rfc9509.original   rfc9509.txt 
LAMPS WG T. Reddy Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Reddy.K
Internet-Draft J. Ekman Request for Comments: 9509 J. Ekman
Intended status: Standards Track Nokia Category: Standards Track Nokia
Expires: 25 March 2024 D. Migault ISSN: 2070-1721 D. Migault
Ericsson Ericsson
22 September 2023 March 2024
X.509 Certificate Extended Key Usage (EKU) for 5G Network Functions X.509 Certificate Extended Key Usage (EKU) for 5G Network Functions
draft-ietf-lamps-nf-eku-05
Abstract Abstract
RFC 5280 specifies several extended key purpose identifiers RFC 5280 specifies several extended key purpose identifiers
(KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates. This document defines (KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates. This document defines
encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages, JSON Web Token (JWT) and encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages, using JSON Web Tokens
signing the OAuth 2.0 access tokens KeyPurposeIds for inclusion in (JWTs), and signing the OAuth 2.0 access tokens KeyPurposeIds for
the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 v3 public key inclusion in the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 v3
certificates used by Network Functions (NFs) for the 5G System. public key certificates used by Network Functions (NFs) for the 5G
System.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9509.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Terminology
3. Extended Key Purpose for Network Functions . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Extended Key Purpose for Network Functions
4. Including the Extended Key Purpose in Certificates . . . . . 5 4. Including the Extended Key Purpose in Certificates
5. Implications for a Certification Authority . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Implications for a Certification Authority
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Security Considerations
7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Privacy Considerations
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. IANA Considerations
9. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. References
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.1. Normative References
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.2. Informative References
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Acknowledgments
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Contributor
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Operators of 5G ("fifth generation") systems as defined by 3GPP The operators of 5G ("fifth generation") systems as defined by 3GPP
make use of an internal PKI to generate X.509 PKI certificates for make use of an internal PKI to generate X.509 PKI certificates for
the Network Functions (NFs) (Section 6 of [TS23.501]) in a 5G system. the Network Functions (NFs) (Section 6 of [TS23.501]) in a 5G System.
The certificates are used for the following purposes: The certificates are used for the following purposes:
* Client and Server certificates for NFs in 5GC Service Based * Client and Server certificates for NFs in 5G Core (5GC) Service
Architecture (see Section 6.1.3c of [TS33.310]) Based Architecture (SBA) (see Section 6.1.3c of [TS33.310] and
Section 6.7.2 of [TS29.500])
* Client Credentials Assertion (CCA) uses JSON Web Tokens (JWT) * Client Credentials Assertion (CCA) uses JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)
[RFC7519] and is secured with digital signatures based on JSON Web [RFC7519] and is secured with digital signatures based on the JSON
Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] (see Section 13.3.8.2 of [TS33.501]). Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] (see Section 13.3.8.2 of [TS33.501],
and Section 6.7.5 of [TS29.500]).
* Certificates for encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages between * Certificates for encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages between
Security Edge Protection Proxies (SEPPs) using JSON Web Encryption Security Edge Protection Proxies (SEPPs) using JSON Web Encryption
(JWE) [RFC7516] (Section 13.2.4.4 of [TS33.501]) and Section 6.3.2 (JWE) [RFC7516] (see Section 13.2.4.4 of [TS33.501], Section 6.3.2
of [TS33.210]). of [TS33.210], Section 6.7.4 of [TS29.500], and Section 5.3.2.1 of
[TS29.573]).
* Certificates for signing the OAuth 2.0 access tokens for service * Certificates for signing the OAuth 2.0 access tokens for service
authorization to grant temporary access to resources provided by authorization to grant temporary access to resources provided by
NF producers using JWS (see Section 13.4.1 of [TS33.501]). NF producers using JWS (see Section 13.4.1 of [TS33.501] and
Section 6.7.3 of [TS29.500]).
