Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Snijders
Request for Comments: 9582 Fastly
Obsoletes: 6482 B. Maddison
Category: Standards Track Workonline
ISSN: 2070-1721 M. Lepinski
Carleton College
D. Kong
Raytheon
S. Kent
Independent
May 2024
A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin
Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that
provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has
authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or
more prefixes within the address block. This document obsoletes RFC
6482.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9582.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Requirements Language
1.2. Changes from RFC 6482
2. Related Work
3. The ROA Content Type
4. The ROA eContent
4.1. The version Element
4.2. The asID Element
4.3. The ipAddrBlocks Element
4.3.1. Type ROAIPAddressFamily
4.3.2. Type ROAIPAddress
4.3.3. Canonical Form for ipAddrBlocks
5. ROA Validation
6. Security Considerations
7. IANA Considerations
7.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)
7.2. RPKI Signed Objects Registry
7.3. File Extension
7.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)
7.5. Media Type
8. References
8.1. Normative References
8.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Example ROA eContent Payload
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more
information.) As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow
entities to verify that an Autonomous System (AS) has been given
permission by an IP address block holder to advertise routes to one
or more prefixes within that block. A Route Origin Authorization
(ROA) provides this function.
The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects
[RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) wrapper
[RFC5652] for the ROA content as well as a generic validation
procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore, to complete the
specification of the ROA (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document
defines:
* The OID that identifies the signed object as being a ROA. (This
OID appears within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object
as well as the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo
object.)
* The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent. (This is the payload that
specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as well as
the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.) The ROA
eContent is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER) [X.690].
* Additional steps required to validate ROAs (in addition to the
validation steps specified in [RFC6488]).
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Changes from RFC 6482
This section summarizes the significant changes between [RFC6482] and
the profile described in this document.
* Clarified the requirements for the IP address and AS identifier
X.509 certificate extensions.
* Strengthened the ASN.1 formal notation and definitions.
* Incorporated errata for RFC 6482.
* Added an example ROA eContent payload, and a complete ROA
(Appendix A).
* Specified a canonicalization procedure for the content of
ipAddrBlocks.
2. Related Work
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "X.509
Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779].
Additionally, this document makes use of the RPKI signed object
profile [RFC6488]; thus, familiarity with that document is assumed.
Note that the RPKI signed object profile makes use of certificates
adhering to the RPKI resource certificate profile [RFC6487]; thus,
familiarity with that profile is also assumed.
3. The ROA Content Type
The content-type for a ROA is defined as id-ct-routeOriginAuthz and
has the numerical value 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24.
This OID MUST appear within both the eContentType in the
encapContentInfo object and the content-type signed attribute in the
signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]).
4. The ROA eContent
The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized
by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or
more IP address prefixes that will be advertised. If the address
space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same
set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS
number. A ROA is formally defined as:
RPKI-ROA-2023
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0)
id-mod-rpkiROA-2023(75) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;
ct-routeOriginAttestation CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE RouteOriginAttestation
IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-routeOriginAuthz }
id-ct-routeOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) routeOriginAuthz(24) }
RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
asID ASID,
ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }
ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
addressFamily ADDRESS-FAMILY.&afi ({AddressFamilySet}),
addresses ADDRESS-FAMILY.&Addresses
({AddressFamilySet}{@addressFamily}) }
ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= CLASS {
&afi OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) UNIQUE,
&Addresses
} WITH SYNTAX { AFI &afi ADDRESSES &Addresses }
AddressFamilySet ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
{ addressFamilyIPv4 | addressFamilyIPv6 }
addressFamilyIPv4 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
{ AFI afi-IPv4 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv4 }
addressFamilyIPv6 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
{ AFI afi-IPv6 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv6 }
afi-IPv4 OCTET STRING ::= '0001'H
afi-IPv6 OCTET STRING ::= '0002'H
ROAAddressesIPv4 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv4}
ROAAddressesIPv6 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv6}
ub-IPv4 INTEGER ::= 32
ub-IPv6 INTEGER ::= 128
ROAIPAddress {INTEGER: ub} ::= SEQUENCE {
address BIT STRING (SIZE(0..ub)),
maxLength INTEGER (0..ub) OPTIONAL }
END
4.1. The version Element
The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation entry MUST be 0.
