rfc9337.original   rfc9337.txt 
Network Working Group E.K. Karelina, Ed. Independent Submission E. Karelina, Ed.
Internet-Draft InfoTeCS Request for Comments: 9337 InfoTeCS
Intended status: Informational 28 September 2022 Category: Informational December 2022
Expires: 1 April 2023 ISSN: 2070-1721
Generating Password-based Keys Using the GOST Algorithms Generating Password-Based Keys Using the GOST Algorithms
draft-pkcs5-gost-09
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies how to use the Password-Based Cryptography This document specifies how to use "PKCS #5: Password-Based
Specification version 2.1 (PKCS #5) defined in RFC8018 to generate a Cryptography Specification Version 2.1" (RFC 8018) to generate a
symmetric key from a password in conjunction with the Russian symmetric key from a password in conjunction with the Russian
national standard GOST algorithms. national standard GOST algorithms.
PKCS #5 applies a pseudorandom function (a cryptographic hash, PKCS #5 applies a Pseudorandom Function (PRF) -- a cryptographic
cipher, or HMAC) to the input password along with a salt value and hash, cipher, or Hash-Based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) -- to
repeats the process many times to produce a derived key. the input password along with a salt value and repeats the process
many times to produce a derived key.
This specification is developed outside the IETF and is published to This specification has been developed outside the IETF. The purpose
facilitate interoperable implementations that wish to support the of publication being to facilitate interoperable implementations that
GOST algorithms. This document does not imply IETF endorsement of wish to support the GOST algorithms. This document does not imply
the cryptographic algorithms used in this document. IETF endorsement of the cryptographic algorithms used here.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. published for informational purposes.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference its discretion and makes no statement about its value for
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by
the RFC Editor are not candidates for any level of Internet Standard;
see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on 1 April 2023. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9337.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights publication of this document. Please review these documents
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as to this document.
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions Used in This Document
3. Basic Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Basic Terms and Definitions
4. Algorithm For Generating a Key From a Password . . . . . . . 4 4. Algorithm for Generating a Key from a Password
5. Data Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Data Encryption
5.1. GOST R 34.12-2015 Data Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1. GOST R 34.12-2015 Data Encryption
5.1.1. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1.1. Encryption
5.1.2. Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1.2. Decryption
6. Message Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Message Authentication
6.1. MAC Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.1. MAC Generation
6.2. MAC Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.2. MAC Verification
7. Identifiers and Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Identifiers and Parameters
7.1. PBKDF2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.1. PBKDF2
7.2. PBES2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7.2. PBES2
7.3. Identifier and Parameters of Gost34.12-2015 Encryption 7.3. Identifier and Parameters of Gost34.12-2015 Encryption
Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Scheme
7.4. PBMAC1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.4. PBMAC1
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8. Security Considerations
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9. IANA Considerations
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10. References
Appendix A. PBKDF2 HMAC_GOSTR3411 Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . 14 10.1. Normative References
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10.2. Informative References
Appendix A. PBKDF2 HMAC_GOSTR3411 Test Vectors
Acknowledgments
Author's Address
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document provides a specification of usage of GOST R 34.12-2015 This document provides a specification of usage of GOST R 34.12-2015
encryption algorithms and the GOST R 34.11-2012 hashing functions encryption algorithms and the GOST R 34.11-2012 hashing functions
with PKCS #5. The methods described in this document are designed to with PKCS #5. The methods described in this document are designed to
generate key information using the user's password and to protect generate key information using the user's password and to protect
information using the generated keys. information using the generated keys.
