LAMPS Working Group
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H. Brockhaus, Ed.
Internet-Draft Brockhaus
Request for Comments: 9481 H. Aschauer
Updates: 4210 (if approved) Siemens
Intended status:
Category: Standards Track M. Ounsworth
Expires: 4 December 2022
ISSN: 2070-1721 J. Gray
Entrust
2 June 2022
October 2023
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-15
Abstract
This document describes the conventions for using several
cryptographic algorithms with the Certificate Management Protocol
(CMP). CMP is used to enroll and further manage the lifecycle of
X.509 certificates. This document also updates the algorithm use
profile from RFC 4210 Appendix D.2. D.2 of RFC 4210.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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(IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for a maximum publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 December 2022.
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9481.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Message Digest Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. SHA2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. SHAKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. ECDSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. EdDSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Key Management Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Key Agreement Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.1. Diffie-Hellman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.2. ECDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Key Transport Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2.1. RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Symmetric Key-Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3.1. AES Key Wrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4. Key Derivation Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4.1. PBKDF2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Content Encryption Content-Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1. AES-CBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Message Authentication Code Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. Password-Based MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1.1. PasswordBasedMac . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1.2. PBMAC1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2. Symmetric Key-Based MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2.1. SHA2-Based HMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2.2. AES-GMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2.3. SHAKE-Based KMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Algorithm Use Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. Algorithm Profile for RFC 4210 PKI Management Message Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 in
RFC 4210
7.2. Algorithm Profile for Lightweight CMP Profile . . . . . . 22
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
11. References
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
12.
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Appendix A. History of Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. Introduction
RFC 4210
Appendix D.2 of [RFC4210] contains a set of algorithms, algorithms that is
mandatory to be supported by implementations conforming implementations. to [RFC4210].
These algorithms were appropriate at the time CMP was released, but
as cryptographic algorithms weaken over time, some of them should not no
longer be
used anymore. used. In general, new attacks are emerging due to research
cryptoanalysis
in cryptanalysis or an increase in computing power. New algorithms
were introduced that are more resistant to today's attacks.
This document lists current cryptographic algorithms usable that can be used
with CMP to offer an easier way maintaining to maintain the list of suitable
algorithms over time.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
In the following sections sections, ASN.1 values and types are used to
indicate where algorithm identifier and output values are provided.
These ASN.1 values and types are defined in CMP [RFC4210], CRMF
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) [RFC4211], CMP Updates [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-updates], or CMS
[RFC9480], and Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652].
2. Message Digest Algorithms
This section provides references to object identifiers and
conventions to be employed by CMP implementations that support SHA2
or SHAKE message digest algorithms.
Digest algorithm identifiers are located in: in the:
* hashAlg field of OOBCertHash and CertStatus CertStatus,
* owf field of Challenge, PBMParameter, and DHBMParameter DHBMParameter,
* digestAlgorithms field of SignedData SignedData, and
* digestAlgorithm field of SignerInfo SignerInfo.
Digest values are located in: in the:
* hashVal field of OOBCertHash OOBCertHash,
* certHash field of CertStatus CertStatus, and
* witness field of Challenge Challenge.
In addition, digest values are input to signature algorithms.
2.1. SHA2
The SHA2 algorithm family is defined in FIPS Pub 180-4
[NIST.FIPS.180-4].
The message digest algorithms SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
are identified by the following OIDs:
id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4)
hashalgs(2) 4 }
id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4)
hashalgs(2) 1 }
id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4)
hashalgs(2) 2 }
id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4)
hashalgs(2) 3 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 5754 Section 2 of
[RFC5754].
2.2. SHAKE
The SHA-3 family of hash functions is defined in FIPS Pub 202
[NIST.FIPS.202] and includes consists of the fixed output length variants
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512, as well as the
extendable-output functions (SHAKEs) (XOFs) SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. Currently,
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are the only members of the SHA3-family which that
are specified for use in X.509 certificates [RFC8692] and CMS
[RFC8702] as one-way hash function functions for use with RSASSA-PSS and
ECDSA.
SHAKE is an extendable-output function function, and FIPS Pub 202
[NIST.FIPS.202] prohibits using SHAKE as a general-purpose hash
function. When SHAKE is used in CMP as a message digest algorithm,
the output length MUST be 256 bits for SHAKE128 and 512 bits for
SHAKE256.
The message digest algorithms SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are identified by
the following OIDs:
id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashalgs(2) 11 }
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashalgs(2) 12 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 8702 Section 3.1 of
[RFC8702].
3. Signature Algorithms
This section provides references to object identifiers and
conventions to be employed by CMP implementations that support
signature algorithms like RSA, ECDSA, or EdDSA signature algorithms. EdDSA.
The signature algorithm is referred to as MSG_SIG_ALG in Section 7.2,
RFC 4210 Appendix Appendices D
and E of [RFC4210], and in the Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. [RFC9483], and in
Section 7.2.
Signature algorithm identifiers are located in: in the:
* protectionAlg field of PKIHeader PKIHeader,
* algorithmIdentifier field of POPOSigningKey POPOSigningKey, and
* signatureAlgorithm field of CertificationRequest,
SignKeyPairTypes, and SignerInfo
Signature values are located in: in the:
* protection field of PKIMessage PKIMessage,
* signature field of POPOSigningKey POPOSigningKey, and
* signature field of CertificationRequest and SignerInfo SignerInfo.
3.1. RSA
The RSA (RSASSA-PSS and PKCS#1 PKCS #1 version 1.5) signature algorithm is
defined in RFC 8017 [RFC8017].
The algorithm identifier for RSASAA-PSS signatures used with SHA2
message digest algorithms is identified by the following OID:
id-RSASSA-PSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 10 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 4056 [RFC4056].
The signature algorithm RSASSA-PSS used with SHAKE message digest
algorithms are is identified by the following OIDs:
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 30 }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 31 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 8702 Section 3.2.1
of [RFC8702].
The signature algorithm PKCS#1 PKCS #1 version 1.5 used with SHA2 message
digest algorithms is identified by the following OIDs:
sha224WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 14 }
sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 11 }
sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 12 }
sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 13 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 5754 Section 3.2 of
[RFC5754].
3.2. ECDSA
The ECDSA signature algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 186-4
[NIST.FIPS.186-4]. 186-5
[NIST.FIPS.186-5].
