rfc9582.original   rfc9582.txt 
Network Working Group J. Snijders Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Snijders
Internet-Draft Fastly Request for Comments: 9582 Fastly
Obsoletes: 6482 (if approved) B. Maddison Obsoletes: 6482 B. Maddison
Intended status: Standards Track Workonline Category: Standards Track Workonline
Expires: 16 June 2024 M. Lepinski ISSN: 2070-1721 M. Lepinski
Carleton College Carleton College
D. Kong D. Kong
Raytheon Raytheon
S. Kent S. Kent
Independent Independent
14 December 2023 May 2024
A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
draft-ietf-sidrops-rfc6482bis-09
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin
Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that
provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has
authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or
more prefixes within the address block. This document obsoletes RFC more prefixes within the address block. This document obsoletes RFC
6482. 6482.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9582.
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 June 2024.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction
1.1. Changes from RFC6482 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Language
2. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Changes from RFC 6482
3. The ROA ContentType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Related Work
4. The ROA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. The ROA Content Type
4.1. Element version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. The ROA eContent
4.2. Element asID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. The version Element
4.3. Element ipAddrBlocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. The asID Element
4.3.1. Type ROAIPAddressFamily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.3. The ipAddrBlocks Element
4.3.2. Type ROAIPAddress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.3.1. Type ROAIPAddressFamily
4.3.3. Canonical form for ipAddrBlocks . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.3.2. Type ROAIPAddress
5. ROA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.3.3. Canonical Form for ipAddrBlocks
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. ROA Validation
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Security Considerations
7. IANA Considerations
7.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type 7.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)
7.2. RPKI Signed Objects sub-registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7.2. RPKI Signed Objects Registry
7.3. File Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7.3. File Extension
7.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier 7.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)
7.5. Media Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.5. Media Type
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. References
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.1. Normative References
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Appendix A. Example ROA eContent Payload
Appendix B. Example ROA eContent Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more
information.) As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow information.) As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow
entities to verify that an AS has been given permission by an IP entities to verify that an Autonomous System (AS) has been given
address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes permission by an IP address block holder to advertise routes to one
within that block. A ROA provides this function. or more prefixes within that block. A Route Origin Authorization
(ROA) provides this function.
The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects
[RFC6488], which defines a Crytopgraphic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) wrapper
[RFC5652] wrapper for the ROA content as well as a generic validation [RFC5652] for the ROA content as well as a generic validation
procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore, to complete the procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore, to complete the
specification of the ROA (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document specification of the ROA (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document
defines: defines:
* The OID that identifies the signed object as being a ROA. (This * The OID that identifies the signed object as being a ROA. (This
OID appears within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object OID appears within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object
as well as the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo as well as the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo
object). object.)
* The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent. (This is the payload that * The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent. (This is the payload that
specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as well as specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as well as
the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.) The ROA the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.) The ROA
eContent is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules eContent is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER) [X.690]. (DER) [X.690].
* Additional steps required to validate ROAs (in addition to the * Additional steps required to validate ROAs (in addition to the
validation steps specified in [RFC6488]). validation steps specified in [RFC6488]).
1.1. Changes from RFC6482 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Changes from RFC 6482
This section summarizes the significant changes between [RFC6482] and This section summarizes the significant changes between [RFC6482] and
the profile described in this document. the profile described in this document.
* Clarified the requirements for the IP Addresses and AS Identifiers * Clarified the requirements for the IP address and AS identifier
X.509 certificate extensions. X.509 certificate extensions.
* Strengthened the ASN.1 formal notation and definitions. * Strengthened the ASN.1 formal notation and definitions.
* Incorporated RFC 6482 Errata. * Incorporated errata for RFC 6482.
* Added an example ROA eContent payload and an ROA. * Added an example ROA eContent payload, and a complete ROA
(Appendix A).
* Specified a canonicalization procedure for the content of * Specified a canonicalization procedure for the content of
ipAddrBlocks. ipAddrBlocks.
2. Related Work 2. Related Work
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "X.509 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "X.509
Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779]. Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779].
