Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          R. Singh
Request for Comments: 8443                                  Vencore Labs
Category: Standards Track                                       M. Dolly
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                     AT&T
                                                                  S. Das
                                                            Vencore Labs
                                                               A. Nguyen
                                   Office of Emergency Communication/DHS
                                                             August 2018

  Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT) Extension for Resource Priority
                             Authorization

Abstract

   This document extends the Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT)
   specification defined in RFC 8225 to allow the inclusion of
   cryptographically signed assertions of authorization for the values
   populated in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 'Resource-
   Priority' header field, which is used for communications resource
   prioritization.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8443.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  PASSporT "rph" Claim  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  "rph" in SIP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Authentication Service Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Verification Service Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5   6
   5.  Further Information Associated with the SIP "Resource-
       Priority" 'Resource-
       Priority' Header Field  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  JSON Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.2.  PASSporT Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     7.1.  Avoidance of Replay and Cut-and-Paste Attacks . . . . . .   7
     7.2.  Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   PASSporT [RFC8225] is a token format based on JSON Web Token (JWT)
   [RFC7519] for conveying cryptographically signed information about
   the identities involved in personal communications.  PASSporT with
   Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) [RFC8224] provides a
   mechanism by which an authority on the originating side of a call,
   using a protocol like SIP [RFC3261], can provide a cryptographic
   assurance of the validity of the calling party telephone number in
   order to prevent impersonation attacks.

   [RFC4412] defines a mechanism to prioritize access to SIP-signaled
   resources during periods of communications resource scarcity using
   the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field for
   communications Resource-Priority. header.  As specified in [RFC4412], the
   SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field may be used by SIP user agents
   (UAs) [RFC3261] (including Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)
   gateways and SIP proxy servers) to influence prioritization afforded
   to communication sessions, including PSTN calls (e.g., to manage
   scarce network resources during network congestion scenarios).
   However, the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field could be spoofed
   and abused by unauthorized entities, the threat models and use cases
   of which are described in [RFC7375] and [RFC7340], respectively.

   Compromise of the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field [RFC4412]
   could lead to misuse of network resources (i.e., during congestion
   scenarios), impacting the application services supported using the
   SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field.

   [RFC8225] allows extensions by which an authority on the originating
   side verifying the authorization of a particular communication for
   the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field can use a PASSPorT claim to
   cryptographically sign the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field and
   convey assertion of the authorization for the SIP 'Resource-Priority'
   header field.  A signed SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field will
   allow a receiving entity (including entities located in different
   network domains/boundaries) to verify the validity of assertions
   authorizing the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field and to act on
   the information with confidence that the information has not been
   spoofed or compromised.

   This specification documents an extension to PASSporT and the
   associated STIR mechanisms to provide a function to cryptographically
   sign the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field.  This PASSporT object
   is used to provide attestation of a calling-user authorization for
   priority communications.  This is necessary in addition to the
   PASSporT object that is used for calling-user telephone-number
   attestation.  How this extension to PASSporT is used for real-time
   communications supported using the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header
   field is outside the scope of this document.  In addition, the
   PASSPorT extension defined in this document is intended for use in
   environments where there are means to verify that the signer of the
   SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field is authoritative.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  PASSporT "rph" Claim

   This specification defines a new JSON Web Token claim for "rph" that
   provides an assertion for information in the SIP 'Resource-Priority'
   header field.

   The creator of a PASSporT object adds a "ppt" value of "rph" to the
   header of a PASSporT object.  The PASSporT claims MUST contain an
   "rph" claim, and any entities verifying the PASSporT object will be
   required to understand the "ppt" extension in order to process the
   PASSporT in question.  A PASSPorT header with the "ppt" included will
   look as follows:

   {
   "typ":"passport",
     "ppt":"rph",
     "alg":"ES256",
     "x5u":"https://www.example.org/cert.cer"
   }

   The "rph" claim will provide an assertion of authorization, "auth",
   for information in the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field based on
   [RFC4412].  The syntax is:

   {
   Resource-Priority = "Resource-Priority" : r-value,
   r-value= namespace  "."  r-priority
   }

   Specifically, the "rph" claim includes an assertion of the priority
   level of the user to be used for a given communication session.  The
   value of the "rph" claim is an object with one or more keys.  Each
   key is associated with a JSON array.  These arrays contain strings
   that correspond to the r-values indicated in the SIP 'Resource-
   Priority' header field.