The signature algorithm ECDSA used with SHA2 message digest
algorithms is identified by the following OIDs:
ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }
ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }
ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }
As specified in RFC 5480 [RFC5480] [RFC5480], the NIST-recommended SECP curves are identified
by the following OIDs:
secp192r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 1 }
secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 }
secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 7 }
secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 }
secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 5754 Section 3.3 of
[RFC5754].
The signature algorithm ECDSA used with SHAKE message digest
algorithms are is identified by the following OIDs:
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 32 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 33 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 8702 Section 3.2.2
of [RFC8702].
3.3. EdDSA
The EdDSA signature algorithm is defined in RFC 8032 Section 3.3 of [RFC8032]
and FIPS Pub 186-5 (Draft) [NIST.FIPS.186-5].
The signature algorithm Ed25519 that MUST be used with SHA-512
message digest algorithms is identified by the following OIDs:
id-Ed25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) thawte(101) 112 }
The signature algorithm Ed448 that MUST be used with SHAKE256 message
digest algorithms is identified by the following OIDs:
id-Ed448 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) thawte(101) 113 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 8419 [RFC8419].
Note: The hash algorithm used to calculate the certHash in certConf
messages MUST be SHA512 if the certificate to be confirmed has been
signed using Ed25519 and or SHAKE256 with d=512 if the certificate to be
confirmed has been signed using Ed448.
4. Key Management Algorithms
CMP utilizes the following general key management techniques: key
agreement, key transport, and passwords.
CRMF [RFC4211] and CMP Updates [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-updates] promotes [RFC9480] promote the use of CMS [RFC5652]
EnvelopedData [RFC5652] by deprecating the use of EncryptedValue.
4.1. Key Agreement Algorithms
The key agreement algorithm is referred to as PROT_ENC_ALG in
RFC 4210 Appendix
Appendices D and E of [RFC4210] and as KM_KA_ALG in the Lightweight
CMP Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile], as
well as in [RFC9483] and Section 7.
Key agreement algorithms are only used in CMP when using CMS
[RFC5652]
EnvelopedData [RFC5652] together with the key agreement key
management technique. When a key agreement algorithm is used, a key-
encryption algorithm (Section 4.3) is needed next to the content-
encryption algorithm (Section 5).
Key agreement algorithm identifiers are located in: in the:
* keyEncryptionAlgorithm field of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.
Key wrap algorithm identifiers are located in: in the:
* KeyWrapAlgorithm parameters within keyEncryptionAlgorithm field of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.
Wrapped content-encryption keys are located in: in the:
* encryptedKey field of RecipientEncryptedKeys RecipientEncryptedKeys.
4.1.1. Diffie-Hellman
The Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement is defined in RFC 2631 [RFC2631] and
SHALL be used in the ephemeral-static variants, as specified in RFC 3370
[RFC3370]. Static-static variants SHALL NOT be used.
The Diffie-Hellman DH key agreement algorithm is identified by the following OID:
id-alg-ESDH OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) alg(3) 5 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 3370 Section 4.1 of
[RFC3370].
4.1.2. ECDH
The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement is defined in
RFC 5753
[RFC5753] and SHALL be used in the ephemeral-static variant variant, as
specified in RFC 5753 [RFC5753] [RFC5753], or the 1-Pass ECMQV variant Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-
Vanstone (ECMQV) variant, as specified in RFC 5753 [RFC5753]. Static-static
variants SHALL NOT be used.
The ECDH key agreement algorithm used together with NIST-recommended
SECP curves are identified by the following OIDs:
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 11(11) 0 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 11(11) 1 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 11(11) 2 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 11(11) 3 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1)
14(14) 0 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1)
14(14) 1 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1)
14(14) 2 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1)
14(14) 3 }
mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 15(15) 0 }
mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 15(15) 1 }
mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 15(15) 2 }
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 15(15) 3 }
As specified in RFC 5480 [RFC5480] [RFC5480], the NIST-recommended SECP curves are
identified by the following OIDs:
secp192r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 1 }
secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 }
secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 7 }
secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 }
secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 5753 [RFC5753].
The ECDH key agreement algorithm used together with curve25519 or
curve448 are is identified by the following OIDs:
id-X25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) thawte(101) 110 }
id-X448 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) thawte(101) 111 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 8418 [RFC8418].
4.2. Key Transport Algorithms
The key transport algorithm is also referred to as PROT_ENC_ALG in
RFC 4210 Appendix
Appendices D and E of [RFC4210] and as KM_KL_ALG KM_KT_ALG in the Lightweight
CMP Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile], as
well as in [RFC9483] and Section 7.
Key transport algorithms are only used in CMP when using CMS
[RFC5652] EnvelopedData together with the key transport key
management technique.
Key transport algorithm identifiers are located in: in the:
* keyEncryptionAlgorithm field of KeyTransRecipientInfo KeyTransRecipientInfo.
Key transport encrypted content-encryption keys are located in: in the:
* encryptedKey field of KeyTransRecipientInfo KeyTransRecipientInfo.
4.2.1. RSA
The RSA key transport algorithm is the RSA encryption scheme defined
in RFC 8017 [RFC8017].
The algorithm identifier for RSA (PKCS #1 v1.5) is:
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1 }
The algorithm identifier for RSAES-OAEP is:
id-RSAES-OAEP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 7 }
Further conventions to be considered for PKCS #1 v1.5 are specified
in RFC 3370 Section 4.2.1 of [RFC3370] and for RSAES-OAEP in RFC 3560 [RFC3560].
4.3. Symmetric Key-Encryption Algorithms
The symmetric key-encryption algorithm is also referred to as
KM_KW_ALG in Section 7.2 and in the Lightweight CMP Profile
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. [RFC9483].
As the symmetric key-encryption key management technique is not used
by CMP, the symmetric key-encryption algorithm is only needed when
using the key agreement or password-based key management technique
with CMS [RFC5652] EnvelopedData.
Key wrap algorithm identifiers are located in: in the:
* parameters field of the KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo and PasswordRecipientInfo PasswordRecipientInfo.
Wrapped content-encryption keys are located in: in the:
* encryptedKey field of RecipientEncryptedKeys (for key agreement)
and PasswordRecipientInfo (for password-based key management) management).
