rfc9480.original   rfc9480.txt 
LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus, Ed. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H. Brockhaus
Internet-Draft D. von Oheimb Request for Comments: 9480 D. von Oheimb
Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 (if approved) Siemens Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 Siemens
Intended status: Standards Track J. Gray Category: Standards Track J. Gray
Expires: 31 December 2022 Entrust ISSN: 2070-1721 Entrust
29 June 2022 October 2023
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-23
Abstract Abstract
This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transfer of This document contains a set of updates to the syntax of Certificate
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document Management Protocol (CMP) version 2 and its HTTP transfer mechanism.
updates RFC 4210, RFC 5912, and RFC 6712. This document updates RFCs 4210, 5912, and 6712.
The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData
instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages, instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages,
improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message
types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP, types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP,
and well-known URI path segments. and well-known URI path segments.
CMP version 3 is introduced to enable signaling support of CMP version 3 is introduced to enable signaling support of
EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and signaling the use of an EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and signal the use of an
explicit hash AlgorithmIdentifier in certConf messages, as far as explicit hash AlgorithmIdentifier in certConf messages, as far as
needed. needed.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on 31 December 2022. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9480.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction
1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Convention and Terminology
2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol 2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
(CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. New Section 1.1 - Changes Since RFC 4210
2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes Since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage
2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. Update Section 5.1.1 - PKI Message Header
2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header . . . . . . . 7 2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3 - CertProfile
2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3. - CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1 - Shared Secret Information
2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information . . . 9 2.6. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection
2.6. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 9 2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2 - Encrypted Values
2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 10 2.8. New Section 5.2.9 - GeneralizedTime
2.8. New Section 5.2.9 - GeneralizedTime . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.9. Update Section 5.3.4 - Certification Response
2.9. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 12 2.10. Update Section 5.3.18 - Certificate Confirmation Content
2.10. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation 2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2 - Signing Key Pair Types
Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3 - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair
2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . . 14 Types
2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key 2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9 - Revocation Passphrase
Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates
2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 15 2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update
2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 15 2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template
2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update . . . 15 2.17. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL Update Retrieval
2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template . . 16 2.18. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content
2.17. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL Update Retrieval . . . . . . 18 2.19. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response
2.18. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content . . . . . . 18 2.20. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation
2.19. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 19 2.21. Update Section 7.1.1 - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers
2.20. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 24
2.21. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510
Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.22. Add Section 8.4 - Private Keys for Certificate Signing and 2.22. Add Section 8.4 - Private Keys for Certificate Signing and
CMP Message Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 CMP Message Protection
2.23. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and 2.23. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and
Shared Secret Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Shared Secret Information
2.24. Add Section 8.6 - Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP 2.24. Add Section 8.6 - Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP
Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Messages
2.25. Add Section 8.7 - Authorizing requests for certificates 2.25. Add Section 8.7 - Authorizing Requests for Certificates
with specific EKUs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 with Specific EKUs
2.26. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 27 2.26. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase
2.27. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral 2.27. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral
Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Clarifications
2.28. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of 2.28. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of
These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 These Profiles
2.29. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . 30 2.29. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile
2.30. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification 2.30. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification
(Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 (Basic Authenticated Scheme)
3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate 3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Management Protocol (CMP)
3.1. Update Section 1. - Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.1. Update Section 1 - Introduction
3.2. New Section 1.1. - Changes Since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 31 3.2. New Section 1.1 - Changes Since RFC 6712
3.3. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . 31 3.3. Replace Section 3.6 - HTTP Request-URI
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 4. IANA Considerations
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.1. Updates to the ASN.1 Modules in RFCs 4210 and 5912
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.2. Updates to the IANA Considerations of RFC 4210
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.2.1. SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose Registry
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.2.2. SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information Types
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4.2.3. SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration Controls
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 4.3. Updates to the IANA Considerations of RFC 6712
A.1. Update to RFC4210 - 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . 38 4.3.1. Well-Known URIs
A.2. Update to RFC5912 - 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . 52 4.3.2. Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Registry
Appendix B. History of Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 5. Security Considerations
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 6. References
6.1. Normative References
6.2. Informative References
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
A.1. Update to RFC 4210 - 1988 ASN.1 Module
A.2. Update to RFC 5912 - 2002 ASN.1 Module
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
[RFC Editor: While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and Internet of Things
environments and developing the Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483],
Please perform the following substitution. some limitations were identified in the original CMP specification.
This document updates [RFC4210] and [RFC6712] to overcome these
* RFCXXXX --> the assigned numerical RFC value for this draft
Please update the following references to associated drafts in
progress to reflect their final RFC assignments, if possible:
* I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms
* I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile
* I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport
]
While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and
developing the Lightweight CMP Profile
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were
identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates
RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these
limitations. limitations.
Among others, this document improves the crypto agility of CMP, which Among other updates, this document improves the crypto agility of
means to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography. CMP, which allows more flexibility for future advances in
cryptography.
This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP
endpoints on registration and certification authorities. endpoints on registration and certification authorities.
As the main content of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] The main content of [RFC4210] and [RFC6712] remains unchanged. This
stays unchanged, this document lists all sections that are updated, document lists all sections that are updated, replaced, or added to
replaced, or added to the current text of the respective RFCs. the current text of the respective RFCs.
The authors acknowledge that the style of the document is hard to The authors acknowledge that the style of the document is hard to
read because the original RFCs must be read along with this document read because the original RFCs must be read along with this document
to get the complete content. The working group decided to use this to get the complete content. The working group decided to use this
approach in order to keep the changes to RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and approach in order to keep the changes to [RFC4210] and [RFC6712] to
RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to the required minimum. This was meant to speed the required minimum. This was meant to speed up the editorial
up the editorial process and to minimize the effort spent on process and to minimize the effort spent on reviewing the full text
reviewing the whole text of the original documents. of the original documents.
However, [PKIX-CMP] and [HTTP-CMP] are intended to obsolete RFCs 4210
and 6712, respectively; these documents also include the changes
listed in this document.
1.1. Convention and Terminology 1.1. Convention and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
Technical terminology is used in conformance with RFC 4210 [RFC4210], Technical terminology is used in conformance with [RFC4210],
RFC 4211 [RFC4211], and RFC 5280 [RFC5280]. The following key words [RFC4211], and [RFC5280]. The following key words are used:
are used:
CA: Certification authority, which issues certificates. CA: Certification authority, which issues certificates.
RA: Registration authority, an optional system component to which a RA: Registration authority, an optional system component to which
CA delegates certificate management functions such as a CA delegates certificate management functions, such as
authorization checks. authorization checks.
KGA: Key generation authority, which generates key pairs on behalf KGA: Key generation authority, which generates key pairs on behalf
of an EE. The KGA could be co-located with an RA or a CA. of an EE. The KGA could be colocated with an RA or a CA.
EE: End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI EE: End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI
certificate. An identifier for the EE is given as its subject certificate. An identifier for the EE is given as its subject
of the certificate. of the certificate.
2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) 2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes Since RFC 4210 2.1. New Section 1.1 - Changes Since RFC 4210
The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 4210 The following subsection describes feature updates to [RFC4210].
[RFC4210]. They are always related to the base specification. They are always related to the base specification. Hence, references
Hence, references to the original sections in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are to the original sections in [RFC4210] are used whenever possible.
used whenever possible.
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1: Insert this section after the current Section 1 of [RFC4210]:
1.1. Changes Since RFC 4210 1.1. Changes Since RFC 4210
The following updates are made in this document: The following updates are made in this document:
* Add new extended key usages for various CMP server types, e.g., * Adding new extended key usages for various CMP server types, e.g.,
registration authority and certification authority, to express the registration authority and certification authority, to express the
authorization of the entity identified in the certificate authorization of the entity identified in the certificate
containing the respective extended key usage extension to act as containing the respective extended key usage extension that acts
the indicated PKI management entity. as the indicated PKI management entity.
* Extend the description of multiple protection to cover additional * Extending the description of multiple protection to cover
use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages. additional use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages.
* Offering EnvelopedData as the preferred choice next to * Offering EnvelopedData as the preferred choice next to
EncryptedValue to better support crypto agility in CMP. Note that EncryptedValue to better support crypto agility in CMP. Note
according to RFC 4211 [RFC4211] section 2.1. point 9 the use of that, according to [RFC4211], Section 2.1, point 9, the use of the
the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
EnvelopedData structure. RFC 4211 [RFC4211] offers the EnvelopedData structure. [RFC4211] offers the EncryptedKey
EncryptedKey structure, a choice of EncryptedValue and structure a choice of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData for
EnvelopedData for migration to EnvelopedData. For reasons of migration to EnvelopedData. For reasons of completeness and
completeness and consistency the type EncryptedValue has been consistency, the type EncryptedValue has been exchanged in all
exchanged in all occurrences in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This includes occurrences in [RFC4210]. This includes the protection of
the protection of centrally generated private keys, encryption of centrally generated private keys, encryption of certificates, and
certificates, and protection of revocation passphrases. To protection of revocation passphrases. To properly differentiate
properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of the support of EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, CMP
EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a version 3 is introduced in case a transaction is supposed to use
transaction is supposed to use EnvelopedData. EnvelopedData.
* Offering an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting * Offering an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus that supports
confirmation of certificates signed with signature algorithms, confirmation of certificates signed with signature algorithms,
e.g., EdDSA, not directly indicating a specific hash algorithm to e.g., preparing for upcoming post quantum algorithms, not directly
use to compute the certHash. indicating a specific hash algorithm to use to compute the
certHash.
* Adding new general message types to request CA certificates, a * Adding new general message types to request CA certificates, a
root CA update, a certificate request template, or a CRL update. root CA update, a certificate request template, or a Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) update.
* Extend the usage of polling to p10cr, certConf, rr, genm, and * Extending the usage of polling to p10cr, certConf, rr, genm, and
error messages. error messages.
* Delete the mandatory algorithm profile in RFC 4210 Appendix D.2 * Deleting the mandatory algorithm profile in Appendix D.2 of
[RFC4210] and refer to CMP Algorithms Section 7 [RFC4210] and referring to Section 7 of CMP Algorithms [RFC9481].
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].
2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage 2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage
The following subsection introduces a new extended key usage for CMP The following subsection introduces a new extended key usage for CMP
servers authorized to centrally generate key pairs on behalf of end servers authorized to centrally generate key pairs on behalf of end
entities. entities.
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 4: Insert this section after Section 4.4.3 of [RFC4210]:
4.5. Extended Key Usage 4.5. Extended Key Usage
The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for The extended key usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for
which the certified key pair may be used. It therefore restricts the which the certified key pair may be used. Therefore, it restricts
use of a certificate to specific applications. the use of a certificate to specific applications.
A CA may want to delegate parts of its duties to other PKI management A CA may want to delegate parts of its duties to other PKI management
entities. This section provides a mechanism to both prove this entities. This section provides a mechanism to both prove this
delegation and enable an automated means for checking the delegation and enable an automated means for checking the
authorization of this delegation. Such delegation may also be authorization of this delegation. Such delegation may also be
expressed by other means, e.g., explicit configuration. expressed by other means, e.g., explicit configuration.
To offer automatic validation for the delegation of a role by a CA to To offer automatic validation for the delegation of a role by a CA to
another entity, the certificates used for CMP message protection or another entity, the certificates used for CMP message protection or
signed data for central key generation MUST be issued by the signed data for central key generation MUST be issued by the
delegating CA and MUST contain the respective EKUs. This proves the delegating CA and MUST contain the respective EKUs. This proves the
authorization of this entity by the delegating CA to act in the given authorization of this entity by delegating CA to act in the given
role as described below. role, as described below.
The OIDs to be used for these EKUs are: The OIDs to be used for these EKUs are:
id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 27 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 27 }
id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 28 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 32 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 32 }
Note: RFC 6402 section 2.10 [RFC6402] specifies OIDs for a CMC CA and Note: Section 2.10 of [RFC6402] specifies OIDs for a Certificate
a CMC RA. As the functionality of a CA and RA is not specific to Management over CMS (CMC) CA and a CMC RA. As the functionality of a
using CMC or CMP as the certificate management protocol, these EKUs CA and RA is not specific to any certificate management protocol
are re-used by CMP. (such as CMC or CMP), these EKUs are reused by CMP.
The meaning of the id-kp-cmKGA EKU is as follows: The meaning of the id-kp-cmKGA EKU is as follows:
CMP KGA: CMP Key Generation Authorities are CAs or are identified by CMP KGA: CMP key generation authorities are CAs or are identified by
the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage. The CMP KGA knows the the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage. The CMP KGA knows the
private key it generated on behalf of the end entity. This private key it generated on behalf of the end entity. This
is a very sensitive service and needs specific is a very sensitive service and needs specific
authorization, which by default is with the CA certificate authorization, which by default is with the CA certificate
itself. The CA may delegate its authorization by placing itself. The CA may delegate its authorization by placing
the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage in the certificate used the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage in the certificate used
to authenticate the origin of the generated private key. to authenticate the origin of the generated private key.
The authorization may also be determined through local The authorization may also be determined through local
configuration of the end entity. configuration of the end entity.
2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header 2.3. Update Section 5.1.1 - PKI Message Header
Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the PKI message header. Section 5.1.1 of [RFC4210] describes the PKI message header. This
This document introduces the new version 3 indicating support of document introduces the new version 3, indicating support of
EnvelopedData as specified in Section 2.7. EnvelopedData as specified in Section 2.7 and hashAlg as specified in
Section 2.10.
Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of PKIHeader and the subsequent description Replace the ASN.1 syntax of PKIHeader and the subsequent description
of pvno with the following text: of pvno with the following text:
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2), pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
cmp2021(3) }, cmp2021(3) },
sender GeneralName, sender GeneralName,
recipient GeneralName, recipient GeneralName,
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL,
skipping to change at page 8, line 25 skipping to change at line 322
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
} }
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
The usage of pvno values is described in Section 7. The usage of the protocol version number (pvno) is described in
Section 7.
