rfc9480.original.xml   rfc9480.xml 
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" <rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
submissionType="IETF"
category="std" category="std"
consensus="true"
updates="4210, 5912, 6712" updates="4210, 5912, 6712"
docName="draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-23" docName="draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-23"
number="9480"
ipr="trust200902" ipr="trust200902"
obsoletes="" obsoletes=""
submissionType="IETF"
xml:lang="en" xml:lang="en"
tocInclude="true" tocInclude="true"
tocDepth="4" tocDepth="4"
symRefs="true" symRefs="true"
sortRefs="true" sortRefs="true"
consensus="true"
version="3"> version="3">
<front> <front>
<title abbrev="CMP Updates">Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates</t itle> <title abbrev="CMP Updates">Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates</t itle>
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-23"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9480"/>
<!-- add 'role="editor"' below for the editors if appropriate --> <author fullname="Hendrik Brockhaus" initials="H." surname="Brockhaus">
<!-- Another author who claims to be an editor -->
<author fullname="Hendrik Brockhaus" initials="H." surname="Brockhaus" role="
editor">
<organization abbrev="Siemens">Siemens</organization> <organization abbrev="Siemens">Siemens</organization>
<address> <address>
<postal> <postal>
<street>Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1</street> <street>Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1</street>
<code>80333</code> <code>80333</code>
<city>Munich</city> <city>Munich</city>
<country>Germany</country> <country>Germany</country>
</postal> </postal>
<email>hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com</email> <email>hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com</email>
<uri>https://www.siemens.com</uri> <uri>https://www.siemens.com</uri>
skipping to change at line 71 skipping to change at line 55
<street>Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1</street> <street>Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1</street>
<code>80333</code> <code>80333</code>
<city>Munich</city> <city>Munich</city>
<country>Germany</country> <country>Germany</country>
</postal> </postal>
<email>david.von.oheimb@siemens.com</email> <email>david.von.oheimb@siemens.com</email>
<uri>https://www.siemens.com</uri> <uri>https://www.siemens.com</uri>
</address> </address>
</author> </author>
<author fullname="John Gray" initials="J." surname="Gray"> <author fullname="John Gray" initials="J." surname="Gray">
<organization abbrev="Entrust">Entrust</organization> <organization abbrev="Entrust">Entrust</organization>
<address> <address>
<postal> <postal>
<street>1187 Park Place</street> <street>1187 Park Place</street>
<region>MN</region> <region>MN</region>
<code>55379</code> <code>55379</code>
<city>Minneapolis</city> <city>Minneapolis</city>
<country>United States of America</country> <country>United States of America</country>
</postal> </postal>
<email>john.gray@entrust.com</email> <email>john.gray@entrust.com</email>
<uri>https://www.entrust.com</uri> <uri>https://www.entrust.com</uri>
</address> </address>
</author> </author>
<date year="2022"/> <date year="2023" month="October"/>
<!-- If the month and year are both specified and are the current ones, xml2 <area>sec</area>
rfc will fill <workgroup>lamps</workgroup>
in the current day for you. If only the current year is specified, xml2r <keyword>CMP</keyword>
fc will fill
in the current day and month for you. If the year is not the current one
, it is
necessary to specify at least a month (xml2rfc assumes day="1" if not sp
ecified for the
purpose of calculating the expiry date). With drafts it is normally suf
ficient to
specify just the year. -->
<area>Internet</area>
<workgroup>LAMPS Working Group</workgroup>
<!-- WG name at the upperleft corner of the doc,
IETF is fine for individual submissions.
If this element is not present, the default is "Network Working Group",
which is used by the RFC Editor as a nod to the history of the IETF. -->
<keyword>CMP</keyword>
<abstract> <abstract>
<t>This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transfer of C ertificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document updates RFC 4210, RFC 5912, and RFC 6712.</t> <t>This document contains a set of updates to the syntax of Certificate Ma nagement Protocol (CMP) version 2 and its HTTP transfer mechanism. This document updates RFCs 4210, 5912, and 6712.</t>
<t>The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData ins tead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages, improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message types, extended key usage s to identify certificates for use with CMP, and well-known URI path segments.</ t> <t>The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData ins tead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages, improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message types, extended key usage s to identify certificates for use with CMP, and well-known URI path segments.</ t>
<t>CMP version 3 is introduced to enable signaling support of Enveloped Data instead of EncryptedValue and signaling the use of an explicit hash Algorit hmIdentifier in certConf messages, as far as needed.</t> <t>CMP version 3 is introduced to enable signaling support of Enveloped Data instead of EncryptedValue and signal the use of an explicit hash AlgorithmI dentifier in certConf messages, as far as needed.</t>
</abstract> </abstract>
</front> </front>
<middle> <middle>
<section anchor="Introduction" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="Introduction" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Introduction</name> <name>Introduction</name>
<t>[RFC Editor:</t> <t>While using <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">CMP</xref> in indus
<t>Please perform the following substitution.</t> trial and Internet of Things environments and developing the <xref target="RFC94
<ul spacing="normal"> 83" format="default">Lightweight CMP Profile</xref>, some limitations were ident
<li>RFCXXXX --> the assigned numerical RFC value for this draft</li> ified in the original CMP specification. This document updates <xref target="RFC
</ul> 4210" format="default"/> and <xref target="RFC6712" format="default"/> to overco
<t>Please update the following references to associated drafts in progr me these limitations.</t>
ess to reflect their final RFC assignments, if possible:</t> <t>Among other updates, this document improves the crypto agility of CMP,
<ul spacing="normal"> which allows more flexibility for future advances in cryptography.</t>
<li>I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms</li>
<li>I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile</li>
<li>I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport</li>
</ul>
<t>]</t>
<t>While using <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">CMP</xref> in indus
trial and IoT environments and developing the <xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-light
weight-cmp-profile" format="default">Lightweight CMP Profile</xref> some limitat
ions were identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates <x
ref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp;4210</xref> and <xref target="RFC
6712" format="default">RFC&nbsp;6712</xref> to overcome these limitations.</t>
<t>Among others, this document improves the crypto agility of CMP, which m
eans to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography.</t>
<t>This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP e ndpoints on registration and certification authorities.</t> <t>This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP e ndpoints on registration and certification authorities.</t>
<t>As the main content of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&n <t>The main content of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default"/> and <x
bsp;4210</xref> and <xref target="RFC6712" format="default">RFC&nbsp;6712</xref> ref target="RFC6712" format="default"/> remains unchanged. This document lists a
stays unchanged, this document lists all sections that are updated, replaced, o ll sections that are updated, replaced, or added to the current text of the resp
r added to the current text of the respective RFCs.</t> ective RFCs.</t>
<t>The authors acknowledge that the style of the document is hard to re <t>The authors acknowledge that the style of the document is hard to re
ad because the original RFCs must be read along with this document to get the co ad because the original RFCs must be read along with this document to get the co
mplete content. The working group decided to use this approach in order to keep mplete content. The working group decided to use this approach in order to keep
the changes to <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp;4210</xref> and the changes to <xref target="RFC4210" format="default"/> and <xref target="RFC6
<xref target="RFC6712" format="default">RFC&nbsp;6712</xref> to the required mi 712" format="default"/> to the required minimum. This was meant to speed up the
nimum. This was meant to speed up the editorial process and to minimize the eff editorial process and to minimize the effort spent on reviewing the full text o
ort spent on reviewing the whole text of the original documents.</t> f the original documents.</t>
<t>However, <xref
target="I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis" format="default"/> and
<xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis" format="default"/> are intended to obso
lete RFCs 4210 and 6712, respectively; these documents also include the changes
listed in this document.</t>
<section anchor="Convention_Terminology" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="Convention_Terminology" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Convention and Terminology</name> <name>Convention and Terminology</name>
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", " <t>
SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" i The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQU
n this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC21 IRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
19" format="default"/> <xref target="RFC8174" format="default"/> when, and only NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>
when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t> RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
<t keepWithNext="true">Technical terminology is used in conformance with "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to
<xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp;4210</xref>, <xref target="RFC be interpreted as
4211" format="default">RFC&nbsp;4211</xref>, and <xref target="RFC5280" format=" described in BCP&nbsp;14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/>
default">RFC&nbsp;5280</xref>. The following key words are used:</t> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
<dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="6"> </t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Technical terminology is used in conformance with
<xref target="RFC4210" format="default"/>, <xref target="RFC4211" format="defau
lt"/>, and <xref target="RFC5280" format="default"/>. The following key words ar
e used:</t>
<dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="7">
<dt>CA:</dt> <dt>CA:</dt>
<dd>Certification authority, which issues certificates.</dd> <dd>Certification authority, which issues certificates.</dd>
<dt>RA:</dt> <dt>RA:</dt>
<dd>Registration authority, an optional system component to which a CA delegates certificate management functions such as authorization checks.</dd> <dd>Registration authority, an optional system component to which a CA delegates certificate management functions, such as authorization checks.</dd>
<dt>KGA:</dt> <dt>KGA:</dt>
<dd>Key generation authority, which generates key pairs on behalf of a n EE. The KGA could be co-located with an RA or a CA.</dd> <dd>Key generation authority, which generates key pairs on behalf of a n EE. The KGA could be colocated with an RA or a CA.</dd>
<dt>EE:</dt> <dt>EE:</dt>
<dd>End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI certificat e. An identifier for the EE is given as its subject of the certificate.</dd> <dd>End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI certificat e. An identifier for the EE is given as its subject of the certificate.</dd>
</dl> </dl>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-Updates" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-Updates" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)</name> <name>Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)</name>
<section anchor="CMP-1.1" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-1.1" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>New Section 1.1. - Changes Since RFC 4210</name> <name>New Section 1.1 - Changes Since RFC 4210</name>
<t>The following subsection describes feature updates to <xref target="R <t>The following subsection describes feature updates to <xref target="R
FC4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp;4210</xref>. They are always related to the ba FC4210" format="default"/>. They are always related to the base specification. H
se specification. Hence, references to the original sections in <xref target="RF ence, references to the original sections in <xref target="RFC4210" format="defa
C4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp;4210</xref> are used whenever possible.</t> ult"/> are used whenever possible.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section at the end of the current Sec <t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section after the current <xref targe
tion 1:</t> t="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="1"/>:</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">1.1. Changes Since RFC 4210</t> <t keepWithNext="true">1.1. Changes Since RFC 4210</t>
<t>The following updates are made in this document:</t> <t>The following updates are made in this document:</t>
<ul spacing="normal"> <ul spacing="normal">
<li>Add new extended key usages for various CMP server types, e.g., re <li>Adding new extended key usages for various CMP server types, e.g.,
gistration authority and certification authority, to express the authorization o registration authority and certification authority, to express the authorizatio
f the entity identified in the certificate containing the respective extended ke n of the entity identified in the certificate containing the respective extended
y usage extension to act as the indicated PKI management entity.</li> key usage extension that acts as the indicated PKI management entity.</li>
<li>Extend the description of multiple protection to cover additional <li>Extending the description of multiple protection to cover addition
use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages.</li> al use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages.</li>
<li>Offering EnvelopedData as the preferred choice next to EncryptedVa <li>Offering EnvelopedData as the preferred choice next to EncryptedVa
lue to better support crypto agility in CMP. Note that according to <xref target lue to better support crypto agility in CMP. Note that, according to <xref targe
="RFC4211" format="default">RFC&nbsp;4211</xref> section 2.1. point 9 the use of t="RFC4211" format="default" sectionFormat="comma" section="2.1"/>, point 9, the
the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the EnvelopedData use of the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the Envelop
structure. <xref target="RFC4211" format="default">RFC&nbsp;4211</xref> offers t edData structure. <xref target="RFC4211" format="default"/> offers the Encrypted
he EncryptedKey structure, a choice of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData for migr Key structure a choice of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData for migration to Enve
ation to EnvelopedData. For reasons of completeness and consistency the type Enc lopedData. For reasons of completeness and consistency, the type EncryptedValue
ryptedValue has been exchanged in all occurrences in <xref target="RFC4210" form has been exchanged in all occurrences in <xref target="RFC4210" format="default"
at="default">RFC&nbsp;4210</xref>. This includes the protection of centrally ge />. This includes the protection of centrally generated private keys, encryptio
nerated private keys, encryption of certificates, and protection of revocation p n of certificates, and protection of revocation passphrases. To properly differe
assphrases. To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of En ntiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, CMP version 3 is
cryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction is supposed introduced in case a transaction is supposed to use EnvelopedData.</li>
to use EnvelopedData.</li> <li>Offering an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus that suppo
<li>Offering an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting rts confirmation of certificates signed with signature algorithms, e.g., prepari
confirmation of certificates signed with signature algorithms, e.g., EdDSA, not ng for upcoming post quantum algorithms, not directly indicating a specific hash
directly indicating a specific hash algorithm to use to compute the certHash.</ algorithm to use to compute the certHash.</li>
li> <li>Adding new general message types to request CA certificates, a roo
<li>Adding new general message types to request CA certificates, a roo t CA update, a certificate request template, or a Certificate Revocation List (C
t CA update, a certificate request template, or a CRL update.</li> RL) update.</li>
<li>Extend the usage of polling to p10cr, certConf, rr, genm, and erro <li>Extending the usage of polling to p10cr, certConf, rr, genm, and e
r messages.</li> rror messages.</li>
<li>Delete the mandatory algorithm profile in <xref target="RFC <li>Deleting the mandatory algorithm profile in <xref target="RFC4210"
4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp;4210 Appendix D.2</xref> and refer to <xref targ format="default" sectionFormat="of" section="D.2"/> and referring to <xref targe
et="I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms" format="default">CMP Algorithms Section 7</xr t="RFC9481" sectionFormat="of" section="7" format="default">CMP Algorithms</xref
ef>.</li> >.</li>
</ul> </ul>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-4.5" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-4.5" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage</name> <name>New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage</name>
<t>The following subsection introduces a new extended key usage for CMP servers authorized to centrally generate key pairs on behalf of end entities.</t > <t>The following subsection introduces a new extended key usage for CMP servers authorized to centrally generate key pairs on behalf of end entities.</t >
<t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section at the end of the current Sec tion 4:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section after <xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="4.4.3"/>:</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">4.5. Extended Key Usage</t> <t keepWithNext="true">4.5. Extended Key Usage</t>
<t>The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for whi ch the certified key pair may be used. It therefore restricts the use of a certi ficate to specific applications.</t> <t>The extended key usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for whi ch the certified key pair may be used. Therefore, it restricts the use of a cert ificate to specific applications.</t>
<t>A CA may want to delegate parts of its duties to other PKI management entities. This section provides a mechanism to both prove this delegation and e nable an automated means for checking the authorization of this delegation. Such delegation may also be expressed by other means, e.g., explicit configuration.< /t> <t>A CA may want to delegate parts of its duties to other PKI management entities. This section provides a mechanism to both prove this delegation and e nable an automated means for checking the authorization of this delegation. Such delegation may also be expressed by other means, e.g., explicit configuration.< /t>
<t>To offer automatic validation for the delegation of a role by a CA to another entity, the certificates used for CMP message protection or signed data for central key generation MUST be issued by the delegating CA and MUST contain the respective EKUs. This proves the authorization of this entity by the delega ting CA to act in the given role as described below.</t> <t>To offer automatic validation for the delegation of a role by a CA to another entity, the certificates used for CMP message protection or signed data for central key generation <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be issued by the delegating CA a nd <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain the respective EKUs. This proves the authorizatio n of this entity by delegating CA to act in the given role, as described below.< /t>
<t keepWithNext="true">The OIDs to be used for these EKUs are:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">The OIDs to be used for these EKUs are:</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 27 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 27 }
id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 28 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 32 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 32 }
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
<t>Note: <xref target="RFC6402" format="default">RFC&nbsp;6402 section 2 <t>Note: <xref target="RFC6402" section="2.10" sectionFormat="of"
.10</xref> specifies OIDs for a CMC CA and a CMC RA. As the functionality of a C format="default"/> specifies OIDs for a Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) C
A and RA is not specific to using CMC or CMP as the certificate management proto A and a CMC RA. As the functionality of a CA and RA is not specific to any certi
col, these EKUs are re-used by CMP.</t> ficate management protocol (such as CMC or CMP), these EKUs are reused by CMP.</
t>
<t keepWithNext="true">The meaning of the id-kp-cmKGA EKU is as follows: </t> <t keepWithNext="true">The meaning of the id-kp-cmKGA EKU is as follows: </t>
<dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="10"> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="10">
<dt>CMP KGA:</dt> <dt>CMP KGA:</dt>
<dd>CMP Key Generation Authorities are CAs or are identified by the id -kp-cmKGA extended key usage. The CMP KGA knows the private key it generated on behalf of the end entity. This is a very sensitive service and needs specific authorization, which by default is with the CA certificate itself. The CA may d elegate its authorization by placing the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage in the c ertificate used to authenticate the origin of the generated private key. The aut horization may also be determined through local configuration of the end entity. </dd> <dd>CMP key generation authorities are CAs or are identified by the id -kp-cmKGA extended key usage. The CMP KGA knows the private key it generated on behalf of the end entity. This is a very sensitive service and needs specific authorization, which by default is with the CA certificate itself. The CA may d elegate its authorization by placing the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage in the c ertificate used to authenticate the origin of the generated private key. The aut horization may also be determined through local configuration of the end entity. </dd>
</dl> </dl>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.1.1" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.1.1" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header</name> <name>Update Section 5.1.1 - PKI Message Header</name>
<t>Section 5.1.1 of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&n <t><xref target="RFC4210" section="5.1.1" sectionFormat="of" form
bsp;4210</xref> describes the PKI message header. This document introduces the n at="default"/> describes the PKI message header. This document introduces the ne
ew version 3 indicating support of EnvelopedData as specified in <xref target="C w version 3, indicating support of EnvelopedData as specified in <xref target="C
MP-5.2.2" />.</t> MP-5.2.2"/> and hashAlg as specified in <xref
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of PKIHeader and target="CMP-5.3.18"/>.</t>
the subsequent description of pvno with the following text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the ASN.1 syntax of PKIHeader and
the subsequent description of pvno with the following text:</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2), pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
cmp2021(3) }, cmp2021(3) },
sender GeneralName, sender GeneralName,
recipient GeneralName, recipient GeneralName,
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL,
senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
} }
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
<t>The usage of pvno values is described in Section 7.</t> <t>The usage of the protocol version number (pvno) is described i
n Section <xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="7"/>.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.1.1.3" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.1.1.3" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>New Section 5.1.1.3. - CertProfile</name> <name>New Section 5.1.1.3 - CertProfile</name>
<t>Section 5.1.1 of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&n <t><xref target="RFC4210" section="5.1.1" sectionFormat="of" form
bsp;4210</xref> defines the PKIHeader and id-it OIDs to be used in the generalIn at="default"/> defines the PKIHeader and id-it OIDs to be used in the generalInf
fo field. This section introduces id-it-certProfile.</t> o field. This section introduces id-it-certProfile.</t>
<t>Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.2:</t> <t>Insert this section after <xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat
="of" section="5.1.1.2"/>:</t>
<t>5.1.1.3. CertProfile</t> <t>5.1.1.3. CertProfile</t>
<t>This is used by the EE to indicate specific certificate profil es, e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request template, s ee Section 5.3.19.16.</t> <t>This is used by the EE to indicate specific certificate profil es, e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request template; s ee Section 5.3.19.16.</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
<t>When used in an ir/cr/kur/genm, the value MUST NOT contain mor <t>When used in an ir/cr/kur/genm, the value <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp
e elements than the number of CertReqMsg or InfoTypeAndValue elements and the ce 14> contain more elements than the number of CertReqMsg or InfoTypeAndValue elem
rtificate profile names refer to the elements in the given order.</t> ents and the certificate profile names refer to the elements in the given order.
