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# RFC 9244

## Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry

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### Abstract

This document aims to enrich the Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) signal channel protocol with various telemetry attributes, allowing for optimal Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack mitigation. It specifies the normal traffic baseline and attack traffic telemetry attributes a DOTS client can convey to its DOTS server in the mitigation request, the mitigation status telemetry attributes a DOTS server can communicate to a DOTS client, and the mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes a DOTS client can communicate to a DOTS server. The telemetry attributes can assist the mitigator in choosing the DDoS mitigation techniques and performing optimal DDoS attack mitigation.

This document specifies two YANG modules: one for representing DOTS telemetry message types and one for sharing the attack mapping details over the DOTS data channel.

### Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

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# 1. Introduction

IT organizations and service providers are facing Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks that fall into two broad categories:

1. Network-layer and transport-layer attacks target the victim's infrastructure. These attacks are not necessarily aimed at taking down the actual delivered services; rather, these attacks prevent various network elements (routers, switches, firewalls, transit links, and so on) from serving legitimate users' traffic.

The main method of such attacks is to send a large volume of traffic (e.g., high-pps (packets per second) traffic) toward the victim's infrastructure. Typically, attack volumes may vary from a few hundred Mbps to hundreds of Gbps or even Tbps. Attacks are commonly carried out leveraging botnets and attack reflectors for amplification attacks ([Section 3.1 of \[RFC4732\]](#)) such as NTP (Network Time Protocol), DNS (Domain Name System), SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol), or SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol).

2. Application-layer attacks target various applications. Typical examples include attacks against HTTP/HTTPS, DNS, SIP (Session Initiation Protocol), or SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol). However, all applications with their port numbers open at network edges can be attractive attack targets.

Application-layer attacks are considered more complex and harder to categorize and are therefore harder to detect and mitigate efficiently.

To compound the problem, attackers also leverage multi-vector attacks. These attacks are assembled from dynamic network-layer and application-layer attack vectors and other tactics. As such, multiple attack vectors formed by multiple attack types and volumes are launched simultaneously toward a victim. Multi-vector attacks are harder to detect and defend against. Multiple and simultaneous mitigation techniques are needed to defeat such attack campaigns. It is also common for attackers to change attack vectors right after a successful mitigation, burdening their opponents with changing their defense methods.

The conclusion derived from the aforementioned attack scenarios is that modern attack detection and mitigation are most certainly complicated and highly convoluted tasks. They demand a comprehensive knowledge of the attack attributes and the normal behavior of the targeted systems (including normal traffic patterns), as well as the attacker's ongoing and past actions. Even more challenging, retrieving all the analytics needed for detecting these attacks is not simple with the industry's current reporting capabilities.

The Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) signal channel protocol [[RFC9132](#)] is used to carry information about a network resource or a network (or a part thereof) that is under a DDoS attack. Such information is sent by a DOTS client to one or multiple DOTS servers so that appropriate mitigation actions are undertaken on traffic deemed suspicious. Various use cases are discussed in [[RFC8903](#)].

DOTS clients can be integrated within a DDoS attack detector or within network and security elements that have been actively engaged with ongoing attacks. The DOTS client mitigation environment determines that it is no longer possible or practical for it to handle these attacks itself. This can be due to a lack of resources or security capabilities, as derived from the complexities and intensity of these attacks. In this circumstance, the DOTS client has invaluable knowledge about the actual attacks that need to be handled by its DOTS server(s). By enabling the DOTS client to share this comprehensive knowledge of an ongoing attack under specific circumstances, the DOTS server can drastically increase its ability to accomplish successful mitigation. While the attack is being handled by the mitigation resources associated with the DOTS server, the DOTS server has knowledge about the ongoing attack mitigation. The DOTS server can share this information with the DOTS client so that the client can better assess and evaluate the actual mitigation realized.

DOTS clients can send mitigation hints derived from attack details to DOTS servers, with the full understanding that a DOTS server may ignore mitigation hints, as described in [[RFC8612](#)] (Gen-004). Mitigation hints will be transmitted across the DOTS signal channel, as the data channel may not be functional during an attack. How a DOTS server handles normal and attack traffic attributes, and mitigation hints, is implementation specific.

Both DOTS clients and servers can benefit from this information by presenting various information details in relevant management, reporting, and portal systems.

This document defines DOTS telemetry attributes that can be conveyed by DOTS clients to DOTS servers, and vice versa. The DOTS telemetry attributes are not mandatory attributes of the DOTS signal channel protocol [[RFC9132](#)]. When no limitation policy is provided to a DOTS agent, it can signal available telemetry attributes to its peers in order to optimize the overall mitigation

service provisioned using DOTS. The aforementioned policy can be, for example, agreed upon during a service subscription (which is out of scope for this document) to identify a subset of DOTS clients among those deployed in a DOTS client domain that are allowed to send or receive telemetry data.

[Section 11.2](#) of this document specifies a YANG module that augments the DOTS data channel [[RFC8783](#)] with information related to attack details. Sharing such details during 'idle' time is meant to optimize the data exchanged over the DOTS signal channel.

## 2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [[RFC8612](#)].

"DOTS telemetry" is defined as the collection of attributes that are used to characterize the normal traffic baseline, attacks and their mitigation measures, and any related information that may help in enforcing countermeasures. "DOTS telemetry" is an optional set of attributes that can be signaled in the DOTS signal channel protocol.

The Telemetry Setup Identifier (tsid) is an identifier that is generated by DOTS clients to uniquely identify DOTS telemetry setup configuration data. See [Section 7.1.2](#) for more details.

The Telemetry Identifier (tmid) is an identifier that is generated by DOTS clients to uniquely identify DOTS telemetry data that is communicated prior to or during a mitigation. See [Section 8.2](#) for more details.

"Overlapped" lower numeric 'tsid' (or 'tmid') refers to the lower 'tsid' (or 'tmid') value of two overlapping telemetry requests.

The term "pipe" represents the maximum level of traffic that the DOTS client domain can receive. Whether a "pipe" is mapped to one or a group of network interfaces is deployment specific. For example, each interconnection link may be considered as a specific pipe if the DOTS server is hosted by each upstream provider, while the aggregate of all links to connect to upstream network providers can be considered by a DOTS client domain as a single pipe when communicating with a DOTS server not hosted by these upstream providers.

This document uses IANA-assigned Enterprise Numbers. These numbers are also known as "Private Enterprise Numbers" and "SMI (Structure of Management Information) Network Management Private Enterprise Codes" [[Private-Enterprise-Numbers](#)].

The meanings of the symbols in YANG tree diagrams are defined in [[RFC8340](#)] and [[RFC8791](#)].

Consistent with the convention set in [Section 2](#) of [\[RFC8783\]](#), the examples in [Section 8.1.6](#) use `"/restconf"` as the discovered RESTCONF API root path. Within these examples, some protocol header lines are split into multiple lines for display purposes only. When a line ends with a backslash (`"\"`) as the last character, the line is wrapped for display purposes. It is considered to be joined to the next line by deleting the backslash, the following line break, and the leading whitespace of the next line.

### 3. DOTS Telemetry: Overview and Purpose

Timely and effective signaling of up-to-date DDoS telemetry to all elements involved in the mitigation process is essential and improves the overall DDoS mitigation service's effectiveness. Bidirectional feedback between DOTS agents is required for increased awareness by each party of the attack and mitigation efforts, supporting a superior and highly efficient attack mitigation service.

#### 3.1. Need for More Visibility

When signaling a mitigation request, it is most certainly beneficial for DOTS clients to signal to DOTS servers any knowledge regarding ongoing attacks. This can happen in cases where DOTS clients are asking DOTS servers for support in defending against attacks that they have already detected and/or (partially) mitigated.