2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3. - CertProfile 2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3 - CertProfile
Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] defines the PKIHeader and id-it Section 5.1.1 of [RFC4210] defines the PKIHeader and id-it OIDs to be
OIDs to be used in the generalInfo field. This section introduces used in the generalInfo field. This section introduces id-it-
id-it-certProfile. certProfile.
Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.2: Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.2 of [RFC4210]:
5.1.1.3. CertProfile 5.1.1.3. CertProfile
This is used by the EE to indicate specific certificate profiles, This is used by the EE to indicate specific certificate profiles,
e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request
template, see Section 5.3.19.16. template; see Section 5.3.19.16.
id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
When used in an ir/cr/kur/genm, the value MUST NOT contain more When used in an ir/cr/kur/genm, the value MUST NOT contain more
elements than the number of CertReqMsg or InfoTypeAndValue elements elements than the number of CertReqMsg or InfoTypeAndValue elements
and the certificate profile names refer to the elements in the given and the certificate profile names refer to the elements in the given
order. order.
When used in a p10cr, the value MUST NOT contain multiple certificate When used in a p10cr, the value MUST NOT contain multiple certificate
profile names. profile names.
2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information 2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1 - Shared Secret Information
Section 5.1.3.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the MAC based Section 5.1.3.1 of [RFC4210] describes the protection of a PKIMessage
protection of a PKIMessage using the algorithm id-PasswordBasedMac. based on message authentication code (MAC) using the algorithm id-
PasswordBasedMac.
Replace the first paragraph with the following text: Replace the first paragraph with the following text:
In this case, the sender and recipient share secret information with In this case, the sender and recipient share secret information with
sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means or from a sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means or from a
previous PKI management operation). PKIProtection will contain a MAC previous PKI management operation). PKIProtection will contain a MAC
value and the protectionAlg MAY be one of the options described in value and the protectionAlg MAY be one of the options described in
CMP Algorithms [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. The PasswordBasedMac CMP Algorithms [RFC9481]. The PasswordBasedMac is specified as
is specified as follows (see also [RFC4211] and [RFC9045]): follows (see also [RFC4211] and [RFC9045]):
Replace the last paragraph with the following text (Note: This fixes Replace the last paragraph with the following text (Note: This fixes
Errata ID 2616): Errata ID 2616):
Note: It is RECOMMENDED that the fields of PBMParameter remain Note: It is RECOMMENDED that the fields of PBMParameter remain
constant throughout the messages of a single transaction (e.g., constant throughout the messages of a single transaction (e.g.,
ir/ip/certConf/pkiConf) to reduce the overhead associated with ir/ip/certConf/pkiConf) to reduce the overhead associated with
PasswordBasedMac computation. PasswordBasedMac computation.
2.6. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection 2.6. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection
Section 5.1.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the nested message. Section 5.1.3.4 of [RFC4210] describes the nested message. This
This document enables using nested messages also for batch-delivery document also enables using nested messages for batch-delivery
transport of PKI messages between PKI management entities and with transport of PKI messages between PKI management entities and with
mixed body types. mixed body types.
Replace the text of the section with the following text: Replace the text of the section with the following text:
5.1.3.4. Multiple Protection 5.1.3.4. Multiple Protection
When receiving a protected PKI message, a PKI management entity such When receiving a protected PKI message, a PKI management entity, such
as an RA MAY forward that message adding its own protection (which is as an RA, MAY forward that message along with adding its own
a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and certificates protection (which is a MAC or a signature, depending on the
shared between the RA and the CA). Additionally, multiple PKI information and certificates shared between the RA and the CA).
messages MAY be aggregated. There are several use cases for such Additionally, multiple PKI messages MAY be aggregated. There are
messages. several use cases for such messages.
* The RA confirms having validated and authorized a message and * The RA confirms having validated and authorized a message and
forwards the original message unchanged. forwards the original message unchanged.
* The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., adds or modifies * The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., adds or modifies
particular field values or adds new extensions) before forwarding particular field values or adds new extensions) before forwarding
them, then it MAY create its own desired PKIBody. If the changes them; then, it MAY create its own desired PKIBody. If the changes
made by the RA to PKIMessage break the POP of a certificate made by the RA to PKIMessage break the POP of a certificate
request, the RA MUST set the popo field to RAVerified. It MAY request, the RA MUST set the popo field to RAVerified. It MAY
include the original PKIMessage from the EE in the generalInfo include the original PKIMessage from the EE in the generalInfo
field of PKIHeader of a nested message (to accommodate, for field of PKIHeader of a nested message (to accommodate, for
example, cases in which the CA wishes to check POP or other example, cases in which the CA wishes to check POP or other
information on the original EE message). The infoType to be used information on the original EE message). The infoType to be used
in this situation is {id-it 15} (see Section 5.3.19 for the value in this situation is {id-it 15} (see Section 5.3.19 for the value
of id-it) and the infoValue is PKIMessages (contents MUST be in of id-it), and the infoValue is PKIMessages (contents MUST be in
the same order as the message in PKIBody). the same order as the message in PKIBody).
* A PKI management entity collects several messages that are to be * A PKI management entity collects several messages that are to be
forwarded in the same direction and forwards them in a batch. forwarded in the same direction and forwards them in a batch.
Request messages can be transferred as batch upstream (towards the Request messages can be transferred as batch upstream (towards the
CA); response or announce messages can be transferred as batch CA); response or announce messages can be transferred as batch
downstream (towards an RA, but not to the EE). This can for downstream (towards an RA but not to the EE). For instance, this
instance be used when bridging an off-line connection between two can be used when bridging an off-line connection between two PKI
PKI management entities. management entities.
These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages within a new These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages within a new
PKI message. The structure used is as follows: PKI message. The structure used is as follows:
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values 2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2 - Encrypted Values
Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of Section 5.2.2 of [RFC4210] describes the use of EncryptedValue to
EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data. This document extends transport encrypted data. This document extends the encryption of
the encryption of data to preferably use EnvelopedData. data to preferably use EnvelopedData.
Replace the text of the section with the following text: Replace the text of the section with the following text:
5.2.2. Encrypted Values 5.2.2. Encrypted Values
Where encrypted data (in this specification, private keys, Where encrypted data (in this specification, private keys,
certificates, or revocation passphrase) are sent in PKI messages, the certificates, or revocation passphrase) is sent in PKI messages, the
EncryptedKey data structure is used. EncryptedKey data structure is used.
EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE { EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated
envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData } envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData }
See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and CMS See Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] for
[RFC5652] for EnvelopedData syntax. Using the EncryptedKey data EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and Cryptographic Message
structure offers the choice to either use EncryptedValue (for Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] for EnvelopedData syntax. Using the
backward compatibility only) or EnvelopedData. The use of the EncryptedKey data structure offers the choice to either use
EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the EncryptedValue (for backward compatibility only) or EnvelopedData.
EnvelopedData structure. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED to use The use of the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor
of the EnvelopedData structure. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED to use
EnvelopedData. EnvelopedData.
Note: The EncryptedKey structure defined in CRMF [RFC4211] is reused Note: The EncryptedKey structure defined in CRMF [RFC4211] is reused
here, which makes the update backward compatible. Using the new here, which makes the update backward compatible. Using the new
syntax with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is bits-on- syntax with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is bits-on-
the-wire compatible with the old syntax. the-wire compatible with the old syntax.
To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 has been To indicate support for EnvelopedData, the pvno cmp2021 has been
introduced. Details on the usage of pvno values is described in introduced. Details on the usage of the protocol version number
Section 7. (pvno) are described in Section 7.
The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to transport a private The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to transport a private
key, certificate, or revocation passphrase in encrypted form. key, certificate, or revocation passphrase in encrypted form.
EnvelopedData is used as follows: EnvelopedData is used as follows:
* It contains only one RecipientInfo structure because the content * It contains only one RecipientInfo structure because the content
is encrypted only for one recipient. is encrypted only for one recipient.
* It may contain a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage structure * It may contain a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage
as defined in RFC 5958 [RFC5958] wrapped in a SignedData structure structure, as defined in [RFC5958], that is wrapped in a
as specified in CMS section 5 [RFC5652] and [RFC8933] signed by SignedData structure, as specified in Section 5 of CMS [RFC5652]
the Key Generation Authority. and [RFC8933], and signed by the Key Generation Authority.
* It may contain a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in * It may contain a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in
the encryptedContent field. the encryptedContent field.
The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in CMS The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in Section 6
section 6 [RFC5652], MUST be encrypted using a newly generated of CMS [RFC5652], MUST be encrypted using a newly generated symmetric
symmetric content-encryption key. This content-encryption key MUST content-encryption key. This content-encryption key MUST be securely
be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key provided to the recipient using one of three key management
management techniques. techniques.
The choice of the key management technique to be used by the sender The choice of the key management technique to be used by the sender
depends on the credential available at the recipient: depends on the credential available at the recipient:
* Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension * recipient's certificate with an algorithm identifier and a public
asserting keyAgreement: The content-encryption key will be key that supports key transport and where any given key usage
protected using the key agreement key management technique, as extension allows keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will
specified in CMS section 6.2.2 [RFC5652]. This is the preferred be protected using the key transport key management technique, as
technique. specified in Section 6.2.1 of CMS [RFC5652].
* Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension * recipient's certificate with an algorithm identifier and a public
asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be key that supports key agreement and where any given key usage
protected using the key transport key management technique, as extension allows keyAgreement: The content-encryption key will be
specified in CMS section 6.2.1 [RFC5652]. protected using the key agreement key management technique, as
specified in Section 6.2.2 of CMS [RFC5652].
* A password or shared secret: The content-encryption key will be * a password or shared secret: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the password-based key management technique, as protected using the password-based key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 6.2.4 [RFC5652]. specified in Section 6.2.4 of CMS [RFC5652].
2.8. New Section 5.2.9 - GeneralizedTime 2.8. New Section 5.2.9 - GeneralizedTime
The following subsection point implementers to [RFC5280] regarding The following subsection points implementers to [RFC5280] regarding
usage of GeneralizedTime. usage of GeneralizedTime.
Insert this section after Section 5.2.8.4: Insert this section after Section 5.2.8.4 of [RFC4210]:
5.2.9 GeneralizedTime 5.2.9 GeneralizedTime
GeneralizedTime is a standard ASN.1 type and SHALL be used as GeneralizedTime is a standard ASN.1 type and SHALL be used as
specified in RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.5.2 [RFC5280]. specified in Section 4.1.2.5.2 of [RFC5280].
2.9. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response 2.9. Update Section 5.3.4 - Certification Response
Section 5.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the Certification Section 5.3.4 of [RFC4210] describes the Certification Response.
Response. This document updates the syntax by using the parent This document updates the syntax by using the parent structure
structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue, as described in Section 2.7
Section 2.7 above. Additionally, it clarifies the certReqId to be above. Additionally, it clarifies the certReqId to be used in
used in response to a p10cr message. response to a p10cr message.
Replace the ASN.1 syntax with the following text (Note: This also Replace the ASN.1 syntax with the following text (Note: This also
fixes Errata ID 3949 and 4078): fixes Errata ID 3949 and 4078):
CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE { CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL,
response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse
} }
skipping to change at page 13, line 23 skipping to change at line 538
status PKIStatusInfo, status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211] -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
} }
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL, privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- see [RFC4211] for comment on encoding -- See [RFC4211] for comments on encoding.
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL
} }
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate, certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
} }
Add the following as a new paragraph right after the ASN.1 syntax: Add the following as a new paragraph right after the ASN.1 syntax:
A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data
structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certReqId. structure, as specified in PKCS #10 [RFC2986], but no certReqId.
Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding certification response Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding Certification Response
(cp) message MUST be set to -1. (cp) message MUST be set to -1.
Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section: Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section:
The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2. The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.
Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 has been Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData, the pvno cmp2021 has
introduced. Details on the usage of different pvno values are been introduced. Details on the usage of different protocol version
described in Section 7. numbers (pvno) are described in Section 7.
2.10. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content 2.10. Update Section 5.3.18 - Certificate Confirmation Content
This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus
type used in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash type used in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash
algorithm for those certificates where no hash algorithm is specified algorithm for those certificates where no hash algorithm is specified
in the signatureAlgorithm field. in the signatureAlgorithm field.
Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text: Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
certHash OCTET STRING, certHash OCTET STRING,
skipping to change at page 14, line 25 skipping to change at line 589
The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the
signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not
specify a hash algorithm in the OID or in the parameters. In such specify a hash algorithm in the OID or in the parameters. In such
cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash
algorithm to be used for calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, algorithm to be used for calculating the certHash value. Otherwise,
the certHash value SHALL be computed using the same hash algorithm as the certHash value SHALL be computed using the same hash algorithm as
used to create and verify the certificate signature. If hashAlg is used to create and verify the certificate signature. If hashAlg is
used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message header must used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message header must
be cmp2021(3). be cmp2021(3).
2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types 2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2 - Signing Key Pair Types
The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair
Types on referencing EC curves. Types on referencing elliptic curves.
Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.2: Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.2 of [RFC4210]:
Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey Note: In case several elliptic curves are supported, several id-
elements as defined in RFC 5480 [RFC5480] need to be given, one per ecPublicKey elements as defined in [RFC5480] need to be given, one
named curve. per named curve.
2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair 2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3 - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types
Types
The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key
Agreement Key Pair Types on referencing EC curves. Agreement Key Pair Types on referencing elliptic curves.
Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.3: Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.3 of [RFC4210]:
Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey Note: In case several elliptic curves are supported, several id-
elements as defined in RFC 5480 [RFC5480]need to be given, one per ecPublicKey elements as defined in [RFC5480] need to be given, one
named curve. per named curve.