2. Conventions Used in This Document 2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. Basic Terms and Definitions 3. Basic Terms and Definitions
Throughout this document, the following notation is used: Throughout this document, the following notation is used:
+==========+======================================================+ +==========+====================================================+
+==========+======================================================+ | Notation | Definition |
| P | a password encoded as a Unicode UTF-8 string | +==========+====================================================+
+----------+------------------------------------------------------+ | P | a password encoded as a Unicode UTF-8 string |
| S | a random initializing value | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+
+----------+------------------------------------------------------+ | S | a random initializing value |
| c | a number of iterations of algorithm, a positive | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| | integer | | c | a number of iterations of algorithm, a positive |
+----------+------------------------------------------------------+ | | integer |
| dkLen | a length in octets of derived key, a positive | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| | integer | | dkLen | a length in octets of derived key, a positive |
+----------+------------------------------------------------------+ | | integer |
| DK | a derived key of length dkLen | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+
+----------+------------------------------------------------------+ | DK | a derived key of length dkLen |
| B_n | a set of all octet strings of length n, n >= 0; if n | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| | = 0, then the set B_n consists of an empty string of | | B_n | a set of all octet strings of length n, n >= 0; if |
| | length 0 | | | n = 0, then the set B_n consists of an empty |
+----------+------------------------------------------------------+ | | string of length 0 |
| A||C | a concatenation of two octet strings A, C, i.e., a | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| | vector from B_(|A|+|C|), where the left subvector | | A||C | a concatenation of two octet strings A, C, i.e., a |
| | from B_(|A|) is equal to the vector A and the right | | | vector from B_(|A|+|C|), where the left subvector |
| | subvector from B_(|C|) is equal to the vector C: A = | | | from B_(|A|) is equal to the vector A and the |
| | (a_(n_1),...,a_1) in B_(n_1) and C = (c_(n_2),..., | | | right subvector from B_(|C|) is equal to the |
| | c_1) in B_(n_2), res = (a_(n_1),...,a_1,c_(n_2),..., | | | vector C: A = (a_(n_1),...,a_1) in B_(n_1) and C = |
| | c_1) in B_(n_1 + n_2); | | | (c_(n_2),..., c_1) in B_(n_2), res = |
+----------+------------------------------------------------------+ | | (a_(n_1),...,a_1,c_(n_2),..., c_1) in B_(n_1+n_2)) |
| \xor | a bit-wise exclusive-or of two octet strings of the | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| | same length | | \xor | a bit-wise exclusive-or of two octet strings of |
+----------+------------------------------------------------------+ | | the same length |
| MSB^n_r: | a truncating of an octet string to size r by | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| B_n -> | removing the least significant n-r octets: | | MSB^n_r: | a truncating of an octet string to size r by |
| B_r | MSB^n_r(a_n,...,a_(n-r+1),a_(n-r),...,a_1) | | B_n -> | removing the least significant n-r octets: |
| | =(a_n,...,a_(n-r+1)); | | B_r | MSB^n_r(a_n,...,a_(n-r+1),a_(n-r),...,a_1) |
+----------+------------------------------------------------------+ | | =(a_n,...,a_(n-r+1)) |
| LSB^n_r: | a truncating of a octet string to size r by removing | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| B_n -> | the most significant n-r octets: | | LSB^n_r: | a truncating of an octet string to size r by |
| B_r | LSB^n_r(a_n,...,a_(n-r+1),a_(n-r),...,a_1) | | B_n -> | removing the most significant n-r octets: |
| | =(a_r,...,a_1) | | B_r | LSB^n_r(a_n,...,a_(n-r+1),a_(n-r),...,a_1) |
+----------+------------------------------------------------------+ | | =(a_r,...,a_1) |
| Int(i) | a four-octet encoding of the integer i =< 2^32: | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| | (i_1, i_2, i_3, i_4) in B_4, i = i_1 + 2^8 * i_2 + | | Int(i) | a four-octet encoding of the integer i =< 2^32: |
| | 2^16 * i_3 + 2^24 * i_4 | | | (i_1, i_2, i_3, i_4) in B_4, i = i_1 + 2^8 * i_2 + |
+----------+------------------------------------------------------+ | | 2^16 * i_3 + 2^24 * i_4 |
| b[i, j] | a substring extraction operator: extracts octets i | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| | through j, 0 =< i =< j. | | b[i, j] | a substring extraction operator, extracts octets i |
+----------+------------------------------------------------------+ | | through j, 0 =< i =< j |
| CEIL(x) | the smallest integer greater than, or equal to, x | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+
+----------+------------------------------------------------------+ | CEIL(x) | the smallest integer greater than or equal to x |
+----------+----------------------------------------------------+
Table 1 Table 1: Terms and Definitions
This document uses the following abbreviations and symbols: This document uses the following abbreviations and symbols:
+================+==============================================+ +================+===============================================+
+================+==============================================+ | Abbreviations | Definition |
| HMAC_GOSTR3411 | Hashed-based Message Authentication Code. A | | and Symbols | |
| | function for calculating a message | +================+===============================================+
| | authentication code, based on the GOST R | | HMAC_GOSTR3411 | Hashed-Based Message Authentication Code. A |
| | 34.11-2012 hash function ([RFC6986]) with | | | function for calculating a Message |
| | 512-bit output in accordance with [RFC2104]. | | | Authentication Code (MAC) based on the GOST R |
+----------------+----------------------------------------------+ | | 34.11-2012 hash function (see [RFC6986]) with |
| | 512-bit output in accordance with [RFC2104]. |
+----------------+-----------------------------------------------+
Table 2 Table 2: Abbreviations and Symbols
4. Algorithm For Generating a Key From a Password 4. Algorithm for Generating a Key from a Password
The DK key is calculated by means of a key derivation function The DK is calculated by means of a key derivation function PBKDF2 (P,
PBKDF2(P, S, c, dkLen) [RFC8018], section 5.2 using the S, c, dkLen) (see [RFC8018], Section 5.2) using the HMAC_GOSTR3411
HMAC_GOSTR3411 function as the PRF pseudo-random function: function as the PRF:
DK = PBKDF2(P,S,c,dkLen). DK = PBKDF2 (P, S, c, dkLen).