If attacks are already detected and categorized within a DOTS client domain, the DOTS server, and its associated mitigation services, can proactively benefit from this information and optimize the overall service delivery. It is important to note that DOTS client domains' and DOTS server domains' detection and mitigation approaches can be different and can potentially result in different results and attack classifications. The DDoS mitigation service treats the ongoing attack details received from DOTS clients as hints and cannot completely rely on or trust the attack details conveyed by DOTS clients.

In addition to the DOTS server directly using telemetry data as operational hints, the DOTS server's security operation team also benefits from telemetry data. A basic requirement of security operation teams is to be aware of and get visibility into the attacks they need to handle. This holds especially for the case of ongoing attacks, where DOTS telemetry provides data about the current attack status. Even if some mitigation can be automated, operational teams can use the DOTS telemetry information to be prepared for attack mitigation and to assign the correct resources (e.g., operation staff, networking resources, mitigation resources) for the specific service. Similarly, security operations personnel at the DOTS client side ask for feedback about their requests for protection. Therefore, it is valuable for DOTS servers to share DOTS telemetry with DOTS clients.

Mutual sharing of information is thus crucial for "closing the mitigation loop" between DOTS clients and servers. For the server-side team, it is important to confirm that the same attacks that the DOTS server's mitigation resources are seeing are those for which a DOTS client is requesting mitigation. For the DOTS client-side team, it is important to realize that the DOTS clients receive the required service -- for example, understanding that "I asked for mitigation of two attacks, and

my DOTS server detects and mitigates only one of them." Cases of inconsistency in attack classification between DOTS clients and servers can be highlighted, and maybe handled, using the DOTS telemetry attributes.

In addition, management and orchestration systems, at both the DOTS client and server sides, can use DOTS telemetry as feedback to automate various control and management activities derived from signaled telemetry information.

If the DOTS server's mitigation resources have the capabilities to facilitate the DOTS telemetry, the DOTS server adapts its protection strategy and activates the required countermeasures immediately (automation enabled) for the sake of optimized attack mitigation decisions and actions. Discussion regarding the interface from the DOTS server to the mitigator to signal the telemetry data is out of scope for this document.

### 3.2. Enhanced Detection

DOTS telemetry can also be used as input for determining what values to use for the tuning parameters available on the mitigation resources. During the last few years, DDoS attack detection technologies have evolved from threshold-based detection (that is, cases when all or specific parts of traffic cross a predefined threshold for a certain period of time is considered as an attack) to an "anomaly detection" approach. For the latter, it is required to maintain rigorous learning of "normal" behavior, and an "anomaly" (or an attack) is identified and categorized based on the knowledge about the normal behavior and a deviation from this normal behavior. Statistical and artificial intelligence algorithms (e.g., machine learning) are used such that the actual traffic thresholds are automatically calculated by learning the protected entity's normal traffic behavior during 'idle' time (i.e., no mitigation is active). The normal traffic characterization learned is referred to as the "normal traffic baseline". An attack is detected when the victim's actual traffic is deviating from this normal baseline pattern.

In addition, subsequent activities toward mitigating an attack are much more challenging. The ability to distinguish legitimate traffic from attacker traffic on a per-packet basis is complex. For example, a packet may look "legitimate" and no attack signature can be identified. The anomaly can be identified only after detailed statistical analysis. DDoS attack mitigators use the normal baseline during the mitigation of an attack to identify and categorize the expected appearance of a specific traffic pattern. Particularly, the mitigators use the normal baseline to recognize the "level of normality" that needs to be achieved during the various mitigation processes.

Normal baseline calculation is performed based on continuous learning of the normal behavior of the protected entities. The minimum learning period varies from hours to days and even weeks, depending on the protected applications' behavior. The baseline cannot be learned during active attacks because attack conditions do not characterize the protected entities' normal behavior.

If the DOTS client has calculated the normal baseline of its protected entities, signaling such information to the DOTS server along with the attack traffic levels provides value. The DOTS server benefits from this telemetry by tuning its mitigation resources with the DOTS client's normal baseline. The DOTS server's mitigators use the baseline to familiarize themselves with the



attack victim's normal behavior and target the baseline as the level of normality they need to achieve. Fed with this information, the overall mitigation performance is expected to be improved in terms of time to mitigate, accuracy, and false-negative and false-positive rates.

Mitigation of attacks without having certain knowledge of normal traffic can be inaccurate at best. This is especially true for recursive signaling (see [Section 3.2.3](#) of [\[RFC8811\]](#)). Given that DOTS clients can be integrated in a highly diverse set of scenarios and use cases, this emphasizes the need for knowledge of the behavior of each DOTS client domain -- especially given that common global thresholds for attack detection can almost never be realized. Each DOTS client domain can have its own levels of traffic and normal behavior. Without facilitating normal baseline signaling, it may be very difficult for DOTS servers in some cases to detect and mitigate the attacks accurately:

- It is important to emphasize that it is practically impossible for the DOTS server's mitigators to calculate the normal baseline in cases where they do not have any knowledge of the traffic beforehand.

Of course, this information can be provided using out-of-band mechanisms or manual configuration, at the risk of unmaintained information becoming inaccurate as the network evolves and "normal" patterns change. The use of a dynamic and collaborative means between the DOTS client and server to identify and share key parameters for the sake of efficient DDoS protection is valuable.

### 3.3. Efficient Mitigation

During a high-volume attack, DOTS client pipes can be totally saturated. DOTS clients ask their DOTS servers to handle the attack upstream so that DOTS client pipes return to a reasonable load level (normal pattern, ideally). At this point, it is essential to ensure that the mitigator does not overwhelm the DOTS client pipes by sending back large volumes of "clean traffic", or what it believes is "clean". This can happen when the mitigator has not managed to detect and mitigate all the attacks launched toward the DOTS client domain.

In this case, it can be valuable to DOTS clients to signal to DOTS servers the total pipe capacity, which is the level of traffic the DOTS client domain can absorb from its upstream network. This is usually the circuit size, which includes all the packet overheads. Dynamic updates of the condition of pipes between DOTS agents while they are under a DDoS attack are essential (e.g., where multiple DOTS clients share the same physical connectivity pipes). The DOTS server should activate other mechanisms to ensure that it does not allow the DOTS client domain's pipes to be saturated unintentionally. The rate-limit action defined in [\[RFC8783\]](#) is a reasonable candidate to achieve this objective; the DOTS client can indicate the type(s) of traffic (such as ICMP, UDP, TCP port number 80) it prefers to limit. The rate-limit action can be controlled via the signal channel [\[RFC9133\]](#) even when the pipe is overwhelmed.

## 4. Design Overview

### 4.1. Overview of Telemetry Operations

The DOTS protocol suite is divided into two logical channels: the signal channel [RFC9132] and data channel [RFC8783]. This division is due to the vastly different requirements placed upon the traffic they carry. The DOTS signal channel must remain available and usable even in the face of attack traffic that might, for example, saturate one direction of the links involved, rendering acknowledgment-based mechanisms unreliable and strongly incentivizing messages to be small enough to be contained in a single IP packet (Section 2.2 of [RFC8612]). In contrast, the DOTS data channel is available for high-bandwidth data transfer before or after an attack, using more conventional transport protocol techniques (Section 2.3 of [RFC8612]). It is generally preferable to perform advance configuration over the DOTS data channel, including configuring aliases for static or nearly static data sets such as sets of network addresses/prefixes that might be subject to related attacks. This design helps to optimize the use of the DOTS signal channel for the small messages that are important to deliver during an attack. As a reminder, the DOTS signal channel and data channel both require secure communication channels (Section 11 of [RFC9132] and Section 10 of [RFC8783]).