2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase 2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9 - Revocation Passphrase
Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of Section 5.3.19.9 of [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of a
a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation request.
request. This document updates the handling by using the parent This document updates the handling by using the parent structure
structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this information,
information as described in Section 2.7 above. as described in Section 2.7 above.
Replace the text of the section with the following text: Replace the text of the section with the following text:
5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase 5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase
This MAY be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a CA/RA for the This MAY be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a CA/RA for the
purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case
that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to
authenticate the request). See Appendix B for further details on the authenticate the request). See Appendix B for further details on the
use of this mechanism. use of this mechanism.
GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey
GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent > GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent >
The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2. The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.
2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates 2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates
The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it- The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-
caCerts. The intended use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile caCerts. The intended use is specified in Section 4.3 of the
Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483].
Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13: Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13 of [RFC4210]:
2.3.19.14 CA Certificates 5.3.19.14. CA Certificates
This MAY be used by the client to get CA certificates. This MAY be used by the client to get CA certificates.
GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate | < absent > CMPCertificate | < absent >
2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update 2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update
The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it- The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-
rootCaCert and id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate. The use is specified in rootCaCert and id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate. The use is specified in
Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3 Section 4.3 of the Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483].
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].
Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.14: Insert this section after the new Section 5.3.19.14:
5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update 5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update
This MAY be used by the client to get an update of a root CA This MAY be used by the client to get an update of a root CA
certificate, which is provided in the body of the request message. certificate, which is provided in the body of the request message.
In contrast to the ckuann message this approach follows the request/ In contrast to the ckuann message, this approach follows the request/
response model. response model.
The EE SHOULD reference its current trust anchor in a TrustAnchor The EE SHOULD reference its current trust anchor in a TrustAnchor
structure in the request body, giving the root CA certificate if structure in the request body, giving the root CA certificate if
available, otherwise the public key value of the trust anchor. available; otherwise, the public key value of the trust anchor is
given.
GenMsg: {id-it 20}, RootCaCertValue | < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 20}, RootCaCertValue | < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateContent | < absent > GenRep: {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateContent | < absent >
RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate, newWithNew CMPCertificate,
skipping to change at page 16, line 38 skipping to change at line 690
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
} }
Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting
newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the
needs of the EE. needs of the EE.
2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template 2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template
The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id- The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-
it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in the Lightweight CMP it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in Section 4.3 of the
Profile Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483].
Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.15: Insert this section after the new Section 5.3.19.15:
5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template 5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template
This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing
requirements for certificate request attributes and extensions. The requirements for certificate request attributes and extensions. The
controls id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen MAY contain controls id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen MAY contain
details on the types of subject public keys the CA is willing to details on the types of subject public keys the CA is willing to
certify. certify.
The id-regCtrl-algId control MAY be used to identify a cryptographic The id-regCtrl-algId control MAY be used to identify a cryptographic
algorithm, see RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.7 [RFC5280], other than algorithm (see Section 4.1.2.7 of [RFC5280]) other than
rsaEncryption. The algorithm field SHALL identify a cryptographic rsaEncryption. The algorithm field SHALL identify a cryptographic
algorithm. The contents of the optional parameters field will vary algorithm. The contents of the optional parameters field will vary
according to the algorithm identified. For example, when the according to the algorithm identified. For example, when the
algorithm is set to id-ecPublicKey, the parameters identify the algorithm is set to id-ecPublicKey, the parameters identify the
elliptic curve to be used, see [RFC5480]. elliptic curve to be used; see [RFC5480].
The id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen control SHALL be used for algorithm The id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen control SHALL be used for algorithm
rsaEncryption and SHALL contain the intended modulus bit length of rsaEncryption and SHALL contain the intended modulus bit length of
the RSA key. the RSA key.
GenMsg: {id-it 19}, < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 19}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent > GenRep: {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent >
CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
skipping to change at page 17, line 47 skipping to change at line 745
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX) RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be
used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the
certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity
wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field
MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or
RSA key length MUST be used. RSA key length MUST be used.
Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211] Note: The controls ASN.1 type is defined in Section 6 of CRMF
[RFC4211].
2.17. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL Update Retrieval 2.17. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL Update Retrieval
The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id- The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-
it-crlStatusList and id-it-crls. Details are specified in the it-crlStatusList and id-it-crls. Details are specified in
Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3 Section 4.3 of the Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483]. Insert this
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Insert this section after section after the new Section 5.3.19.16:
new Section 5.3.19.16:
5.3.19.17. CRL Update Retrieval 5.3.19.17. CRL Update Retrieval
This MAY be used by the client to get new CRLs, specifying the source This MAY be used by the client to get new CRLs, specifying the source
of the CRLs and the thisUpdate value of the latest CRL it already of the CRLs and the thisUpdate value of the latest CRL it already
has, if available. A CRL source is given either by a has, if available. A CRL source is given either by a
DistributionPointName or the GeneralNames of the issuing CA. The DistributionPointName or the GeneralNames of the issuing CA. The
DistributionPointName should be treated as an internal pointer to DistributionPointName should be treated as an internal pointer to
identify a CRL that the server already has and not as a way to ask identify a CRL that the server already has and not as a way to ask
the server to fetch CRLs from external locations. The server shall the server to fetch CRLs from external locations. The server shall
provide only those CRLs that are more recent than the ones indicated only provide those CRLs that are more recent than the ones indicated
by the client. by the client.
GenMsg: {id-it 22}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CRLStatus GenMsg: {id-it 22}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CRLStatus
GenRep: {id-it 23}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GenRep: {id-it 23}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertificateList | < absent > CertificateList | < absent >
CRLSource ::= CHOICE { CRLSource ::= CHOICE {
dpn [0] DistributionPointName, dpn [0] DistributionPointName,
issuer [1] GeneralNames } issuer [1] GeneralNames }
CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE { CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
source CRLSource, source CRLSource,
thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL } thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL }
2.18. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content 2.18. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content
Section 5.3.21 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the regular use of Section 5.3.21 of [RFC4210] describes the regular use of error
error messages. This document adds a use by a PKI management entity messages. This document adds a use by a PKI management entity to
to initiate delayed delivery in response to certConf, rr, and genm initiate delayed delivery in response to certConf, rr, and genm
requests and to error messages. requests and to error messages.
Replace the first sentence of the first paragraph with the following Replace the first sentence of the first paragraph with the following
one: one:
This data structure MAY be used by EE, CA, or RA to convey error info This data structure MAY be used by an EE, CA, or RA to convey error
and by a PKI management entity to initiate delayed delivery of information and by a PKI management entity to initiate delayed
responses. delivery of responses.
Replace the second paragraph with the following text: Replace the second paragraph with the following text:
This message MAY be generated at any time during a PKI transaction. This message MAY be generated at any time during a PKI transaction.
If the client sends this request, the server MUST respond with a If the client sends this request, the server MUST respond with a
PKIConfirm response, or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header is PKIConfirm response or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header is
not valid. In case a PKI management entity sends an error message to not valid. In case a PKI management entity sends an error message to
the EE with the pKIStatusInfo field containing the status "waiting", the EE with the pKIStatusInfo field containing the status "waiting",
the EE will initiate polling as described in Section 5.3.22. the EE will initiate polling as described in Section 5.3.22.
Otherwise, both sides MUST treat this message as the end of the Otherwise, both sides MUST treat this message as the end of the
transaction (if a transaction is in progress). transaction (if a transaction is in progress).
2.19. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response 2.19. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response
Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling Section 5.3.22 of [RFC4210] describes when and how polling messages
messages are used for ir, cr, and kur messages. This document are used for ir, cr, and kur messages. This document extends the
extends the polling mechanism for outstanding responses to any kind polling mechanism for outstanding responses to any kind of request
of request message. This update also fixes the inconsistent use of message. This update also fixes the inconsistent use of the terms
the terms 'rReq' vs. 'pollReq' and 'pRep' vs. 'pollRep'. 'pReq' vs. 'pollReq' and 'pRep' vs. 'pollRep'.
Replace Section 5.3.22 with following text: Replace Section 5.3.22 of [RFC4210] with following text:
This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the
client needs to poll the server to determine the status of an client needs to poll the server to determine the status of an
outstanding response (i.e., when the "waiting" PKIStatus has been outstanding response (i.e., when the "waiting" PKIStatus has been
received). received).
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER } certReqId INTEGER }
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
skipping to change at page 20, line 11 skipping to change at line 842
multiple certConf messages can be sent during transactions. There multiple certConf messages can be sent during transactions. There
will be one sent in response to each ip, cp, or kup that contains a will be one sent in response to each ip, cp, or kup that contains a
CertStatus for an issued certificate. CertStatus for an issued certificate.
1 In response to an ip, cp, or kup message, an EE will send a 1 In response to an ip, cp, or kup message, an EE will send a
certConf for all issued certificates and expect a PKIconf for each certConf for all issued certificates and expect a PKIconf for each
certConf. An EE will send a pollReq message in response to each certConf. An EE will send a pollReq message in response to each
CertResponse element of an ip, cp, or kup message with status CertResponse element of an ip, cp, or kup message with status
"waiting" and in response to an error message with status "waiting" and in response to an error message with status
"waiting". Its certReqId MUST be either the index of a "waiting". Its certReqId MUST be either the index of a
CertResponse data structure with status "waiting" or -1 referring CertResponse data structure with status "waiting" or -1, referring
to the complete response. to the complete response.
2 In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup if 2 In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup if
one or more of still pending requested certificates are ready or one or more of the still pending requested certificates are ready
the final response to some other type of request is available; or the final response to some other type of request is available;
otherwise, it will return a pollRep. otherwise, it will return a pollRep.
3 If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least the number 3 If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least the number
of seconds given in the checkAfter field before sending another of seconds given in the checkAfter field before sending another
pollReq. pollReq.
4 If the EE receives an ip, cp, or kup, then it will be treated in 4 If the EE receives an ip, cp, or kup, then it will be treated in
the same way as the initial response; if it receives any other the same way as the initial response; if it receives any other
response, then this will be treated as the final response to the response, then this will be treated as the final response to the
original request. original request.
skipping to change at page 22, line 11 skipping to change at line 898
In the following exchange, the end entity is enrolling for two In the following exchange, the end entity is enrolling for two
certificates in one request. certificates in one request.
Step End Entity PKI Step End Entity PKI
-------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Format ir 1 Format ir
2 -> ir -> 2 -> ir ->
3 Handle ir 3 Handle ir
4 Manual intervention is 4 Manual intervention is
required for both certs. required for both certs
5 <- ip <- 5 <- ip <-
6 Process ip 6 Process ip
7 Format pollReq 7 Format pollReq
8 -> pollReq -> 8 -> pollReq ->
9 Check status of cert requests 9 Check status of cert requests
10 Certificates not ready 10 Certificates not ready
11 Format pollRep 11 Format pollRep
12 <- pollRep <- 12 <- pollRep <-
13 Wait 13 Wait
14 Format pollReq 14 Format pollReq
skipping to change at page 23, line 29 skipping to change at line 960
| | | | | |
| pollRep | other response | | pollRep | other response |
+-----------+------------------->+<-------------------+ +-----------+------------------->+<-------------------+
| |
v v
Handle response Handle response
| |
v v
End End
In the following exchange, the end-entity is sending a general In the following exchange, the end entity is sending a general
message request, and the response is delayed by the server. message request, and the response is delayed by the server.
Step End Entity PKI Step End Entity PKI
-------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Format genm 1 Format genm
2 -> genm -> 2 -> genm ->
3 Handle genm 3 Handle genm
4 delay in response is necessary 4 delay in response is necessary
5 Format error message "waiting" 5 Format error message "waiting"
with certReqId set to -1 with certReqId set to -1
6 <- error <- 6 <- error <-
7 Process error 7 Process error
8 Format pollReq 8 Format pollReq
9 -> pollReq -> 9 -> pollReq ->
10 Check status of original request 10 Check status of original request
general message response not ready general message response not ready
11 Format pollRep 11 Format pollRep
12 <- pollRep <- 12 <- pollRep <-
13 Wait 13 Wait
14 Format pollReq 14 Format pollReq
15 -> pollReq -> 15 -> pollReq ->
16 Check status of original request 16 Check status of original request
general message response is ready general message response is ready
17 Format genp 17 Format genp
18 <- genp <- 18 <- genp <-
19 Handle genp 19 Handle genp
2.20. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation 2.20. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation
Section 7 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of CMP protocol Section 7 of [RFC4210] describes the use of CMP versions. This
versions. This document describes the handling of the additional CMP document describes the handling of the additional CMP version
version cmp2021 introduced to indicate support of EnvelopedData and cmp2021, which is introduced to indicate support of EnvelopedData and
hashAlg. hashAlg.
Replace the text of the second paragraph with the following text: Replace the text of the second paragraph with the following text:
If a client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the server If a client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the server
(e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-of-band (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-of-band
means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest version means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest version
supported by both it and the server. If a client does not know what supported by both it and the server. If a client does not know what
version(s) the server supports, then it MUST send a PKIMessage using version(s) the server supports, then it MUST send a PKIMessage using
the highest version it supports, with the following exception. the highest version it supports with the following exception.
Version cmp2021 SHOULD only be used if cmp2021 syntax is needed for Version cmp2021 SHOULD only be used if cmp2021 syntax is needed for
the request being sent or for the expected response. the request being sent or for the expected response.
Note: Using cmp2000 as the default pvno is done to avoid extra Note: Using cmp2000 as the default pvno is done to avoid extra
message exchanges for version negotiation and to foster compatibility message exchanges for version negotiation and to foster compatibility
with cmp2000 implementations. Version cmp2021 syntax is only needed with cmp2000 implementations. Version cmp2021 syntax is only needed
if a message exchange uses hashAlg (in CertStatus) or EnvelopedData. if a message exchange uses hashAlg (in CertStatus) or EnvelopedData.
