Diff: rfc9399.original.xml

	rfc9399.original.xml	rfc9399.xml

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	-ietf-lamps-rfc3709bis-10" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF"	<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft
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	<front>	<front>
	<title abbrev="Logotypes in X.509 Certificates">Internet X.509 Public Key In frastructure: Logotypes in X.509 Certificates</title>	<title abbrev="Logotypes in X.509 Certificates">Internet X.509 Public Key In frastructure: Logotypes in X.509 Certificates</title>

	<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lamps-rfc3709bis-10"/>	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9399"/>
	<author initials="S." surname="Santesson" fullname="Stefan Santesson">	<author initials="S." surname="Santesson" fullname="Stefan Santesson">
	<organization abbrev="IDsec Solutions">IDsec Solutions AB</organization>	<organization abbrev="IDsec Solutions">IDsec Solutions AB</organization>
	<address>	<address>
	<postal>	<postal>
	<postalLine>Forskningsbyn Ideon</postalLine>	<postalLine>Forskningsbyn Ideon</postalLine>
	<postalLine>SE-223 70 Lund</postalLine>	<postalLine>SE-223 70 Lund</postalLine>

	<postalLine>SE</postalLine>	<postalLine>Sweden</postalLine>
	</postal>	</postal>
	<email>sts@aaa-sec.com</email>	<email>sts@aaa-sec.com</email>
	</address>	</address>
	</author>	</author>
	<author initials="R." surname="Housley" fullname="Russ Housley">	<author initials="R." surname="Housley" fullname="Russ Housley">
	<organization abbrev="Vigil Security">Vigil Security, LLC</organization>	<organization abbrev="Vigil Security">Vigil Security, LLC</organization>
	<address>	<address>
	<postal>	<postal>
	<street>516 Dranesville Road</street>	<street>516 Dranesville Road</street>

	<city>Herndon, VA</city>	<city>Herndon</city>
		<region>VA</region>
	<code>20170</code>	<code>20170</code>

	<country>US</country>	<country>United States of America</country>
	</postal>	</postal>
	<email>housley@vigilsec.com</email>	<email>housley@vigilsec.com</email>
	</address>	</address>
	</author>	</author>
	<author initials="T." surname="Freeman" fullname="Trevor Freeman">	<author initials="T." surname="Freeman" fullname="Trevor Freeman">
	<organization>Amazon Web Services</organization>	<organization>Amazon Web Services</organization>
	<address>	<address>
	<postal>	<postal>
	<street>1918 8th Ave</street>	<street>1918 8th Ave</street>

	<city>Seattle, WA</city>	<city>Seattle</city>
		<region>WA</region>
	<code>98101</code>	<code>98101</code>

	<country>US</country>	<country>United States of America</country>
	</postal>	</postal>
	<email>frtrevor@amazon.com</email>	<email>frtrevor@amazon.com</email>
	</address>	</address>
	</author>	</author>
	<author initials="L." surname="Rosenthol" fullname="Leonard Rosenthol">	<author initials="L." surname="Rosenthol" fullname="Leonard Rosenthol">
	<organization>Adobe</organization>	<organization>Adobe</organization>
	<address>	<address>
	<postal>	<postal>
	<street>345 Park Avenue</street>	<street>345 Park Avenue</street>

	<city>San Jose, CA</city>	<city>San Jose</city>
		<region>CA</region>
	<code>95110</code>	<code>95110</code>

	<country>US</country>	<country>United States of America</country>
	</postal>	</postal>
	<email>lrosenth@adobe.com</email>	<email>lrosenth@adobe.com</email>
	</address>	</address>
	</author>	</author>

	<date year="2022" month="December" day="11"/>	<date year="2023" month="April"/>
	<area>Security</area>	<area>sec</area>
	<keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>	<workgroup>lamps</workgroup>
		<keyword>X.509</keyword>
		<keyword>Public Key Infrastructure</keyword>
		<keyword>authentication</keyword>
		<keyword>security identification</keyword>
		<keyword>certificates</keyword>
	<abstract>	<abstract>
	<t>This document specifies a certificate extension for including	<t>This document specifies a certificate extension for including
	logotypes in public key certificates and attribute certificates.	logotypes in public key certificates and attribute certificates.

	This document obsoletes RFC 3709 and RFC 6170.</t>	This document obsoletes RFCs 3709 and 6170.</t>
	</abstract>	</abstract>
	</front>	</front>
	<middle>	<middle>
	<section anchor="intro">	<section anchor="intro">
	<name>Introduction</name>	<name>Introduction</name>
	<t>This specification supplements <xref target="RFC5280"/>, which profiles	<t>This specification supplements <xref target="RFC5280"/>, which profiles

	public-key certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) for use in	public key certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) for use in
	the Internet, and it supplements <xref target="RFC5755"/> which profiles	the Internet, and it supplements <xref target="RFC5755"/>, which profiles
	attribute certificates for use in the Internet.</t>	attribute certificates for use in the Internet.</t>

	<t>This document obsoletes RFC 3709 <xref target="RFC3709"/> and RFC 6170 <xref target="RFC6170"/>.	<t>This document obsoletes <xref target="RFC3709"/> and <xref target="RFC6 170"/>.
	<xref target="changes"/> provides a summary of the changes since the publication of	<xref target="changes"/> provides a summary of the changes since the publication of

	RFC 3709 and RFC 6170.</t>	<xref target="RFC3709"/> and <xref target="RFC6170"/>.</t>
	<t>The basic function of a certificate is to bind a public key to the	<t>The basic function of a certificate is to bind a public key to the
	identity of an entity (the subject). From a strictly technical	identity of an entity (the subject). From a strictly technical
	viewpoint, this goal could be achieved by signing the identity of the	viewpoint, this goal could be achieved by signing the identity of the
	subject together with its public key. However, the art of Public Key	subject together with its public key. However, the art of Public Key
	Infrastructure (PKI) has developed certificates far beyond this	Infrastructure (PKI) has developed certificates far beyond this
	functionality in order to meet the needs of modern global networks and	functionality in order to meet the needs of modern global networks and
	heterogeneous information and operational technology structures.</t>	heterogeneous information and operational technology structures.</t>
	<t>Certificate users must be able to determine certificate policies,	<t>Certificate users must be able to determine certificate policies,
	appropriate key usage, assurance level, and name form constraints.	appropriate key usage, assurance level, and name form constraints.
	Before a relying party can make an informed decision whether a	Before a relying party can make an informed decision whether a
	particular certificate is trustworthy and relevant for its intended	particular certificate is trustworthy and relevant for its intended
	usage, a certificate may be examined from several different	usage, a certificate may be examined from several different
	perspectives.</t>	perspectives.</t>
	<t>Systematic processing is necessary to determine whether a particular	<t>Systematic processing is necessary to determine whether a particular
	certificate meets the predefined prerequisites for an intended usage.	certificate meets the predefined prerequisites for an intended usage.
	Much of the information contained in certificates is appropriate and	Much of the information contained in certificates is appropriate and
	effective for machine processing; however, this information is not	effective for machine processing; however, this information is not
	suitable for a corresponding human trust and recognition process.</t>	suitable for a corresponding human trust and recognition process.</t>

	<t>Humans prefer to structure information into categories and	<t>Humans prefer to structure information into categories and
	symbols. Most humans associate complex structures of reality with easily	symbols. Most humans associate complex structures of reality with easily
	recognizable logotypes and marks. Humans tend to trust things that	recognizable logotypes and marks. Humans tend to trust things that
	they recognize from previous experiences. Humans may examine	they recognize from previous experiences. Humans may examine
	information to confirm their initial reaction. Very few consumers	information to confirm their initial reaction. Very few consumers

	actually read all terms and conditions they agree to in	actually read all terms and conditions they agree to in accepting a
	accepting a service, rather they commonly act on trust derived from	service; instead, they commonly act on trust derived from previous
	previous experience and recognition.</t>	experience and recognition.</t>
	<t>A big part of this process is branding. Service providers and product	<t>A big part of this process is branding. Service providers and product
	vendors invest a lot of money and resources into creating a strong	vendors invest a lot of money and resources into creating a strong
	relation between positive user experiences and easily recognizable	relation between positive user experiences and easily recognizable
	trademarks, servicemarks, and logotypes.</t>	trademarks, servicemarks, and logotypes.</t>
	<t>Branding is also pervasive in identification instruments, including	<t>Branding is also pervasive in identification instruments, including
	identification cards, passports, driver's licenses, credit cards,	identification cards, passports, driver's licenses, credit cards,
	gasoline cards, and loyalty cards. Identification instruments are	gasoline cards, and loyalty cards. Identification instruments are
	intended to identify the holder as a particular person or as a member	intended to identify the holder as a particular person or as a member
	of the community. The community may represent the subscribers of a	of the community. The community may represent the subscribers of a
	service or any other group. Identification instruments, in physical	service or any other group. Identification instruments, in physical
	form, commonly use logotypes and symbols, solely to enhance human	form, commonly use logotypes and symbols, solely to enhance human
	recognition and trust in the identification instrument itself. They	recognition and trust in the identification instrument itself. They
	may also include a registered trademark to allow legal recourse for	may also include a registered trademark to allow legal recourse for
	unauthorized duplication.</t>	unauthorized duplication.</t>
	<t>Since certificates play an equivalent role in electronic exchanges,	<t>Since certificates play an equivalent role in electronic exchanges,
	we examine the inclusion of logotypes in certificates. We consider	we examine the inclusion of logotypes in certificates. We consider
	certificate-based identification and certificate selection.</t>	certificate-based identification and certificate selection.</t>
	<section anchor="cert-ident">	<section anchor="cert-ident">

	<name>Certificate-based Identification</name>	<name>Certificate-Based Identification</name>
	<t>The need for human recognition depends on the manner in which	<t>The need for human recognition depends on the manner in which
	certificates are used and whether certificates need to be visible to	certificates are used and whether certificates need to be visible to
	human users. If certificates are to be used in open environments and	human users. If certificates are to be used in open environments and
	in applications that bring the user in conscious contact with the	in applications that bring the user in conscious contact with the
	result of a certificate-based identification process, then human	result of a certificate-based identification process, then human

	recognition is highly relevant, and may be a necessity.</t>	recognition is highly relevant and may be a necessity.</t>
	<t>Examples of such applications include:</t>	<t>Examples of such applications include:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">	<ul spacing="normal">
	<li>Web server identification where a user identifies the owner	<li>Web server identification where a user identifies the owner
	of the website.</li>	of the website.</li>

	<li>Peer e-mail exchange in business-to-business (B2B),	<li>Peer email exchange in business-to-business (B2B),
	business-to-consumer (B2C), and private communications.</li>	business-to-consumer (B2C), and private communications.</li>

	<li>Exchange of medical records, and system for medical prescriptions. </li>	<li>Exchange of medical records and system for medical prescriptions.< /li>
	<li>Unstructured e-business applications (i.e., non-EDI applications). </li>	<li>Unstructured e-business applications (i.e., non-EDI applications). </li>
	<li>Wireless client authenticating to a service provider.</li>	<li>Wireless client authenticating to a service provider.</li>
	</ul>	</ul>
	<t>Most applications provide the human user with an opportunity to view	<t>Most applications provide the human user with an opportunity to view
	the results of a successful certificate-based identification	the results of a successful certificate-based identification
	process. When the user takes the steps necessary to view these results,	process. When the user takes the steps necessary to view these results,
	the	the
	user is presented with a view of a certificate. This solution has two	user is presented with a view of a certificate. This solution has two
	major problems. First, the function to view a certificate is often	major problems. First, the function to view a certificate is often
	rather hard to find for a non-technical user. Second, the	rather hard to find for a non-technical user. Second, the

	skipping to change at line 167 ¶	skipping to change at line 178 ¶
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="cert-select">	<section anchor="cert-select">
	<name>Selection of Certificates</name>	<name>Selection of Certificates</name>
	<t>One situation where software applications must expose human users to	<t>One situation where software applications must expose human users to
	certificates is when the user must select a single certificate from a	certificates is when the user must select a single certificate from a
	portfolio of certificates. In some cases, the software application	portfolio of certificates. In some cases, the software application
	can use information within the certificates to filter the list for	can use information within the certificates to filter the list for
	suitability; however, the user must be queried if more than one	suitability; however, the user must be queried if more than one
	certificate is suitable. The human user must select one of them.</t>	certificate is suitable. The human user must select one of them.</t>
	<t>This situation is comparable to a person selecting a suitable plastic	<t>This situation is comparable to a person selecting a suitable plastic

	card from his wallet. In this situation, substantial assistance is	card from their wallet. In this situation, substantial assistance is
	provided by card color, location, and branding.</t>	provided by card color, location, and branding.</t>
	<t>In order to provide similar support for certificate selection, the	<t>In order to provide similar support for certificate selection, the
	users need tools to easily recognize and distinguish	users need tools to easily recognize and distinguish
	certificates. Introduction of logotypes into certificates provides	certificates. Introduction of logotypes into certificates provides
	the necessary graphic.</t>	the necessary graphic.</t>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="cert-combo">	<section anchor="cert-combo">
	<name>Combination of Verification Techniques</name>	<name>Combination of Verification Techniques</name>

	<t>The use of logotypes will, in many cases, affect the users decision t o	<t>The use of logotypes will, in many cases, affect the user's decision to
	trust and use a certificate. It is therefore important that there be	trust and use a certificate. It is therefore important that there be
	a distinct and clear architectural and functional distinction between	a distinct and clear architectural and functional distinction between
	the processes and objectives of the automated certificate	the processes and objectives of the automated certificate
	verification and human recognition.</t>	verification and human recognition.</t>
	<t>Since logotypes are only aimed for human interpretation and contain	<t>Since logotypes are only aimed for human interpretation and contain

	data that is inappropriate for computer based verification schemes,	data that is inappropriate for computer-based verification schemes,
	the logotype extension <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be an active component in automat	the logotype certificate extension <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be an active componen
	ed	t in automated
	certification path validation as specified in <xref section="6" sectionFormat="o	certification path validation, as specified in <xref section="6" sectionFormat="
	f" target="RFC5280"/>.</t>	of" target="RFC5280"/>.</t>
	<t>Automated certification path verification determines whether the	<t>Automated certification path verification determines whether the

	end-entity certificate can be verified according to defined	end entity certificate can be verified according to defined
	policy. The algorithm for this verification is specified in <xref target="RFC52 80"/>.</t>	policy. The algorithm for this verification is specified in <xref target="RFC52 80"/>.</t>
	<t>The automated processing provides assurance that the certificate is	<t>The automated processing provides assurance that the certificate is
	valid. It does not indicate whether the subject is entitled to any	valid. It does not indicate whether the subject is entitled to any

	particular information, or whether the subject ought to be trusted to	particular information or whether the subject ought to be trusted to
	perform a particular service. These are authorization	perform a particular service. These are authorization
	decisions. Automatic processing will make some authorization decisions,	decisions. Automatic processing will make some authorization decisions,
	but others, depending on the application context, involve the human user.</t>	but others, depending on the application context, involve the human user.</t>
	<t>In some situations, where automated procedures have failed to	<t>In some situations, where automated procedures have failed to
	establish the suitability of the certificate to the task, the human	establish the suitability of the certificate to the task, the human
	user is the final arbitrator of the post certificate verification	user is the final arbitrator of the post certificate verification
	authorization decisions. In the end, the human will decide whether	authorization decisions. In the end, the human will decide whether
	or not to accept an executable email attachment, to release personal	or not to accept an executable email attachment, to release personal

	information, or follow the instructions displayed by a web browser.	information, or to follow the instructions displayed by a web browser.
	This decision will often be based on recognition and previous	This decision will often be based on recognition and previous
	experience.</t>	experience.</t>
	<t>The distinction between systematic processing and human processing is	<t>The distinction between systematic processing and human processing is
	rather straightforward. They can be complementary. While the	rather straightforward. They can be complementary. While the
	systematic process is focused on certification path construction and	systematic process is focused on certification path construction and
	verification, the human acceptance process is focused on recognition	verification, the human acceptance process is focused on recognition
	and related previous experience.</t>	and related previous experience.</t>
	<t>There are some situations where systematic processing and human	<t>There are some situations where systematic processing and human
	processing interfere with each other. These issues are discussed in	processing interfere with each other. These issues are discussed in
	the <xref target="sec-cons"/>.</t>	the <xref target="sec-cons"/>.</t>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="terms">	<section anchor="terms">

	<name>Terminology</name>	<name>Requirements Language</name>
	<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp 14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL	<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp 14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
	NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECO MMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",	NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECO MMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
	"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be i nterpreted as	"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be i nterpreted as

	described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they	described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
	appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>	appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="logotypes">	<section anchor="logotypes">
	<name>Different Types of Logotypes in Certificates</name>	<name>Different Types of Logotypes in Certificates</name>
	<t>This specification defines the inclusion of three standard logotype typ es:</t>	<t>This specification defines the inclusion of three standard logotype typ es:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">	<ul spacing="normal">

	<li>Community logotype</li>	<li>community logotype</li>
	<li>Issuer organization logotype</li>	<li>issuer organization logotype</li>
	<li>Subject organization logotype</li>	<li>subject organization logotype</li>
	</ul>	</ul>
	<t>The community logotype is the general mark for a community. It	<t>The community logotype is the general mark for a community. It
	identifies a service concept for entity identification and	identifies a service concept for entity identification and
	certificate issuance. Many issuers may use a community logotype to	certificate issuance. Many issuers may use a community logotype to
	co-brand with a global community in order to gain global recognition	co-brand with a global community in order to gain global recognition
	of its local service provision. This type of community branding is	of its local service provision. This type of community branding is
	very common in the credit card business, where local independent card	very common in the credit card business, where local independent card

	issuers include a globally recognized brand (such as VISA and	issuers include a globally recognized brand (such as Visa and
	MasterCard). Certificate issuers may include more than one community	Mastercard). Certificate issuers may include more than one community
	logotype to indicate participation in more than one global community.</t>	logotype to indicate participation in more than one global community.</t>

	<t>Issuer organization logotype is a logotype representing the	<t>The issuer organization logotype is a logotype representing the
	organization identified as part of the issuer name in the	organization identified as part of the issuer name in the
	certificate.</t>	certificate.</t>

	<t>Subject organization logotype is a logotype representing the	<t>The subject organization logotype is a logotype representing the
	organization identified in the subject name in the certificate.</t>	organization identified in the subject name in the certificate.</t>
	<t>In addition to the standard logotype types, this specification	<t>In addition to the standard logotype types, this specification
	accommodates inclusion of other logotype types where each class of	accommodates inclusion of other logotype types where each class of
	logotype is defined by an object identifier. The object identifier	logotype is defined by an object identifier. The object identifier
	can be either locally defined or an identifier defined in <xref target="extn-oth er"/>	can be either locally defined or an identifier defined in <xref target="extn-oth er"/>
	of this document.</t>	of this document.</t>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="logotype-data">	<section anchor="logotype-data">
	<name>Logotype Data</name>	<name>Logotype Data</name>
	<t>This specification defines two types of logotype data: image data and	<t>This specification defines two types of logotype data: image data and

	skipping to change at line 275 ¶	skipping to change at line 286 ¶
	significantly increase the size of the certificate.</t>	significantly increase the size of the certificate.</t>
	<t>Several image objects, representing the same visual content in differen t	<t>Several image objects, representing the same visual content in differen t
	formats, sizes, and color palates, may represent each logotype image. At	formats, sizes, and color palates, may represent each logotype image. At
	least one of the image objects representing a logotype <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> con tain an	least one of the image objects representing a logotype <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> con tain an
	image with a width between 60 pixels and 200 pixels and a height between	image with a width between 60 pixels and 200 pixels and a height between
	45 pixels and 150 pixels.</t>	45 pixels and 150 pixels.</t>
	<t>Several instances of audio data may further represent the same audio	<t>Several instances of audio data may further represent the same audio
	sequence in different formats, resolutions, and languages. At least one	sequence in different formats, resolutions, and languages. At least one
	of the audio objects representing a logotype <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> provide text- based	of the audio objects representing a logotype <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> provide text- based
	audio data suitable for processing by text-to-speech software.</t>	audio data suitable for processing by text-to-speech software.</t>

	<t>A typical use of text based audio data is inclusion in web applications	<t>A typical use of text-based audio data is inclusion in web applications
	where the	where the
	audio text is placed as the "alt" atttribute value of an HTML image (img) elemen	audio text is placed as the "alt" attribute value of an HTML image (img) element
	t	,
	and the language value obtained from LogotypeAudioInfo is included as the "lang"	and the language value obtained from LogotypeAudioInfo is included as the "lang"
	attribute of that image.</t>	attribute of that image.</t>
	<t>If a logotype of a certain type (as defined in <xref target="logotypes" />) is	<t>If a logotype of a certain type (as defined in <xref target="logotypes" />) is
	represented by more than one image object, then each image object <bcp14>MUST</b cp14>	represented by more than one image object, then each image object <bcp14>MUST</b cp14>
	contain variants of roughly the same visual content. Likewise, if a	contain variants of roughly the same visual content. Likewise, if a
	logotype of a certain type is represented by more than one audio object,	logotype of a certain type is represented by more than one audio object,
	then the audio objects <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain variants of the same audio in formation.	then the audio objects <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain variants of the same audio in formation.
	A spoken message in different languages is considered a variation of	A spoken message in different languages is considered a variation of
	the same audio information. When more than one image object or more than	the same audio information. When more than one image object or more than
	one audio object for the same logotype type is included in the certificate,	one audio object for the same logotype type is included in the certificate,

	skipping to change at line 301 ¶	skipping to change at line 312 ¶
	<t>A client <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> simultaneously display multiple logotypes o f different	<t>A client <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> simultaneously display multiple logotypes o f different
	logotype types. For example, it may display one subject organization	logotype types. For example, it may display one subject organization
	logotype while also displaying a community logotype, but it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp 14>	logotype while also displaying a community logotype, but it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp 14>
	display multiple image variants of the same community logotype.</t>	display multiple image variants of the same community logotype.</t>
	<t>Each logotype present in a certificate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be represent ed by at	<t>Each logotype present in a certificate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be represent ed by at
	least one image data object.</t>	least one image data object.</t>
	<t>Client applications <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> enhance processing and off-li ne	<t>Client applications <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> enhance processing and off-li ne
	functionality by caching logotype data.</t>	functionality by caching logotype data.</t>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="extn">	<section anchor="extn">

	<name>Logotype Extension</name>	<name>Logotype Certificate Extension</name>
	<t>This section specifies the syntax and semantics of the logotype	<t>This section specifies the syntax and semantics of the logotype
	certificate extension.</t>	certificate extension.</t>
	<section anchor="extn-format">	<section anchor="extn-format">
	<name>Extension Format</name>	<name>Extension Format</name>

	<t>The logotype extension <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be included in public key c ertificates	<t>The logotype certificate extension <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be included in public key certificates
	<xref target="RFC5280"/> or attribute certificates <xref target="RFC5755"/>.	<xref target="RFC5280"/> or attribute certificates <xref target="RFC5755"/>.