Telemetry information has aspects that correspond to both operational modes (i.e., signal channel and data channel): there is certainly a need to convey updated information about ongoing attack traffic and targets during an attack, so as to convey detailed information about mitigation status and inform updates to mitigation strategy in the face of adaptive attacks. However, it is also useful to provide mitigation services with a picture of normal or "baseline" traffic toward potential targets to aid in detecting when incoming traffic deviates from normal into being an attack. Also, one might populate a "database" of classifications of known types of attacks so that a short attack identifier can be used during an attack period to describe an observed attack. This specification does make provision for use of the DOTS data channel for the latter function (Section 8.1.6) but otherwise retains most telemetry functionality in the DOTS signal channel.

Note that it is a functional requirement to convey information about ongoing attack traffic during an attack, and information about baseline traffic uses an essentially identical data structure that is naturally defined to sit next to the description of attack traffic. The related telemetry setup information used to parameterize actual traffic data is also sent over the signal channel, out of expediency.

This document specifies an extension to the DOTS signal channel protocol. Considerations about how to establish, maintain, and make use of the DOTS signal channel are specified in [RFC9132].

Once the DOTS signal channel is established, DOTS clients that support the DOTS telemetry extension proceed with the telemetry setup configuration (e.g., measurement interval, telemetry notification interval, pipe capacity, normal traffic baseline) as detailed in Section 7. DOTS agents can then include DOTS telemetry attributes using the DOTS signal channel (Section 8.1). A DOTS client can use separate messages to share with its DOTS server(s) a set of telemetry data bound to

an ongoing mitigation ([Section 8.2](#)). Also, a DOTS client that is interested in receiving telemetry notifications related to some of its resources follows the procedure defined in [Section 8.3](#). A DOTS client that receives such notifications can then decide to send a mitigation request if an attack cannot be mitigated locally within the DOTS client domain.

Aggregate DOTS telemetry data can also be included in efficacy update ([Section 9.1](#)) or mitigation update ([Section 9.2](#)) messages.

## 4.2. Block-Wise Transfers

DOTS clients can use a block-wise transfer [[RFC7959](#)] with the recommendation detailed in [Section 4.4.2](#) of [[RFC9132](#)] to control the size of a response when the data to be returned does not fit within a single datagram.

DOTS clients can also use the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) Block1 Option in a PUT request ([Section 2.5](#) of [[RFC7959](#)]) to initiate large transfers, but these Block1 transfers are likely to fail if the inbound "pipe" is running full because the transfer requires a message from the server for each block, which would likely be lost in the incoming flood. Consideration needs to be made to try to fit this PUT into a single transfer or to separate out the PUT into several discrete PUTs where each of them fits into a single packet.

Q-Block1 and Q-Block2 Options that are similar to the CoAP Block1 and Block2 Options, but enable robust transmissions of big blocks of data with less packet interchanges using NON messages, are defined in [[RFC9177](#)]. DOTS implementations can consider the use of Q-Block1 and Q-Block2 Options [[DOTS-Robust-Blocks](#)].

## 4.3. DOTS Multihoming Considerations

Considerations for multihomed DOTS clients to select which DOTS server to contact and which IP prefixes to include in a telemetry message to a given peer DOTS server are discussed in [[DOTS-Multihoming](#)]. For example, if each upstream network exposes a DOTS server and the DOTS client maintains DOTS channels with all of them, only the information related to prefixes assigned by an upstream network to the DOTS client domain will be signaled via the DOTS channel established with the DOTS server of that upstream network.

Considerations related to whether (and how) a DOTS client gleans some telemetry information (e.g., attack details) it receives from a first DOTS server and shares it with a second DOTS server are implementation and deployment specific.

## 4.4. YANG Considerations

Telemetry messages exchanged between DOTS agents are serialized using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [[RFC8949](#)]. CBOR-encoded payloads are used to carry signal-channel-specific payload messages that convey request parameters and response information such as errors.

This document specifies a YANG module [RFC7950] for representing DOTS telemetry message types (Section 11.1). All parameters in the payload of the DOTS signal channel are mapped to CBOR types as specified in Section 12. As a reminder, Section 3 of [RFC9132] defines the rules for mapping YANG-modeled data to CBOR.

The DOTS telemetry module (Section 11.1) is not intended to be used via the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) / RESTCONF for DOTS server management purposes. It serves only to provide a data model and encoding following [RFC8791]. Server deviations (Section 5.6.3 of [RFC7950]) are strongly discouraged, as the peer DOTS agent does not have the means to retrieve the list of deviations and thus interoperability issues are likely to be encountered.

The DOTS telemetry module (Section 11.1) uses "enumerations" rather than "identities" to define units, samples, and intervals because otherwise the namespace identifier "ietf-dots-telemetry" must be included when a telemetry attribute is included (e.g., in a mitigation efficacy update). The use of "identities" is thus suboptimal from the standpoint of message compactness, as message compactness is one of the key requirements for DOTS signal channel messages.

The DOTS telemetry module (Section 11.1) includes some lists for which no "key" statement is included. This behavior is compliant with [RFC8791]. The reason for not including these keys is that they are not included in the message body of DOTS requests; such keys are included as mandatory Uri-Paths in requests (Sections 7 and 8). Otherwise, whenever a "key" statement is used in the module, the same definition as the definition provided in Section 7.8.2 of [RFC7950] is assumed.

Some parameters (e.g., low-percentile values) may be associated with different YANG types (e.g., decimal64 and yang:gauge64). To easily distinguish the types of these parameters while using meaningful names, the following suffixes are used:

Suffix	YANG Type	Example
-g	yang:gauge64	low-percentile-g
-c	container	connection-c
-ps	per second	connection-ps

Table 1: Suffixes and YANG Types

The full tree diagram of the DOTS telemetry module can be generated using the "pyang" tool [PYANG]. That tree is not included here because it is too long (Section 3.3 of [RFC8340]). Instead, subtrees are provided for the reader's convenience.

In order to optimize the data exchanged over the DOTS signal channel, this document specifies a second YANG module ("ietf-dots-mapping"; see Section 11.2) that augments the DOTS data channel [RFC8783]. This augmentation can be used during 'idle' time to share the attack mapping details (Section 8.1.5). DOTS clients can use tools, e.g., the YANG Library [RFC8525], to retrieve the list of features and deviations supported by the DOTS server over the data channel.

## 5. Generic Considerations

### 5.1. DOTS Client Identification

Following the rules in [Section 4.4.1](#) of [\[RFC9132\]](#), a unique identifier is generated by a DOTS client to prevent request collisions ('cuid').

As a reminder, [Section 4.4.1.3](#) of [\[RFC9132\]](#) forbids 'cuid' to be returned in a response message body.

### 5.2. DOTS Gateways

DOTS gateways may be located between DOTS clients and servers. The considerations elaborated in [Section 4.4.1](#) of [\[RFC9132\]](#) must be followed. In particular, the 'cdid' attribute is used to unambiguously identify a DOTS client domain.

As a reminder, [Section 4.4.1.3](#) of [\[RFC9132\]](#) forbids 'cdid' (if present) to be returned in a response message body.

### 5.3. Uri-Path Parameters and Empty Values

Uri-Path parameters and attributes with empty values **MUST NOT** be present in a request. The presence of such an empty value renders the entire containing message invalid.

### 5.4. Controlling Configuration Data

The DOTS server follows the same considerations discussed in [Section 4.5.3](#) of [\[RFC9132\]](#) for managing DOTS telemetry configuration freshness and notifications.

Likewise, a DOTS client may control the selection of configuration and non-configuration data nodes when sending a GET request by means of the 'c' (content) Uri-Query option and following the procedure specified in [Section 4.4.2](#) of [\[RFC9132\]](#). These considerations are not reiterated in the following sections.

### 5.5. Message Validation

The authoritative references for validating telemetry messages exchanged over the DOTS signal channel are [Sections 7, 8, and 9](#) together with the mapping table provided in [Section 12](#). The structure of telemetry message bodies is represented as a YANG data structure ([Section 11.1](#)).

### 5.6. A Note about Examples

Examples are provided for illustration purposes. This document does not aim to provide a comprehensive list of message examples.