2.21. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers 2.21. Update Section 7.1.1 - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers
Section 7.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the behavior of a Section 7.1.1 of [RFC4210] describes the behavior of a client sending
client sending a cmp2000 message talking to a cmp1999 server as a cmp2000 message talking to a cmp1999 server, as specified in
specified in RFC 2510 [RFC2510]. This document extends the section [RFC2510]. This document extends the section to clients with any
to clients with any higher version than cmp1999. higher version than cmp1999.
Replace the first sentence of Section 7.1.1 with the following text: Replace the first sentence of Section 7.1.1 of [RFC4210] with the
following text:
If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher
than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of
cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction. cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction.
2.22. Add Section 8.4 - Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP 2.22. Add Section 8.4 - Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP
Message Protection Message Protection
The following subsection addresses the risk arising from reusing the The following subsection addresses the risk arising from reusing the
CA private key for CMP message protection. CA private key for CMP message protection.
Insert this section after Section 8.3 (Note: This fixes Errata ID Insert this section after Section 8.3 of [RFC4210] (Note: This fixes
5731): Errata ID 5731):
8.4. Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Message Protection 8.4. Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Message Protection
A CA should not reuse its certificate signing key for other purposes A CA should not reuse its certificate signing key for other purposes,
such as protecting CMP responses and TLS connections. This way, such as protecting CMP responses and TLS connections. This way,
exposure to other parts of the system and the number of uses of this exposure to other parts of the system and the number of uses of this
particularly critical key is reduced to a minimum. particularly critical key are reduced to a minimum.
2.23. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and 2.23. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and
Shared Secret Information Shared Secret Information
The following subsection addresses the risk arising from low entropy The following subsection addresses the risk arising from low entropy
of random numbers, asymmetric keys, and shared secret information. of random numbers, asymmetric keys, and shared secret information.
Insert this section after Section 8.4: Insert this section after the new Section 8.4:
8.5. Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and Shared Secret 8.5. Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and Shared Secret
Information Information
Implementations must generate nonces and private keys from random Implementations must generate nonces and private keys from random
input. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) input. The use of inadequate pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs)
to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security. to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security.
An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment
that produced the keys and to search the resulting small set of that produced the keys and to search the resulting small set of
possibilities than brute-force searching the whole key space. As an possibilities than brute-force searching the whole key space. As an
example of predictable random numbers see [CVE-2008-0166]; example of predictable random numbers, see [CVE-2008-0166];
consequences of low-entropy random numbers are discussed in Mining consequences of low-entropy random numbers are discussed in Mining
Your Ps and Qs [MiningPsQs]. The generation of quality random Your Ps and Qs [MiningPsQs]. The generation of quality random
numbers is difficult. ISO/IEC 20543:2019 [ISO.20543-2019], NIST SP numbers is difficult. ISO/IEC 20543:2019 [ISO.20543-2019], NIST SP
800-90A Rev.1 [NIST.SP.800-90Ar1], BSI AIS 31 V2.0 [AIS31], and 800-90A Rev.1 [NIST_SP_800_90Ar1], BSI AIS 31 V2.0 [AIS31], and other
others offer valuable guidance in this area. specifications offer valuable guidance in this area.
If shared secret information is generated by a cryptographically If shared secret information is generated by a cryptographically
secure random-number generator (CSRNG) it is safe to assume that the secure random number generator (CSRNG), it is safe to assume that the
entropy of the shared secret information equals its bit length. If entropy of the shared secret information equals its bit length. If
no CSRNG is used, the entropy of a shared secret information depends no CSRNG is used, the entropy of shared secret information depends on
on the details of the generation process and cannot be measured the details of the generation process and cannot be measured securely
securely after it has been generated. If user-generated passwords after it has been generated. If user-generated passwords are used as
are used as shared secret information, their entropy cannot be shared secret information, their entropy cannot be measured and are
measured and are typically insufficient for protected delivery of typically insufficient for protected delivery of centrally generated
centrally generated keys or trust anchors. keys or trust anchors.
If the entropy of a shared secret information protecting the delivery If the entropy of shared secret information protecting the delivery
of a centrally generated key pair is known, it should not be less of a centrally generated key pair is known, it should not be less
than the security strength of that key pair; if the shared secret than the security strength of that key pair; if the shared secret
information is re-used for different key pairs, the security of the information is reused for different key pairs, the security of the
shared secret information should exceed the security strength of each shared secret information should exceed the security strength of each
individual key pair. individual key pair.
For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new trust For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new trust
anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate) using caPubs or genm (a) that is anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate) using caPubs or genm that is (a)
not concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret not concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret
information is re-used for several key management operations, the information is reused for several key management operations, the
entropy of the shared secret information, if known, should not be entropy of the shared secret information, if known, should not be
less than the security strength of the trust anchor being managed by less than the security strength of the trust anchor being managed by
the operation. The shared secret information should have an entropy the operation. The shared secret information should have an entropy
that at least matches the security strength of the key material being that at least matches the security strength of the key material being
managed by the operation. Certain use cases may require shared managed by the operation. Certain use cases may require shared
secret information that may be of a low security strength, e.g., a secret information that may be of a low security strength, e.g., a
human generated password. It is RECOMMENDED that such secret human-generated password. It is RECOMMENDED that such secret
information be limited to a single PKI management operation. information be limited to a single PKI management operation.
2.24. Add Section 8.6 - Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages 2.24. Add Section 8.6 - Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages
The following subsection addresses the risk arising from in-band The following subsection addresses the risk arising from in-band
provisioning of new trust anchors in a PKI management operation. provisioning of new trust anchors in a PKI management operation.
Insert this section after new Section 8.5: Insert this section after the new Section 8.5:
8.6. Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages 8.6. Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages
A provider of trust anchors, which may be an RA involved in A provider of trust anchors, which may be an RA involved in
configuration management of its clients, MUST NOT include to-be- configuration management of its clients, MUST NOT include to-be-
trusted CA certificates in a CMP message unless the specific trusted CA certificates in a CMP message unless the specific
deployment scenario can ensure that it is adequate that the receiving deployment scenario can ensure that it is adequate that the receiving
EE trusts these certificates, e.g., by loading them into its trust EE trusts these certificates, e.g., by loading them into its trust
store. store.
Whenever an EE receives in a CMP message, e.g., in the caPubs field Whenever an EE receives in a CMP message a CA certificate to be used
of a certificate response or in a general response (genp), a CA as a trust anchor (for example in the caPubs field of a certificate
certificate for use as a trust anchor, it MUST properly authenticate response or in a general response), it MUST properly authenticate the
the message sender with existing trust anchors without requiring new message sender with existing trust anchor information without
trust anchors included in the message. requiring the new trust anchors included in the message.
Additionally, the EE MUST verify that the sender is an authorized Additionally, the EE MUST verify that the sender is an authorized
source of trust anchors. This authorization is governed by local source of trust anchors. This authorization is governed by local
policy and typically indicated using shared secret information or policy and typically indicated using shared secret information or
with a signature-based message protection using a certificate issued with a signature-based message protection using a certificate issued
by a PKI that is explicitly authorized for this purpose. by a PKI that is explicitly authorized for this purpose.
2.25. Add Section 8.7 - Authorizing requests for certificates with 2.25. Add Section 8.7 - Authorizing Requests for Certificates with
specific EKUs Specific EKUs
The following subsection addresses the security considerations to The following subsection addresses the security considerations to
follow when authorizing requests for certificates containing specific follow when authorizing requests for certificates containing specific
EKUs. EKUs.
Insert this section after new Section 8.6: Insert this section after new Section 8.6:
8.7. Authorizing requests for certificates with specific EKUs 8.7. Authorizing Requests for Certificates with Specific EKUs
When a CA issues a certificate containing extended key usage When a CA issues a certificate containing extended key usage
extensions as defined in Section 4.5, this expresses delegation of an extensions as defined in Section 4.5, this expresses delegation of an
authorization that originally is only with the CA certificate itself. authorization that originally is only with the CA certificate itself.
Such delegation is a very sensitive action in a PKI and therefore Such delegation is a very sensitive action in a PKI and therefore
special care must be taken when approving such certificate requests special care must be taken when approving such certificate requests
to ensure that only legitimate entities receive a certificate to ensure that only legitimate entities receive a certificate
containing such an EKU. containing such an EKU.
2.26. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase 2.26. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase
Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of the revocation Appendix B of [RFC4210] describes the use of the revocation
passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to utilize passphrase. As this document updates [RFC4210] to utilize the parent
the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in
described in Section 2.7 above, the description is updated Section 2.7 above, the description is updated accordingly.
accordingly.
Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following
text: text:
* The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a * The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a
GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be sent in the generalInfo GenMsg message at any time or MAY be sent in the generalInfo field
field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time. (In of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time. (In particular,
particular, the EncryptedKey structure as described in the EncryptedKey structure as described in Section 5.2.2 may be
Section 5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message sent in the header of the certConf message that confirms
that confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an acceptance of certificates requested in an initialization request
initialization request or certificate request message.) This or certificate request message.) This conveys a revocation
conveys a revocation passphrase chosen by the entity to the passphrase chosen by the entity to the relevant CA/RA. When
relevant CA/RA. When EnvelopedData is used, this is in the EnvelopedData is used, this is in the decrypted bytes of the
decrypted bytes of encryptedContent field. When EncryptedValue is encryptedContent field. When EncryptedValue is used, this is in
used, this is in the decrypted bytes of the encValue field. the decrypted bytes of the encValue field. Furthermore, the
Furthermore, the transfer is accomplished with appropriate transfer is accomplished with appropriate confidentiality
confidentiality characteristics. characteristics.
Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following
text: text:
* Either the localKeyId attribute of EnvelopedData as specified in * Either the localKeyId attribute of EnvelopedData as specified in
RFC 2985 [RFC2985] or the valueHint field of EncryptedValue MAY [RFC2985] or the valueHint field of EncryptedValue MAY contain a
contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along with the key identifier (chosen by the entity, along with the passphrase
passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the correct itself) to assist in later retrieval of the correct passphrase
passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is constructed by (e.g., when the revocation request is constructed by the entity
the entity and received by the CA/RA). and received by the CA/RA).
2.27. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications 2.27. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the Appendix C of [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the request
request message behavior. As this document updates RFC 4210 message behavior. As this document updates [RFC4210] to utilize the
[RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described
EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.7 above, the description is in Section 2.7 above, the description is updated accordingly.
updated accordingly.
Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the
definition of POPOSigningKey with the following text (Note: This definition of POPOSigningKey with the following text (Note: This
fixes Errata ID 2615): fixes Errata ID 2615):
-- ********** -- **********
-- * For the purposes of this specification, the ASN.1 comment -- * For the purposes of this specification, the ASN.1 comment
-- * given in [RFC4211] pertains not only to certTemplate, but -- * given in [RFC4211] pertains not only to certTemplate but
-- * also to the altCertTemplate control. -- * also to the altCertTemplate control.
-- ********** -- **********
-- * The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the -- * The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the
-- * DER-encoded value of poposkInput (i.e., the "value" OCTETs -- * DER-encoded value of poposkInput (i.e., the "value" OCTETs
-- * of the POPOSigningKeyInput DER). NOTE: If CertReqMsg -- * of the POPOSigningKeyInput DER). NOTE: If CertReqMsg
-- * certReq certTemplate (or the altCertTemplate control) -- * certReq certTemplate (or the altCertTemplate control)
-- * contains the subject and publicKey values, then poposkInput -- * contains the subject and publicKey values, then poposkInput
-- * MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be computed on the -- * MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be computed on the
-- * DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq (or the DER- -- * DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq (or the DER-
-- * encoded value of AltCertTemplate). If -- * encoded value of AltCertTemplate). If
-- * certTemplate/altCertTemplate does not contain both the -- * certTemplate/altCertTemplate does not contain both the
-- * subject and public key values (i.e., if it contains only -- * subject and public key values (i.e., if it contains only
-- * one of these, or neither), then poposkInput MUST be present -- * one of these or neither), then poposkInput MUST be present
-- * and MUST be signed. -- * and MUST be signed.
-- ********** -- **********
Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the Replace the ASN.1 syntax of POPOPrivKey with the following text:
definition of POPOPrivKey with the following text:
POPOPrivKey ::= CHOICE {
thisMessage [0] BIT STRING, -- deprecated
subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage,
dhMAC [2] BIT STRING, -- deprecated
agreeMAC [3] PKMACValue,
encryptedKey [4] EnvelopedData }
-- ********** -- **********
-- * the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in RFC 4211 -- * When using CMP V2, the encrypted value MUST be transferred in
-- * [RFC4211]; it should be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with -- * the thisMessage field that is given as BIT STRING in [RFC4211],
-- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this -- * but it requires EncryptedValue. Therefore, this document makes
-- * document makes the behavioral clarification of specifying -- * the behavioral clarification for CMP V2 of specifying that the
-- * that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as -- * contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded as an
-- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward -- * EncryptedValue and then wrapped in a BIT STRING.
-- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This -- * When using CMP V3, the encrypted value MUST be transferred
-- * allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the -- * in the encryptedKey field, as specified in Section 5.2.2.
-- * private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility
-- * with RFC4210 and [RFCXXXX].
-- ********** -- **********
2.28. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These 2.28. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These
Profiles Profiles
Appendix D.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides general rules for Appendix D.1 of [RFC4210] provides general rules for interpretation
interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles specified in of the PKI management messages profiles specified in Appendices D and
Appendix D and Appendix E of RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This document E of [RFC4210]. This document updates a sentence regarding the new
updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version cmp2021. protocol version cmp2021.
Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with
the following text: the following text:
Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value
(e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000). (e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000).