	The logotype extension <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be identified by the following object	The logotype certificate extension <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be identified by the foll owing object
	identifier:</t>	identifier:</t>

	<artwork><![CDATA[
		<sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
	id-pe-logotype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=	id-pe-logotype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 12 }	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 12 }

	]]></artwork>	]]></sourcecode>
	<t>This extension <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be marked critical.</t>	<t>This extension <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be marked critical.</t>
	<t>Logotype data may be referenced through either direct or indirect	<t>Logotype data may be referenced through either direct or indirect
	addressing. Client applications <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support both direct and i ndirect	addressing. Client applications <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support both direct and i ndirect
	addressing. Certificate issuing applications <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support direct	addressing. Certificate issuing applications <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support direct
	addressing, and certificate issuing applications <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support	addressing, and certificate issuing applications <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support
	indirect addressing.</t>	indirect addressing.</t>
	<t>The direct addressing includes information about each logotype in the	<t>The direct addressing includes information about each logotype in the
	certificate, and URIs point to the image and audio data object. Multiple	certificate, and URIs point to the image and audio data object. Multiple
	URIs <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be included for locations for obtaining the same logotyp e object.	URIs <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be included for locations for obtaining the same logotyp e object.
	Multiple hash values <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be included, each computed with a differ ent	Multiple hash values <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be included, each computed with a differ ent
	one-way hash function. Direct addressing supports cases where just	one-way hash function. Direct addressing supports cases where just
	one or a few alternative images and audio objects are referenced.</t>	one or a few alternative images and audio objects are referenced.</t>
	<t>The indirect addressing includes one or more references to an externa l	<t>The indirect addressing includes one or more references to an externa l
	hashed data structure that contains information on the type, content, and	hashed data structure that contains information on the type, content, and
	location of each image and audio object. Indirect addressing supports	location of each image and audio object. Indirect addressing supports
	cases where each logotype is represented by many alternative audio or	cases where each logotype is represented by many alternative audio or
	image objects.</t>	image objects.</t>

	<t>Both direct and indirect addressing accommodate alternative URIs to	<t>Both direct and indirect addressing accommodate alternative URIs to
	obtain exactly the same logotype data. This opportunity for replication is	obtain exactly the same logotype data. This opportunity for replication is
	intended to improve availability. Therefore, if a client is unable to	intended to improve availability. Therefore, if a client is unable to
	fetch the item from one URI, the client <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> try another URI in the	fetch the item from one URI, the client <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> try another URI in the

	sequence. All direct addressing URIs <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use the HTTPS scheme	sequence. All direct addressing URIs <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use the HTTPS scheme
	(https://...)	(https://...),
	or the HTTP scheme (http://...) or the DATA scheme (data://...) <xref target="RF	the HTTP scheme (http://...), or the DATA scheme (data://...) <xref target="RFC3
	C3986"/>.	986"/>.
	However, the "data" URI scheme <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used with the indirect addressing.	However, the "data" URI scheme <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used with the indirect addressing.

	Clients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support retrieval of referenced LogoTypeData with th	Clients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support retrieval of the referenced LogotypeData wit
	e	h
	HTTP <xref target="RFC9110"/> and the HTTP with TLS <xref target="RFC8446"/>, or	HTTP <xref target="RFC9110"/>, HTTP with TLS <xref target="RFC8446"/>, or subseq
	subsequent versions of	uent versions of
	these protocols. Client applications <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also support the "da ta" URI	these protocols. Client applications <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also support the "da ta" URI
	scheme <xref target="RFC2397"/> for direct addressing with embedded logotype dat a	scheme <xref target="RFC2397"/> for direct addressing with embedded logotype dat a
	within the extension.</t>	within the extension.</t>
	<t>Note that the HTTPS scheme (https://...) requires the validation of o ther	<t>Note that the HTTPS scheme (https://...) requires the validation of o ther
	certificates to establish a secure connection. For this reason, the	certificates to establish a secure connection. For this reason, the
	HTTP scheme (http://...) may be easier for a client to handle. Also, the	HTTP scheme (http://...) may be easier for a client to handle. Also, the
	hash of the logotype data provides data integrity.</t>	hash of the logotype data provides data integrity.</t>

	<t>The logotype extension <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have the following syntax:	<t>The logotype certificate extension <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have the follo
	</t>	wing syntax:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[	<sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
	LogotypeExtn ::= SEQUENCE {	LogotypeExtn ::= SEQUENCE {
	communityLogos [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,	communityLogos [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,
	issuerLogo [1] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,	issuerLogo [1] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,
	subjectLogo [2] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,	subjectLogo [2] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,
	otherLogos [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF OtherLogotypeInfo	otherLogos [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF OtherLogotypeInfo
	OPTIONAL }	OPTIONAL }

	LogotypeInfo ::= CHOICE {	LogotypeInfo ::= CHOICE {
	direct [0] LogotypeData,	direct [0] LogotypeData,
	indirect [1] LogotypeReference }	indirect [1] LogotypeReference }

	skipping to change at line 374 ¶	skipping to change at line 386 ¶

	LogotypeImage ::= SEQUENCE {	LogotypeImage ::= SEQUENCE {
	imageDetails LogotypeDetails,	imageDetails LogotypeDetails,
	imageInfo LogotypeImageInfo OPTIONAL }	imageInfo LogotypeImageInfo OPTIONAL }

	LogotypeAudio ::= SEQUENCE {	LogotypeAudio ::= SEQUENCE {
	audioDetails LogotypeDetails,	audioDetails LogotypeDetails,
	audioInfo LogotypeAudioInfo OPTIONAL }	audioInfo LogotypeAudioInfo OPTIONAL }

	LogotypeDetails ::= SEQUENCE {	LogotypeDetails ::= SEQUENCE {

	mediaType IA5String, -- MIME media type name and optional	mediaType IA5String, -- Media type name and optional
	-- parameters	-- parameters
	logotypeHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue,	logotypeHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue,
	logotypeURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String }	logotypeURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String }

	LogotypeImageInfo ::= SEQUENCE {	LogotypeImageInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	type [0] LogotypeImageType DEFAULT color,	type [0] LogotypeImageType DEFAULT color,
	fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified	fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified
	xSize INTEGER, -- Horizontal size in pixels	xSize INTEGER, -- Horizontal size in pixels
	ySize INTEGER, -- Vertical size in pixels	ySize INTEGER, -- Vertical size in pixels
	resolution LogotypeImageResolution OPTIONAL,	resolution LogotypeImageResolution OPTIONAL,

	skipping to change at line 414 ¶	skipping to change at line 426 ¶

	LogotypeReference ::= SEQUENCE {	LogotypeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
	refStructHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue,	refStructHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue,
	refStructURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String }	refStructURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String }
	-- Places to get the same LogotypeData	-- Places to get the same LogotypeData
	-- image or audio object	-- image or audio object

	HashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {	HashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
	hashAlg AlgorithmIdentifier,	hashAlg AlgorithmIdentifier,
	hashValue OCTET STRING }	hashValue OCTET STRING }

	]]></artwork>	]]></sourcecode>
	<t>When using indirect addressing, the URI (refStructURI) pointing to	<t>When using indirect addressing, the URI (refStructURI) pointing to
	the external data structure <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> point to a resource that contain s	the external data structure <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> point to a resource that contain s
	the DER-encoded data with the syntax LogotypeData.</t>	the DER-encoded data with the syntax LogotypeData.</t>
	<t>At least one of the optional elements in the LogotypeExtn structure	<t>At least one of the optional elements in the LogotypeExtn structure
	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present.</t>	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present.</t>
	<t>When using direct addressing, at least one of the optional elements	<t>When using direct addressing, at least one of the optional elements

	in the LogotypeData structure <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present.</t>	in the LogotypeData structure <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present.</t>

	<t>The LogotypeReference and LogotypeDetails structures explicitly	<t>The LogotypeReference and LogotypeDetails structures explicitly
	identify one or more one-way hash functions employed to authenticate	identify one or more one-way hash functions employed to authenticate

	referenced image or audio objects. CAs <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include a hash value for each	referenced image or audio objects. Certification Authorities (CAs) <bcp14>MUST< /bcp14> include a hash value for each
	referenced object, calculated on the whole object. CAs <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the	referenced object, calculated on the whole object. CAs <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the
	one-way hash function that is associated with the certificate signature to	one-way hash function that is associated with the certificate signature to
	compute one hash value, and CAs <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include other hash values. C lients	compute one hash value, and CAs <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include other hash values. C lients
	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> compute a one-way hash value using one of the identified fun ctions,	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> compute a one-way hash value using one of the identified fun ctions,
	and clients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> discard the logotype data if the computed hash v alue does	and clients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> discard the logotype data if the computed hash v alue does
	not match the hash value in the certificate extension.</t>	not match the hash value in the certificate extension.</t>

	<t>A MIME type is used to specify the format of the image or audio objec
	t	<t>A media type is used to specify the format of the image or audio object
	containing the logotype data. The mediaType field <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain a string	containing the logotype data. The mediaType field <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain a string

	that is constructed according to the ABNF <xref target="RFC5234"/> provided in	that is constructed according to the ABNF <xref target="RFC5234"/> rule for medi
	Section 4.2 of <xref target="RFC6838"/>. MIME types <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include	a-type
	parameters.</t>	provided in <xref target="RFC9110" sectionFormat="of" section="8.3.1"/>. Media
		types <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include parameters. To keep the mediaType field as
		small as possible, optional whitespace <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be included.<
		/t>
	<t>Image format requirements are specified in <xref target="image-format "/>, and audio	<t>Image format requirements are specified in <xref target="image-format "/>, and audio
	format requirements are specified in <xref target="audio-format"/>.</t>	format requirements are specified in <xref target="audio-format"/>.</t>

	<t>When language is specified, the language tag <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use	<t>When language is specified, the language tag <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use
	the <xref target="RFC5646"/> syntax.</t>	the syntax in <xref target="RFC5646"/>.</t>
	<t>Logotype types defined in this specification are:</t>	<t>The following logotype types are defined in this specification:</t>
	<ul empty="true">	<ul>
	<li>	<li>community logotype: If communityLogos is present, the logotypes
	<t>Community Logotype: If communityLogos is present, the logotypes
	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> represent one or more communities with which the certifica te	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> represent one or more communities with which the certifica te
	issuer is affiliated. The communityLogos <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be present in an end	issuer is affiliated. The communityLogos <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be present in an end
	entity certificate, a CA certificate, or an attribute	entity certificate, a CA certificate, or an attribute

	certificate. The communityLogos contains a sequence of Community Logotypes,	certificate. The communityLogos contains a sequence of community logotypes,
	each representing a different community. If more than one Community	each representing a different community. If more than one community
	logotype is present, they <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be placed in order of preferred	logotype is present, they <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be placed in order of preferred

	appearance. Some clients <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> choose to display a subset of the	appearance.
	present community logos; therefore the placement within the	Some clients <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> choose to display a subset of the
		present community logos; therefore, the placement within the
	sequence aids the client selection. The most preferred logotype	sequence aids the client selection. The most preferred logotype
	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be first in the sequence, and the least preferred logotype	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be first in the sequence, and the least preferred logotype

	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be last in the sequence.</t>	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be last in the sequence.</li>
	</li>	<li>issuer organization logotype: If issuerLogo is present, the
	</ul>
	<ul empty="true">
	<li>
	<t>Issuer Organization Logotype: If issuerLogo is present, the
	logotype <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> represent the issuer's organization. The logotyp e	logotype <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> represent the issuer's organization. The logotyp e
	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be consistent with, and require the presence of, an	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be consistent with, and require the presence of, an
	organization name stored in the organization attribute in the	organization name stored in the organization attribute in the
	issuer field (for either a public key certificate or attribute	issuer field (for either a public key certificate or attribute
	certificate). The issuerLogo <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be present in an end entity	certificate). The issuerLogo <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be present in an end entity

	certificate, a CA certificate, or an attribute certificate.</t>	certificate, a CA certificate, or an attribute certificate.</li>
	</li>	<li>subject organization logotype: If subjectLogo is present, the
	</ul>
	<ul empty="true">
	<li>
	<t>Subject Organization Logotype: If subjectLogo is present, the
	logotype <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> represent the subject's organization. The logoty pe	logotype <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> represent the subject's organization. The logoty pe
	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be consistent with, and require the presence of, an	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be consistent with, and require the presence of, an
	organization name stored in the organization attribute in the	organization name stored in the organization attribute in the
	subject field (for either a public key certificate or attribute	subject field (for either a public key certificate or attribute
	certificate). The subjectLogo <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be present in an end entity	certificate). The subjectLogo <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be present in an end entity

	certificate, a CA certificate, or an attribute certificate.</t>	certificate, a CA certificate, or an attribute certificate.</li>
	</li>
	</ul>	</ul>
	<t>The relationship between the subject organization and the subject	<t>The relationship between the subject organization and the subject
	organization logotype, and the relationship between the issuer and	organization logotype, and the relationship between the issuer and
	either the issuer organization logotype or the community logotype,	either the issuer organization logotype or the community logotype,

	are relationships asserted by the issuer. The policies and practices	are relationships asserted by the issuer. The policies and practices
	employed by the issuer to check subject organization logotypes or	employed by the issuer that check subject organization logotypes or
	claims its issuer and community logotypes is outside the scope of	claims about its issuer and community logotypes are outside the scope of
	this document.</t>	this document.</t>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="image-info">	<section anchor="image-info">
	<name>Conventions for LogotypeImageInfo</name>	<name>Conventions for LogotypeImageInfo</name>
	<t>When the optional LogotypeImageInfo is included with a logotype	<t>When the optional LogotypeImageInfo is included with a logotype
	image, the parameters <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used with the following semantics a nd	image, the parameters <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used with the following semantics a nd
	restrictions.</t>	restrictions.</t>
	<t>The xSize and ySize fields represent the recommended display size for	<t>The xSize and ySize fields represent the recommended display size for
	the logotype image. When a value of 0 (zero) is present, no recommended	the logotype image. When a value of 0 (zero) is present, no recommended
	display size is specified. When non-zero values are present and these	display size is specified. When non-zero values are present and these
	values differ from corresponding size values in the referenced image object,	values differ from corresponding size values in the referenced image object,
	then the referenced image <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be scaled to fit within the size parameters	then the referenced image <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be scaled to fit within the size parameters

	of LogotypeImageInfo, while preserving the x and y ratio. Dithering may	of LogotypeImageInfo while preserving the x and y ratio. Dithering may
	produce a more appropriate image than linear scaling.</t>	produce a more appropriate image than linear scaling.</t>
	<t>The resolution field is redundant for all logotype image formats	<t>The resolution field is redundant for all logotype image formats
	listed in <xref target="image-format"/>. The optional resolution field <bcp14>SH OULD</bcp14>	listed in <xref target="image-format"/>. The optional resolution field <bcp14>SH OULD</bcp14>
	be omitted when the image format already contains this information.</t>	be omitted when the image format already contains this information.</t>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="embedded-image">	<section anchor="embedded-image">
	<name>Embedded Images</name>	<name>Embedded Images</name>

	<t>If the logotype image is provided through direct addressing, then	<t> If the logotype image is provided through direct addressing, then t
	the image <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be stored within the logotype certificate extension	he
	using the	image <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be stored within the logotype certificate extension u
	"data" scheme <xref target="RFC2397"/>. The syntax of the "data" URI scheme	sing
	defined is included here for convenience:</t>	the "data" scheme <xref target="RFC2397"/>. The syntax of the "data" URI sche
	<artwork><![CDATA[	me is
	dataurl := "data:" [ mediatype ] [ ";base64" ] "," data	shown below, which incorporates Errata ID 2045 and uses modern ABNF
	mediatype := [ type "/" subtype ] *( ";" parameter )	<xref target="RFC5234"/>:</t>
	data := *urlchar	<sourcecode type="abnf"><![CDATA[
	parameter := attribute "=" value	dataurl = "data:" [ media-type ] [ ";base64" ] "," data
	]]></artwork>	data = *(reserved / unreserved / escaped)
	<t>When including the image data in the logotype extension using the	reserved = ";" / "/" / "?" / ":" / "@" / "&" / "=" / "+" /
		"$" / ","
		unreserved = alphanum / mark
		alphanum = ALPHA / DIGIT
		mark = "-" / "_" / "." / "!" / "~" / "*" / "'" / "(" / ")"
		escaped = "%" hex hex
		hex = HEXDIG / "a" / "b" / "c" / "d" / "e" / "f"
		]]></sourcecode>
		<t>where media-type is defined in <xref target="RFC9110" sectionFormat="of" sect
		ion="8.3.1"/> and
		ALPHA, DIGIT, and HEXDIG are defined in <xref target="RFC5234" sectionFormat="
		of" section="B.1"/>.</t>
		<t>When including the image data in the logotype certificate extension u
		sing the
	"data" URI scheme, the following conventions apply:</t>	"data" URI scheme, the following conventions apply:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">	<ul spacing="normal">
	<li>The value of mediaType in LogotypeDetails <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be i dentical to the	<li>The value of mediaType in LogotypeDetails <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be i dentical to the
	media type value in the "data" URL.</li>	media type value in the "data" URL.</li>
	<li>The hash of the image <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be included in logotypeH ash and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be	<li>The hash of the image <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be included in logotypeH ash and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be

	calculated over the same data as it would have been, had the image	calculated over the same data as it would have been if the image
	been referenced through a link to an external resource.</li>	had been referenced through a link to an external resource.</li>
	</ul>	</ul>

		<aside>
	<t>NOTE: As the "data" URI scheme is processed as a data source rather	<t>NOTE: As the "data" URI scheme is processed as a data source rather
	than as a URL, the image data is typically not limited by any	than as a URL, the image data is typically not limited by any
	URL length limit settings that otherwise apply to URLs in general.</t>	URL length limit settings that otherwise apply to URLs in general.</t>
	<t>NOTE: Implementations need to be cautious about the size of images	<t>NOTE: Implementations need to be cautious about the size of images
	included in a certificate in order to ensure that the size of	included in a certificate in order to ensure that the size of
	the certificate does not prevent the certificate from being	the certificate does not prevent the certificate from being

	used as intended.</t>	used as intended.</t>
		</aside>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="extn-other">	<section anchor="extn-other">
	<name>Other Logotypes</name>	<name>Other Logotypes</name>
	<t>Logotypes identified by otherLogos (as defined in <xref target="extn- format"/>) can be used to	<t>Logotypes identified by otherLogos (as defined in <xref target="extn- format"/>) can be used to
	enhance the display of logotypes and marks that represent partners,	enhance the display of logotypes and marks that represent partners,
	products, services, or any other characteristic associated with the	products, services, or any other characteristic associated with the
	certificate or its intended application environment when the standard	certificate or its intended application environment when the standard
	logotype types are insufficient.</t>	logotype types are insufficient.</t>
	<t>The conditions and contexts of the intended use of these logotypes	<t>The conditions and contexts of the intended use of these logotypes
	are defined at the discretion of the local client application.</t>	are defined at the discretion of the local client application.</t>
	<t>Three other logotype types are defined in the follow subsections.</t>	<t>Three other logotype types are defined in the follow subsections.</t>
	<section anchor="extn-other-1">	<section anchor="extn-other-1">
	<name>Loyalty Logotype</name>	<name>Loyalty Logotype</name>