4.3.1. AES Key Wrap
The AES encryption algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 197
[NIST.FIPS.197]
[NIST.FIPS.197], and the key wrapping is defined in RFC 3394 [RFC3394].
AES key encryption has the algorithm identifier:
id-aes128-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 5 }
id-aes192-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 25 }
id-aes256-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 45 }
The underlying encryption functions for the key wrap and content-
encryption algorithms (as specified in Section 5) and the key sizes
for the two algorithms MUST be the same (e.g., AES-128 key wrap
algorithm with AES-128 content-encryption algorithm), algorithm); see also
RFC 8551 [RFC8551].
Further conventions to be considered for AES key wrap are specified
in RFC 3394 Section 2.2 of [RFC3394] and RFC 3565 Section 2.3.2 of [RFC3565].
4.4. Key Derivation Algorithms
The key derivation algorithm is also referred to as KM_KD_ALG in
Section 7.2 and in the Lightweight CMP Profile
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. [RFC9483].
Key derivation algorithms are only used in CMP when using CMS
[RFC5652]
EnvelopedData [RFC5652] together with the password-based key
management technique.
Key derivation algorithm identifiers are located in: in the:
* keyDerivationAlgorithm field of PasswordRecipientInfo PasswordRecipientInfo.
When using the password-based key management technique with
EnvelopedData as specified in CMP Updates [RFC9480] together with
PKIProtection based on the message authentication code (MAC)-based PKIProtection, (MAC), the
salt for the password-based MAC and KDF key derivation function (KDF)
must be chosen independently to ensure usage of independent symmetric
keys.
4.4.1. PBKDF2
The password-based
Password-based key derivation function 2 (PBKDF2) is defined in
RFC 8018
[RFC8018].
Password-based key derivation function 2
PBKDF2 has the algorithm identifier:
id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-5(5) 12 }
Further conventions to be considered for PBKDF2 are specified in
RFC 3370
Section 4.4.1 of [RFC3370] and RFC 8018 Section 5.2 of [RFC8018].
5. Content Encryption Content-Encryption Algorithms
The content encryption content-encryption algorithm is also referred to as PROT_SYM_ALG
in Section 7, RFC 4210 Appendix Appendices D and E of [RFC4210], and in the Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].
Content encryption
[RFC9483], and in Section 7.
Content-encryption algorithms are only used in CMP when using CMS
[RFC5652]
EnvelopedData [RFC5652] to transport a signed private key package in
case of central key generation or key archiving, a certificate to
facilitate implicit proof-of-possession, or a revocation passphrase
in encrypted form.
Content encryption
Content-encryption algorithm identifiers are located in: in the:
* contentEncryptionAlgorithm field of EncryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo.
Encrypted content is located in: in the:
* encryptedContent field of EncryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo.
5.1. AES-CBC
The AES encryption algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 197
[NIST.FIPS.197].
AES-CBC
AES Cipher Block Chaining (AES-CBC) content encryption has the
algorithm identifier:
id-aes128-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 2 }
id-aes192-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1)22 }
id-aes256-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1)42 }
Specific conventions to be considered for AES-CBC content encryption
are specified in RFC 3565 [RFC3565].
6. Message Authentication Code Algorithms
The message authentication code (MAC) is either used for shared
secret-based CMP message protection or together with the password-
based key derivation function (PBKDF2).
The message authentication code MAC algorithm is also referred to as MSG_MAC_ALG in Section 7, RFC 4210 Appendix
Appendices D and E of [RFC4210], and the Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].
[RFC9483].
6.1. Password-Based MAC
Password-based message authentication code (MAC) algorithms combine
the derivation of a symmetric key from a password or other shared
secret information and a symmetric key-based MAC function function, as
specified in Section 6.2 6.2, using this derived key.
Message authentication code
MAC algorithm identifiers are located in: in the:
* protectionAlg field of PKIHeader PKIHeader.
Message authentication code values are located in: in the:
* PKIProtection field of PKIMessage PKIMessage.
6.1.1. PasswordBasedMac
The PasswordBasedMac algorithm is defined in RFC 4210 Section 5.1.3.1 of
[RFC4210], RFC 4211 Section 4.4 of [RFC4211], and Algorithm "Algorithm Requirements
Update to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF) (CRMF)" [RFC9045].
The PasswordBasedMac algorithm is identified by the following OID:
id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 }
Further conventions to be considered for password-based MAC PasswordBasedMac are
specified in RFC 4210 Section 5.1.3.1 of [RFC4210], RFC 4211 Section 4.4 of [RFC4211],
and Algorithm "Algorithm Requirements Update to the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) (CRMF)" [RFC9045].
6.1.2. PBMAC1
The
Password-Based Message Authentication Code 1 (PBMAC1) is defined in RFC 8018
[RFC8018]. PBMAC1 combines a password-based key derivation function function,
like PBKDF2 (Section 4.4.1) 4.4.1), with an underlying symmetric key-based
message authentication scheme.
PBMAC1 has the following OID:
id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-5(5) 14 }
Specific conventions to be considered for PBMAC1 are specified in
RFC 8018
Section 7.1 and Appendix A.5 of [RFC8018].
6.2. Symmetric Key-Based MAC
Symmetric key-based message authentication code (MAC) algorithms are
used for deriving the symmetric encryption key when using PBKDF2 PBKDF2, as
described in Section 4.4.1 4.4.1, as well as with Password-based MAC password-based MAC, as
described in Section 6.1.
Message authentication code
MAC algorithm identifiers are located in: in the:
* protectionAlg field of PKIHeader PKIHeader,
* messageAuthScheme field of PBMAC1 PBMAC1,
* mac field of PBMParameter PBMParameter, and
* prf field of PBKDF2-params
Message authentication code PBKDF2-params.
MAC values are located in: in the:
* PKIProtection field of PKIMessage PKIMessage.
6.2.1. SHA2-Based HMAC
The HMAC algorithm is defined in RFC 2104 [RFC2104] and FIPS Pub 198-1
[NIST.FIPS.198-1].
The HMAC algorithm used with SHA2 message digest algorithms is
identified by the following OIDs:
id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 8 }
id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }
id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 10 }
id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 11 }
Specific conventions to be considered for SHA2-based HMAC are
specified in RFC 4231 Section 3.1 of [RFC4231].