JSON encoding of YANG-modeled data is used to illustrate the various telemetry operations. To ease readability, parameter names and their JSON types are thus used in the examples rather than their CBOR key values and CBOR types following the mappings in Section 12. These conventions are inherited from [RFC9132].

The examples use Enterprise Number 32473, which is defined for documentation use; see [RFC5612].

### 6. Telemetry Operation Paths

As discussed in Section 4.2 of [RFC9132], each DOTS operation is indicated by a path suffix that indicates the intended operation. The operation path is appended to the path prefix to form the URI used with a CoAP request to perform the desired DOTS operation. The following telemetry path suffixes are defined (Table 2):

Operation	Operation Path	Details
Telemetry Setup	/tm-setup	Section 7
Telemetry	/tm	Section 8

Table 2: DOTS Telemetry Operations

Consequently, the "ietf-dots-telemetry" YANG module defined in Section 11.1 defines a data structure to represent new DOTS message types called 'telemetry-setup' and 'telemetry'. The tree structure is shown in Figure 1. More details are provided in Sections 7 and 8 about the exact structure of 'telemetry-setup' and 'telemetry' message types.

```
structure dots-telemetry:
  +-- (telemetry-message-type)?
    +--:(telemetry-setup)
      |
      | ...
      +-- telemetry* []
        |
        | ...
        +-- (setup-type)?
          +--:(telemetry-config)
            |
            | ...
            +--:(pipe)
              |
              | ...
              +--:(baseline)
                |
                | ...
                +--:(telemetry)
                  ...
```

Figure 1: New DOTS Message Types (YANG Tree Structure)

DOTS implementations **MUST** support the Observe Option [RFC7641] for 'tm' (Section 8).

## 7. DOTS Telemetry Setup Configuration

In reference to [Figure 1](#), a DOTS telemetry setup message **MUST** include only telemetry-related configuration parameters ([Section 7.1](#)), information about DOTS client domain pipe capacity ([Section 7.2](#)), or information about the telemetry traffic baseline ([Section 7.3](#)). As such, requests that include a mix of telemetry configuration, pipe capacity, and traffic baseline information **MUST** be rejected by DOTS servers with a 4.00 (Bad Request) Response Code.

A DOTS client can reset all installed DOTS telemetry setup configuration data following the considerations detailed in [Section 7.4](#).

A DOTS server may detect conflicts when processing requests related to DOTS client domain pipe capacity or telemetry traffic baseline information with requests from other DOTS clients of the same DOTS client domain. More details are included in [Section 7.5](#).

Telemetry setup configuration is bound to a DOTS client domain. DOTS servers **MUST NOT** expect DOTS clients to send regular requests to refresh the telemetry setup configuration. Any available telemetry setup configuration is valid until the DOTS server ceases to service a DOTS client domain. DOTS servers **MUST NOT** reset 'tsid' because a session failed with a DOTS client. DOTS clients update their telemetry setup configuration upon change of a parameter that may impact attack mitigation.

DOTS telemetry setup configuration request and response messages are marked as Confirmable messages ([Section 2.1](#) of [[RFC7252](#)]).

### 7.1. Telemetry Configuration

DOTS telemetry uses several percentile values to provide a picture of a traffic distribution overall, as opposed to just a single snapshot of observed traffic at a single point in time. Modeling raw traffic flow data as a distribution and describing that distribution entails choosing a measurement period that the distribution will describe, and a number of sampling intervals, or "buckets", within that measurement period. Traffic within each bucket is treated as a single event (i.e., averaged), and then the distribution of buckets is used to describe the distribution of traffic over the measurement period. A distribution can be characterized by statistical measures (e.g., mean, median, and standard deviation) and also by reporting the value of the distribution at various percentile levels of the data set in question (e.g., "quartiles" that correspond to 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles). More details about percentile values and their computation are found in [Section 11.3](#) of [[RFC2330](#)].

DOTS telemetry uses up to three percentile values, plus the overall peak, to characterize traffic distributions. Which percentile thresholds are used for these "low-percentile", "mid-percentile", and "high-percentile" values is configurable. Default values are defined in [Section 7.1.2](#).

A DOTS client can negotiate with its server(s) a set of telemetry configuration parameters to be used for telemetry. Such parameters include:

- Percentile-related measurement parameters. In particular, 'measurement-interval' defines the period during which percentiles are computed, while 'measurement-sample' defines the time distribution for measuring values that are used to compute percentiles.
- Measurement units.
- Acceptable percentile values.
- Telemetry notification interval.
- Acceptable server-originated telemetry.

### 7.1.1. Retrieving the Current DOTS Telemetry Configuration

A GET request is used to obtain acceptable and current telemetry configuration parameters on the DOTS server. This request may include a 'cddid' Uri-Path when the request is relayed by a DOTS gateway. An example of such a GET request (without a gateway) is depicted in [Figure 2](#).

```
Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
```

*Figure 2: GET to Retrieve the Current and Acceptable DOTS Telemetry Configuration*

Upon receipt of such a request, and assuming that no error is encountered when processing the request, the DOTS server replies with a 2.05 (Content) response that conveys the telemetry parameters that are acceptable to the DOTS server, any pipe information ([Section 7.2](#)), and the current baseline information ([Section 7.3](#)) maintained by the DOTS server for this DOTS client. The tree structure of the response message body is provided in [Figure 3](#).

DOTS servers that support the capability of sending telemetry information to DOTS clients prior to or during a mitigation ([Section 9.2](#)) set 'server-originated-telemetry' under 'max-config-values' to 'true' ('false' is used otherwise). If 'server-originated-telemetry' is not present in a response, this is equivalent to receiving a response with 'server-originated-telemetry' set to 'false'.



```

structure dots-telemetry:
  +-- (telemetry-message-type)?
  +--:(telemetry-setup)
  | +-- (direction)?
  | | +--:(server-to-client-only)
  | | | +-- max-config-values
  | | | | +-- measurement-interval?          interval
  | | | | +-- measurement-sample?           sample
  | | | | +-- low-percentile?               percentile
  | | | | +-- mid-percentile?              percentile
  | | | | +-- high-percentile?             percentile
  | | | | +-- server-originated-telemetry?  boolean
  | | | | +-- telemetry-notify-interval?    uint16
  | | | +-- min-config-values
  | | | | +-- measurement-interval?          interval
  | | | | +-- measurement-sample?           sample
  | | | | +-- low-percentile?               percentile
  | | | | +-- mid-percentile?              percentile
  | | | | +-- high-percentile?             percentile
  | | | | +-- telemetry-notify-interval?    uint16
  | | | +-- supported-unit-classes
  | | | | +-- unit-config* [unit]
  | | | | | +-- unit          unit-class
  | | | | | +-- unit-status  boolean
  | | | +-- supported-query-type* query-type
  +-- telemetry* []
  | +-- (direction)?
  | | +--:(server-to-client-only)
  | | | +-- tsid?          uint32
  +-- (setup-type)?
  | +--:(telemetry-config)
  | | +-- current-config
  | | | +-- measurement-interval?          interval
  | | | +-- measurement-sample?           sample
  | | | +-- low-percentile?               percentile
  | | | +-- mid-percentile?              percentile
  | | | +-- high-percentile?             percentile
  | | | +-- unit-config* [unit]
  | | | | +-- unit          unit-class
  | | | | +-- unit-status  boolean
  | | | +-- server-originated-telemetry?  boolean
  | | | +-- telemetry-notify-interval?    uint16
  | +--:(pipe)
  | | ...
  +--:(baseline)
  | ...
+--:(telemetry)
  ...

```

Figure 3: Telemetry Configuration Tree Structure

When both 'min-config-values' and 'max-config-values' attributes are present, the values carried in 'max-config-values' attributes **MUST** be greater than or equal to their counterparts in 'min-config-values' attributes.

