rfc9353.original   rfc9353.txt 
PCE working group D. Lopez Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. Lopez
Internet-Draft Telefonica I+D Request for Comments: 9353 Telefonica I+D
Updates: 5088, 5089, 8231, 8306 (if approved) Q. Wu Updates: 5088, 5089, 8231, 8306 Q. Wu
Intended status: Standards Track D. Dhody Category: Standards Track D. Dhody
Expires: 14 April 2023 Q. Ma ISSN: 2070-1721 Q. Ma
Huawei Huawei
D. King D. King
Old Dog Consulting Old Dog Consulting
11 October 2022 January 2023
IGP extension for PCEP security capability support in PCE discovery IGP Extension for Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)
draft-ietf-lsr-pce-discovery-security-support-13 Security Capability Support in PCE Discovery (PCED)
Abstract Abstract
When a Path Computation Element (PCE) is a Label Switching Router When a Path Computation Element (PCE) is a Label Switching Router
(LSR) participating in the Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP), or even a (LSR) or a server participating in the Interior Gateway Protocol
server participating in the IGP, its presence and path computation (IGP), its presence and path computation capabilities can be
capabilities can be advertised using IGP flooding. The IGP advertised using IGP flooding. The IGP extensions for PCE Discovery
extensions for PCE discovery (RFC 5088 and RFC 5089) define a method (PCED) (RFCs 5088 and 5089) define a method to advertise path
to advertise path computation capabilities using IGP flooding for computation capabilities using IGP flooding for OSPF and IS-IS,
OSPF and IS-IS respectively. However these specifications lack a respectively. However, these specifications lack a method to
method to advertise PCE Communication Protocol (PCEP) security (e.g., advertise Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)
Transport Layer Security (TLS), TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)) security (e.g., Transport Layer Security (TLS) and TCP Authentication
support capability. Option (TCP-AO)) support capability.
This document defines capability flag bits for the PCE-CAP-FLAGS sub- This document defines capability flag bits for the PCE-CAP-FLAGS sub-
TLV that can be announced as an attribute in the IGP advertisement to TLV that can be announced as an attribute in the IGP advertisement to
distribute PCEP security support information. In addition, this distribute PCEP security support information. In addition, this
document updates RFC 5088 and RFC 5089 to allow advertisement of a document updates RFCs 5088 and 5089 to allow advertisement of a Key
Key ID or Key Chain Name Sub-TLV to support TCP-AO security ID or KEY-CHAIN-NAME sub-TLV to support TCP-AO security capability.
capability. Further, this document updates RFC 8231 and RFC 8306. This document also updates RFCs 8231 and 8306.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
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working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9353.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 April 2023.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction
2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Conventions Used in This Document
3. IGP extension for PCEP security capability support . . . . . 4 3. IGP Extension for PCEP Security Capability Support
3.1. Use of PCEP security capability support for PCE 3.1. Use of PCEP Security Capability Support for PCED
discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. KEY-ID Sub-TLV
3.2. KEY-ID Sub-TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2.1. IS-IS
3.2.1. IS-IS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2.2. OSPF
3.2.2. OSPF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. KEY-CHAIN-NAME Sub-TLV
3.3. KEY-CHAIN-NAME Sub-TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3.1. IS-IS
3.3.1. IS-IS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3.2. OSPF
3.3.2. OSPF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Updates to RFCs
4. Update to RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Backward Compatibility Considerations
5. Backward Compatibility Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Management Considerations
6. Management Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.1. Control of Policy and Functions
6.1. Control of Policy and Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.2. Information and Data Model
6.2. Information and Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.3. Liveness Detection and Monitoring
6.3. Liveness Detection and Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6.4. Verification of Correct Operations
6.4. Verify Correct Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6.5. Requirements on Other Protocols and Functional Components
6.5. Requirements on Other Protocols and Functional 6.6. Impact on Network Operations
Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Security Considerations
6.6. Impact on Network Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. IANA Considerations
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.1. PCE Capability Flags
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8.2. PCED Sub-TLV Type Indicators
8.1. PCE Capability Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. References
8.2. PCED sub-TLV Type Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.1. Normative References
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9.2. Informative References
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Acknowledgments
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Authors' Addresses
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
As described in [RFC5440], Path Computation Element Communication As described in [RFC5440], privacy and integrity are important issues
Protocol (PCEP) communication privacy and integrity are important for communication using the Path Computation Element Communication
issues, as an attacker that intercepts a PCEP message could obtain Protocol (PCEP); an attacker that intercepts a PCEP message could
sensitive information related to computed paths and resources. obtain sensitive information related to computed paths and resources.
Authentication and integrity checks allow the receiver of a PCEP Authentication and integrity checks allow the receiver of a PCEP
message to know that the message genuinely comes from the node that message to know that the message genuinely comes from the node that
purports to have sent it and to know whether the message has been purports to have sent it and whether the message has been modified.
modified.
Among the possible solutions mentioned in that document, Transport Among the possible solutions mentioned in [RFC5440], Transport Layer
Layer Security (TLS) [RFC8446] provides support for peer Security (TLS) [RFC8446] provides support for peer authentication,
authentication, and message encryption and integrity while TCP message encryption, and integrity while TCP-AO) [RFC5925] and
Authentication Option (TCP-AO) [RFC5925] and Cryptographic Algorithms Cryptographic Algorithms for TCP-AO [RFC5926] offer significantly
for TCP-AO [RFC5926] offer significantly improved security for improved security for applications using TCP. As specified in
applications using TCP. As specified in section 4 of [RFC8253], in Section 4 of [RFC8253], the PCC needs to know whether the PCE server
order for a Path Computation Client (PCC) to establish a connection supports TLS or TCP-AO as a secure transport in order for a Path
with a PCE server using TLS or TCP-AO, the PCC needs to know whether Computation Client (PCC) to establish a connection with a PCE server
PCE server supports TLS or TCP-AO as a secure transport. using TLS or TCP-AO.