2.29. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile 2.29. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile
Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides a list of algorithms that Appendix D.2 of [RFC4210] provides a list of algorithms that
implementations must support when claiming conformance with PKI implementations must support when claiming conformance with PKI
Management Message Profiles as specified in CMP Appendix D.2 management message profiles, as specified in Appendix D.2 of CMP
[RFC4210]. This document redirects to the new algorithm profile as [RFC4210]. This document redirects to the new algorithm profile, as
specified in Section 7.1 of CMP Algorithms specified in Section 7.1 of CMP Algorithms [RFC9481].
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].
Replace the text of the section with the following text: Replace the text of the section with the following text:
D.2. Algorithm Use Profile D.2. Algorithm Use Profile
For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective
conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to CMP conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to
Algorithms Section 7.1 [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. Section 7.1 of CMP Algorithms [RFC9481].
2.30. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic 2.30. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic
Authenticated Scheme) Authenticated Scheme)
Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/ Appendix D.4 of [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/
certification scheme. This scheme shall continue using certification scheme. This scheme shall continue using
EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons. EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons.
Replace the line specifying protectionAlg of the Initialization Replace the line specifying protectionAlg of the Initialization
Response message with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID Response message with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID
5201): 5201):
protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG
Replace the comment after the privateKey field of Replace the comment after the privateKey field of
crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response
message with the following text: message with the following text:
-- see Appendix C, Request Message Behavioral Clarifications -- see Appendix C (Request Message Behavioral Clarifications)
-- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue -- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue
3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management 3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP) Protocol (CMP)
3.1. Update Section 1. - Introduction 3.1. Update Section 1 - Introduction
To indicate and explain why delayed delivery of all kinds of To indicate and explain why delayed delivery of all kinds of
PKIMessages may be handled at transfer level and/or at CMP level, the PKIMessages may be handled at transfer level and/or at CMP level, the
introduction of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] is updated. introduction of [RFC6712] is updated.
Replace the third paragraph of this section with the following text: Replace the third paragraph of this section with the following text:
In addition to reliable transport, CMP requires connection and error In addition to reliable transport, CMP requires connection and error
handling from the transfer protocol, which is all covered by HTTP. handling from the transfer protocol, which is all covered by HTTP.
Additionally, delayed delivery of CMP response messages may be Additionally, delayed delivery of CMP response messages may be
handled at transfer level regardless of the message contents. Since handled at transfer level, regardless of the message contents. Since
this document extends the polling mechanism specified in the second this document extends the polling mechanism specified in the second
version of CMP [RFC4210] to cover all types of PKI management version of CMP [RFC4210] to cover all types of PKI management
transactions, delays detected at application level may also be transactions, delays detected at application level may also be
handled within CMP, using pollReq and pollRep messages. handled within CMP, using pollReq and pollRep messages.
3.2. New Section 1.1. - Changes Since RFC 6712 3.2. New Section 1.1 - Changes Since RFC 6712
The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 6712 The following subsection describes feature updates to [RFC6712].
[RFC6712]. They are related to the base specification. Hence, They are related to the base specification. Hence, references to the
references to the original sections in RFC 6712 [RFC6712] are used original sections in [RFC6712] are used whenever possible.
whenever possible.
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1: Insert this section after the current Section 1 of [RFC6712]:
1.1 Changes Since RFC 6712 1.1 Changes Since RFC 6712
The following updates are made in this document: The following updates are made in this document:
* Introduce the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp'. * Introduce the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp'.
* Extend the URI structure. * Extend the URI structure.
3.3. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI 3.3. Replace Section 3.6 - HTTP Request-URI
Section 3.6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] specifies the used HTTP URIs. This Section 3.6 of [RFC6712] specifies the used HTTP URIs. This document
document introduces the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp' and extends the introduces the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp' and extends the URIs.
URIs.
Replace the text of the section with the following text: Replace the text of the section with the following text:
3.6. HTTP Request-URI 3.6. HTTP Request-URI
Each CMP server on a PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS Each CMP server on a PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS
transfer MUST support the use of the path prefix '/.well-known/' as transfer MUST support the use of the path prefix '/.well-known/' as
defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] and the registered name 'cmp' to ease defined in [RFC8615] and the registered name 'cmp' to ease
interworking in a multi-vendor environment. interworking in a multi-vendor environment.
The CMP client needs to be configured with sufficient information to The CMP client needs to be configured with sufficient information to
form the CMP server URI. This is at least the authority portion of form the CMP server URI. This is at least the authority portion of
the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operation path the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operation path
segment of the PKI management entity. Additionally, OPTIONAL path segment of the PKI management entity. Additionally, OPTIONAL path
segments MAY be added after the registered application name as part segments MAY be added after the registered application name as part
of the full operation path to provide further distinction. The path of the full operation path to provide further distinction. The path
segment 'p' followed by an arbitraryLabel <name> could for example segment 'p' followed by an arbitraryLabel <name> could, for example,
support the differentiation of specific CAs or certificate profiles. support the differentiation of specific CAs or certificate profiles.
Further path segments, e.g., as specified in the Lightweight CMP Further path segments, e.g., as specified in the Lightweight CMP
Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile], could indicate PKI Profile [RFC9483], could indicate PKI management operations using an
management operations using an operationLabel <operation>. A valid operationLabel <operation>. A valid, full CMP URI can look like
full CMP URI can look like this: this:
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/<operation> http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/<operation>
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/p/<name> http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/p/<name>
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/p/<name>/<operation> http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/p/<name>/<operation>
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
This document updates the ASN.1 modules of RFC 4210 Appendix F 4.1. Updates to the ASN.1 Modules in RFCs 4210 and 5912
[RFC4210] and RFC 5912 Section 9 [RFC5912]. The OIDs 99 (id-mod-
cmp2021-88) and 100 (id-mod-cmp2021-02) were registered in the SMI
Security for PKIX Module Identifier registry to identify the updated
ASN.1 modules.
This document contains an update to the IANA Consideration sections This document updates the ASN.1 modules of Appendix F of [RFC4210]
of [RFC4210] adding this content. and Section 9 of [RFC5912] as shown in Appendixes A.1 and A.2 of this
document, respectively. The OIDs 99 (id-mod-cmp2021-88) and 100 (id-
mod-cmp2021-02) have been registered in the "SMI Security for PKIX
Module Identifier" registry to identify the updated ASN.1 modules.
In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key 4.2. Updates to the IANA Considerations of RFC 4210
Purpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see
https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-
numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3) as defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] one
addition has been performed.
One new entry has been added: This document updates the IANA Consideration sections of [RFC4210] by
adding this content.
4.2.1. SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose Registry
IANA has registered the following new entry in the "SMI Security for
PKIX Extended Key Purpose" registry (see
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers>, as defined in
[RFC7299]:
+=========+=============+============+ +=========+=============+============+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=============+============+ +=========+=============+============+
| 32 | id-kp-cmKGA | [RFCXXXX] | | 32 | id-kp-cmKGA | RFC 9480 |
+---------+-------------+------------+ +---------+-------------+------------+
Table 1: Addition to the PKIX Table 1: Addition to the SMI
Extended Key Purpose Identifiers Security for PKIX Extended Key
Registry Purpose
In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information 4.2.2. SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information Types
Types (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-
numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4) as defined in
RFC 7299 [RFC7299] seven additions have been performed.
Seven new entries have been added: IANA has registered the following new entries in the "SMI Security
for PKIX CMP Information Types" registry (see
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers>), as defined in
[RFC7299]:
+=========+=======================+============+ +=========+=======================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=======================+============+ +=========+=======================+============+
| 17 | id-it-caCerts | [RFCXXXX] | | 17 | id-it-caCerts | RFC 9480 |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 18 | id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate | [RFCXXXX] | | 18 | id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate | RFC 9480 |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 19 | id-it-certReqTemplate | [RFCXXXX] | | 19 | id-it-certReqTemplate | RFC 9480 |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 20 | id-it-rootCaCert | [RFCXXXX] | | 20 | id-it-rootCaCert | RFC 9480 |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 21 | id-it-certProfile | [RFCXXXX] | | 21 | id-it-certProfile | RFC 9480 |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 22 | id-it-crlStatusList | [RFCXXXX] | | 22 | id-it-crlStatusList | RFC 9480 |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 23 | id-it-crls | [RFCXXXX] | | 23 | id-it-crls | RFC 9480 |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------------+------------+
Table 2: Addition to the PKIX CMP Table 2: Additions to the PKIX CMP
Information Types Registry Information Types Registry
In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration 4.2.3. SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration Controls
Controls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/
smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1) as
defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] two additions have been performed.
Two new entries have been added: IANA has registered the following new entries in the "SMI Security
for PKIX CRMF Registration Controls" registry (see
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers>), as defined in
[RFC7299]:
+=========+======================+============+ +=========+======================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+======================+============+ +=========+======================+============+
| 11 | id-regCtrl-algId | [RFCXXXX] | | 11 | id-regCtrl-algId | RFC 9480 |
+---------+----------------------+------------+ +---------+----------------------+------------+
| 12 | id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen | [RFCXXXX] | | 12 | id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen | RFC 9480 |
+---------+----------------------+------------+ +---------+----------------------+------------+
Table 3: Addition to the PKIX CRMF Table 3: Addition to the PKIX CRMF
Registration Controls Registry Registration Controls Registry
This document contains an update to the IANA Consideration sections 4.3. Updates to the IANA Considerations of RFC 6712
of [RFC6712] adding this content.
This document defines a new entry with the following content in the This document contains an update to the IANA Considerations sections
"Well-Known URIs" registry (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/ of [RFC6712] by adding this content.
well-known-uris/) as defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615].
URI Suffix: cmp 4.3.1. Well-Known URIs
Change Controller: IETF
References: [RFCXXXX] [I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport] IANA has registered the following new entry in the "Well-Known URIs"
Related Information: CMP has a sub-registry at registry (see <https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris>), as
[https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp/] defined in [RFC8615]:
URI Suffix: cmp
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC9480] [RFC9482]
Status: permanent
Related Information: CMP has a registry at
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp>
4.3.2. Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Registry
This document defines a new protocol registry group entitled This document defines a new protocol registry group entitled
"Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)" (at "Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)" (at
https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp/) with a new registry "CMP Well- <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp>) with a new "CMP Well-Known
Known URI Path Segments" containing three columns: Path Segment, URI Path Segments" registry containing three columns: Path Segment,
Description, and Reference. New items can be added using the Description, and Reference. New items can be added using the
Specification Required RFC 8615 [RFC8615] process. The initial Specification Required [RFC8615] process. The initial entry of this
contents of this registry is: registry is:
Path Segment: p Path Segment: p
Description: Indicates that the next path segment specifies, e.g., Description: Indicates that the next path segment specifies, e.g., a
a CA or certificate profile name CA or certificate profile name
References: [RFCXXXX] [I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport] Reference: [RFC9480] [RFC9482]
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
The security considerations of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are extended in The security considerations of [RFC4210] are extended in Section 2.22
Section 2.22 to Section 2.24. No security considerations updates of to Section 2.24. No security considerations updates of [RFC6712]
RFC 6712 [RFC6712] were required. were required.
6. Acknowledgements
Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration
on structuring and writing this document we got from [RFC6402] which
updates CMC. Special thank also goes to Russ Housley, Lijun Liao,
Martin Peylo, and Tomas Gustavsson for reviewing and providing
valuable suggestions on improving this document.
We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable
feedback.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport] 6. References
Sahni, M. and S. Tripathi, "CoAP Transfer for the
Certificate Management Protocol", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport-04, 8
November 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport-04>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms] 6.1. Normative References
Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
"Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
algorithms-15, 2 June 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
cmp-algorithms-15>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key [RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols", Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols",
RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999, RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2510>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2510>.
skipping to change at page 36, line 47 skipping to change at line 1547
(CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection", RFC 8933, (CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection", RFC 8933,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8933, October 2020, DOI 10.17487/RFC8933, October 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8933>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8933>.
[RFC9045] Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the [RFC9045] Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 9045, Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 9045,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9045, June 2021, DOI 10.17487/RFC9045, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9045>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9045>.
7.2. Informative References [RFC9481] Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
"Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms",
RFC 9481, DOI 10.17487/RFC9481, October 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9481>.
[AIS31] Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik [RFC9482] Sahni, M., Ed. and S. Tripathi, Ed., "Constrained
(BSI), Killmann, W., and W. Schindler, "A proposal for: Application Protocol (CoAP) Transfer for the Certificate
Functionality classes for random number generators, Management Protocol", RFC 9482, DOI 10.17487/RFC9482,
version 2.0", 18 September 2011, October 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9482>.
6.2. Informative References
[AIS31] Killmann, W. and W. Schindler, "A proposal for:
Functionality classes for random number generators -
Version 2.0", September 2011,
<https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/ <https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/
Zertifizierung/Interpretationen/AIS_31_Functionality_class Zertifizierung/Interpretationen/AIS_31_Functionality_class
es_for_random_number_generators_e.pdf>. es_for_random_number_generators_e.pdf>.
[CVE-2008-0166] [CVE-2008-0166]
National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST),
"National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2008-0166", 13 May "National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2008-0166", May
2008, <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0166>. 2008, <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0166>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] [HTTP-CMP] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
Brockhaus, H., Oheimb, D. V., and S. Fries, "Lightweight "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", Work in for the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight- Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis-03,
cmp-profile-12, 13 May 2022, 10 February 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps- draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis-03>.
lightweight-cmp-profile-12>.
[IEEE.802.1AR_2018]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018,
DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, 2 August 2018,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794>.
[ISO.20543-2019] [ISO.20543-2019]
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
"Information technology -- Security techniques -- Test and "Information technology -- Security techniques -- Test and
analysis methods for random bit generators within ISO/IEC analysis methods for random bit generators within ISO/IEC
19790 and ISO/IEC 15408", ISO Draft Standard 20543-2019, 19790 and ISO/IEC 15408", ISO/IEC 20543:2019, October
October 2019. 2019.
[MiningPsQs] [MiningPsQs]
Security'12: Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on , Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., and J. A.