   The following is an example "rph" claim for a SIP 'Resource-Priority'
   header field with one r-value of "ets.0" and with another r-value of
   "wps.0":

    {
     "orig":{"tn":"12155550112"},
     "dest":{["tn":"12125550113"]},
     "iat":1443208345,
     "rph":{"auth":["ets.0", "wps.0"]}
    }

   After the header and claims PASSporT objects have been constructed,
   their signature is generated normally per the guidance in [RFC8225]
   using the full form of PASSPorT.  The credentials (i.e., Certificate)
   used to create the signature must have authority over the namespace
   of the "rph" claim, and there is only one authority per claim.  The
   authority MUST use its credentials associated with the specific
   service supported by the resource priority namespace in the claim.
   If r-values are added or dropped by the intermediaries along the
   path, the intermediaries must generate a new "rph" header and sign
   the claim with their own authority.

   The use of the compact form of PASSporT is not specified in this
   document.

4.  "rph" in SIP

   This section specifies SIP-specific usage for the "rph" claim in
   PASSporT.

4.1.  Authentication Service Behavior

   The Authentication Service will create the "rph" claim using the
   values discussed in Section 3 of this document that are based on
   [RFC4412].  The construction of the "rph" claim follows the steps
   described in Section 4.1 of [RFC8224].

   The resulting Identity header for "rph" might look as follows
   (backslashes shown for line folding only):

      Identity:eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInBwdCI6InJwaCIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0\
      IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vY2VydC5jZXIifQo.eyJkZ\
      XN0Ijp7WyJ0biI6IjEyMTI1NTUwMTEzIl19LCJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3\
      JpZyI6eyJ0biI6IjEyMTU1NTUwMTEyIn0sInJwaCI6eyJhdXRoIjpbImV0cy4wIiw\
      id3BzLjAiXX19Cg.s37S6VC8HM6Dl6YzJeQDsrZcwJ0lizxhUrA7f_98oWBHvo-cl\
      -n8MIhoCr18vYYFy3blXvs3fslM_oos2P2Dyw;info=<https://www.example.\
      org/cert.cer>;alg=ES256;ppt="rph"

   A SIP authentication service will derive the value of "rph" from the
   SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field based on policy associated with
   service-specific use of the "namespace r-values, defined as follows in [RFC4412]:

      r-value = namespace "." r-priority" for r-values
   based on [RFC4412]. r-priority

   The authentication service derives the value of the PASSPorT claim by
   verifying the authorization for the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header
   field (i.e., verifying a calling-user privilege for the SIP
   'Resource-Priority' header field based on its identity).  The
   authorization might be derived from customer-profile data or access
   to external services.

   [RFC4412] allows multiple "namespace "." priority value" pairs,
   either in a single SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field or across
   multiple SIP 'Resource-Priority' header fields.  An authority is
   responsible for signing all the content of a SIP 'Resource-Priority'
   header field for which it has the authority.

4.2.  Verification Service Behavior

   [RFC8224], Section 6.2, Step 5 requires that specifications defining
   "ppt" values describe any additional verifier behavior.  The behavior
   specified for the "ppt" values of "rph" is as follows:

   The verification service MUST extract the value associated with the
   "auth" key in a full-form PASSPorT with a "ppt" value of "rph".  If
   the signature validates, then the verification service can use the
   value of the "rph" claim as validation that the calling party is
   authorized for SIP 'Resource-Priority' header fields as indicated in
   the claim.  This value would, in turn, be used for priority treatment
   in accordance with local policy for the associated communication
   service.  If the signature validation fails, the verification service
   should infer that the calling party is not authorized for SIP
   'Resource-Priority' header fields as indicated in the claim.  In such
   cases, the priority treatment for the associated communication
   service is handled as per the local policy of the verifier.  In such
   scenarios, the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field SHOULD be
   stripped from the SIP request, and the network entities should treat
   the call as an ordinary call.

   In addition, [RFC8224], Section 6.2, Step 4 requires the "iat" value
   in "rph" claim to be verified.

   The behavior of a SIP UA upon receiving an INVITE containing a
   PASSporT object with an "rph" claim will largely remain a matter of
   implementation policy for the specific communication service.  In
   most cases, implementations would act based on confidence in the
   veracity of this information.