[RFC5088] and [RFC5089] define a method to advertise path computation [RFC5088] and [RFC5089] define a method to advertise path computation
capabilities using IGP flooding for OSPF and IS-IS respectively. capabilities using IGP flooding for OSPF and IS-IS, respectively.
However, these specifications lack a method to advertise PCEP However, these specifications lack a method to advertise PCEP
security (e.g., TLS) support capability. security (e.g., TLS and TCP-AO) support capability.
This document defines capability flag bits for the PCE-CAP-FLAGS sub- This document defines capability flag bits for the PCE-CAP-FLAGS sub-
TLV that can be announced as attributes in the IGP advertisement to TLV that can be announced as attributes in the IGP advertisement to
distribute PCEP security support information. In addition, this distribute PCEP security support information. In addition, this
document updates [RFC5088] and [RFC5089] to allow advertisement of a document updates [RFC5088] and [RFC5089] to allow advertisement of a
Key ID or Key Chain Name Sub-TLV to support TCP-AO security KeyID or KEY-CHAIN-NAME sub-TLV to support TCP-AO security
capability. capability.
As per [RFC5088], the IANA created a top-level OSPF registry, the IANA created a top-level registry titled "Path Computation Element
"Path Computation Element (PCE) Capability Flags" registry. This (PCE) Capability Flags" per [RFC5088]. This document updates
document updates [RFC5088] and moves the registry to "Interior [RFC5088] and moves it to follow the heading of the "Interior Gateway
Gateway Protocol (IGP) Parameters". [RFC5089] states that the IS-IS Protocol (IGP) Parameters" registry. [RFC5089] states that the IS-IS
uses the same registry as OSPF. This document updates [RFC5089] to PCE-CAP-FLAGS sub-TLV uses the same registry as OSPF. This document
refer to the new IGP registry. Further, this document updates updates [RFC5089] to refer to the new IGP registry. Further, this
[RFC8231] where it references the registry location as "Open Shortest document updates [RFC8231] where it references the registry location
Path First (OSPF) Parameters" registry to "Interior Gateway Protocol as the "Open Shortest Path First v2 (OSPFv2) Parameters" registry to
(IGP) Parameters" registry. This document updates [RFC8306] where it the "Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) Parameters" registry. This
uses the term "OSPF PCE Capability Flag" and request assignment from document also updates [RFC8306] by changing the term "OSPF PCE
OSPF Parameters registry with "PCE Capability Flag" and the IGP Capability Flag" to read as "Path Computation Element (PCE)
Parameters registry. Capability Flags" and to note the corresponding registry now exists
in the "Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) Parameters" registry.
Note that [RFC5557] uses the term "OSPF registry" instead of the "IGP | Note that [RFC5557] uses the term "OSPF registry" instead of
registry" whereas [RFC8623] and [RFC9168] uses the term "OSPF | the "IGP registry", whereas [RFC8623] and [RFC9168] use the
Parameters" instead of "IGP Parameters". | term "OSPF Parameters" instead of "IGP Parameters".
Note that the PCEP Open message exchange is another way to discover | Note that the PCEP Open message exchange is another way to
PCE capabilities information, but in this instance, the TCP security | discover PCE capabilities information; however, in this
related key parameters need to be known before the PCEP session is | instance, the TCP-security-related key parameters need to be
established and the PCEP Open messages are exchanged. Thus, the use | known before the PCEP session is established and the PCEP Open
of the PCE discovery and capabilities advertisement of the IGP needs | messages are exchanged. Thus, the IGP advertisement and
to be leveraged. | flooding mechanisms need to be leveraged for PCE discovery and
| capabilities advertisement.
2. Conventions used in this document 2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. IGP extension for PCEP security capability support 3. IGP Extension for PCEP Security Capability Support
[RFC5088] defines a PCE Discovery (PCED) TLV carried in an OSPF [RFC5088] defines a PCE Discovery (PCED) TLV carried in an OSPF
Router Information Link State Advertisement (LSA) as defined in Router Information Link State Advertisement (LSA) as defined in
[RFC7770] to facilitate PCE discovery using OSPF. This document [RFC7770] to facilitate PCED using OSPF. This document defines two
defines two capability flag bits in the OSPF PCE Capability Flags to capability flag bits in the OSPF PCE Capability Flags to indicate
indicate TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) support TCP-AO support [RFC5925] [RFC5926] and PCEP over TLS support
[RFC5925][RFC5926] and PCEP over TLS support [RFC8253] respectively. [RFC8253], respectively.
Similarly, [RFC5089] defines the PCED sub-TLV for use in PCE Similarly, [RFC5089] defines the PCED sub-TLV for use in PCED using
discovery using IS-IS. This document will use the same flag for the IS-IS. This document will use the same flag for the OSPF PCE
OSPF PCE Capability Flags sub-TLV to allow IS-IS to indicate TCP Capability Flags sub-TLV to allow IS-IS to indicate TCP-AO support
Authentication Option (TCP-AO) support, PCEP over TLS support and PCEP over TLS support, respectively.
respectively.
The IANA assignments for shared OSPF and IS-IS Security Capability The IANA assignments for shared OSPF and IS-IS Security Capability
Flags are documented in Section 8.1 ("PCE Capability Flags") of this Flags are documented in Section 8.1 of this document.
document.
3.1. Use of PCEP security capability support for PCE discovery 3.1. Use of PCEP Security Capability Support for PCED
TCP-AO, PCEP over TLS support flag bits are advertised using IGP TCP-AO and PCEP over TLS support flag bits are advertised using IGP
flooding. flooding.