### 7.1.2. Conveying the DOTS Telemetry Configuration

A PUT request is used to convey the configuration parameters for the telemetry data (e.g., low-, mid-, or high-percentile values). For example, a DOTS client may contact its DOTS server to change the default percentile values used as the baseline for telemetry data. [Figure 3](#) lists the attributes that can be set by a DOTS client in such a PUT request. An example of a DOTS client that modifies all percentile reference values is shown in [Figure 4](#).

Note: The payload of the message depicted in [Figure 4](#) is CBOR-encoded as indicated by setting the Content-Format entry to "application/dots+cbor" ([Section 10.3](#) of [\[RFC9132\]](#)). However, and for the sake of better readability, the example (and other similar figures depicting a DOTS telemetry message body) follows the conventions set in [Section 5.6](#): use the JSON names and types defined in [Section 12](#).

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=123"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
    "telemetry": [
      {
        "current-config": {
          "low-percentile": "5.00",
          "mid-percentile": "65.00",
          "high-percentile": "95.00"
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

*Figure 4: PUT to Convey the DOTS Telemetry Configuration, Depicted as per Section 5.6*

'cuid' is a mandatory Uri-Path parameter for PUT requests.

The following additional Uri-Path parameter is defined:

**tsid:** The Telemetry Setup Identifier is an identifier for the DOTS telemetry setup configuration data represented as an integer. This identifier **MUST** be generated by DOTS clients. 'tsid' values **MUST** increase monotonically whenever new configuration parameters (not just for changed values) need to be conveyed by the DOTS client.

The procedure specified in [Section 4.4.1](#) of [\[RFC9132\]](#) for 'mid' rollover **MUST** also be followed for 'tsid' rollover.

This is a mandatory attribute. 'tsid' **MUST** appear after 'cuid' in the Uri-Path options.

'cuid' and 'tsid' **MUST NOT** appear in the PUT request message body.

At least one configurable attribute **MUST** be present in the PUT request.

A PUT request with a higher numeric 'tsid' value overrides the DOTS telemetry configuration data installed by a PUT request with a lower numeric 'tsid' value. To avoid maintaining a long list of 'tsid' requests for requests carrying telemetry configuration data from a DOTS client, the lower numeric 'tsid' **MUST** be automatically deleted and no longer be available at the DOTS server.

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request using the following Response Codes:

- If the request is missing a mandatory attribute, does not include 'cuid' or 'tsid' Uri-Path parameters, or contains one or more invalid or unknown parameters, a 4.00 (Bad Request) Response Code **MUST** be returned in the response.
- If the DOTS server does not find the 'tsid' parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS server has accepted the configuration parameters, then a 2.01 (Created) Response Code **MUST** be returned in the response.
- If the DOTS server finds the 'tsid' parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS server has accepted the updated configuration parameters, a 2.04 (Changed) Response Code **MUST** be returned in the response.
- If any of the enclosed configurable attribute values are not acceptable to the DOTS server ([Section 7.1.1](#)), a 4.22 (Unprocessable Entity) Response Code **MUST** be returned in the response.

The DOTS client may retry and send the PUT request with updated attribute values acceptable to the DOTS server.

By default, low-percentile (10th percentile), mid-percentile (50th percentile), high-percentile (90th percentile), and peak (100th percentile) values are used to represent telemetry data. Nevertheless, a DOTS client can disable some percentile types (low, mid, high). In particular, setting 'low-percentile' to "0.00" indicates that the DOTS client is not interested in receiving low-percentiles. Likewise, setting 'mid-percentile' (or 'high-percentile') to the same value as 'low-percentile' (or 'mid-percentile') indicates that the DOTS client is not interested in receiving mid-percentiles (or high-percentiles). For example, a DOTS client can send the request depicted in [Figure 5](#) to inform the server that it is interested in receiving only high-percentiles. This assumes that the client will only use that percentile type when sharing telemetry data with the server.

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=124"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
    "telemetry": [
      {
        "current-config": {
          "low-percentile": "0.00",
          "mid-percentile": "0.00",
          "high-percentile": "95.00"
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 5: PUT to Disable Low- and Mid-Percentiles, Depicted as per Section 5.6

DOTS clients can also configure the unit class(es) to be used for traffic-related telemetry data among the following supported unit classes: packets per second, bits per second, and bytes per second. Supplying both bits per second and bytes per second unit classes is allowed for a given set of telemetry data. However, receipt of conflicting values is treated as invalid parameters and rejected with a 4.00 (Bad Request) Response Code.

DOTS clients that are interested in receiving pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry ('pre-or-ongoing-mitigation') information from a DOTS server ([Section 9.2](#)) **MUST** set 'server-originated-telemetry' to 'true'. If 'server-originated-telemetry' is not present in a PUT request, this is equivalent to receiving a request with 'server-originated-telemetry' set to 'false'. An example of a request to enable pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry from DOTS servers is shown in [Figure 6](#).

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=125"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
    "telemetry": [
      {
        "current-config": {
          "server-originated-telemetry": true
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 6: PUT to Enable Pre-or-Ongoing-Mitigation Telemetry from the DOTS Server, Depicted as per Section 5.6

### 7.1.3. Retrieving the Installed DOTS Telemetry Configuration

A DOTS client may issue a GET message with a 'tsid' Uri-Path parameter to retrieve the current DOTS telemetry configuration. An example of such a request is depicted in [Figure 7](#).

```
Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=123"
```

Figure 7: GET to Retrieve the Current DOTS Telemetry Configuration

If the DOTS server does not find the 'tsid' Uri-Path value conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data for the requesting DOTS client, it **MUST** respond with a 4.04 (Not Found) error Response Code.

### 7.1.4. Deleting the DOTS Telemetry Configuration

A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS telemetry configuration data ([Figure 8](#)). 'cuid' and 'tsid' are mandatory Uri-Path parameters for such DELETE requests.

```

Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=123"

```

Figure 8: Deleting the Telemetry Configuration

The DOTS server resets the DOTS telemetry configuration back to the default values and acknowledges a DOTS client's request to remove the DOTS telemetry configuration using a 2.02 (Deleted) Response Code. A 2.02 (Deleted) Response Code is returned even if the 'tsid' parameter value conveyed in the DELETE request does not exist in its configuration data before the request.

Section 7.4 discusses the procedure to reset all DOTS telemetry setup configuration data.

## 7.2. Total Pipe Capacity

A DOTS client can communicate to the DOTS server(s) its DOTS client domain pipe information. The tree structure of the pipe information is shown in Figure 9.

```

structure dots-telemetry:
  +-- (telemetry-message-type)?
  +--:(telemetry-setup)
  |
  | ...
  | +-- telemetry* []
  |   +-- (direction)?
  |     | +--:(server-to-client-only)
  |     | | +-- tsid?
  |     | |                               uint32
  |     +-- (setup-type)?
  |         +--:(telemetry-config)
  |         | ...
  |         +--:(pipe)
  |           +-- total-pipe-capacity* [link-id unit]
  |             +-- link-id      nt:link-id
  |             +-- capacity    uint64
  |             +-- unit        unit
  |         +--:(baseline)
  |
  | ...
  +--:(telemetry)
  ...

```

Figure 9: Pipe Tree Structure

A DOTS client domain pipe is defined as a list of limits on (incoming) traffic volume ('total-pipe-capacity') that can be forwarded over ingress interconnection links of a DOTS client domain. Each of these links is identified with a 'link-id' [RFC8345].

The unit used by a DOTS client when conveying pipe information is captured in the 'unit' attribute. The DOTS client **MUST** auto-scale so that the appropriate unit is used. That is, for a given unit class, the DOTS client uses the largest unit that gives a value greater than one. As such, only one unit per unit class is allowed.