Additionally, this document makes use of the RPKI signed object Additionally, this document makes use of the RPKI signed object
profile [RFC6488]; thus, familiarity with that document is assumed. profile [RFC6488]; thus, familiarity with that document is assumed.
Note that the RPKI signed object profile makes use of certificates Note that the RPKI signed object profile makes use of certificates
adhering to the RPKI Resource Certificate Profile [RFC6487]; thus, adhering to the RPKI resource certificate profile [RFC6487]; thus,
familiarly with that profile is also assumed. familiarity with that profile is also assumed.
3. The ROA ContentType 3. The ROA Content Type
The content-type for a ROA is defined as routeOriginAuthz and has the The content-type for a ROA is defined as id-ct-routeOriginAuthz and
numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24. has the numerical value 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24.
This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the This OID MUST appear within both the eContentType in the
encapContentInfo object as well as the ContentType signed attribute encapContentInfo object and the content-type signed attribute in the
in the signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]). signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]).
4. The ROA eContent 4. The ROA eContent
The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized
by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or
more IP address prefixes that will be advertised. If the address more IP address prefixes that will be advertised. If the address
space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same
set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS
number. A ROA is formally defined as: number. A ROA is formally defined as:
RPKI-ROA-2023 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) RPKI-ROA-2023
pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiROA-2023(TBD) } { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0)
id-mod-rpkiROA-2023(75) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
IMPORTS IMPORTS
CONTENT-TYPE CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268] FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ; pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;
skipping to change at page 5, line 16 skipping to change at line 204
RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0, version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
asID ASID, asID ASID,
ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily } ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }
ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295) ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE { ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
addressFamily ADDRESS-FAMILY.&afi ({AddressFamilySet}), addressFamily ADDRESS-FAMILY.&afi ({AddressFamilySet}),
addresses ADDRESS-FAMILY.&Addresses ({AddressFamilySet}{@addressFamily}) } addresses ADDRESS-FAMILY.&Addresses
({AddressFamilySet}{@addressFamily}) }
ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= CLASS { ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= CLASS {
&afi OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) UNIQUE, &afi OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) UNIQUE,
&Addresses &Addresses
} WITH SYNTAX { AFI &afi ADDRESSES &Addresses } } WITH SYNTAX { AFI &afi ADDRESSES &Addresses }
AddressFamilySet ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= AddressFamilySet ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
{ addressFamilyIPv4 | addressFamilyIPv6 } { addressFamilyIPv4 | addressFamilyIPv6 }
addressFamilyIPv4 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= addressFamilyIPv4 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
{ AFI afi-IPv4 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv4 } { AFI afi-IPv4 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv4 }
addressFamilyIPv6 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= addressFamilyIPv6 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
{ AFI afi-IPv6 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv6 } { AFI afi-IPv6 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv6 }
afi-IPv4 OCTET STRING ::= '0001'H afi-IPv4 OCTET STRING ::= '0001'H
afi-IPv6 OCTET STRING ::= '0002'H afi-IPv6 OCTET STRING ::= '0002'H
ROAAddressesIPv4 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{32} ROAAddressesIPv4 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv4}
ROAAddressesIPv6 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{128} ROAAddressesIPv6 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv6}
ROAIPAddress {INTEGER: len} ::= SEQUENCE { ub-IPv4 INTEGER ::= 32
address BIT STRING (SIZE(0..len)), ub-IPv6 INTEGER ::= 128
maxLength INTEGER (0..len) OPTIONAL }
ROAIPAddress {INTEGER: ub} ::= SEQUENCE {
address BIT STRING (SIZE(0..ub)),
maxLength INTEGER (0..ub) OPTIONAL }
END END
4.1. Element version 4.1. The version Element
The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation MUST be 0. The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation entry MUST be 0.
4.2. Element asID 4.2. The asID Element
The asID element contains the AS number that is authorized to The asID element contains the AS number that is authorized to
originate routes to the given IP address prefixes. originate routes to the given IP address prefixes.