* PCE supports TCP-AO: IGP advertisement SHOULD include TCP-AO * PCE supports TCP-AO: IGP advertisement SHOULD include a TCP-AO
support flag bit. support flag bit.
* PCE supports TLS: IGP advertisement SHOULD include PCEP over TLS * PCE supports TLS: IGP advertisement SHOULD include PCEP over TLS
support flag bit. support flag bit.
If the PCE supports multiple security mechanisms, it SHOULD include If the PCE supports multiple security mechanisms, it SHOULD include
all corresponding flag bits in its IGP advertisement. all corresponding flag bits in its IGP advertisement.
A client's configuration MAY indicate that support for a given A client's configuration MAY indicate that support for a given
security capability is required. If a client is configured to security capability is required. If a client is configured to
skipping to change at page 5, line 21 skipping to change at line 205
that the TCP-AO flag bit in the PCE-CAP-FLAGS sub-TLV for a given that the TCP-AO flag bit in the PCE-CAP-FLAGS sub-TLV for a given
server is set before it opens a connection to that server. server is set before it opens a connection to that server.
Similarly, if the client is configured to require that its PCE server Similarly, if the client is configured to require that its PCE server
supports TLS, the client MUST verify that the PCEP over TLS support supports TLS, the client MUST verify that the PCEP over TLS support
flag bit in the PCE-CAP-FLAGS sub-TLV for a given server is set flag bit in the PCE-CAP-FLAGS sub-TLV for a given server is set
before it opens a connection to that server. before it opens a connection to that server.
3.2. KEY-ID Sub-TLV 3.2. KEY-ID Sub-TLV
The KEY-ID sub-TLV specifies an identifier that can be used by the The KEY-ID sub-TLV specifies an identifier that can be used by the
PCC to identify the TCP-AO key [RFC5925] (referred to as KeyID). PCC to identify the TCP-AO key (referred to as "KeyID" in [RFC5925]).
3.2.1. IS-IS 3.2.1. IS-IS
The KEY-ID sub-TLV MAY be present in the PCED sub-TLV carried within The KEY-ID sub-TLV MAY be present in the PCED sub-TLV carried within
the IS-IS Router CAPABILITY TLV when the capability flag bit of PCE- the IS-IS Router CAPABILITY TLV when the capability flag bit of the
CAP-FLAGS sub-TLV in IS-IS is set to indicate TCP Authentication PCE-CAP-FLAGS sub-TLV in IS-IS is set to indicate TCP-AO support.
Option (TCP-AO) support.
The KEY-ID sub-TLV has the following format: The KEY-ID sub-TLV has the following format:
Type: 6 Type: 6
Length: 1 Length: 1
KeyID: The one octet Key ID as per [RFC5925] to uniquely identify KeyID: The one-octet KeyID as per [RFC5925] to uniquely identify the
the Master Key Tuple (MKT). Master Key Tuple (MKT).
3.2.2. OSPF 3.2.2. OSPF
Similarly, this sub-TLV MAY be present in the PCED TLV carried within Similarly, this sub-TLV MAY be present in the PCED TLV carried within
OSPF Router Information LSA when the capability flag bit of PCE-CAP- the OSPF Router Information LSA when the capability flag bit of the
FLAGS sub-TLV in OSPF is set to indicate TCP-AO support. PCE-CAP-FLAGS sub-TLV in OSPF is set to indicate TCP-AO support.
The format of KEY-ID sub-TLV is as follows: The format of the KEY-ID sub-TLV is as follows:
1 2 3 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 6 | Length | | Type = 6 | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| KeyID | Reserved | | KeyID | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type: 6 Type: 6
Length: 4 Length: 4
KeyID: The one octet Key ID as per [RFC5925] to uniquely identify KeyID: The one octet KeyID as per [RFC5925] to uniquely identify the
the Master Key Tuple (MKT). MKT.
Reserved: MUST be set to zero while sending and ignored on Reserved: MUST be set to zero while sending and ignored on receipt.
receipt.
3.3. KEY-CHAIN-NAME Sub-TLV 3.3. KEY-CHAIN-NAME Sub-TLV
The KEY-CHAIN-NAME sub-TLV specifies a keychain name that can be used The KEY-CHAIN-NAME sub-TLV specifies a key chain name that can be
by the PCC to identify the keychain. The keychain name could be used by the PCC to identify the key chain. The key chain name could
manually configured via CLI or installed in the YANG datastore (see be manually configured via command-line interface (CLI) or installed
[RFC8177]) at the PCC. in the YANG datastore (see [RFC8177]) at the PCC.
3.3.1. IS-IS 3.3.1. IS-IS
The KEY-CHAIN-NAME sub-TLV MAY be present in the PCED sub-TLV carried The KEY-CHAIN-NAME sub-TLV MAY be present in the PCED sub-TLV carried
within the IS-IS Router CAPABILITY TLV when the capability flag bit within the IS-IS Router CAPABILITY TLV when the capability flag bit
of the PCE-CAP-FLAGS sub-TLV in IS-IS is set to indicate TCP of the PCE-CAP-FLAGS sub-TLV in IS-IS is set to indicate TCP-AO
Authentication Option (TCP-AO) support. support.
The KEY-CHAIN-NAME sub-TLV has the following format: The KEY-CHAIN-NAME sub-TLV has the following format:
Type: 7 Type: 7
Length: Variable, encodes the length of the value field. Length: Variable, encodes the length of the value field.
Key Name: The Key Chain Name contains a string of 1 to 255 octets Key Chain Name: The Key Chain Name contains a string of 1 to 255
to be used to identify the key chain. It MUST be encoded using octets to be used to identify the key chain. It MUST be encoded
UTF-8. A receiving entity MUST NOT interpret invalid UTF-8 using UTF-8. A receiving entity MUST NOT interpret invalid UTF-8
sequences and ignore them. This field is not NULL terminated. sequences and ignore them. This field is not NULL terminated.