4.2. The asID Element
The asID element contains the AS number that is authorized to
originate routes to the given IP address prefixes.
4.3. The ipAddrBlocks Element
The ipAddrBlocks element encodes the set of IP address prefixes to
which the AS is authorized to originate routes. Note that the syntax
here is more restrictive than that used in the IP address delegation
extension defined in [RFC3779]. That extension can represent
arbitrary address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only IP
prefixes.
4.3.1. Type ROAIPAddressFamily
Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, the addressFamily element
contains the Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family.
This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6; therefore,
addressFamily MUST be either 0001 or 0002. IPv4 prefixes MUST NOT
appear as IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (Section 2.5.5.2 of [RFC4291]).
There MUST be only one instance of ROAIPAddressFamily per unique AFI
in the ROA. Thus, the ROAIPAddressFamily structure MUST NOT appear
more than twice.
The addresses field contains IP prefixes as a sequence of type
ROAIPAddress.
4.3.2. Type ROAIPAddress
A ROAIPAddress structure is a sequence containing an address element
of type IPAddress BIT STRING and an optional maxLength element of type INTEGER.
See Section 2.2.3.8 of [RFC3779] for more details on type IPAddress.
4.3.2.1. The address Element
The address element is of type IPAddress BIT STRING and represents a single IP
address prefix. This field uses the same representation of an IP
address prefix as a BIT STRING as the IPAddress type defined in
Section 2.2.3.8 of [RFC3779].
4.3.2.2. The maxLength Element
When present, the maxLength element specifies the maximum length of
the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise. The
maxLength element SHOULD NOT be encoded if the maximum length is
equal to the prefix length. Certification Authorities SHOULD
anticipate that future Relying Parties will become increasingly
stringent in considering the presence of superfluous maxLength
elements an encoding error.
If present, the maxLength element MUST be:
* an integer greater than or equal to the length of the accompanying
prefix, and
* less than or equal to the maximum length (in bits) of an IP
address in the applicable address family: 32 in the case of IPv4
and 128 in the case of IPv6.
For example, if the IP address prefix is 203.0.113.0/24 and maxLength
is 26, the AS is authorized to advertise any more-specific prefix
with a maximum length of 26. In this example, the AS would be
authorized to advertise 203.0.113.0/24, 203.0.113.128/25, or
203.0.113.192/26, but not 203.0.113.0/27. See [RFC9319] for more
information on the use of maxLength.
When the maxLength element is not present, the AS is only authorized
to advertise the exact prefix specified in the ROAIPAddress
structure's address element.
4.3.2.3. Note on Overlapping or Superfluous Information Encoding
Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP address prefix (within a
ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP address
prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element). For example, a ROA
may contain the prefix 203.0.113.0/24 with maxLength 26, as well as
the prefix 203.0.113.0/28 with maxLength 28. This ROA would
authorize the indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with
203.0.113 with a minimum length of 24 and a maximum length of 26, as
well as the specific prefix 203.0.113.0/28.
Additionally, a ROA MAY contain two ROAIPAddress elements, where the
IP address prefix is identical in both cases. However, this is NOT
RECOMMENDED, because in such a case, the ROAIPAddress element with
the shorter maxLength grants no additional privileges to the
indicated AS and thus can be omitted without changing the meaning of
the ROA.
4.3.3. Canonical Form for ipAddrBlocks
As the data structure described by the ROA ASN.1 module allows for
many different ways to represent the same set of IP address
information, a canonical form is defined such that every set of IP
address information has a unique representation. In order to produce
and verify this canonical form, the process described in this section
SHOULD be used to ensure that information elements are unique with
respect to one another and sorted in ascending order. Certification
Authorities SHOULD anticipate that future Relying Parties will impose
a strict requirement for the ipAddrBlocks field to be in this
canonical form. This canonicalization procedure builds upon the
canonicalization procedure specified in Section 2.2.3.6 of [RFC3779].