6.2.2. AES-GMAC
The AES-GMAC algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 197 [NIST.FIPS.197] and
NIST SP 800-38d [NIST.SP.800-38d].
Note: The AES-GMAC MUST NOT be used twice with the same parameter
set, especially the same nonce. Therefore, it MUST NOT be used
together with PBKDF2. When using it with PBMAC1 PBMAC1, it MUST be ensured
that AES-
GMAC the AES-GMAC is only used as a message authentication scheme and
not for the key derivation function PBKDF2.
The AES-GMAC algorithm is identified by the following OIDs:
id-aes128-GMAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 9 }
id-aes192-GMAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 29 }
id-aes256-GMAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 49 }
Specific conventions to be considered for the AES-GMAC are specified
in
RFC 9044 [RFC9044].
6.2.3. SHAKE-Based KMAC
The KMAC algorithm is defined in RFC 8702 [RFC8702] and FIPS SP 800-185 [NIST.SP.800-185].
[NIST.SP.800-185]].
The SHAKE-based KMAC algorithm is identified by the following OIDs:
id-KmacWithSHAKE128
id-KMACWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 hashAlgs(2) 19 }
id-KmacWithSHAKE256
id-KMACWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 hashAlgs(2) 20 }
Specific conventions to be considered for KMAC with SHAKE are
specified in RFC 8702 Section 3.4 of [RFC8702].
7. Algorithm Use Profiles
This section provides profiles of algorithms and respective
conventions for different application use cases.
Recommendations like those described in Table 2 of NIST SP 800-57 Recommendation
"Recommendation for Key Management
Table 2 Management" [NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5] and
Section 4.6 of ECRYPT Algorithms, "Algorithms, Key Size and Protocols Report (2018) Section 4.6
(2018)" [ECRYPT.CSA.D5.4] provide general information on current
cryptographic algorithms.
The overall cryptographic strength of a CMP deployment implementations will depend
on several factors, including:
* Capabilities capabilities of the end entity: What kind of algorithms does the
end entity support. support? The cryptographic strength of the system
SHOULD be at least as strong as the algorithms and keys used for
the certificate being managed.
* Algorithm algorithm profile: The overall strength of the profile will be the
strength of the weakest algorithm it contains.
* Message message protection: The overall strength of the CMC CMP message
protection
protection.
- MAC-based protection: The entropy of the shared secret
information or password when MAC-based message protection is
used (MSG_MAC_ALG).
- Signature-based signature-based protection: The strength of the key pair and
signature algorithm when signature-based protection is used
(MSG_SIG_ALG).
- Protection protection of centrally generated keys: The strength of the
algorithms used for the key management technique (Section 7.2: 7.1:
PROT_ENC_ALG or Section 7.1: 7.2: KM_KA_ALG, KM_KT_ALG, KM_KD_ALG)
and the encryption of the content-encryption key and private
key (Section 7.2: 7.1: SYM_PENC_ALG, PROT_SYM_ALG or Section 7.1: 7.2:
KM_KW_ALG, PROT_SYM_ALG).
The following table shows the algorithms listed in this document
sorted by their bits of security. If an implementation intends to
enroll and manage certificate certificates for keys of a specific security, it
SHALL implement and use algorithms of at least that strength for the
respective PKI management operation. If one row does not provide a
suitable algorithm, the implementer MUST choose one offering more
bits of security.
+=======+==========+================+==================+============+
| Bits
+========+==========+==============+==================+============+
|Bits of | RSA or | Elliptic | Hash Function or | Symmetric |
| of |
|Security| DH | Curve | XOF with | Encryption |
| Secu- | | Cryptography | Specified Output | |
| rity | | | Length (d) | |
+=======+==========+================+==================+============+
| 112
+========+==========+==============+==================+============+
|112 | RSA2048, | ECDSA/ECDH | SHA224 SHA-224 | |
| | DH(2048) | (secp224r1) | | |
+-------+----------+----------------+------------------+------------+
| 128
+--------+----------+--------------+------------------+------------+
|128 | RSA3072, | ECDSA/ECDH | SHA256, SHA-256, | AES-128 |
| | DH(3072) | (secp256r1), | SHAKE128(d=256) | |
| | | Ed25519/ | | |
| | | X25519 | | |
| | | (Curve25519) (curve25519) | | |
+-------+----------+----------------+------------------+------------+
| 192
+--------+----------+--------------+------------------+------------+
|192 | | ECDSA/ECDH | SHA384 SHA-384 | AES-192 |
| | | (secp384r1) | | |
+-------+----------+----------------+------------------+------------+
| 224
+--------+----------+--------------+------------------+------------+
|224 | | Ed448/X448 | | |
| | | (Curve448) | (curve448) | |
+-------+----------+----------------+------------------+------------+ | 256
+--------+----------+--------------+------------------+------------+
|256 | | ECDSA/ECDH | SHA512, SHA-512, | AES-256 |
| | | (secp521r1) | SHAKE256(d=512) | |
+-------+----------+----------------+------------------+------------+
+--------+----------+--------------+------------------+------------+
Table 1: Cryptographic Algorithms Sorted by their Their Bits of Security
The following table shows the cryptographic algorithms sorted by
their usage in CMP and with more details.