The PBKDF2 function is defined as the following algorithm: The PBKDF2 function is defined as the following algorithm:
1. If dkLen > (2^32 - 1) * 64, output "derived key too long" and 1. If dkLen > (2^32 - 1) * 64, output "derived key too long" and
stop. stop.
2. Calculate n = CEIL(dkLen / 64). 2. Calculate n = CEIL (dkLen / 64).
3. Calculate a set of values for each i from 1 to n: 3. Calculate a set of values for each i from 1 to n:
U_1(i) = HMAC_GOSTR3411 (P, S || INT (i)) U_1(i) = HMAC_GOSTR3411 (P, S || INT (i)),
U_2(i) = HMAC_GOSTR3411 (P, U_1(i)),
U_2(i) = HMAC_GOSTR3411 (P, U_1(i))
... ...
U_c(i) = HMAC_GOSTR3411 (P, U_{c-1}(i)) U_c(i) = HMAC_GOSTR3411 (P, U_(c-1)(i)),
T(i) = U_1(i) \xor U_2(i) \xor ... \xor U_c(i) T(i) = U_1(i) \xor U_2(i) \xor ... \xor U_c(i).
4. Concatenate the octet strings T(i) and extract the first dkLen 4. Concatenate the octet strings T(i) and extract the first dkLen
octets to produce a derived key DK: octets to produce a derived key DK:
DK = MSB^{n * 64}_dkLen(T(1)||T(2)||...||T(n)) * DK = MSB^(n * 64)_dkLen(T(1)||T(2)||...||T(n))
5. Data Encryption 5. Data Encryption
5.1. GOST R 34.12-2015 Data Encryption 5.1. GOST R 34.12-2015 Data Encryption
Data encryption using the DK key is carried out in accordance with Data encryption using the DK is carried out in accordance with the
the PBES2 scheme (see [RFC8018], section 6.2) using GOST R 34.12-2015 PBES2 scheme (see [RFC8018], Section 6.2) using GOST R 34.12-2015 in
in CTR_ACPKM mode (see [RFC8645]). CTR_ACPKM mode (see [RFC8645]).
5.1.1. Encryption 5.1.1. Encryption
The encryption process for PBES2 consists of the following steps: The encryption process for PBES2 consists of the following steps:
1. Select the random value S of length from 8 to 32 octets. 1. Select the random value S of a length from 8 to 32 octets.
2. Select the iteration count c depending on the conditions of use 2. Select the iteration count c depending on the conditions of use
(see [GostPkcs5]). The minimum allowable value for the parameter (see [GostPkcs5]). The minimum allowable value for the parameter
is 1000. is 1000.
3. Set the value dkLen = 32. 3. Set the value dkLen = 32.
4. Apply the key derivation function to the password P, the random 4. Apply the key derivation function to the password P, the random
value S and the iteration count c to produce a derived key DK of value S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived key DK of
length dkLen octets in accordance with the algorithm from length dkLen octets in accordance with the algorithm from
Section 4. Generate the sequence T(1) and truncate it to 32 Section 4. Generate the sequence T(1) and truncate it to 32
octets, i.e., octets, i.e.,
DK = PBKDF2(P,S,c,32) = MSB^64_32(T(1)). DK = PBKDF2 (P, S, c, 32) = MSB^64_32(T(1)).
5. Generate the random value ukm of size n, where n takes a value of 5. Generate the random value ukm of size n, where n takes a value of
12 or 16 octets, depending on the selected encryption algorithm: 12 or 16 octets depending on the selected encryption algorithm:
GOST R 34.12-2015 "Kuznyechik" n = 16 (see [RFC7801]) * GOST R 34.12-2015 "Kuznyechik" n = 16 (see [RFC7801])
GOST R 34.12-2015 "Magma" n = 12 (see [RFC8891]) * GOST R 34.12-2015 "Magma" n = 12 (see [RFC8891])
6. Set the value S' = ukm[1..n-8] 6. Set the value S' = ukm[1..n-8].
7. For id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm and id-gostr3412-2015-
kuznyechik-ctracpkm algorithms (see Section 7.3) encrypt the
message M with GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm with the derived key
DK and the random value S' to produce a ciphertext C.
8. For id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac and id-gostr3412-2015- 7. For the id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm and id-gostr3412-2015-
kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac algorithms (see Section 7.3) encrypt the kuznyechik-ctracpkm algorithms (see Section 7.3), encrypt the
message M with GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm with the derived key message M with the GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm with the derived
DK and the ukm in accordance with the following steps: key DK and the random value S' to produce a ciphertext C.