	<t>When a loyalty logotype appears in the otherLogos, it <bcp14>MUST</ bcp14> be identified	<t>When a loyalty logotype appears in otherLogos, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp1 4> be identified
	by the id-logo-loyalty object identifier.</t>	by the id-logo-loyalty object identifier.</t>

	<artwork><![CDATA[	<sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
	id-logo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 20 }	id-logo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 20 }

	id-logo-loyalty OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 1 }	id-logo-loyalty OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 1 }

	]]></artwork>	]]></sourcecode>
	<t>A loyalty logotype, if present, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain a logot ype associated	<t>A loyalty logotype, if present, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain a logot ype associated
	with a loyalty program related to the certificate or its use. The	with a loyalty program related to the certificate or its use. The
	relation between the certificate and the identified loyalty program	relation between the certificate and the identified loyalty program

	is beyond the scope of this document. The logotype extension <bcp14>MAY</bcp14>	is beyond the scope of this document. The logotype certificate extension <bcp14
	contain more than one Loyalty logotype.</t>	>MAY</bcp14>
		contain more than one loyalty logotype.</t>
	<t>If more than one loyalty logotype is present, they <bcp14>MUST</bcp 14> be	<t>If more than one loyalty logotype is present, they <bcp14>MUST</bcp 14> be
	placed in order of preferred appearance. Some clients <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> choose	placed in order of preferred appearance. Some clients <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> choose

	to display a subset of the present loyalty logotype data; therefore the	to display a subset of the present loyalty logotype data; therefore, the
	placement within the sequence aids the client selection. The most	placement within the sequence aids the client selection. The most
	preferred loyalty logotype data <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be first in the sequence, an d the	preferred loyalty logotype data <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be first in the sequence, an d the
	least preferred loyalty logotype data <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be last in the sequenc e.</t>	least preferred loyalty logotype data <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be last in the sequenc e.</t>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="extn-other-2">	<section anchor="extn-other-2">
	<name>Certificate Background Logotype</name>	<name>Certificate Background Logotype</name>

	<t>When a certificate background logotype appears in the otherLogos, i t	<t>When a certificate background logotype appears in otherLogos, it
	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be identified by the id-logo-background object identifier.</ t>	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be identified by the id-logo-background object identifier.</ t>

	<artwork><![CDATA[	<sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
	id-logo-background OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 2 }	id-logo-background OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 2 }

	]]></artwork>	]]></sourcecode>
	<t>The certificate background logotype, if present, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14 > contain a	<t>The certificate background logotype, if present, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14 > contain a

	graphical image intended as a background image for the certificate,	graphical image intended as a background image for the certificate
	and/or a general audio sequence for the certificate. The background	and/or a general audio sequence for the certificate. The background
	image <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> allow black text to be clearly read when placed on top of	image <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> allow black text to be clearly read when placed on top of

	the background image. The logotype extension <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain mo re	the background image. The logotype certificate extension <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14 > contain more
	than one certificate background logotype.</t>	than one certificate background logotype.</t>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="extn-other-3">	<section anchor="extn-other-3">
	<name>Certificate Image Logotype</name>	<name>Certificate Image Logotype</name>

	<t>When a certificate image logotype appears in the otherLogos, it	<t>When a certificate image logotype appears in otherLogos, it
	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be identified by the id-logo-certImage object identifier.</t >	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be identified by the id-logo-certImage object identifier.</t >

	<artwork><![CDATA[	<sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
	id-logo-certImage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 3 }	id-logo-certImage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 3 }

	]]></artwork>	]]></sourcecode>
	<t>The certificate image logotype, if present, aids human interpretati on	<t>The certificate image logotype, if present, aids human interpretati on
	of a certificate by providing meaningful visual information to the	of a certificate by providing meaningful visual information to the

	user interface (UI). The logotype extension <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain mor e	user interface (UI). The logotype certificate extension <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain more
	than one certificate image logotype.</t>	than one certificate image logotype.</t>
	<t>Typical situations when a human needs to examine	<t>Typical situations when a human needs to examine
	the visual representation of a certificate are:</t>	the visual representation of a certificate are:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">	<ul spacing="normal">
	<li>A person establishes a secured channel with an authenticated	<li>A person establishes a secured channel with an authenticated
	service. The person needs to determine the identity of the	service. The person needs to determine the identity of the
	service based on the authenticated credentials.</li>	service based on the authenticated credentials.</li>
	<li>A person validates the signature on critical information, such a s	<li>A person validates the signature on critical information, such a s
	signed executable code, and needs to determine the identity of the	signed executable code, and needs to determine the identity of the
	signer based on the signer's certificate.</li>	signer based on the signer's certificate.</li>
	<li>A person is required to select an appropriate certificate to be	<li>A person is required to select an appropriate certificate to be

	used when authenticating to a service or Identity Management	used when authenticating to a service or identity management
	infrastructure. The person needs to see the available	infrastructure. The person needs to see the available
	certificates in order to distinguish between them in the selection	certificates in order to distinguish between them in the selection
	process.</li>	process.</li>
	</ul>	</ul>
	<t>The display of certificate information to humans is challenging due	<t>The display of certificate information to humans is challenging due
	to lack of well-defined semantics for critical identity attributes.	to lack of well-defined semantics for critical identity attributes.
	Unless the application has out-of-band knowledge about a particular	Unless the application has out-of-band knowledge about a particular
	certificate, the application will not know the exact nature of the	certificate, the application will not know the exact nature of the

	data stored in common identification attributes such as serialNumber,	data stored in common identification attributes, such as serialNumber,
	organizationName, country, etc. Consequently, the application can	organizationName, country, etc. Consequently, the application can

	display the actual data, but faces the problem of labeling that data	display the actual data but faces the problem of labeling that data
	in the UI and informing the human about the exact nature (semantics)	in the UI and informing the human about the exact nature (semantics)
	of that data. It is also challenging for the application to	of that data. It is also challenging for the application to
	determine which identification attributes are important to display	determine which identification attributes are important to display
	and how to organize them in a logical order.</t>	and how to organize them in a logical order.</t>
	<t>When present, the certificate image <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a comple te visual	<t>When present, the certificate image <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a comple te visual
	representation of the certificate. This means that the display of	representation of the certificate. This means that the display of
	this certificate image represents all information about the	this certificate image represents all information about the
	certificate that the issuer subjectively defines as relevant to show	certificate that the issuer subjectively defines as relevant to show
	to a typical human user within the typical intended use of the	to a typical human user within the typical intended use of the
	certificate, giving adequate information about at least the following	certificate, giving adequate information about at least the following

	three aspects of the certificate:</t>	three aspects of the certificate:</t>

	<ul spacing="normal">	<ul spacing="normal">

	<li>Certificate Context</li>	<li>certificate context</li>
	<li>Certificate Issuer</li>	<li>certificate issuer</li>
	<li>Certificate Subject</li>	<li>certificate subject</li>
	</ul>	</ul>

	<t>Certificate Context information is visual marks and/or textual	<t>Certificate context information is visual marks and/or textual
	information that helps the typical user to understand the typical	information that helps the typical user to understand the typical
	usage and/or purpose of the certificate.</t>	usage and/or purpose of the certificate.</t>
	<t>It is up to the issuer to decide what information -- in the form of	<t>It is up to the issuer to decide what information -- in the form of
	text, graphical symbols, and elements -- represents a complete visual	text, graphical symbols, and elements -- represents a complete visual
	representation of the certificate. However, the visual	representation of the certificate. However, the visual

	representation of Certificate Subject and Certificate Issuer	representation of certificate subject and certificate issuer
	information from the certificate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have the same meaning as th e	information from the certificate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have the same meaning as th e
	textual representation of that information in the certificate itself.</t>	textual representation of that information in the certificate itself.</t>
	<t>Applications providing a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to the	<t>Applications providing a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to the
	certificate user <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> present a certificate image as the only visu al	certificate user <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> present a certificate image as the only visu al
	representation of a certificate; however, the certificate user <bcp14>SHOULD</bc p14>	representation of a certificate; however, the certificate user <bcp14>SHOULD</bc p14>
	be able to easily obtain the details of the certificate content.</t>	be able to easily obtain the details of the certificate content.</t>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="cert-types">	<section anchor="cert-types">
	<name>Type of Certificates</name>	<name>Type of Certificates</name>
	<t>Logotypes <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be included in public key certificates and attribute	<t>Logotypes <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be included in public key certificates and attribute
	certificates at the discretion of the certificate issuer; however, the	certificates at the discretion of the certificate issuer; however, the
	relying party <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use the logotypes as part of certification path	relying party <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use the logotypes as part of certification path

	validation or automated trust decision. The sole purpose of logotypes is	validation or automated trust decisions. The sole purpose of logotypes is
	to enhance the display of a particular certificate, regardless of its	to enhance the display of a particular certificate, regardless of its
	position in a certification path.</t>	position in a certification path.</t>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="use-in-clients">	<section anchor="use-in-clients">
	<name>Use in Clients</name>	<name>Use in Clients</name>
	<t>All PKI implementations require relying party software to have some	<t>All PKI implementations require relying party software to have some
	mechanism to determine whether a trusted CA issues a particular	mechanism to determine whether a trusted CA issues a particular
	certificate. This is an issue for certification path validation,	certificate. This is an issue for certification path validation,
	including consistent policy and name checking.</t>	including consistent policy and name checking.</t>
	<t>After a certification path is successfully validated, the replying	<t>After a certification path is successfully validated, the replying
	party trusts the information that the CA includes in the certificate,	party trusts the information that the CA includes in the certificate,
	including any certificate extensions. The client software can choose	including any certificate extensions. The client software can choose
	to make use of such information, or the client software can ignore	to make use of such information, or the client software can ignore

	it. If the client is unable to support a provided logotype, the client	it. If the client is unable to support a provided logotype, the
	<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> report an error, rather the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> b	client <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> report an error; instead, the client <bcp14>MU
	ehave as though no	ST</bcp14> behave as
	logotype extension was included in the certificate. Current standards	though no logotype certificate extension was included in the certificate. Cu
		rrent standards
	do not provide any mechanism for cross-certifying CAs to constrain	do not provide any mechanism for cross-certifying CAs to constrain
	subordinate CAs from including private extensions (see <xref target="sec-cons"/> ).</t>	subordinate CAs from including private extensions (see <xref target="sec-cons"/> ).</t>
	<t>Consequently, if relying party software accepts a CA, then it should	<t>Consequently, if relying party software accepts a CA, then it should
	be prepared to (unquestioningly) display the associated logotypes to	be prepared to (unquestioningly) display the associated logotypes to
	its human user, given that it is configured to do so. Information	its human user, given that it is configured to do so. Information
	about the logotypes is provided so that the replying party software	about the logotypes is provided so that the replying party software
	can select the one that will best meet the needs of the human	can select the one that will best meet the needs of the human
	user. This choice depends on the abilities of the human user, as well as	user. This choice depends on the abilities of the human user, as well as
	the	the
	capabilities of the platform on which the replaying party software is	capabilities of the platform on which the replaying party software is
	running. If none of the provided logotypes meets the needs of the	running. If none of the provided logotypes meets the needs of the
	human user or matches the capabilities of the platform, then the	human user or matches the capabilities of the platform, then the
	logotypes can be ignored.</t>	logotypes can be ignored.</t>
	<t>A client <bcp14>MAY</bcp14>, subject to local policy, choose to display none, one, or	<t>A client <bcp14>MAY</bcp14>, subject to local policy, choose to display none, one, or

	any number of the logotypes in the logotype extension. In many cases,	any number of the logotypes in the logotype certificate extension. In many case s,
	a client will be used in an environment with a good	a client will be used in an environment with a good
	network connection and also used in an environment with little or no	network connection and also used in an environment with little or no
	network connectivity. For example, a laptop computer can be docked	network connectivity. For example, a laptop computer can be docked
	with a high-speed LAN connection, or it can be disconnected from the	with a high-speed LAN connection, or it can be disconnected from the
	network altogether. In recognition of this situation, the client <bcp14>MUST</b cp14>	network altogether. In recognition of this situation, the client <bcp14>MUST</b cp14>
	include the ability to disable the fetching of logotypes. However,	include the ability to disable the fetching of logotypes. However,
	locally cached logotypes can still be displayed when the user	locally cached logotypes can still be displayed when the user
	disables the fetching of additional logotypes.</t>	disables the fetching of additional logotypes.</t>
	<t>A client <bcp14>MAY</bcp14>, subject to local policy, choose any combin ation of	<t>A client <bcp14>MAY</bcp14>, subject to local policy, choose any combin ation of
	audio and image presentation for each logotype. That is, the client	audio and image presentation for each logotype. That is, the client

	skipping to change at line 705 ¶	skipping to change at line 722 ¶
	especially difficult with audio logotypes. It is important that the	especially difficult with audio logotypes. It is important that the
	human user be able to recognize the context of the logotype, even if	human user be able to recognize the context of the logotype, even if
	other audio streams are being played.</t>	other audio streams are being played.</t>
	<t>If the relying party software is unable to successfully validate a	<t>If the relying party software is unable to successfully validate a
	particular certificate, then it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> display any logotype dat a	particular certificate, then it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> display any logotype dat a
	associated with that certificate.</t>	associated with that certificate.</t>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="image-format">	<section anchor="image-format">
	<name>Image Formats</name>	<name>Image Formats</name>
	<t>Animated images <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be used.</t>	<t>Animated images <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be used.</t>

	<t>The following table lists many common image formats and the	<t>The following table lists common image formats and the
	corresponding MIME type. The table also indicates the support	corresponding media type. The table also indicates the support
	requirements for these image formats. The filename extensions	requirements for these image formats. The file name extensions
	commonly used for each of these formats is also	commonly used for each of these formats is also
	provided. Implementations <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support other image formats.</t>	provided. Implementations <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support other image formats.</t>
	<table anchor="image-format-table">	<table anchor="image-format-table">
	<name>Image Formats</name>	<name>Image Formats</name>
	<thead>	<thead>
	<tr>	<tr>
	<th align="left">Format</th>	<th align="left">Format</th>

	<th align="left">MIME Type</th>	<th align="left">Media Type</th>
	<th align="left">Extension</th>	<th align="left">Extension</th>
	<th align="left">References</th>	<th align="left">References</th>
	<th align="left">Implement?</th>	<th align="left">Implement?</th>
	</tr>	</tr>
	</thead>	</thead>
	<tbody>	<tbody>
	<tr>	<tr>
	<td align="left">JPEG</td>	<td align="left">JPEG</td>
	<td align="left">image/jpeg</td>	<td align="left">image/jpeg</td>
	<td align="left">.jpg<br/>.jpeg</td>	<td align="left">.jpg<br/>.jpeg</td>

	skipping to change at line 778 ¶	skipping to change at line 795 ¶
	<td align="left">PDF</td>	<td align="left">PDF</td>
	<td align="left">application/pdf</td>	<td align="left">application/pdf</td>
	<td align="left">.pdf</td>	<td align="left">.pdf</td>
	<td align="left">	<td align="left">
	<xref target="ISO32000"/><br/><xref target="ISO19005"/><br/><xref target="RFC8118"/></td>	<xref target="ISO32000"/><br/><xref target="ISO19005"/><br/><xref target="RFC8118"/></td>
	<td align="left">	<td align="left">
	<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support</td>	<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support</td>
	</tr>	</tr>
	</tbody>	</tbody>
	</table>	</table>

		<aside>
	<t>NOTE: The image/svg+xml-compressed media type is widely implemented, bu t it	<t>NOTE: The image/svg+xml-compressed media type is widely implemented, bu t it

	has not yet been registered with IANA.</t>	has not yet been registered with IANA.</t>
		</aside>
	<t>When a Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) image is used, whether the image is	<t>When a Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) image is used, whether the image is
	compressed or not, the SVG Tiny profile <xref target="SVGT"/> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14 > be followed, with	compressed or not, the SVG Tiny profile <xref target="SVGT"/> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14 > be followed, with
	these additional restrictions:</t>	these additional restrictions:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">	<ul spacing="normal">
	<li>The SVG image <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain any Internationalized Resource	<li>The SVG image <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain any Internationalized Resource
	Identifier (IRI) references to information stored outside of the	Identifier (IRI) references to information stored outside of the
	SVG image of type B, C, or D, according to Section 14.1.4 of <xref target="SVGT" />.</li>	SVG image of type B, C, or D, according to Section 14.1.4 of <xref target="SVGT" />.</li>

	<li>The SVG image <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain any 'script' element, according to	<li>The SVG image <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain any script element, ac cording to
	Section 15.2 of <xref target="SVGT"/>.</li>	Section 15.2 of <xref target="SVGT"/>.</li>
	<li>The XML structure in the SVG file <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use linefeed ( 0x0A) as	<li>The XML structure in the SVG file <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use linefeed ( 0x0A) as
	the end-of-line (EOL) character when calculating a hash over the	the end-of-line (EOL) character when calculating a hash over the
	SVG image.</li>	SVG image.</li>
	</ul>	</ul>
	<t>When a GZIP-compressed SVG image is fetched with HTTP, the	<t>When a GZIP-compressed SVG image is fetched with HTTP, the
	client will receive a response that includes these headers:</t>	client will receive a response that includes these headers:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[	<artwork><![CDATA[
	Content-Type: image/svg+xml	Content-Type: image/svg+xml
	Content-Encoding: gzip	Content-Encoding: gzip
	]]></artwork>	]]></artwork>
	<t>In this case, the octet stream of type image/svg+xml is compressed with	<t>In this case, the octet stream of type image/svg+xml is compressed with

	GZIP <xref target="RFC1952"/> as specified in <xref target="SVGR"/>.</t>	GZIP <xref target="RFC1952"/>, as specified in <xref target="SVGR"/>.</t>
	<t>When an uncompressed SVG image is fetched with HTTP, the client will re ceive	<t>When an uncompressed SVG image is fetched with HTTP, the client will re ceive

	a response with the same Content-Type header, but no Content-Encoding header.</t >	a response with the same Content-Type header but no Content-Encoding header.</t>
	<t>Whether the SVG image is GZIP-compressed or uncompressed, the hash valu e for	<t>Whether the SVG image is GZIP-compressed or uncompressed, the hash valu e for
	the SVG image is calculated over the uncompressed SVG content with	the SVG image is calculated over the uncompressed SVG content with

	canonicalized EOL characters as specified above.</t>	canonicalized EOL characters, as specified above.</t>
	<t>When an SVG image is embedded in the certificate extension using the	<t>When an SVG image is embedded in the certificate extension using the
	"data" URL scheme, the SVG image data <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be provided in GZIP-co mpressed	"data" URL scheme, the SVG image data <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be provided in GZIP-co mpressed
	form, and the XML structure, prior to compression, <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use lin efeed	form, and the XML structure, prior to compression, <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use lin efeed
	(0x0A) as the end-of-line (EOL) character.</t>	(0x0A) as the end-of-line (EOL) character.</t>
	<t>When a bitmap image is used, the PNG <xref target="ISO15948"/> format < bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used.</t>	<t>When a bitmap image is used, the PNG <xref target="ISO15948"/> format < bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used.</t>

	<t>When a Portable Document Format (PDF) document according to <xref targe t="ISO32000"/>	<t>According to <xref target="ISO32000"/>, when a Portable Document Format (PDF) document
	is used, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also be formatted according to the profile PDF/A <xref target="ISO19005"/>.</t>	is used, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also be formatted according to the profile PDF/A <xref target="ISO19005"/>.</t>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="audio-format">	<section anchor="audio-format">
	<name>Audio Formats</name>	<name>Audio Formats</name>
	<t>Implementations that support audio <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support the MP3 audio format	<t>Implementations that support audio <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support the MP3 audio format

	<xref target="MP3"/> with a MIME type of "audio/mpeg" <xref target="RFC3003"/>.	<xref target="MP3"/> with a media type of "audio/mpeg" <xref target="RFC3003"/>.
	Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support	Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support
	text-based audio data with a MIME type of "text/plain;charset=UTF-8".	text-based audio data with a media type of "text/plain;charset=UTF-8".
	Implementations <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support other audio formats.</t>	Implementations <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support other audio formats.</t>