+========+==========+===============+===============+===============+
+========+==========+================+================+=============+
|Bits of |Key Types |CMP | CMP Protection |Key Management | Key-Wrap Key Management |Key-Wrap and |
|Security|to Be | |Technique MSG_SIG_ALG, | Symmetric Technique |Symmetric |
| |Certified | MSG_MAC_ALG | PROT_ENC_ALG |Encryption | Encryption
|
+========+==========+===============+===============+===============+ | | |MSG_SIG_ALG, |PROT_ENC_ALG or| PROT_SYM_ALG, | or KM_KA_ALG, |PROT_SYM_ALG,|
| | |MSG_MAC_ALG |KM_KA_ALG, | SYM_PENC_ALG | KM_KT_ALG, |SYM_PENC_ALG |
| | |KM_KT_ALG, | or | KM_KD_ALG |or |
| | |KM_KD_ALG | KM_KW_ALG |
+--------+----------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ |KM_KW_ALG |
+========+==========+================+================+=============+
|112 |RSA2048, |RSASSA-PSS |DH(2048), | RSASSA-PSS | DH(2048), | |
| |secp224r1 |(2048, SHA224 |RSAES-OAEP | (2048, SHA-224 | RSAES-OAEP | | |or
| | | or SHAKE128 |(2048, SHA224),| | (2048, SHA- | |
| | | (d=256)), | 224), | |
| | | RSAEncryption | RSAEncryption | | |(d=256)), |RSAEncryption
| | | (2048, SHA- | |RSAEncryption |(2048, SHA224),| (2048, SHA- | |
| |(2048, SHA224),|ECDH | | 224), | 224), | |ECDSA |(secp224r1, |
| | | |(secp224r1, |SHA224), ECDSA | ECDH | |
| | | (secp224r1, | (secp224r1, | | |SHA224
| | | SHA-224 or |PBKDF2 (HMAC- | SHA-224), | |
| |SHAKE128 |SHA224) | | SHAKE128 | PBKDF2 (HMAC- | |
| | |(d=256)), | (d=256)), | SHA-224) | |
| |PBMAC1 | | PBMAC1 (HMAC- | | |
| | |SHA224) | SHA-224) | |
+--------+----------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ |
+--------+----------+----------------+----------------+-------------+
|128 |RSA3072, |RSASSA-PSS |DH(3072), | AES-128 RSASSA-PSS | DH(3072), |AES-128 | |secp256r1,|(3072, SHA256 |RSAES-OAEP
| |secp256r1,| (3072, SHA-256 | RSAES-OAEP | |
| |Curve25519|or |curve25519| or SHAKE128 |(3072, SHA256),| | (3072, SHA- | |
| | | (d=256)), | 256), | |
| | | RSAEncryption | RSAEncryption | | |(d=256)), |RSAEncryption
| | | (3072, SHA- | |RSAEncryption |(3072, SHA256),| (3072, SHA- | |
| |(3072, SHA256),|ECDH | | 256), | 256), | |ECDSA |(secp256r1, |
| | | |(secp256r1, |SHA256), ECDSA | ECDH | |
| | | (secp256r1, | (secp256r1, | | |SHA256
| | | SHA-256 or |X25519, | SHA-256), | |
| |SHAKE128 |PBKDF2 (HMAC- | | SHAKE128 | X25519, | |
| | |(d=256)), |SHA256) | (d=256)), | PBKDF2 (HMAC- | | |Ed25519
| | | Ed25519 (SHA- | SHA-256) | |
| |(SHA512), | | 512), | | | |PBMAC1
| | | PBMAC1 (HMAC- | | |
| | |SHA256) | SHA-256) | | |
+--------+----------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
+--------+----------+----------------+----------------+-------------+
|192 |secp384r1 |ECDSA |ECDH | AES-192 ECDSA | ECDH |AES-192 |
| | | (secp384r1, | (secp384r1, | | |(secp384r1, |(secp384r1,
| | | SHA-384), | |SHA384), |SHA384), SHA-384), | |
| | |PBMAC1 | PBMAC1 (HMAC- |PBKDF2 | PBKDF2 (HMAC- | |
| | |SHA384) |SHA384) | SHA-384) |
+--------+----------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ SHA-384) | |
+--------+----------+----------------+----------------+-------------+
|224 |Curve448 |Ed448 |X448 |curve448 | Ed448 | X448 | |
| | | |(SHAKE256) (SHAKE256) | | |
+--------+----------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
+--------+----------+----------------+----------------+-------------+
|256 |secp521r1 |ECDSA |ECDH | AES-256 ECDSA | ECDH |AES-256 |
| |(secp521r1, |(secp521r1, | | (secp521r1, | (secp521r1, | |SHA512 |
| | | SHA-512 or |SHA512), | SHA-512), | |
| | |SHAKE256 |PBKDF2 | SHAKE256 | PBKDF2 (HMAC- | |
| | |(d=512)), |SHA512) | (d=512)), | SHA-512) | |
| | | |PBMAC1 PBMAC1 (HMAC- | | |
| | |SHA512) | SHA-512) | | |
+--------+----------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
+--------+----------+----------------+----------------+-------------+
Table 2: Cryptographic Algorithms Sorted by their Their Bits of
Security and Usage by CMP
To avoid consuming too many computational resources it is recommended
to choose resources, choosing a set
of algorithms offering roughly the same level of
security. security is
recommended. Below are provided several algorithm profiles which that are balanced,
assuming the implementer chooses MAC secrets and/or certificate
profiles of at least equivalent strength.
7.1. Algorithm Profile for RFC 4210 PKI Management Message Profiles in RFC 4210
The following table updates the definitions of algorithms used within
PKI Management Message Profiles Profiles, as defined in CMP Appendix D.2 of
[RFC4210].