In order to semantically compare, sort, and deduplicate the contents
of the ipAddrBlocks field, each ROAIPAddress element is mapped to an
abstract data element composed of four integer values:
afi The AFI value appearing in the addressFamily field of the
containing ROAIPAddressFamily as an integer.
addr The first IP address of the IP prefix appearing in the
ROAIPAddress address field, as a 32-bit (IPv4) or 128-bit (IPv6)
integer value.
plen The length of the IP prefix appearing in the ROAIPAddress
address field as an integer value.
mlen The value appearing in the maxLength field of the ROAIPAddress
element, if present; otherwise, the above prefix length value.
Thus, the equality or relative order of two ROAIPAddress elements can
be tested by comparing their abstract representations.
4.3.3.1. Comparator
The set of ipAddrBlocks is totally ordered. The order of two
ipAddrBlocks is determined by the first non-equal comparison in the
following list.
1. Data elements with a lower afi value precede data elements with a
higher afi value.
2. Data elements with a lower addr value precede data elements with
a higher addr value.
3. Data elements with a lower plen value precede data elements with
a higher plen value.
4. Data elements with a lower mlen value precede data elements with
a higher mlen value.
Data elements for which all four values compare equal are duplicates
of one another.
4.3.3.2. Example Implementations
* A sorting implementation [roasort-c] in ISO/IEC 9899:1999
("ANSI C99").
* A sorting implementation [roasort-rs] in the Rust 2021 Edition.
5. ROA Validation
Before a Relying Party can use a ROA to validate a routing
announcement, the Relying Party MUST first validate the ROA. To
validate a ROA, the Relying Party MUST perform all the validation
checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional
ROA-specific validation steps:
* The IP address delegation extension [RFC3779] is present in the
end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ROA), and every
IP address prefix in the ROA payload is contained within the set
of IP addresses specified by the EE certificate's IP address
delegation extension.
* The EE certificate's IP address delegation extension MUST NOT
contain "inherit" elements as described in [RFC3779].
* The Autonomous System identifier delegation extension described in
[RFC3779] is not used in ROAs and MUST NOT be present in the EE
certificate.
* The ROA content fully conforms with all requirements specified in
Sections 3 and 4.
If any of the above checks fail, the ROA in its entirety MUST be
considered invalid and an error SHOULD be logged.
6. Security Considerations
There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it
is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are
accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is
no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used
for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication.
Although the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no
intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.
The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to
originate a route to the prefix or prefixes in the ROA. Thus, the
integrity of a ROA MUST be established. This ROA specification makes
use of the RPKI signed object format; thus, all security
considerations discussed in [RFC6488] also apply to ROAs.
Additionally, the signed object profile uses the CMS signed message
format for integrity; thus, ROAs inherit all security considerations
associated with that data structure.
The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate
routes to the prefix or prefixes is established through the use of
the address space and AS number PKI as described in [RFC6480].
Specifically, one MUST verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509
certificate issued under this PKI and check that the prefix or
prefixes in the ROA are contained within those in the certificate's
IP address delegation extension.
7. IANA Considerations
7.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)
IANA has updated the id-ct-routeOriginAuthz entry in the "SMI
Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)"
registry as follows:
+=========+========================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+========================+============+
| 24 | id-ct-routeOriginAuthz | RFC 9582 |
+---------+------------------------+------------+
Table 1
7.2. RPKI Signed Objects Registry
IANA has updated the Route Origination Authorization entry in the
"RPKI Signed Objects" registry created by [RFC6488] as follows:
+===================+============================+===========+
| Name | OID | Reference |
+===================+============================+===========+
| Route Origination | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24 | RFC 9582 |
| Authorization | | |
+-------------------+----------------------------+-----------+
Table 2
7.3. File Extension
IANA has updated the entry for the ROA file extension in the "RPKI
Repository Name Schemes" registry created by [RFC6481] as follows:
+====================+=================================+===========+
| Filename Extension | RPKI Object | Reference |
+====================+=================================+===========+
| .roa | Route Origination Authorization | RFC 9582 |
+--------------------+---------------------------------+-----------+
Table 3
7.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)
IANA has allocated the following entry in the "SMI Security for S/
MIME
S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:
+=========+=====================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=====================+============+
| 75 | id-mod-rpkiROA-2023 | RFC 9582 |
+---------+---------------------+------------+
Table 4
7.5. Media Type
IANA has updated the media type application/rpki-roa in the "Media
Types" registry as follows:
Type name: application
Subtype name: rpki-roa
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: Carries an RPKI ROA (RFC 9582). This media
type contains no active content. See Section 6 of RFC 9582 for
further information.