4.3. Element ipAddrBlocks 4.3. The ipAddrBlocks Element
The ipAddrBlocks element encodes the set of IP address prefixes to The ipAddrBlocks element encodes the set of IP address prefixes to
which the AS is authorized to originate routes. Note that the syntax which the AS is authorized to originate routes. Note that the syntax
here is more restrictive than that used in the IP Address Delegation here is more restrictive than that used in the IP address delegation
extension defined in [RFC3779]. That extension can represent extension defined in [RFC3779]. That extension can represent
arbitrary address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only IP arbitrary address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only IP
prefixes. prefixes.
4.3.1. Type ROAIPAddressFamily 4.3.1. Type ROAIPAddressFamily
Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, the addressFamily element Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, the addressFamily element
contains the Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family. contains the Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family.
This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6, therefore This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6; therefore,
addressFamily MUST be either 0001 or 0002. IPv4 prefixes MUST NOT addressFamily MUST be either 0001 or 0002. IPv4 prefixes MUST NOT
appear as IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Addresses (section 2.5.5.2 of [RFC4291]). appear as IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (Section 2.5.5.2 of [RFC4291]).
There MUST be only one instance of ROAIPAddressFamily per unique AFI There MUST be only one instance of ROAIPAddressFamily per unique AFI
in the ROA. Thus, the ROAIPAddressFamily structure MUST NOT appear in the ROA. Thus, the ROAIPAddressFamily structure MUST NOT appear
more than twice. more than twice.
The addresses element represents IP prefixes as a sequence of type The addresses field contains IP prefixes as a sequence of type
ROAIPAddress. ROAIPAddress.
4.3.2. Type ROAIPAddress 4.3.2. Type ROAIPAddress
A ROAIPAddress structure is a sequence containing an address element A ROAIPAddress structure is a sequence containing an address element
of type IPAddress and an optional maxLength element of type INTEGER. of type BIT STRING and an optional maxLength element of type INTEGER.
See section 2.2.3.8 of [RFC3779] for more details on type IPAddress.
4.3.2.1. Element address 4.3.2.1. The address Element
The address element is of type IPAddress and represents a single IP The address element is of type BIT STRING and represents a single IP
address prefix. address prefix. This field uses the same representation of an IP
address prefix as a BIT STRING as the IPAddress type defined in
Section 2.2.3.8 of [RFC3779].
4.3.2.2. Element maxLength 4.3.2.2. The maxLength Element
When present, the maxLength specifies the maximum length of the IP When present, the maxLength element specifies the maximum length of
address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise. The maxLength the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise. The
element SHOULD NOT be encoded if the maximum length is equal to the maxLength element SHOULD NOT be encoded if the maximum length is
prefix length. Certification Authorities SHOULD anticipate that equal to the prefix length. Certification Authorities SHOULD
future Relying Parties will become increasingly stringent in anticipate that future Relying Parties will become increasingly
considering the presence of superfluous maxLength elements an stringent in considering the presence of superfluous maxLength
encoding error. elements an encoding error.
If present, the maxLength MUST be: If present, the maxLength element MUST be:
* an integer greater than or equal to the length of the accompanying * an integer greater than or equal to the length of the accompanying
prefix, and prefix, and
* less than or equal to the maximum length (in bits) of an IP * less than or equal to the maximum length (in bits) of an IP
address in the applicable address family: 32 in case of IPv4 and address in the applicable address family: 32 in the case of IPv4
128 in case of IPv6. and 128 in the case of IPv6.
For example, if the IP address prefix is 203.0.113.0/24 and the For example, if the IP address prefix is 203.0.113.0/24 and maxLength
maxLength is 26, the AS is authorized to advertise any more specific is 26, the AS is authorized to advertise any more-specific prefix
prefix with a maximum length of 26. In this example, the AS would be with a maximum length of 26. In this example, the AS would be
authorized to advertise 203.0.113.0/24, 203.0.113.128/25, or authorized to advertise 203.0.113.0/24, 203.0.113.128/25, or
203.0.113.192/26; but not 203.0.113.0/27. See [RFC9319] for more 203.0.113.192/26, but not 203.0.113.0/27. See [RFC9319] for more
information on the use of maxLength. information on the use of maxLength.
When the maxLength is not present, the AS is only authorized to When the maxLength element is not present, the AS is only authorized
advertise the exact prefix specified in the ROAIPAddress' address to advertise the exact prefix specified in the ROAIPAddress
element. structure's address element.