The columns in the table are:
Name: An identifier used for message profiles
Use: Description of where and for what the algorithm is used
Mandatory: Algorithms which that MUST be supported by conforming
implementations
Optional: Algorithms which that are OPTIONAL to support
Deprecated: Algorithms from RFC 4210 [RFC4210] which that SHOULD NOT be used any
more
+============+==============+======+===================+============+
+============+=============+=========+=================+============+
|Name |Use |Manda-| Optional |Mandatory|Optional |Deprecated |
| | |tory | | |
+============+==============+======+===================+============+
+============+=============+=========+=================+============+
|MSG_SIG_ALG |protection of |RSA | ECDSA, of|RSA |ECDSA, EdDSA |DSA, |
| |PKI messages | | |combinations|
| |using | | |with MD5 and|
| |signature |signatures | | |SHA-1 |
+------------+--------------+------+-------------------+------------+
+------------+-------------+---------+-----------------+------------+
|MSG_MAC_ALG |protection of |PBMAC1| PasswordBasedMac, |X9.9 of|PBMAC1 |PasswordBasedMac,|X9.9 |
| |PKI messages | | HMAC, |HMAC, KMAC | |
| |using MACing MACs | | | |
+------------+--------------+------+-------------------+------------+
+------------+-------------+---------+-----------------+------------+
|SYM_PENC_ALG|symmetric |AES- |AES-wrap | |3-DES(3-key-|
| |encryption of |wrap of| | |EDE, CBC |
| |an end | | |Mode), RC5, |
| |entity's | | |CAST-128 |
| |private key | | | |
| |where the | | | |
| |symmetric key | key| | | |
| |is distributed| | | | | |out-of-band
| |distributed | | | |
+------------+--------------+------+-------------------+------------+
| |out of band | | | |
+------------+-------------+---------+-----------------+------------+
|PROT_ENC_ALG|asymmetric |DH | ECDH, |ECDH, RSA | |
| |algorithm used| | | | | |for encryption|
| |used for | | | |of (symmetric |
| |encryption of| | | |
| |(symmetric | | | |
| |keys for | | | |
| |encryption of)| | | | | |private keys
| |of) private | | | |
| |keys | | | |
| |transported in| | | | |
| |in | | | |
| |PKIMessages | | | |
+------------+--------------+------+-------------------+------------+
+------------+-------------+---------+-----------------+------------+
|PROT_SYM_ALG|symmetric |AES- |AES-CBC | |3-DES(3-key-|
| |encryption |CBC | | |EDE, CBC |
| |algorithm used| | | |Mode), RC5, |
| |for encryption| |used for | | |CAST-128 |
| |of private key| |encryption of| | | |
| |private key | | | |
| |bits (a key of| | | | | |this
| |of this type is | | | |
| |encrypted |is encrypted | | | |
| |using | | | |
| |PROT_ENC_ALG) |PROT_ENC_ALG)| | | | |
+------------+--------------+------+-------------------+------------+
+------------+-------------+---------+-----------------+------------+
Table 3: Algorithms Used Within RFC 4210 within Appendix D.2
Mandatory Algorithm Identifiers of RFC 4210
The following are the mandatory algorithm identifiers and Specifications:
specifications:
RSA: sha256WithRSAEncryption with 2048 bit, see Section 3.1
PasswordBasedMac: id-PasswordBasedMac, see Section 6.1 (with id-
sha256 as the owf parameter, see Section 2.1 and id-hmacWithSHA256
as the mac parameter, see Section 6.2.1)
PBMAC1: id-PBMAC1, see Section 6.1.2 (with id-PBKDF2 as the key
derivation function, see Section 4.4.1 and id-hmacWithSHA256 as
the message authentication scheme, see Section 6.2.1). It is
RECOMMENDED to prefer the usage of PBMAC1 instead of
PasswordBasedMac.
DH: id-alg-ESDH, see Section 4.1.1
AES-wrap: id-aes128-wrap, see Section 4.3.1
AES-CBC: id-aes128-CBC, see Section 5.1
7.2. Algorithm Profile for Lightweight CMP Profile
The following table contains definitions of algorithms which that MAY be
supported by implementations of the Lightweight CMP Profile
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].
[RFC9483].
As the set of algorithms to be used for implementations of the
Lightweight CMP Profile heavily depends on the PKI management
operations implemented, the certificates used for messages message protection,
and the certificates to be managed, this document will not specify a
specific set that is mandatory to support for conforming
implementations.
The columns in the table are:
Name: An identifier used for message profiles
Use: Description of where and for what the algorithm is used
Examples: Lists the algorithms algorithms, as described in this document. The
list of algorithms depends on the set of PKI management operations
to be implemented.
Note: It is RECOMMENDED to prefer the usage of PBMAC1 instead of
PasswordBasedMac.
+==============+================================+==================+
| Name | Use | Examples |
+==============+================================+==================+
| MSG_SIG_ALG | protection of PKI messages | RSA, ECDSA, |
| | using signature signatures and for | EdDSA |
| | SignedData, e.g., a private | |
| | key transported in PKIMessages | |
+--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+
| MSG_MAC_ALG | protection of PKI messages | PasswordBasedMac |
| | using MACing | (see Section 9), |
| | | PBMAC1, HMAC, |
| | | KMAC |
+--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+
| KM_KA_ALG | asymmetric key agreement | DH, ECDH |
| | algorithm used for agreement | |
| | of a symmetric key for use | |
| | with KM_KW_ALG | |
+--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+
| KM_KT_ALG | asymmetric key encryption key-encryption | RSA |
| | algorithm used for transport | |
| | of a symmetric key for | |
| | PROT_SYM_ALG | |
+--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+
| KM_KD_ALG | symmetric key derivation | PBKDF2 |
| | algorithm used for derivation | |
| | of a symmetric key for use | |
| | with KM_KW_ALG | |
+--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+
| KM_KW_ALG | algorithm to wrap a symmetric | AES-wrap |
| | key for PROT_SYM_ALG | |
+--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+
| PROT_SYM_ALG | symmetric content encryption content-encryption | AES-CBC |
| | algorithm used for encryption | |
| | of EnvelopedData, e.g., a | |
| | private key transported in | |
| | PKIMessages | |
+--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+
Table 4: Algorithms Used Within within the Lightweight CMP Profile
8. IANA Considerations
This document does not request changes to the has no IANA registry. actions.
9. Security Considerations
This document lists many cryptographic algorithms usable with CMP to
offer implementer implementers a more up-to-date choice. Finally, the algorithms
to be supported also heavily depend on the certificates and PKI
management operations utilized in the target environment. The
algorithm with the lowest security strength and the entropy of shared
secret information define defines the security of the overall solution, solution; see
Section 7.
When using MAC-based message protection protection, the use of PBMAC1 is
preferable to that of PasswordBasedMac. First, PBMAC1 is a well-
known scrutinized algorithm, which is not true for PasswordBasedMac.
Second, the PasswordBasedMac algorithm as specified in RFC 4211 Section 4.4 of
[RFC4211] is essentially PBKDF1 (as defined in RFC 8018 Section 5.1 of
[RFC8018]) with an HMAC step at the end. Here Here, we update to use the
PBKDF2-HMAC construct defined as PBMAC1 in [RFC8018]. PBKDF2 is
superior to PBKDF1 in an improved internal construct for iterated hashing,
hashing and in removing PBKDF1's limitation of only being able to
derive keys up to the size of the underlying hash function.
Additionally, PBKDF1 is not recommended for new applications as
stated in Section 5.1 of RFC 8018 [RFC8018] and is no longer an approved
algorithm by most standards bodies, and therefore bodies. Therefore, it presents
difficulties to implementer implementers who are submitting their CMP
implementations for certification, hence moving to a PBKDF2-based
mechanism. This change is in alignment with [RFC9045] [RFC9045], which updates
[RFC4211] to allow the use of PBMAC1 in CRMF.
The AES-GMAC MUST NOT be used as the pseudo random pseudorandom function (PRF) in
PBKDF2; the use of the AES-GMAC more than once with the same key and
the same nonce will break the security.