<t>When used in a p10cr, the value MUST NOT contain multiple cert </t>
ificate profile names.</t> <t>When used in a p10cr, the value <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contai
n multiple certificate profile names.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.1.3.1" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.1.3.1" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information</name> <name>Update Section 5.1.3.1 - Shared Secret Information</name>
<t>Section 5.1.3.1 of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC <t><xref target="RFC4210" section="5.1.3.1" sectionFormat="of" fo
&nbsp;4210</xref> describes the MAC based protection of a PKIMessage using the a rmat="default"/> describes the protection of a PKIMessage based on message authe
lgorithm id-PasswordBasedMac.</t> ntication code (MAC) using the algorithm id-PasswordBasedMac.</t>
<t>Replace the first paragraph with the following text:</t> <t>Replace the first paragraph with the following text:</t>
<t>In this case, the sender and recipient share secret informatio n with sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means or from a previous PKI management operation). PKIProtection will contain a MAC value and the protec tionAlg MAY be one of the options described in <xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp- algorithms" format="default">CMP Algorithms</xref>. The PasswordBasedMac is spec ified as follows (see also <xref target="RFC4211" format="default"></xref> and < xref target="RFC9045" format="default"></xref>):</t> <t>In this case, the sender and recipient share secret informatio n with sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means or from a previous PKI management operation). PKIProtection will contain a MAC value and the protec tionAlg <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be one of the options described in <xref target="RFC9 481" format="default">CMP Algorithms</xref>. The PasswordBasedMac is specified a s follows (see also <xref target="RFC4211" format="default"></xref> and <xref ta rget="RFC9045" format="default"></xref>):</t>
<t>Replace the last paragraph with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID 2616):</t> <t>Replace the last paragraph with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID 2616):</t>
<t>Note: It is RECOMMENDED that the fields of PBMParameter remain constant throughout the messages of a single transaction (e.g., ir/ip/certConf/ pkiConf) to reduce the overhead associated with PasswordBasedMac computation.</t > <t>Note: It is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that the fields of PBMP arameter remain constant throughout the messages of a single transaction (e.g., ir/ip/certConf/pkiConf) to reduce the overhead associated with PasswordBasedMac computation.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.1.3.4" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.1.3.4" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection</name> <name>Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection</name>
<t>Section 5.1.3.4 of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp;4 210</xref> describes the nested message. This document enables using nested mess ages also for batch-delivery transport of PKI messages between PKI management e ntities and with mixed body types.</t> <t><xref target="RFC4210" section="5.1.3.4" sectionFormat="of" format="d efault"/> describes the nested message. This document also enables using nested messages for batch-delivery transport of PKI messages between PKI management en tities and with mixed body types.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the section with the followin g text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the section with the followin g text:</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">5.1.3.4. Multiple Protection</t> <t keepWithNext="true">5.1.3.4. Multiple Protection</t>
<t>When receiving a protected PKI message, a PKI management entity such as an RA MAY forward that message adding its own protection (which is a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and certificates shared between the RA and the CA). Additionally, multiple PKI messages MAY be aggregated. There are several use cases for such messages.</t> <t>When receiving a protected PKI message, a PKI management entity, such as an RA, <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> forward that message along with adding its own pro tection (which is a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and certifi cates shared between the RA and the CA). Additionally, multiple PKI messages <b cp14>MAY</bcp14> be aggregated. There are several use cases for such messages.< /t>
<ul spacing="normal"> <ul spacing="normal">
<li>The RA confirms having validated and authorized a message and forw ards the original message unchanged.</li> <li>The RA confirms having validated and authorized a message and forw ards the original message unchanged.</li>
<li>The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., adds or modifies <li>The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., adds or modifies
particular field values or adds new extensions) before forwarding them, then it particular field values or adds new extensions) before forwarding them; then, i
MAY create its own desired PKIBody. If the changes made by the RA to PKIMessag t <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> create its own desired PKIBody. If the changes made by the
e break the POP of a certificate request, the RA MUST set the popo field to RAVe RA to PKIMessage break the POP of a certificate request, the RA <bcp14>MUST</bc
rified. It MAY include the original PKIMessage from the EE in the generalInfo fi p14> set the popo field to RAVerified. It <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include the origina
eld of PKIHeader of a nested message (to accommodate, for example, cases in whic l PKIMessage from the EE in the generalInfo field of PKIHeader of a nested messa
h the CA wishes to check POP or other information on the original EE message). T ge (to accommodate, for example, cases in which the CA wishes to check POP or ot
he infoType to be used in this situation is {id-it 15} (see Section 5.3.19 for t her information on the original EE message). The infoType to be used in this sit
he value of id-it) and the infoValue is PKIMessages (contents MUST be in the sam uation is {id-it 15} (see Section <xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" se
e order as the message in PKIBody).</li> ction= "5.3.19"/> for the value of id-it), and the infoValue is PKIMessages (con
<li>A PKI management entity collects several messages that are to be f tents <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be in the same order as the message in PKIBody).</li>
orwarded in the same direction and forwards them in a batch. Request messages ca <li>A PKI management entity collects several messages that are to be f
n be transferred as batch upstream (towards the CA); response or announce messag orwarded in the same direction and forwards them in a batch. Request messages ca
es can be transferred as batch downstream (towards an RA, but not to the EE). Th n be transferred as batch upstream (towards the CA); response or announce messag
is can for instance be used when bridging an off-line connection between two PKI es can be transferred as batch downstream (towards an RA but not to the EE). For
management entities.</li> instance, this can be used when bridging an off-line connection between two PKI
management entities.</li>
</ul> </ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">These use cases are accomplished by nesting the m essages within a new PKI message. The structure used is as follows:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">These use cases are accomplished by nesting the m essages within a new PKI message. The structure used is as follows:</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.2.2" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.2.2" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values</name> <name>Replace Section 5.2.2 - Encrypted Values</name>
<t>Section 5.2.2 of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp;421 <t><xref target="RFC4210" section="5.2.2" sectionFormat="of" format="def
0</xref> describes the use of EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data. This d ault"/> describes the use of EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data. This do
ocument extends the encryption of data to preferably use EnvelopedData.</t> cument extends the encryption of data to preferably use EnvelopedData.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the section with the followin g text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the section with the followin g text:</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">5.2.2. Encrypted Values</t> <t keepWithNext="true">5.2.2. Encrypted Values</t>
<t>Where encrypted data (in this specification, private keys, certificat es, or revocation passphrase) are sent in PKI messages, the EncryptedKey data st ructure is used.</t> <t>Where encrypted data (in this specification, private keys, certificat es, or revocation passphrase) is sent in PKI messages, the EncryptedKey data str ucture is used.</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE { EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated
envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData } envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData }
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
<t>See <xref target="RFC4211" format="default">CRMF</xref> for Encrypted <t>See <xref target="RFC4211" format="default">Certificate Request Messa
Key and EncryptedValue syntax and <xref target="RFC5652" format="default">CMS</x ge Format (CRMF)</xref> for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and <xref tar
ref> for EnvelopedData syntax. Using the EncryptedKey data structure offers the get="RFC5652" format="default">Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)</xref> for Env
choice to either use EncryptedValue (for backward compatibility only) or Envelop elopedData syntax. Using the EncryptedKey data structure offers the choice to ei
edData. The use of the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of ther use EncryptedValue (for backward compatibility only) or EnvelopedData. The
the EnvelopedData structure. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED to use EnvelopedData use of the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the Envelop
.</t> edData structure. Therefore, it is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> to use EnvelopedD
<t>Note: The EncryptedKey structure defined in <xref target="RFC4211" fo ata.</t>
rmat="default">CRMF</xref> is reused here, which makes the update backward compa <t>Note: The EncryptedKey structure defined in <xref target="RFC4
tible. Using the new syntax with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is b 211" format="default">CRMF</xref> is reused here, which makes the update backwar
its-on-the-wire compatible with the old syntax.</t> d compatible. Using the new syntax with the untagged default choice EncryptedVal
<t>To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 has bee ue is bits-on-the-wire compatible with the old syntax.</t>
n introduced. Details on the usage of pvno values is described in Section 7.</t <t>To indicate support for EnvelopedData, the pvno cmp2021 has be
> en introduced. Details on the usage of the protocol version number (pvno) are d
escribed in Section <xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="7"/>.</
t>
<t>The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to transport a private key, certificate, or revocation passphrase in encrypted form.</t> <t>The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to transport a private key, certificate, or revocation passphrase in encrypted form.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">EnvelopedData is used as follows:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">EnvelopedData is used as follows:</t>
<ul spacing="normal"> <ul spacing="normal">
<li>It contains only one RecipientInfo structure because the content i s encrypted only for one recipient.</li> <li>It contains only one RecipientInfo structure because the content i s encrypted only for one recipient.</li>
<li>It may contain a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage structure as defined in <xref target="RFC5958" format="default">RFC&nbsp;5958</xref> wrap ped in a SignedData structure as specified in <xref target="RFC5652" format="def ault">CMS section 5</xref> and <xref target="RFC8933" format="default"/> signed by the Key Generation Authority.</li> <li>It may contain a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage structure , as defined in <xref target="RFC5958" format="default"/>, that is wrapped in a SignedData structure, as specified in <xref target="RFC5652" sectionFormat="of" section="5">CMS</xref> and <xref target="RFC8933" format="default"/>, and signed by the Key Generation Authority.</li>
<li>It may contain a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in the encryptedContent field.</li> <li>It may contain a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in the encryptedContent field.</li>
</ul> </ul>
<t>The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in <xref tar get="RFC5652" format="default">CMS section 6</xref>, MUST be encrypted using a n ewly generated symmetric content-encryption key. This content-encryption key MUS T be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key management techni ques. </t> <t>The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in <xref tar get="RFC5652" sectionFormat="of" section="6">CMS</xref>, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be encrypted using a newly generated symmetric content-encryption key. This content -encryption key <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key management techniques. </t>
<t keepWithNext="true">The choice of the key management technique to be used by the sender depends on the credential available at the recipient:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">The choice of the key management technique to be used by the sender depends on the credential available at the recipient:</t>
<ul spacing="normal"> <ul spacing="normal">
<li>Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension assert <li>recipient's certificate with an algorithm identifier and a
ing keyAgreement: The content-encryption key will be protected using the key agr public key that supports key transport and where any given key usage extension
eement key management technique, as specified in <xref target="RFC5652" format=" allows keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be protected using the
default">CMS section 6.2.2</xref>. This is the preferred technique.</li> key transport key management technique, as specified in <xref target="RFC5652"
<li>Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension assert sectionFormat="of" section="6.2.1">CMS</xref>.</li>
ing keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be protected using the key <li>recipient's certificate with an algorithm identifier and a
transport key management technique, as specified in <xref target="RFC5652" forma public key that supports key agreement and where any given key usage extension
t="default">CMS section 6.2.1</xref>.</li> allows keyAgreement: The content-encryption key will be protected using the
<li>A password or shared secret: The content-encryption key will be pr key agreement key management technique, as specified in <xref target="RFC5652"
otected using the password-based key management technique, as specified in <xref sectionFormat="of" section="6.2.2">CMS</xref>.</li>
target="RFC5652" format="default">CMS section 6.2.4</xref>.</li> <li>a password or shared secret: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the password-based key management technique, as specified in
<xref target="RFC5652" sectionFormat="of" section="6.2.4">CMS</xref>.</li>
</ul> </ul>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.2.9" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.2.9" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>New Section 5.2.9 - GeneralizedTime</name> <name>New Section 5.2.9 - GeneralizedTime</name>
<t>The following subsection point implementers to [RFC5280] regarding us <t>The following subsection points implementers to <xref target="RFC5280
age of GeneralizedTime.</t> "/> regarding usage of GeneralizedTime.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section after Section 5.2.8.4:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section after <xref target="RFC4210"
sectionFormat="of" section="5.2.8.4"/>:</t>
<t>5.2.9 GeneralizedTime</t> <t>5.2.9 GeneralizedTime</t>
<t>GeneralizedTime is a standard ASN.1 type and SHALL be used as specified in <xref target="RFC5280" format="default">RFC&nbsp;5280 Section 4.1.2 .5.2</xref>.</t> <t>GeneralizedTime is a standard ASN.1 type and <bcp14>SHALL</bcp 14> be used as specified in <xref target="RFC5280" section="4.1.2.5.2" sectionFo rmat="of" format="default"/>.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.3.4" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.4" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response</name> <name>Update Section 5.3.4 - Certification Response</name>
<t>Section 5.3.4 of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp;421 <t><xref target="RFC4210" section="5.3.4" sectionFormat="of" format="def
0</xref> describes the Certification Response. This document updates the syntax ault"/> describes the Certification Response. This document updates the syntax b
by using the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as describe y using the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue, as describe
d in <xref target="CMP-5.2.2" format="default"/> above. Additionally, it clarifi d in <xref target="CMP-5.2.2" format="default"/> above. Additionally, it clarifi
es the certReqId to be used in response to a p10cr message.</t> es the certReqId to be used in response to a p10cr message.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the ASN.1 syntax with the following text (Note: This also fixes Errata ID 3949 and 4078):</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the ASN.1 syntax with the following text (Note: This also fixes Errata ID 3949 and 4078):</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE { CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL,
response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse
} }
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
status PKIStatusInfo, status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211] -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
} }
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL, privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- see [RFC4211] for comment on encoding -- See [RFC4211] for comments on encoding.