### 7.2.1. Conveying DOTS Client Domain Pipe Capacity

Considerations similar to those specified in [Section 7.1.2](#) are followed, with one exception:

- The relative order of two PUT requests carrying DOTS client domain pipe attributes from a DOTS client is determined by comparing their respective 'tsid' values. If these two requests have overlapping 'link-id' and 'unit' settings, the PUT request with a higher numeric 'tsid' value will override the request with a lower numeric 'tsid' value. The overlapped lower numeric 'tsid' **MUST** be automatically deleted and no longer be available.

DOTS clients **SHOULD** minimize the number of active 'tsid's used for pipe information. In order to avoid maintaining a long list of 'tsid's for pipe information, it is **RECOMMENDED** that DOTS clients include in any request to update information related to a given link the information regarding other links (already communicated using a lower 'tsid' value). By doing so, this update request will override these existing requests and hence optimize the number of 'tsid' requests per DOTS client.

Note: This assumes that all link information can fit in one single message.

As an example of configuring pipe information, a DOTS client managing a single-homed domain ([Figure 10](#)) can send a PUT request (shown in [Figure 11](#)) to communicate the capacity of "link1" used to connect to its ISP.




Figure 10: Single-Homed DOTS Client Domain

```

Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=126"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
    "telemetry": [
      {
        "total-pipe-capacity": [
          {
            "link-id": "link1",
            "capacity": "500",
            "unit": "megabit-ps"
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}

```

Figure 11: Example of a PUT Request to Convey Pipe Information (Single-Homed), Depicted as per Section 5.6

DOTS clients may be instructed to signal a link aggregate instead of individual links. For example, a DOTS client that manages a DOTS client domain having two interconnection links with an upstream ISP (Figure 12) can send a PUT request (shown in Figure 13) to communicate the aggregate link capacity with its ISP. Signaling individual or aggregate link capacity is deployment specific.



Figure 12: DOTS Client Domain with Two Interconnection Links



```

Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=hmcpH87lmPGsSTjkhXCbin"
Uri-Path: "tsid=896"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
    "telemetry": [
      {
        "total-pipe-capacity": [
          {
            "link-id": "aggregate",
            "capacity": "700",
            "unit": "megabit-ps"
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}

```

Figure 13: Example of a PUT Request to Convey Pipe Information (Aggregated Link), Depicted as per Section 5.6

Now consider that the DOTS client domain was upgraded to connect to an additional ISP (e.g., ISP#B in Figure 14); the DOTS client can inform a DOTS server that is not hosted with ISP#A and ISP#B domains about this update by sending the PUT request depicted in Figure 15. This request also includes information related to "link1" even if that link is not upgraded. Upon receipt of this request, the DOTS server removes the request with 'tsid=126' and updates its configuration base to maintain two links (link1 and link2).




Figure 14: Multihomed DOTS Client Domain

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=127"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
    "telemetry": [
      {
        "total-pipe-capacity": [
          {
            "link-id": "link1",
            "capacity": "500",
            "unit": "megabit-ps"
          },
          {
            "link-id": "link2",
            "capacity": "500",
            "unit": "megabit-ps"
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

*Figure 15: Example of a PUT Request to Convey Pipe Information (Multihomed), Depicted as per Section 5.6*

A DOTS client can delete a link by sending a PUT request with the 'capacity' attribute set to "0" if other links are still active for the same DOTS client domain. For example, if a DOTS client domain re-homes (that is, it changes its ISP), the DOTS client can inform its DOTS server about this update (e.g., from the network configuration in [Figure 10](#) to the network configuration shown in [Figure 16](#)) by sending the PUT request depicted in [Figure 17](#). Upon receipt of this request, and assuming that no error is encountered when processing the request, the DOTS server removes "link1" from its configuration bases for this DOTS client domain. Note that if the DOTS server receives a PUT request with a 'capacity' attribute set to "0" for all included links, it **MUST** reject the request with a 4.00 (Bad Request) Response Code. Instead, the DOTS client can use a DELETE request to delete all links ([Section 7.2.3](#)).



Figure 16: Multihomed DOTS Client Domain

```

Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=128"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
    "telemetry": [
      {
        "total-pipe-capacity": [
          {
            "link-id": "link1",
            "capacity": "0",
            "unit": "megabit-ps"
          },
          {
            "link-id": "link2",
            "capacity": "500",
            "unit": "megabit-ps"
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}

```

Figure 17: Example of a PUT Request to Convey Pipe Information (Multihomed), Depicted as per Section 5.6

### 7.2.2. Retrieving Installed DOTS Client Domain Pipe Capacity

A GET request with a 'tsid' Uri-Path parameter is used to retrieve the specific information related to an installed DOTS client domain pipe. The same procedure as that defined in [Section 7.1.3](#) is followed.

To retrieve all pipe information bound to a DOTS client, the DOTS client proceeds as specified in [Section 7.1.1](#).

### 7.2.3. Deleting Installed DOTS Client Domain Pipe Capacity

A DELETE request is used to delete the specific information related to an installed DOTS client domain pipe. The same procedure as that defined in [Section 7.1.4](#) is followed.

## 7.3. Telemetry Baseline

A DOTS client can communicate to its DOTS server(s) its normal traffic baseline and connection capacity:

**Total traffic normal baseline:** Total traffic normal baseline data provides the percentile values representing the total traffic normal baseline. It can be represented for a target using 'total-traffic-normal'.

The traffic normal per-protocol ('total-traffic-normal-per-protocol') baseline is represented for a target and is transport-protocol specific.

The traffic normal per-port-number ('total-traffic-normal-per-port') baseline is represented for each port number bound to a target.

If the DOTS client negotiated percentile values and units ([Section 7.1](#)), these negotiated parameters will be used instead of the default parameters. For each unit class used, the DOTS client **MUST** auto-scale so that the appropriate unit is used.

**Total connection capacity:** If the target is susceptible to resource-consuming DDoS attacks, the following optional attributes for the target per transport protocol are useful for detecting resource-consuming DDoS attacks:

- The maximum number of simultaneous connections that are allowed to the target.
- The maximum number of simultaneous connections that are allowed to the target per client.
- The maximum number of simultaneous embryonic connections that are allowed to the target. The term "embryonic connection" refers to a connection whose connection handshake is not finished. Embryonic connections are only possible in connection-oriented transport protocols like TCP or the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [[RFC9260](#)].
- The maximum number of simultaneous embryonic connections that are allowed to the target per client.
- The maximum number of connections allowed per second to the target.
- The maximum number of connections allowed per second to the target per client.
- The maximum number of requests (e.g., HTTP/DNS/SIP requests) allowed per second to the target.
- The maximum number of requests allowed per second to the target per client.

- The maximum number of outstanding partial requests allowed to the target. Attacks relying upon partial requests create a connection with a target but do not send a complete request (e.g., an HTTP request).
- The maximum number of outstanding partial requests allowed to the target per client.

The aggregate per transport protocol is captured in 'total-connection-capacity', while port-specific capabilities are represented using 'total-connection-capacity-per-port'.

Note that a target resource is identified using the attributes 'target-prefix', 'target-port-range', 'target-protocol', 'target-fqdn', 'target-uri', or 'alias-name' as defined in [Section 4.4.1.1](#) of [\[RFC9132\]](#).