Security symposium, Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, Halderman, "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread
E., and J. A. Halderman, "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection Weak Keys in Network Devices", Security'12: Proceedings of
of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices", August 2012, the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium, August
<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/ 2012, <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/
technical-sessions/presentation/heninger>. technical-sessions/presentation/heninger>.
[NIST.SP.800-90Ar1] [NIST_SP_800_90Ar1]
Barker, Elaine B. and John M. Kelsey, "Recommendation for Barker, E. B., Kelsey, J. M., and NIST, "Recommendation
Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random
Generators", NIST NIST SP 800-90Ar1, Bit Generators", NIST Special Publications
DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1, June 2015, (General) 800-90Ar1, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1, June
2015,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/ <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>. NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.
[PKCS11] RSA Laboratories, "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards - [PKIX-CMP] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
Cryptographic Token Interface Standard. Version 2.10", "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate
December 1999, Management Protocol (CMP)", Work in Progress, Internet-
<https://www.cryptsoft.com/pkcs11doc/STANDARD/ Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis-07, 19 June 2023,
pkcs11v2-10.pdf>. <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
rfc4210bis-07>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2202] Cheng, P. and R. Glenn, "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC- [RFC2202] Cheng, P. and R. Glenn, "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-
SHA-1", RFC 2202, DOI 10.17487/RFC2202, September 1997, SHA-1", RFC 2202, DOI 10.17487/RFC2202, September 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2202>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2202>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX [RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014, Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.
[RFC9483] Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. von Oheimb, "Lightweight
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", RFC 9483,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9483, October 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9483>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
A.1. Update to RFC4210 - 1988 ASN.1 Module A.1. Update to RFC 4210 - 1988 ASN.1 Module
This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for [RFC4210]. This This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for [RFC4210]. This
module replaces the module in Appendix F of that document. Although module replaces the module in Appendix F of that document. Although
a 2002 ASN.1 module is provided, this 1988 ASN.1 module remains the a 2002 ASN.1 module is provided, this 1988 ASN.1 module remains the
normative module as per the policy of the PKIX working group. normative module, as per the policy of the PKIX Working Group.
PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3) PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-88(99)} id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-88(99)}
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- -- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS IMPORTS
Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, Name, Time, Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, Name, Time,
AlgorithmIdentifier, id-kp AlgorithmIdentifier, id-kp
--, UTF8String -- -- if required; otherwise, comment out --, UTF8String -- -- if required; otherwise, comment out
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(18)} id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(18)}
-- The import of Name is added to define CertificationRequest -- The import of Name is added to define CertificationRequest
-- instead of importing it from PKCS#10 [RFC2986] -- instead of importing it from PKCS #10 [RFC2986].
DistributionPointName, GeneralNames, GeneralName, KeyIdentifier DistributionPointName, GeneralNames, GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(19)} id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(19)}
CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId, CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
CertReqMessages, Controls, AttributeTypeAndValue, id-regCtrl CertReqMessages, Controls, AttributeTypeAndValue, id-regCtrl
FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)} id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}
-- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
-- in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX]]. EncryptedValue does not need to -- in CMP Updates [RFC9480]. EncryptedValue does not need to
-- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here. -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here.
-- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in -- Also, see the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
-- Appendix C of this specification -- Appendix C of this specification.
EnvelopedData, SignedData, Attribute EnvelopedData, SignedData, Attribute
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1) FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) } smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
-- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to -- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
-- the updates made in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- the updates made in CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- The import of Attribute is added to define -- The import of Attribute is added to define
-- CertificationRequest instead of importing it from -- CertificationRequest instead of importing it from
-- PKCS#10 [RFC2986] -- PKCS #10 [RFC2986].
; ;
-- the rest of the module contains locally-defined OIDs and -- The rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and
-- constructs -- constructs:
CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE {
x509v3PKCert Certificate x509v3PKCert Certificate
} }
-- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
-- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
-- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509 -- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
-- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds -- attribute certificates, card-verifiable
-- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol, -- certificates, or other kinds of certificates) within this
-- should a need ever arise to support such generality. Those -- Certificate Management Protocol, should a need ever arise to
-- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support -- support such generality. Those implementations that do not
-- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the -- foresee a need to ever support other certificate types MAY, if
-- above structure and "un-comment" the following one prior to -- they wish, comment out the above structure and "uncomment" the
-- compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that interoperability -- following one prior to compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that
-- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by -- interoperability with implementations that don't do this will be
-- this change.) -- unaffected by this change.)
-- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate -- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate
PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE { PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader, header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody, body PKIBody,
protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL, protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL OPTIONAL
} }
skipping to change at page 40, line 30 skipping to change at line 1730
PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2), pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
cmp2021(3) }, cmp2021(3) },
sender GeneralName, sender GeneralName,
-- identifies the sender -- identifies the sender
recipient GeneralName, recipient GeneralName,
-- identifies the intended recipient -- identifies the intended recipient
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
-- time of production of this message (used when sender -- time of production of this message (used when the sender
-- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e., -- believes that the transport will be "suitable", i.e.,
-- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt) -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits -- algorithm used for the calculation of protection bits
senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- to identify specific keys used for protection -- to identify specific keys used for protection
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in -- identifies the transaction, i.e., this will be the same in
-- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
-- messages -- messages
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
-- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
-- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
-- the intended recipient of this message -- the intended recipient of this message.
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
-- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
-- (this field is intended for human consumption) -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
-- this may be used to convey context-specific information -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
-- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption) -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
} }
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
-- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] -- text encoded as a UTF-8 string [RFC3629]
PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements
ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request
ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response
cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request
cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response
p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [RFC2986] p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [RFC2986]
popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response
kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request
skipping to change at page 41, line 37 skipping to change at line 1785
ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response
ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann. ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann.
cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann. cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann.
rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann. rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann.
crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement
pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation
nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message
genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message
genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response
error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message
certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate confirm certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate Confirm
pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling request pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling Request
pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling response pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling Response
} }
PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING
ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE { ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader, header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody body PKIBody
} }
id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13} id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}
PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING, salt OCTET STRING,
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes -- Note: Implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this string to values appropriate for their environment -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks.
owf AlgorithmIdentifier, owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (OWF)
iterationCount INTEGER, iterationCount INTEGER,
-- number of times the OWF is applied -- number of times the OWF is applied
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes -- Note: Implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks.
mac AlgorithmIdentifier mac AlgorithmIdentifier
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC [RFC9481],
} -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) } -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30} id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30}
DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier, owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function -- AlgId for a One-Way Function
mac AlgorithmIdentifier mac AlgorithmIdentifier
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC [RFC9481],
} -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) } -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
PKIStatus ::= INTEGER { PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
accepted (0), accepted (0),
-- you got exactly what you asked for -- you got exactly what you asked for
grantedWithMods (1), grantedWithMods (1),
-- you got something like what you asked for; the -- you got something like what you asked for; the
-- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
rejection (2), rejection (2),
-- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
waiting (3), waiting (3),
-- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to -- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
-- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status -- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
-- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified -- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
skipping to change at page 43, line 4 skipping to change at line 1847
-- underlying transport layer MAY have some utility in this -- underlying transport layer MAY have some utility in this
-- regard) -- regard)
revocationWarning (4), revocationWarning (4),
-- this message contains a warning that a revocation is -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
-- imminent -- imminent
revocationNotification (5), revocationNotification (5),
-- notification that a revocation has occurred -- notification that a revocation has occurred
keyUpdateWarning (6) keyUpdateWarning (6)
-- update already done for the oldCertId specified in -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
-- CertReqMsg -- CertReqMsg
} }
PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING { PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
-- since we can fail in more than one way! -- since we can fail in more than one way!
-- More codes may be added in the future if/when required. -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
badAlg (0), badAlg (0),
-- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier -- unrecognized or unsupported algorithm identifier
badMessageCheck (1), badMessageCheck (1),
-- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify) -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
badRequest (2), badRequest (2),
-- transaction not permitted or supported -- transaction not permitted or supported
badTime (3), badTime (3),
-- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time, -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
-- as defined by local policy -- as defined by local policy
badCertId (4), badCertId (4),
-- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
badDataFormat (5), badDataFormat (5),
skipping to change at page 43, line 34 skipping to change at line 1876
-- the authority indicated in the request is different from the -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
-- one creating the response token -- one creating the response token
incorrectData (7), incorrectData (7),
-- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services) -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
missingTimeStamp (8), missingTimeStamp (8),
-- when the timestamp is missing but should be there -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
-- (by policy) -- (by policy)
badPOP (9), badPOP (9),
-- the proof-of-possession failed -- the proof-of-possession failed
certRevoked (10), certRevoked (10),
-- the certificate has already been revoked -- the certificate has already been revoked
certConfirmed (11), certConfirmed (11),
-- the certificate has already been confirmed -- the certificate has already been confirmed
wrongIntegrity (12), wrongIntegrity (12),
-- not valid integrity, password based instead of signature or -- not valid integrity, based on the password instead of the
-- vice versa -- signature or vice versa
badRecipientNonce (13), badRecipientNonce (13),
-- not valid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value -- not valid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
timeNotAvailable (14), timeNotAvailable (14),
-- the TSA's time source is not available -- the time source of the Time Stamping Authority (TSA) is
-- not available
unacceptedPolicy (15), unacceptedPolicy (15),
-- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA. -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA
unacceptedExtension (16), unacceptedExtension (16),
-- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA. -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA
addInfoNotAvailable (17), addInfoNotAvailable (17),
-- the additional information requested could not be -- the additional information requested could not be
-- understood or is not available -- understood or is not available
badSenderNonce (18), badSenderNonce (18),
-- not valid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size -- not valid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
badCertTemplate (19), badCertTemplate (19),
-- not valid cert. template or missing mandatory information -- not valid cert. template or missing mandatory information
signerNotTrusted (20), signerNotTrusted (20),
-- signer of the message unknown or not trusted -- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
transactionIdInUse (21), transactionIdInUse (21),
-- the transaction identifier is already in use -- the transaction identifier is already in use
unsupportedVersion (22), unsupportedVersion (22),
-- the version of the message is not supported -- the version of the message is not supported
notAuthorized (23), notAuthorized (23),
-- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
-- request or perform the preceding action -- request or perform the preceding action
systemUnavail (24), systemUnavail (24),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
systemFailure (25), systemFailure (25),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system failure -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
duplicateCertReq (26) duplicateCertReq (26)
-- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate -- the certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
-- certificate already exists -- certificate already exists
} }
PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE { PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus, status PKIStatus,
statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL
} }
OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate
OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE { OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL, certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL,
hashVal BIT STRING hashVal BIT STRING
-- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the -- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
-- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID. -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
} }
POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
-- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the -- one Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages)
Challenge ::= SEQUENCE { Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, owf AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
-- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
-- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
-- Challenge is to be used). -- Challenge is to be used)
witness OCTET STRING, witness OCTET STRING,
-- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a -- the result of applying the One-Way Function (owf) to a
-- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. [Note that a different -- randomly generated INTEGER, A (Note that a different
-- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.] -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.)
challenge OCTET STRING challenge OCTET STRING
-- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert. -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
-- request is being made) of Rand. -- request is being made) of Rand
} }
-- Added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- Rand was added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
Rand ::= SEQUENCE { Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
-- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge -- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge
-- in POPODecKeyChallContent -- in POPODecKeyChallContent
int INTEGER, int INTEGER,
-- the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above) -- the randomly generated INTEGER A (above)
sender GeneralName sender GeneralName
-- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader) -- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
} }
POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
-- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The
-- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
-- corresponding Challenge. -- corresponding Challenge.
skipping to change at page 45, line 48 skipping to change at line 1988
subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE { subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING },
attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute }, attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute },
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING signature BIT STRING
} }
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this response with corresponding request (a value -- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value
-- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
-- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr) -- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr)
status PKIStatusInfo, status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211] -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
} }
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL, privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- see [RFC4211] for comment on encoding -- See [RFC4211] for comments on encoding.
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change -- syntax without this change.
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL
} }
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate, certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change -- syntax without this change.
} }
KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatusInfo, status PKIStatusInfo,
newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL
} }
RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE { RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
certDetails CertTemplate, certDetails CertTemplate,
-- allows requester to specify as much as they can about -- allows the requester to specify as much as they can about
-- the cert. for which revocation is requested -- the cert. for which revocation is requested
-- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available) -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
crlEntryDetails Extensions OPTIONAL crlEntryDetails Extensions OPTIONAL
-- requested crlEntryExtensions -- requested crlEntryExtensions
} }
RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo, status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
-- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent -- in the same order as was sent in RevReqContent
revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId
OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL,
-- IDs for which revocation was requested -- IDs for which revocation was requested
-- (same order as status) -- (same order as status)
crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList
OPTIONAL OPTIONAL
-- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one) -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
} }
CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
skipping to change at page 48, line 4 skipping to change at line 2087
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL, statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL
-- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
-- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier -- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm -- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm
} }
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
-- CertReqTemplateContent, id-regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, and -- CertReqTemplateContent, id-regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, and
-- id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen were added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen were added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE { CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
certTemplate CertTemplate, certTemplate CertTemplate,
-- prefilled certTemplate structure elements -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
-- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
-- be used. -- be used.