5.  Further Information Associated with the SIP "Resource-Priority" 'Resource-Priority'
    Header Field

   There may be additional information about the calling party or the
   call that could be relevant to authorization for the SIP 'Resource-
   Priority' header field.  This may include information related to the
   device subscription of the caller, to any institutions that the
   caller or device is associated with, or even to categories of
   institutions.  All of these data elements would benefit from the
   secure attestations provided by the STIR and PASSporT frameworks.
   The specification of the "rph" claim could entail the optional
   presence of one or more such additional information fields applicable
   to the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field.

   A new IANA registry has been defined to hold potential values of the
   "rph" array; see Section 6.2.  The definition of the "rph" claim may
   have one or more such additional information field(s).  Details of
   how an "rph" claim encompasses other data elements are left for
   future specifications.

6.  IANA Considerations

6.1.  JSON Web Token Claims

   IANA has added a new claim to the "JSON Web Token Claims" registry as
   defined in [RFC7519].

   o  Claim Name: "rph"

   o  Claim Description: Resource Priority Header Authorization

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): Section 3 of RFC 8443

6.2.  PASSporT Types

   IANA has created a new entry in the "Personal Assertion Token
   (PASSporT) Extensions" registry for the type "rph", which is
   specified in this document.  In addition, the "PASSporT Resource
   Priority Header (rph) Types" registry has been created in which each
   entry must contain two fields: the name of the "rph" type and the
   specification in which the type is described.  This registry has been
   initially populated with the single value for "auth", which is
   specified in this document.  Registration of new "rph" types shall be
   under the Specification Required policy[RFC8126].

7.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations discussed in [RFC8224], Section 12, are
   applicable here.

7.1.  Avoidance of Replay and Cut-and-Paste Attacks

   The PASSporT extension with a "ppt" value of "rph" MUST only be sent
   with SIP INVITE when the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field is used
   to convey the priority of the communication, as defined in [RFC4412].
   To avoid replay and cut-and-paste attacks, the recommendations
   provided in Section 12.1 of [RFC8224] MUST be followed.

7.2.  Solution Considerations

   Using extensions to PASSporT tokens with a "ppt" value of "rph"
   requires knowledge of the authentication, authorization, and
   reputation of the signer to attest to the identity being asserted,
   including validating the digital signature and the associated
   certificate chain to a trust anchor.  The following considerations
   should be recognized when using PASSporT extensions with a "ppt"
   value of "rph":

   o  A signer is only allowed to sign the content of a SIP 'Resource-
      Priority' header field for which it has the proper authorization.
      Before signing tokens, the signer MUST have a secure method for
      authentication of the end user or the device being granted a
      token.

   o  The verification of the signature MUST include means of verifying
      that the signer is authoritative for the signed content of the
      resource priority namespace in the PASSporT.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.

   [RFC4412]  Schulzrinne, H. and J. Polk, "Communications Resource
              Priority for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)",
              RFC 4412, DOI 10.17487/RFC4412, February 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4412>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8224]  Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
              "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 8224,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8224, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224>.

   [RFC8225]  Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
              Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC7340]  Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
              Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
              RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.

   [RFC7375]  Peterson, J., "Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model",
              RFC 7375, DOI 10.17487/RFC7375, October 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7375>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

Acknowledgements

   We would like to thank STIR Working Group members, the ATIS/SIP Forum
   Task Force on IPNNI members, and the NS/EP Priority Services
   community for contributions to this problem statement and
   specification.  We would also like to thank David Hancock and Ning
   Zhang for their valuable inputs.

Authors' Addresses

   Ray P. Singh
   Vencore Labs
   150 Mount Airy Road
   New Jersey, NJ  07920
   United States of America

   Email: rsingh@vencorelabs.com

   Martin Dolly
   AT&T
   200 Laurel Avenue
   Middletown, NJ 07748
   United States of America

   Email: md3135@att.com
   Subir Das
   Vencore Labs
   150 Mount Airy Road
   New Jersey, NJ  07920
   United States of America

   Email: sdas@vencorelabs.com

   An Nguyen
   Office of Emergency Communication/DHS
   245 Murray Lane, Building 410
   Washington, DC 20528
   United States of America

   Email: an.p.nguyen@HQ.DHS.GOV