[RFC5280] specifies several key usage extensions, defined via [RFC5280] specifies several key usage extensions, defined via
KeyPurposeIds, for X.509 certificates. Key usage extensions added to KeyPurposeIds, for X.509 certificates. Key usage extensions added to
a certificate are meant to express intent as to the purpose of the a certificate are meant to express intent as to the purpose of the
named usage, for humans and for complying libraries. In addition, named usage, for humans and for complying libraries. In addition,
the IANA registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose" the IANA registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose"
[RFC7299] contains additional KeyPurposeIds.The use of the [RFC7299] contains additional KeyPurposeIds. The use of the
anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId, as defined in Section 4.2.1.12 of anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId, as defined in Section 4.2.1.12 of
[RFC5280], is generally considered a poor practice. This is [RFC5280], is generally considered a poor practice. This is
especially true for publicly trusted certificates, whether they are especially true for publicly trusted certificates, whether they are
multi-purpose or single-purpose, within the context of 5G systems and multi-purpose or single-purpose, within the context of 5G Systems and
the 5G Core Service Based Architecture. the 5GC Service Based Architecture.
If the purpose of the issued certificates is not restricted, i.e., If the purpose of the issued certificates is not restricted, i.e.,
the type of operations for which a public key contained in the the type of operations for which a public key contained in the
certificate can be used are not specified, those certificates could certificate can be used are not specified, those certificates could
be used for another purpose than intended, increasing the risk of be used for another purpose than intended, increasing the risk of
cross-protocol attacks. Failure to ensure proper segregation of cross-protocol attacks. Failure to ensure proper segregation of
duties means that a NF which generates the public/private keys and duties means that a NF that generates the public/private keys and
applies for a certificate to the operator CA, could obtain a applies for a certificate to the operator certification authority
certificate which can be misused for tasks that this NF is not could obtain a certificate that can be misused for tasks that this NF
entitled to perform. For example, a NF service consumer could is not entitled to perform. For example, a NF service consumer could
potentially impersonate NF service producers using its certificate. potentially impersonate NF service producers using its certificate.
Additionally, in cases where the certificate's purpose is intended Additionally, in cases where the certificate's purpose is intended
for use by the NF service consumer as a client certificate, it's for use by the NF service consumer as a client certificate, it's
essential to ensure that the NF with this client certificate and the essential to ensure that the NF with this client certificate and the
corresponding private key is not allowed to sign the Client corresponding private key are not allowed to sign the Client
Credentials Assertion (CCA). When a NF service producer receives the Credentials Assertion (CCA). When a NF service producer receives the
signed CCA from the NF service consumer, the NF should only accept signed CCA from the NF service consumer, the NF should only accept
the token if the CCA is signed with a certificate that has been the token if the CCA is signed with a certificate that has been
explicitly issued for this purpose. explicitly issued for this purpose.
The KeyPurposeId id-kp-serverAuth (Section 4.2.1.12 of [RFC5280]) can The KeyPurposeId id-kp-serverAuth (Section 4.2.1.12 of [RFC5280]) can
be used to identify that the certificate is for a server (e.g., NF be used to identify that the certificate is for a server (e.g., NF
service producer), and the KeyPurposeId id-kp-clientAuth service producer), and the KeyPurposeId id-kp-clientAuth
(Section 4.2.1.12 of [RFC5280]) can be used to identify that the (Section 4.2.1.12 of [RFC5280]) can be used to identify that the
certificate is for a client (e.g., NF service consumer). However, certificate is for a client (e.g., NF service consumer). However,
there are currently no KeyPurposeIds for the other usages of there are currently no KeyPurposeIds for the other usages of
certificates in 5G System. This document addresses the above problem certificates in a 5G System. This document addresses the above
by defining the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 public problem by defining the EKU extension of X.509 public key
key certificates for signing the JWT Claims set using JWS, encrypting certificates for signing the JWT Claims Set using JWS, encrypting
JSON objects in HTTP messages using JWE, and signing the OAuth 2.0 JSON objects in HTTP messages using JWE, and signing the OAuth 2.0
access tokens using JWS. access tokens using JWS.