UTF-8 "Shortest Form" encoding is REQUIRED to guard against the UTF-8 "Shortest Form" encoding is REQUIRED to guard against the
technical issues outlined in [UTR36]. technical issues outlined in [UTR36].
3.3.2. OSPF 3.3.2. OSPF
Similarly, this sub-TLV MAY be present in the PCED TLV carried within Similarly, this sub-TLV MAY be present in the PCED TLV carried within
the OSPF Router Information LSA when the capability flag bit of PCE- the OSPF Router Information LSA when the capability flag bit of the
CAP-FLAGS sub-TLV in OSPF is set to indicate TCP-AO support. The PCE-CAP-FLAGS sub-TLV in OSPF is set to indicate TCP-AO support. The
sub-TLV MUST be zero-padded so that the sub-TLV is 4-octet aligned. sub-TLV MUST be zero-padded so that the sub-TLV is 4-octet aligned.
The format of KEY-CHAIN-NAME sub-TLV is as follows: The format of KEY-CHAIN-NAME sub-TLV is as follows:
1 2 3 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 7 | Length | | Type = 7 | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
// Key Chain Name // // Key Chain Name //
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type: 7 Type: 7
Length: Variable, padding is not included in the Length field Length: Variable, padding is not included in the Length field.
Key Name: The Key Chain Name contains a string of 1 to 255 octets Key Chain Name: The Key Chain Name contains a string of 1 to 255
to be used to identify the key chain. It MUST be encoded using octets to be used to identify the key chain. It MUST be encoded
UTF-8. A receiving entity MUST NOT interpret invalid UTF-8 using UTF-8. A receiving entity MUST NOT interpret invalid UTF-8
sequences and ignore them. This field is not NULL terminated. sequences and ignore them. This field is not NULL terminated.
UTF-8 "Shortest Form" encoding is REQUIRED to guard against the UTF-8 "Shortest Form" encoding is REQUIRED to guard against the
technical issues outlined in [UTR36]. The sub-TLV MUST be zero- technical issues outlined in [UTR36]. The sub-TLV MUST be zero-
padded so that the sub-TLV is 4-octet aligned. padded so that the sub-TLV is 4-octet aligned.
4. Update to RFCs 4. Updates to RFCs
Section 4 of [RFC5088] states that no new sub-TLVs will be added to Section 4 of [RFC5088] states that no new sub-TLVs will be added to
the PCED TLV, and no new PCE information will be carried in the the PCED TLV and no new PCE information will be carried in the Router
Router Information LSA. This document updates [RFC5088] by allowing Information LSA. This document updates [RFC5088] by allowing the two
the two sub-TLVs defined in this document to be carried in the PCED sub-TLVs defined in this document to be carried in the PCED TLV
TLV advertised in the Router Information LSA. advertised in the Router Information LSA.
Section 4 of [RFC5089] states that no new sub-TLVs will be added to Section 4 of [RFC5089] states that no new sub-TLVs will be added to
the PCED TLV, and no new PCE information will be carried in the the PCED TLV and no new PCE information will be carried in the Router
Router CAPABLITY TLV. This document updates [RFC5089] by allowing CAPABILITY TLV. This document updates [RFC5089] by allowing the two
the two sub-TLVs defined in this document to be carried in the PCED sub-TLVs defined in this document to be carried in the PCED TLV
TLV advertised in the Router CAPABILITY TLV. advertised in the Router CAPABILITY TLV.
This introduction of additional sub-TLVs should be viewed as an This introduction of additional sub-TLVs should be viewed as an
exception to the [RFC5088][RFC5089] policy, justified by the exception to the policies in [RFC5088] and [RFC5089], which is
requirement to discover the PCEP security support prior to justified by the requirement to discover the PCEP security support
establishing a PCEP session. The restrictions defined in prior to establishing a PCEP session. The restrictions defined in
[RFC5088][RFC5089] should still be considered to be in place. If in [RFC5088] and [RFC5089] should still be considered to be in place.
the future new advertisements are required, alternative mechanisms If new advertisements are required in the future, alternative
such as using [RFC6823] or [I-D.ietf-lsr-ospf-transport-instance] mechanisms such as using [RFC6823] or [LSR-OSPF-TRANSPORT-INSTANCE]
should be considered. should be considered.
The registry for the PCE Capability Flags assigned in section 8.3 of The registry for the PCE Capability Flags assigned in Section 8.3 of
[RFC5557], section 8.1 of [RFC8231], section 6.9 of [RFC8306], [RFC5557], Section 8.1 of [RFC8231], Section 6.9 of [RFC8306],
section 11.1 of [RFC8623], and section 10.5 of [RFC9168] has changed Section 11.1 of [RFC8623], and Section 10.5 of [RFC9168] has changed
to the IGP Parameters "Path Computation Element (PCE) Capability to the IGP Parameters "Path Computation Element (PCE) Capability
Flags" registry created in this document. Flags" registry created in this document.
5. Backward Compatibility Considerations 5. Backward Compatibility Considerations
An LSR that does not support the IGP PCE capability bits specified in An LSR that does not support the IGP PCE capability bits specified in
this document silently ignores those bits. this document silently ignores those bits.
An LSR that does not support the KEY-ID and KEY-CHAIN-NAME sub-TLVs An LSR that does not support the KEY-ID and KEY-CHAIN-NAME sub-TLVs
specified in this document silently ignores these sub-TLVs. specified in this document silently ignores those sub-TLVs.
IGP extensions defined in this document do not introduce any new IGP extensions defined in this document do not introduce any new
interoperability issues. interoperability issues.