4.3.2.3. Note on overlapping or superfluous information encoding 4.3.2.3. Note on Overlapping or Superfluous Information Encoding
Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP address prefix (within a Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP address prefix (within a
ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP address ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP address
prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element). For example, a ROA prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element). For example, a ROA
may contain the prefix 203.0.113.0/24 with maxLength 26, as well as may contain the prefix 203.0.113.0/24 with maxLength 26, as well as
the prefix 203.0.113.0/28 with maxLength 28. This ROA would the prefix 203.0.113.0/28 with maxLength 28. This ROA would
authorize the indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with authorize the indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with
203.0.113 with a minimum length of 24 and a maximum length of 26, as 203.0.113 with a minimum length of 24 and a maximum length of 26, as
well as the specific prefix 203.0.113.0/28. well as the specific prefix 203.0.113.0/28.
Additionally, a ROA MAY contain two ROAIPAddress elements, where the Additionally, a ROA MAY contain two ROAIPAddress elements, where the
IP address prefix is identical in both cases. However, this is NOT IP address prefix is identical in both cases. However, this is NOT
RECOMMENDED as, in such a case, the ROAIPAddress with the shorter RECOMMENDED, because in such a case, the ROAIPAddress element with
maxLength grants no additional privileges to the indicated AS and the shorter maxLength grants no additional privileges to the
thus can be omitted without changing the meaning of the ROA. indicated AS and thus can be omitted without changing the meaning of
the ROA.
4.3.3. Canonical form for ipAddrBlocks 4.3.3. Canonical Form for ipAddrBlocks
As the data structure described by the ROA ASN.1 module allows for As the data structure described by the ROA ASN.1 module allows for
many different ways to represent the same set of IP address many different ways to represent the same set of IP address
information, a canonical form is defined such that every set of IP information, a canonical form is defined such that every set of IP
address information has a unique representation. In order to produce address information has a unique representation. In order to produce
and verify this canonical form, the process described in this section and verify this canonical form, the process described in this section
SHOULD be used to ensure information elements are unique with respect SHOULD be used to ensure that information elements are unique with
to one another and sorted in ascending order. Certification respect to one another and sorted in ascending order. Certification
Authorities SHOULD anticipate that future Relying Parties will impose Authorities SHOULD anticipate that future Relying Parties will impose
a strict requirement for the ipAddrBlocks field to be in this a strict requirement for the ipAddrBlocks field to be in this
canonical form. This canonicalization procedure builds upon the canonical form. This canonicalization procedure builds upon the
canonicalization procedure specified in section 2.2.3.6 of [RFC3779]. canonicalization procedure specified in Section 2.2.3.6 of [RFC3779].
In order to semantically compare, sort, and deduplicate the contents In order to semantically compare, sort, and deduplicate the contents
of the ipAddrBlocks field, each ROAIPAddress element is mapped to an of the ipAddrBlocks field, each ROAIPAddress element is mapped to an
abstract data element composed of four integer values: abstract data element composed of four integer values:
afi The AFI value appearing in the addressFamily field of the afi The AFI value appearing in the addressFamily field of the
containing ROAIPAddressFamily as an integer. containing ROAIPAddressFamily as an integer.
addr The first IP address of the IP prefix appearing in the addr The first IP address of the IP prefix appearing in the
ROAIPAddress address field, as a 32-bit (IPv4) or 128-bit (IPv6) ROAIPAddress address field, as a 32-bit (IPv4) or 128-bit (IPv6)
integer value. integer value.
plen The prefix length of the IP prefix appearing in the plen The length of the IP prefix appearing in the ROAIPAddress
ROAIPAddress address field as an integer value. address field as an integer value.
mlen The value appearing in the maxLength field of the ROAIPAddress, mlen The value appearing in the maxLength field of the ROAIPAddress
if present, otherwise the above prefix length value. element, if present; otherwise, the above prefix length value.
Thus, the equality or relative order of two ROAIPAddress elements can Thus, the equality or relative order of two ROAIPAddress elements can
be tested by comparing their abstract representations. be tested by comparing their abstract representations.