	<t>Text-based audio data using the MIME type of "text/plain;charset=UTF-8" is	<t>Text-based audio data using the media type of "text/plain;charset=UTF-8 " is
	intended to be used by text-to-speech software. When this audio type is used,	intended to be used by text-to-speech software. When this audio type is used,
	the following requirements apply:</t>	the following requirements apply:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">	<ul spacing="normal">
	<li>LogotypeAudioInfo <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present and specify the lan guage of the text.</li>	<li>LogotypeAudioInfo <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present and specify the lan guage of the text.</li>
	<li>The fileSize, playTime, and channels elements of LogotypeAudioInfo < bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have the value of 0.</li>	<li>The fileSize, playTime, and channels elements of LogotypeAudioInfo < bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have the value of 0.</li>
	<li>The sampleRate element of LogotypeAudioInfo <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a bsent.</li>	<li>The sampleRate element of LogotypeAudioInfo <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a bsent.</li>
	</ul>	</ul>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="sec-cons">	<section anchor="sec-cons">
	<name>Security Considerations</name>	<name>Security Considerations</name>
	<t>Implementations that simultaneously display multiple logotype types	<t>Implementations that simultaneously display multiple logotype types

	(subject organization, issuer, community, or other), <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ensure that	(subject organization, issuer organization, community, or other) <bcp14>MUST</bc p14> ensure that
	there is no ambiguity as to the binding between the image and the	there is no ambiguity as to the binding between the image and the
	type of logotype that the image represents. "Logotype type" is	type of logotype that the image represents. "Logotype type" is
	defined in <xref target="cert-ident"/>, and it refers to the type	defined in <xref target="cert-ident"/>, and it refers to the type
	of entity or affiliation represented by the logotype, not the	of entity or affiliation represented by the logotype, not the
	of binary format of the image or audio.</t>	of binary format of the image or audio.</t>
	<t>Logotypes are very difficult to securely and accurately define. Names	<t>Logotypes are very difficult to securely and accurately define. Names
	are also difficult in this regard, but logotypes are even worse. It	are also difficult in this regard, but logotypes are even worse. It
	is quite difficult to specify what is, and what is not, a legitimate	is quite difficult to specify what is, and what is not, a legitimate
	logotype of an organization. There is an entire legal structure around	logotype of an organization. There is an entire legal structure around
	this issue, and it will not be repeated here. However, issuers should	this issue, and it will not be repeated here. However, issuers should

	skipping to change at line 863 ¶	skipping to change at line 882 ¶
	providers who want to issue logotypes from doing so, where relevant.</t>	providers who want to issue logotypes from doing so, where relevant.</t>
	<t>It is impossible to prevent fraudulent creation of certificates by	<t>It is impossible to prevent fraudulent creation of certificates by
	dishonest or badly performing issuers, containing names and logotypes	dishonest or badly performing issuers, containing names and logotypes
	that the issuer has no claim to or has failed to check correctly. Such	that the issuer has no claim to or has failed to check correctly. Such
	certificates could be created in an attempt to socially engineer a user	certificates could be created in an attempt to socially engineer a user
	into accepting a certificate. The premise used for the logotype work is	into accepting a certificate. The premise used for the logotype work is
	thus that logotype graphics in a certificate are trusted only if the	thus that logotype graphics in a certificate are trusted only if the
	certificate is successfully validated within a valid path. It is thus	certificate is successfully validated within a valid path. It is thus
	imperative that the representation of any certificate that fails to	imperative that the representation of any certificate that fails to
	validate is not enhanced in any way by using the logotype data.</t>	validate is not enhanced in any way by using the logotype data.</t>

	<t>This underlines the necessity for CAs to provide reliable services,	<t>This underlines the necessity for CAs to provide reliable services
	and the relying party's responsibility and need to carefully select	and the relying party's responsibility and need to carefully select
	which CAs are trusted to provide public key certificates.</t>	which CAs are trusted to provide public key certificates.</t>
	<t>This also underlines the general necessity for relying parties to use	<t>This also underlines the general necessity for relying parties to use
	up-to-date software libraries to render or dereference data from	up-to-date software libraries to render or dereference data from
	external sources, including logotype data in certificates, to minimize	external sources, including logotype data in certificates, to minimize
	risks related to processing potentially malicious data before it has been	risks related to processing potentially malicious data before it has been
	adequately verified and validated. Implementers should review the guidance	adequately verified and validated. Implementers should review the guidance
	in <xref section="7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3986"/>.</t>	in <xref section="7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3986"/>.</t>
	<t>Referenced image objects are hashed in order to bind the image to the	<t>Referenced image objects are hashed in order to bind the image to the
	signature of the certificate. Some image types, such as SVG, allow	signature of the certificate. Some image types, such as SVG, allow
	part of the image to be collected from an external source by	part of the image to be collected from an external source by
	incorporating a reference to an external file that contains the image. If	incorporating a reference to an external file that contains the image. If
	this feature were used within a logotype image, the hash of the image	this feature were used within a logotype image, the hash of the image

	would only cover the URI reference to the external image file, but	would only cover the URI reference to the external image file but
	not the referenced image data. Clients <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> verify that SVG	not the referenced image data. Clients <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> verify that SVG
	images meet all requirements listed in <xref target="image-format"/> and reject	images meet all requirements listed in <xref target="image-format"/> and reject
	images that contain references to external data.</t>	images that contain references to external data.</t>
	<t>CAs issuing certificates with embedded logotype images should be	<t>CAs issuing certificates with embedded logotype images should be

	cautious when accepting graphics from the certificate requestor for	cautious when accepting graphics from the certificate requester for
	inclusion in the certificate if the hash algorithm used to sign the	inclusion in the certificate if the hash algorithm used to sign the

	certificate is vulnerable to collision attacks such as <xref target="RFC6151"/>. In	certificate is vulnerable to collision attacks, as described in <xref target="RF C6151"/>. In
	such a case, the accepted image may contain data that could help an	such a case, the accepted image may contain data that could help an
	attacker to obtain colliding certificates with identical certificate	attacker to obtain colliding certificates with identical certificate
	signatures.</t>	signatures.</t>
	<t>Certification paths may also impose name constraints that are	<t>Certification paths may also impose name constraints that are
	systematically checked during certification path processing, which,	systematically checked during certification path processing, which,
	in theory, may be circumvented by logotypes.</t>	in theory, may be circumvented by logotypes.</t>

	<t>Certificate path processing as defined in <xref target="RFC5280"/> does not constrain	<t>Certificate path processing, as defined in <xref target="RFC5280"/>, do es not constrain
	the inclusion of logotype data in certificates. A parent CA can	the inclusion of logotype data in certificates. A parent CA can
	constrain certification path validation such that subordinate CAs cannot	constrain certification path validation such that subordinate CAs cannot

	issue valid certificates to end-entities outside a limited name space or	issue valid certificates to end entities outside a limited name space or
	outside specific certificate polices. A malicious CA can comply with	outside specific certificate policies. A malicious CA can comply with
	these name and policy requirements and still include inappropriate	these name and policy requirements and still include inappropriate
	logotypes in the certificates that it issues. These certificates will	logotypes in the certificates that it issues. These certificates will
	pass the certification path validation algorithm, which means the client	pass the certification path validation algorithm, which means the client
	will trust the logotypes in the certificates. Since there is no	will trust the logotypes in the certificates. Since there is no
	technical mechanism to prevent or control subordinate CAs from including	technical mechanism to prevent or control subordinate CAs from including

	the logotype extension or its contents, where appropriate, a parent CA	the logotype certificate extension or its contents, where appropriate, a parent CA
	could employ a legal agreement to impose a suitable restriction on the	could employ a legal agreement to impose a suitable restriction on the

	subordinate CA. This situation is not unique to the logotype extension.</t>	subordinate CA. This situation is not unique to the logotype certificate extens ion.</t>
	<t>When a relying party fetches remote logotype data, a mismatch between t he	<t>When a relying party fetches remote logotype data, a mismatch between t he
	media type provided in the mediaType field of the LogotypeDetails and the	media type provided in the mediaType field of the LogotypeDetails and the
	Content-Type HTTP header of the retrieved object <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be treated as a	Content-Type HTTP header of the retrieved object <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be treated as a

	failure and the fetched logotype data should not be presented to the	failure, and the fetched logotype data should not be presented to the
	user. However, if more than one location for the remote logotype data is	user. However, if more than one location for the remote logotype data is
	provided in the certificate extension, the relying party <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> try to fetch	provided in the certificate extension, the relying party <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> try to fetch
	the remote logotype data from an alternate location to resolve the failure.</t>	the remote logotype data from an alternate location to resolve the failure.</t>
	<t>When a subscriber requests the inclusion of remote logotype data in a	<t>When a subscriber requests the inclusion of remote logotype data in a
	certificate, the CA cannot be sure that any logotype data will be	certificate, the CA cannot be sure that any logotype data will be
	available at the provided URI for the entire validity period of the	available at the provided URI for the entire validity period of the
	certificate. To mitigate this concern, the CA may provide the logotype	certificate. To mitigate this concern, the CA may provide the logotype
	data from a server under its control, rather than a subscriber-controlled	data from a server under its control, rather than a subscriber-controlled
	server.</t>	server.</t>
	<t>The controls available to a parent CA to protect itself from rogue	<t>The controls available to a parent CA to protect itself from rogue

	skipping to change at line 963 ¶	skipping to change at line 982 ¶
	servers <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> reduce visibility into the data that is being returne d by	servers <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> reduce visibility into the data that is being returne d by
	encrypting with HTTPS and padding to a few common sizes.</t>	encrypting with HTTPS and padding to a few common sizes.</t>
	<t>Similarly, when fetching logotype data from a server, the server operat or	<t>Similarly, when fetching logotype data from a server, the server operat or
	can determine which clients are making use of certificates that contain	can determine which clients are making use of certificates that contain
	particular logotype data. As above, locally caching logotype data will	particular logotype data. As above, locally caching logotype data will
	eliminate the need to fetch the logotype data each time the certificate	eliminate the need to fetch the logotype data each time the certificate
	is used, and lack of caching would reveal usage frequency. Even when	is used, and lack of caching would reveal usage frequency. Even when
	implementations cache logotype data, regardless of whether direct or	implementations cache logotype data, regardless of whether direct or
	indirect addressing is employed, the server operator could observe when	indirect addressing is employed, the server operator could observe when
	logotype data is fetched for the first time.</t>	logotype data is fetched for the first time.</t>

	<t>In addition, the use of an encrypted DNS mechanism, such as DoT <xref t	<t>In addition, the use of an encrypted DNS mechanism, such as DNS over TLS (DoT
	arget="RFC7858"/>	) <xref target="RFC7858"/>
	or DoH <xref target="RFC9230"/>, hides the name resolution traffic associated fe	or DNS over HTTPS (DoH) <xref target="RFC9230"/>, hides the name resolution traf
	tching	fic, which is usually a first step in fetching
	remote logotype objects from third parties.</t>	remote logotype objects.</t>
	<t>When the "data" URI scheme is used with direct addressing, there is no	<t>When the "data" URI scheme is used with direct addressing, there is no
	network traffic to fetch logotype data, which avoids the observations of	network traffic to fetch logotype data, which avoids the observations of
	network traffic or server operations described above. To obtain this	network traffic or server operations described above. To obtain this
	benefit, the certificate will be larger than one that contains a URL.	benefit, the certificate will be larger than one that contains a URL.
	Due to the improved privacy posture, the "data" URI scheme with direct	Due to the improved privacy posture, the "data" URI scheme with direct
	addressing will be the only one that is supported by some CAs.	addressing will be the only one that is supported by some CAs.
	Privacy-aware certificate subscribers <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> wish to insist that log otype	Privacy-aware certificate subscribers <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> wish to insist that log otype
	data is embedded in the certificate with the "data" URI scheme with	data is embedded in the certificate with the "data" URI scheme with
	direct addressing.</t>	direct addressing.</t>
	<t>In cases where logotype data is cached by the relying party, the cache	<t>In cases where logotype data is cached by the relying party, the cache

	skipping to change at line 988 ¶	skipping to change at line 1007 ¶
	multiple URIs. The index should include hash values for all supported	multiple URIs. The index should include hash values for all supported
	hash algorithms. The cached data should include the media type as well as	hash algorithms. The cached data should include the media type as well as
	the logotype data. Implementations should give preference to logotype data	the logotype data. Implementations should give preference to logotype data
	that is already in the cache when multiple alternatives are offered in the	that is already in the cache when multiple alternatives are offered in the
	LogotypeExtn certificate extension.</t>	LogotypeExtn certificate extension.</t>
	<t>When the "data" URI scheme is used, the relying party <bcp14>MAY</bcp14 > add the embedded	<t>When the "data" URI scheme is used, the relying party <bcp14>MAY</bcp14 > add the embedded
	logotype data to the local cache, which could avoid the need to fetch the	logotype data to the local cache, which could avoid the need to fetch the
	logotype data if it is referenced by a URL in another certificate.</t>	logotype data if it is referenced by a URL in another certificate.</t>
	<t>When fetching remote logotype data, relying parties should use the most	<t>When fetching remote logotype data, relying parties should use the most
	privacy-preserving options that are available to minimize the opportunities	privacy-preserving options that are available to minimize the opportunities

	for servers to "fingerprint" clients. For example, avoid cookies, e-tags, and	for servers to "fingerprint" clients. For example, avoid cookies, ETags, and
	client certificates.</t>	client certificates.</t>
	<t>When a relying party encounters a new certificate, the lack of network traffic	<t>When a relying party encounters a new certificate, the lack of network traffic
	to fetch logotype data might indicate that a certificate with references to the	to fetch logotype data might indicate that a certificate with references to the
	same logotype data has been previously processed and cached.</t>	same logotype data has been previously processed and cached.</t>
	<t>TLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC8446"/> includes the ability to encrypt the se rver's certificate	<t>TLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC8446"/> includes the ability to encrypt the se rver's certificate
	in the TLS handshake, which helps hide the server's identity from anyone that	in the TLS handshake, which helps hide the server's identity from anyone that
	is watching activity on the network. If the server's certificate includes	is watching activity on the network. If the server's certificate includes
	remote logotype data, the client fetching that data might disclose the	remote logotype data, the client fetching that data might disclose the
	otherwise protected server identity.</t>	otherwise protected server identity.</t>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="iana">	<section anchor="iana">
	<name>IANA Considerations</name>	<name>IANA Considerations</name>

	<t>For the new ASN.1 Module in <xref target="asn1-mod-new"/>, IANA	<t>For the new ASN.1 module in <xref target="asn1-mod-new"/>, IANA has
	is requested to assign an object identifier (OID) for the module	assigned the following OID
	identifier. The OID for the module should be allocated in the "SMI	in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry
	Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0).</t>	(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0):</t>
	<t>For the existing entries in the Structure of Management Information (SM
	I)	<table anchor="iana1" align="left">
	Numbers registry that refer to RFC 3709 or RFC 6170, IANA is requested	<name></name>
	update the entries to refer to this document. These entries are:</t>	<thead>
	<artwork><![CDATA[	<tr>
	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.22 id-mod-logotype	<th>Decimal</th>
	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.68 id-mod-logotype-certimage	<th>Description</th>
	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.12 id-pe-logotype	<th>References</th>
	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.20.1 id-logo-loyalty	</tr>
	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.20.2 id-logo-background	</thead>
	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.20.3 id-logo-certImage	<tbody>
	]]></artwork>	<tr>
	</section>	<td>107</td>
	<section anchor="acks">	<td>id-mod-logotype-2022</td>
	<name>Acknowledgments</name>	<td>RFC 9399</td>
	<section anchor="acks-rfc3709">	</tr>
	<name>Acknowledgments from RFC 3709</name>	</tbody>
	<t>This document is the result of contributions from many	</table>
	professionals. The authors appreciate contributions from all members
	of the IETF PKIX Working Group. We extend a special thanks to Al	<t>IANA has updated the entries in the "Structure of Management
	Arsenault, David Cross, Tim Polk, Russel Weiser, Terry Hayes, Alex	Information (SMI) Numbers" registry that referred to <xref
	Deacon, Andrew Hoag, Randy Sabett, Denis Pinkas, Magnus Nystrom, Ryan	target="RFC3709"/> or <xref target="RFC6170"/> to refer to this
	Hurst, and Phil Griffin for their efforts and support.</t>	document. These entries are noted in the tables below.</t>
	<t>Russ Housley thanks the management at RSA Laboratories, especially
	Burt Kaliski, who supported the development of this specification. The	<t>From the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0)
	vast majority of the work on this specification was done while	:</t>
	Russ was employed at RSA Laboratories.</t>	<table anchor="iana2" align="left">
	</section>	<name></name>
	<section anchor="acks-rfc6170">	<thead>
	<name>Acknowledgments from RFC 6170</name>	<tr>
	<t>The authors recognize valuable contributions from members of the PKIX	<th>Decimal</th>
	working group, the CA Browser Forum, and James Manger, for their	<th>Description</th>
	review and sample data.</t>	<th>References</th>
	</section>	</tr>
	<section anchor="acks-additional">	</thead>
	<name>Additional Acknowledgments</name>	<tbody>
	<t>Combining RFC 3709 and RFC 6170 has produced an improved	<tr>
	specification. The authors appreciate contributions from all members	<td>22</td>
	of the IETF LAMPS Working Group. We extend a special thanks to	<td>id-mod-logotype</td>
	Alexey Melnikov for his guidance on media types. We extend a special	<td>RFC 9399</td>
	thanks to Tim Geiser for his careful checking of the new examples in	</tr>
	Appendix B.4 and B.5. We extend a special thanks to Corey Bonnell,	<tr>
	Daniel Kahn Gillmor, Roman Danyliw, Paul Wouters, Paul Kyzivat, Shuping Peng,	<td>68</td>
	Sheng Jiang, Rob Wilton, Eric Vyncke, Donald Eastlake, and Dan Harkins	<td>id-mod-logotype-certimage</td>
	for their careful review and helpful comments.</t>	<td>RFC 9399</td>
	</section>	</tr>
		</tbody>
		</table>

		<t>From the "SMI Security for PKIX Certificate Extension" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.
		7.1):</t>

		<table anchor="iana3" align="left">
		<name></name>
		<thead>
		<tr>
		<th>Decimal</th>
		<th>Description</th>
		<th>References</th>
		</tr>
		</thead>
		<tbody>
		<tr>
		<td>12</td>
		<td>id-pe-logotype</td>
		<td>RFC 9399</td>
		</tr>
		</tbody>
		</table>

		<t>From the "SMI Security for PKIX Other Logotype Identifiers" registry (1.3.6.1
		.5.5.7.20):</t>
		<table anchor="iana4" align="left">
		<name></name>
		<thead>
		<tr>
		<th>Decimal</th>
		<th>Description</th>
		<th>References</th>
		</tr>
		</thead>
		<tbody>
		<tr>
		<td>1</td>
		<td>id-logo-loyalty</td>
		<td>RFC 9399</td>
		</tr>
		<tr>
		<td>2</td>
		<td>id-logo-background</td>
		<td>RFC 9399</td>
		</tr>
		<tr>
		<td>3</td>
		<td>id-logo-certImage</td>
		<td>RFC 9399</td>
		</tr>
		</tbody>
		</table>

	</section>	</section>
	</middle>	</middle>
	<back>	<back>
	<references>	<references>
	<name>References</name>	<name>References</name>
	<references>	<references>
	<name>Normative References</name>	<name>Normative References</name>