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL
} }
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate, certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
} }
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
<t keepWithNext="true">Add the following as a new paragraph right after the ASN.1 syntax:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Add the following as a new paragraph right after the ASN.1 syntax:</t>
<t>A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data structure as specified in <xref target="RFC2986" format="default">PKCS#10</ xref> but no certReqId. Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding certifica tion response (cp) message MUST be set to -1.</t> <t>A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data structure, as specified in <xref target="RFC2986" format="default">PKCS #10 </xref>, but no certReqId. Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding Certif ication Response (cp) message <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be set to -1.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section:</t>
<t>The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.</t> <t>The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section <xref target="RFC4210
<t>Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 h " sectionFormat="bare" section="5.2.2"/>.</t>
as been introduced. Details on the usage of different pvno values are described <t>Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData, the pvno cmp2021
in Section 7.</t> has been introduced. Details on the usage of different protocol version numbers
(pvno) are described in Section <xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" sect
ion="7"/>.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.3.18" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.18" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content</name> <name>Update Section 5.3.18 - Certificate Confirmation Content</name>
<t>This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus t ype used in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash algorithm for those certificates where no hash algorithm is specified in the signatureAlgorithm fie ld.</t> <t>This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus t ype used in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash algorithm for those certificates where no hash algorithm is specified in the signatureAlgorithm fie ld.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the f ollowing text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the f ollowing text:</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
certHash OCTET STRING, certHash OCTET STRING,
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL, statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL OPTIONAL
} }
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
<t>The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not specify a hash al gorithm in the OID or in the parameters. In such cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the has hAlg MUST be used to specify the hash algorithm to be used for calculating the c ertHash value. Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be computed using the same ha sh algorithm as used to create and verify the certificate signature. If hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message header must be cmp202 1(3).</t> <t>The hashAlg field <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used only in exceptional c ases where the signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not sp ecify a hash algorithm in the OID or in the parameters. In such cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the hashAlg <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used to specify the hash algorithm to be used for calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, the certHash value <bcp1 4>SHALL</bcp14> be computed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify the certificate signature. If hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message header must be cmp2021(3).</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.2" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.2" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types</name> <name>Update Section 5.3.19.2 - Signing Key Pair Types</name>
<t>The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair Typ <t>The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair Typ
es on referencing EC curves.</t> es on referencing elliptic curves.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.2:< <t keepWithNext="true">Insert this note at the end of <xref target="RFC4
/t> 210" sectionFormat="of" section="5.3.19.2"/>:</t>
<t>Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey <t>Note: In case several elliptic curves are supported, several id-ecPub
elements as defined in <xref target="RFC5480" format="default">RFC&nbsp;5480</x licKey elements as defined in <xref target="RFC5480" format="default"/> need to
ref> need to be given, one per named curve.</t> be given, one per named curve.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.3" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.3" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types <name>Update Section 5.3.19.3 - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types<
</name> /name>
<t>The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key Agreeme <t>The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key Agreeme
nt Key Pair Types on referencing EC curves.</t> nt Key Pair Types on referencing elliptic curves.</t>
<t>Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.3:</t> <t>Insert this note at the end of <xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="
<t keepWithNext="true">Note: In case several EC curves are supported, se of" section="5.3.19.3"/>:</t>
veral id-ecPublicKey elements as defined in <xref target="RFC5480" format="defau <t keepWithNext="true">Note: In case several elliptic curves are support
lt">RFC&nbsp;5480</xref>need to be given, one per named curve.</t> ed, several id-ecPublicKey elements as defined in <xref target="RFC5480" format=
"default"/> need to be given, one per named curve.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.9" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.9" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase</name> <name>Replace Section 5.3.19.9 - Revocation Passphrase</name>
<t>Section 5.3.19.9 of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp; <t><xref target="RFC4210" section="5.3.19.9" sectionFormat="of" format="
4210</xref> describes the provisioning of a revocation passphrase for authentica default"/> describes the provisioning of a revocation passphrase for authenticat
ting a later revocation request. This document updates the handling by using the ing a later revocation request. This document updates the handling by using the
parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this infor parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this inform
mation as described in <xref target="CMP-5.2.2" format="default"/> above.</t> ation, as described in <xref target="CMP-5.2.2" format="default"/> above.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the section with the followin g text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the section with the followin g text:</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase</t> <t keepWithNext="true">5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase</t>
<t>This MAY be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a CA/RA for the pu rpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case that the appropr iate signing private key is no longer available to authenticate the request). S ee Appendix B for further details on the use of this mechanism.</t> <t>This <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a C A/RA for the purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case t hat the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to authenticate t he request). See Appendix <xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section=" B"/> for further details on the use of this mechanism.</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey
GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent > GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent >
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
<t>The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.</t> <t>The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section <xref target="RFC4210 " sectionFormat="bare" section="5.2.2"/>.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.14" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.14" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates</name> <name>New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates</name>
<t>The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-c <t>The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-c
aCerts. The intended use is specified in <xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweigh aCerts. The intended use is specified in <xref target="RFC9483" sectionFormat="o
t-cmp-profile">Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3</xref>.</t> f" section="4.3">the Lightweight CMP Profile</xref>.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section after <xref target="RFC4210"
<t keepWithNext="true">2.3.19.14 CA Certificates</t> sectionFormat="of" section="5.3.19.13"/>:</t>
<t>This MAY be used by the client to get CA certificates.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">5.3.19.14. CA Certificates</t>
<t>This <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used by the client to get CA certificates.
</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate | < absent > CMPCertificate | < absent >
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.15" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.15" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update</name> <name>New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update</name>
<t>The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-r <t>The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-r
ootCaCert and id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate. The use is specified in <xref target="I-D.i ootCaCert and id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate. The use is specified in <xref target="RFC94
etf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile">Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3</xref>.</ 83" sectionFormat="of" section="4.3">the Lightweight CMP Profile </xref>.</t>
t> <t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section after the new Section 5.3.19.
<t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.14:< 14:</t>
/t>
<t keepWithNext="true">5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update</t> <t keepWithNext="true">5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update</t>
<t>This MAY be used by the client to get an update of a root CA certific <t>This <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used by the client to get an update of a r
ate, which is provided in the body of the request message. In contrast to the c oot CA certificate, which is provided in the body of the request message. In co
kuann message this approach follows the request/response model.</t> ntrast to the ckuann message, this approach follows the request/response model.<
<t>The EE SHOULD reference its current trust anchor in a TrustAnc /t>
hor structure in the request body, giving the root CA certificate if available, <t>The EE <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> reference its current trust ancho
otherwise the public key value of the trust anchor.</t> r in a TrustAnchor structure in the request body, giving the root CA certificate
if available; otherwise, the public key value of the trust anchor is given.</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
GenMsg: {id-it 20}, RootCaCertValue | < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 20}, RootCaCertValue | < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateContent | < absent > GenRep: {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateContent | < absent >
RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate, newWithNew CMPCertificate,
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
} }
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
<t>Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting ne wWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the needs of the EE. </t> <t>Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omit ting newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the needs of the EE.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.16" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.16" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template</name> <name>New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template</name>
<t>The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id- <t>The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-
it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in the <xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-li it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in <xref target="RFC9483" sectionForma
ghtweight-cmp-profile">Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3</xref>.</t> t="of" section="4.3">the Lightweight CMP Profile </xref>.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.15:< <t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section after the new Section 5.3.19.
/t> 15:</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template</t> <t keepWithNext="true">5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template</t>
<t>This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing requireme <t>This <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used by the client to get a template conta
nts for certificate request attributes and extensions. The controls id-regCtrl-a ining requirements for certificate request attributes and extensions. The contro
lgId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen MAY contain details on the types of subject public ls id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> contain details
keys the CA is willing to certify.</t> on the types of subject public keys the CA is willing to certify.</t>
<t>The id-regCtrl-algId control MAY be used to identify a cryptographic <t>The id-regCtrl-algId control <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used to identify a
algorithm, see <xref target="RFC5280" format="default">RFC&nbsp;5280 Section 4.1 cryptographic algorithm (see <xref target="RFC5280" section="4.1.2.7" sectionFo
.2.7</xref>, other than rsaEncryption. The algorithm field SHALL identify a cryp rmat="of" format="default"/>) other than rsaEncryption. The algorithm field <bcp
tographic algorithm. The contents of the optional parameters field will vary acc 14>SHALL</bcp14> identify a cryptographic algorithm. The contents of the optiona
ording to the algorithm identified. For example, when the algorithm is set to id l parameters field will vary according to the algorithm identified. For example,
-ecPublicKey, the parameters identify the elliptic curve to be used, see <xref t when the algorithm is set to id-ecPublicKey, the parameters identify the ellipt
arget="RFC5480" format="default"/>.</t> ic curve to be used; see <xref target="RFC5480" format="default"/>.</t>
<t>The id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen control SHALL be used for algorithm rsaEncry <t>The id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen control <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be used for alg
ption and SHALL contain the intended modulus bit length of the RSA key.</t> orithm rsaEncryption and <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> contain the intended modulus bit l
ength of the RSA key.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true"/> <t keepWithNext="true"/>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
GenMsg: {id-it 19}, < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 19}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent > GenRep: {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent >
CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE { CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
certTemplate CertTemplate, certTemplate CertTemplate,
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL } keySpec Controls OPTIONAL }
skipping to change at line 434 skipping to change at line 414
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 11 } mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 12 } mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX) RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
<t>The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be us <t>The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be us
ed for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the certTemplate MU ed for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the certTemplate <b
ST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity wishes to specify supported p cp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used. In case the PKI management entity wishes to spec
ublic-key algorithms, the keySpec field MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue ify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be us
per supported algorithm or RSA key length MUST be used.</t> ed. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or RSA key length <bcp14>
<t>Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in <xref target="RFC4211" fo MUST</bcp14> be used.</t>
rmat="default">CRMF Section 6</xref></t> <t>Note: The controls ASN.1 type is defined in <xref target="RFC4211" se
ctionFormat="of" section="6">CRMF</xref>.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.3.17.17" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.17" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL Update Retrieval</name> <name>New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL Update Retrieval</name>
<t>The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id- it-crlStatusList and id-it-crls. Details are specified in the <xref target="I-D. ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile">Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3</xref>. Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.16:</t> <t>The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id- it-crlStatusList and id-it-crls. Details are specified in <xref target="RFC9483" sectionFormat="of" section="4.3">the Lightweight CMP Profile</xref>. Insert thi s section after the new Section 5.3.19.16:</t>
<t>5.3.19.17. CRL Update Retrieval</t> <t>5.3.19.17. CRL Update Retrieval</t>
<t>This MAY be used by the client to get new CRLs, specifying the source of the CRLs and the thisUpdate value of the latest CRL it already has, i f available. A CRL source is given either by a DistributionPointName or the Gen eralNames of the issuing CA. The DistributionPointName should be treated as an internal pointer to identify a CRL that the server already has and not as a way to ask the server to fetch CRLs from external locations. The server shall provid e only those CRLs that are more recent than the ones indicated by the client.</t > <t>This <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used by the client to get new CRLs, specifying the source of the CRLs and the thisUpdate value of the latest CRL it already has, if available. A CRL source is given either by a DistributionPoint Name or the GeneralNames of the issuing CA. The DistributionPointName should be treated as an internal pointer to identify a CRL that the server already has an d not as a way to ask the server to fetch CRLs from external locations. The serv er shall only provide those CRLs that are more recent than the ones indicated by the client.</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
GenMsg: {id-it 22}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CRLStatus GenMsg: {id-it 22}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CRLStatus
GenRep: {id-it 23}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GenRep: {id-it 23}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertificateList | < absent > CertificateList | < absent >
CRLSource ::= CHOICE { CRLSource ::= CHOICE {
dpn [0] DistributionPointName, dpn [0] DistributionPointName,
issuer [1] GeneralNames } issuer [1] GeneralNames }
CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE { CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
source CRLSource, source CRLSource,
thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL } thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL }
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.3.21" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.21" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content</name> <name>Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content</name>
<t><xref target="RFC4210">Section 5.3.21 of RFC&nbsp;4210</xref> describ es the regular use of error messages. This document adds a use by a PKI managem ent entity to initiate delayed delivery in response to certConf, rr, and genm re quests and to error messages.</t> <t><xref target="RFC4210" section="5.3.21" sectionFormat="of"/> describe s the regular use of error messages. This document adds a use by a PKI manageme nt entity to initiate delayed delivery in response to certConf, rr, and genm req uests and to error messages.</t>
<t>Replace the first sentence of the first paragraph with the following one:</t> <t>Replace the first sentence of the first paragraph with the following one:</t>
<t>This data structure MAY be used by EE, CA, or RA to convey error info and by a PKI management entity to initiate delayed delivery of responses.</t> <t>This data structure <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used by an EE, CA, or RA to convey error information and by a PKI management entity to initiate delayed del ivery of responses.</t>
<t>Replace the second paragraph with the following text:</t> <t>Replace the second paragraph with the following text:</t>
<t>This message MAY be generated at any time during a PKI transaction. I <t>This message <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be generated at any time during a PKI
f the client sends this request, the server MUST respond with a PKIConfirm respo transaction. If the client sends this request, the server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> r
nse, or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header is not valid. In case a PKI m espond with a PKIConfirm response or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header
anagement entity sends an error message to the EE with the pKIStatusInfo field c is not valid. In case a PKI management entity sends an error message to the EE w
ontaining the status "waiting", the EE will initiate polling as described in Sec ith the pKIStatusInfo field containing the status "waiting", the EE will initiat
tion 5.3.22. Otherwise, both sides MUST treat this message as the end of the tr e polling
ansaction (if a transaction is in progress).</t> as described in Section <xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="5.
3.22"/>. Otherwise, both sides <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat this message as the en
d of the transaction (if a transaction is in progress).</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-5.3.22" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.22" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response</name> <name>Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response</name>
<t>Section 5.3.22 of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp;42 <t><xref target="RFC4210" section="5.3.22" sectionFormat="of" format="de
10</xref> describes when and how polling messages are used for ir, cr, and kur m fault"/> describes when and how polling messages are used for ir, cr, and kur me
essages. This document extends the polling mechanism for outstanding responses ssages. This document extends the polling mechanism for outstanding responses t
to any kind of request message. This update also fixes the inconsistent use of t o any kind of request message. This update also fixes the inconsistent use of th
he terms 'rReq' vs. 'pollReq' and 'pRep' vs. 'pollRep'.</t> e terms 'pReq' vs. 'pollReq' and 'pRep' vs. 'pollRep'.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace Section 5.3.22 with following text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace <xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of"
section="5.3.22"/> with following text:</t>
<t>This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the client needs to poll the server to determine the status of an outstanding r esponse (i.e., when the "waiting" PKIStatus has been received).</t> <t>This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the client needs to poll the server to determine the status of an outstanding r esponse (i.e., when the "waiting" PKIStatus has been received).</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER } certReqId INTEGER }
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL } reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
<t>In response to an ir, cr, p10cr, or kur request message, polli ng is initiated with an ip, cp, or kup response message containing status "waiti ng". For any type of request message, polling can be initiated with an error res ponse messages with status "waiting". The following clauses describe how polling messages are used. It is assumed that multiple certConf messages can be sent d uring transactions. There will be one sent in response to each ip, cp, or kup t hat contains a CertStatus for an issued certificate.</t> <t>In response to an ir, cr, p10cr, or kur request message, polli ng is initiated with an ip, cp, or kup response message containing status "waiti ng". For any type of request message, polling can be initiated with an error res ponse messages with status "waiting". The following clauses describe how polling messages are used. It is assumed that multiple certConf messages can be sent d uring transactions. There will be one sent in response to each ip, cp, or kup t hat contains a CertStatus for an issued certificate.</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="%d"> <ol spacing="normal" type="%d">
<li>In response to an ip, cp, or kup message, an EE will send <li>In response to an ip, cp, or kup message, an EE will send
a certConf for all issued certificates and expect a PKIconf for each certConf. a certConf for all issued certificates and expect a PKIconf for each certConf.
An EE will send a pollReq message in response to each CertResponse element of a An EE will send a pollReq message in response to each CertResponse element of a
n ip, cp, or kup message with status "waiting" and in response to an error messa n ip, cp, or kup message with status "waiting" and in response to an error messa
ge with status "waiting". Its certReqId MUST be either the index of a CertRespo ge with status "waiting". Its certReqId <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be either the index
nse data structure with status "waiting" or -1 referring to the complete respons of a CertResponse data structure with status "waiting" or -1, referring to the
e.</li> complete response.</li>
<li>In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup <li>In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup
if one or more of still pending requested certificates are ready or the final re if one or more of the still pending requested certificates are ready or the fina
sponse to some other type of request is available; otherwise, it will return a p l response to some other type of request is available; otherwise, it will return
ollRep.</li> a pollRep.</li>
<li>If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least the numb er of seconds given in the checkAfter field before sending another pollReq.</li> <li>If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least the numb er of seconds given in the checkAfter field before sending another pollReq.</li>
<li>If the EE receives an ip, cp, or kup, then it will be treated in the same way as the initial response; if it receives any other respo nse, then this will be treated as the final response to the original request.</l i> <li>If the EE receives an ip, cp, or kup, then it will be treated in the same way as the initial response; if it receives any other respo nse, then this will be treated as the final response to the original request.</l i>
</ol> </ol>
<t keepWithNext="true">The following client-side state machine de scribes polling for individual CertResponse elements.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">The following client-side state machine de scribes polling for individual CertResponse elements.</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[
START START
| |
v v
Send ir Send ir
| ip | ip
v v
Check status Check status
of returned <------------------------+ of returned <------------------------+
certs | certs |
| | | |
skipping to change at line 513 skipping to change at line 494
/ | / |
(conf list) / (empty conf list) | (conf list) / (empty conf list) |
/ ip | / ip |
/ +-----------------+ / +-----------------+
(empty pending list) / | pollRep (empty pending list) / | pollRep
END <---- Send certConf Send pollReq---------->Wait END <---- Send certConf Send pollReq---------->Wait
| ^ ^ | | ^ ^ |
| | | | | | | |
+-----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------+ +---------------+
(pending list) (pending list)
]]></sourcecode> ]]></artwork>
<t keepWithNext="true">In the following exchange, the end entity is enrolling for two certificates in one request.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">In the following exchange, the end entity is enrolling for two certificates in one request.</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[
Step End Entity PKI Step End Entity PKI
-------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Format ir 1 Format ir
2 -> ir -> 2 -> ir ->
3 Handle ir 3 Handle ir
4 Manual intervention is 4 Manual intervention is
required for both certs. required for both certs
5 <- ip <- 5 <- ip <-
6 Process ip 6 Process ip
7 Format pollReq 7 Format pollReq
8 -> pollReq -> 8 -> pollReq ->
9 Check status of cert requests 9 Check status of cert requests
10 Certificates not ready 10 Certificates not ready
11 Format pollRep 11 Format pollRep
12 <- pollRep <- 12 <- pollRep <-
13 Wait 13 Wait
14 Format pollReq 14 Format pollReq
skipping to change at line 556 skipping to change at line 537
28 Check status of certificate 28 Check status of certificate
29 Certificate is ready 29 Certificate is ready
30 Format ip 30 Format ip
31 <- ip <- 31 <- ip <-
31 Handle ip 31 Handle ip
32 Format certConf 32 Format certConf
33 -> certConf -> 33 -> certConf ->
34 Handle certConf 34 Handle certConf
35 Format ack 35 Format ack
36 <- pkiConf <- 36 <- pkiConf <-
]]></sourcecode> ]]></artwork>
<t keepWithNext="true">The following client-side state machine de scribes polling for a complete response message.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">The following client-side state machine de scribes polling for a complete response message.</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[
Start Start
| |
| Send request | Send request
| |
+----------- Receive response ------------+ +----------- Receive response ------------+
| | | |
| ip/cp/kup/error with | other | ip/cp/kup/error with | other
| status "waiting" | response | status "waiting" | response
| | | |
v | v |
skipping to change at line 582 skipping to change at line 563
| | Receive response | | | Receive response |
| | | | | |
| pollRep | other response | | pollRep | other response |
+-----------+------------------->+<-------------------+ +-----------+------------------->+<-------------------+
| |
v v
Handle response Handle response
| |
v v
End End
]]></sourcecode> ]]></artwork>
<t keepWithNext="true">In the following exchange, the end-entity <t keepWithNext="true">In the following exchange, the end entity
is sending a general message request, and the response is delayed by the server. is sending a general message request, and the response is delayed by the server.