Vendor-defined KeyPurposeIds used within a PKI governed by the vendor Vendor-defined KeyPurposeIds used within a PKI governed by the vendor
or a group of vendors typically do not pose interoperability or a group of vendors typically do not pose interoperability
concerns, as non-critical extensions can be safely ignored if concerns, as non-critical extensions can be safely ignored if
unrecognized. However, using or misusing KeyPurposeIds outside of unrecognized. However, using or misusing KeyPurposeIds outside of
their intended vendor-controlled environment can lead to their intended vendor-controlled environment can lead to
interoperability issues. Therefore, it is advisable not to rely on interoperability issues. Therefore, it is advisable not to rely on
vendor-defined KeyPurposeIds. Instead, the specification defines vendor-defined KeyPurposeIds. Instead, the specification defines
skipping to change at page 4, line 23 skipping to change at line 156
implementations. implementations.
Although the specification focuses on a 5G use case, the standard Although the specification focuses on a 5G use case, the standard
KeyPurposeIds defined in this document can be used in other KeyPurposeIds defined in this document can be used in other
deployments. deployments.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. Extended Key Purpose for Network Functions 3. Extended Key Purpose for Network Functions
This specification defines the KeyPurposeIds id-kp-jwt, id-kp- This specification defines the KeyPurposeIds id-kp-jwt, id-kp-
httpContentEncrypt, id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning and uses these for httpContentEncrypt, and id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning and uses these,
respectively signing the JWT Claims set of CCA using JWS, encrypting respectively, for: signing the JWT Claims Set of CCA using JWS,
JSON objects in HTTP messages between Security Edge Protection encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages between Security Edge
Proxies (SEPPs) using JWE and signing the OAuth 2.0 access tokens for Protection Proxies (SEPPs) using JWE, and signing the OAuth 2.0
service authorization to grant temporary access to resources provided access tokens for service authorization to grant temporary access to
by NF producers using JWS. As described in [RFC5280], "[i]f the resources provided by NF producers using JWS. As described in
[Extended Key Usage] extension is present, then the certificate MUST [RFC5280], "[i]f the [Extended Key Usage] extension is present, then
only be used for one of the purposes indicated." [RFC5280] also the certificate MUST only be used for one of the purposes indicated."
notes that "[i]f multiple [key] purposes are indicated the [RFC5280] also notes that "[i]f multiple [key] purposes are indicated
application need not recognize all purposes indicated, as long as the the application need not recognize all purposes indicated, as long as
intended purpose is present." the intended purpose is present."
Network functions that verify the signature of a CCA represented as a
Network Functions that verify the signature of a CCA represented as a
JWT, decrypt JSON objects in HTTP messages between Security Edge JWT, decrypt JSON objects in HTTP messages between Security Edge
Protection Proxies (SEPPs) using JWE, or verify the signature of an Protection Proxies (SEPPs) using JWE, or verify the signature of an
OAuth 2.0 access tokens for service authorization to grant temporary OAuth 2.0 access tokens for service authorization to grant temporary
access to resources provided by NF producers using JWS SHOULD require access to resources provided by NF producers using JWS SHOULD require
the specification of corresponding KeyPurposeIds by the Extended Key that corresponding KeyPurposeIds be specified by the EKU extension.
Usage (EKU) extension. If the certificate requester knows the If the certificate requester knows the certificate users are mandated
certificate users are mandated to use these KeyPurposeIds, it MUST to use these KeyPurposeIds, it MUST enforce their inclusion.
enforce their inclusion. Additionally, such certificate requester Additionally, such a certificate requester MUST ensure that the
MUST ensure that the KeyUsage extension be set to digitalSignature or KeyUsage extension be set to digitalSignature or nonRepudiation (also
nonRepudiation (also designated as contentCommitment) for signature designated as contentCommitment) for signature calculation and/or to
calculation and/or to keyEncipherment for secret key encryption. keyEncipherment for secret key encryption.