- Generate two keys from the derived key DK using the 8. For the id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac and id-
gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac algorithms (see
Section 7.3), encrypt the message M with the GOST R 34.12-2015
algorithm with the derived key DK and the ukm in accordance with
the following steps:
* Generate two keys from the derived key DK using the
KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 algorithm (see [RFC7836]): KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 algorithm (see [RFC7836]):
encryption key K(1) encryption key K(1)
MAC key K(2). MAC key K(2)
Input parameters for the KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 algorithm Input parameters for the KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 algorithm
take the folowing values: take the following values:
K_in = DK K_in = DK
label = "kdf tree" (8 octets) label = "kdf tree" (8 octets)
seed = ukm[n-7..n] seed = ukm[n-7..n]
R = 1 R = 1
The input string label above is encoded using ASCII ( The input string label above is encoded using ASCII (see
[RFC0020] ). [RFC0020]).
- Compute MAC for the message M using the K(2) key in * Compute the MAC for the message M using the K(2) key in
accordance with GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm. Append the accordance with the GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm. Append the
computed MAC value to the message M: M||MAC. computed MAC value to the message M: M||MAC.
- Encrypt the resulting octet string with MAC with GOST R * Encrypt the resulting octet string with MAC with the GOST R
34.12-2015 algorithm with the derived key K(1) and the random 34.12-2015 algorithm with the derived key K(1) and the random
value S' to produce a ciphertext C. value S' to produce a ciphertext C.
9. Serialize the parameters S, c, ukm as algorithm parameters in 9. Serialize the parameters S, c, and ukm as algorithm parameters in
accordance with Section 7.2. accordance with Section 7.2.
5.1.2. Decryption 5.1.2. Decryption
The decryption process for PBES2 consists of the following steps: The decryption process for PBES2 consists of the following steps:
1. Set the value dkLen = 32. 1. Set the value dkLen = 32.
2. Apply the key derivation function PBKDF2 to the password P, the 2. Apply the key derivation function PBKDF2 to the password P, the
random value S and the iteration count c to produce a derived key random value S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived
DK of length dkLen octets in accordance with the algorithm from key DK of length dkLen octets in accordance with the algorithm
Section 4. Generate the sequence T(1) and truncate it to 32 from Section 4. Generate the sequence T(1) and truncate it to 32
octets, i.e., DK = PBKFD2(P,S,c,32) = MSB^64_32(T(1)). octets, i.e., DK = PBKFD2 (P, S, c, 32) = MSB^64_32(T(1)).
3. Set the value S' = ukm[1..n-8], where n is the size of ukm in 3. Set the value S' = ukm[1..n-8], where n is the size of ukm in
octets. octets.
4. For id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm and id-gostr3412-2015- 4. For the id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm and id-gostr3412-2015-
kuznyechik-ctracpkm algorithms (see Section 7.3) decrypt the kuznyechik-ctracpkm algorithms (see Section 7.3), decrypt the
ciphertext C with GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm with the derived ciphertext C with the GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm with the
key DK and the random value S' to produce the message M. derived key DK and the random value S' to produce the message M.
5. For id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac and id-gostr3412-2015- 5. For id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac and id-gostr3412-2015-
kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac algorithms (see Section 7.3) decrypt the kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac algorithms (see Section 7.3), decrypt
ciphertext C with GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm with the derived the ciphertext C with the GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm with the
key DK and the ukm in accordance with the following steps: derived key DK and the ukm in accordance with the following
steps:
- Generate two keys from the derived key DK using the * Generate two keys from the derived key DK using the
KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 algorithm: KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 algorithm:
encryption key K(1) encryption key K(1)
MAC key K(2). MAC key K(2)
Input parameters for the KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 algorithm Input parameters for the KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 algorithm
take the folowing values: take the following values:
K_in = DK K_in = DK
label = "kdf tree" (8 octets) label = "kdf tree" (8 octets)
seed = ukm[n-7..n] seed = ukm[n-7..n]
R = 1 R = 1
The input string label above is encoded using ASCII ( The input string label above is encoded using ASCII (see
[RFC0020] ). [RFC0020]).
- Decrypt the ciphertext C with GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm * Decrypt the ciphertext C with the GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm
with the derived key K(1) and the random value S' to produce with the derived key K(1) and the random value S' to produce
the plaintext. The last k octets of the text are the message the plaintext. The last k octets of the text are the MAC,
authentication code MAC', where k depends on the selected where k depends on the selected encryption algorithm.
encryption algorithm.
- Compute MAC for the text[1..m - k] using the K(2) key in * Compute the MAC for the text[1..m - k] using the K(2) key in
accordance with GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm, where m is the accordance with GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm, where m is the
size of text. size of text.
- Compare the original message authentication code MAC and the * Compare the computing MAC and the receiving MAC. If the sizes
receiving message authentication code MAC'. If the sizes or or values do not match, the message is distorted.
values do not match, the message is distorted.
6. Message Authentication 6. Message Authentication
PBMAC1 scheme is used for message authentication (see [RFC8018], The PBMAC1 scheme is used for message authentication (see [RFC8018],
section 7.1). This scheme bases on the HMAC_GOSTR3411 function. Section 7.1). This scheme is based on the HMAC_GOSTR3411 function.