</t> </t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[
Step End Entity PKI Step End Entity PKI
-------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Format genm 1 Format genm
2 -> genm -> 2 -> genm ->
3 Handle genm 3 Handle genm
4 delay in response is necessary 4 delay in response is necessary
5 Format error message "waiting" 5 Format error message "waiting"
with certReqId set to -1 with certReqId set to -1
6 <- error <- 6 <- error <-
7 Process error 7 Process error
8 Format pollReq 8 Format pollReq
9 -> pollReq -> 9 -> pollReq ->
10 Check status of original request 10 Check status of original request
general message response not ready general message response not ready
11 Format pollRep 11 Format pollRep
12 <- pollRep <- 12 <- pollRep <-
13 Wait 13 Wait
14 Format pollReq 14 Format pollReq
15 -> pollReq -> 15 -> pollReq ->
16 Check status of original request 16 Check status of original request
general message response is ready general message response is ready
17 Format genp 17 Format genp
18 <- genp <- 18 <- genp <-
19 Handle genp 19 Handle genp
]]></sourcecode> ]]></artwork>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-7" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-7" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation</name> <name>Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation</name>
<t>Section 7 of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp; 4210</xref> describes the use of CMP protocol versions. This document describes the handling of the additional CMP version cmp2021 introduced to indicate suppor t of EnvelopedData and hashAlg.</t> <t><xref target="RFC4210" section="7" sectionFormat="of" format=" default"/> describes the use of CMP versions. This document describes the handli ng of the additional CMP version cmp2021, which is introduced to indicate suppor t of EnvelopedData and hashAlg.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the second paragraph w ith the following text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the second paragraph w ith the following text:</t>
<t>If a client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the ser ver (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-of-band means), t hen it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest version supported by both it and the server. If a client does not know what version(s) the server supports, then it MUST send a PKIMessage using the highest version it supports, with the follo wing exception. Version cmp2021 SHOULD only be used if cmp2021 syntax is needed for the request being sent or for the expected response.</t> <t>If a client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the ser ver (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-of-band means), t hen it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> send a PKIMessage with the highest version supported by both it and the server. If a client does not know what version(s) the server supports, then it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> send a PKIMessage using the highest versi on it supports with the following exception. Version cmp2021 <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp1 4> only be used if cmp2021 syntax is needed for the request being sent or for th e expected response.</t>
<t>Note: Using cmp2000 as the default pvno is done to avoid extra message exchanges for version negotiation and to foster compatibility with cmp2 000 implementations. Version cmp2021 syntax is only needed if a message exchange uses hashAlg (in CertStatus) or EnvelopedData.</t> <t>Note: Using cmp2000 as the default pvno is done to avoid extra message exchanges for version negotiation and to foster compatibility with cmp2 000 implementations. Version cmp2021 syntax is only needed if a message exchange uses hashAlg (in CertStatus) or EnvelopedData.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-7.1.1" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-7.1.1" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers</name> <name>Update Section 7.1.1 - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers</name>
<t>Section 7.1.1 of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&n <t><xref target="RFC4210" section="7.1.1" sectionFormat="of" form
bsp;4210</xref> describes the behavior of a client sending a cmp2000 message tal at="default"/> describes the behavior of a client sending a cmp2000 message talk
king to a cmp1999 server as specified in <xref target="RFC2510" format="default" ing to a cmp1999 server, as specified in <xref target="RFC2510" format="default"
>RFC&nbsp;2510</xref>. This document extends the section to clients with any hig />. This document extends the section to clients with any higher version than cm
her version than cmp1999.</t> p1999.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the first sentence of Section 7.1. <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the first sentence of <xref target
1 with the following text:</t> ="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="7.1.1"/> with the following text:</t>
<t>If, after sending a message with a protocol version number hig <t>If, after sending a message with a protocol version number hig
her than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of cmp1999 her than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of cmp1999
, then it MUST abort the current transaction.</t> , then it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> abort the current transaction.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-8.4" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-8.4" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Add Section 8.4 - Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Mes sage Protection</name> <name>Add Section 8.4 - Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Mes sage Protection</name>
<t>The following subsection addresses the risk arising from reusi ng the CA private key for CMP message protection.</t> <t>The following subsection addresses the risk arising from reusi ng the CA private key for CMP message protection.</t>
<t>Insert this section after Section 8.3 (Note: This fixes Errat a ID 5731):</t> <t>Insert this section after <xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat ="of" section="8.3"/> (Note: This fixes Errata ID 5731):</t>
<t>8.4. Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Message Prot ection</t> <t>8.4. Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Message Prot ection</t>
<t>A CA should not reuse its certificate signing key for other pu rposes such as protecting CMP responses and TLS connections. This way, exposure to other parts of the system and the number of uses of this particularly critica l key is reduced to a minimum.</t> <t>A CA should not reuse its certificate signing key for other pu rposes, such as protecting CMP responses and TLS connections. This way, exposure to other parts of the system and the number of uses of this particularly critic al key are reduced to a minimum.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-8.5" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-8.5" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and Shared Secret Information</name> <name>Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and Shared Secret Information</name>
<t>The following subsection addresses the risk arising from low e ntropy of random numbers, asymmetric keys, and shared secret information.</t> <t>The following subsection addresses the risk arising from low e ntropy of random numbers, asymmetric keys, and shared secret information.</t>
<t>Insert this section after Section 8.4:</t> <t>Insert this section after the new Section 8.4:</t>
<t>8.5. Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and Shared Secret I nformation</t> <t>8.5. Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and Shared Secret I nformation</t>
<t>Implementations must generate nonces and private keys from ran <t>Implementations must generate nonces and private keys from ran
dom input. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to gene dom input. The use of inadequate pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) to gener
rate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security. An attacker may fin ate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security. An attacker may find
d it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys and to it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys and to
search the resulting small set of possibilities than brute-force searching the search the resulting small set of possibilities than brute-force searching the w
whole key space. As an example of predictable random numbers see <xref target="C hole key space. As an example of predictable random numbers, see <xref target="C
VE-2008-0166" format="default"/>; consequences of low-entropy random numbers are VE-2008-0166" format="default"/>; consequences of low-entropy random numbers are
discussed in <xref target="MiningPsQs" format="default">Mining Your Ps and Qs</ discussed in <xref target="MiningPsQs" format="default">Mining Your Ps and Qs</
xref>. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. <xref target="ISO. xref>. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. <xref target="ISO.
20543-2019" format="default">ISO/IEC 20543:2019</xref>, <xref target="NIST.SP.80 20543-2019" format="default">ISO/IEC 20543:2019</xref>, <xref target="NIST_SP_80
0-90Ar1" format="default">NIST SP 800-90A Rev.1</xref>, <xref target="AIS31" for 0_90Ar1" format="default">NIST SP 800-90A Rev.1</xref>, <xref target="AIS31" for
mat="default">BSI AIS 31 V2.0</xref>, and others offer valuable guidance in this mat="default">BSI AIS 31 V2.0</xref>, and other specifications offer valuable gu
area.</t> idance in this area.</t>
<t>If shared secret information is generated by a cryptographical <t>If shared secret information is generated by a cryptographical
ly secure random-number generator (CSRNG) it is safe to assume that the entropy ly secure random number generator (CSRNG), it is safe to assume that the entropy
of the shared secret information equals its bit length. If no CSRNG is used, the of the shared secret information equals its bit length. If no CSRNG is used, th
entropy of a shared secret information depends on the details of the generation e entropy of shared secret information depends on the details of the generation
process and cannot be measured securely after it has been generated. If user-ge process and cannot be measured securely after it has been generated. If user-gen
nerated passwords are used as shared secret information, their entropy cannot be erated passwords are used as shared secret information, their entropy cannot be
measured and are typically insufficient for protected delivery of centrally gen measured and are typically insufficient for protected delivery of centrally gene
erated keys or trust anchors.</t> rated keys or trust anchors.</t>
<t>If the entropy of a shared secret information protecting the d <t>If the entropy of shared secret information protecting the del
elivery of a centrally generated key pair is known, it should not be less than t ivery of a centrally generated key pair is known, it should not be less than the
he security strength of that key pair; if the shared secret information is re-us security strength of that key pair; if the shared secret information is reused
ed for different key pairs, the security of the shared secret information should for different key pairs, the security of the shared secret information should ex
exceed the security strength of each individual key pair.</t> ceed the security strength of each individual key pair.</t>
<t>For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new <t>For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new
trust anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate) using caPubs or genm (a) that is not trust anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate) using caPubs or genm that is (a) not
concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret information is re-u concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret information is reus
sed for several key management operations, the entropy of the shared secret info ed for several key management operations, the entropy of the shared secret infor
rmation, if known, should not be less than the security strength of the trust an mation, if known, should not be less than the security strength of the trust anc
chor being managed by the operation. The shared secret information should have a hor being managed by the operation. The shared secret information should have an
n entropy that at least matches the security strength of the key material being entropy that at least matches the security strength of the key material being m
managed by the operation. Certain use cases may require shared secret informatio anaged by the operation. Certain use cases may require shared secret information
n that may be of a low security strength, e.g., a human generated password. It i that may be of a low security strength, e.g., a human-generated password. It is
s RECOMMENDED that such secret information be limited to a single PKI management <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that such secret information be limited to a single
operation. </t> PKI management operation. </t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-8.6" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-8.6" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Add Section 8.6 - Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages</na me> <name>Add Section 8.6 - Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages</na me>
<t>The following subsection addresses the risk arising from in-ba nd provisioning of new trust anchors in a PKI management operation.</t> <t>The following subsection addresses the risk arising from in-ba nd provisioning of new trust anchors in a PKI management operation.</t>
<t>Insert this section after new Section 8.5:</t> <t>Insert this section after the new Section 8.5:</t>
<t>8.6. Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages</t> <t>8.6. Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages</t>
<t>A provider of trust anchors, which may be an RA involved in co <t>A provider of trust anchors, which may be an RA involved in co
nfiguration management of its clients, MUST NOT include to-be-trusted CA certifi nfiguration management of its clients, <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> include to-be-tru
cates in a CMP message unless the specific deployment scenario can ensure that i sted CA certificates in a CMP message unless the specific deployment scenario ca
t is adequate that the receiving EE trusts these certificates, e.g., by loading n ensure that it is adequate that the receiving EE trusts these certificates, e.
them into its trust store.</t> g., by loading them into its trust store.</t>
<t>Whenever an EE receives in a CMP message, e.g., in the caPubs <t>Whenever an EE receives in a CMP message a CA certificate to b
field of a certificate response or in a general response (genp), a CA certificat e used as a trust anchor (for example in the caPubs field of a certificate respo
e for use as a trust anchor, it MUST properly authenticate the message sender wi nse or in a general response), it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> properly authenticate the
th existing trust anchors without requiring new trust anchors included in the me message sender with existing trust anchor information without requiring the new
ssage.</t> trust anchors included in the message.</t>
<t>Additionally, the EE MUST verify that the sender is an authori <t>Additionally, the EE <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify that the sende
zed source of trust anchors. This authorization is governed by local policy and r is an authorized source of trust anchors. This authorization is governed by l
typically indicated using shared secret information or with a signature-based m ocal policy and typically indicated using shared secret information or with a si
essage protection using a certificate issued by a PKI that is explicitly authori gnature-based message protection using a certificate issued by a PKI that is exp
zed for this purpose.</t> licitly authorized for this purpose.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-8.7" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-8.7" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Add Section 8.7 - Authorizing requests for certificates with speci fic EKUs</name> <name>Add Section 8.7 - Authorizing Requests for Certificates with Speci fic EKUs</name>
<t>The following subsection addresses the security considerations to follow when authorizing requests for certificates containing specific EKUs.< /t> <t>The following subsection addresses the security considerations to follow when authorizing requests for certificates containing specific EKUs.< /t>
<t>Insert this section after new Section 8.6:</t> <t>Insert this section after new Section 8.6:</t>
<t>8.7. Authorizing requests for certificates with specific EKUs </t> <t>8.7. Authorizing Requests for Certificates with Specific EKUs </t>
<t>When a CA issues a certificate containing extended key usage e xtensions as defined in Section 4.5, this expresses delegation of an authorizati on that originally is only with the CA certificate itself. Such delegation is a very sensitive action in a PKI and therefore special care must be taken when app roving such certificate requests to ensure that only legitimate entities receive a certificate containing such an EKU.</t> <t>When a CA issues a certificate containing extended key usage e xtensions as defined in Section 4.5, this expresses delegation of an authorizati on that originally is only with the CA certificate itself. Such delegation is a very sensitive action in a PKI and therefore special care must be taken when app roving such certificate requests to ensure that only legitimate entities receive a certificate containing such an EKU.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-B" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-B" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase</name> <name>Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase</name>
<t>Appendix B of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp;4210</ xref> describes the use of the revocation passphrase. As this document updates < xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp;4210</xref> to utilize the paren t structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in <xref target= "CMP-5.2.2" format="default"/> above, the description is updated accordingly.</t > <t><xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="B"/> describes the use of the revocation passphrase. As this document updates <xref target="RFC421 0" format="default"/> to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of En cryptedValue as described in <xref target="CMP-5.2.2" format="default"/> above, the description is updated accordingly.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the first bullet point of this section wi th the following text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the first bullet point of this section wi th the following text:</t>
<ul spacing="normal"> <ul spacing="normal">
<li>The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a G enMsg message at any time, or MAY be sent in the generalInfo field of the PKIHea der of any PKIMessage at any time. (In particular, the EncryptedKey structure a s described in Section 5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message t hat confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an initialization request o r certificate request message.) This conveys a revocation passphrase chosen by the entity to the relevant CA/RA. When EnvelopedData is used, this is in the dec rypted bytes of encryptedContent field. When EncryptedValue is used, this is in the decrypted bytes of the encValue field. Furthermore, the transfer is accompli shed with appropriate confidentiality characteristics.</li> <li>The OID and value specified in Section <xref target="RFC4210" sect ionFormat="bare" section="5.3.19.9"/> <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be sent in a GenMsg mes sage at any time or <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be sent in the generalInfo field of the P KIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time. (In particular, the EncryptedKey struct ure as described in Section <xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section= "5.2.2"/> may be sent in the header of the certConf message that confirms accept ance of certificates requested in an initialization request or certificate reque st message.) This conveys a revocation passphrase chosen by the entity to the r elevant CA/RA. When EnvelopedData is used, this is in the decrypted bytes of the encryptedContent field. When EncryptedValue is used, this is in the decrypted b ytes of the encValue field. Furthermore, the transfer is accomplished with appro priate confidentiality characteristics.</li>
</ul> </ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the third bullet point of this section wi th the following text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the third bullet point of this section wi th the following text:</t>
<ul spacing="normal"> <ul spacing="normal">
<li>Either the localKeyId attribute of EnvelopedData as specified in < xref target="RFC2985" format="default">RFC&nbsp;2985</xref> or the valueHint fie ld of EncryptedValue MAY contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along w ith the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the correct passphras e (e.g., when the revocation request is constructed by the entity and received b y the CA/RA).</li> <li>Either the localKeyId attribute of EnvelopedData as specified in < xref target="RFC2985" format="default"/> or the valueHint field of EncryptedValu e <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the correct passphrase (e .g., when the revocation request is constructed by the entity and received by th e CA/RA).</li>
</ul> </ul>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-C" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-C" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications</nam e> <name>Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications</nam e>
<t>Appendix C of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp;4210</ xref> provides clarifications to the request message behavior. As this document updates <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp;4210</xref> to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in <xre f target="CMP-5.2.2" format="default"/> above, the description is updated accord ingly.</t> <t><xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="C"/> provides clar ifications to the request message behavior. As this document updates <xref targe t="RFC4210" format="default"/> to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey inst ead of EncryptedValue as described in <xref target="CMP-5.2.2" format="default"/ > above, the description is updated accordingly.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax comin g after the definition of POPOSigningKey with the following text (Note: This fix es Errata ID 2615):</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax comin g after the definition of POPOSigningKey with the following text (Note: This fix es Errata ID 2615):</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
-- ********** -- **********
-- * For the purposes of this specification, the ASN.1 comment -- * For the purposes of this specification, the ASN.1 comment
-- * given in [RFC4211] pertains not only to certTemplate but
-- * also to the altCertTemplate control. -- * also to the altCertTemplate control.
-- ********** -- **********
-- * The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the -- * The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the
-- * DER-encoded value of poposkInput (i.e., the "value" OCTETs -- * DER-encoded value of poposkInput (i.e., the "value" OCTETs
-- * of the POPOSigningKeyInput DER). NOTE: If CertReqMsg -- * of the POPOSigningKeyInput DER). NOTE: If CertReqMsg
-- * certReq certTemplate (or the altCertTemplate control) -- * certReq certTemplate (or the altCertTemplate control)
-- * contains the subject and publicKey values, then poposkInput -- * contains the subject and publicKey values, then poposkInput
-- * MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be computed on the -- * MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be computed on the
-- * DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq (or the DER- -- * DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq (or the DER-
-- * encoded value of AltCertTemplate). If -- * encoded value of AltCertTemplate). If
-- * certTemplate/altCertTemplate does not contain both the -- * certTemplate/altCertTemplate does not contain both the
-- * subject and public key values (i.e., if it contains only -- * subject and public key values (i.e., if it contains only
-- * one of these or neither), then poposkInput MUST be present
-- * and MUST be signed. -- * and MUST be signed.