4. Including the Extended Key Purpose in Certificates 4. Including the Extended Key Purpose in Certificates
[RFC5280] specifies the Extended Key Usage (EKU) X.509 certificate [RFC5280] specifies the EKU X.509 certificate extension for use on
extension for use on end entity certificates. The extension end entity certificates. The extension indicates one or more
indicates one or more purposes for which the certified public key is purposes for which the certified public key is valid. The EKU
valid. The EKU extension can be used in conjunction with the key extension can be used in conjunction with the key usage extension,
usage extension, which indicates the set of basic cryptographic which indicates the set of basic cryptographic operations for which
operations for which the certified key may be used. The EKU the certified key may be used. The EKU extension syntax is repeated
extension syntax is repeated here for convenience: here for convenience:
ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
As described in [RFC5280], the EKU extension may, at the option of As described in [RFC5280], the EKU extension may, at the option of
the certificate issuer, be either critical or non-critical. The the certificate issuer, be either critical or non-critical. The
inclusion of KeyPurposeId id-kp-jwt, id-kp-httpContentEncrypt, and inclusion of KeyPurposeIds id-kp-jwt, id-kp-httpContentEncrypt, and
id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning in a certificate indicates that the id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning in a certificate indicates that the
public key encoded in the certificate has been certified for use in public key encoded in the certificate has been certified for use in
the following: the following:
1. Validating the JWS Signature in JWT. The distinction between JWS 1. Validating the JWS Signature in JWT. The distinction between JWS
and JWE is determined by the KU that is set to digitalSignature and JWE is determined by the Key Usage (KU) that is set to
or nonRepudiation for JWS and keyEncipherment for JWE. digitalSignature or nonRepudiation for JWS and keyEncipherment
for JWE.
2. Encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages (for example, encrypting 2. Encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages (for example, encrypting
the CEK with the recipient's public key using the RSAES-OAEP the content-encryption key (CEK) with the recipient's public key
algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key). KU is set to using the RSAES-OAEP algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key).
keyEncipherment. KU is set to keyEncipherment.
3. Signing OAuth 2.0 access tokens. In this case, KU is set to 3. Signing OAuth 2.0 access tokens. In this case, KU is set to
digitalSignature or nonRepudiation. digitalSignature or nonRepudiation.
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }
id-kp-jwt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD1 } id-kp-jwt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 37 }
id-kp-httpContentEncrypt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD2 } id-kp-httpContentEncrypt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 38 }
id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD3 } id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 39 }
5. Implications for a Certification Authority 5. Implications for a Certification Authority
The procedures and practices employed by a certification authority The procedures and practices employed by a certification authority
MUST ensure that the correct values for the EKU extension as well as MUST ensure that the correct values for the EKU extension as well as
the KU extension are inserted in each certificate that is issued. the KU extension are inserted in each certificate that is issued.
The inclusion of the id-kp-jwt, id-kp-httpContentEncrypt and id-kp- The inclusion of the id-kp-jwt, id-kp-httpContentEncrypt, and id-kp-
oauthAccessTokenSigning KeyPurposeIds does not preclude the inclusion oauthAccessTokenSigning KeyPurposeIds does not preclude the inclusion
of other KeyPurposeIds. of other KeyPurposeIds.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] are applicable to this The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] are applicable to this
document. This extended key purpose does not introduce new security document. This extended key purpose does not introduce new security
risks but instead reduces existing security risks by providing means risks but instead reduces existing security risks by providing the
to identify if the certificate is generated to sign the JWT Claims means to identify if the certificate is generated to sign the JWT
Set, signing the OAuth 2.0 access tokens using JWS or to encrypt the Claims Set, signing the OAuth 2.0 access tokens using JWS, or
CEK in JWE for encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages. encrypting the CEK in JWE for encrypting JSON objects in HTTP
messages.
