Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.¶

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.¶

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9445.¶

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶

Table of Contents

3. RADIUS DHCP Options Attributes

This section specifies two new RADIUS attributes for RADIUS clients and servers to exchange DHCP-encoded data. This data is then used to feed the DHCP procedure between a DHCP client and a DHCP server.¶

Both the DHCPv4-Options and DHCPv6-Options Attributes use the "Long Extended Type" format (Section 2.2 of [RFC6929]). The description of the fields is provided in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.¶

These attributes use the "Long Extended Type" format in order to permit the transport of attributes encapsulating more than 253 octets of data. DHCP options that can be included in the RADIUS DHCP*-Options Attributes are limited by the maximum packet size of 4096 bytes (Section 3 of [RFC2865]). In order to accommodate deployments with large DHCP options, RADIUS implementations are RECOMMENDED to support a packet size up to 65535 bytes. Such a recommendation can be met if RADIUS implementations support a mechanism that relaxes the limit of 4096 bytes (e.g., the mechanisms described in [RFC7499] or [RFC7930]).¶

The Value fields of the DHCP*-Options Attributes are encoded in the clear and not encrypted like, for example, the Tunnel-Password Attribute [RFC2868].¶

RADIUS implementations may support a configuration parameter to control the DHCP options that can be included in a RADIUS DHCP*-Options Attribute. Likewise, DHCP server implementations may support a configuration parameter to control the permitted DHCP options in a RADIUS DHCP*-Options Attribute. Absent explicit configuration, RADIUS implementations and DHCP server implementations SHOULD ignore non-permitted DHCP options received in a RADIUS DHCP*-Options Attribute.¶

RADIUS-supplied data is specific configuration data that is returned as a function of authentication and authorization checks. As such, absent any explicit configuration on the DHCP server, RADIUS-supplied data by means of the DHCP*-Options Attributes take precedence over any local configuration.¶

These attributes are defined with globally unique names. The naming of the attributes follows the guidelines in Section 2.7.1 of [RFC6929]. Invalid attributes are handled as per Section 2.8 of [RFC6929].¶

4. Passing RADIUS DHCP Options Attributes by DHCP Relay Agents to DHCP Servers

5. An Example: Applicability to Encrypted DNS Provisioning

Typical deployment scenarios are similar to those described, for instance, in Section 2 of [RFC6911]. For illustration purposes, Figure 1 shows an example where a Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) is provided with an encrypted DNS resolver. This example assumes that the Network Access Server (NAS) embeds both RADIUS client and DHCPv6 server capabilities.¶

+-------------+           +-------------+             +-------+
|     CPE     |           |     NAS     |             |  AAA  |
|DHCPv6 Client|           |DHCPv6 Server|             |Server |
|             |           |RADIUS Client|             |       |
+------+------+           +------+------+             +---+---+
       |                         |                        |
       o-----DHCPv6 Solicit----->|                        |
       |                         o----Access-Request ---->|
       |                         |                        |
       |                         |<----Access-Accept------o
       |                         |     DHCPv6-Options     |
       |<----DHCPv6 Advertise----o    (OPTION_V6_DNR)     |
       |     (OPTION_V6_DNR)     |                        |
       |                         |                        |
       o-----DHCPv6 Request----->|                        |
       |                         |                        |
       |<------DHCPv6 Reply------o                        |
       |     (OPTION_V6_DNR)     |                        |
       |                         |                        |

                DHCPv6                     RADIUS

Upon receipt of the DHCPv6 Solicit message from a CPE, the NAS sends a RADIUS Access-Request message to the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server. Once the AAA server receives the request, it replies with an Access-Accept message (possibly after having sent a RADIUS Access-Challenge message and assuming the CPE is entitled to connect to the network) that carries a list of parameters to be used for this session, which includes the encrypted DNS information. Such information is encoded as OPTION_V6_DNR (144) instances [DNR] in the RADIUS DHCPv6-Options Attribute. These instances are then used by the NAS to complete the DHCPv6 procedure that the CPE initiated to retrieve information about the encrypted DNS service to use. The Discovery of Network-designated Resolvers (DNR) procedure defined in [DNR] is then followed between the DHCPv6 client and the DHCPv6 server.¶