-- ********** -- **********
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax comin <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the ASN.1 syntax of POPOPrivKey with
g after the definition of POPOPrivKey with the following text:</t> the following text:</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
POPOPrivKey ::= CHOICE {
thisMessage [0] BIT STRING, -- deprecated
subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage,
dhMAC [2] BIT STRING, -- deprecated
agreeMAC [3] PKMACValue,
encryptedKey [4] EnvelopedData }
-- ********** -- **********
-- * When using CMP V2, the encrypted value MUST be transferred in
-- * the thisMessage field that is given as BIT STRING in [RFC4211],
-- * but it requires EncryptedValue. Therefore, this document makes
-- * the behavioral clarification for CMP V2 of specifying that the
-- * contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded as an
-- * EncryptedValue and then wrapped in a BIT STRING.
-- * When using CMP V3, the encrypted value MUST be transferred
-- * in the encryptedKey field, as specified in Section 5.2.2.
-- ********** -- **********
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-D.1" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-D.1" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These P rofiles</name> <name>Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These P rofiles</name>
<t>Appendix D.1 of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&nb sp;4210</xref> provides general rules for interpretation of the PKI management m essages profiles specified in Appendix D and Appendix E of <xref target="RFC4210 " format="default">RFC&nbsp;4210</xref>. This document updates a sentence regard ing the new protocol version cmp2021.</t> <t><xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="D.1"/> prov ides general rules for interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles sp ecified in Appendices <xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="D"/> and <xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="E"/> of <xref target="R FC4210"/>. This document updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version c mp2021.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the last sentence of the first par agraph of the section with the following text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the last sentence of the first par agraph of the section with the following text:</t>
<t>Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious val ue (e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000).</t> <t>Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious val ue (e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000).</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-D.2" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-D.2" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile</name> <name>Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile</name>
<t><xref target="RFC4210" format="default">Appendix D.2 of RFC&nbsp;4210 </xref> provides a list of algorithms that implementations must support when cla iming conformance with PKI Management Message Profiles as specified in <xref tar get="RFC4210" format="default">CMP Appendix D.2</xref>. This document redirects to the new algorithm profile as specified in Section 7.1 of <xref target="I-D.ie tf-lamps-cmp-algorithms" format="default">CMP Algorithms</xref>.</t> <t><xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="D.2" format="defau lt"/> provides a list of algorithms that implementations must support when claim ing conformance with PKI management message profiles, as specified in <xref targ et="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="D.2">CMP</xref>. This document redirect s to the new algorithm profile, as specified in <xref target="RFC9481" section=" 7.1" sectionFormat="of" format="default">CMP Algorithms</xref>.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the section with the followin g text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the section with the followin g text:</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">D.2. Algorithm Use Profile</t> <t keepWithNext="true">D.2. Algorithm Use Profile</t>
<t>For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective convention s for conforming implementations, please refer to <xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-c mp-algorithms" format="default">CMP Algorithms Section 7.1</xref>.</t> <t>For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective convention s for conforming implementations, please refer to <xref target="RFC9481" section Format="of" section="7.1">CMP Algorithms</xref>.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="CMP-D.4" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="CMP-D.4" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic A uthenticated Scheme)</name> <name>Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic A uthenticated Scheme)</name>
<t>Appendix D.4 of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&nbsp;4210 </xref> provides the initial registration/certification scheme. This scheme sha ll continue using EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons.</t> <t><xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="D.4" format="defau lt"/> provides the initial registration/certification scheme. This scheme shall continue using EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the line specifying protectionAlg of the Initialization Response message with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID 5201):</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the line specifying protectionAlg of the Initialization Response message with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID 5201):</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the comment after the privateKey field of crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response message wi th the following text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the comment after the privateKey field of crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response message wi th the following text:</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[
-- see Appendix C, Request Message Behavioral Clarifications -- see Appendix C (Request Message Behavioral Clarifications)
-- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue -- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="Trans-Updates" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="Trans-Updates" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management P rotocol (CMP)</name> <name>Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management P rotocol (CMP)</name>
<section anchor="Trans-1" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="Trans-1" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update Section 1. - Introduction</name> <name>Update Section 1 - Introduction</name>
<t>To indicate and explain why delayed delivery of all kinds of P <t>To indicate and explain why delayed delivery of all kinds of P
KIMessages may be handled at transfer level and/or at CMP level, the introductio KIMessages may be handled at transfer level and/or at CMP level, the introductio
n of <xref target="RFC6712" format="default">RFC&nbsp;6712</xref> is updated.</t n of <xref target="RFC6712" format="default"/> is updated.</t>
>
<t>Replace the third paragraph of this section with the following text:</t> <t>Replace the third paragraph of this section with the following text:</t>
<t>In addition to reliable transport, CMP requires connection and error handling from the transfer protocol, which is all covered by HTTP. Addit ionally, delayed delivery of CMP response messages may be handled at transfer le vel regardless of the message contents. Since this document extends the polling mechanism specified in the second version of CMP [RFC4210] to cover all types o f PKI management transactions, delays detected at application level may also be handled within CMP, using pollReq and pollRep messages.</t> <t>In addition to reliable transport, CMP requires connection and error handling from the transfer protocol, which is all covered by HTTP. Addit ionally, delayed delivery of CMP response messages may be handled at transfer le vel, regardless of the message contents. Since this document extends the pollin g mechanism specified in the second version of CMP <xref target="RFC4210"/> to c over all types of PKI management transactions, delays detected at application le vel may also be handled within CMP, using pollReq and pollRep messages.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="Trans-1.1" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="Trans-1.1" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>New Section 1.1. - Changes Since RFC 6712</name> <name>New Section 1.1 - Changes Since RFC 6712</name>
<t>The following subsection describes feature updates to <xref target="R <t>The following subsection describes feature updates to <xref target="R
FC6712" format="default">RFC&nbsp;6712</xref>. They are related to the base spec FC6712" format="default"/>. They are related to the base specification. Hence, r
ification. Hence, references to the original sections in <xref target="RFC6712" eferences to the original sections in <xref target="RFC6712" format="default"/>
format="default">RFC&nbsp;6712</xref> are used whenever possible.</t> are used whenever possible.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section at the end of the current Sec <t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section after the current <xref targe
tion 1:</t> t="RFC6712" sectionFormat="of" section="1"/>:</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">1.1 Changes Since RFC 6712</t> <t keepWithNext="true">1.1 Changes Since RFC 6712</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">The following updates are made in this document:< /t> <t keepWithNext="true">The following updates are made in this document:< /t>
<ul spacing="normal"> <ul spacing="normal">
<li>Introduce the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp'.</li> <li>Introduce the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp'.</li>
<li>Extend the URI structure.</li> <li>Extend the URI structure.</li>
</ul> </ul>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="Trans-3.6" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="Trans-3.6" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI</name> <name>Replace Section 3.6 - HTTP Request-URI</name>
<t>Section 3.6 of <xref target="RFC6712" format="default">RFC&nbsp;6712< <t><xref target="RFC6712" section="3.6" sectionFormat="of" format="defau
/xref> specifies the used HTTP URIs. This document introduces the HTTP path '/.w lt"/> specifies the used HTTP URIs. This document introduces the HTTP path '/.we
ell-known/cmp' and extends the URIs.</t> ll-known/cmp' and extends the URIs.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the section with the followin g text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the section with the followin g text:</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">3.6. HTTP Request-URI</t> <t keepWithNext="true">3.6. HTTP Request-URI</t>
<t>Each CMP server on a PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS t <t>Each CMP server on a PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS t
ransfer MUST support the use of the path prefix '/.well-known/' as defined in <x ransfer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support the use of the path prefix '/.well-known/' a
ref target="RFC8615" format="default">RFC&nbsp;8615</xref> and the registered na s defined in <xref target="RFC8615" format="default"/> and the registered name '
me 'cmp' to ease interworking in a multi-vendor environment.</t> cmp' to ease interworking in a multi-vendor environment.</t>
<t keepWithNext="true">The CMP client needs to be configured with suffic <t keepWithNext="true">The CMP client needs to be configured with suffic
ient information to form the CMP server URI. This is at least the authority por ient information to form the CMP server URI. This is at least the authority por
tion of the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operation path segment tion of the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operation path segment
of the PKI management entity. Additionally, OPTIONAL path segments MAY be added of the PKI management entity. Additionally, <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> path segment
after the registered application name as part of the full operation path to prov s <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be added after the registered application name as part of t
ide further distinction. The path segment 'p' followed by an arbitraryLabel &lt he full operation path to provide further distinction. The path segment 'p' fol
;name&gt; could for example support the differentiation of specific CAs or certi lowed by an arbitraryLabel &lt;name&gt; could, for example, support the differen
ficate profiles. Further path segments, e.g., as specified in the <xref target=" tiation of specific CAs or certificate profiles. Further path segments, e.g., as
I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile" format="default">Lightweight CMP Profile specified in the <xref target="RFC9483" format="default">Lightweight CMP Profil
</xref>, could indicate PKI management operations using an operationLabel &lt;op e</xref>, could indicate PKI management operations using an operationLabel &lt;o
eration&gt;. A valid full CMP URI can look like this:</t> peration&gt;. A valid, full CMP URI can look like this:</t>
<ul empty="true" spacing="compact"> <ul empty="true" spacing="compact">
<li>http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp</li> <li>http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp</li>
<li>http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/&lt;operation&gt;</li> <li>http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/&lt;operation&gt;</li>
<li>http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/p/&lt;name&gt;</li> <li>http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/p/&lt;name&gt;</li>
<li>http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/p/&lt;name&gt;/&lt;operatio n&gt;</li> <li>http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/p/&lt;name&gt;/&lt;operatio n&gt;</li>
</ul> </ul>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="IANA" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="IANA" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>IANA Considerations</name> <name>IANA Considerations</name>
<t>This document updates the ASN.1 modules of <xref target="RFC4210" fo <section anchor="IANA-ASN1" numbered="true" toc="default">
rmat="default">RFC&nbsp;4210 Appendix F</xref> and <xref target="RFC5912" format <name>Updates to the ASN.1 Modules in RFCs 4210 and 5912</name>
="default">RFC&nbsp;5912 Section 9</xref>. The OIDs 99 (id-mod-cmp2021-88) and <t>This document updates the ASN.1 modules of <xref target="RFC4210" se
100 (id-mod-cmp2021-02) were registered in the SMI Security for PKIX Module Iden ctionFormat="of" section="F" format="default"/> and <xref target="RFC5912" secti
tifier registry to identify the updated ASN.1 modules.</t> on="9" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/> as shown in Appendixes <xref target
<t>This document contains an update to the IANA Consideration sections of ="ASN.1_1988_Modules" format="counter"/> and <xref target="ASN.1_2002_Modules" f
<xref target="RFC4210" format="default"/> adding this content.</t> ormat="counter"/> of this document, respectively. The OIDs 99 (id-mod-cmp2021-88
<t>In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpo ) and 100 (id-mod-cmp2021-02) have been registered in the "SMI Security for PKIX
se Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numb Module Identifier" registry to identify the updated ASN.1 modules.</t>
ers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3) as defined in <xref target="R </section>
FC7299" format="default">RFC&nbsp;7299</xref> one addition has been performed.</ <section anchor="IANA-4210" numbered="true" toc="default">
t> <name>Updates to the IANA Considerations of RFC 4210</name>
<t keepWithNext="true">One new entry has been added:</t> <t>This document updates the IANA Consideration sections of <xref target="
RFC4210" format="default"/> by adding this content.</t>
<section anchor="IANA-EKU" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose Registry</name>
<t>IANA has registered the following new entry in the "SMI Security for
PKIX Extended Key Purpose" registry (see <eref
target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers" brackets="angle"/>, as def
ined in <xref target="RFC7299" format="default"/>:</t>
<table anchor="IANA_new_EKU" align="left"> <table anchor="IANA_new_EKU" align="left">
<name>Addition to the PKIX Extended Key Purpose Identifiers Reg istry</name> <name>Addition to the SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpos e</name>
<thead> <thead>
<tr> <tr>
<th align="left">Decimal</th> <th align="left">Decimal</th>
<th align="left">Description</th> <th align="left">Description</th>
<th align="left">References</th> <th align="left">References</th>
</tr> </tr>
</thead> </thead>
<tbody> <tbody>
<tr> <tr>
<td align="left">32</td> <td align="left">32</td>
<td align="left">id-kp-cmKGA</td> <td align="left">id-kp-cmKGA</td>
<td align="left">[RFCXXXX]</td> <td align="left">RFC 9480</td>
</tr> </tr>
</tbody> </tbody>
</table> </table>
<t>In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information Ty </section>
pes (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-num
bers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4) as defined in <xref target="RFC7299" for <section anchor="IANA-CMP-IT" numbered="true" toc="default">
mat="default">RFC&nbsp;7299</xref> seven additions have been performed.</t> <name>SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information Types</name>
<t keepWithNext="true">Seven new entries have been added:</t> <t>IANA has registered the following new entries in the "SMI Security fo
r PKIX CMP Information Types" registry (see <eref target="https://www.iana.org/a
ssignments/smi-numbers" brackets="angle"/>), as defined in <xref target="RFC7299
" format="default"/>:</t>
<table anchor="IANA_new_id-it" align="left"> <table anchor="IANA_new_id-it" align="left">
<name>Addition to the PKIX CMP Information Types Registry</name > <name>Additions to the PKIX CMP Information Types Registry</nam e>
<thead> <thead>
<tr> <tr>
<th align="left">Decimal</th> <th align="left">Decimal</th>
<th align="left">Description</th> <th align="left">Description</th>
<th align="left">References</th> <th align="left">References</th>
</tr> </tr>
</thead> </thead>
<tbody> <tbody>
<tr> <tr>
<td align="left">17</td> <td align="left">17</td>
<td align="left">id-it-caCerts</td> <td align="left">id-it-caCerts</td>
<td align="left">[RFCXXXX]</td> <td align="left">RFC 9480</td>
</tr> </tr>
<tr> <tr>
<td align="left">18</td> <td align="left">18</td>
<td align="left">id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate</td> <td align="left">id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate</td>
<td align="left">[RFCXXXX]</td> <td align="left">RFC 9480</td>
</tr> </tr>
<tr> <tr>
<td align="left">19</td> <td align="left">19</td>
<td align="left">id-it-certReqTemplate</td> <td align="left">id-it-certReqTemplate</td>
<td align="left">[RFCXXXX]</td> <td align="left">RFC 9480</td>
</tr> </tr>
<tr> <tr>
<td align="left">20</td> <td align="left">20</td>
<td align="left">id-it-rootCaCert</td> <td align="left">id-it-rootCaCert</td>
<td align="left">[RFCXXXX]</td> <td align="left">RFC 9480</td>
</tr> </tr>
<tr> <tr>
<td align="left">21</td> <td align="left">21</td>
<td align="left">id-it-certProfile</td> <td align="left">id-it-certProfile</td>
<td align="left">[RFCXXXX]</td> <td align="left">RFC 9480</td>
</tr> </tr>
<tr> <tr>
<td align="left">22</td> <td align="left">22</td>
<td align="left">id-it-crlStatusList</td> <td align="left">id-it-crlStatusList</td>
<td align="left">[RFCXXXX]</td> <td align="left">RFC 9480</td>
</tr> </tr>
<tr> <tr>
<td align="left">23</td> <td align="left">23</td>
<td align="left">id-it-crls</td> <td align="left">id-it-crls</td>
<td align="left">[RFCXXXX]</td> <td align="left">RFC 9480</td>
</tr> </tr>
</tbody> </tbody>
</table> </table>
<t>In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration </section>
Controls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/
smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1) as defined in <xref target="RFC <section anchor="IANA-CRMF" numbered="true" toc="default">
7299" format="default">RFC&nbsp;7299</xref> two additions have been performed.</ <name>SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration Controls</name>
t> <t>IANA has registered the following new entries in the "SMI Security fo
<t keepWithNext="true">Two new entries have been added:</t> r PKIX CRMF Registration Controls" registry (see <eref target="https://www.iana.