The tree structure of the normal traffic baseline is shown in [Figure 18](#).

```

structure dots-telemetry:
  +-- (telemetry-message-type)?
  +---:(telemetry-setup)
  |   ...
  |   +--- telemetry* []
  |   |   +-- (direction)?
  |   |   |   +---:(server-to-client-only)
  |   |   |   |   +-- tsid?                               uint32
  |   |   +--- (setup-type)?
  |   |   |   +---:(telemetry-config)
  |   |   |   |   ...
  |   |   |   +---:(pipe)
  |   |   |   |   ...
  |   |   |   +---:(baseline)
  |   |   |   |   +-- baseline* [id]
  |   |   |   |   |   +-- id                               uint32
  |   |   |   |   |   +-- target-prefix*
  |   |   |   |   |   |   inet:ip-prefix
  |   |   |   |   |   +-- target-port-range* [lower-port]
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- lower-port   inet:port-number
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- upper-port?  inet:port-number
  |   |   |   |   |   +-- target-protocol*                               uint8
  |   |   |   |   |   +-- target-fqdn*
  |   |   |   |   |   |   inet:domain-name
  |   |   |   |   |   +-- target-uri*
  |   |   |   |   |   |   inet:uri
  |   |   |   |   |   +-- alias-name*
  |   |   |   |   |   |   string
  |   |   |   |   |   +-- total-traffic-normal* [unit]
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- unit                               unit
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- low-percentile-g?   yang:gauge64
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- mid-percentile-g?   yang:gauge64
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- high-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- peak-g?            yang:gauge64
  |   |   |   |   |   +-- total-traffic-normal-per-protocol*
  |   |   |   |   |   |   [unit protocol]
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- protocol           uint8
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- unit               unit
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- low-percentile-g?   yang:gauge64
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- mid-percentile-g?   yang:gauge64
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- high-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- peak-g?            yang:gauge64
  |   |   |   |   |   +-- total-traffic-normal-per-port* [unit port]
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- port               inet:port-number
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- unit               unit
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- low-percentile-g?   yang:gauge64
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- mid-percentile-g?   yang:gauge64
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- high-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- peak-g?            yang:gauge64
  |   |   |   |   |   +-- total-connection-capacity* [protocol]
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- protocol           uint8
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- connection?        uint64
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- connection-client?  uint64
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- embryonic?          uint64
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- embryonic-client?   uint64
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- connection-ps?     uint64
  |   |   |   |   |   |   +-- connection-client-ps? uint64

```




Figure 18: Telemetry Baseline Tree Structure

A DOTS client can share one or multiple normal traffic baselines (e.g., aggregate or per-prefix baselines); each is uniquely identified within the DOTS client domain with an identifier ('id'). This identifier can be used to update a baseline entry, delete a specific entry, etc.

### 7.3.1. Conveying DOTS Client Domain Baseline Information

Considerations similar to those specified in [Section 7.1.2](#) are followed, with one exception:

- The relative order of two PUT requests carrying DOTS client domain baseline attributes from a DOTS client is determined by comparing their respective 'tsid' values. If these two requests have overlapping targets, the PUT request with a higher numeric 'tsid' value will override the request with a lower numeric 'tsid' value. The overlapped lower numeric 'tsid' **MUST** be automatically deleted and no longer be available.

Two PUT requests from a DOTS client have overlapping targets if there is a common IP address, IP prefix, FQDN, URI, or alias name. Also, two PUT requests from a DOTS client have overlapping targets from the perspective of the DOTS server if the addresses associated with the FQDN, URI, or alias are overlapping with each other or with 'target-prefix'.

DOTS clients **SHOULD** minimize the number of active 'tsid's used for baseline information. In order to avoid maintaining a long list of 'tsid's for baseline information, it is **RECOMMENDED** that DOTS clients include in any request to update information related to a given target the information regarding other targets (already communicated using a lower 'tsid' value) (assuming that this information fits within one single datagram). This update request will override these existing requests and hence optimize the number of 'tsid' requests per DOTS client.

If no target attribute is included in the request, this is an indication that the baseline information applies for the DOTS client domain as a whole.

An example of a PUT request to convey the baseline information is shown in [Figure 19](#).

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=129"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
    "telemetry": [
      {
        "baseline": [
          {
            "id": 1,
            "target-prefix": [
              "2001:db8:6401::1/128",
              "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
            ],
            "total-traffic-normal": [
              {
                "unit": "megabit-ps",
                "peak-g": "60"
              }
            ]
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

*Figure 19: PUT to Convey DOTS Traffic Baseline Information, Depicted as per Section 5.6*

The DOTS client may share protocol-specific baseline information (e.g., TCP and UDP) as shown in [Figure 20](#).



```

Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=130"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
    "telemetry": [
      {
        "baseline": [
          {
            "id": 1,
            "target-prefix": [
              "2001:db8:6401::1/128",
              "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
            ],
            "total-traffic-normal-per-protocol": [
              {
                "unit": "megabit-ps",
                "protocol": 6,
                "peak-g": "50"
              },
              {
                "unit": "megabit-ps",
                "protocol": 17,
                "peak-g": "10"
              }
            ]
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}

```

Figure 20: PUT to Convey DOTS Traffic Baseline Information (2), Depicted as per Section 5.6

The normal traffic baseline information should be updated to reflect legitimate overloads (e.g., flash crowds) to prevent unnecessary mitigation.

### 7.3.2. Retrieving Installed Normal Traffic Baseline Information

A GET request with a 'tsid' Uri-Path parameter is used to retrieve a specific installed DOTS client domain's baseline traffic information. The same procedure as that defined in [Section 7.1.3](#) is followed.

To retrieve all baseline information bound to a DOTS client, the DOTS client proceeds as specified in [Section 7.1.1](#).

### 7.3.3. Deleting Installed Normal Traffic Baseline Information

A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS client domain's normal traffic baseline information. The same procedure as that defined in [Section 7.1.4](#) is followed.

## 7.4. Resetting the Installed Telemetry Setup

Upon bootstrapping (or reboot or any other event that may alter the DOTS client setup), a DOTS client **MAY** send a DELETE request to set the telemetry parameters to default values. Such a request does not include any 'tsid' parameters. An example of such a request is depicted in [Figure 21](#).

```
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
```

*Figure 21: Deleting the Telemetry Configuration*

## 7.5. Conflict with Other DOTS Clients of the Same Domain

A DOTS server may detect conflicts between requests conveying pipe and baseline information received from DOTS clients of the same DOTS client domain. 'conflict-information' is used to report the conflict to the DOTS client, following guidelines for conflict handling similar to those discussed in [Section 4.4.1](#) of [RFC9132]. The conflict cause can be set to one of these values:

- 1: Overlapping targets ([Section 4.4.1](#) of [RFC9132]).
- 5: Overlapping pipe scope (see [Section 13](#)).

## 8. DOTS Pre-or-Ongoing-Mitigation Telemetry

There are two broad types of DDoS attacks: bandwidth-consuming attacks and target-resource-consuming attacks. This section outlines the set of DOTS telemetry attributes ([Section 8.1](#)) that covers both types of attacks. The objective of these attributes is to allow for the complete knowledge of attacks and the various particulars that can best characterize attacks.

The "ietf-dots-telemetry" YANG module ([Section 11.1](#)) defines the data structure of a new message type called 'telemetry'. The tree structure of the 'telemetry' message type is shown in [Figure 22](#).

```

structure dots-telemetry:
  +-- (telemetry-message-type)?
  +--:(telemetry-setup)
  |   ...
  |   +-- telemetry* []
  |   |   +-- (direction)?
  |   |   |   +--:(server-to-client-only)
  |   |   |   |   +-- tsid?                               uint32
  |   |   +-- (setup-type)?
  |   |   |   +--:(telemetry-config)
  |   |   |   |   ...
  |   |   |   +--:(pipe)
  |   |   |   |   ...
  |   |   |   +--:(baseline)
  |   |   |   |   ...
  |   |   +--:(telemetry)
  |   +-- pre-or-ongoing-mitigation* []
  |   |   +-- (direction)?
  |   |   |   +--:(server-to-client-only)
  |   |   |   |   +-- tmid?                               uint32
  |   |   +-- target
  |   |   |   ...
  |   |   +-- total-traffic* [unit]
  |   |   |   ...
  |   |   +-- total-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
  |   |   |   ...
  |   |   +-- total-traffic-port* [unit port]
  |   |   |   ...
  |   |   +-- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
  |   |   |   ...
  |   |   +-- total-attack-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
  |   |   |   ...
  |   |   +-- total-attack-traffic-port* [unit port]
  |   |   |   ...
  |   |   +-- total-attack-connection-protocol* [protocol]
  |   |   |   ...
  |   |   +-- total-attack-connection-port* [protocol port]
  |   |   |   ...
  |   |   +-- attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]
  |   |   |   ...
  |   |   ...