To reduce the risk of specific cross-protocol attacks, the relying To reduce the risk of specific cross-protocol attacks, the relying
party or the relying party software may additionally prohibit use of party or the relying party software may additionally prohibit use of
specific combinations of KeyPurposeIds. The procedure for allowing specific combinations of KeyPurposeIds. The procedure for allowing
or disallowing combinations of KeyPurposeIds using Excluded or disallowing combinations of KeyPurposeIds using Excluded
KeyPurposeId and Permitted KeyPurposeId, as carried out by a relying KeyPurposeId and Permitted KeyPurposeId, as carried out by a relying
party, is defined in Section 4 of [RFC9336]. Examples of Excluded party, is defined in Section 4 of [RFC9336]. Examples of Excluded
KeyPurposeId include the presence of the anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeIds include the presence of the anyExtendedKeyUsage
KeyPurposeId or the complete absence of the EKU extension in a KeyPurposeId or the complete absence of the EKU extension in a
certificate. Examples of Permitted KeyPurposeId include the presence certificate. Examples of Permitted KeyPurposeIds include the
of id-kp-jwt, id-kp-httpContentEncrypt or id-kp- presence of id-kp-jwt, id-kp-httpContentEncrypt, or id-kp-
oauthAccessTokenSigning KeyPurposeId. oauthAccessTokenSigning KeyPurposeIds.
7. Privacy Considerations 7. Privacy Considerations
In some security protocols, such as TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], certificates In some security protocols, such as TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], certificates
are exchanged in the clear. In other security protocols, such as TLS are exchanged in the clear. In other security protocols, such as TLS
1.3 [RFC8446], the certificates are encrypted. The inclusion of the 1.3 [RFC8446], the certificates are encrypted. The inclusion of the
EKU extension can help an observer determine the purpose of the EKU extension can help an observer determine the purpose of the
certificate. In addition, If the certificate is issued by a public certificate. In addition, if the certificate is issued by a public
certification authority, the inclusion of EKU extension can help an certification authority, the inclusion of an EKU extension can help
attacker to monitor the Certificate Transparency logs [RFC9162] to an attacker to monitor the Certificate Transparency logs [RFC9162] to
identify the purpose of the certificate. identify the purpose of the certificate.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to register the following OIDs in the "SMI Security IANA has registered the following OIDs in the "SMI Security for PKIX
for PKIX Extended Key Purpose" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3). These Extended Key Purpose" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3). These OIDs are
OIDs are defined in Section 4. defined in Section 4.
+=========+===============================+============+ +=========+===============================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+===============================+============+ +=========+===============================+============+
| TBD1 | id-kp-jwt | This-RFC | | 37 | id-kp-jwt | RFC 9509 |
+---------+-------------------------------+------------+ +---------+-------------------------------+------------+
| TBD2 | id-kp-httpContentEncrypt | This-RFC | | 38 | id-kp-httpContentEncrypt | RFC 9509 |
+---------+-------------------------------+------------+ +---------+-------------------------------+------------+
| TBD3 | id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning | This-RFC | | 39 | id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning | RFC 9509 |
+---------+-------------------------------+------------+ +---------+-------------------------------+------------+
Figure 1: Table 1 Table 1
IANA is also requested to register the following ASN.1[X.680] module
OID in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry
(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0). This OID is defined in Appendix A.
+=========+==========================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+==========================+============+
| TBD4 | id-mod-nf-eku | This-RFC |
+---------+--------------------------+------------+
Figure 2: Table 2
9. Contributors
The following individuals have contributed to this document:
German Peinado
Nokia
Email: german.peinado@nokia.com
10. Acknowledgments IANA has registered the following ASN.1[X.680] module OID in the "SMI
Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0).
This OID is defined in Appendix A.
We would like to thank Corey Bonnell, Ilari Liusvaara, Carl Wallace +=========+===============+============+
and Russ Housley for their useful feedback. Thanks to Yoav Nir for | Decimal | Description | References |
the secdir review, Elwyn Davies for the genart review and Benson +=========+===============+============+
Muite for the intdir review. | 108 | id-mod-nf-eku | RFC 9509 |
+---------+---------------+------------+
Thanks to Paul Wouters, Lars Eggert, and Éric Vyncke for the IESG Table 2
review.
11. References 9. References
11.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
skipping to change at page 8, line 39 skipping to change at line 333
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[X.680] "ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation [X.680] ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T
Recommendation X.680, February 2021.", Recommendation X.680, February 2021,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>. <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>.
[X.690] "ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: [X.690] ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, February 2021,", (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, February 2021,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690>. <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690>.
11.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX [RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014, Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.
skipping to change at page 9, line 27 skipping to change at line 368
[RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate [RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate
Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162, Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162,
December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162>. December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162>.