org/assignments/smi-numbers" brackets="angle"/>), as defined in <xref target="RF
C7299" format="default"/>:</t>
<table anchor="IANA_new_id-regCtrl" align="left"> <table anchor="IANA_new_id-regCtrl" align="left">
<name>Addition to the PKIX CRMF Registration Controls Registry< /name> <name>Addition to the PKIX CRMF Registration Controls Registry< /name>
<thead> <thead>
<tr> <tr>
<th align="left">Decimal</th> <th align="left">Decimal</th>
<th align="left">Description</th> <th align="left">Description</th>
<th align="left">References</th> <th align="left">References</th>
</tr> </tr>
</thead> </thead>
<tbody> <tbody>
<tr> <tr>
<td align="left">11</td> <td align="left">11</td>
<td align="left">id-regCtrl-algId</td> <td align="left">id-regCtrl-algId</td>
<td align="left">[RFCXXXX]</td> <td align="left">RFC 9480</td>
</tr> </tr>
<tr> <tr>
<td align="left">12</td> <td align="left">12</td>
<td align="left">id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen</td> <td align="left">id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen</td>
<td align="left">[RFCXXXX]</td> <td align="left">RFC 9480</td>
</tr> </tr>
</tbody> </tbody>
</table> </table>
<t>This document contains an update to the IANA Consideration sections of </section>
<xref target="RFC6712" format="default"/> adding this content.</t> </section>
<t>This document defines a new entry with the following content in the " <section anchor="IANA-6712" numbered="true" toc="default">
Well-Known URIs" registry (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/ <name>Updates to the IANA Considerations of RFC 6712</name>
) as defined in <xref target="RFC8615" format="default">RFC&nbsp;8615</xref>.</t <t>This document contains an update to the IANA Considerations sections of
> <xref target="RFC6712" format="default"/> by adding this content.</t>
<ul empty="true" spacing="compact"> <section anchor="IANA-URI" numbered="true" toc="default">
<li>URI Suffix: cmp</li> <name>Well-Known URIs</name>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li> <t>IANA has registered the following new entry in the "Well-Known URIs"
<li>References: [RFCXXXX] <xref target="I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap registry (see <eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris" br
-transport" format="default"/></li> ackets="angle"/>), as defined in <xref target="RFC8615" format="default"/>:</t>
<li>Related Information: CMP has a sub-registry at [https://www <dl newline="false" spacing="compact">
.iana.org/assignments/cmp/]</li> <dt>URI Suffix:</dt> <dd>cmp</dd>
</ul> <dt>Change Controller:</dt> <dd>IETF</dd>
<t>This document defines a new protocol registry group entitled "Certifi <dt>Reference:</dt> <dd>[RFC9480] <xref target="RFC9482" format
cate Management Protocol (CMP)" (at https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp/) with ="default"/></dd>
a new registry "CMP Well-Known URI Path Segments" containing three columns: Path <dt>Status:</dt> <dd>permanent</dd>
Segment, Description, and Reference. New items can be added using the Specifica <dt>Related Information:</dt> <dd>CMP has a registry at <eref t
tion Required <xref target="RFC8615" format="default">RFC&nbsp;8615</xref> proce arget="https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp" brackets="angle"/></dd>
ss. The initial contents of this registry is:</t> </dl>
<ul empty="true" spacing="compact"> </section>
<li>Path Segment: p</li> <section anchor="IANA-URI-CMP" numbered="true" toc="default">
<li>Description: Indicates that the next path segment specifies <name>Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Registry</name>
, e.g., a CA or certificate profile name</li> <t>This document defines a new protocol registry group entitled "Certifi
<li>References: [RFCXXXX] <xref target="I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap cate Management Protocol (CMP)" (at <eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignmen
-transport" format="default"/></li> ts/cmp" brackets="angle"/>) with a new "CMP Well-Known URI Path Segments" regist
</ul> ry containing three columns: Path Segment, Description, and Reference. New items
can be added using the Specification Required <xref target="RFC8615" format="de
fault"/> process. The initial entry of this registry is:</t>
<dl newline="false" spacing="compact">
<dt>Path Segment:</dt> <dd>p</dd>
<dt>Description:</dt> <dd>Indicates that the next path segment
specifies, e.g., a CA or certificate profile name</dd>
<dt>Reference:</dt> <dd>[RFC9480] <xref target="RFC9482" format
="default"/></dd>
</dl>
</section>
</section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="Security" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="Security" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Security Considerations</name> <name>Security Considerations</name>
<t>The security considerations of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default"> <t>The security considerations of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default"/
RFC&nbsp;4210</xref> are extended in <xref target="CMP-8.4" format="default"/> t > are extended in <xref target="CMP-8.4" format="default"/> to <xref target="CMP
o <xref target="CMP-8.6" format="default"/>. No security considerations updates -8.6" format="default"/>. No security considerations updates of <xref target="RF
of <xref target="RFC6712" format="default">RFC&nbsp;6712</xref> were required.</ C6712" format="default"/> were required.</t>
t>
</section>
<section anchor="Acknowledgements" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Acknowledgements</name>
<t>Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration o
n structuring and writing this document we got from <xref target="RFC6402" forma
t="default"/> which updates CMC. Special thank also goes to Russ Housley, Lijun
Liao, Martin Peylo, and Tomas Gustavsson for reviewing and providing valuable su
ggestions on improving this document.</t>
<t>We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable feedbac
k.</t>
</section> </section>
</middle> </middle>
<back> <back>
<!-- References split into informative and normative -->
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in the local
filing system or remote ones accessed by http (http://domain/dir/... ).-->
<displayreference target="I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis" to="PKIX-CMP"/>
<displayreference target="I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis" to="HTTP-CMP"/>
<references> <references>
<name>References</name> <name>References</name>
<references> <references>
<name>Normative References</name> <name>Normative References</name>
<!--?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RF <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.21
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<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/refe <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2
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<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2
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<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3
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<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5
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<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5
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<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5
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<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5
FC.5652.xml"/> 958.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6
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<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6
FC.6402.xml"/> 712.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8
FC.6712.xml"/> 174.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8
FC.8174.xml"/> 615.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8
FC.8615.xml"/> 933.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9
FC.8933.xml"/> 045.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R
FC.9045.xml"/> <reference anchor="RFC9481" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9481">
<xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/draft-ietf-la <front>
mps-cmp-algorithms.xml"/> <title>Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms</title>
<xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/draft-ietf-ac <author initials='H' surname='Brockhaus' fullname='Hendrik Brockhaus'>
e-cmpv2-coap-transport.xml"/> <organization />
</author>
<author initials='H' surname='Aschauer' fullname='Hans Aschauer'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='M' surname='Ounsworth' fullname='Mike Ounsworth'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='J' surname='Gray' fullname='John Gray'>
<organization />
</author>
<date year='2023' month='October'/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9481"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9481"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9482" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9482">
<front>
<title>
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) Transfer for the Certificate Management
Protocol
</title>
<author initials="M." surname="Sahni" fullname="Mohit Sahni" role="editor">
<organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization>
</author>
<author initials="S." surname="Tripathi" fullname="Saurabh Tripathi" role="edito
r">
<organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization>
</author>
<date month="October" year="2023"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9482"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9482"/>
</reference>
</references> </references>
<references> <references>
<name>Informative References</name> <name>Informative References</name>
<!--?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RF <xi:include
C.2119.xml"?--> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc4210b
<xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/draft-ietf is.xml"/>
-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/ref
<!-- A reference written by an organization not a person. --> erence.I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R
FC.2104.xml"/> <reference anchor="RFC9483" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9483">
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R <front>
FC.2202.xml"/> <title>Lightweight Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile</title>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R <author initials='H' surname='Brockhaus' fullname='Hendrik Brockhaus'>
FC.5912.xml"/> <organization />
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.R </author>
FC.7299.xml"/> <author initials='S' surname='Fries' fullname='Steffen Fries'>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxm <organization />
l-nist/reference.NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.xml"/> </author>
<reference anchor="IEEE.802.1AR_2018" target="https://ieeexplore.ieee <author initials='D' surname='von Oheimb' fullname='David von Oheimb'>
.org/document/8423794"> <organization />
<front> </author>
<title>IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area netw <date year='2023' month='October'/>
orks - Secure Device Identity</title> </front>
<author> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9483"/>
<organization>IEEE</organization> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9483"/>
</author> </reference>
<date day="2" month="August" year="2018"/>
</front> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2
<seriesInfo name="IEEE" value="802.1AR-2018"/> 104.xml"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2
</reference> 202.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5
912.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7
299.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml-nist/reference.N
IST.SP.800-90Ar1.xml"/>
<reference anchor="CVE-2008-0166" target="https://nvd.nist.gov/vu ln/detail/CVE-2008-0166"> <reference anchor="CVE-2008-0166" target="https://nvd.nist.gov/vu ln/detail/CVE-2008-0166">
<front> <front>
<title>National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2008 -0166</title> <title>National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2008 -0166</title>
<author> <author>
<organization>National Institute of Scien ce and Technology (NIST)</organization> <organization>National Institute of Scien ce and Technology (NIST)</organization>
</author> </author>
<date day="13" month="May" year="2008"/> <date month="May" year="2008"/>
</front> </front>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="MiningPsQs" target="https://www.usenix.org/con ference/usenixsecurity12/technical-sessions/presentation/heninger"> <reference anchor="MiningPsQs" target="https://www.usenix.org/con ference/usenixsecurity12/technical-sessions/presentation/heninger">
<front> <front>
<title>Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widesp read Weak Keys in Network Devices</title> <title>Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widesp read Weak Keys in Network Devices</title>
<author> <author>
<organization>Security'12: Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium</organization> <organization></organization>
</author> </author>
<author fullname="Nadia Heninger"> <author fullname="Nadia Heninger">
<organization>UC San Diego</organization> <organization>UC San Diego</organization>
</author> </author>
<author fullname="Zakir Durumeric"> <author fullname="Zakir Durumeric">
<organization>University of Michigan</org anization> <organization>University of Michigan</org anization>
</author> </author>
<author fullname="Eric Wustrow"> <author fullname="Eric Wustrow">
<organization>University of Michigan</org anization> <organization>University of Michigan</org anization>
</author> </author>
<author fullname="J. Alex Halderman"> <author fullname="J. Alex Halderman">
<organization>University of Michigan</org anization> <organization>University of Michigan</org anization>
</author> </author>
<date month="August" year="2012"/> <date month="August" year="2012"/>
</front> </front>
<refcontent>Security'12: Proceedings of the 21st USENIX c onference on Security symposium</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="ISO.20543-2019"> <reference anchor="ISO.20543-2019">
<front> <front>
<title>Information technology -- Security techniq ues -- Test and analysis methods for random bit generators within ISO/IEC 19790 and ISO/IEC 15408</title> <title>Information technology -- Security techniq ues -- Test and analysis methods for random bit generators within ISO/IEC 19790 and ISO/IEC 15408</title>
<seriesInfo name="ISO" value="Draft Standard 2054 3-2019"/>
<author> <author>
<organization>International Organization for Standardization (ISO)</organization> <organization>International Organization for Standardization (ISO)</organization>
</author> </author>
<date month="October" year="2019"/> <date month="October" year="2019"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="20543:2019"/>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="AIS31" target="https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedD ocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Zertifizierung/Interpretationen/AIS_31_Functionality_classe s_for_random_number_generators_e.pdf"> <reference anchor="AIS31" target="https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedD ocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Zertifizierung/Interpretationen/AIS_31_Functionality_classe s_for_random_number_generators_e.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>A proposal for: Functionality classes for <title>A proposal for: Functionality classes for random
random number generators, version 2.0</title> number generators - Version 2.0</title>
<author> <author initials="W" surname="Killmann" fullname="Wolfg
<organization>Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit i ang Killmann">
n der Informationstechnik (BSI)</organization> <organization>T-Systems GEI GmbH</organization>
<!-- <organization>Bundesamt für Sicherheit in </author>
der Informationstechnik (BSI)</organization> --> <author initials="W" surname="Schindler" fullname="Wern
<!-- <organization>Federal Office for Information Secu er Schindler">
rity (BSI)</organization> --> <organization>Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der Inform
</author> ationstechnik (BSI)</organization>
<author initials="W" surname="Killmann" fullname= </author>
"Wolfgang Killmann"> <date month="September" year="2011"/>
<organization>T-Systems GEI GmbH</organiz
ation>
</author>
<author initials="W" surname="Schindler" fullname
="Werner Schindler">
<organization>Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit i
n der Informationstechnik (BSI)</organization>
<!-- <organization>Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik (BSI)</organization> -->
<!-- <organization>Federal Office for Information Secu
rity (BSI)</organization> -->
</author>
<date day="18" month="09" year="2011"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="PKCS11" target="https://www.cryptsoft.com/pkcs
11doc/STANDARD/pkcs11v2-10.pdf">
<front>
<title>The Public-Key Cryptography Standards - Cr
yptographic Token Interface Standard. Version 2.10</title>
<author>
<organization>RSA Laboratories</organizat
ion>
</author>
<date month="12" year="1999"/>
</front> </front>
</reference> </reference>
</references> </references>
</references> </references>
<section anchor="ASN.1_Modules" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="ASN.1_Modules" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>ASN.1 Modules</name> <name>ASN.1 Modules</name>
<section anchor="ASN.1_1988_Modules" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="ASN.1_1988_Modules" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update to RFC4210 - 1988 ASN.1 Module</name> <name>Update to RFC 4210 - 1988 ASN.1 Module</name>
<t>This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for <xref target="RFC4 <t>This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for <xref target="RFC4
210" format="default"/>. This module replaces the module in Appendix F of that 210" format="default"/>. This module replaces the module in Appendix <xref targ
document. Although a 2002 ASN.1 module is provided, this 1988 ASN.1 module rema et="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="F"/> of that document. Although a 20
ins the normative module as per the policy of the PKIX working group.</t> 02 ASN.1 module is provided, this 1988 ASN.1 module remains the normative module
<sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[ , as per the policy of the PKIX Working Group.</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3) PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-88(99)} id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-88(99)}
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- -- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS IMPORTS
Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, Name, Time, Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, Name, Time,
AlgorithmIdentifier, id-kp AlgorithmIdentifier, id-kp
--, UTF8String -- -- if required; otherwise, comment out --, UTF8String -- -- if required; otherwise, comment out
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(18)} id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(18)}
-- The import of Name is added to define CertificationRequest -- The import of Name is added to define CertificationRequest
-- instead of importing it from PKCS#10 [RFC2986] -- instead of importing it from PKCS #10 [RFC2986].
DistributionPointName, GeneralNames, GeneralName, KeyIdentifier DistributionPointName, GeneralNames, GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(19)} id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(19)}
CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId, CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
CertReqMessages, Controls, AttributeTypeAndValue, id-regCtrl CertReqMessages, Controls, AttributeTypeAndValue, id-regCtrl
FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)} id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}
-- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
-- in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX]]. EncryptedValue does not need to -- in CMP Updates [RFC9480]. EncryptedValue does not need to
-- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here. -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here.
-- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in -- Also, see the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
-- Appendix C of this specification -- Appendix C of this specification.
EnvelopedData, SignedData, Attribute EnvelopedData, SignedData, Attribute
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1) FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) } smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
-- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to -- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
-- the updates made in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- the updates made in CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- The import of Attribute is added to define -- The import of Attribute is added to define
-- CertificationRequest instead of importing it from -- CertificationRequest instead of importing it from
-- PKCS#10 [RFC2986] -- PKCS #10 [RFC2986].
; ;
-- The rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and
-- constructs:
CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE {
x509v3PKCert Certificate x509v3PKCert Certificate
} }
-- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
-- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
-- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509 -- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
-- attribute certificates, card-verifiable
-- certificates, or other kinds of certificates) within this
-- Certificate Management Protocol, should a need ever arise to
-- support such generality. Those implementations that do not
-- foresee a need to ever support other certificate types MAY, if
-- they wish, comment out the above structure and "uncomment" the
-- following one prior to compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that
-- interoperability with implementations that don't do this will be
-- unaffected by this change.)
-- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate -- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate
PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE { PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader, header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody, body PKIBody,
protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL, protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL OPTIONAL
} }
skipping to change at line 1116 skipping to change at line 1147
PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2), pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
cmp2021(3) }, cmp2021(3) },
sender GeneralName, sender GeneralName,
-- identifies the sender -- identifies the sender
recipient GeneralName, recipient GeneralName,
-- identifies the intended recipient -- identifies the intended recipient
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
-- time of production of this message (used when sender -- time of production of this message (used when the sender
-- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e., -- believes that the transport will be "suitable", i.e.,
-- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt) -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits -- algorithm used for the calculation of protection bits
senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- to identify specific keys used for protection -- to identify specific keys used for protection
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in -- identifies the transaction, i.e., this will be the same in
-- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
-- messages -- messages
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
-- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
-- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
-- the intended recipient of this message -- the intended recipient of this message.
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
-- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
-- (this field is intended for human consumption) -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
-- this may be used to convey context-specific information -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
-- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption) -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
} }
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
-- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] -- text encoded as a UTF-8 string [RFC3629]
PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements
ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request
ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response
cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request
cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response
p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [RFC2986] p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [RFC2986]
popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response
kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request
skipping to change at line 1171 skipping to change at line 1202
ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response
ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann. ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann.
cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann. cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann.
rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann. rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann.
crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement
pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation
nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message
genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message
genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response
error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message
certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate confirm certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate Confirm
pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling request pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling Request
pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling response pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling Response
} }
PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING
ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE { ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader, header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody body PKIBody
} }
id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13} id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}
PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING, salt OCTET STRING,
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes -- Note: Implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this string to values appropriate for their environment -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks.
owf AlgorithmIdentifier, owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (OWF)
iterationCount INTEGER, iterationCount INTEGER,
-- number of times the OWF is applied -- number of times the OWF is applied
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes -- Note: Implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks.
mac AlgorithmIdentifier mac AlgorithmIdentifier
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC [RFC9481],
} -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) } -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30} id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30}
DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier, owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function -- AlgId for a One-Way Function
mac AlgorithmIdentifier mac AlgorithmIdentifier
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC [RFC9481],
} -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) } -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
PKIStatus ::= INTEGER { PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
accepted (0), accepted (0),
-- you got exactly what you asked for -- you got exactly what you asked for
grantedWithMods (1), grantedWithMods (1),
-- you got something like what you asked for; the -- you got something like what you asked for; the
-- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
rejection (2), rejection (2),
-- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
waiting (3), waiting (3),
-- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to -- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
-- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status -- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
-- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified -- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
skipping to change at line 1239 skipping to change at line 1270
-- notification that a revocation has occurred -- notification that a revocation has occurred
keyUpdateWarning (6) keyUpdateWarning (6)
-- update already done for the oldCertId specified in -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
-- CertReqMsg -- CertReqMsg
} }
PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING { PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
-- since we can fail in more than one way! -- since we can fail in more than one way!