6. Management Considerations 6. Management Considerations
Manageability considerations for PCE Discovery are addressed in Manageability considerations for PCED are addressed in Section 4.10
Section 4.10 of [RFC4674] and Section 9 of [RFC5088] [RFC5089]. of [RFC4674], Section 9 of [RFC5088], and Section 9 of [RFC5089].
6.1. Control of Policy and Functions 6.1. Control of Policy and Functions
A PCE implementation SHOULD allow the following parameters to be A PCE implementation SHOULD allow the following parameters to be
configured on the PCE: configured on the PCE:
* support for TCP-AO * support for TCP-AO
* the KeyID used by TCP-AO * the KeyID used by TCP-AO
* Key Chain Name * Key Chain Name
* support for TLS * support for TLS
6.2. Information and Data Model 6.2. Information and Data Model
The YANG model for PCEP [I-D.ietf-pce-pcep-yang] supports PCEP The YANG module for PCEP [PCE-PCEP-YANG] supports PCEP security
security parameters (key, key chain, and TLS). parameters (key, key chain, and TLS).
6.3. Liveness Detection and Monitoring 6.3. Liveness Detection and Monitoring
Normal operations of the IGP meet the requirements for liveness Normal operations of the IGP meet the requirements for liveness
detection and monitoring. detection and monitoring.
6.4. Verify Correct Operations 6.4. Verification of Correct Operations
The correlation of PCEP security information advertised against The correlation of PCEP security information advertised against
information received can be achieved by comparing the information in information received can be achieved by comparing the information in
the PCED sub-TLV received by the PCC with that stored at the PCE the PCED sub-TLV received by the PCC with that stored at the PCE
using the PCEP YANG. using the PCEP YANG.
6.5. Requirements on Other Protocols and Functional Components 6.5. Requirements on Other Protocols and Functional Components
There are no new requirements on other protocols. There are no new requirements on other protocols.
6.6. Impact on Network Operations 6.6. Impact on Network Operations
Frequent changes in PCEP security information advertised in the PCED Frequent changes in PCEP security information advertised in the PCED
sub-TLV may have a significant impact on IGP and might destabilize sub-TLV may have a significant impact on IGP and might destabilize
the operation of the network by causing the PCCs to reconnect the operation of the network by causing the PCCs to reconnect
sessions with PCE(s). Section 4.10.4 of [RFC4674] and Section 9.6 of sessions with PCEs. Section 4.10.4 of [RFC4674], Section 9.6 of
[RFC5088] [RFC5089] list techniques that are applicable to this [RFC5088], and Section 9.6 of [RFC5089] list techniques that are
document as well. applicable to this document as well.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
Security considerations as specified by [RFC5088] and [RFC5089] are Security considerations as specified by [RFC5088] and [RFC5089] are
applicable to this document. applicable to this document.
As described in Section 10.2 of [RFC5440], an PCEP speaker MUST As described in Section 10.2 of [RFC5440], a PCEP speaker MUST
support TCP MD5 [RFC2385], so no capability advertisement is needed support TCP MD5 [RFC2385], so no capability advertisement is needed
to indicate support. However, as noted in [RFC6952], TCP MD5 has to indicate support. However, as noted in [RFC6952], TCP MD5 has
been obsoleted by TCP-AO [RFC5925] because of security concerns. been obsoleted by TCP-AO [RFC5925] because of security concerns.
However, TCP-AO is not widely implemented and so it is, therefore, TCP-AO is not widely implemented; therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that
RECOMMENDED (per [RFC8253] which updates [RFC5440]) that PCEP is PCEP be secured using TLS per [RFC8253] (which updates [RFC5440]).
secured using TLS. An implementation SHOULD offer at least one of An implementation SHOULD offer at least one of the two security
the two security capabilities defined in this document. capabilities defined in this document.
The information related to PCEP security is sensitive and due care The information related to PCEP security is sensitive and due care
needs to be taken by the operator. This document defines new needs to be taken by the operator. This document defines new
capability bits that are susceptible to a downgrade attack by setting capability bits that are susceptible to a downgrade attack by setting
them to zero. The content of Key ID or Key Chain Name Sub-TLV can be them to zero. The content of the Key-ID or KEY-CHAIN-NAME sub-TLV
altered to enable an on-path attack. Thus, before advertising the can be altered to enable an on-path attack. Thus, before advertising
PCEP security parameters, using the mechanism described in this the PCEP security parameters by using the mechanism described in this
document, the IGP MUST be known to provide authentication and document, the IGP MUST be known to provide authentication and
integrity for the PCED TLV using the mechanisms defined in [RFC5304], integrity for the PCED TLV using the mechanisms defined in [RFC5304],
[RFC5310] or [RFC5709]. [RFC5310], or [RFC5709].
Moreover, as stated in the Security Considerations of [RFC5088] and Moreover, as stated in the security considerations of [RFC5088] and
[RFC5089], there are no mechanisms defined in OSPF or IS-IS to [RFC5089], there are no mechanisms defined in OSPF or IS-IS to
protect the confidentiality of the PCED TLV. For this reason, the protect the confidentiality of the PCED TLV. For this reason, the
operator must ensure that no private data is carried in the TLV, e.g. operator must ensure that no private data is carried in the TLV. For
that key-ids or key-chain names do not reveal sensitive information example, the operator must ensure that KeyIDs or key chain names do
about the network. not reveal sensitive information about the network.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
8.1. PCE Capability Flags 8.1. PCE Capability Flags
IANA is requested to move the "Path Computation Element (PCE) IANA has moved the "Path Computation Element (PCE) Capability Flags"
Capability Flags" registry from the "Open Shortest Path First v2 registry from the "Open Shortest Path First v2 (OSPFv2) Parameters"
(OSPFv2) Parameters" grouping to the "Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) grouping to the "Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) Parameters"
Parameters" grouping. grouping.