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL keySpec Controls OPTIONAL
-- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms. -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms
-- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue -- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
-- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211) -- as specified in CRMF [RFC4211]
} }
id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 } id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 }
AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue
-- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3 -- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3
-- public-key certificate -- public key certificate
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 } id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA -- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 } id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX) RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
-- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths -- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths
-- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in -- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in
-- CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- CMP Updates [RFC9480]
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate, newWithNew CMPCertificate,
-- new root CA certificate -- new root CA certificate
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
-- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
-- signed with the old private root CA key -- signed with the old private root CA key
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
-- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key -- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
-- signed with the new private root CA key -- signed with the new private root CA key
skipping to change at page 49, line 10 skipping to change at line 2142
CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE { CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
source CRLSource, source CRLSource,
thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL } thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL }
InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL
} }
-- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
-- to, the following (un-comment in this ASN.1 module and use as -- to, the following (uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as
-- appropriate for a given environment): -- appropriate for a given environment):
-- --
-- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1} -- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
-- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2} -- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
-- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier -- AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3} -- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
-- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier -- AlgorithmIdentifier
skipping to change at page 49, line 38 skipping to change at line 2170
-- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10} -- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
-- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11} -- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
-- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier -- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12} -- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
-- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey -- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey
-- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE -- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
-- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes -- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
-- - made in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- - made in CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- - syntax without this change -- - syntax without this change.
-- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13} -- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
-- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL -- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14} -- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime -- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15} -- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages -- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16} -- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String -- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
-- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17} -- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
-- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CMPCertificate -- CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18} -- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
-- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent -- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
-- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19} -- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
-- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent -- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
-- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20} -- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
-- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} -- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
-- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- UTF8String -- UTF8String
-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 22} -- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 22}
-- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CRLStatus -- CRLStatus
-- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 23} -- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 23}
-- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CertificateList -- CertificateList
-- - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- --
-- where -- where
-- --
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and -- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
-- --
-- --
-- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
-- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general- -- Management Protocol request and response messages or general-
-- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
-- specific environments. -- specific environments.
GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content). -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
-- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
-- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above. -- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
-- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it -- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OIDs that it
-- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set -- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
-- indicates that the CA may send -- indicates that the CA may send
-- any/all information that it wishes. -- any/all information that it wishes.
GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not -- The receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
-- recognize. -- recognize.
ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE { ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo, pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL, errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-- implementation-specific error codes -- implementation-specific error codes
errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
-- implementation-specific error details -- implementation-specific error details
} }
skipping to change at page 51, line 25 skipping to change at line 2254
certReqId INTEGER certReqId INTEGER
} }
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
} }
-- --
-- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP -- Extended key usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
-- operations, added due to the changes made in -- operations, added due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in -- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC, as defined in
-- [RFC6402] -- [RFC6402]
-- --
-- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 } -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 } -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 } id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
-- There is no 1988 ASN.1 module of PKCS#9 available to import the -- There is no 1988 ASN.1 module of PKCS #9 available to import the
-- syntax of the localKeyId attribute type and value from. Therefore, -- syntax of the localKeyId attribute type and value from. Therefore,
-- the syntax is added here as needed for the updates made in -- the syntax is added here as needed for the updates made in
-- CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9} rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9}
pkcs-9-at-localKeyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 21} pkcs-9-at-localKeyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 21}
LocalKeyIdValue ::= OCTET STRING LocalKeyIdValue ::= OCTET STRING
END -- of CMP module END -- of CMP module
A.2. Update to RFC5912 - 2002 ASN.1 Module A.2. Update to RFC 5912 - 2002 ASN.1 Module
This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for [RFC5912]. This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for [RFC5912].
This module replaces the module in Section 9 of [RFC5912]. The This module replaces the module in Section 9 of [RFC5912]. The
module contains those changes to the normative ASN.1 module from module contains those changes to the normative ASN.1 module from
RFC4210 Appendix F [RFC4210] that were to update to 2002 ASN.1 Appendix F of [RFC4210] that were to update to the 2002 ASN.1
standard done in [RFC5912] as well as changes made in this document. standard done in [RFC5912], as well as changes made in this document.
PKIXCMP-2021 PKIXCMP-2021
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-cmp2021-02(100) } id-mod-cmp2021-02(100) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
IMPORTS IMPORTS
AttributeSet{}, SingleAttribute{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE AttributeSet{}, SingleAttribute{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
skipping to change at page 52, line 50 skipping to change at line 2324
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)} mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}
CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId, CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
CertReqMessages, Controls, RegControlSet, id-regCtrl CertReqMessages, Controls, RegControlSet, id-regCtrl
FROM PKIXCRMF-2009 FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) } id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) }
-- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
-- in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX]. EncryptedValue does not need to -- in CMP Updates [RFC9480]. EncryptedValue does not need to
-- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here. -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here.
-- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in -- See also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
-- Appendix C of this specification -- Appendix C of this specification.
CertificationRequest CertificationRequest
FROM PKCS-10 FROM PKCS-10
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69)} mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69)}
-- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT -- (specified in [RFC2986] with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT
-- tags). Alternatively, implementers may directly include -- tags). Alternatively, implementers may directly include
-- the [RFC2986] syntax in this module -- the syntax of [RFC2986] in this module.
localKeyId localKeyId
FROM PKCS-9 FROM PKCS-9
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
modules(0) pkcs-9(1)} modules(0) pkcs-9(1)}
-- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in -- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in
-- CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
EnvelopedData, SignedData EnvelopedData, SignedData
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)} smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)}
-- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to -- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
-- the updates made in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- the updates made in CMP Updates [RFC9480].
; ;
-- the rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and -- The rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and
-- constructs -- constructs:
CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate, ... } CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate, ... }
-- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
-- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
-- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509 -- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
-- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds -- attribute certificates, card-verifiable
-- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol, -- certificates, or other kinds of certificates) within this
-- should a need ever arise to support such generality. Those -- Certificate Management Protocol, should a need ever arise to
-- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support -- support such generality. Those implementations that do not
-- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the -- foresee a need to ever support other certificate types MAY, if
-- above structure and "uncomment" the following one prior to -- they wish, comment out the above structure and "uncomment" the
-- compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that interoperability -- following one prior to compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that
-- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by -- interoperability with implementations that don't do this will be
-- this change.) -- unaffected by this change.)
-- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate -- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate
PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE { PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader, header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody, body PKIBody,
protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL, protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL } OPTIONAL }
PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2), pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
cmp2012(3) }, cmp2012(3) },
sender GeneralName, sender GeneralName,
-- identifies the sender -- identifies the sender
recipient GeneralName, recipient GeneralName,
-- identifies the intended recipient -- identifies the intended recipient
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
-- time of production of this message (used when sender -- time of production of this message (used when the sender
-- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e., -- believes that the transport will be "suitable", i.e.,
-- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt) -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL,
-- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits -- algorithm used for the calculation of protection bits
senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- to identify specific keys used for protection -- to identify specific keys used for protection
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in -- identifies the transaction, i.e., this will be the same in
-- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
-- messages -- messages
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
-- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
-- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
-- the intended recipient of this message -- the intended recipient of this message.
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
-- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
-- (this field is intended for human consumption) -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
-- this may be used to convey context-specific information -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
-- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption) -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
} }
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
-- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] -- text encoded as a UTF-8 string [RFC3629]
PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements
ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request
ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response
cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request
cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response
p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [RFC2986] p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [RFC2986]
popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response
kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request
skipping to change at page 55, line 26 skipping to change at line 2445
ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response
ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann. ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann.
cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann. cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann.
rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann. rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann.
crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement
pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation
nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message
genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message
genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response
error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message
certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate confirm certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate Confirm
pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling request pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling Request
pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling response pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling Response
} }
PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING
ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE { ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader, header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody } body PKIBody }
id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 } usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 }
PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING, salt OCTET STRING,
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes -- Note: Implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this string to values appropriate for their environment -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks.
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}, owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function -- AlgId for a One-Way Function
iterationCount INTEGER, iterationCount INTEGER,
-- number of times the OWF is applied -- number of times the OWF is applied
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes -- Note: Implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks.
mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}} mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC [RFC9481],
-- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
} }
id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 } usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 }
DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}, owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function -- AlgId for a One-Way Function
mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}} mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC [RFC9481],
-- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
} }
PKIStatus ::= INTEGER { PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
accepted (0), accepted (0),
-- you got exactly what you asked for -- you got exactly what you asked for
grantedWithMods (1), grantedWithMods (1),
-- you got something like what you asked for; the -- you got something like what you asked for; the
-- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
rejection (2), rejection (2),
skipping to change at page 56, line 47 skipping to change at line 2514
-- notification that a revocation has occurred -- notification that a revocation has occurred
keyUpdateWarning (6) keyUpdateWarning (6)
-- update already done for the oldCertId specified in -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
-- CertReqMsg -- CertReqMsg
} }
PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING { PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
-- since we can fail in more than one way! -- since we can fail in more than one way!
-- More codes may be added in the future if/when required. -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
badAlg (0), badAlg (0),
-- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier -- unrecognized or unsupported algorithm identifier
badMessageCheck (1), badMessageCheck (1),
-- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify) -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
badRequest (2), badRequest (2),
-- transaction not permitted or supported -- transaction not permitted or supported
badTime (3), badTime (3),
-- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time, -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
-- as defined by local policy -- as defined by local policy
badCertId (4), badCertId (4),
-- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
badDataFormat (5), badDataFormat (5),
skipping to change at page 57, line 26 skipping to change at line 2541
missingTimeStamp (8), missingTimeStamp (8),
-- when the timestamp is missing but should be there -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
-- (by policy) -- (by policy)
badPOP (9), badPOP (9),
-- the proof-of-possession failed -- the proof-of-possession failed
certRevoked (10), certRevoked (10),
-- the certificate has already been revoked -- the certificate has already been revoked
certConfirmed (11), certConfirmed (11),
-- the certificate has already been confirmed -- the certificate has already been confirmed
wrongIntegrity (12), wrongIntegrity (12),
-- not valid integrity, password based instead of signature or -- not valid integrity, based on the password instead of the
-- vice versa -- signature or vice versa
badRecipientNonce (13), badRecipientNonce (13),
-- not valid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value -- not valid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
timeNotAvailable (14), timeNotAvailable (14),
-- the TSA's time source is not available -- the TSA's time source is not available
unacceptedPolicy (15), unacceptedPolicy (15),
-- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA
unacceptedExtension (16), unacceptedExtension (16),
-- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA
addInfoNotAvailable (17), addInfoNotAvailable (17),
-- the additional information requested could not be -- the additional information requested could not be
skipping to change at page 58, line 9 skipping to change at line 2572
unsupportedVersion (22), unsupportedVersion (22),
-- the version of the message is not supported -- the version of the message is not supported
notAuthorized (23), notAuthorized (23),
-- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
-- request or perform the preceding action -- request or perform the preceding action
systemUnavail (24), systemUnavail (24),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
systemFailure (25), systemFailure (25),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system failure -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
duplicateCertReq (26) duplicateCertReq (26)
-- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate -- the certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
-- certificate already exists -- certificate already exists
} }
PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE { PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus, status PKIStatus,
statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL } failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL }
OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate
skipping to change at page 58, line 31 skipping to change at line 2594
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL,
certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL, certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL,
hashVal BIT STRING hashVal BIT STRING
-- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the -- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
-- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID. -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
} }
POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
-- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages)
Challenge ::= SEQUENCE { Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL,
-- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
-- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
-- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
-- Challenge is to be used). -- Challenge is to be used)
witness OCTET STRING, witness OCTET STRING,
-- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a -- the result of applying the One-Way Function (owf) to a
-- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. [Note that a different -- randomly generated INTEGER, A (Note that a different
-- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.] -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.)
challenge OCTET STRING challenge OCTET STRING
-- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert. -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
-- request is being made) of Rand. -- request is being made) of Rand
} }
-- Added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- Rand was added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
Rand ::= SEQUENCE { Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
-- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge -- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge
-- in POPODecKeyChallContent -- in POPODecKeyChallContent
int INTEGER, int INTEGER,
-- the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above) -- the randomly generated INTEGER A (above)
sender GeneralName sender GeneralName
-- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader) -- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
} }
POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
-- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The
-- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
-- corresponding Challenge. -- corresponding Challenge.
skipping to change at page 59, line 38 skipping to change at line 2649
status PKIStatusInfo, status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211] -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
} }
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL, privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- see [RFC4211] for comment on encoding -- See [RFC4211] for comments on encoding.
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change -- syntax without this change.
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL } publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL }
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate, certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change -- syntax without this change.
} }
KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatusInfo, status PKIStatusInfo,
newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL } CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL }
RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE { RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
certDetails CertTemplate, certDetails CertTemplate,
-- allows requester to specify as much as they can about -- allows the requester to specify as much as they can about
-- the cert. for which revocation is requested -- the cert. for which revocation is requested
-- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available) -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
crlEntryDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL crlEntryDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL
-- requested crlEntryExtensions -- requested crlEntryExtensions
} }
RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo, status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
-- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent -- in the same order as was sent in RevReqContent
revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL, revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL,
-- IDs for which revocation was requested -- IDs for which revocation was requested
-- (same order as status) -- (same order as status)
crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL
-- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one) -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
} }
CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
skipping to change at page 61, line 4 skipping to change at line 2711
CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate
RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus, status PKIStatus,
certId CertId, certId CertId,
willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime, willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime,
badSinceDate GeneralizedTime, badSinceDate GeneralizedTime,
crlDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL crlDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL
-- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.) -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
} }
CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
-- CertReqTemplateContent, AttributeTypeAndValue, -- CertReqTemplateContent, AttributeTypeAndValue,
-- ExpandedRegControlSet, id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate, -- ExpandedRegControlSet, id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate,
-- AltCertTemplate, regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, AlgIdCtrl, -- AltCertTemplate, regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, AlgIdCtrl,
-- regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, and RsaKeyLenCtrl -- regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, and RsaKeyLenCtrl
-- were added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- were added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE { CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
certTemplate CertTemplate, certTemplate CertTemplate,
-- prefilled certTemplate structure elements -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
-- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
-- be used. -- be used.