6.1. MAC Generation 6.1. MAC Generation
The MAC generation operation for PBMAC1 consists of the following The MAC generation operation for PBMAC1 consists of the following
steps: steps:
1. Select the random value S of length from 8 to 32 octets. 1. Select the random value S of a length from 8 to 32 octets.
2. Select the iteration count c depending on the conditions of use 2. Select the iteration count c depending on the conditions of use
(see [GostPkcs5]). The minimum allowable value for the parameter (see [GostPkcs5]). The minimum allowable value for the parameter
is 1000. is 1000.
3. Set the dkLen to at least 32 octets. It depends on previous 3. Set the dkLen to at least 32 octets. The number of octets
parameter values. depends on previous parameter values.
4. Apply the key derivation function to the password P, the random 4. Apply the key derivation function to the password P, the random
value S and the iteration count c to generate a sequence K of value S, and the iteration count c to generate a sequence K of
length dkLen octets in accordance with the algorithm from length dkLen octets in accordance with the algorithm from
Section 4. Section 4.
5. Truncate the sequence K to 32 octets to get the derived key DK, 5. Truncate the sequence K to 32 octets to get the derived key DK,
i.e., DK = LSB^dkLen_32(K). i.e., DK = LSB^dkLen_32(K).
6. Process the message M with the underlying message authentication 6. Process the message M with the underlying message authentication
scheme with the derived key DK to generate a message scheme with the derived key DK to generate a message
authentication code T. authentication code T.
7. Save the parameters S, c as algorithm parameters in accordance 7. Save the parameters S and c as algorithm parameters in accordance
with Section 7.4. with Section 7.4.
6.2. MAC Verification 6.2. MAC Verification
The MAC verification operation for PBMAC1 consists of the following The MAC verification operation for PBMAC1 consists of the following
steps: steps:
1. Set the dkLen to at least 32 octets. It depends on previous 1. Set the dkLen to at least 32 octets. The number of octets
parameter values. depends on previous parameter values.
2. Apply the key derivation function to the password P, the random 2. Apply the key derivation function to the password P, the random
value S and the iteration count c to generate a sequence K of value S, and the iteration count c to generate a sequence K of
length dkLen octets in accordance with the algorithm from length dkLen octets in accordance with the algorithm from
Section 4. Section 4.
3. Truncate the sequence K to 32 octets to get the derived key DK, 3. Truncate the sequence K to 32 octets to get the derived key DK,
i.e., DK = LSB^dkLen_32(K). i.e., DK = LSB^dkLen_32(K).
4. Process the message M with the underlying message authentication 4. Process the message M with the underlying message authentication
scheme with the derived key DK to generate a message scheme with the derived key DK to generate a MAC.
authentication code MAC'.
5. Compare the original message authentication code MAC and the 5. Compare the computing MAC and the receiving MAC. If the sizes or
receiving message authentication code MAC'. If the sizes or
values do not match, the message is distorted. values do not match, the message is distorted.
7. Identifiers and Parameters 7. Identifiers and Parameters
This section defines ASN.1 syntax for the key derivation functions, This section defines the ASN.1 syntax for the key derivation
the encryption schemes, the message authentication scheme, and functions, the encryption schemes, the message authentication scheme,
supporting techniques ([RFC8018]). and supporting techniques (see [RFC8018]).
rsadsi OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 113549 } rsadsi OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 113549 }
pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { rsadsi 1 } pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { rsadsi 1 }
pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs 5 } pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs 5 }
7.1. PBKDF2 7.1. PBKDF2
The object identifier id-PBKDF2 identifies the PBKDF2 key derivation The Object Identifier (OID) id-PBKDF2 identifies the PBKDF2 key
function: derivation function:
id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-5 12 } id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-5 12 }
The parameters field associated with this OID in an The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have type PBKDF2-params: AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have type PBKDF2-params:
PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE
{ {
salt CHOICE salt CHOICE
{ {
specified OCTET STRING, specified OCTET STRING,
otherSource AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-SaltSources}} otherSource AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-SaltSources}}
}, },
iterationCount INTEGER (1000..MAX), iterationCount INTEGER (1000..MAX),
keyLength INTEGER (32..MAX) OPTIONAL, keyLength INTEGER (32..MAX) OPTIONAL,
prf AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-PRFs}} prf AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-PRFs}}
} }
The fields of type PBKDF2-params have the following meanings: The fields of type PBKDF2-params have the following meanings:
- salt contains the random value S in OCTET STRING. * salt contains the random value S in OCTET STRING.
- iterationCount specifies the iteration count c. * iterationCount specifies the iteration count c.
- keyLength is the length of the derived key in octets. It is * keyLength is the length of the derived key in octets. It is an
optional field for PBES2 sheme since it is always 32 octets. It optional field for the PBES2 scheme since it is always 32 octets.