4.3.3.1. Comparator 4.3.3.1. Comparator
The set of ipAddrBlocks is totally ordered. The order of two The set of ipAddrBlocks is totally ordered. The order of two
ipAddrBlocks is determined by the first non-equal comparison in the ipAddrBlocks is determined by the first non-equal comparison in the
following list. following list.
skipping to change at page 8, line 46 skipping to change at line 383
3. Data elements with a lower plen value precede data elements with 3. Data elements with a lower plen value precede data elements with
a higher plen value. a higher plen value.
4. Data elements with a lower mlen value precede data elements with 4. Data elements with a lower mlen value precede data elements with
a higher mlen value. a higher mlen value.
Data elements for which all four values compare equal are duplicates Data elements for which all four values compare equal are duplicates
of one another. of one another.
4.3.3.2. Example implementations 4.3.3.2. Example Implementations
A sorting implementation [roasort-c] in ISO/IEC 9899:1999 * A sorting implementation [roasort-c] in ISO/IEC 9899:1999
("ANSI C99"). ("ANSI C99").
A sorting implementation [roasort-rs] in Rust 2021 Edition. * A sorting implementation [roasort-rs] in the Rust 2021 Edition.
5. ROA Validation 5. ROA Validation
Before a relying party can use a ROA to validate a routing Before a Relying Party can use a ROA to validate a routing
announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ROA. To announcement, the Relying Party MUST first validate the ROA. To
validate a ROA, the relying party MUST perform all the validation validate a ROA, the Relying Party MUST perform all the validation
checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional
ROA-specific validation steps: ROA-specific validation steps:
* The IP Address Delegation extension [RFC3779] is present in the * The IP address delegation extension [RFC3779] is present in the
end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ROA), and every end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ROA), and every
IP address prefix in the ROA payload is contained within the set IP address prefix in the ROA payload is contained within the set
of IP addresses specified by the EE certificate's IP Address of IP addresses specified by the EE certificate's IP address
Delegation extension. delegation extension.
* The EE certificate's IP Address Delegation extension MUST NOT * The EE certificate's IP address delegation extension MUST NOT
contain "inherit" elements described in [RFC3779]. contain "inherit" elements as described in [RFC3779].
* The Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension described in * The Autonomous System identifier delegation extension described in
[RFC3779] is not used in Route Origin Authorizations and MUST NOT [RFC3779] is not used in ROAs and MUST NOT be present in the EE
be present in the EE certificate. certificate.
* The ROA content fully conforms with all requirements specified in * The ROA content fully conforms with all requirements specified in
Section 3 and Section 4. Sections 3 and 4.
If any of the above checks fail, the ROA in its entirety MUST be If any of the above checks fail, the ROA in its entirety MUST be
considered invalid and an error SHOULD be logged. considered invalid and an error SHOULD be logged.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it
is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are
accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is
no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used
for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication. for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication.
Although the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no Although the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no
intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA. intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.
The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to
originate a route to the prefix(es) in the ROA. Thus, the integrity originate a route to the prefix or prefixes in the ROA. Thus, the
of a ROA MUST be established. The ROA specification makes use of the integrity of a ROA MUST be established. This ROA specification makes
RPKI signed object format; thus, all security considerations in use of the RPKI signed object format; thus, all security
[RFC6488] also apply to ROAs. Additionally, the signed object considerations discussed in [RFC6488] also apply to ROAs.
profile uses the CMS signed message format for integrity; thus, ROAs Additionally, the signed object profile uses the CMS signed message
inherit all security considerations associated with that data format for integrity; thus, ROAs inherit all security considerations
structure. associated with that data structure.
The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate
routes to the prefix(es) is established through use of the address routes to the prefix or prefixes is established through the use of
space and AS number PKI described in [RFC6480]. Specifically, one the address space and AS number PKI as described in [RFC6480].