In Section 7 of this document document, there is also an update to the
Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and a set of algorithms that MAY be
supported when implementing the Lightweight CMP Profile
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. [RFC9483].
It is recognized that there may be older CMP implementations in use
that conform to the algorithm use profile from Appendix D.2 of
RFC 4210
[RFC4210]. For example, the use of AES is now mandatory for
PROT_SYM_ALG but in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]
PROT_SYM_ALG, while 3-DES was mandatory. mandatory in [RFC4210]. Therefore, it
is expected that many CMP systems may already support the recommended
algorithms in this specification. In such systems systems, the weakened
algorithms should be disabled from further use. If critical systems
cannot be immediately updated to conform to the recommended algorithm
use profile, it is recommended that a plan to migrate the
infrastructure to conforming profiles be adopted as soon as possible.
Symmetric key-based MAC algorithms as described in Section 6.2 MAY be
used as MSG_MAC_ALG. The implementer MUST choose a suitable PRF and
ensure that the key has sufficient entropy to match the overall
security level of the algorithm profile. These considerations are
outside the scope of the profile.
10. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Russ Housley for supporting this draft with submitting
[RFC9044] and [RFC9045].
May thanks also to all reviewers like Serge Mister, Mark Ferreira,
Yuefei Lu, Tomas Gustavsson, Lijun Liao, David von Oheimb and Steffen
Fries for their input and feedback to this document. Apologies to
all not mentioned reviewers and supporters.
11. References
10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-updates]
Brockhaus, H., Oheimb, D. V., and J. Gray, "Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP) Updates", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-20, 31 May
2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
lamps-cmp-updates-20>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]
Brockhaus, H., Oheimb, D. V., and S. Fries, "Lightweight
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-
cmp-profile-12, 13 May 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
lightweight-cmp-profile-12>.
[NIST.FIPS.180-4]
Dang, Quynh H., Q. H. and NIST, "Secure Hash Standard", NIST NIST FIPS Federal
Information Processing Standards Publications 180-4,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, July 2015,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.
[NIST.FIPS.186-4]
[NIST.FIPS.186-5]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", NIST NIST FIPS 186-4, PUB 186-5,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, July 2013,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>.
[NIST.FIPS.186-5]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"FIPS Pub 186-5 (Draft): Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)", October 2019, 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5, February 2023,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.186-5-draft.pdf>.
NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf>.
[NIST.FIPS.197]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Advanced encryption standard Encryption Standard (AES)", NIST NIST FIPS 197,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.197, November 2001,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.197.pdf>.
[NIST.FIPS.198-1]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)",
NIST NIST FIPS
PUB 198-1, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.198-1, July 2008,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.198-1.pdf>.
[NIST.FIPS.202]
Dworkin, Morris J., M. J. and NIST, "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Permutation-
Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", NIST NIST FIPS Federal
Information Processing Standards Publications 202,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202, July 2015,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.202.pdf>.
[NIST.SP.800-185]
[NIST.SP.800-185]]
Kelsey, John., J., Change, Shu-jen., and Ray. S., Perlner, R., and NIST, "SHA-3
derived functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and
ParallelHash", NIST NIST SP Special Publications
(General) 800-185, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-185, December
2016,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>.
[NIST.SP.800-38d]
Dworkin, M J., J. and NIST, "Recommendation for block cipher
modes of operation :GaloisCounter Mode (GCM) and GMAC",
NIST NIST
SP Special Publications (General) 800-38d,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38d, 2007,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/
nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2631] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
RFC 2631, DOI 10.17487/RFC2631, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2631>.
[RFC3370] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms", RFC 3370, DOI 10.17487/RFC3370, August 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3370>.
[RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, DOI 10.17487/RFC3394,
September 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3394>.
[RFC3560] Housley, R., "Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport
Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 3560, DOI 10.17487/RFC3560, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3560>.
[RFC3565] Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS)", RFC 3565, DOI 10.17487/RFC3565, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3565>.
[RFC4056] Schaad, J., "Use of the RSASSA-PSS Signature Algorithm in
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 4056,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4056, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4056>.
[RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
[RFC4231] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-
224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512",
RFC 4231, DOI 10.17487/RFC4231, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4231>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5753] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, DOI 10.17487/RFC5753, January
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5753>.
[RFC5754] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
Message Syntax", RFC 5754, DOI 10.17487/RFC5754, January
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5754>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8018] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., and A. Rusch, "PKCS #5:
Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.1",
RFC 8018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8018, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8018>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8418] Housley, R., "Use of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key
Agreement Algorithm with X25519 and X448 in the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 8418,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8418, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8418>.
[RFC8419] Housley, R., "Use of Edwards-Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (EdDSA) Signatures in the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)", RFC 8419, DOI 10.17487/RFC8419, August
2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8419>.
[RFC8551] Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "Secure/
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0
Message Specification", RFC 8551, DOI 10.17487/RFC8551,
April 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8551>.
[RFC8692] Kampanakis, P. and Q. Dang, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Identifiers for
RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA Using SHAKEs", RFC 8692,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8692, December 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8692>.
[RFC8702] Kampanakis, P. and Q. Dang, "Use of the SHAKE One-Way Hash
Functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 8702, DOI 10.17487/RFC8702, January 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8702>.
[RFC9044] Housley, R., "Using the AES-GMAC Algorithm with the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 9044,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9044, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9044>.
[RFC9045] Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 9045,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9045, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9045>.
12.
[RFC9480] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., and J. Gray, "Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP) Updates", RFC 9480,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9480, October 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9480>.
[RFC9483] Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. von Oheimb, "Lightweight
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", RFC 9483,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9483, October 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9483>.
10.2. Informative References
[ECRYPT.CSA.D5.4]
University of Bristol, "Algorithms, Key Size and Protocols
Report (2018)", March 2015,
<https://www.ecrypt.eu.org/csa/documents/
D5.4-FinalAlgKeySizeProt.pdf>.
[NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5]
Barker, Elaine., E. and NIST, "Recommendation for key
management:part 1 - general", NIST NIST SP Special Publications
(General) 800-57pt1r5, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5,
May 2020,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf>.
[RFC8551] Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "Secure/
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0
Message Specification", RFC 8551, DOI 10.17487/RFC8551,
April 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8551>.