	<reference anchor="RFC5280" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5
	280">	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml"
	<front>	/>
	<title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Cert	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5755.xml"
	ificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>	/>
	<author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper">	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3986.xml"
	<organization/>	/>
	</author>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2397.xml"
	<author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson">	/>
	<organization/>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2046.xml"
	</author>	/>
	<author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell">	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3003.xml"
	<organization/>	/>
	</author>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5646.xml"
	<author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen">	/>
	<organization/>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5234.xml"
	</author>	/>
	<author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley">	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.1952.xml"
	<organization/>	/>
	</author>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8446.xml"
	<author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk">	/>
	<organization/>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9110.xml"
	</author>	/>
	<date month="May" year="2008"/>
	<abstract>	<reference anchor="NEW-ASN1" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680"
	<t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certif	>
	icate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approa
	ch and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is
	described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and seman
	tics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and
	two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate ext
	ensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with
	standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certificatio
	n path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in th
	e appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC5755" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5
	755">
	<front>
	<title>An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization</
	title>
	<author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="January" year="2010"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This specification defines a profile for the use of X.509 Attri
	bute Certificates in Internet Protocols. Attribute certificates may be used in
	a wide range of applications and environments covering a broad spectrum of inter
	operability goals and a broader spectrum of operational and assurance requiremen
	ts. The goal of this document is to establish a common baseline for generic app
	lications requiring broad interoperability as well as limited special purpose re
	quirements. The profile places emphasis on attribute certificate support for In
	ternet electronic mail, IPsec, and WWW security applications. This document obs
	oletes RFC 3281. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5755"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5755"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC3986" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3
	986">
	<front>
	<title>Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</title>
	<author fullname="T. Berners-Lee" initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee
	">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." surname="Fielding">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="L. Masinter" initials="L." surname="Masinter">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="January" year="2005"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of ch
	aracters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification d
	efines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that mi
	ght be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for t
	he use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a supe
	rset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common component
	s of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every p
	ossible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for
	URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI schem
	e. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="STD" value="66"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3986"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3986"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC2397" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2
	397">
	<front>
	<title>The "data" URL scheme</title>
	<author fullname="L. Masinter" initials="L." surname="Masinter">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="August" year="1998"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>A new URL scheme, "data", is defined. It allows inclusion of sm
	all data items as "immediate" data, as if it had been included externally. [STAN
	DARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2397"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2397"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC2046" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2
	046">
	<front>
	<title>Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media
	Types</title>
	<author fullname="N. Freed" initials="N." surname="Freed">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="N. Borenstein" initials="N." surname="Borenstein">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="November" year="1996"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This second document defines the general structure of the MIME
	media typing system and defines an initial set of media types. [STANDARDS-TRACK
	]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2046"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2046"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC3003" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3
	003">
	<front>
	<title>The audio/mpeg Media Type</title>
	<author fullname="M. Nilsson" initials="M." surname="Nilsson">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="November" year="2000"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>The audio layers of the MPEG-1 and MPEG-2 standards are in freq
	uent use on the internet, but there is no uniform Multipurpose Internet Mail Ext
	ension (MIME) type for these files. The intention of this document is to define
	the media type audio/mpeg to refer to this kind of contents. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
	</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3003"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3003"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC5646" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5
	646">
	<front>
	<title>Tags for Identifying Languages</title>
	<author fullname="A. Phillips" initials="A." role="editor" surname="
	Phillips">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="M. Davis" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Dav
	is">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="September" year="2009"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document describes the structure, content, construction, a
	nd semantics of language tags for use in cases where it is desirable to indicate
	the language used in an information object. It also describes how to register
	values for use in language tags and the creation of user-defined extensions for
	private interchange. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practice
	s for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improv
	ements.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="47"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5646"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5646"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC6838" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6
	838">
	<front>
	<title>Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures</title>
	<author fullname="N. Freed" initials="N." surname="Freed">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="J. Klensin" initials="J." surname="Klensin">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="T. Hansen" initials="T." surname="Hansen">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="January" year="2013"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document defines procedures for the specification and regi
	stration of media types for use in HTTP, MIME, and other Internet protocols. Th
	is memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="13"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6838"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6838"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC5234" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5
	234">
	<front>
	<title>Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF</title>
	<author fullname="D. Crocker" initials="D." role="editor" surname="C
	rocker">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="P. Overell" initials="P." surname="Overell">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="January" year="2008"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>Internet technical specifications often need to define a formal
	syntax. Over the years, a modified version of Backus-Naur Form (BNF), called A
	ugmented BNF (ABNF), has been popular among many Internet specifications. The c
	urrent specification documents ABNF. It balances compactness and simplicity with
	reasonable representational power. The differences between standard BNF and AB
	NF involve naming rules, repetition, alternatives, order-independence, and value
	ranges. This specification also supplies additional rule definitions and encod
	ing for a core lexical analyzer of the type common to several Internet specifica
	tions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="STD" value="68"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5234"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5234"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC1952" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1
	952">
	<front>
	<title>GZIP file format specification version 4.3</title>
	<author fullname="P. Deutsch" initials="P." surname="Deutsch">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="May" year="1996"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This specification defines a lossless compressed data format th
	at is compatible with the widely used GZIP utility. This memo provides informat
	ion for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard
	of any kind.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1952"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1952"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC8446" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
	446">
	<front>
	<title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</titl
	e>
	<author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="August" year="2018"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Secu
	rity (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over
	the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and
	message forgery.</t>
	<t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 50
	77, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 i
	mplementations.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC9110" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9
	110">
	<front>
	<title>HTTP Semantics</title>
	<author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." role="editor" surname="
	Fielding">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." role="editor" surname
	="Nottingham">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="J. Reschke" initials="J." role="editor" surname="R
	eschke">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="June" year="2022"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless applicati
	on-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems.
	This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common te
	rminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions.
	In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the
	"http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes. </t>
	<t>This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7
	232, 7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="STD" value="97"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9110"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9110"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="NEW-ASN1" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680
	">
	<front>	<front>
	<title>Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1 ): Specification of basic notation</title>	<title>Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1 ): Specification of basic notation</title>
	<author>	<author>
	<organization>ITU-T</organization>	<organization>ITU-T</organization>
	</author>	</author>
	<date year="2021" month="February"/>	<date year="2021" month="February"/>
	</front>	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.680"/>	<seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.680"/>
	<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="8824-1:2021"/>	<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="8824-1:2021"/>
	</reference>	</reference>

	<reference anchor="SVGT" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/2008/PR-SVGTiny12
	-20081117">	<reference anchor="SVGT" target="http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-SVGTiny12
		-20081222/">
	<front>	<front>
	<title>Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) Tiny 1.2 Specification</title>	<title>Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) Tiny 1.2 Specification</title>
	<author>	<author>
	<organization>World Wide Web Consortium</organization>	<organization>World Wide Web Consortium</organization>
	</author>	</author>

	<date year="2008" month="November" day="17"/>	<date year="2008" month="December"/>
	</front>	</front>

	<seriesInfo name="W3C" value="PR-SVGTiny12-20081117"/>	<seriesInfo name="W3C" value="REC-SVGTiny12-20081222"/>
	</reference>	</reference>


	<reference anchor="ISO15948">	<reference anchor="ISO15948">
	<front>	<front>
	<title>Information technology -- Computer graphics and image process ing -- Portable Network Graphics (PNG): Functional specification</title>	<title>Information technology -- Computer graphics and image process ing -- Portable Network Graphics (PNG): Functional specification</title>
	<author>	<author>
	<organization>ISO/IEC</organization>	<organization>ISO/IEC</organization>
	</author>	</author>

	<date year="2004"/>	<date year="2004" month="March"/>
	</front>	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="15948:2004"/>	<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="15948:2004"/>
	</reference>	</reference>


	<reference anchor="JPEG">	<reference anchor="JPEG">
	<front>	<front>
	<title>Information technology -- Digital compression and coding of c ontinuous-tone still images: JPEG File Interchange Format (JFIF)</title>	<title>Information technology -- Digital compression and coding of c ontinuous-tone still images: JPEG File Interchange Format (JFIF)</title>
	<author>	<author>
	<organization>ITU-T</organization>	<organization>ITU-T</organization>
	</author>	</author>

	<date year="2011" month="May"/>	<date year="2013" month="May"/>
	</front>	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="T.871"/>	<seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="T.871"/>
	<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="10918-5:2013"/>	<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="10918-5:2013"/>
	</reference>	</reference>


	<reference anchor="GIF" target="https://www.w3.org/Graphics/GIF/spec-gif 89a.txt">	<reference anchor="GIF" target="https://www.w3.org/Graphics/GIF/spec-gif 89a.txt">
	<front>	<front>
	<title>Graphics Interchange Format</title>	<title>Graphics Interchange Format</title>
	<author>	<author>
	<organization>CompuServe Incorporated</organization>	<organization>CompuServe Incorporated</organization>
	</author>	</author>

	<date year="1990" month="July" day="31"/>	<date year="1990" month="July"/>
	</front>	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="Version" value="89a"/>	<seriesInfo name="Version" value="89a"/>
	</reference>	</reference>


	<reference anchor="MP3">	<reference anchor="MP3">
	<front>	<front>
	<title>Information technology -- Generic coding of moving pictures a nd associated audio information -- Part 3: Audio</title>	<title>Information technology -- Generic coding of moving pictures a nd associated audio information -- Part 3: Audio</title>
	<author>	<author>
	<organization>ISO/IEC</organization>	<organization>ISO/IEC</organization>
	</author>	</author>

	<date year="1998"/>	<date year="1998" month="April"/>
	</front>	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="13818-3:1998"/>	<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="13818-3:1998"/>
	</reference>	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2
	119">	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"
	<front>	/>
	<title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</tit	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"
	le>	/>
	<author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="March" year="1997"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>In many standards track documents several words are used to sig
	nify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized.
	This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF document
	s. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet
	Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
	174">
	<front>
	<title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</ti
	tle>
	<author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="May" year="2017"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protoco
	l specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying tha
	t only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
	</reference>
	</references>	</references>
	<references>	<references>
	<name>Informative References</name>	<name>Informative References</name>

	<reference anchor="RFC5912" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5
	912">	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5912.xml"
	<front>	/>
	<title>New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.5	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6151.xml"
	09 (PKIX)</title>	/>
	<author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman">	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6268.xml"
	<organization/>	/>
	</author>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8118.xml"
	<author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad">	/>
	<organization/>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3709.xml"
	</author>	/>
	<date month="June" year="2010"/>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6170.xml"
	<abstract>	/>
	<t>The Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificate fo	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7858.xml"
	rmat, and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1	/>
	modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates those ASN.	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9162.xml"
	1 modules to conform to the 2002 version of ASN.1. There are no bits-on-the-wire	/>
	changes to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. This doc	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9216.xml"
	ument is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for inf	/>
	ormational purposes.</t>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9230.xml"
	</abstract>	/>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5912"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5912"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC6151" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6
	151">
	<front>
	<title>Updated Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest an
	d the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms</title>
	<author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="L. Chen" initials="L." surname="Chen">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="March" year="2011"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document updates the security considerations for the MD5 m
	essage digest algorithm. It also updates the security considerations for HMAC-M
	D5. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is publ
	ished for informational purposes.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6151"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6151"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC6268" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6
	268">
	<front>
	<title>Additional New ASN.1 Modules for the Cryptographic Message Sy
	ntax (CMS) and the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)</title>
	<author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="July" year="2011"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) format, and many associa
	ted formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to th
	e 1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates some auxiliary ASN.1 modules to
	conform to the 2008 version of ASN.1; the 1988 ASN.1 modules remain the normativ
	e version. There are no bits- on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this i
	s simply a change to the syntax. This document is not an Internet Standards Tra
	ck specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6268"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6268"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC8118" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
	118">
	<front>
	<title>The application/pdf Media Type</title>
	<author fullname="M. Hardy" initials="M." surname="Hardy">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="L. Masinter" initials="L." surname="Masinter">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="D. Markovic" initials="D." surname="Markovic">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="D. Johnson" initials="D." surname="Johnson">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="M. Bailey" initials="M." surname="Bailey">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="March" year="2017"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>The Portable Document Format (PDF) is an ISO standard (ISO 3200
	0-1:2008) defining a final-form document representation language in use for docu
	ment exchange, including on the Internet, since 1993. This document provides an
	overview of the PDF format and updates the media type registration of "applicati
	on/pdf". It obsoletes RFC 3778.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8118"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8118"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC3709" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3
	709">
	<front>
	<title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Logotypes in X.509
	Certificates</title>
	<author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="T. Freeman" initials="T." surname="Freeman">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="February" year="2004"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document specifies a certificate extension for including l
	ogotypes in public key certificates and attribute certificates. [STANDARDS-TRAC
	K]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3709"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3709"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC6170" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6
	170">
	<front>
	<title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate Image
	</title>
	<author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="S. Bajaj" initials="S." surname="Bajaj">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="L. Rosenthol" initials="L." surname="Rosenthol">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="May" year="2011"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document specifies a method to bind a visual representatio
	n of a certificate in the form of a certificate image to a public key certificat
	e as defined in RFC 5280, by defining a new "otherLogos" image type according to
	RFC 3709. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6170"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6170"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC7858" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7
	858">
	<front>
	<title>Specification for DNS over Transport Layer Security (TLS)</ti
	tle>
	<author fullname="Z. Hu" initials="Z." surname="Hu">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="L. Zhu" initials="L." surname="Zhu">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="J. Heidemann" initials="J." surname="Heidemann">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="A. Mankin" initials="A." surname="Mankin">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="D. Wessels" initials="D." surname="Wessels">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="May" year="2016"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document describes the use of Transport Layer Security (TL
	S) to provide privacy for DNS. Encryption provided by TLS eliminates opportunit
	ies for eavesdropping and on-path tampering with DNS queries in the network, suc
	h as discussed in RFC 7626. In addition, this document specifies two usage prof
	iles for DNS over TLS and provides advice on performance considerations to minim
	ize overhead from using TCP and TLS with DNS.</t>
	<t>This document focuses on securing stub-to-recursive traffic, as
	per the charter of the DPRIVE Working Group. It does not prevent future applic
	ations of the protocol to recursive-to-authoritative traffic.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7858"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7858"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC9162" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9
	162">
	<front>
	<title>Certificate Transparency Version 2.0</title>
	<author fullname="B. Laurie" initials="B." surname="Laurie">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="E. Messeri" initials="E." surname="Messeri">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="R. Stradling" initials="R." surname="Stradling">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="December" year="2021"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document describes version 2.0 of the Certificate Transpar
	ency (CT) protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Securit
	y (TLS) server certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that all
	ows anyone to audit certification authority (CA) activity and notice the issuanc
	e of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. T
	he intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do
	not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to t
	he logs.</t>
	<t>This document obsoletes RFC 6962. It also specifies a new TLS
	extension that is used to send various CT log artifacts.</t>
	<t>Logs are network services that implement the protocol operation
	s for submissions and queries that are defined in this document.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9162"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9162"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC9216" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9
	216">
	<front>
	<title>S/MIME Example Keys and Certificates</title>
	<author fullname="D. K. Gillmor" initials="D. K." role="editor" surn
	ame="Gillmor">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="April" year="2022"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>The S/MIME development community benefits from sharing samples
	of signed or encrypted data. This document facilitates such collaboration by def
	ining a small set of X.509v3 certificates and keys for use when generating such
	samples.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9216"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9216"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC9230" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9
	230">
	<front>
	<title>Oblivious DNS over HTTPS</title>
	<author fullname="E. Kinnear" initials="E." surname="Kinnear">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="P. McManus" initials="P." surname="McManus">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="T. Pauly" initials="T." surname="Pauly">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="T. Verma" initials="T." surname="Verma">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<author fullname="C.A. Wood" initials="C.A." surname="Wood">
	<organization/>
	</author>
	<date month="June" year="2022"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document describes a protocol that allows clients to hide
	their IP addresses from DNS resolvers via proxying encrypted DNS over HTTPS (DoH
	) messages. This improves privacy of DNS operations by not allowing any one serv
	er entity to be aware of both the client IP address and the content of DNS queri
	es and answers.</t>
	<t>This experimental protocol has been developed outside the IETF
	and is published here to guide implementation, ensure interoperability among imp
	lementations, and enable wide-scale experimentation.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9230"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9230"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="OLD-ASN1" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.208 /en">	<reference anchor="OLD-ASN1" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.208 /en">
	<front>	<front>
	<title>Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)</title>	<title>Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)</title>
	<author>	<author>
	<organization>CCITT</organization>	<organization>CCITT</organization>
	</author>	</author>
	<date year="1988" month="November"/>	<date year="1988" month="November"/>
	</front>	</front>

	<refcontent>CCITT Recommendation X.208</refcontent>	<seriesInfo name="CCITT Recommendation" value="X.208"/>
	</reference>	</reference>


	<reference anchor="ISO19005">	<reference anchor="ISO19005">
	<front>	<front>
	<title>Document management -- Electronic document file format for lo ng-term preservation -- Part 1: Use of PDF 1.4 (PDF/A-1)</title>	<title>Document management -- Electronic document file format for lo ng-term preservation -- Part 1: Use of PDF 1.4 (PDF/A-1)</title>
	<author>	<author>
	<organization>ISO</organization>	<organization>ISO</organization>
	</author>	</author>

	<date year="2005"/>	<date year="2005" month="October"/>
	</front>	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="ISO" value="19005-1:2005"/>	<seriesInfo name="ISO" value="19005-1:2005"/>
	</reference>	</reference>


	<reference anchor="ISO32000">	<reference anchor="ISO32000">
	<front>	<front>
	<title>Document management -- Portable document format -- Part 1: PD F 1.7</title>	<title>Document management -- Portable document format -- Part 1: PD F 1.7</title>
	<author>	<author>
	<organization>ISO</organization>	<organization>ISO</organization>
	</author>	</author>

	<date year="2008"/>	<date year="2008" month="July"/>
	</front>	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="ISO" value="32000-1:2008"/>	<seriesInfo name="ISO" value="32000-1:2008"/>
	</reference>	</reference>


	<reference anchor="SVGR" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/media- types/image/svg+xml">	<reference anchor="SVGR" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/media- types/image/svg+xml">
	<front>	<front>
	<title>Media Type Registration for image/svg+xml</title>	<title>Media Type Registration for image/svg+xml</title>
	<author>	<author>
	<organization>World Wide Web Consortium</organization>	<organization>World Wide Web Consortium</organization>
	</author>	</author>

	<date/>
	</front>	</front>
	</reference>	</reference>


	<reference anchor="SVGZR" target="https://github.com/w3c/svgwg/issues/70 1">	<reference anchor="SVGZR" target="https://github.com/w3c/svgwg/issues/70 1">
	<front>	<front>
	<title>A separate MIME type for svgz files is needed</title>	<title>A separate MIME type for svgz files is needed</title>
	<author>	<author>
	<organization/>	<organization/>
	</author>	</author>

	<date/>
	</front>	</front>
	</reference>	</reference>


	<reference anchor="PNGR" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/media- types/image/png">	<reference anchor="PNGR" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/media- types/image/png">
	<front>	<front>
	<title>Media Type Registration for image/png</title>	<title>Media Type Registration for image/png</title>
	<author>	<author>
	<organization>World Wide Web Consortium</organization>	<organization>World Wide Web Consortium</organization>
	</author>	</author>

	<date/>
	</front>	</front>
	</reference>	</reference>
	</references>	</references>
	</references>	</references>
	<section anchor="asn1-mods">	<section anchor="asn1-mods">
	<name>ASN.1 Modules</name>	<name>ASN.1 Modules</name>
	<section anchor="asn1-mod-old">	<section anchor="asn1-mod-old">
	<name>ASN.1 Modules with 1988 Syntax</name>	<name>ASN.1 Modules with 1988 Syntax</name>
	<t>This appendix contains two ASN.1 modules, both using the old	<t>This appendix contains two ASN.1 modules, both using the old
	syntax <xref target="OLD-ASN1"/>.</t>	syntax <xref target="OLD-ASN1"/>.</t>

	<t>The first ASN.1 module provides the syntax for the Logotype certifica	<t>The first ASN.1 module provides the syntax for the logotype certifica
	te	te
	extension. Only comments have changed in the module from RFC 3709, and	extension. Only comments have changed in the module from <xref target="RFC3709"
		/> and
	the IMPORTS now come from <xref target="RFC5280"/>.</t>	the IMPORTS now come from <xref target="RFC5280"/>.</t>

	<t>The second ASN.1 module provides the Certificate Image	<t>The second ASN.1 module provides the certificate image
	object identifier. The module is unchanged from RFC 6170.</t>	object identifier. The module is unchanged from <xref target="RFC6170"/>.</t>
	<sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="true"><![CDATA[	<sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="true"><![CDATA[
	LogotypeCertExtn	LogotypeCertExtn
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
	id-mod-logotype(22) }	id-mod-logotype(22) }

	DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=	DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
	BEGIN	BEGIN

	IMPORTS	IMPORTS
	AlgorithmIdentifier FROM PKIX1Explicit88 -- RFC 5280	AlgorithmIdentifier FROM PKIX1Explicit88 -- RFC 5280
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
	id-pkix1-explicit(18) };	id-pkix1-explicit(18) };


		-- Logotype Certificate Extension OID

	id-pe-logotype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=	id-pe-logotype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 12 }	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 12 }


		-- Logotype Certificate Extension Syntax

	LogotypeExtn ::= SEQUENCE {	LogotypeExtn ::= SEQUENCE {
	communityLogos [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,	communityLogos [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,
	issuerLogo [1] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,	issuerLogo [1] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,
	subjectLogo [2] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,	subjectLogo [2] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,
	otherLogos [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF OtherLogotypeInfo	otherLogos [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF OtherLogotypeInfo
	OPTIONAL }	OPTIONAL }

	-- Note: At least one of the OPTIONAL components MUST be present	-- Note: At least one of the OPTIONAL components MUST be present


	skipping to change at line 1709 ¶	skipping to change at line 1350 ¶

	LogotypeImage ::= SEQUENCE {	LogotypeImage ::= SEQUENCE {
	imageDetails LogotypeDetails,	imageDetails LogotypeDetails,
	imageInfo LogotypeImageInfo OPTIONAL }	imageInfo LogotypeImageInfo OPTIONAL }