Interoperability considerations: None
Published specification: RFC 9582
Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators
Additional information:
Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined in
[RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of prefixes and
an AS identifier as defined in RFC 9582.
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .roa
Macintosh file type code(s): None
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: None
Change controller: IETF
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[X.690] ITU-T, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, February 2021.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC9319] Gilad, Y., Goldberg, S., Sriram, K., Snijders, J., and B.
Maddison, "The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185, RFC 9319,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9319, October 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9319>.
[roasort-c]
Snijders, J., "ROA sorter in C", commit 68969ea, July
2023, <https://github.com/job/roasort>.
[roasort-rs]
Maddison, B., "ROA sorter in Rust", commit 023e756, August
2023, <https://github.com/benmaddison/roasort>.
Appendix A. Example ROA eContent Payload
An example of a DER-encoded ROA eContent is provided below, with
annotation following the "#" character.
$ echo 16i 301802030100003011300F040200023009300703050020010DB8 P \
| dc | openssl asn1parse -inform DER -i -dump
0:d=0 hl=2 l= 24 cons: SEQUENCE # RouteOriginAttestation
2:d=1 hl=2 l= 3 prim: INTEGER :010000 # asID 65536
7:d=1 hl=2 l= 17 cons: SEQUENCE # ipAddrBlocks
9:d=2 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddressFamily
11:d=3 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OCTET STRING # addressFamily
0000 - 00 02 # IPv6
15:d=3 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE # addresses
17:d=4 hl=2 l= 7 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddress
19:d=5 hl=2 l= 5 prim: BIT STRING # 2001:db8::/32
0000 - 00 20 01 0d b8
Below is a complete RPKI ROA signed object, Base64 encoded per
[RFC4648].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The object in this appendix has the following properties:
Object size: 1668 octets
Object SHA256 message digest:
3a39e0b652e79ddf6efdd178ad5e3b29e0121b1e593b89f1e0ac18f3ba60d5e7
CMS signing time: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000
X.509 end-entity certificate
Subject key id: DE145B193FB320B25A744355298C8BF7C2523D22
Authority key id: D67208EA470E9D6DD6654022F553ADC1389AB434
Issuer: CN=86525cd5-44d7-4df9-8079-4a9dcdf26944
Serial: 3
Not before: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000
Not after: Thu 01 May 2025 00:34:13 +0000
IP address delegation: 2001:db8::/32
ROA eContent
asID: 65536
addresses: 2001:db8::/32
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Theo Buehler, Ties de Kock, Martin
Hoffmann, Charles Gardiner, Russ Housley, Jeffrey Haas, Bob Beck, and
Tom Harrison for their help and contributions. Additionally, the
authors thank Jim Fenton, Vijay Gurbani, Haoyu Song, Rob Austein,
Roque Gagliano, Danny McPherson, Sam Weiler, Jasdip Singh, and Murray
S. Kucherawy for their careful reviews and helpful comments.
Authors' Addresses
Job Snijders
Fastly
Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Email: job@fastly.com
Ben Maddison
Workonline
Cape Town
South Africa
Email: benm@workonline.africa
Matthew Lepinski
Carleton College
Email: mlepinski@carleton.edu
Derrick Kong
Raytheon
Email: derrick.kong@raytheon.com
Stephen Kent
Independent
Email: kent@alum.mit.edu