[RFC8692] Kampanakis, P. and Q. Dang, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Identifiers for
RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA Using SHAKEs", RFC 8692,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8692, December 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8692>.
Appendix A. History of Changes
Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the
document.
From version 14 -> 15:
* Providing changes addressing comment from Martin Duke and
Zaheduzzaman Sarker regarding the introduction
From version 13 -> 14:
* Providing changes addressing comments from GEN AD review
From version 12 -> 13:
* Providing changes addressing comments from OPSDIR and GENART last
call reviews
From version 11 -> 12:
* Capitalized all headlines
From version 10 -> 11:
* Changes on the tables in Section 7 after direct exchange with
Quynh
From version 09 -> 10:
* Removed the pre-RFC5378 work disclaimer after the RFC 4210 authors
granted BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust
* Implemented the changes proposed by Quynh, (see thread "Quynh
Action: draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-08.txt") and removed
markers for ToDos regarding this review of SHAKE and KMAC usage as
well as on the tables in Section 7
From version 08 -> 09:
* Updated IPR disclaimer
From version 07 -> 08:
* Fixing issues from WG and AD review
* Adding Note to Section 2.2, 3.3, and 6.2.3 regarding usage of
SHAKE and KMAC and added ToDo regarding checking respective notes
* Added two tables showing algorithms sorted by their strength to
Section 7 and added ToDo regarding checking these tables
* Updates the algorithm use profile in Section 7.1
* Updated and added security consideration on SHAKE,
PasswordBasedMac, KMAC, and symmetric key-based MAC functions and
added ToDo regarding checking the security consideration on SHAKE
From version 06 -> 07:
* Fixing minor formatting nits
From version 05 -> 06:
* Added text to Section 2 and Section 3.3 to clearly specify the
hash algorithm to use for certConf messages for certificates
signed with EdDSA (see thread "[CMP Updates] Hash algorithm
Acknowledgements
Thanks to us
for calculating certHash")
* Updated new RFC numbers Russ Housley for I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg and I-
D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs
From version 04 -> 05:
* Minor changes and corrections in wording
From version 03 -> 04:
* Added John Gray to the list of authors due to his extensive
support and valuable feedback
* Added some clarification of the use AES-GMAC to Section 6.2.1
* Extended the guidance work on how to select a set of algorithms in
Section 7 and deleted former Section 7.1
* Deleted the algorithms mandatory to support in Section 7.2 as
discussed at IETF 110
* Extended the Security considerations in Section 9
* Minor changes in wording
From version 02 -> 03:
* Moved former Appendix A to new Section 7 as suggested by Rich [RFC9044] and
Russ (see thread "I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-
02.txt")
* Added a column to Table 1 in Section 7.2 to reflect the changes to [RFC9045] upon
which this RFC 4210
* Updated Table 2 in Section 7.3
* Added a paragraph to Section 9 relies heavily.
May thanks also to discuss backward compatibility
with RFC 4210
* Minor changes in wording
From version 01 -> 02:
* Added Hans Aschauer, Mike Ounsworth, and all reviewers like Serge Mister as co-author
* Changed to XML V3
* Added SHAKE digest algorithm to Section 2 as discussed at IETF 109
* Deleted DSA from Section 3 as discussed at IETF 109
* Added RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE to Section 3
* Added SECP curves the section on ECDSA with SHA2, ECDSA with
SHAKE, and EdDSA to Section 3 as discussed at IETF 109
* Deleted static-static D-H and ECDH from Section 4.1 based on the
discussion on the mailing list (see thread "[CMP Algorithms]
Section 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 drop static-static (EC)DH key agreement
algorithms for use in CMP")
* Added ECDH OIDs and SECP curves, as well as ECDH with curve25519
and curve448 to Section 4.1 as discussed at IETF 109
* Deleted RSA-OAEP from Section 4.2 first as discussed at IETF 109,
but re-added it after discussion on the mailing list (see thread
"Mail regarding draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms")
* Added a paragraph to Section 4.3.1 to explain that the algorithms Mister, Mark Ferreira,
Yuefei Lu, Tomas Gustavsson, Lijun Liao, David von Oheimb, and key length
Steffen Fries for content encryption and key wrapping must be
aligned as discussed on the mailing list (see thread "[CMP
Algorithms] Use Key-Wrap with or without padding in Section 4.3
and Section 5")
* Deleted AES-CCM and AES-GMC from and added AES-CBC to Section 5 as
discussed at IETF 109
* Added Section 6.1.2 to offer PBMAC1 as discusses on the mailing
list (see thread "Mail regarding draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-
algs-02") and restructured text in Section 6 to be easier to
differentiate between password- and shared-key-based MAC
* Deleted Diffie-Hellmann based MAC from Section 6 as is only
relevant when using enrolling Diffie-Hellmann certificates
* Added AES-GMAC and SHAKE-based KMAC to Section 6 as discussed at
IETF 109
* Extended Section 9 to mention Russ supporting with two additional
I-Ds their input and name further supporters of the draft
* Added a first draft of a generic algorithm selection guideline feedback to
Appendix A
* Added a first proposal for mandatory algorithms for the
Lightweight CMP Profile this document.
Apologies to Appendix A
* Minor changes in wording
From version 00 -> 01:
* Changed sections Symmetric Key-Encryption Algorithms and Content
Encryption Algorithms based on the discussion on the mailing list
(see thread "[CMP Algorithms] Use Key-Wrap with or without padding
in Section 4.3 and Section 5")
* Added Appendix A with updated algorithms profile for RDC4210
Appendix D.2 all not mentioned reviewers and first proposal for the Lightweight CMP Profile
* Minor changes in wording supporters.
Authors' Addresses
Hendrik Brockhaus (editor)
Siemens AG
Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1
80333 Munich
Germany
Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com
URI: https://www.siemens.com
Hans Aschauer
Siemens AG
Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1
80333 Munich
Germany
Email: hans.aschauer@siemens.com
URI: https://www.siemens.com
Mike Ounsworth
Entrust
1187 Park Place
Minneapolis, MN 55379
United States of America
Email: mike.ounsworth@entrust.com
URI: https://www.entrust.com
John Gray
Entrust
1187 Park Place
Minneapolis, MN 55379
United States of America
Email: john.gray@entrust.com
URI: https://www.entrust.com