[RFC9336] Ito, T., Okubo, T., and S. Turner, "X.509 Certificate [RFC9336] Ito, T., Okubo, T., and S. Turner, "X.509 Certificate
General-Purpose Extended Key Usage (EKU) for Document General-Purpose Extended Key Usage (EKU) for Document
Signing", RFC 9336, DOI 10.17487/RFC9336, December 2022, Signing", RFC 9336, DOI 10.17487/RFC9336, December 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9336>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9336>.
[TS23.501] "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical [TS23.501] 3GPP, "System architecture for the 5G System (5GS)",
Specification Group Services and System Aspects; System Release 18.4.0, 3GPP TS 23.501, December 2023,
architecture for the 5G System (5GS); Stage 2 (Release
18), 3GPP TS 23.501 V18.0.0 Dec 2022,",
<https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/ <https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/
archive/23_series/23.501/23501-i00.zip>. archive/23_series/23.501/23501-i40.zip>.
[TS33.210] "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical [TS29.500] 3GPP, "5G System; Technical Realization of Service Based
Specification Group Services and System Aspects;Network Architecture; Stage 3", Release 18.4.0, 3GPP TS 29.500,
Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security (Release December 2023, <https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/
17), 3GPP TS 33.210 V17.1.0 Sept 2022,", archive/29_series/29.500/29500-i40.zip>.
[TS29.573] 3GPP, "5G System; Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN)
Interconnection; Stage 3", Release 18.5.0, 3GPP TS 29.573,
December 2023, <https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/
archive/29_series/29.573/29573-i50.zip>.
[TS33.210] 3GPP, "Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer
security", Release 17.1.0, 3GPP TS 33.210, September 2022,
<https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/ <https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/
archive/33_series/33.210/33210-h10.zip>. archive/33_series/33.210/33210-h10.zip>.
[TS33.310] "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical [TS33.310] 3GPP, "Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication
Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Network Framework (AF)", Release 18.2.0, 3GPP TS 33.310, December
Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF) 2023, <https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/
(Release 17), 3GPP 33.310 V17.4.0, Sept 2022,", archive/33_series/33.310/33310-i20.zip>.
<https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/
archive/33_series/33.310/33310-h40.zip>.
[TS33.501] "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical [TS33.501] 3GPP, "Security architecture and procedures for 5G
Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security system", Release 18.4.0, 3GPP TS 33.501, December 2023,
architecture and procedures for 5G system (Release 17), ,
3GPP TS:33.501 V17.7.0, Sept 2022,",
<https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/ <https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/
archive/33_series/33.501/33501-h70.zip>. archive/33_series/33.501/33501-i40.zip>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
The following module adheres to ASN.1 specifications [X.680] and The following module adheres to ASN.1 specifications [X.680] and
[X.690]. [X.690].
<CODE BEGINS> <CODE BEGINS>
NF-EKU NF-EKU
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-nf-eku (TBD4) } id-mod-nf-eku (108) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- OID Arc -- OID Arc
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }
-- Extended Key Usage Values -- Extended Key Usage Values
id-kp-jwt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD1 } id-kp-jwt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 37 }
id-kp-httpContentEncrypt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD2 } id-kp-httpContentEncrypt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 38 }
id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD3 } id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 39 }
END END
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Corey Bonnell, Ilari Liusvaara, Carl Wallace,
and Russ Housley for their useful feedback. Thanks to Yoav Nir for
the secdir review, Elwyn Davies for the genart review, and Benson
Muite for the intdir review.
Thanks to Paul Wouters, Lars Eggert, and Éric Vyncke for the IESG
review.
Contributor
The following individual has contributed to this document:
German Peinado
Nokia
Email: german.peinado@nokia.com
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Tirumaleswar Reddy Tirumaleswar Reddy.K
Nokia Nokia
India India
Email: kondtir@gmail.com Email: kondtir@gmail.com
Jani Ekman Jani Ekman
Nokia Nokia
Finland Finland
Email: jani.ekman@nokia.com Email: jani.ekman@nokia.com
Daniel Migault Daniel Migault
Ericsson Ericsson
Canada Canada
Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com
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