IANA is requested to make the following additional assignments from IANA has made the following additional assignments from the "Path
the "Path Computation Element (PCE) Capability Flags" registry. Computation Element (PCE) Capability Flags" registry:
Bit Capability Description Reference +=====+========================+===========+
xx TCP-AO Support [This.I.D] | Bit | Capability Description | Reference |
xx PCEP over TLS support [This.I.D] +=====+========================+===========+
| 17 | TCP-AO Support | RFC 9353 |
+-----+------------------------+-----------+
| 18 | PCEP over TLS support | RFC 9353 |
+-----+------------------------+-----------+
The grouping is located at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/igp- Table 1: Path Computation Element (PCE)
parameters/igp-parameters.xhtml. Capability Flags Registrations
8.2. PCED sub-TLV Type Indicators The grouping is located at: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/igp-
parameters/>.
The PCED sub-TLVs were defined in [RFC5088] and [RFC5089], but they 8.2. PCED Sub-TLV Type Indicators
did not create a registry for it. This document requests IANA to
create a new registry called "PCED sub-TLV type indicators" under the The PCED sub-TLVs are defined in [RFC5088] and [RFC5089], but a
"Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) Parameters" grouping. The corresponding IANA registry was not created. IANA has created a new
registry called "PCE Discovery (PCED) Sub-TLV Type Indicators" under
the "Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) Parameters" registry. The
registration policy for this registry is "Standards Action" registration policy for this registry is "Standards Action"
[RFC8126]. Values in this registry come from the range 0-65535. [RFC8126]. Values in this registry come from the range 0-65535.
This registry should be populated with: This registry is initially populated as follows:
Value Description Reference +=======+=================+====================+
0 Reserved [This.I.D][RFC5088] | Value | Description | Reference |
1 PCE-ADDRESS [This.I.D][RFC5088] +=======+=================+====================+
2 PATH-SCOPE [This.I.D][RFC5088] | 0 | Reserved | RFC 9353, RFC 5088 |
3 PCE-DOMAIN [This.I.D][RFC5088] +-------+-----------------+--------------------+
4 NEIG-PCE-DOMAIN [This.I.D][RFC5088] | 1 | PCE-ADDRESS | RFC 9353, RFC 5088 |
5 PCE-CAP-FLAGS [This.I.D][RFC5088] +-------+-----------------+--------------------+
6 KEY-ID [This.I.D] | 2 | PATH-SCOPE | RFC 9353, RFC 5088 |
7 KEY-CHAIN-NAME [This.I.D] +-------+-----------------+--------------------+
| 3 | PCE-DOMAIN | RFC 9353, RFC 5088 |
+-------+-----------------+--------------------+
| 4 | NEIG-PCE-DOMAIN | RFC 9353, RFC 5088 |
+-------+-----------------+--------------------+
| 5 | PCE-CAP-FLAGS | RFC 9353, RFC 5088 |
+-------+-----------------+--------------------+
| 6 | KEY-ID | RFC 9353 |
+-------+-----------------+--------------------+
| 7 | KEY-CHAIN-NAME | RFC 9353 |
+-------+-----------------+--------------------+
Table 2: Initial Contents of the PCED Sub-
TLV Type Indicators Registry
This registry is used by both the OSPF PCED TLV and the IS-IS PCED This registry is used by both the OSPF PCED TLV and the IS-IS PCED
sub-TLV. sub-TLV.
This grouping is located at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/igp- This grouping is located at: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/igp-
parameters/igp-parameters.xhtml. parameters/>.
9. Acknowledgments
The authors of this document would also like to thank Acee Lindem,
Julien Meuric, Les Ginsberg, Ketan Talaulikar, Tom Petch, Aijun Wang,
Adrian Farrel for the review and comments.
The authors would also like to special thank Michale Wang for his
major contributions to the initial version.
Thanks to John Scudder for providing an excellent AD review. Thanks
to Carlos Pignataro, Yaron Sheffer, Ron Bonica, and Will (Shucheng)
LIU for directorate reviews.
Thanks to Lars Eggert, Robert Wilton, Roman Danyliw, Eric Vyncke,
Paul Wouters, Murray Kucherawy, and Warren Kumari for IESG reviews.
10. References 9. References
10.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S. and RFC Publisher, "Key words for use in RFCs
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5088] Le Roux, JL., Ed., Vasseur, JP., Ed., Ikejiri, Y., and R. [RFC5088] Le Roux, JL., Ed., Vasseur, JP., Ed., Ikejiri, Y., Zhang,
Zhang, "OSPF Protocol Extensions for Path Computation R., and RFC Publisher, "OSPF Protocol Extensions for Path
Element (PCE) Discovery", RFC 5088, DOI 10.17487/RFC5088, Computation Element (PCE) Discovery", RFC 5088,
January 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5088>. DOI 10.17487/RFC5088, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5088>.
[RFC5089] Le Roux, JL., Ed., Vasseur, JP., Ed., Ikejiri, Y., and R.
Zhang, "IS-IS Protocol Extensions for Path Computation
Element (PCE) Discovery", RFC 5089, DOI 10.17487/RFC5089,
January 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5089>.
[RFC5557] Lee, Y., Le Roux, JL., King, D., and E. Oki, "Path
Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)
Requirements and Protocol Extensions in Support of Global
Concurrent Optimization", RFC 5557, DOI 10.17487/RFC5557,
July 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5557>.
[RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925,
June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925>.
[RFC8253] Lopez, D., Gonzalez de Dios, O., Wu, Q., and D. Dhody,
"PCEPS: Usage of TLS to Provide a Secure Transport for the
Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)",
RFC 8253, DOI 10.17487/RFC8253, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8253>.