MUST be present for PBMAC1 sheme and MUST be at least 32 octets It MUST be present for the PBMAC1 scheme and MUST be at least 32
since the HMAC_GOSTR3411 function has a variable key size. octets since the HMAC_GOSTR3411 function has a variable key size.
- prf identifies the pseudorandom function. The identifier value * prf identifies the pseudorandom function. The identifier value
MUST be id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-12-512, the parameters value must MUST be id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-12-512 and the parameters value
be NULL: must be NULL:
id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-12-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-12-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ {
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) reg7(7) iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) reg7(7)
tk26(1) algorithms(1) hmac(4) 512(2) tk26(1) algorithms(1) hmac(4) 512(2)
} }
7.2. PBES2 7.2. PBES2
The object identifier id-PBES2 identifies the PBES2 encryption The OID id-PBES2 identifies the PBES2 encryption scheme:
scheme:
id-PBES2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-5 13 } id-PBES2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-5 13 }
The parameters field associated with this OID in an The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have type PBES2-params: AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have type PBES2-params:
PBES2-params ::= SEQUENCE PBES2-params ::= SEQUENCE
{ {
keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBES2-KDFs } }, keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBES2-KDFs } },
encryptionScheme AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBES2-Encs } } encryptionScheme AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBES2-Encs } }
skipping to change at page 11, line 4 skipping to change at line 463
id-PBES2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-5 13 } id-PBES2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-5 13 }
The parameters field associated with this OID in an The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have type PBES2-params: AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have type PBES2-params:
PBES2-params ::= SEQUENCE PBES2-params ::= SEQUENCE
{ {
keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBES2-KDFs } }, keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBES2-KDFs } },
encryptionScheme AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBES2-Encs } } encryptionScheme AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBES2-Encs } }
} }
The fields of type PBES2-params have the following meanings: The fields of type PBES2-params have the following meanings:
- keyDerivationFunc identifies the key derivation function in * keyDerivationFunc identifies the key derivation function in
accordance with Section 7.1. accordance with Section 7.1.
- encryptionScheme identifies the encryption scheme in with * encryptionScheme identifies the encryption scheme in accordance
Section 7.3. with Section 7.3.
7.3. Identifier and Parameters of Gost34.12-2015 Encryption Scheme 7.3. Identifier and Parameters of Gost34.12-2015 Encryption Scheme
The Gost34.12-2015 encryption algorithm identifier SHALL take one of The Gost34.12-2015 encryption algorithm identifier SHALL take one of
the following values: the following values:
id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ {
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7)
tc26(1) algorithms(1) cipher(5) tc26(1) algorithms(1) cipher(5)
gostr3412-2015-magma(1) mode-ctracpkm(1) gostr3412-2015-magma(1) mode-ctracpkm(1)
} }
In case of use id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm identifier the data When the id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm identifier is used, the
is encrypted by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Magma cipher in CTR_ACPKM mode data is encrypted by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Magma cipher in CTR_ACPKM
in accordance with [RFC8645]. The block size is 64 bits, the section mode in accordance with [RFC8645]. The block size is 64 bits and the
size is fixed within a specific protocol based on the requirements of section size is fixed within a specific protocol based on the
the system capacity and the key lifetime. requirements of the system capacity and the key lifetime.
id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ {
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7)
tc26(1) algorithms(1) cipher(5) tc26(1) algorithms(1) cipher(5)
gostr3412-2015-magma(1) mode-ctracpkm-omac(2) gostr3412-2015-magma(1) mode-ctracpkm-omac(2)
} }
In case of use id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac identifier the When the id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac identifier is used,
data is encrypted by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Magma cipher in CTR_ACPKM the data is encrypted by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Magma cipher in
mode in accordance with [RFC8645], and MAC is computed by the GOST R CTR_ACPKM mode in accordance with [RFC8645] and the MAC is computed
34.12-2015 Magma cipher in MAC mode (MAC size is 64 bits). The block by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Magma cipher in MAC mode (MAC size is 64
size is 64 bits, the section size is fixed within a specific protocol bits). The block size is 64 bits and the section size is fixed
based on the requirements of the system capacity and the key within a specific protocol based on the requirements of the system
lifetime. capacity and the key lifetime.
id-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ {
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7)
tc26(1) algorithms(1) cipher(5) tc26(1) algorithms(1) cipher(5)
gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik(2) mode-ctracpkm(1) gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik(2) mode-ctracpkm(1)
} }
In case of use id-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm identifier the
data is encrypted by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Kuznyechik cipher in When the id-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm identifier is used,
the data is encrypted by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Kuznyechik cipher in
CTR_ACPKM mode in accordance with [RFC8645]. The block size is 128 CTR_ACPKM mode in accordance with [RFC8645]. The block size is 128
bits, the section size is fixed within a specific protocol based on bits and the section size is fixed within a specific protocol based
the requirements of the system capacity and the key lifetime. on the requirements of the system capacity and the key lifetime.