-- More codes may be added in the future if/when required. -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
badAlg (0), badAlg (0),
-- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier -- unrecognized or unsupported algorithm identifier
badMessageCheck (1), badMessageCheck (1),
-- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify) -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
badRequest (2), badRequest (2),
-- transaction not permitted or supported -- transaction not permitted or supported
badTime (3), badTime (3),
-- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time, -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
-- as defined by local policy -- as defined by local policy
badCertId (4), badCertId (4),
-- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
badDataFormat (5), badDataFormat (5),
skipping to change at line 1262 skipping to change at line 1293
-- the authority indicated in the request is different from the -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
-- one creating the response token -- one creating the response token
incorrectData (7), incorrectData (7),
-- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services) -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
missingTimeStamp (8), missingTimeStamp (8),
-- when the timestamp is missing but should be there -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
-- (by policy) -- (by policy)
badPOP (9), badPOP (9),
-- the proof-of-possession failed -- the proof-of-possession failed
certRevoked (10), certRevoked (10),
-- the certificate has already been revoked -- the certificate has already been revoked
certConfirmed (11), certConfirmed (11),
-- the certificate has already been confirmed -- the certificate has already been confirmed
wrongIntegrity (12), wrongIntegrity (12),
-- not valid integrity, password based instead of signature or -- not valid integrity, based on the password instead of the
-- vice versa -- signature or vice versa
badRecipientNonce (13), badRecipientNonce (13),
-- not valid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value -- not valid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
timeNotAvailable (14), timeNotAvailable (14),
-- the TSA's time source is not available -- the time source of the Time Stamping Authority (TSA) is
-- not available
unacceptedPolicy (15), unacceptedPolicy (15),
-- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA. -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA
unacceptedExtension (16), unacceptedExtension (16),
-- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA. -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA
addInfoNotAvailable (17), addInfoNotAvailable (17),
-- the additional information requested could not be -- the additional information requested could not be
-- understood or is not available -- understood or is not available
badSenderNonce (18), badSenderNonce (18),
-- not valid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size -- not valid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
badCertTemplate (19), badCertTemplate (19),
-- not valid cert. template or missing mandatory information -- not valid cert. template or missing mandatory information
signerNotTrusted (20), signerNotTrusted (20),
-- signer of the message unknown or not trusted -- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
transactionIdInUse (21), transactionIdInUse (21),
-- the transaction identifier is already in use -- the transaction identifier is already in use
unsupportedVersion (22), unsupportedVersion (22),
-- the version of the message is not supported -- the version of the message is not supported
notAuthorized (23), notAuthorized (23),
-- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
-- request or perform the preceding action -- request or perform the preceding action
systemUnavail (24), systemUnavail (24),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
systemFailure (25), systemFailure (25),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system failure -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
duplicateCertReq (26) duplicateCertReq (26)
-- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate -- the certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
-- certificate already exists -- certificate already exists
} }
PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE { PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus, status PKIStatus,
statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL
} }
OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate
OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE { OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL, certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL,
hashVal BIT STRING hashVal BIT STRING
-- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the -- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
-- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID. -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
} }
POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
-- one Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages)
Challenge ::= SEQUENCE { Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, owf AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
-- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
-- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
-- Challenge is to be used). -- Challenge is to be used)
witness OCTET STRING, witness OCTET STRING,
-- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a -- the result of applying the One-Way Function (owf) to a
-- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. [Note that a different -- randomly generated INTEGER, A (Note that a different
-- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.] -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.)
challenge OCTET STRING challenge OCTET STRING
-- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert. -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
-- request is being made) of Rand. -- request is being made) of Rand
} }
-- Rand was added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
Rand ::= SEQUENCE { Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
-- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge -- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge
-- in POPODecKeyChallContent -- in POPODecKeyChallContent
int INTEGER, int INTEGER,
-- the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above) -- the randomly generated INTEGER A (above)
sender GeneralName sender GeneralName
-- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader) -- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
} }
POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
-- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The
-- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
-- corresponding Challenge. -- corresponding Challenge.
skipping to change at line 1373 skipping to change at line 1405
subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE { subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING },
attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute }, attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute },
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING signature BIT STRING
} }
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this response with corresponding request (a value -- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value
-- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
-- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr) -- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr)
status PKIStatusInfo, status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211] -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
} }
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL, privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- see [RFC4211] for comment on encoding -- See [RFC4211] for comments on encoding.
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change -- syntax without this change.
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL
} }
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate, certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change -- syntax without this change.
} }
KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatusInfo, status PKIStatusInfo,
newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL
} }
RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE { RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
certDetails CertTemplate, certDetails CertTemplate,
-- allows requester to specify as much as they can about -- allows the requester to specify as much as they can about
-- the cert. for which revocation is requested -- the cert. for which revocation is requested
-- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available) -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
crlEntryDetails Extensions OPTIONAL crlEntryDetails Extensions OPTIONAL
-- requested crlEntryExtensions -- requested crlEntryExtensions
} }
RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo, status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
-- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent -- in the same order as was sent in RevReqContent
revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId
OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL,
-- IDs for which revocation was requested -- IDs for which revocation was requested
-- (same order as status) -- (same order as status)
crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList
OPTIONAL OPTIONAL
-- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one) -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
} }
CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
skipping to change at line 1474 skipping to change at line 1506
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL, statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL
-- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
-- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier -- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm -- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm
} }
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
-- CertReqTemplateContent, id-regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, and -- CertReqTemplateContent, id-regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, and
-- id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen were added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE { CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
certTemplate CertTemplate, certTemplate CertTemplate,
-- prefilled certTemplate structure elements -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
-- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
-- be used. -- be used.
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL keySpec Controls OPTIONAL
-- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms. -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms
-- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue -- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
-- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211) -- as specified in CRMF [RFC4211]
} }
id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 } id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 }
AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue
-- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3 -- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3
-- public-key certificate -- public key certificate
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 } id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA -- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 } id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX) RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
-- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths -- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths
-- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in -- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in
-- CMP Updates [RFC9480]
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate, newWithNew CMPCertificate,
-- new root CA certificate -- new root CA certificate
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
-- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
-- signed with the old private root CA key -- signed with the old private root CA key
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
-- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key -- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
-- signed with the new private root CA key -- signed with the new private root CA key
skipping to change at line 1527 skipping to change at line 1559
CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE { CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
source CRLSource, source CRLSource,
thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL } thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL }
InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL
} }
-- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
-- to, the following (uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as
-- appropriate for a given environment): -- appropriate for a given environment):
-- --
-- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1} -- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
-- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2} -- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
-- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier -- AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3} -- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
-- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier -- AlgorithmIdentifier
skipping to change at line 1555 skipping to change at line 1587
-- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10} -- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
-- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11} -- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
-- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier -- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12} -- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
-- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey -- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey
-- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE -- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
-- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes -- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
-- - made in CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- - syntax without this change.
-- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13} -- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
-- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL -- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14} -- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime -- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15} -- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages -- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16} -- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String -- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
-- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17} -- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
-- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CMPCertificate -- CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18} -- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
-- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent -- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
-- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19} -- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
-- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent -- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
-- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20} -- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
-- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} -- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
-- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- UTF8String -- UTF8String
-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 22} -- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 22}
-- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CRLStatus -- CRLStatus
-- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 23} -- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 23}
-- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CertificateList -- CertificateList
-- - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- --
-- where -- where
-- --
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and -- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
-- --
-- --
-- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
-- Management Protocol request and response messages or general-
-- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
-- specific environments. -- specific environments.
GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content). -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
-- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
-- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above. -- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
-- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OIDs that it
-- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
-- indicates that the CA may send -- indicates that the CA may send
-- any/all information that it wishes. -- any/all information that it wishes.
GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- The receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
-- recognize. -- recognize.
ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE { ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo, pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL, errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-- implementation-specific error codes -- implementation-specific error codes
errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
-- implementation-specific error details -- implementation-specific error details
} }
skipping to change at line 1639 skipping to change at line 1671
certReqId INTEGER certReqId INTEGER
} }
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
} }
-- --
-- Extended key usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
-- operations, added due to the changes made in -- operations, added due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC, as defined in
-- [RFC6402] -- [RFC6402]
-- --
-- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 } -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 } -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 } id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
-- There is no 1988 ASN.1 module of PKCS #9 available to import the
-- syntax of the localKeyId attribute type and value from. Therefore, -- syntax of the localKeyId attribute type and value from. Therefore,
-- the syntax is added here as needed for the updates made in -- the syntax is added here as needed for the updates made in
-- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9} rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9}
pkcs-9-at-localKeyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 21} pkcs-9-at-localKeyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 21}
LocalKeyIdValue ::= OCTET STRING LocalKeyIdValue ::= OCTET STRING
END -- of CMP module END -- of CMP module
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="ASN.1_2002_Modules" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="ASN.1_2002_Modules" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Update to RFC5912 - 2002 ASN.1 Module</name> <name>Update to RFC 5912 - 2002 ASN.1 Module</name>
<t>This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for <xref target= <t>This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for <xref target=
"RFC5912" format="default"/>. This module replaces the module in Section 9 of < "RFC5912" format="default"/>. This module replaces the module in <xref target="
xref target="RFC5912" format="default"/>. The module contains those changes to RFC5912" section="9" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/>. The module contains
the normative ASN.1 module from <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC4210 those changes to the normative ASN.1 module from <xref target="RFC4210" section
Appendix F</xref> that were to update to 2002 ASN.1 standard done in <xref targe Format="of" section="F"/> that were to update to the 2002 ASN.1 standard done in
t="RFC5912" format="default"/> as well as changes made in this document.</t> <xref target="RFC5912" format="default"/>, as well as changes made in this docu
ment.</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
PKIXCMP-2021 PKIXCMP-2021
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-cmp2021-02(100) } id-mod-cmp2021-02(100) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
IMPORTS IMPORTS
AttributeSet{}, SingleAttribute{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE AttributeSet{}, SingleAttribute{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
skipping to change at line 1706 skipping to change at line 1738
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)} mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}
CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId, CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
CertReqMessages, Controls, RegControlSet, id-regCtrl CertReqMessages, Controls, RegControlSet, id-regCtrl
FROM PKIXCRMF-2009 FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) } id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) }
-- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
-- in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX]. EncryptedValue does not need to -- in CMP Updates [RFC9480]. EncryptedValue does not need to
-- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here. -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here.
-- See also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
-- Appendix C of this specification.
CertificationRequest CertificationRequest
FROM PKCS-10 FROM PKCS-10
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69)} mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69)}
-- (specified in [RFC2986] with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT
-- tags). Alternatively, implementers may directly include -- tags). Alternatively, implementers may directly include
-- the syntax of [RFC2986] in this module.
localKeyId localKeyId
FROM PKCS-9 FROM PKCS-9
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
modules(0) pkcs-9(1)} modules(0) pkcs-9(1)}
-- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in -- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in
-- CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
EnvelopedData, SignedData EnvelopedData, SignedData
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)} smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)}
-- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to -- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
-- the updates made in CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- the updates made in CMP Updates [RFC9480].
; ;
-- The rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and
-- constructs:
CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate, ... } CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate, ... }
-- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
-- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
-- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509 -- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
-- attribute certificates, card-verifiable
-- certificates, or other kinds of certificates) within this
-- Certificate Management Protocol, should a need ever arise to
-- support such generality. Those implementations that do not
-- foresee a need to ever support other certificate types MAY, if
-- they wish, comment out the above structure and "uncomment" the
-- following one prior to compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that
-- interoperability with implementations that don't do this will be
-- unaffected by this change.)
-- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate -- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate
PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE { PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader, header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody, body PKIBody,
protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL, protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL } OPTIONAL }
PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2), pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
cmp2012(3) }, cmp2012(3) },
sender GeneralName, sender GeneralName,
-- identifies the sender -- identifies the sender
recipient GeneralName, recipient GeneralName,
-- identifies the intended recipient -- identifies the intended recipient
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
-- time of production of this message (used when sender -- time of production of this message (used when the sender
-- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e., -- believes that the transport will be "suitable", i.e.,
-- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt) -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL,
-- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits -- algorithm used for the calculation of protection bits
senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- to identify specific keys used for protection -- to identify specific keys used for protection
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in -- identifies the transaction, i.e., this will be the same in
-- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
-- messages -- messages
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
-- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
-- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
-- the intended recipient of this message -- the intended recipient of this message.
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
-- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
-- (this field is intended for human consumption) -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
-- this may be used to convey context-specific information -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
-- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption) -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
} }
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
-- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] -- text encoded as a UTF-8 string [RFC3629]
PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements
ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request
ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response
cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request
cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response
p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [RFC2986] p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [RFC2986]
popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response
kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request
skipping to change at line 1827 skipping to change at line 1859
ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response
ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann. ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann.
cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann. cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann.
rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann. rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann.
crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement
pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation
nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message
genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message
genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response
error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message
certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate confirm certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate Confirm
pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling request pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling Request
pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling response pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling Response
} }
PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING
ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE { ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader, header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody } body PKIBody }
id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 } usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 }
PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING, salt OCTET STRING,
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes -- Note: Implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this string to values appropriate for their environment -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks.
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}, owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function -- AlgId for a One-Way Function
iterationCount INTEGER, iterationCount INTEGER,
-- number of times the OWF is applied -- number of times the OWF is applied
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes -- Note: Implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks.
mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}} mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC [RFC9481],
-- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
} }
id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 } usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 }
DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}, owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function -- AlgId for a One-Way Function
mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}} mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC [RFC9481],
-- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
} }
PKIStatus ::= INTEGER { PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
accepted (0), accepted (0),
-- you got exactly what you asked for -- you got exactly what you asked for
grantedWithMods (1), grantedWithMods (1),
-- you got something like what you asked for; the -- you got something like what you asked for; the
-- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
rejection (2), rejection (2),
skipping to change at line 1896 skipping to change at line 1928
-- notification that a revocation has occurred -- notification that a revocation has occurred
keyUpdateWarning (6) keyUpdateWarning (6)
-- update already done for the oldCertId specified in -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
-- CertReqMsg -- CertReqMsg
} }
PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING { PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
-- since we can fail in more than one way! -- since we can fail in more than one way!
-- More codes may be added in the future if/when required. -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
badAlg (0), badAlg (0),
-- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier -- unrecognized or unsupported algorithm identifier
badMessageCheck (1), badMessageCheck (1),
-- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify) -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
badRequest (2), badRequest (2),
-- transaction not permitted or supported -- transaction not permitted or supported
badTime (3), badTime (3),
-- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time, -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
-- as defined by local policy -- as defined by local policy
badCertId (4), badCertId (4),
-- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
badDataFormat (5), badDataFormat (5),
skipping to change at line 1923 skipping to change at line 1955
missingTimeStamp (8), missingTimeStamp (8),
-- when the timestamp is missing but should be there -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
-- (by policy) -- (by policy)
badPOP (9), badPOP (9),
-- the proof-of-possession failed -- the proof-of-possession failed
certRevoked (10), certRevoked (10),
-- the certificate has already been revoked -- the certificate has already been revoked
certConfirmed (11), certConfirmed (11),
-- the certificate has already been confirmed -- the certificate has already been confirmed
wrongIntegrity (12), wrongIntegrity (12),
-- not valid integrity, password based instead of signature or -- not valid integrity, based on the password instead of the
-- vice versa -- signature or vice versa
badRecipientNonce (13), badRecipientNonce (13),
-- not valid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value -- not valid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
timeNotAvailable (14), timeNotAvailable (14),
-- the TSA's time source is not available -- the TSA's time source is not available
unacceptedPolicy (15), unacceptedPolicy (15),
-- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA
unacceptedExtension (16), unacceptedExtension (16),
-- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA
addInfoNotAvailable (17), addInfoNotAvailable (17),
-- the additional information requested could not be -- the additional information requested could not be
skipping to change at line 1954 skipping to change at line 1986
unsupportedVersion (22), unsupportedVersion (22),
-- the version of the message is not supported -- the version of the message is not supported
notAuthorized (23), notAuthorized (23),
-- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
-- request or perform the preceding action -- request or perform the preceding action
systemUnavail (24), systemUnavail (24),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
systemFailure (25), systemFailure (25),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system failure -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
duplicateCertReq (26) duplicateCertReq (26)
-- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate -- the certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
-- certificate already exists -- certificate already exists
} }
PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE { PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus, status PKIStatus,
statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL } failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL }
OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate
skipping to change at line 1976 skipping to change at line 2008
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL,
certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL, certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL,
hashVal BIT STRING hashVal BIT STRING
-- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the -- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
-- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID. -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
} }
POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
-- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages)
Challenge ::= SEQUENCE { Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL,
-- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
-- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
-- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
-- Challenge is to be used). -- Challenge is to be used)
witness OCTET STRING, witness OCTET STRING,
-- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a -- the result of applying the One-Way Function (owf) to a
-- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. [Note that a different -- randomly generated INTEGER, A (Note that a different
-- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.] -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.)
challenge OCTET STRING challenge OCTET STRING
-- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert. -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
-- request is being made) of Rand. -- request is being made) of Rand
} }
-- Rand was added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
Rand ::= SEQUENCE { Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
-- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge -- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge
-- in POPODecKeyChallContent -- in POPODecKeyChallContent
int INTEGER, int INTEGER,
-- the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above) -- the randomly generated INTEGER A (above)
sender GeneralName sender GeneralName
-- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader) -- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
} }
POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
-- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The
-- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
-- corresponding Challenge. -- corresponding Challenge.
skipping to change at line 2031 skipping to change at line 2063
status PKIStatusInfo, status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211] -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
} }
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL, privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- see [RFC4211] for comment on encoding -- See [RFC4211] for comments on encoding.
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change -- syntax without this change.
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL } publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL }
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate, certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFCXXXX] -- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change -- syntax without this change.