MUST verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509 certificate Specifically, one MUST verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509
issued under this PKI, and check that the prefix(es) in the ROA are certificate issued under this PKI and check that the prefix or
contained within those in the certificate's IP Address Delegation prefixes in the ROA are contained within those in the certificate's
Extension. IP address delegation extension.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
7.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) 7.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)
The IANA is requested to update the id-ct-routeOriginAuthz entry in IANA has updated the id-ct-routeOriginAuthz entry in the "SMI
the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)"
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows: registry as follows:
Decimal Description References +=========+========================+============+
--------------------------------------------------------------- | Decimal | Description | References |
24 id-ct-routeOriginAuthz [RFC-to-be] +=========+========================+============+
| 24 | id-ct-routeOriginAuthz | RFC 9582 |
+---------+------------------------+------------+
Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to reference the Table 1
RFC publication instead of this draft.
7.2. RPKI Signed Objects sub-registry 7.2. RPKI Signed Objects Registry
The IANA is requested to update the entry for the Route Origination IANA has updated the Route Origination Authorization entry in the
Authorization in the "RPKI Signed Objects" registry created by "RPKI Signed Objects" registry created by [RFC6488] as follows:
[RFC6488] as follows:
Name OID Specification +===================+============================+===========+
Route Origination Authorization 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24 [RFC-to-be] | Name | OID | Reference |
+===================+============================+===========+
| Route Origination | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24 | RFC 9582 |
| Authorization | | |
+-------------------+----------------------------+-----------+
Table 2
7.3. File Extension 7.3. File Extension
The IANA is requested to update the entry for the ROA file extension IANA has updated the entry for the ROA file extension in the "RPKI
in the "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry created by [RFC6481] Repository Name Schemes" registry created by [RFC6481] as follows:
as follows:
Filename Extension RPKI Object Reference +====================+=================================+===========+
.roa Route Origination Authorization [RFC-to-be] | Filename Extension | RPKI Object | Reference |
+====================+=================================+===========+
| .roa | Route Origination Authorization | RFC 9582 |
+--------------------+---------------------------------+-----------+
Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to make this Table 3
addition permanent and to reference the RFC publication instead of
this draft.
7.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier 7.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)
The IANA is requested to allocate for this document in the "SMI IANA has allocated the following entry in the "SMI Security for
Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:
registry:
Decimal Description Reference +=========+=====================+============+
-------------------------------------------- | Decimal | Description | References |
TBD id-mod-rpkiROA-2023 [RFC-to-be] +=========+=====================+============+
| 75 | id-mod-rpkiROA-2023 | RFC 9582 |
+---------+---------------------+------------+
Table 4
7.5. Media Type 7.5. Media Type
The IANA is requested to update the media type application/rpki-roa IANA has updated the media type application/rpki-roa in the "Media
in the "Media Type" registry as follows: Types" registry as follows:
Type name: application Type name: application
Subtype name: rpki-roa
Required parameters: N/A Subtype name: rpki-roa
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary Required parameters: N/A
Security considerations: Carries an RPKI ROA [RFC-to-be].
This media type contains no active content. See Optional parameters: N/A
Section 6 of [RFC-to-be] for further information.
Interoperability considerations: None Encoding considerations: binary
Published specification: [RFC-to-be]
Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators Security considerations: Carries an RPKI ROA (RFC 9582). This media
Additional information: type contains no active content. See Section 6 of RFC 9582 for
Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined further information.
in [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of
prefixes and an AS identifer as defined in [RFC-to-be]. Interoperability considerations: None
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .roa Published specification: RFC 9582
Macintosh file type code(s):
Person & email address to contact for further information: Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators
Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
Intended usage: COMMON Additional information:
Restrictions on usage: None
Change controller: IETF Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined in
[RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of prefixes and
an AS identifier as defined in RFC 9582.
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .roa
Macintosh file type code(s): None
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: None
Change controller: IETF
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
skipping to change at page 13, line 9 skipping to change at line 596
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object [RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012, (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[X.690] ITU-T, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: [X.690] ITU-T, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015. (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, February 2021.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
skipping to change at page 13, line 37 skipping to change at line 624
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>. February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC9319] Gilad, Y., Goldberg, S., Sriram, K., Snijders, J., and B. [RFC9319] Gilad, Y., Goldberg, S., Sriram, K., Snijders, J., and B.
Maddison, "The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key Maddison, "The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185, RFC 9319, Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185, RFC 9319,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9319, October 2022, DOI 10.17487/RFC9319, October 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9319>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9319>.