id-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ {
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7)
tc26(1) algorithms(1) cipher(5) tc26(1) algorithms(1) cipher(5)
gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik(2) mode-ctracpkm-omac(2) gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik(2) mode-ctracpkm-omac(2)
} }
In case of use id-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac identifier When the id-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac identifier is
the data is encrypted by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Kuznyechik cipher in used, the data is encrypted by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Kuznyechik
CTR_ACPKM mode in accordance with [RFC8645], and MAC is computed by cipher in CTR_ACPKM mode in accordance with [RFC8645] and MAC is
the GOST R 34.12-2015 Kuznyechik cipher in MAC mode (MAC size is 128 computed by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Kuznyechik cipher in MAC mode (MAC
bits). The block size is 128 bits, the section size is fixed within size is 128 bits). The block size is 128 bits and the section size
a specific protocol based on the requirements of the system capacity is fixed within a specific protocol based on the requirements of the
and the key lifetime. system capacity and the key lifetime.
The parameters field in an AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have type The parameters field in an AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have type
Gost3412-15-Encryption-Parameters: Gost3412-15-Encryption-Parameters:
Gost3412-15-Encryption-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE Gost3412-15-Encryption-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE
{ {
ukm OCTET STRING ukm OCTET STRING
} }
The field of type Gost3412-15-Encryption-Parameters have the The field of type Gost3412-15-Encryption-Parameters have the
following meanings: following meanings:
- ukm MUST be present and MUST contain n octets. Its value * ukm MUST be present and MUST contain n octets. Its value depends
depends on the selected encryption algorithm: on the selected encryption algorithm:
GOST R 34.12-2015 "Kuznyechik" n = 16 (see [RFC7801]) - GOST R 34.12-2015 "Kuznyechik" n = 16 (see [RFC7801])
GOST R 34.12-2015 "Magma" n = 12 (see [RFC8891]) - GOST R 34.12-2015 "Magma" n = 12 (see [RFC8891])
7.4. PBMAC1 7.4. PBMAC1
The object identifier id-PBMAC1 identifies the PBMAC1 message The OID id-PBMAC1 identifies the PBMAC1 message authentication
authentication scheme: scheme:
id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-5 14 } id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-5 14 }
The parameters field associated with this OID in an The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have type PBMAC1-params: AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have type PBMAC1-params:
PBMAC1-params ::= SEQUENCE PBMAC1-params ::= SEQUENCE
{ {
keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBMAC1-KDFs } }, keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBMAC1-KDFs } },
messageAuthScheme AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBMAC1-MACs } } messageAuthScheme AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBMAC1-MACs } }
} }
The fields of type PBMAC1-params have the following meanings: The fields of type PBMAC1-params have the following meanings:
- keyDerivationFunc is identifier and parameters of key derivation * keyDerivationFunc is the identifier and parameters of key
function in accordance with Section 7.1 derivation function in accordance with Section 7.1.
- messageAuthScheme is identifier and parameters of HMAC_GOSTR3411 * messageAuthScheme is the identifier and parameters of the
algorithm. HMAC_GOSTR3411 algorithm.
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
For information on security considerations for password-based For information on security considerations for password-based
cryptography see [RFC8018]. cryptography, see [RFC8018].
Conforming applications MUST use unique values for ukm and S in order Conforming applications MUST use unique values for ukm and S in order
to avoid the encryption of different data on the same keys with the to avoid the encryption of different data on the same keys with the
same initialization vector. same initialization vector.
It is RECOMMENDED that parameter S consist of at least 32 octets of It is RECOMMENDED that parameter S consist of at least 32 octets of
pseudo-random data in order to reduce the probability of collisions pseudorandom data in order to reduce the probability of collisions of
of keys generated from the same password. keys generated from the same password.
9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
This document makes no requests for IANA action. This document has no IANA actions.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References
[GostPkcs5] [GostPkcs5]
Karelina, E., Pianov, S., and A. Davletshina, "Information Potashnikov, A., Karelina, E., Pianov, S., and A.
technology. Cryptographic Data Security. Password-based Naumenko, "Information technology. Cryptographic Data
key security.", R 1323565.1.xxx-2022 (work in progress). Security. Password-based key security.", R
Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology (In 1323565.1.040-2022. Federal Agency on Technical Regulating
Russian). and Metrology (In Russian).
[RFC0020] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for network interchange", STD 80, [RFC0020] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for network interchange", STD 80,
RFC 20, DOI 10.17487/RFC0020, October 1969, RFC 20, DOI 10.17487/RFC0020, October 1969,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc20>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc20>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6070] Josefsson, S., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Key Derivation
Function 2 (PBKDF2) Test Vectors", RFC 6070,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6070, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6070>.
