoid 0-RTT unless it is
documented for the particular protocol.
Appendix B. Document History
// Note to RFC Editor: please remove before publication.
B.1. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-11
* Addressed outstanding comments by Peter Gutmann.
B.2. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-10
* Addressed IESG feedback, ARTART review by Cullen Jennings, and
TSVART review by Magnus Westerlund.
* Improved the rationale for still recommending TLS 1.2.
* Specified TLS 1.3 as a MUST for new transport protocols and a
SHOULD for new application protocols.
* Clarified TLS-only vs. dynamic upgrade for non-HTTP protocols.
* Clarified distinction between implementation and deployment.
* Clarified applicability to QUIC.
* Further specified what to do on reaching the confidentiality limit
or integrity limit.
* Added a note about post-quantum cryptography.
* Improved the text about Encrypted Client Hello.
B.3. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-09
* More background on strict TLS for non-HTTP protocols.
B.4. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-08
* Addressed SecDir review by Ben Kaduk.
* Addressed reviews by Stephen Farrell, Martin Thomson, Tim Evans
and John Mattsson.
B.5. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-07
* Addressed AD reviews by Francesca and Paul.
B.6. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-06
* Addressed several I-D nits raised by the document shepherd.
B.7. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-05
* Addressed WG Last Call comments, specifically:
- More clarity and guidance on session resumption.
- Clarity on TLS 1.2 renegotiation.
- Wording on the 0-RTT feature aligned with RFC 8446.
- SHOULD NOT guidance on static and ephemeral finite field DH
cipher suites.
- Revamped the recommended TLS 1.2 cipher suites, removing DHE
and adding ECDSA. The latter due to the wide adoption of ECDSA
certificates and in line with RFC 8446.
- Recommendation to use deterministic ECDSA.
- Finally deprecated the old TLS 1.2 MTI cipher suite.
- Deeper discussion of ECDH public key reuse issues, and as a
result, recommended support of X25519.
- Reworded the section on certificate revocation and OCSP
following a long mailing list thread.
B.8. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-04
* No version fallback from TLS 1.2 to earlier versions, therefore no
SCSV.
B.9. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-03
* Cipher integrity and confidentiality limits.
* Require extended_master_secret.
B.10. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-02
* Adjusted text about ALPN support in application protocols
* Incorporated text from draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
B.11. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-01
* Many more changes, including:
- SHOULD-level requirement for forward secrecy in TLS 1.3 session - SHOULD-level requirement for forward secrecy in TLS 1.3 session
resumption. resumption.
- Removed TLS 1.2 capabilities: renegotiation, compression. - Generic MUST-level guidance to avoid 0-RTT unless it is
- Specific guidance for multiplexed protocols.
- MUST-level implementation requirement for ALPN, and more
specific SHOULD-level guidance for ALPN and SNI.
- Generic SHOULD-level guidance to avoid 0-RTT unless it is
documented for the particular protocol. documented for the particular protocol.
- SHOULD-level guidance on AES-GCM nonce generation in TLS 1.2. Acknowledgments
- SHOULD NOT use static DH keys or reuse ephemeral DH keys across
multiple connections.
- 2048-bit DH now a MUST, ECDH minimal curve size is 224, up from
192.
B.12. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-00
* Renamed: WG document.
* Started populating list of changes from RFC 7525.
* General rewording of abstract and intro for revised version.
* Protocol versions, fallback.
* Reference to ECHO.
B.13. draft-sheffer-uta-rfc7525bis-00
* Renamed, since the BCP number does not change.
* Added an empty "Differences from RFC 7525" section. Thanks to Alexey Melnikov, Alvaro Retana, Andrei Popov, Ben Kaduk,
Christian Huitema, Corey Bonnell, Cullen Jennings, Daniel Kahn
Gillmor, David Benjamin, Eric Rescorla, Éric Vyncke, Francesca
Palombini, Hannes Tschofenig, Hubert Kario, Ilari Liusvaara, John
Preuß Mattsson, John R. Levine, Julien Élie, Lars Eggert, Leif
Johansson, Magnus Westerlund, Martin Duke, Martin Thomson, Mohit
Sahni, Nick Sullivan, Nimrod Aviram, Paul Wouters, Peter Gutmann,
Rich Salz, Robert Sayre, Robert Wilton, Roman Danyliw, Ryan Sleevi,
Sean Turner, Stephen Farrell, Tim Evans, Valery Smyslov, Viktor
Dukhovni, and Warren Kumari for helpful comments and discussions that
have shaped this document.
B.14. draft-sheffer-uta-bcp195bis-00 The authors gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Ralph Holz,
who was a coauthor of RFC 7525, the previous version of the TLS
recommendations.
* Initial release, the RFC 7525 text as-is, with some minor See RFC 7525 for additional acknowledgments specific to the previous
editorial changes to the references. version of the TLS recommendations.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Yaron Sheffer Yaron Sheffer
Intuit Intuit
Email: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com Email: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com
Peter Saint-Andre Peter Saint-Andre
independent independent
Email: stpeter@stpeter.im Email: stpeter@stpeter.im
Thomas Fossati Thomas Fossati
arm ARM Limited
Email: thomas.fossati@arm.com Email: thomas.fossati@arm.com
 End of changes. 171 change blocks. 
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