[roasort-c] [roasort-c]
Snijders, J., "ROA sorter in C", Snijders, J., "ROA sorter in C", commit 68969ea, July
<https://github.com/job/roasort>. 2023, <https://github.com/job/roasort>.
[roasort-rs] [roasort-rs]
Maddison, B., "ROA sorter in Rust", Maddison, B., "ROA sorter in Rust", commit 023e756, August
<https://github.com/benmaddison/roasort>. 2023, <https://github.com/benmaddison/roasort>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements Appendix A. Example ROA eContent Payload
The authors wish to thank Theo Buehler, Ties de Kock, Martin An example of a DER-encoded ROA eContent is provided below, with
Hoffmann, Charles Gardiner, Russ Housley, Jeffrey Haas, and Bob Beck annotation following the "#" character.
for their help and contributions. Additionally, the authors thank
Jim Fenton, Vijay Gurbani, Haoyu Song, Rob Austein, Roque Gagliano,
Danny McPherson, Sam Weiler, Jasdip Singh, and Murray S. Kucherawy
for their careful reviews and helpful comments.
Appendix B. Example ROA eContent Payload $ echo 16i 301802030100003011300F040200023009300703050020010DB8 P \
| dc | openssl asn1parse -inform DER -i -dump
0:d=0 hl=2 l= 24 cons: SEQUENCE # RouteOriginAttestation
2:d=1 hl=2 l= 3 prim: INTEGER :010000 # asID 65536
7:d=1 hl=2 l= 17 cons: SEQUENCE # ipAddrBlocks
9:d=2 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddressFamily
11:d=3 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OCTET STRING # addressFamily
0000 - 00 02 # IPv6
15:d=3 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE # addresses
17:d=4 hl=2 l= 7 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddress
19:d=5 hl=2 l= 5 prim: BIT STRING # 2001:db8::/32
0000 - 00 20 01 0d b8
Below an example of a DER encoded ROA eContent is provided with Below is a complete RPKI ROA signed object, Base64 encoded per
annotation following the '#' character. [RFC4648].
$ echo 302402023CCA301E301C04020002301630090307002001067C208C30090307002A0EB2400000 \ MIIGgAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGcTCCBm0CAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwKwYLKoZI
| xxd -r -ps \ hvcNAQkQARigHAQaMBgCAwEAADARMA8EAgACMAkwBwMFACABDbigggR8MIIEeDCC
| openssl asn1parse -i -dump -inform DER A2CgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAvMS0wKwYDVQQDEyQ4NjUyNWNkNS00
0:d=0 hl=2 l= 36 cons: SEQUENCE # RouteOriginAttestation NGQ3LTRkZjktODA3OS00YTlkY2RmMjY5NDQwHhcNMjQwNTAxMDAzNDEzWhcNMjUw
2:d=1 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER :3CCA # asID 15562 NTAxMDAzNDEzWjAvMS0wKwYDVQQDEyRlYjg3NmJmMC1lYTlkLTRiMjItYTExZS0y
6:d=1 hl=2 l= 30 cons: SEQUENCE # ipAddrBlocks YmNhZDA4MzliMTMwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCsPSYD
8:d=2 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddressFamily JnGOFRSHUZuVxibx2TQfWWoPIHNKgQAwYn1Kz88HaGgVf63G1mJd/cxBNMj5AfNQ
10:d=3 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OCTET STRING # addressFamily m2zKSAb83UAp97DUXf+lvoKj4F+lxCCjFaBpBeehc7X0XPDpbcbqo1YrzIzxxqou
0000 - 00 02 .. # IPv6 GijEwZ4k+BaM2avEFYMBszqWA+ZdneBSuZ3YbHPKp2royn4pJ9a1I5fYdqFQi0eo
14:d=3 hl=2 l= 22 cons: SEQUENCE # addresses VZbAc8pZmwRVOuedYYqQiy9CSRGsbiGlB0fKt2m/zSsuvl4Zit7+NyGL3wAZecjZ
16:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddress XEInsTtQsjQuy5PeJjLDyfWi/ZFi0qPsNlK0M2lMsi5B7QKaagA1RbRVHZyrkWoe
18:d=5 hl=2 l= 7 prim: BIT STRING # address 20l5rfk1bIGMv/plAgMBAAGjggGdMIIBmTAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwHQYDVR0O