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL keySpec Controls OPTIONAL
-- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms. -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms
-- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue -- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
-- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211) -- as specified in CRMF [RFC4211]
} }
AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SingleAttribute{{ ... }} AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SingleAttribute{{ ... }}
ExpandedRegControlSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { RegControlSet | ExpandedRegControlSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { RegControlSet |
regCtrl-altCertTemplate | regCtrl-algId | regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, ... } regCtrl-altCertTemplate | regCtrl-algId | regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, ... }
regCtrl-altCertTemplate ATTRIBUTE ::= regCtrl-altCertTemplate ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE AltCertTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate } { TYPE AltCertTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate }
id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 } id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 }
AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue
-- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3 -- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3
-- public-key certificate -- public key certificate
regCtrl-algId ATTRIBUTE ::= regCtrl-algId ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE AlgIdCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-algId } { TYPE AlgIdCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-algId }
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 } id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA -- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA
regCtrl-rsaKeyLen ATTRIBUTE ::= regCtrl-rsaKeyLen ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE RsaKeyLenCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen } { TYPE RsaKeyLenCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen }
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 } id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX) RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
-- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths -- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths
-- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in -- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in
-- CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- CMP Updates [RFC9480]
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate, newWithNew CMPCertificate,
-- new root CA certificate -- new root CA certificate
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
-- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
-- signed with the old private root CA key -- signed with the old private root CA key
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
-- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key -- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
-- signed with the new private root CA key -- signed with the new private root CA key
skipping to change at page 63, line 22 skipping to change at line 2826
-- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10} -- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
-- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11} -- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
-- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}} -- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12} -- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
-- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey -- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey
-- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE -- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
-- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes -- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
-- - made in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- - made in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to -- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to
-- - the syntax without this change -- - the syntax without this change
-- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13} -- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
-- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL -- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14} -- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime -- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15} -- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages -- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16} -- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String -- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
-- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17} -- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
-- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CMPCertificate -- CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18} -- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
-- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent -- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
-- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19} -- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
-- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent -- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
-- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20} -- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
-- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} -- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
-- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- UTF8String -- UTF8String
-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 22} -- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 22}
-- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CRLStatus -- CRLStatus
-- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 23} -- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 23}
-- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CertificateList -- CertificateList
-- - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- --
-- where -- where
-- --
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and -- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
-- --
-- --
-- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
-- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general- -- Management Protocol request and response messages or general-
-- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
-- specific environments. -- specific environments.
GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content). -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
-- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
-- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above. -- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
-- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJECT IDs that it -- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OIDs that it
-- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set -- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
-- indicates that the CA may send -- indicates that the CA may send
-- any/all information that it wishes. -- any/all information that it wishes.
GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not -- The receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
-- recognize. -- recognize.
ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE { ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo, pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL, errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-- implementation-specific error codes -- implementation-specific error codes
errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
-- implementation-specific error details -- implementation-specific error details
} }
skipping to change at page 65, line 23 skipping to change at line 2923
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER } certReqId INTEGER }
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL } reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }
-- --
-- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP -- Extended key usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
-- operations, added due to the changes made in -- operations, added due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in -- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC, as defined in
-- [RFC6402] -- [RFC6402]
-- --
-- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 } -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 } -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 } id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
END END
Appendix B. History of Changes Acknowledgements
[RFC Editor: This appendix must be deleted in the final version of
the document.]
From version 22 -> 23:
* Addressed comments from IESG discussion (see thread "Francesca
Palombini's No Objection on draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-22: (with
COMMENT)")
* Addressed comment from Carl (see thread "Paul Wouters' Discuss on
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-21: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)")
From version 21 -> 22:
* Addressed comments from IESG discussion (see thread " Paul
Wouters' Discuss on draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-21: (with DISCUSS
and COMMENT)")
From version 20 -> 21:
* Extended Section 1 based on feedback from the IESG telechat
* Removed a redundant paragraph from the Abstract
From version 19 -> 20:
* Addressed comments reported after GEN AD review
From version 18 -> 19:
* Deleted the Comments on IANA ToDos and changed the decimals TBD1
-> 22 and TBD2 -> 23
* Updated Section 3.4 regarding ToDos updating the well-known URI
registration
From version 17 -> 18:
* Addressed comments from AD Evaluation (see thread "AD Review of
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-17")
* Added Section 2.8 to clarify on the usage of GeneralizedTime (see
thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates: fractional seconds")
* Updated Section 3.4 introducing the path segment 'p' to indicate
the following arbitrary label according to the discussion during
IETF 113 (see thread "/.well-known/brski reference to brski-
registry")
* Capitalized all headlines
From version 16 -> 17:
* Removed the pre-RFC5378 work disclaimer after the RFC 4210 authors
granted BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust
* Removed note on usage of language tags in UTF8String due to
reference to references to outdated/historic RFCs
* Resolved some nits reported by I-D nit checker tool
From version 15 -> 16:
* Updated IPR disclaimer
From version 14 -> 15:
* Updated Section 2.16 clarifying the usage of CRLSource (see thread
"CRL update retrieval - WG Last Call for draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
updates-14 and draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile-08")
* Updated Section 2.22 adding further references regarding random
number generation (see thread "CMP draft WGLC: measuring entropy,
CA certificates")
* Fixed some nits
From version 13 -> 14:
* Extended id-it-caCerts support message to allow transporting to-
be-trusted root CA certificates; added respective security
consideration (see thread "Generalizing the CMP "Get CA
certificates" use case")
* Rolled back changes made in previous version regarding root CA
update to avoid registration of new OIDs. Yet we sticked to using
id-it-rootCaCert in the genm body instead its headers' generalInfo
field and removed the ToDos and TBDs on re-arranging id-it OIDs
(see thread "Allocation of OIDs for CRL update retrieval (draft-
ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-13)")
From version 12 -> 13:
* Added John Gray to the list of authors due to fruitful discussion
and important proposals
* Fixed errata no. 2615, 2616, 3949, 4078, and 5201 on RFC 4210
* Added reference on RFC 8933 regarding CMS signedAttrs to
Section 2.7
* Updated Section 2.9 and the ASN.1 modules moving the position of
the hashAlg field (see thread "[CMP Updates] position of hashAlg
in certStatus")
* Changed "rootCaCert" from generalInfo to genm body and generalized
to "oldTrustAnchor", renaming "rootCaKeyUpdate" to
"trustAnchorUpdate" in Sections 2.14, A.1, and A.2, removing
former Section 2.4
* Added genm use case "CRL update retrieval" in Section 2.16, A.1,
and A.2. (see thread "[CMP Updates] Requesting a current CRL")
* Updated Section 2.18 and 2.17 to support polling for all kinds of
CMP request messages initiated by an error message with status
"waiting" as initially discussed at IETF 111
* Updated Sections 2.19 and 2.20 regarding version handling
* Added further OIDs and a TBD regarding reordering of the OIDs
* Added Sections 2.21 to 2.23 with new security considerations and
updated Section 5 accordingly
* Added a ToDo regarding OID registration, renaming, and re-ordering
* Added Section 3.1 updating the introduction of RFC 6712
* Fixed some nits in the ASN.1 modules (see thread "draft-ietf-
lamps-cmp-updates-12: Comments on A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module" and
"draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-12: Comments on A.2. 2002 ASN.1
Module")
* Replaced the term "transport" by "transfer" where appropriate to
prevent confusion
* Minor editorial changes
From version 11 -> 12:
* Extended Section 2.5 and the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A to allow
a sequence of certificate profiles in CertProfileValue (see thread
"id-it-CertProfile in draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates")
From version 10 -> 11:
* Add Section 2.10 to add an additional hashAlg field to the
CertStatus type to support certificates signed with a signature
algorithm not explicitly indicating a hash algorithm in the
AlgorithmIdentifier (see thread "Hash algorithm to us for
calculating certHash")
* Added newly registered OIDs and temporarily registered URI suffix
* Exchanged the import of CertificationRequest from RFC 2986 to the
definition from RFC 6402 Appendix A.1 (see thread "CMP Update of
CertificationRequest")
* Corrected the definition of LocalKeyIdValue in Appendix A.1
* Updated new RFC numbers for draft-lamps-crmf-update-algs
From version 9 -> 10:
* Added 1988 ASN.1 syntax for localKeyId attribute to Appendix A.1
From version 08 -> 09:
* Deleted specific definition of CMP CA and CMP RA in Section 2.2
and only reference RFC 6402 for definition of id-kp-cmcCA and id-
kp-cmcRA to resolve the ToDo below based on feedback of Tomas
Gustavsson
* Added Section 2.4. and 2.5 to define id-it-rootCaCert and id-it-
certProfile to be used in Section 2.14 and 2.15
* Added reference to CMP Algorithms in Section 2.8
* Extended Section 2.14 to explicitly indicate the root CA an update
is requested for by using id-it-rootCaCert and changing the ASN.1
syntax to require providing the newWithOld certificate in the
response message
* Extended Section 2.15 to explicitly indicate the certificate
request template by using id-it-certProfile and on further details
of the newly introduced controls
* Deleted the table on id-kp-cmcCA and id-kp-cmcRA and adding id-it-
rootCaCert and id-it-certProfile in Section 2.19
* Adding the definition of id-it-rootCaCert and id-it-certProfile in
both ASN.1 modules in Appendix A
* Minor editorial changes reflecting the above changes
From version 07 -> 08:
* Added a ToDo to Section 2.2 to reflect a current discussion on the
need of an additional CMP-CA role and EKU and differentiation from
CMP-RA
* Added ToDos to Section 2.12 and 2.13
From version 06 -> 07:
* Added David von Oheimb as co-author
* Changed to XML V3
* Added Section 2.3 to enable a CMP protocol version number 3 in the
PKIHeader for cases where EnvelopedData is to be used (see thread
"Mail regarding draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates").
* Added Section 2.4 to refer to draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs
for the update of id-PasswordBasedMac for PKI message protection
using passwords or shared secrets.
* Updated Section 2.6 to introduce the protocol version number 3 to
properly indicate support of EnvelopedData instead of
EncryptedValue in case a transaction requires use of EnvelopedData
(see thread "Mail regarding draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates").
* Update Section 2.14 to make the minimal changes to the respective
section in CMP more explicit.
* Added Sections 2.15 and 2.16 to address the new cmp2021 protocol
version in Section 7 Version Negotiation.
* Updated Section 2.17 to add new OIDs for id-regCtrl-algId and id-
regCtrl-rsaKeyLen for registration at IANA.
* Added Section 2.20 to update the general rules of interpretation
in Appendix D.1 regarding the new cmp2021 version.
* Added Section 2.21 to update the Algorithm Use Profile in
Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP Algorithms document
as decided at IETF 108.
* Updates Section 3.1 to delete the description of a discovery
mechanism as decided at IETF 108.
* Various changes and corrections in wording.
From version 05 -> 06:
* Added the update of Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP
Algorithms document as decided in IETF 108
* Updated the IANA considerations to register new OIDs for id-
regCtrl-algId and d-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen.
* Minor changes and corrections
From version 04 -> 05:
* Added Section 2.11 and Section 2.12 to clarify the usage of these
general messages types with EC curves (see thread
"AlgorithmIdentifier parameters NULL value - Re: InfoTypeAndValue
in CMP headers")
* Split former section 2.7 on adding 'CA Certificates', 'Root CA
Certificates Update', and 'Certificate Request Template' in three
separate sections for easier readability
* Changed in Section 2.15 the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue
from using rsaKeyLen to usage of controls as specified in CRMF
Section 6 [RFC4211] (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and
rsaKeyLen")
* Updated the IANA considerations in Section 4 to introduce new OID
for id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen (see thread "dtaft-
ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen")
* Updated the IANA Considerations in and the Appendixes to introduce
new OID for the updates ASN.1 modules (see thread "I-D Action:
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-04.txt")
* Removed EncryptedValue from and added Controls to the list of
types imported from CRMF [RFC4211] in ASN.1 modules (see thread
"draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")
* Moved declaration of Rand out of the comment in ASN.1 modules (see
thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")
* Minor changes and corrections
From version 03 -> 04:
* Added Section 2.7 to introduce three new id-it IDs for uses in
general messages as discussed (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
updates add section to introduce id-it-caCerts, id-it-
rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate")
* Added the new id-it IDs and the /.well-known/cmp to the IANA
Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9
* Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.26
* Some changes in wording on Section 3 due to review comments from
Martin Peylo
From version 02 -> 03:
* Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will
be set up as decided in IETF 108
* Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.7 to add the
AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated
private key as decided in IETF 108
* Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.26
* Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.26 and the ASN.1 module
* Added Section 3 to document the changes to RFC 6712 [RFC6712]
regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of '/.well-
known/' as discussed in IETF 108
* Updated the IANA Considerations section
* Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update
Appendix F of [RFC4210] and a complete updated ASN.1 module in
2002 syntax to update Section 9 of [RFC5912]
* Minor changes in wording
From version 01 -> 02:
* Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107
* Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key
management technique in Section 2.7 as discussed with Russ and Jim
on the mailing list
* Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the
revocation passphrase in Section 2.26
* Moved the change history to the Appendix
From version 00 -> 01:
* Minor changes in wording
From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
updates-00:
* Changes required to reflect WG adoption
From version 02 -> 03:
* Added some clarification in Section 2.1
From version 01 -> 02:
* Added clarification to section on multiple protection
* Added clarification on new EKUs after some exchange with Tomas
Gustavsson
* Reused OIDs from RFC 6402 [RFC6402] as suggested by Sean Turner at
IETF 106
* Added clarification on the field containing the key identifier for
a revocation passphrase
* Minor changes in wording
From version 00 -> 01: Special thanks goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the
inspiration to structure and write this document like [RFC6402],
which updates CMC. Special thanks also goes to Russ Housley, Lijun
Liao, Martin Peylo, and Tomas Gustavsson for reviewing and providing
valuable suggestions on improving this document.
* Added a section describing the new extended key usages We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable
* Completed the section on changes to the specification of encrypted feedback.
values
* Added a section on clarification to Appendix D.4
* Minor generalization in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] Sections 5.1.3.4 and
5.3.22
* Minor changes in wording
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Hendrik Brockhaus (editor) Hendrik Brockhaus
Siemens Siemens
Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1 Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1
80333 Munich 80333 Munich
Germany Germany
Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com
URI: https://www.siemens.com URI: https://www.siemens.com
David von Oheimb David von Oheimb
Siemens Siemens
Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1 Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1
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