[RFC8177] Lindem, A., Ed., Qu, Y., Yeung, D., Chen, I., and J.
Zhang, "YANG Data Model for Key Chains", RFC 8177,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8177, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8177>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC7770] Lindem, A., Ed., Shen, N., Vasseur, JP., Aggarwal, R., and [RFC5089] Le Roux, JL., Ed., Vasseur, JP., Ed., Ikejiri, Y., Zhang,
S. Shaffer, "Extensions to OSPF for Advertising Optional R., and RFC Publisher, "IS-IS Protocol Extensions for Path
Router Capabilities", RFC 7770, DOI 10.17487/RFC7770, Computation Element (PCE) Discovery", RFC 5089,
February 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7770>. DOI 10.17487/RFC5089, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5089>.
[RFC5304] Li, T. and R. Atkinson, "IS-IS Cryptographic [RFC5304] Li, T., Atkinson, R., and RFC Publisher, "IS-IS
Authentication", RFC 5304, DOI 10.17487/RFC5304, October Cryptographic Authentication", RFC 5304,
2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5304>. DOI 10.17487/RFC5304, October 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5304>.
[RFC5310] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, R., [RFC5310] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, R.,
and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Fanto, M., and RFC Publisher, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic
Authentication", RFC 5310, DOI 10.17487/RFC5310, February Authentication", RFC 5310, DOI 10.17487/RFC5310, February
2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5310>. 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5310>.
[RFC5557] Lee, Y., Le Roux, JL., King, D., Oki, E., and RFC
Publisher, "Path Computation Element Communication
Protocol (PCEP) Requirements and Protocol Extensions in
Support of Global Concurrent Optimization", RFC 5557,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5557, July 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5557>.
[RFC5709] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Fanto, M., White, R., Barnes, M., [RFC5709] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Fanto, M., White, R., Barnes, M.,
Li, T., and R. Atkinson, "OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic Li, T., Atkinson, R., and RFC Publisher, "OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA
Authentication", RFC 5709, DOI 10.17487/RFC5709, October Cryptographic Authentication", RFC 5709,
2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5709>. DOI 10.17487/RFC5709, October 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5709>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for [RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., Bonica, R., and RFC Publisher, "The
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, TCP Authentication Option", RFC 5925,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925>.
[RFC7770] Lindem, A., Ed., Shen, N., Vasseur, JP., Aggarwal, R.,
Shaffer, S., and RFC Publisher, "Extensions to OSPF for
Advertising Optional Router Capabilities", RFC 7770,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7770, February 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7770>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., Narten, T., and RFC Publisher,
"Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in
RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8231] Crabbe, E., Minei, I., Medved, J., and R. Varga, "Path [RFC8174] Leiba, B. and RFC Publisher, "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs
Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP) Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174,
Extensions for Stateful PCE", RFC 8231, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8177] Lindem, A., Ed., Qu, Y., Yeung, D., Chen, I., Zhang, J.,
and RFC Publisher, "YANG Data Model for Key Chains",
RFC 8177, DOI 10.17487/RFC8177, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8177>.
[RFC8231] Crabbe, E., Minei, I., Medved, J., Varga, R., and RFC
Publisher, "Path Computation Element Communication
Protocol (PCEP) Extensions for Stateful PCE", RFC 8231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8231, September 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8231, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8231>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8231>.
[RFC8306] Zhao, Q., Dhody, D., Ed., Palleti, R., and D. King, [RFC8253] Lopez, D., Gonzalez de Dios, O., Wu, Q., Dhody, D., and
"Extensions to the Path Computation Element Communication RFC Publisher, "PCEPS: Usage of TLS to Provide a Secure
Protocol (PCEP) for Point-to-Multipoint Traffic Transport for the Path Computation Element Communication
Engineering Label Switched Paths", RFC 8306, Protocol (PCEP)", RFC 8253, DOI 10.17487/RFC8253, October
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8253>.
[RFC8306] Zhao, Q., Dhody, D., Ed., Palleti, R., King, D., and RFC
Publisher, "Extensions to the Path Computation Element
Communication Protocol (PCEP) for Point-to-Multipoint
Traffic Engineering Label Switched Paths", RFC 8306,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8306, November 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8306, November 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8306>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8306>.
[RFC8623] Palle, U., Dhody, D., Tanaka, Y., and V. Beeram, "Stateful [RFC8623] Palle, U., Dhody, D., Tanaka, Y., Beeram, V., and RFC
Path Computation Element (PCE) Protocol Extensions for Publisher, "Stateful Path Computation Element (PCE)
Usage with Point-to-Multipoint TE Label Switched Paths Protocol Extensions for Usage with Point-to-Multipoint TE
(LSPs)", RFC 8623, DOI 10.17487/RFC8623, June 2019, Label Switched Paths (LSPs)", RFC 8623,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8623, June 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8623>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8623>.
[RFC9168] Dhody, D., Farrel, A., and Z. Li, "Path Computation [RFC9168] Dhody, D., Farrel, A., Li, Z., and RFC Publisher, "Path
Element Communication Protocol (PCEP) Extension for Flow Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)
Specification", RFC 9168, DOI 10.17487/RFC9168, January Extension for Flow Specification", RFC 9168,
2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9168>. DOI 10.17487/RFC9168, January 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9168>.
10.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 [LSR-OSPF-TRANSPORT-INSTANCE]
Signature Option", RFC 2385, DOI 10.17487/RFC2385, August Lindem, A., Qu, Y., Roy, A., and S. Mirtorabi, "OSPF-GT
1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2385>. (Generalized Transport)", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-lsr-ospf-transport-instance-04, 3
January 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-lsr-ospf-transport-instance-04>.