	LogotypeAudio ::= SEQUENCE {	LogotypeAudio ::= SEQUENCE {
	audioDetails LogotypeDetails,	audioDetails LogotypeDetails,
	audioInfo LogotypeAudioInfo OPTIONAL }	audioInfo LogotypeAudioInfo OPTIONAL }

	LogotypeDetails ::= SEQUENCE {	LogotypeDetails ::= SEQUENCE {

	mediaType IA5String, -- MIME media type name and optional	mediaType IA5String, -- Media type name and optional
	-- parameters	-- parameters
	logotypeHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue,	logotypeHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue,
	logotypeURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String }	logotypeURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String }

	LogotypeImageInfo ::= SEQUENCE {	LogotypeImageInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	type [0] LogotypeImageType DEFAULT color,	type [0] LogotypeImageType DEFAULT color,
	fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified	fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified
	xSize INTEGER, -- Horizontal size in pixels	xSize INTEGER, -- Horizontal size in pixels
	ySize INTEGER, -- Vertical size in pixels	ySize INTEGER, -- Vertical size in pixels
	resolution LogotypeImageResolution OPTIONAL,	resolution LogotypeImageResolution OPTIONAL,

	skipping to change at line 1786 ¶	skipping to change at line 1427 ¶

	END	END
	]]></sourcecode>	]]></sourcecode>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="asn1-mod-new">	<section anchor="asn1-mod-new">
	<name>ASN.1 Module with 2002 Syntax</name>	<name>ASN.1 Module with 2002 Syntax</name>
	<t>Some developers like to use the latest version of ASN.1 standards. T his	<t>Some developers like to use the latest version of ASN.1 standards. T his
	appendix provides an ASN.1 module to assist in that goal. It uses the ASN.1	appendix provides an ASN.1 module to assist in that goal. It uses the ASN.1
	syntax defined in <xref target="NEW-ASN1"/>, and it follows the conventions	syntax defined in <xref target="NEW-ASN1"/>, and it follows the conventions
	established in <xref target="RFC5912"/> and <xref target="RFC6268"/>.</t>	established in <xref target="RFC5912"/> and <xref target="RFC6268"/>.</t>

	<t>This ASN.1 module incorporates the module from RFC 3709 and the modul	<t>This ASN.1 module incorporates the module from <xref target="RFC3709"
	e	/> and the module
	from RFC 6170.</t>	from <xref target="RFC6170"/>.</t>
	<t>Note that <xref target="NEW-ASN1"/> was published in 2021, and all of the features	<t>Note that <xref target="NEW-ASN1"/> was published in 2021, and all of the features
	used in this module are backward compatible with the specification	used in this module are backward compatible with the specification
	that was published in 2002.</t>	that was published in 2002.</t>

	<sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="true"><![CDATA[	<sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="true"><![CDATA[
	LogotypeCertExtn	LogotypeCertExtn-2022
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)

	id-mod-logotype(TBD) }	id-mod-logotype-2022(107) }

	DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=	DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
	BEGIN	BEGIN

	IMPORTS	IMPORTS
	EXTENSION	EXTENSION
	FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- RFC 5912	FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- RFC 5912
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
	id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }	id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }

	AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM	AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM
	FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009	FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
	id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) } ;	id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) } ;


		-- Logotype Certificate Extension

	ext-logotype EXTENSION ::= {	ext-logotype EXTENSION ::= {
	SYNTAX LogotypeExtn	SYNTAX LogotypeExtn
	IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-logotype }	IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-logotype }


		-- Logotype Certificate Extension OID

	id-pe-logotype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=	id-pe-logotype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 12 }	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 12 }


		-- Logotype Certificate Extension Syntax

	LogotypeExtn ::= SEQUENCE {	LogotypeExtn ::= SEQUENCE {
	communityLogos [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,	communityLogos [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,
	issuerLogo [1] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,	issuerLogo [1] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,
	subjectLogo [2] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,	subjectLogo [2] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo OPTIONAL,
	otherLogos [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF OtherLogotypeInfo	otherLogos [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF OtherLogotypeInfo
	OPTIONAL }	OPTIONAL }
	-- At least one of the OPTIONAL components MUST be present	-- At least one of the OPTIONAL components MUST be present
	( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., communityLogos PRESENT } \|	( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., communityLogos PRESENT } \|
	WITH COMPONENTS { ..., issuerLogo PRESENT } \|	WITH COMPONENTS { ..., issuerLogo PRESENT } \|

	skipping to change at line 1858 ¶	skipping to change at line 1499 ¶

	LogotypeImage ::= SEQUENCE {	LogotypeImage ::= SEQUENCE {
	imageDetails LogotypeDetails,	imageDetails LogotypeDetails,
	imageInfo LogotypeImageInfo OPTIONAL }	imageInfo LogotypeImageInfo OPTIONAL }

	LogotypeAudio ::= SEQUENCE {	LogotypeAudio ::= SEQUENCE {
	audioDetails LogotypeDetails,	audioDetails LogotypeDetails,
	audioInfo LogotypeAudioInfo OPTIONAL }	audioInfo LogotypeAudioInfo OPTIONAL }

	LogotypeDetails ::= SEQUENCE {	LogotypeDetails ::= SEQUENCE {

	mediaType IA5String, -- MIME media type name and optional	mediaType IA5String, -- Media type name and optional
	-- parameters	-- parameters
	logotypeHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue,	logotypeHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue,
	logotypeURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String }	logotypeURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String }

	LogotypeImageInfo ::= SEQUENCE {	LogotypeImageInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	type [0] LogotypeImageType DEFAULT color,	type [0] LogotypeImageType DEFAULT color,
	fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified	fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified
	xSize INTEGER, -- Horizontal size in pixels	xSize INTEGER, -- Horizontal size in pixels
	ySize INTEGER, -- Vertical size in pixels	ySize INTEGER, -- Vertical size in pixels
	resolution LogotypeImageResolution OPTIONAL,	resolution LogotypeImageResolution OPTIONAL,

	skipping to change at line 1921 ¶	skipping to change at line 1562 ¶
	id-logo-certImage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 3 }	id-logo-certImage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 3 }

	END	END
	]]></sourcecode>	]]></sourcecode>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="examples">	<section anchor="examples">
	<name>Examples</name>	<name>Examples</name>
	<section anchor="example-rfc3709">	<section anchor="example-rfc3709">
	<name>Example from RFC 3709</name>	<name>Example from RFC 3709</name>

	<t>The following example displays a logotype extension containing one
	Issuer logotype using direct addressing. The issuer logotype image is	<t>The following example displays a logotype certificate extension conta
		ining one
		issuer organization logotype using direct addressing. The issuer organization l
		ogotype image is
	of the type image/gif. The logotype image is referenced through	of the type image/gif. The logotype image is referenced through

	one URI and the image is hashed with SHA-256. This example	one URI, and the image is hashed with SHA-256. This example
	is changed from RFC 3709 to use SHA-256 instead of SHA-1.</t>	is changed from <xref target="RFC3709"/> to use SHA-256 instead of SHA-1.</t>
	<t>The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and	<t>The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and
	the length (in decimal).</t>	the length (in decimal).</t>

	<artwork><![CDATA[	<sourcecode type=""><![CDATA[
	30 122: SEQUENCE {	30 122: SEQUENCE {
	06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12)	06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12)
	04 110: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {	04 110: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
	30 108: SEQUENCE {	30 108: SEQUENCE {
	A1 106: [1] {	A1 106: [1] {
	A0 104: [0] {	A0 104: [0] {
	30 102: SEQUENCE {	30 102: SEQUENCE {
	30 100: SEQUENCE {	30 100: SEQUENCE {
	30 98: SEQUENCE {	30 98: SEQUENCE {
	16 9: IA5String 'image/gif'	16 9: IA5String 'image/gif'

	skipping to change at line 1961 ¶	skipping to change at line 1603 ¶
	16 32: IA5String 'http://logo.example.com/logo.gif'	16 32: IA5String 'http://logo.example.com/logo.gif'
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }

	]]></artwork>	]]></sourcecode>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="example-new">	<section anchor="example-new">

	<name>Issuer Logotype Example</name>	<name>Issuer Organization Logotype Example</name>
	<t>The following example displays a logotype extension containing one	<t>The following example displays a logotype certificate extension conta
	Issuer logotype using direct addressing. The issuer logotype image is	ining one
		issuer organization logotype using direct addressing. The issuer organization l
		ogotype image is
	of the type image/jpeg. The logotype image is referenced through	of the type image/jpeg. The logotype image is referenced through

	one URI and the image is hashed with SHA-256.</t>	one URI, and the image is hashed with SHA-256.</t>
	<t>The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and	<t>The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and
	the length (in decimal).</t>	the length (in decimal).</t>

	<artwork><![CDATA[	<sourcecode type=""><![CDATA[
	30 124: SEQUENCE {	30 124: SEQUENCE {
	06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12)	06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12)
	04 112: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {	04 112: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
	30 110: SEQUENCE {	30 110: SEQUENCE {
	A1 108: [1] {	A1 108: [1] {
	A0 106: [0] {	A0 106: [0] {
	30 104: SEQUENCE {	30 104: SEQUENCE {
	30 102: SEQUENCE {	30 102: SEQUENCE {
	30 100: SEQUENCE {	30 100: SEQUENCE {
	16 10: IA5String 'image/jpeg'	16 10: IA5String 'image/jpeg'

	skipping to change at line 2004 ¶	skipping to change at line 1646 ¶
	16 33: IA5String 'http://logo.example.com/logo.jpeg'	16 33: IA5String 'http://logo.example.com/logo.jpeg'
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }

	]]></artwork>	]]></sourcecode>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="example-embed">	<section anchor="example-embed">
	<name>Embedded Image Example</name>	<name>Embedded Image Example</name>

	<t>The following example displays a logotype extension containing one	<t>The following example displays a logotype certificate extension
	Subject logotype using direct addressing. The subject logotype image	containing one subject organization logotype using direct addressing.
	uses image/svg+xml-compressed. The logotype image is embedded in the	The subject organization logotype image uses image/svg+xml+gzip.
	certificate extension with a "data:" URI and the image is hashed by	The logotype image is embedded in the certificate extension with a
	SHA-256. This technique produces a large certificate extension, but	"data:" URI, and the image is hashed by SHA-256. This technique
	offers reduced latency and improved privacy.</t>	produces a large certificate extension but offers reduced latency
	<t>The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and	and improved privacy.</t>
	the length (in decimal).</t>	<t>The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and the
	<artwork><![CDATA[	length (in decimal).</t>
	30 2160: SEQUENCE {	<sourcecode type=""><![CDATA[
		30 2148: SEQUENCE {
	06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12)	06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12)

	04 2146: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {	04 2134: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
	30 2142: SEQUENCE {	30 2130: SEQUENCE {
	A2 2138: [2] {	A2 2126: [2] {
	A0 2134: [0] {	A0 2122: [0] {
	30 2130: SEQUENCE {	30 2118: SEQUENCE {
	30 2126: SEQUENCE {	30 2114: SEQUENCE {
	30 2122: SEQUENCE {	30 2110: SEQUENCE {
	16 24: IA5String 'image/svg+xml-compressed'	16 18: IA5String 'image/svg+xml+gzip'
	30 49: SEQUENCE {	30 49: SEQUENCE {
	30 47: SEQUENCE {	30 47: SEQUENCE {
	30 11: SEQUENCE {	30 11: SEQUENCE {
	06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER	06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
	: sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1)	: sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1)
	: }	: }
	04 32: OCTET STRING	04 32: OCTET STRING
	: C5 AC 94 1A 0A 25 1F B3 16 6F 97 C5 52 40 9B 49	: C5 AC 94 1A 0A 25 1F B3 16 6F 97 C5 52 40 9B 49
	: 9E 7B 92 61 5A B0 A2 6C 19 BF B9 D8 09 C5 D9 E7	: 9E 7B 92 61 5A B0 A2 6C 19 BF B9 D8 09 C5 D9 E7
	: }	: }
	: }	: }

	30 2041: SEQUENCE {	30 2035: SEQUENCE {
	16 2037: IA5String	16 2031: IA5String
	: ''	: ''
	: 'AA2xvZ28tY29weS5zdmcApVbbbhs3EH3nV0y3Lw2Q9fK2JLe'	: '28tY29weS5zdmcApVbbbhs3EH3nV0y3Lw2Q9fK2JLewHDROU'
	: 'wHDROUBRo2iBxW+RRlTa2UFkypIWV5ut7zlB2UqF9cuLlUkt'	: 'BRo2iBxW+RRlTa2UFkypIWV5ut7zlB2UqF9cuLlUktyLmfOz'
	: 'yLmfOzPD8xafbtdyPu/1qu5k17sw2sp/mm+V8vd2Ms2azbV5'	: 'PD8xafbtdyPu/1qu5k17sw2sp/mm+V8vd2Ms2azbV5cmPNvX'
	: 'cmPNvXv16efXh7WvZ31/L299e/vzTpTRt1/0RLrvu1dUref/'	: 'v16efXh7WvZ31/L299e/vzTpTRt1/0RLrvu1dUref/7j+Ktd'
	: '7j+KtdXawsete/9IYaW6m6e77rjscDmeHcLbdXXdX7zpu6t6'	: 'Xawsete/9IYaW6m6e77rjscDmeHcLbdXXdX7zpu6t69vmxxo'
	: '9vmxxon08AREdRDt7tpyWDRRSz7+tgp2b/ew/hEKI5WGoPKy'	: 'n08AREdRDt7tpyWDRRSz7+tgp2b/ew/hEKI5WGoPKyW082s8'
	: 'W082s8SmeWf13NzVyM66ub6ZZk+xXH+9X4+Hl9tOssWLly35'	: 'SmeWf13NzVyM66ub6ZZk+xXH+9X4+Hl9tOssWLly3553ARpd'
	: '53ARpd7txP+7uxx/2d+NiejefVttZ8+nNavkBj9yO40RLb8d'	: '7txP+7uxx/2d+NiejefVttZ8+nNavkBj9yO40RLb8dpvpxP8'
	: 'pvpxP8wtzuRvn07iUP/+Wu+20my9GcWfOPpfDbjVN44YLb8d'	: 'wtzuRvn07iUP/+Wu+20my9GcWfOPpfDbjVN44YLb8dp3Mn7c'
	: 'p3Mn7cb3aXGNCAICCc+a8+yLo/FpwfLP/uN3dzhqdriH5uwf'	: 'b3aXGNCAICCc+a8+yLo/FpwfLP/uN3dzhqdriH5uwfbnj9a+'
	: 'bnj9a+Uz2i/maK66utA+zZ435uFqvZ823R38Q1t32Lw3pZqT'	: 'Uz2i/maK66utA+zZ435uFqvZ823R38Q1t32Lw3pZqThd/PpR'
	: 'hd/PpRpaz5o2LNkocvCzaIm0vrQvSpog359lLy3my0ga+e3H'	: 'paz5o2LNkocvCzaIm0vrQvSpog359lLy3my0ga+e3Hp+B4In'
	: 'p+B4InjVFPD9awdhnrGEFW30Sl/Pnpvta2QBVxUEVxFbJ2VU'	: 'jVFPD9awdhnrGEFW30Sl/Pnpvta2QBVxUEVxFbJ2VUFfYC01'
	: 'FfYC01pUs+O4GK84V/k6CHUFyhvhiDVQF8Y5aPDbmnsrXbS7'	: 'pUs+O4GK84V/k6CHUFyhvhiDVQF8Y5aPDbmnsrXbS74DANjg'
	: '4DANjguwgENZLPwjUYVTRJQgEpiLR0ctiWj+Ig8rCvZAArxK'	: 'uwgENZLPwjUYVTRJQgEpiLR0ctiWj+Ig8rCvZAArxKExEEWM'
	: 'ExEEWMJLqMA1F+ggnsQDXgpQeomJPCVhtCRycNrAWxgAI+g1'	: 'JLqMA1F+ggnsQDXgpQeomJPCVhtCRycNrAWxgAI+g1Qsr6IU'
	: 'Qsr6IUxlomBswjydYBEgOeVCDoRreBjiFjX2SdSA60BP5DgQ'	: 'xlomBswjydYBEgOeVCDoRreBjiFjX2SdSA60BP5DgQM63xoP'
	: 'M63xoPlWHbNq+egAEeAzxyNAdCQz+sDEMOhaGisKJdSlS6gt'	: 'lWHbNq+egAEeAzxyNAdCQz+sDEMOhaGisKJdSlS6gtWWm4M1'
	: 'WWm4M1rQwP0egEBIhhFLoXuCJhR4mT5RJBaiLKqqFROUEzYr'	: 'rQwP0egEBIhhFLoXuCJhR4mT5RJBaiLKqqFROUEzYr1idG0g'
	: '1idG0gahwCzEnk+AMJLdp0FevQQ6VZ+SKOwGlOIJOh1MVjo0'	: 'ahwCzEnk+AMJLdp0FevQQ6VZ+SKOwGlOIJOh1MVjo0eB6DRA'
	: 'eB6DRA10SRpSY6il/eFFKAm+MKSIWNFqSo4OFnORfwH5wJHC'	: '10SRpSY6il/eFFKAm+MKSIWNFqSo4OFnORfwH5wJHCMNM0ql'
	: 'MNM0qlDRlcIwUEkDlgiSBhiEpBgMKOx5FdAYqI3KYewKKkAI'	: 'DRlcIwUEkDlgiSBhiEpBgMKOx5FdAYqI3KYewKKkAItTABTk'
	: 'tTABTkp5khI86kgbOgRywEBR0VGcwAjf8t9wqvdUMG6gLAbI'	: 'p5khI86kgbOgRywEBR0VGcwAjf8t9wqvdUMG6gLAbI0QQ8Cb'
	: '0QQ8CbzCTtCSn/DEhCbm++duQaiRG1mQkdWHnminHA+r5wpL'	: 'zCTtCSn/DEhCbm++duQaiRG1mQkdWHnminHA+r5wpLvsJbCA'
	: 'vsJbCALUKsDW5NAj43J+AD5vpfamUzJqiRJACmCWwIMhQq4H'	: 'LUKsDW5NAj43J+AD5vpfamUzJqiRJACmCWwIMhQq4HmYGKai'
	: 'mYGKaiiJPmIvpS80UzTtAjdSraApQZogslgFcJHw0y5WoEXD'	: 'iJPmIvpS80UzTtAjdSraApQZogslgFcJHw0y5WoEXDYr/aTq'
	: 'Yr/aTqfxk2qhcg3z6ETQL+S18llvHOZQvlEOVEVpzqCozE9V'	: 'fxk2qhcg3z6ETQL+S18llvHOZQvlEOVEVpzqCozE9V6JZhh/'
	: '6JZhh/lCslg7mUFY4AR7IlcApmgV6gz3DCSDe56fQ0SRS7el'	: 'lCslg7mUFY4AR7IlcApmgV6gz3DCSDe56fQ0SRS7el0NJWO8'
	: '0NJWO8mQ6mkc6ylPpaL7QUZ5IR/M/dEwoJiEp+L6iT4cdSyI'	: 'mQ6mkc6ylPpaL7QUZ5IR/M/dEwoJiEp+L6iT4cdSyIp4ljDk'
	: 'p4ljDkoaZpQlgMoz0ApahjTiTWbZYu9v+MUqVjY61j2Bxr68'	: 'oaZpQlgMoz0ApahjTiTWbZYu9v+MUqVjY61j2Bxr68bPF3uS'
	: 'bPF3uS1232qAyAQDMhr4MRyVZq5l2QcuwgY/oTozbgoIKycH'	: '1232qAyAQDMhr4MRyVZq5l2QcuwgY/oTozbgoIKycH+yQxhz'
	: '+yQxhzQsPJQ/ne9OmRKvYH1AeKA/EQRtzrmaYUiHUhpJOW4b'	: 'QsPJQ/ne9OmRKvYH1AeKA/EQRtzrmaYUiHUhpJOW4breSaxZ'
	: 'reSaxZ/TVc3ZAQJKOagAJiw6pRHVkBMIBa5E+SUMWi0ZNW1R'	: '/TVc3ZAQJKOagAJiw6pRHVkBMIBa5E+SUMWi0ZNW1Rfn/xQX'
	: 'fn/xQXywHXyMHN5G8WF6gZ2IVjANHMIJQ1lAJQE8MJjZHJiU'	: 'ywHXyMHN5G8WF6gZ2IVjANHMIJQ1lAJQE8MJjZHJiUtQZAWz'
	: 'tQZAWzmkisDywTVWSqLkkQG2NNB3wwyaerqRGLNKpvwUOhaQ'	: 'mkisDywTVWSqLkkQG2NNB3wwyaerqRGLNKpvwUOhaQFiYcqv'
	: 'FiYcqviSjvp1n8WnRRzXFs9IXDxiiDd8HU/ROoAGn9+QgTPE'	: 'iSjvp1n8WnRRzXFs9IXDxiiDd8HU/ROoAGn9+QgTPEVu6HaN'
	: 'Vu6HaN6i0VPuv1SCzwyZeHwBA1EjFYoAk2jJ3OFeJ5Gp1E+3'	: '6i0VPuv1SCzwyZeHwBA1EjFYoAk2jJ3OFeJ5Gp1E+3Dlf3Aj'
	: 'Dlf3Aj70bbvmag5oyKHunVyGPq6+EnvTua/JUn3iadMHlqUa'	: '70bbvmag5oyKHunVyGPq6+EnvTua/JUn3iadMHlqUapsK2T8'
	: 'psK2T8SwCBJUF1JnEmhu0ntBthJoQpZqumsBk5mA1hRc0LR5'	: 'SwCBJUF1JnEmhu0ntBthJoQpZqumsBk5mA1hRc0LR5ZFerdj'
	: 'ZFerdjksaCqt3IUWXcXW16vb6xdWyHLTgCaKXWKUKK1kOp9H'	: 'ksaCqt3IUWXcXW16vb6xdWyHLTgCaKXWKUKK1kOp9HK5B3EL'
	: 'K5B3ELjSdXb0loB5RYtS01L6h9yTPW51Wpqwgosr5I927aw6'	: 'jSdXb0loB5RYtS01L6h9yTPW51Wpqwgosr5I927aw6401+Yf'
	: '401+YfwDria4WoQwAAA=='	: 'wDria4WoQwAAA=='
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }

	]]></artwork>	]]></sourcecode>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="example-rfc6170">	<section anchor="example-rfc6170">
	<name>Embedded Certificate Image Example</name>	<name>Embedded Certificate Image Example</name>

	<t>The following example displays a logotype extension containing one	<t>The following example displays a logotype certificate extension
	Certificate Image logotype using direct addressing. The Certificate	containing one certificate image logotype using direct addressing.
	Image logotype uses image/svg+xml-compressed. The logotype image	The certificate image logotype uses image/svg+xml+gzip. The
	is embedded in the certificate extension with a "data:" URI and the	logotype image is embedded in the certificate extension with a
	image is hashed by SHA-256. This example contains the image from	"data:" URI, and the image is hashed by SHA-256. This example
	Appendix B of RFC 6170, however, the media type used here is explicit	contains the image from <xref target="RFC6170" sectionFormat="of" section="B"/>;
	about the use of GZIP compression <xref target="RFC1952"/>.</t>	however, the media
	<t>The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and	type used here is explicit about the use of GZIP compression
	the length (in decimal).</t>	<xref target="RFC1952"/>.</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[	<t>The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and the
	30 2914: SEQUENCE {	length (in decimal).</t>
		<sourcecode type=""><![CDATA[
		30 2902: SEQUENCE {
	06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12)	06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12)

	04 2900: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {	04 2888: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
	30 2896: SEQUENCE {	30 2884: SEQUENCE {
	A3 2892: [3] {	A3 2880: [3] {
	30 2888: SEQUENCE {	30 2876: SEQUENCE {
	30 2884: SEQUENCE {	30 2872: SEQUENCE {
	06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 20 3'	06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 20 3'

	A0 2870: [0] {	A0 2858: [0] {
	30 2866: SEQUENCE {	30 2854: SEQUENCE {
	30 2862: SEQUENCE {	30 2850: SEQUENCE {
	30 2858: SEQUENCE {	30 2846: SEQUENCE {
	16 24: IA5String 'image/svg+xml-compressed'	16 18: IA5String 'image/svg+xml+gzip'
	30 49: SEQUENCE {	30 49: SEQUENCE {
	30 47: SEQUENCE {	30 47: SEQUENCE {
	30 11: SEQUENCE {	30 11: SEQUENCE {
	06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER	06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
	: sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1)	: sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1)
	: }	: }
	04 32: OCTET STRING	04 32: OCTET STRING
	: 83 14 B3 26 9B D3 8B 0B 2A E6 6E 42 74 E2 A7 57	: 83 14 B3 26 9B D3 8B 0B 2A E6 6E 42 74 E2 A7 57
	: 7A 40 B7 E1 2E 53 42 44 CC 7C AE 14 68 1B 0E B6	: 7A 40 B7 E1 2E 53 42 44 CC 7C AE 14 68 1B 0E B6
	: }	: }
	: }	: }

	30 2777: SEQUENCE {	30 2771: SEQUENCE {
	16 2773: IA5String	16 2767: IA5String
	: ''	: ''
	: 'AA0NlcnRJbWFnZURlbW8uc3ZnANVaW2/bOBZ+n19BqBigwdo'	: 'nRJbWFnZURlbW8uc3ZnANVaW2/bOBZ+n19BqBigwdoS7xK9j'
	: 'S7xK9jmeapB0EWHQHzez2WZZoR1tZMiQ5jvvr95CSL7Gl1Em'	: 'meapB0EWHQHzez2WZZoR1tZMiQ5jvvr95CSL7Gl1Em8C9d9i'
	: '8C9d9iERSPOd85+O5EB3+9jhL0YMuyiTPLh3iYgfpLMrjJJt'	: 'ERSPOd85+O5EB3+9jhL0YMuyiTPLh3iYgfpLMrjJJteOv/66'
	: 'eOv/661M/cFBZhVkcpnmmL50sd34b/TIsH6YoiS+da11UySS'	: '1M/cFBZhVkcpnmmL50sd34b/TIsH6YoiS+da11UySSJwkqj2'
	: 'Jwkqj21k41Q6CDbNyUMSTS+e+quYDz1sul+6SuXkx9YhSysP'	: '1k41Q6CDbNyUMSTS+e+quYDz1sul+6SuXkx9YhSysPUo7QPK'
	: 'Uo7QPK/rlKqvCx35Wvmu+a/uGYow9EOigh0Qvr/LHSwcjjDj'	: '/rlKqvCx35Wvmu+a/uGYow9EOigh0Qvr/LHSwcjjDjGiGHQ9'
	: 'GiGHQ914n0/sKlMf4Vwctk7i6X7/sGEYdNA5L/WeRT5IUDKm'	: '14n0/sKlMf4Vwctk7i6X7/sGEYdNA5L/WeRT5IUDKmSbLVWN'
	: 'SbLVWNoo2cqNCh1XyoKN8Nsuz0iqwVW8Qb1fOF0Vqp+PI06m'	: 'oo2cqNCh1XyoKN8Nsuz0iqwVW8Qb1fOF0Vqp+PI06me6awqP'
	: 'e6awqPeISzxn9goYzXYVxWIUWpfWLCMwcGoLpgy83n8wzGkb'	: 'eISzxn9goYzXYVxWIUWpfWLCMwcGoLpgy83n8wzGkbR4Gtef'
	: 'R4GtefENmMBznC7DEroKpOBpM8mIWVqPEYGtA+BvoMfS2E5u'	: 'ENmMBznC7DEroKpOBpM8mIWVqPEYGtA+BvoMfS2E5uF1Wqu7'
	: 'F1Wqu7R6FLvNFEelWReNolpiV3l2VpGntMW9nk6RKdf0+9Br'	: 'R6FLvNFEelWReNolpiV3l2VpGntMW9nk6RKdf0+9BrFrMbeV'
	: 'FrMbeVuWhtzbHvMR6UlobPyVpBWjXBk7six2vH5nCwY6nXCo'	: 'uWhtzbHvMR6UlobPyVpBWjXBk7six2vH5nCwY6nXCo5xb7Yu'
	: '5xb7YusvFVPqCOGh16fSxSxglmPkScLfvmDDmC4FlDc1wov8'	: 'svFVPqCOGh16fSxSxglmPkScLfvmDDmC4FlDc1wov8IF2WZh'
	: 'IF2WZhNlVumgEPRliimDD3PhGPyTgUUMC6lKqKAjxaptq1bo'	: 'NlVumgEPRliimDD3PhGPyTgUUMC6lKqKAjxaptq1boUJvQFs'
	: 'UJvQFsvi+LOJyxZkPE/vCwHuAmXmoj1AarnRBatzqkbv7cK5'	: 'vi+LOJyxZkPE/vCwHuAmXmoj1AarnRBatzqkbv7cK5Ls2ORf'
	: 'Ls2ORfwM/vsOG5lURZqXxOnDXPKZw5t5jVzIhFKO0B6D6hAR'	: 'wM/vsOG5lURZqXxOnDXPKZw5t5jVzIhFKO0B6D6hARSXDR6F'
	: 'SXDR6Fzqq7H7mQeJAOQiUSPvFIrUHOfuui3zrFI5dYVeAmpc'	: 'zqq7H7mQeJAOQiUSPvFIrUHOfuui3zrFI5dYVeAmpcOcOb9u'
	: 'OcOb9u63vLjae4kYX4yRifYPrTa2SlMigYdO+cEWeGADMLZL'	: '63vLjae4kYX4yRifYPrTa2SlMigYdO+cEWeGADMLZLH96SH4'
	: 'H96SH4R9xRYApl6q3Y02f+NzlRAl+cZSKhB6qSIVa80fsqMn'	: 'R9xRYApl6q3Y02f+NzlRAl+cZSKhB6qSIVa80fsqMnWOqZJp'
	: 'WOqZJpmsXwAPoyNaQ95uNIGasKPwhxGzQzOXzMIIzBKabmLI'	: 'msXwAPoyNaQ95uNIGasKPwhxGzQzOXzMIIzBKabmLIil470z'
	: 'il470zfSjWWn+kvpvLQ9g1l3yRIc8gukz0uysEcakcDfy3KM'	: 'fSjWWn+kvpvLQ9g1l3yRIc8gukz0uysEcakcDfy3KMk+l0SO'
	: 'k+l0SOXlOopltJL7EPtUlzZfP4tnM70k8xkKCySt92MwfIXP'	: 'XlOopltJL7EPtUlzZfP4tnM70k8xkKCySt92MwfIXPoTe0pn'
	: 'oTe0pnu4dYbp7hJ/kxWySN0ey0o/1qbiCsxDXJMWWo37QekB'	: 'u4dYbp7hJ/kxWySN0ey0o/1qbiCsxDXJMWWo37QekBcAUFPS'
	: 'cAUFPSGkPCnUJF5wwBacDK5cGlEp4BC2lYoJcrNNGVc7DzIq'	: 'GkPCnUJF5wwBacDK5cGlEp4BC2lYoJcrNNGVc7DzIqxT4CKs'
	: 'xT4CKsPlrAG8mL8whRejiQe9EmImIAoz3sds9NxP4RZEzugq'	: 'PlrAG8mL8whRejiQe9EmImIAoz3sds9NxP4RZEzugqzb7c3Q'
	: 'zb7c3Q89u3WQKY9aegbsA/AUJB/bJs6pfJt9BHFEuk5DWITz'	: '89u3WQKY9aegbsA/AUJB/bJs6pfJt9BHFEuk5DWITzOH5uZS'
	: 'OH5uZSThLUsDjQ5GE6RMsyihMTaQLfA6BIiAQMAhnHHN1sd6'	: 'ThLUsDjQ5GE6RMsyihMTaQLfA6BIiAQMAhnHHN1sd61WtUhD'
	: '1WtUhDVJiuhkrdBXd740+hLB9Vm1HjQe4ywLOBLWOMMiyQAX'	: 'VJiuhkrdBXd740+hLB9Vm1HjQe4ywLOBLWOMMiyQAXNB8sm9'
	: 'NB8sm9Gx2qdGgGkMG6wY8aLfqgH4dfnmrVc+pPrE/Z/QnZOs'	: 'Gx2qdGgGkMG6wY8aLfqgH4dfnmrVc+pPrE/Z/QnZOs8C1Okb'
	: '8C1Okb2/ggwLdxlDC1D6DFPZDD98txv8xQf5TEc7Ax6ZyaDf'	: '2/ggwLdxlDC1D6DFPZDD98txv8xQf5TEc7Ax6ZyaDf6BC4Sy'
	: '6BC4SylWKCMqtizp80+UMchATal63qHq0M3ZTs83Ob/XO6LY'	: 'lWKCMqtizp80+UMchATal63qHq0M3ZTs83Ob/XO6LYsFzpGV'
	: 'sFzpGVY5+iLxdWvwY+NaKoR/0iJIXL3dBjT2hG+wO+NXm53X'	: 'Y5+iLxdWvwY+NaKoR/0iJIXL3dBjT2hG+wO+NXm53XStSh1e'
	: 'StSh1eogfeojV35BTOaqh/cmPUe2Mdp91pQp2CjWOO2k7Oam'	: 'ogfeojV35BTOaqh/cmPUe2Mdp91pQp2CjWOO2k7OamhjU1HB'
	: 'hjU1HB3DLGm66n6iajz4bqn2oICmNFxDR/x2mC5s+rKhlkUA'	: '3DLGm66n6iajz4bqn2oICmNFxDR/x2mC5s+rKhlkUA3Ne3P8'
	: '3Ne3P8lgP0qJfjf9uvu+HWXSfFwNoH4uqGUmTadYMtOc7yjE'	: 'lgP0qJfjf9uvu+HWXSfFwNoH4uqGUmTadYMtOc7yjEEd9EUh'
	: 'Ed9EUhkwEEOcDSHKQ+yhnSvUYRH8miQo2FK5TCjWZZGWKB8i'	: 'kwEEOcDSHKQ+yhnSvUYRH8miQo2FK5TCjWZZGWKB8iHPud16'
	: 'HPud16wApnCvTOzjIFAj9TQdCxa+ddOTizaa1xJvD0qMrKx+'	: 'wApnCvTOzjIFAj9TQdCxa+ddOTizaa1xJvD0qMrKx+Ydaj6i'
	: 'Ydaj6iwJQG0vaSdYWpTv4HwVRAP3Z6ONjOJunEIeKRVmhujp'	: 'wJQG0vaSdYWpTv4HwVRAP3Z6ONjOJunEIeKRVmhujpA2+wPm'
	: 'A2+wPmQR9WFQAFhh9bGQzFEXX+WwOnXq8pV35P2Acdn0pGeb'	: 'QR9WFQAFhh9bGQzFEXX+WwOnXq8pV35P2Acdn0pGebcMg7Og'
	: 'cMg7OgQKaEdOKEAkFlk/9HuEKGBVwucc4AjnJ/LBYU09hVwW'	: 'QKaEdOKEAkFlk/9HuEKGBVwucc4AjnJ/LBYU09hVwWY1F0Hl'
	: 'Y1F0HlBUC2lbyIuYF58O8p+adMwUt9YAoX/IwRtAC9NAdBAy'	: 'BUC2lbyIuYF58O8p+adMwUt9YAoX/IwRtAC9NAdBAyGuEB3V'
	: 'GuEB3VR59u8/TGYx9/Xjz8bPB/Z/F9B0SghBK+4xxfiwtr0G'	: 'R59u8/TGYx9/Xjz8bPB/Z/F9B0SghBK+4xxfiwtr0GXECqed'
	: 'XECqedQQ9PRVpEAQ+26MidbGSmPm8RwRzcQsT17EPSmoorH3'	: 'QQ9PRVpEAQ+26MidbGSmPm8RwRzcQsT17EPSmoorH3+av4Jc'
	: '+av4Jcj78O/vIp/uzMEkHKAE6/F7VHHSj8HddR0Q3ymcGZfR'	: 'j78O/vIp/uzMEkHKAE6/F7VHHSj8HddR0Q3ymcGZfRVjwfmO'
	: 'VjwfmOnNn3GuWR+FzhcPmPqiptHcayacT28T8j3Cs0/LQCwo'	: 'nNn3GuWR+FzhcPmPqiptHcayacT28T8j3Cs0/LQCwo6J2iYx'
	: '6J2iYxP4R58AsobjFegusoJhuq7VNS2evRPcqASvQki+gbkB'	: 'P4R58AsobjFegusoJhuq7VNS2evRPcqASvQki+gbkBYwETNP'
	: 'YwETNPt/1A2pT6UErR1zMzUITZRvF5Lp5basO1fk2U4aBSjk'	: 't/1A2pT6UErR1zMzUITZRvF5Lp5basO1fk2U4aBSjkji8quL'
	: 'ji8quL3cDyW7TpI3unxezMcSTNhQJhfpGctKgKN2Amo7/7Sh'	: '3cDyW7TpI3unxezMcSTNhQJhfpGctKgKN2Amo7/7ShSev4oX'
	: 'Sev4oXicPSYS+6GkCm9a1Qw3VEchCUA+z5HtTcbQhK6F14YF'	: 'icPSYS+6GkCm9a1Qw3VEchCUA+z5HtTcbQhK6F14YFUp+Yn7'
	: 'Up+Yn7WgmzwpZCDf5DDiXT9B7U6RdHAHpdb7IqmLVjqZSLnT'	: 'WgmzwpZCDf5DDiXT9B7U6RdHAHpdb7IqmLVjqZSLnTW61zjQ'
	: 'W61zjQ7/G7D3hm9E846uTDZoNMADmLlm7IG2ieXfUtu1US9T'	: '7/G7D3hm9E846uTDZoNMADmLlm7IG2ieXfUtu1US9TeNGUHi'
	: 'eNGUHibE9Nv//2jRJGZfQmK3v7ykJJOv1IXjBsDCPpmgWppe'	: 'bE9Nv//2jRJGZfQmK3v7ykJJOv1IXjBsDCPpmgWppe6sHxR3'
	: '6sHxR3KVSQKqp+WIqammuJbtqkxZmMHry4oS/9pLhdCXKq8u'	: 'KVSQKqp+WIqammuJbtqkxZmMHry4oS/9pLhdCXKq8uR0R+LD'
	: 'R0R+LDEqCKRxqc5VXdvPvIP+ggwR0RkyBfO9iKZvrWGAKVdz'	: 'EqCKRxqc5VXdvPvIP+ggwR0RkyBfO9iKZvrWGAKVdz31cuoc'
	: '31cuocvoO/qemClFMYEFEH7oI+vpkek4s4bCMBqK+5mHQUlD'	: 'voO/qemClFMYEFEH7oI+vpkek4s4bCMBqK+5mHQUlDpE/oyl'
	: 'pE/oylpy+2/6pWXK31PEYagP04epV1cE50UMy6IQZeQM7+Ol'	: 'py+2/6pWXK31PEYagP04epV1cE50UMy6IQZeQM7+Ol74Z+eH'
	: '74Z+eHfpHNc7OjffQ/HeV0X8BopoDkGEkAAA='	: 'fpHNc7OjffQ/HeV0X8BopoDkGEkAAA='
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }

	]]></artwork>	]]></sourcecode>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="example-full-cert">	<section anchor="example-full-cert">
	<name>Full Certificate Example</name>	<name>Full Certificate Example</name>
	<t>The following example contains a certificate for Alice; it is	<t>The following example contains a certificate for Alice; it is
	essentially a renewal of the certificate that appears in <xref target="RFC9216"/ >.	essentially a renewal of the certificate that appears in <xref target="RFC9216"/ >.
	Of course, the serial number and issue dates are different. In	Of course, the serial number and issue dates are different. In

	addition, Alice's certificate now has a logotype extension. The	addition, Alice's certificate now has a logotype certificate extension. The
	extension contains URLs for two community logotype images, both at	extension contains URLs for two community logotype images, both at
	fictional URLs. The extension also contains URLs for two subject	fictional URLs. The extension also contains URLs for two subject

	logotype images, both at fictional URLs. An implementation would	organization logotype images, both at fictional URLs. An implementation would
	display at most three of these images, both of the community logotype	display at most three of these images, both of the community logotype

	images and one of the subject logotype images. Direct addressing is	images and one of the subject organization logotype images. Direct addressing i s
	used for all of the images, and the images are hashed by SHA-256.</t>	used for all of the images, and the images are hashed by SHA-256.</t>