} }
KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatusInfo, status PKIStatusInfo,
newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL } CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL }
RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE { RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
certDetails CertTemplate, certDetails CertTemplate,
-- allows requester to specify as much as they can about -- allows the requester to specify as much as they can about
-- the cert. for which revocation is requested -- the cert. for which revocation is requested
-- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available) -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
crlEntryDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL crlEntryDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL
-- requested crlEntryExtensions -- requested crlEntryExtensions
} }
RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo, status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
-- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent -- in the same order as was sent in RevReqContent
revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL, revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL,
-- IDs for which revocation was requested -- IDs for which revocation was requested
-- (same order as status) -- (same order as status)
crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL
-- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one) -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
} }
CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
skipping to change at line 2104 skipping to change at line 2136
CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
-- CertReqTemplateContent, AttributeTypeAndValue, -- CertReqTemplateContent, AttributeTypeAndValue,
-- ExpandedRegControlSet, id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate, -- ExpandedRegControlSet, id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate,
-- AltCertTemplate, regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, AlgIdCtrl, -- AltCertTemplate, regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, AlgIdCtrl,
-- regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, and RsaKeyLenCtrl -- regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, and RsaKeyLenCtrl
-- were added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE { CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
certTemplate CertTemplate, certTemplate CertTemplate,
-- prefilled certTemplate structure elements -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
-- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
-- be used. -- be used.
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL keySpec Controls OPTIONAL
-- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms. -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms
-- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue -- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
-- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211) -- as specified in CRMF [RFC4211]
} }
AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SingleAttribute{{ ... }} AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SingleAttribute{{ ... }}
ExpandedRegControlSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { RegControlSet | ExpandedRegControlSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { RegControlSet |
regCtrl-altCertTemplate | regCtrl-algId | regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, ... } regCtrl-altCertTemplate | regCtrl-algId | regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, ... }
regCtrl-altCertTemplate ATTRIBUTE ::= regCtrl-altCertTemplate ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE AltCertTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate } { TYPE AltCertTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate }
id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 } id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 }
AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue
-- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3 -- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3
-- public-key certificate -- public key certificate
regCtrl-algId ATTRIBUTE ::= regCtrl-algId ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE AlgIdCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-algId } { TYPE AlgIdCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-algId }
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 } id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA -- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA
regCtrl-rsaKeyLen ATTRIBUTE ::= regCtrl-rsaKeyLen ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE RsaKeyLenCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen } { TYPE RsaKeyLenCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen }
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 } id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX) RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
-- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths -- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths
-- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in -- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in
-- CMP Updates [RFC9480]
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate, newWithNew CMPCertificate,
-- new root CA certificate -- new root CA certificate
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
-- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
-- signed with the old private root CA key -- signed with the old private root CA key
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
-- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key -- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
-- signed with the new private root CA key -- signed with the new private root CA key
skipping to change at line 2208 skipping to change at line 2240
-- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10} -- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
-- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11} -- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
-- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}} -- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12} -- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
-- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey -- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey
-- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE -- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
-- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes -- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
-- - made in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to -- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to
-- - the syntax without this change -- - the syntax without this change
-- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13} -- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
-- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL -- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14} -- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime -- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15} -- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages -- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16} -- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String -- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
-- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17} -- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
-- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CMPCertificate -- CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18} -- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
-- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent -- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
-- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19} -- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
-- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent -- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
-- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20} -- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
-- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} -- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
-- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- UTF8String -- UTF8String
-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 22} -- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 22}
-- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CRLStatus -- CRLStatus
-- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 23} -- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 23}
-- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CertificateList -- CertificateList
-- - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- --
-- where -- where
-- --
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and -- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
-- --
-- --
-- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
-- Management Protocol request and response messages or general-
-- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
-- specific environments. -- specific environments.
GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content). -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
-- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
-- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above. -- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
-- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OIDs that it
-- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set -- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
-- indicates that the CA may send -- indicates that the CA may send
-- any/all information that it wishes. -- any/all information that it wishes.
GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- The receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
-- recognize. -- recognize.
ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE { ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo, pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL, errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-- implementation-specific error codes -- implementation-specific error codes
errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
-- implementation-specific error details -- implementation-specific error details
} }
skipping to change at line 2305 skipping to change at line 2337
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER } certReqId INTEGER }
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL } reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }
-- --
-- Extended key usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
-- operations, added due to the changes made in -- operations, added due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC, as defined in
-- [RFC6402] -- [RFC6402]
-- --
-- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 } -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 } -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 } id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
END END
]]></sourcecode> ]]></sourcecode>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="History" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="Acknowledgements" numbered="false" toc="default">
<name>History of Changes</name> <name>Acknowledgements</name>
<t>[RFC Editor: This appendix must be deleted in the final version of the <t>Special thanks goes to <contact fullname="Jim Schaad"/> for his guidanc
document.]</t> e and the inspiration to structure and write this document like <xref target="RF
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 22 -&gt; 23:</t> C6402" format="default"/>, which updates CMC. Special thanks also goes to <conta
<ul spacing="compact"> ct fullname="Russ Housley"/>, <contact fullname="Lijun Liao"/>, <contact fullnam
<li>Addressed comments from IESG discussion (see thread "Francesc e="Martin Peylo"/>, and <contact fullname="Tomas Gustavsson"/> for reviewing and
a Palombini's No Objection on draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-22: (with COMMENT)")< providing valuable suggestions on improving this document.</t>
/li> <t>We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable feedbac
<li>Addressed comment from Carl (see thread "Paul Wouters' Discus k.</t>
s on draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-21: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)")</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 21 -&gt; 22:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Addressed comments from IESG discussion (see thread " Paul Wo
uters' Discuss on draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-21: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)")<
/li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 20 -&gt; 21:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Extended Section 1 based on feedback from the IESG telechat</
li>
<li>Removed a redundant paragraph from the Abstract</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 19 -&gt; 20:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Addressed comments reported after GEN AD review</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 18 -&gt; 19:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Deleted the Comments on IANA ToDos and changed the decimals T
BD1 -> 22 and TBD2 -> 23</li>
<li>Updated Section 3.4 regarding ToDos updating the well-known U
RI registration</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 17 -&gt; 18:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Addressed comments from AD Evaluation (see thread "AD Review
of draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-17")</li>
<li>Added Section 2.8 to clarify on the usage of GeneralizedTime
(see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates: fractional seconds")</li>
<li>Updated Section 3.4 introducing the path segment 'p' to indic
ate the following arbitrary label according to the discussion during IETF 113 (s
ee thread "/.well-known/brski reference to brski-registry")</li>
<li>Capitalized all headlines</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 16 -&gt; 17:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Removed the pre-RFC5378 work disclaimer after the RFC 4210 au
thors granted BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust</li>
<li>Removed note on usage of language tags in UTF8String due to r
eference to references to outdated/historic RFCs</li>
<li>Resolved some nits reported by I-D nit checker tool</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 15 -&gt; 16:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Updated IPR disclaimer</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 14 -&gt; 15:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Updated Section 2.16 clarifying the usage of CRLSource (see thread "
CRL update retrieval - WG Last Call for draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-14 and draf
t-ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile-08")</li>
<li>Updated Section 2.22 adding further references regarding random numb
er generation (see thread "CMP draft WGLC: measuring entropy, CA certificates")<
/li>
<li>Fixed some nits</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 13 -&gt; 14:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Extended id-it-caCerts support message to allow transporting to-be-t
rusted root CA certificates; added respective security consideration (see thread
"Generalizing the CMP "Get CA certificates" use case")</li>
<li>Rolled back changes made in previous version regarding root CA updat
e to avoid registration of new OIDs. Yet we sticked to using id-it-rootCaCert in
the genm body instead its headers' generalInfo field and removed the ToDos and
TBDs on re-arranging id-it OIDs (see thread "Allocation of OIDs for CRL update r
etrieval (draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-13)")</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 12 -&gt; 13:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Added John Gray to the list of authors due to fruitful discussion an
d important proposals</li>
<li>Fixed errata no. 2615, 2616, 3949, 4078, and 5201 on RFC 4210</li>
<li>Added reference on RFC 8933 regarding CMS signedAttrs to Section 2.7
</li>
<li>Updated Section 2.9 and the ASN.1 modules moving the position of the
hashAlg field (see thread "[CMP Updates] position of hashAlg in certStatus")</l
i>
<li>Changed "rootCaCert" from generalInfo to genm body and generalized t
o "oldTrustAnchor", renaming "rootCaKeyUpdate" to "trustAnchorUpdate" in Section
s 2.14, A.1, and A.2, removing former Section 2.4</li>
<li>Added genm use case "CRL update retrieval" in Section 2.16, A.1, and
A.2. (see thread "[CMP Updates] Requesting a current CRL")</li>
<li>Updated Section 2.18 and 2.17 to support polling for all kinds of CM
P request messages initiated by an error message with status "waiting" as initia
lly discussed at IETF 111</li>
<li>Updated Sections 2.19 and 2.20 regarding version handling</li>
<li>Added further OIDs and a TBD regarding reordering of the OIDs</li>
<li>Added Sections 2.21 to 2.23 with new security considerations and upd
ated Section 5 accordingly</li>
<li>Added a ToDo regarding OID registration, renaming, and re-ordering</
li>
<li>Added Section 3.1 updating the introduction of RFC 6712</li>
<li>Fixed some nits in the ASN.1 modules (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-c
mp-updates-12: Comments on A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module" and "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-upd
ates-12: Comments on A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module")</li>
<li>Replaced the term "transport" by "transfer" where appropriate to pre
vent confusion</li>
<li>Minor editorial changes</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 11 -&gt; 12:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Extended Section 2.5 and the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A to allow a
sequence of certificate profiles in CertProfileValue (see thread "id-it-CertProf
ile in draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates")</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 10 -&gt; 11:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Add Section 2.10 to add an additional hashAlg field to the CertStatu
s type to support certificates signed with a signature algorithm not explicitly
indicating a hash algorithm in the AlgorithmIdentifier (see thread "Hash algorit
hm to us for calculating certHash")</li>
<li>Added newly registered OIDs and temporarily registered URI suffix</l
i>
<li>Exchanged the import of CertificationRequest from RFC 2986 to the de
finition from RFC 6402 Appendix A.1 (see thread "CMP Update of CertificationRequ
est")</li>
<li>Corrected the definition of LocalKeyIdValue in Appendix A.1</li>
<li>Updated new RFC numbers for draft-lamps-crmf-update-algs</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 9 -&gt; 10:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Added 1988 ASN.1 syntax for localKeyId attribute to Appendix A.1</li
>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 08 -&gt; 09:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Deleted specific definition of CMP CA and CMP RA in Section 2.2 and
only reference RFC 6402 for definition of id-kp-cmcCA and id-kp-cmcRA to resolve
the ToDo below based on feedback of Tomas Gustavsson</li>
<li>Added Section 2.4. and 2.5 to define id-it-rootCaCert and id-it-cert
Profile to be used in Section 2.14 and 2.15</li>
<li>Added reference to CMP Algorithms in Section 2.8</li>
<li>Extended Section 2.14 to explicitly indicate the root CA an update i
s requested for by using id-it-rootCaCert and changing the ASN.1 syntax to requi
re providing the newWithOld certificate in the response message</li>
<li>Extended Section 2.15 to explicitly indicate the certificate request
template by using id-it-certProfile and on further details of the newly introdu
ced controls</li>
<li>Deleted the table on id-kp-cmcCA and id-kp-cmcRA and adding id-it-ro
otCaCert and id-it-certProfile in Section 2.19</li>
<li>Adding the definition of id-it-rootCaCert and id-it-certProfile in b
oth ASN.1 modules in Appendix A</li>
<li>Minor editorial changes reflecting the above changes</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 07 -&gt; 08:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Added a ToDo to Section 2.2 to reflect a current discussion on the n
eed of an additional CMP-CA role and EKU and differentiation from CMP-RA</li>
<li>Added ToDos to Section 2.12 and 2.13</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 06 -&gt; 07:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Added David von Oheimb as co-author</li>
<li>Changed to XML V3</li>
<li>Added Section 2.3 to enable a CMP protocol version number 3 in the P
KIHeader for cases where EnvelopedData is to be used (see thread "Mail regarding
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates").</li>
<li>Added Section 2.4 to refer to draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs for
the update of id-PasswordBasedMac for PKI message protection using passwords or
shared secrets.</li>
<li>Updated Section 2.6 to introduce the protocol version number 3 to pr
operly indicate support of EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue in case a tra
nsaction requires use of EnvelopedData (see thread "Mail regarding draft-ietf-la
mps-cmp-updates").</li>
<li>Update Section 2.14 to make the minimal changes to the respective se
ction in CMP more explicit.</li>
<li>Added Sections 2.15 and 2.16 to address the new cmp2021 protocol ver
sion in Section 7 Version Negotiation.</li>
<li>Updated Section 2.17 to add new OIDs for id-regCtrl-algId and id-reg
Ctrl-rsaKeyLen for registration at IANA.</li>
<li>Added Section 2.20 to update the general rules of interpretation in
Appendix D.1 regarding the new cmp2021 version.</li>
<li>Added Section 2.21 to update the Algorithm Use Profile in Appendix D
.2 with the reference to the new CMP Algorithms document as decided at IETF 108.
</li>
<li>Updates Section 3.1 to delete the description of a discovery mechani
sm as decided at IETF 108.</li>
<li>Various changes and corrections in wording.</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 05 -&gt; 06:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Added the update of Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP A
lgorithms document as decided in IETF 108</li>
<li>Updated the IANA considerations to register new OIDs for id-regCtrl-
algId and d-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen.</li>
<li>Minor changes and corrections</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 04 -&gt; 05:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Added <xref target="CMP-5.3.19.2" format="default"/> and <xref targe
t="CMP-5.3.19.3" format="default"/> to clarify the usage of these general messag
es types with EC curves (see thread "AlgorithmIdentifier parameters NULL value -
Re: InfoTypeAndValue in CMP headers")</li>
<li>Split former section 2.7 on adding 'CA Certificates', 'Root CA Certi
ficates Update', and 'Certificate Request Template' in three separate sections f
or easier readability</li>
<li>Changed in <xref target="CMP-5.3.19.15" format="default"/> the ASN.1
syntax of CertReqTemplateValue from using rsaKeyLen to usage of controls as spe
cified in <xref target="RFC4211" format="default">CRMF Section 6</xref> (see thr
ead "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen")</li>
<li>Updated the IANA considerations in <xref target="IANA" format="defau
lt"/> to introduce new OID for id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen (see t
hread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen")</li>
<li>Updated the IANA Considerations in and the Appendixes to introduce n
ew OID for the updates ASN.1 modules (see thread "I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-c
mp-updates-04.txt")</li>
<li>Removed EncryptedValue from and added Controls to the list of types
imported from <xref target="RFC4211" format="default">CRMF</xref> in ASN.1 modul
es (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")</li>
<li>Moved declaration of Rand out of the comment in ASN.1 modules (see t
hread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")</li>
<li>Minor changes and corrections</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 03 -&gt; 04:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Added Section 2.7 to introduce three new id-it IDs for uses in gener
al messages as discussed (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates add section t
o introduce id-it-caCerts, id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate")</l
i>
<li>Added the new id-it IDs and the /.well-known/cmp to the IANA Conside
rations of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default"/> in Section 2.9</li>
<li>Updated the IANA Considerations of <xref target="RFC4210" format="de
fault"/> in <xref target="CMP-B" format="default"/></li>
<li>Some changes in wording on <xref target="Trans-Updates" format="defa
ult"/> due to review comments from Martin Peylo</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 02 -&gt; 03:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will be
set up as decided in IETF 108</li>
<li>Updated section on Encrypted Values in <xref target="CMP-5.2.2" form
at="default"/> to add the AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly g
enerated private key as decided in IETF 108</li>
<li>Updated the IANA Considerations of <xref target="RFC4210" format="de
fault"/> in <xref target="CMP-B" format="default"/></li>
<li>Added the pre-registered OID in <xref target="CMP-B" format="default
"/> and the ASN.1 module</li>
<li>Added <xref target="Trans-Updates" format="default"/> to document th
e changes to <xref target="RFC6712" format="default">RFC&nbsp;6712</xref> regard
ing URI discovery and using the path-prefix of '/.well-known/' as discussed in I
ETF 108</li>
<li>Updated the IANA Considerations section</li>
<li>Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update Appen
dix F of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default"/> and a complete updated ASN.1
module in 2002 syntax to update Section 9 of <xref target="RFC5912" format="defa
ult"/></li>
<li>Minor changes in wording</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 01 -&gt; 02:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Updated section on EKU OIDs in <xref target="CMP-4.5" format="defaul
t"/> as decided in IETF 107</li>
<li>Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key manageme
nt technique in <xref target="CMP-5.2.2" format="default"/> as discussed with Ru
ss and Jim on the mailing list</li>
<li>Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the revocati
on passphrase in <xref target="CMP-B" format="default"/></li>
<li>Moved the change history to the Appendix</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 00 -&gt; 01:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Minor changes in wording</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -&gt; dra
ft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-00:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Changes required to reflect WG adoption</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 02 -&gt; 03:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Added some clarification in <xref target="CMP-1.1" format="default"/
></li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 01 -&gt; 02:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Added clarification to section on multiple protection</li>
<li>Added clarification on new EKUs after some exchange with Tomas Gusta
vsson</li>
<li>Reused OIDs from <xref target="RFC6402" format="default">RFC&nbsp;64
02</xref> as suggested by Sean Turner at IETF 106</li>
<li>Added clarification on the field containing the key identifier for a
revocation passphrase</li>
<li>Minor changes in wording</li>
</ul>
<t keepWithNext="true">From version 00 -&gt; 01:</t>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Added a section describing the new extended key usages</li>
<li>Completed the section on changes to the specification of encrypted v
alues</li>
<li>Added a section on clarification to Appendix D.4</li>
<li>Minor generalization in <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC&
nbsp;4210</xref> Sections 5.1.3.4 and 5.3.22</li>
<li>Minor changes in wording</li>
</ul>
</section> </section>
</back> </back>
</rfc> </rfc>
 End of changes. 272 change blocks. 
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