[RFC4674] Le Roux, J.L., Ed., "Requirements for Path Computation [PCE-PCEP-YANG]
Element (PCE) Discovery", RFC 4674, DOI 10.17487/RFC4674, Dhody, D., Ed., Beeram, V., Hardwick, J., and J. Tantsura,
October 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4674>. "A YANG Data Model for Path Computation Element
Communications Protocol (PCEP)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-pce-pcep-yang-20, 23 October
2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
pce-pcep-yang-20>.
[RFC5440] Vasseur, JP., Ed. and JL. Le Roux, Ed., "Path Computation [RFC2385] Heffernan, A. and RFC Publisher, "Protection of BGP
Element (PCE) Communication Protocol (PCEP)", RFC 5440, Sessions via the TCP MD5 Signature Option", RFC 2385,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5440, March 2009, DOI 10.17487/RFC2385, August 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2385>.
[RFC4674] Le Roux, J.L., Ed. and RFC Publisher, "Requirements for
Path Computation Element (PCE) Discovery", RFC 4674,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4674, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4674>.
[RFC5440] Vasseur, JP., Ed., Le Roux, JL., Ed., and RFC Publisher,
"Path Computation Element (PCE) Communication Protocol
(PCEP)", RFC 5440, DOI 10.17487/RFC5440, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5440>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5440>.
[RFC5926] Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms [RFC5926] Lebovitz, G., Rescorla, E., and RFC Publisher,
for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926, "Cryptographic Algorithms for the TCP Authentication
DOI 10.17487/RFC5926, June 2010, Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926, DOI 10.17487/RFC5926, June
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5926>. 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5926>.
[RFC6823] Ginsberg, L., Previdi, S., and M. Shand, "Advertising [RFC6823] Ginsberg, L., Previdi, S., Shand, M., and RFC Publisher,
Generic Information in IS-IS", RFC 6823, "Advertising Generic Information in IS-IS", RFC 6823,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6823, December 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6823, December 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6823>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6823>.
[RFC6952] Jethanandani, M., Patel, K., and L. Zheng, "Analysis of [RFC6952] Jethanandani, M., Patel, K., Zheng, L., and RFC Publisher,
BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP Issues According to the Keying "Analysis of BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP Issues According to
and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design the Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP)
Guide", RFC 6952, DOI 10.17487/RFC6952, May 2013, Design Guide", RFC 6952, DOI 10.17487/RFC6952, May 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6952>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6952>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E. and RFC Publisher, "The Transport Layer
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[I-D.ietf-pce-pcep-yang] [UTR36] Davis, M., Ed. and M. Suignard, Ed., "Unicode Security
Dhody, D., Beeram, V. P., Hardwick, J., and J. Tantsura, Considerations", Unicode Technical Report #36, August
"A YANG Data Model for Path Computation Element 2010, <https://www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/tr36/>.
Communications Protocol (PCEP)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-pce-pcep-yang-19, 11 July 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-pce-pcep-yang-
19.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-lsr-ospf-transport-instance] Acknowledgments
Lindem, A., Qu, Y., Roy, A., and S. Mirtorabi, "OSPF-GT
(Generalized Transport)", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-lsr-ospf-transport-instance-03, 9 July
2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-lsr-
ospf-transport-instance-03.txt>.
[UTR36] Davis, M., "Unicode Technical Report #36, Character The authors of this document would like to thank Acee Lindem, Julien
Encoding Model", Meuric, Les Ginsberg, Ketan Talaulikar, Tom Petch, Aijun Wang, and
UTR17 https://www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/tr36/, Adrian Farrel for the review and comments.
February 2005.
The authors would also like to give special thanks to Michale Wang
for his major contributions to the initial draft version.
Thanks to John Scudder for providing an excellent AD review. Thanks
to Carlos Pignataro, Yaron Sheffer, Ron Bonica, and Will (Shucheng)
LIU for directorate reviews.
Thanks to Lars Eggert, Robert Wilton, Roman Danyliw, Éric Vyncke,
Paul Wouters, Murray Kucherawy, and Warren Kumari for IESG reviews.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Diego R. Lopez Diego R. Lopez
Telefonica I+D Telefonica I+D
Spain Spain
Email: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com Email: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com
Qin Wu Qin Wu
Huawei Technologies Huawei Technologies
101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District Yuhua District
101 Software Avenue
Nanjing Nanjing
Jiangsu, 210012 Jiangsu, 210012
China China
Email: bill.wu@huawei.com Email: bill.wu@huawei.com
Dhruv Dhody Dhruv Dhody
Huawei Technologies Huawei Technologies
Divyashree Techno Park, Whitefield Divyashree Techno Park, Whitefield
Bangalore 560037 Bangalore 560037
Karnataka Karnataka
skipping to change at page 15, line 4 skipping to change at line 688
China China
Email: bill.wu@huawei.com Email: bill.wu@huawei.com
Dhruv Dhody Dhruv Dhody
Huawei Technologies Huawei Technologies
Divyashree Techno Park, Whitefield Divyashree Techno Park, Whitefield
Bangalore 560037 Bangalore 560037
Karnataka Karnataka
India India
Email: dhruv.ietf@gmail.com Email: dhruv.ietf@gmail.com
Qiufang Ma Qiufang Ma
Huawei Huawei Technologies
101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District Yuhua District
101 Software Avenue
Nanjing Nanjing
Jiangsu, 210012 Jiangsu, 210012
China China
Email: maqiufang1@huawei.com Email: maqiufang1@huawei.com
Daniel King Daniel King
Old Dog Consulting Old Dog Consulting
United Kingdom United Kingdom
Email: daniel@olddog.co.uk Email: daniel@olddog.co.uk
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