	<artwork><![CDATA[	<sourcecode type=""><![CDATA[
	-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----	-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
	MIIFpTCCBI2gAwIBAgITN0EFee11f0Kpolw69Phqzpqx1zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQ0F	MIIFpTCCBI2gAwIBAgITN0EFee11f0Kpolw69Phqzpqx1zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQ0F
	ADBVMQ0wCwYDVQQKEwRJRVRGMREwDwYDVQQLEwhMQU1QUyBXRzExMC8GA1UEAxMo	ADBVMQ0wCwYDVQQKEwRJRVRGMREwDwYDVQQLEwhMQU1QUyBXRzExMC8GA1UEAxMo
	U2FtcGxlIExBTVBTIFJTQSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTAgFw0yMjA2	U2FtcGxlIExBTVBTIFJTQSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTAgFw0yMjA2
	MTUxODE4MThaGA8yMDUyMDkyNzA2NTQxOFowOzENMAsGA1UEChMESUVURjERMA8G	MTUxODE4MThaGA8yMDUyMDkyNzA2NTQxOFowOzENMAsGA1UEChMESUVURjERMA8G
	A1UECxMITEFNUFMgV0cxFzAVBgNVBAMTDkFsaWNlIExvdmVsYWNlMIIBIjANBgkq	A1UECxMITEFNUFMgV0cxFzAVBgNVBAMTDkFsaWNlIExvdmVsYWNlMIIBIjANBgkq
	hkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAtPSJ6Fg4Fj5Nmn9PkrYo0jTkfCv4TfA/	hkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAtPSJ6Fg4Fj5Nmn9PkrYo0jTkfCv4TfA/
	pdO/KLpZbJOAEr0sI7AjaO7B1GuMUFJeSTulamNfCwDcDkY63PQWl+DILs7GxVwX	pdO/KLpZbJOAEr0sI7AjaO7B1GuMUFJeSTulamNfCwDcDkY63PQWl+DILs7GxVwX
	urhYdZlaV5hcUqVAckPvedDBc/3rz4D/esFfs+E7QMFtmd+K04s+A8TCNO12DRVB	urhYdZlaV5hcUqVAckPvedDBc/3rz4D/esFfs+E7QMFtmd+K04s+A8TCNO12DRVB
	DpbP4JFD9hsc8prDtpGmFk7rd0q8gqnhxBW2RZAeLqzJOMayCQtws1q7ktkNBR2w	DpbP4JFD9hsc8prDtpGmFk7rd0q8gqnhxBW2RZAeLqzJOMayCQtws1q7ktkNBR2w

	skipping to change at line 2249 ¶	skipping to change at line 1893 ¶
	bXBsZS9sb2dvLmdpZjBmMGQWCmltYWdlL2pwZWcwMTAvMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAQQg	bXBsZS9sb2dvLmdpZjBmMGQWCmltYWdlL2pwZWcwMTAvMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAQQg
	vct7dXJtjBszpCzerHly2krZ8nmEClhYas4vAoDq16UwIxYhaHR0cDovL3d3dy5z	vct7dXJtjBszpCzerHly2krZ8nmEClhYas4vAoDq16UwIxYhaHR0cDovL3d3dy5z
	bWltZS5leGFtcGxlL2xvZ28uanBnMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBDQUAA4IBAQBbjdCNVFA/	bWltZS5leGFtcGxlL2xvZ28uanBnMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBDQUAA4IBAQBbjdCNVFA/
	emCc5uKX5WSPrdvRFZSs57SEhE0odxvhTrOs13VM8Om0TxhNJ0Pl6d9CJdbUxtFw	emCc5uKX5WSPrdvRFZSs57SEhE0odxvhTrOs13VM8Om0TxhNJ0Pl6d9CJdbUxtFw
	SSnSu9fnghDO7OZDJnPiIYLNY5eTTzY6sx85mde9TLaBTE7RZf0W7NV0hqDqcfM+	SSnSu9fnghDO7OZDJnPiIYLNY5eTTzY6sx85mde9TLaBTE7RZf0W7NV0hqDqcfM+
	9HnQrU4TtPSvtPS5rr5SvqkaMM0k89bpbkgZlh9HH14+x+DIeT0dLythiXJvkVod	9HnQrU4TtPSvtPS5rr5SvqkaMM0k89bpbkgZlh9HH14+x+DIeT0dLythiXJvkVod
	qEfyZTcdplQHQ4szWO7lsjmvHrUIbS1tdAJnah8AZRZfqiJEFeiUp06hvAWnPc3y	qEfyZTcdplQHQ4szWO7lsjmvHrUIbS1tdAJnah8AZRZfqiJEFeiUp06hvAWnPc3y
	1TMwYI8onfwPIVzyT6YLgjiT6PuLwSB/wtlhI+vWfdINaHdotegjawLm/3jZ+ceN	1TMwYI8onfwPIVzyT6YLgjiT6PuLwSB/wtlhI+vWfdINaHdotegjawLm/3jZ+ceN
	tu39FvbV0uKJ	tu39FvbV0uKJ
	-----END CERTIFICATE-----	-----END CERTIFICATE-----

	]]></artwork>	]]></sourcecode>
	<t>The following displays the logotype extension from Alice's	<t>The following displays the logotype certificate extension from Alice
		's
	certificate. The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal)	certificate. The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal)
	and the length (in decimal).</t>	and the length (in decimal).</t>

	<artwork><![CDATA[	<sourcecode type=""><![CDATA[
	30 464: SEQUENCE {	30 464: SEQUENCE {
	06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12)	06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12)
	04 450: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {	04 450: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
	30 446: SEQUENCE {	30 446: SEQUENCE {
	A0 227: [0] {	A0 227: [0] {
	30 224: SEQUENCE {	30 224: SEQUENCE {
	A0 111: [0] {	A0 111: [0] {
	30 109: SEQUENCE {	30 109: SEQUENCE {
	30 107: SEQUENCE {	30 107: SEQUENCE {
	30 105: SEQUENCE {	30 105: SEQUENCE {

	skipping to change at line 2355 ¶	skipping to change at line 1999 ¶
	16 33: IA5String 'http://www.smime.example/logo.jpg'	16 33: IA5String 'http://www.smime.example/logo.jpg'
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }
	: }	: }

	]]></artwork>	]]></sourcecode>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="changes">	<section anchor="changes">

	<name>Changes Since RFC 3709 and RFC 6170</name>	<name>Changes since RFCs 3709 and 6170</name>
	<t>This appendix summarizes the changes since RFC 3709. The changes are:<	<t>This appendix summarizes the changes since <xref target="RFC3709"/>. T
	/t>	he changes are:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">	<ul spacing="normal">

	<li>Combine RFC 3709 and RFC 6170 into one document, and encourage	<li>Combine RFCs 3709 and 6170 into one document, and encourage
	implementers to support the "data" URI scheme (data:...) that was	implementers to support the "data" URI scheme (data:...) that was

	originally specified in RFC 6170. Merging RFC 3709 and RFC 6170 lead	originally specified in RFC 6170. Merging RFCs 3709 and 6170 led
	to many editoral changes throughout the document.</li>	to many editorial changes throughout the document.</li>
	<li>Drop SHA-1 as the mandatory-to-implement hash algorithm, and encoura ge	<li>Drop SHA-1 as the mandatory-to-implement hash algorithm, and encoura ge
	use of the one-way hash function that is employed by the certificate	use of the one-way hash function that is employed by the certificate
	signature algorithm.</li>	signature algorithm.</li>
	<li>RFC 3709 required client applications to support both direct and ind irect	<li>RFC 3709 required client applications to support both direct and ind irect
	addressing. This requirement is changed to <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support both d irect and	addressing. This requirement is changed to <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support both d irect and
	indirect addressing to allow implementations to be more privacy preserving.</li>	indirect addressing to allow implementations to be more privacy preserving.</li>
	<li>Update the reference for language tags to be RFC 5646 instead of	<li>Update the reference for language tags to be RFC 5646 instead of
	the now obsolete RFC 3066.</li>	the now obsolete RFC 3066.</li>
	<li>Update the reference for the URI Generic Syntax to be RFC 3986 inste ad	<li>Update the reference for the URI Generic Syntax to be RFC 3986 inste ad
	of the now obsolete RFC 2396.</li>	of the now obsolete RFC 2396.</li>
	<li>Update the reference for the application/pdf media type to be RFC 81 18	<li>Update the reference for the application/pdf media type to be RFC 81 18
	instead of the now obsolete RFC 3778.</li>	instead of the now obsolete RFC 3778.</li>
	<li>No longer require support for the FTP scheme (ftp://...) URI.</li>	<li>No longer require support for the FTP scheme (ftp://...) URI.</li>
	<li>Require support for the HTTP scheme (http://...) URI and the	<li>Require support for the HTTP scheme (http://...) URI and the

	HTTPS scheme (https://...) URI.</li>	HTTPS scheme (https://...) URI.</li>
		<li>Provide syntax of the "data" URI scheme using modern ABNF.</li>
	<li>Require support for the compressed SVG image format with the	<li>Require support for the compressed SVG image format with the
	image/svg+xml+gzip media type.</li>	image/svg+xml+gzip media type.</li>
	<li>Media types <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> follow the ABNF <xref target="RFC523 4"/> that is	<li>Media types <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> follow the ABNF <xref target="RFC523 4"/> that is

	provided in Section 4.2 of <xref target="RFC6838"/>. This change resolves	provided in <xref target="RFC9110" sectionFormat="of" section="8.3.1"/>. This c hange resolves
	Errata ID 2679.</li>	Errata ID 2679.</li>
	<li>Remove the requirement that the LogotypeData file name have	<li>Remove the requirement that the LogotypeData file name have
	a file extension of ".LTD". This change resolves Errata ID 2325.</li>	a file extension of ".LTD". This change resolves Errata ID 2325.</li>
	<li>Encourage, instead of requiring, each logotype to be represented by	<li>Encourage, instead of requiring, each logotype to be represented by
	at least one image.</li>	at least one image.</li>
	<li>Encourage the inclusion of text-based audio data suitable for	<li>Encourage the inclusion of text-based audio data suitable for

	processing by a text-to-speech software using the MIME type of	processing by a text-to-speech software using the media type of
	"text/plain;charset=UTF-8".</li>	"text/plain;charset=UTF-8".</li>
	<li>Encourage the use of dithering if an image needs to be scaled.</li>	<li>Encourage the use of dithering if an image needs to be scaled.</li>

	<li>Require that the logotype extension not contain more than one certif icate	<li>Require that the logotype certificate extension not contain more tha n one certificate
	image logotype.</li>	image logotype.</li>
	<li>Privacy-related topics that were previously discussed in the Securit y	<li>Privacy-related topics that were previously discussed in the Securit y
	Considerations section are now covered in a separate Privacy Considerations	Considerations section are now covered in a separate Privacy Considerations
	section. Additional topics are covered in both sections.</li>	section. Additional topics are covered in both sections.</li>
	<li>Provide ASN.1 modules for both the older syntax <xref target="OLD-AS N1"/> and the most	<li>Provide ASN.1 modules for both the older syntax <xref target="OLD-AS N1"/> and the most
	recent ASN.1 syntax <xref target="NEW-ASN1"/>.</li>	recent ASN.1 syntax <xref target="NEW-ASN1"/>.</li>
	<li>Provide additional references.</li>	<li>Provide additional references.</li>
	<li>Provide additional examples.</li>	<li>Provide additional examples.</li>
	<li>Several editorial changes to improve clarity.</li>	<li>Several editorial changes to improve clarity.</li>

	<li>The example in Appendix B.1 was changed to use SHA-256 instead of SH A-1.</li>	<li>The example in <xref target="example-rfc3709"/> was changed to use S HA-256 instead of SHA-1.</li>
	</ul>	</ul>
	</section>	</section>

	</back>	<section anchor="acks" numbered="false">
	<!-- ##markdown-source:	<name>Acknowledgments</name>
	H4sIAJ2dlmMAA+y96XbiWLIw+l9PoZv1o5zHYDMbsr869zDa2EwGPPbqdZcA	<ul spacing="normal">
	AbKFhCUBxnnye5b7LPfJbkTsQVtCuLKq+wzfOp3dq9tI2lPs2DFH7HQ6rfmB	<li><t>Acknowledgments from RFC 3709</t>
	4cz+H8N2HfObHngbU7PWHv3lB7lMppLJaTN36hgreD3zjHmQtsxgnraN1dpP	<t>This document is the result of contributions from many
	e/Np/iJTmVh+OpvRpkbwTfeDmeZOfNc2A9P/puPrlF7KXsBr1/FNx9/A019x	professionals. The authors appreciate contributions from all members
	oF+1tfVN0/XAncKTven/Cj981ws8c+4rT/Yr9UFgBTZM5de2E5ieYwb641kx	of the IETF PKIX Working Group. We extend a special thanks to <contact fullname
	U9EHm4ltTfUbc6+3nbln+DDCNNh48GnHXbjBfm36uuXwr+umF1hzCyaMXRqT	="Al
	iWduf/dDzd9MVpbvW64zhq++6e3muKUZnml800fmdONZwV573cFzPrV0A+Gl	Arsenault"/>, <contact fullname="David Cross"/>, <contact fullname="Tim Polk"/>,
	zaDxNz2XyeXSWfhvVtOMTbB0vW9aWmdwHQXm3HD0kQENfd91YNWut4COGr45	<contact fullname="Russel Weiser"/>, <contact fullname="Terry Hayes"/>, <contac
	1UeuvQlgUF+v1uCNmG3sJbxZu7CZNoI0rbdcz391LGfhT/aO3p6Z1GtaHzXT	t fullname="Alex
	uVxev8jonY0zg0dTd+ME3h4m0YRf5sqwbNxE/98Mw0jDCGdTdyUnOtz4vn7l	Deacon"/>, <contact fullname="Andrew Hoag"/>, <contact fullname="Randy Sabett"/>
	bnzb3ItJ3lsLy5YASOmdTl2ZZfQtbidsrwl4UsyWdICPY/pby7ZNfegaNB34	, <contact fullname="Denis Pinkas"/>, <contact fullname="Magnus Nystrom"/>, <con
	6pt+BfCbuU5Kv6/SFGcEQEQiZcJ3o3DCSzanf9vicPFZj2Emrqe3YOCVIYFb	tact fullname="Ryan
	XRkfrqM/mBOYnre1pqavTC9byZb1crDUq1tTTmtkGgFgX0p/CKdVKWcz2WPT	Hurst"/>, and <contact fullname="Phil Griffin"/> for their efforts and support.<
	miMyw9j/ZtBgkVl1YEsMbwYLh1MB+GDLic3cialMJV8o6gPDe8WpOBtlNoAy	/t>
	19A4pdeV6RSz2aNQsj021r8ZOATNRrOcueutjMDamog5w1a9WMnm+J+lbDEr	<t><contact fullname="Russ Housley"/> thanks the management at RSA Labor
	/syVyvzPcjYr/sTjLb+9yPA/L8pF8UElWxKdVXLZkvwzT9/2O410ddSjMYAQ	atories, especially
	GN4CF7wMgrX/7fx8t9udWcHmzHKCc8+cno/Tw2Y9/XiWy5TPTYc1YdRgtDan	<contact fullname="Burt Kaliski"/>, who supported the development of this specif
	7JjCUdDduV6dAPSMaaCP9k5gvOs9N2Dv+o6pn8CQZ9mv1IE4ivh3msG/Xm+P	ication. The
	x/SAndxspVzGY4tPgBIBGQsAiKIJfa0PTQDmynRmbBSaI3zQHvWzlUym+E2d	vast majority of the work on this specification was done while
	7L/SD11vuNMNNAl0QEpjYdKfQJDZy6ZtTgPPdYCmzcR3cwvOCdst/D8daPYi	Russ was employed at RSA Laboratories.</t>
	DaRmpa890wccZoPLPgBpAj0LKOCbCJNBo6Vnzwr6CfxxXk0fBwDMWlk+MIEi	</li>
	/YQRLNNHfPnGB4APETzwQTr7jX8Hz/LwZ+aPL3kApN+YwBLDBbO1HiyIreTi	<li><t>Acknowledgments from RFC 6170</t>
	p+df/mz+NFs2f/xudH85/AQdYd5nMMi5AXxg4eAs/fOVObOMNHGOc2sF6zr3	<t>The authors recognize valuable contributions from members of the PKIX
	t4vT95WtgqCLH+nIOABZFhaiJ+0WbuRho4RVPbiePdMfrJlJNKsONB8AZm1W	working group, the CA Browser Forum, and <contact fullname="James Manger"/>, for
	ylrnBhA/tojnI6tYWMFyM8Gzf77LT3HQ3eIcuNoGJn+RyapTrgLI1gbM09S7	their
	7W5TxxXSfKHRB2EjcEpfd0xzZs4SZjHo/QNAuXYWfwyMosHfBUInThNzZUHc	review and sample data.</t>
	ihfFoqB+lbKgaLl85UL8mSmIp/lMJi+aleTTUjlflv3mC/zPbKUoKGW5IL+t	</li>
	ADnHP3vNhz9BKUvlTNIxbAuaD4ALzOnScW13sQ/P2c9QT3GGDkjvxPCBaDm8	<li><t>Additional Acknowledgments</t>
	ydEzOr5Lq0QWxKNsGmTNIwcVv44R2W96uD46yuftZv2bXi7nCnSac1l2EMbH	<t>Combining RFCs 3709 and 6170 has produced an improved
	QbbLEwKOh+d4+M8HwzR+bzl7kNPwSTabvYiwmalhE4W6B+IMCHfpGeulNfX1	specification. The authors appreciate contributions from all members
	E2j3VceWQJdyUZj8PciIkwDWk+bTOATMQx6WfGzeyH2KlUI5kRT/Hg7U3dV6	of the IETF LAMPS Working Group. We extend a special thanks to
	A8xFX4hFgp7AjhiwGxekJZjIIoF698xg54K0EgIH6IBEl9bGmeKYhq37PwMl	<contact fullname="Alexey Melnikov"/> for his guidance on media types. We exten
	vq9RmBSO03OGBGzZ/MvrQfPyT4GgAcIkCNQgS62QwaLgT0AASQuXDriOsoDl	d a special
	bED4TAegQIHIBrIsA5IvJoXD6y1k3aQXTJeGAyBsMdZ2ct1qt44z4oNDArhw	thanks to <contact fullname="Tim Geiser"/> for his careful checking of the new e
	nBsnHpLxWfkiewCfDIi36SJAKJuHd5ft1u8eErGd5/DxOW5demHNyxXjLHgP	xamples in
	VODKbT9c7VGBC1ENZXAE0dT11i7yHJWjZCuVTDpzkc5nj6z93vR8Wi7MCB51	Appendices <xref target="example-rfc6170" format="counter"/> and <xref target="e
	B/k/teOXpgNdT5UdXrlb/GttkTLJDgEwLHdq4RRhNTPL1S2l26iwkgcuip/8	xample-full-cert" format="counter"/>. We extend a special thanks to <contact fu
	PHrDUj8RV/j25cuwfflv9K2WTqdB3WIUW9PGS2DJUoLiZwwnrk9DXVY330GG	llname="Corey Bonnell"/>,
	9SXjdKb2Bles2aoKvGY69Svo1EpbDoMg8KwJEIjIq7PY8NIQgKyMbAHUGH+g	<contact fullname="Daniel Kahn Gillmor"/>, <contact fullname="Roman Danyliw"/>,
	unDGJr+yZjPb1LRfEGc8d7YhCqF//8XCnz/4miLkQvc367VNAqSvf//OOfSP	<contact fullname="Paul Wouters"/>, <contact fullname="Paul Kyzivat"/>, <contact
	Hyl9B8i3RApF8onG1pBOXIMKEFTTeNc2SBVAterDjv+VwLMB+dlytGBpStU+	fullname="Shuping Peng"/>,
	xahhkDAPEA9+/IhPIxlcSu+62vtZfBsT4EiD4V8wmApT9gL/+vHjTPv+nZ1A	<contact fullname="Sheng Jiang"/>, <contact fullname="Rob Wilton"/>, <contact fu
	H76CyWyB2yAq+JvVyvD2iOA4Lv9GB2ybmvSEgU3wdO3Y7o3hU8bv55yuY5dR	llname="Éric Vyncke"/>, <contact fullname="Donald Eastlake 3rd"/>, and <contact
	VIN1BK4+sRBpVJSChzCSBjMCGhrQXECh5T9OcBL+ZvICjPbrGbANz13hvAGK	fullname="Dan Harkins"/>
	08Des8ML/dva1jJ3axcwJQXdwVgLlyj2BnjrxNSN6dIyt3BQJ3sdpUw8y9i1	for their careful review and helpful comments.</t>
	OirOgg8FkwL6twSutwMxGfbXV2YM07hyd9Cbl6I+8HyjWiUtT1rU8gSM76b9	</li>
	VV8asJHQynbX5iy2/YYHk9y7ABqcuzaXzBGnBkjhejOYC0BqZZoBDYrCts8I	</ul>
	E7xy9IXtTmDBDmO6hNfaEjDFg4U4JjCmCHHC7YNpMJkZmik0UE4bDrGmmL0Q	</section>
	Pz1fX238gACKLB4mNMMxVpYTQWh97QIogNqkNGMN6Lb2kErSbm984IkpJJ0b	</back>
	z0AssxEk7BihPYR0PeSnSMdgN2EWNROewYhwNu09EWGAOBxjwJKV8WoitrC1
	AVhnQBuInO2WbP8MDb+2phsbYBxHR7RtAriC5Z7Gh/7NrcH0TdpzCzV81GnE
	rCM9rIw9QsJ8N3D9M32OuOkjXgBEZ9Z8bnqAXBqAGUkWKhEI0tHeD0zchqkq
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	rtoN4NBZTGSkecLwHmDfGk4DQma5WcHUaav4Jk1dOL/Uno8CUL3Cr3xc9pwd
	lPD0RQZ04BUuZeF6FqP+mr9fTVzbh1PddWGMJetJ8naS+mzzXTkYCDPPZIeT
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