[RFC6986] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.11-2012: [RFC6986] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.11-2012:
Hash Function", RFC 6986, DOI 10.17487/RFC6986, August Hash Function", RFC 6986, DOI 10.17487/RFC6986, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6986>. 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6986>.
[RFC7801] Dolmatov, V., Ed., "GOST R 34.12-2015: Block Cipher [RFC7801] Dolmatov, V., Ed., "GOST R 34.12-2015: Block Cipher
"Kuznyechik"", RFC 7801, DOI 10.17487/RFC7801, March 2016, "Kuznyechik"", RFC 7801, DOI 10.17487/RFC7801, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7801>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7801>.
[RFC7836] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Alekseev, E., Oshkin, I., Popov, V., [RFC7836] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Alekseev, E., Oshkin, I., Popov, V.,
Leontiev, S., Podobaev, V., and D. Belyavsky, "Guidelines Leontiev, S., Podobaev, V., and D. Belyavsky, "Guidelines
skipping to change at page 14, line 47 skipping to change at line 649
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8645] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., "Re-keying Mechanisms for Symmetric [RFC8645] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., "Re-keying Mechanisms for Symmetric
Keys", RFC 8645, DOI 10.17487/RFC8645, August 2019, Keys", RFC 8645, DOI 10.17487/RFC8645, August 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8645>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8645>.
[RFC8891] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and D. Baryshkov, "GOST R 34.12-2015: [RFC8891] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and D. Baryshkov, "GOST R 34.12-2015:
Block Cipher "Magma"", RFC 8891, DOI 10.17487/RFC8891, Block Cipher "Magma"", RFC 8891, DOI 10.17487/RFC8891,
September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8891>. September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8891>.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC6070] Josefsson, S., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Key Derivation
Function 2 (PBKDF2) Test Vectors", RFC 6070,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6070, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6070>.
Appendix A. PBKDF2 HMAC_GOSTR3411 Test Vectors Appendix A. PBKDF2 HMAC_GOSTR3411 Test Vectors
These test vectors are formed by analogy with test vectors from These test vectors are formed by analogy with test vectors from
[RFC6070]. The input strings below are encoded using ASCII ( [RFC6070]. The input strings below are encoded using ASCII (see
[RFC0020] ). The sequence "\0" (without quotation marks) means a [RFC0020]). The sequence "\0" (without quotation marks) means a
literal ASCII NULL value (1 octet). "DK" refers to the Derived Key. literal ASCII NULL value (1 octet). "DK" refers to the derived key.
Input: Input:
P = "password" (8 octets) P = "password" (8 octets)
S = "salt" (4 octets) S = "salt" (4 octets)
c = 1 c = 1
dkLen = 64 dkLen = 64
Output: Output:
DK = 64 77 0a f7 f7 48 c3 b1 c9 ac 83 1d bc fd 85 c2 DK = 64 77 0a f7 f7 48 c3 b1 c9 ac 83 1d bc fd 85 c2
61 11 b3 0a 8a 65 7d dc 30 56 b8 0c a7 3e 04 0d 61 11 b3 0a 8a 65 7d dc 30 56 b8 0c a7 3e 04 0d
skipping to change at page 16, line 32 skipping to change at line 738
S = "sa\0lt" (5 octets) S = "sa\0lt" (5 octets)
c = 4096 c = 4096
dkLen = 64 dkLen = 64
Output: Output:
DK = 50 df 06 28 85 b6 98 01 a3 c1 02 48 eb 0a 27 ab DK = 50 df 06 28 85 b6 98 01 a3 c1 02 48 eb 0a 27 ab
6e 52 2f fe b2 0c 99 1c 66 0f 00 14 75 d7 3a 4e 6e 52 2f fe b2 0c 99 1c 66 0f 00 14 75 d7 3a 4e
16 7f 78 2c 18 e9 7e 92 97 6d 9c 1d 97 08 31 ea 16 7f 78 2c 18 e9 7e 92 97 6d 9c 1d 97 08 31 ea
78 cc b8 79 f6 70 68 cd ac 19 10 74 08 44 e8 30 78 cc b8 79 f6 70 68 cd ac 19 10 74 08 44 e8 30
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Potashnikov Alexander, Pianov Semen, Davletshina
Alexandra, Belyavsky Dmitry, and Smyslov Valery for their careful
readings and useful comments.
Author's Address Author's Address
Karelina Ekaterina (editor) Ekaterina Karelina (editor)
InfoTeCS InfoTeCS
2B stroenie 1, ul. Otradnaya 2B stroenie 1, ul. Otradnaya
Moscow Moscow
127273 127273
Russian Federation Russian Federation
Phone: +7 (495) 737-61-92
Email: Ekaterina.Karelina@infotecs.ru Email: Ekaterina.Karelina@infotecs.ru
 End of changes. 93 change blocks. 
262 lines changed or deleted 275 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.48.