0000 - 00 20 01 06 7c 20 8c . ..| . # 2001:67c:208c::/48 BBYEFN4UWxk/syCyWnRDVSmMi/fCUj0iMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFNZyCOpHDp1t1mVA
27:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddress IvVTrcE4mrQ0MBgGA1UdIAEB/wQOMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHDgIwWgYIKwYBBQUHAQEE
29:d=5 hl=2 l= 7 prim: BIT STRING # address TjBMMEoGCCsGAQUFBzAChj5yc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwby8x
0000 - 00 2a 0e b2 40 .*..@ # 2a0e:b240::/48 bklJNmtjT25XM1daVUFpOVZPdHdUaWF0RFNnLmNlcjBRBgNVHR8ESjBIMEagRKBC
0007 - <SPACES/NULS> hkByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwby9BLzFuSUk2a2NPblczV1pV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Below is a complete Base64 [RFC4648] encoded RPKI ROA Signed Object. The object in this appendix has the following properties:
MIIHCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIG/DCCBvgCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwNwYLKoZIhvcNAQkQ Object size: 1668 octets
ARigKAQmMCQCAjzKMB4wHAQCAAIwFjAJAwcAIAEGfCCMMAkDBwAqDrJAAACgggT7MIIE9zCC Object SHA256 message digest:
A9+gAwIBAgIDAIb5MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDM4ZTE0ZjkyZmRjN2Nj 3a39e0b652e79ddf6efdd178ad5e3b29e0121b1e593b89f1e0ac18f3ba60d5e7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The object in Appendix B has the following properties: CMS signing time: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000
Object X.509 end-entity certificate
SHA256 hash: 13afbad09ed59b315efd8722d38b09fd02962e376e4def32247f9de905649b47 Subject key id: DE145B193FB320B25A744355298C8BF7C2523D22
Size: 1807 octets Authority key id: D67208EA470E9D6DD6654022F553ADC1389AB434
Issuer: CN=86525cd5-44d7-4df9-8079-4a9dcdf26944
Serial: 3
Not before: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000
Not after: Thu 01 May 2025 00:34:13 +0000
IP address delegation: 2001:db8::/32
CMS signing time: Fri 17 Jun 2022 00:24:22 +0000 ROA eContent
asID: 65536
addresses: 2001:db8::/32
X.509 end-entity certificate Acknowledgements
Subject key id: A3D964245749BB6DD5AB1F2E830E33A6C5146E8F
Authority key id: 38E14F92FDC7CCFBFC182361523AE27D697E952F
Issuer: /CN=38e14f92fdc7ccfbfc182361523ae27d697e952f
Serial: 86F9
Not before: Fri 17 Jun 2022 00:24:22 +0000
Not after: Sat 01 Jul 2023 00:00:00 +0000
IP address delegation: 2001:67c:208c::/48, 2a0e:b240::/48
eContent The authors wish to thank Theo Buehler, Ties de Kock, Martin
asID: 15562 Hoffmann, Charles Gardiner, Russ Housley, Jeffrey Haas, Bob Beck, and
addresses: 2001:67c:208c::/48, 2a0e:b240::/48 Tom Harrison for their help and contributions. Additionally, the
authors thank Jim Fenton, Vijay Gurbani, Haoyu Song, Rob Austein,
Roque Gagliano, Danny McPherson, Sam Weiler, Jasdip Singh, and Murray
S. Kucherawy for their careful reviews and helpful comments.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Job Snijders Job Snijders
Fastly Fastly
Amsterdam Amsterdam
Netherlands The Netherlands
Email: job@fastly.com Email: job@fastly.com
Ben Maddison Ben Maddison
Workonline Workonline
Cape Town Cape Town
South Africa South Africa
Email: benm@workonline.africa Email: benm@workonline.africa
Matthew Lepinski Matthew Lepinski
Carleton College Carleton College
 End of changes. 94 change blocks. 
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