Should any encrypted DNS-related information (e.g., Authentication Domain Name (ADN) and IPv6 address) change, the RADIUS server sends a RADIUS Change-of-Authorization (CoA) message [RFC5176] that carries the DHCPv6-Options Attribute with the updated OPTION_V6_DNR information to the NAS. Once that message is received and validated by the NAS, it replies with a RADIUS CoA ACK message. The NAS replaces the old encrypted DNS resolver information with the new one and sends a DHCPv6 Reconfigure message, which leads the DHCPv6 client to initiate a Renew/Reply message exchange with the DHCPv6 server.¶

In deployments where the NAS behaves as a DHCPv6 relay agent, the procedure discussed in Section 3 of [RFC7037] can be followed. To that aim, the "RADIUS Attributes Permitted in DHCPv6 RADIUS Option" registry has been updated (Section 8.2). CoA-Requests can be used following the procedure specified in [RFC6977].¶

Figure 2 shows another example where a CPE is provided with an encrypted DNS resolver, but the CPE uses DHCPv4 to retrieve its encrypted DNS resolver.¶

+-------------+           +-------------+             +-------+
|     CPE     |           |     NAS     |             |  AAA  |
|DHCPv4 Client|           |DHCPv4 Server|             |Server |
|             |           |RADIUS Client|             |       |
+------+------+           +------+------+             +---+---+
       |                         |                        |
       o------DHCPDISCOVER------>|                        |
       |                         o----Access-Request ---->|
       |                         |                        |
       |                         |<----Access-Accept------o
       |                         |     DHCPv4-Options     |
       |<-----DHCPOFFER----------o    (OPTION_V4_DNR)     |
       |     (OPTION_V4_DNR)     |                        |
       |                         |                        |
       o-----DHCPREQUEST-------->|                        |
       |     (OPTION_V4_DNR)     |                        |
       |                         |                        |
       |<-------DHCPACK----------o                        |
       |     (OPTION_V4_DNR)     |                        |
       |                         |                        |

               DHCPv4                      RADIUS

Other deployment scenarios can be envisaged, such as returning customized service parameters (e.g., different DoH URI Templates) as a function of the service, policies, and preferences that are set by a network administrator. How an administrator indicates its service, policies, and preferences to an AAA server is out of scope.¶

6. Security Considerations

RADIUS-related security considerations are discussed in [RFC2865].¶

DHCPv6-related security issues are discussed in Section 22 of [RFC8415], while DHCPv4-related security issues are discussed in Section 7 of [RFC2131]. Security considerations specific to the DHCP options that are carried in RADIUS are discussed in relevant documents that specify these options. For example, security considerations (including traffic theft) are discussed in Section 7 of [DNR].¶

RADIUS servers have conventionally tolerated the input of arbitrary data via the "string" data type (Section 3.5 of [RFC8044]). This practice allows RADIUS servers to support newer standards without software upgrades, by allowing administrators to manually create complex attribute content and then pass that content to a RADIUS server as opaque strings. While this practice is useful, it is RECOMMENDED that RADIUS servers that implement the present specification are updated to understand the format and encoding of DHCP options. Administrators can thus enter the DHCP options as options instead of manually encoded opaque strings. This recommendation increases security and interoperability by ensuring that the options are encoded correctly. It also increases usability for administrators.¶

The considerations discussed in Section 7 of [RFC4014] and Section 8 of [RFC7037] should be taken into account in deployments where DHCP relay agents pass the DHCP*-Options Attributes to DHCP servers. Additional considerations specific to the use of Reconfigure messages are discussed in Section 9 of [RFC6977].¶

8. IANA Considerations

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Christian Jacquenet, Neil Cook, Joe Clarke, Qin Wu, Dirk von-Hugo, Tom Petch, and Chongfeng Xie for the review and suggestions.¶

Thanks to Ben Schwartz and Bernie Volz for the comments.¶

Thanks to Rob Wilton for the careful AD review.¶

Thanks to Ralf Weber for the dnsdir reviews, Robert Sparks for the genart review, and Tatuya Jinmei for the intdir review.¶

Thanks to Éric Vyncke, Paul Wouters, and Warren Kumari for the IESG review.¶

Authors' Addresses