```

Figure 22: Telemetry Message Type Tree Structure

The pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry attributes are indicated by the path suffix '/tm'. '/tm' is appended to the path prefix to form the URI used with a CoAP request to signal the DOTS telemetry. Pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry attributes as specified in [Section 8.1](#) can be signaled between DOTS agents.

Pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry attributes may be sent by a DOTS client or a DOTS server.

DOTS agents **SHOULD** bind pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data to mitigation requests associated with the resources under attack. In particular, a telemetry PUT request sent after a mitigation request may include a reference to that mitigation request ('mid-list') as shown in [Figure 23](#). An example illustrating request correlation by means of 'target-prefix' is shown in [Figure 24](#).

Much of the pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data uses a unit that falls under the unit class that is configured following the procedure described in [Section 7.1.2](#). When generating telemetry data to send to a peer, the DOTS agent **MUST** auto-scale so that one or more appropriate units are used.



Figure 23: Example of Request Correlation Using 'mid'




Figure 24: Example of Request Correlation Using 'target-prefix'

DOTS agents **MUST NOT** send pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry notifications to the same peer more frequently than once every 'telemetry-notify-interval' ([Section 7.1](#)). If a telemetry notification is sent using a block-like transfer mechanism (e.g., [RFC9177](#)), this rate-limit policy **MUST NOT** consider these individual blocks as separate notifications, but as a single notification.

DOTS pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry request and response messages **MUST** be marked as Non-confirmable messages ([Section 2.1](#) of [RFC7252](#)).

## 8.1. Pre-or-Ongoing-Mitigation DOTS Telemetry Attributes

[Section 3](#) discusses the motivation for using the DOTS telemetry attributes. These attributes are specified in the following subsections.

### 8.1.1. Target

A target resource (Figure 25) is identified using the attributes 'target-prefix', 'target-port-range', 'target-protocol', 'target-fqdn', 'target-uri', 'alias-name', or a pointer to a mitigation request ('mid-list').

```

+--:(telemetry)
  +-- pre-or-ongoing-mitigation* []
    +-- (direction)?
      | +--:(server-to-client-only)
      |   +-- tmid?                               uint32
    +-- target
      | +-- target-prefix*           inet:ip-prefix
      | +-- target-port-range* [lower-port]
      |   | +-- lower-port         inet:port-number
      |   | +-- upper-port?       inet:port-number
      | +-- target-protocol*        uint8
      | +-- target-fqdn*            inet:domain-name
      | +-- target-uri*             inet:uri
      | +-- alias-name*             string
      | +-- mid-list*               uint32
    +-- total-traffic* [unit]
      | ...
    +-- total-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
      | ...
    +-- total-traffic-port* [unit port]
      | ...
    +-- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
      | ...
    +-- total-attack-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
      | ...
    +-- total-attack-traffic-port* [unit port]
      | ...
    +-- total-attack-connection-protocol* [protocol]
      | ...
    +-- total-attack-connection-port* [protocol port]
      | ...
    +-- attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]
      ...
  
```

Figure 25: Target Tree Structure

At least one of the attributes 'target-prefix', 'target-fqdn', 'target-uri', 'alias-name', or 'mid-list' **MUST** be present in the target definition.

If the target is susceptible to bandwidth-consuming attacks, the attributes representing the percentile values of the 'attack-id' attack traffic are included.

If the target is susceptible to resource-consuming DDoS attacks, the attributes defined in [Section 8.1.4](#) are applicable for representing the attack.

At least the 'target' attribute and one other pre-or-ongoing-mitigation attribute **MUST** be present in the DOTS telemetry message.

### **8.1.2. Total Traffic**

The 'total-traffic' attribute ([Figure 26](#)) conveys the percentile values (including peak and current observed values) of the total observed traffic. More fine-grained information about the total traffic can be conveyed in the 'total-traffic-protocol' and 'total-traffic-port' attributes.

The 'total-traffic-protocol' attribute represents the total traffic for a target and is transport-protocol specific.

The 'total-traffic-port' attribute represents the total traffic for a target per port number.

```

+--:(telemetry)
  +-- pre-or-ongoing-mitigation* []
    +-- (direction)?
      +--:(server-to-client-only)
        +-- tmid?                               uint32
      +-- target
        | ...
      +-- total-traffic* [unit]
        | +-- unit                               unit
        | +-- low-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
        | +-- mid-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
        | +-- high-percentile-g?                yang:gauge64
        | +-- peak-g?                           yang:gauge64
        | +-- current-g?                         yang:gauge64
      +-- total-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
        | +-- protocol                           uint8
        | +-- unit                               unit
        | +-- low-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
        | +-- mid-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
        | +-- high-percentile-g?                yang:gauge64
        | +-- peak-g?                           yang:gauge64
        | +-- current-g?                         yang:gauge64
      +-- total-traffic-port* [unit port]
        | +-- port                               inet:port-number
        | +-- unit                               unit
        | +-- low-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
        | +-- mid-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
        | +-- high-percentile-g?                yang:gauge64
        | +-- peak-g?                           yang:gauge64
        | +-- current-g?                         yang:gauge64
      +-- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
        | ...
      +-- total-attack-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
        | ...
      +-- total-attack-traffic-port* [unit port]
        | ...
      +-- total-attack-connection-protocol* [protocol]
        | ...
      +-- total-attack-connection-port* [protocol port]
        | ...
      +-- attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]
        ...

```

Figure 26: Total Traffic Tree Structure

### 8.1.3. Total Attack Traffic

The 'total-attack-traffic' attribute (Figure 27) conveys the total observed attack traffic. More fine-grained information about the total attack traffic can be conveyed in the 'total-attack-traffic-protocol' and 'total-attack-traffic-port' attributes.

The 'total-attack-traffic-protocol' attribute represents the total attack traffic for a target and is transport-protocol specific.

The 'total-attack-traffic-port' attribute represents the total attack traffic for a target per port number.

```

+--:(telemetry)
  +-- pre-or-ongoing-mitigation* []
    +-- (direction)?
      | +--:(server-to-client-only)
      |   +-- tmid?                               uint32
      +-- target
      |   ...
      +-- total-traffic* [unit]
      |   ...
      +-- total-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
      |   ...
      +-- total-traffic-port* [unit port]
      |   ...
      +-- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
      |   +-- unit                                unit
      |   +-- low-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
      |   +-- mid-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
      |   +-- high-percentile-g?                yang:gauge64
      |   +-- peak-g?                           yang:gauge64
      |   +-- current-g?                         yang:gauge64
      +-- total-attack-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
      |   +-- protocol                           uint8
      |   +-- unit                                unit
      |   +-- low-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
      |   +-- mid-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
      |   +-- high-percentile-g?                yang:gauge64
      |   +-- peak-g?                           yang:gauge64
      |   +-- current-g?                         yang:gauge64
      +-- total-attack-traffic-port* [unit port]
      |   +-- port                               inet:port-number
      |   +-- unit                                unit
      |   +-- low-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
      |   +-- mid-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
      |   +-- high-percentile-g?                yang:gauge64
      |   +-- peak-g?                           yang:gauge64
      |   +-- current-g?                         yang:gauge64
      +-- total-attack-connection-protocol* [protocol]
      |   ...
      +-- total-attack-connection-port* [protocol port]
      |   ...
      +-- attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]
      |   ...
  
```

Figure 27: Total Attack Traffic Tree Structure



#### 8.1.4. Total Attack Connections

If the target is susceptible to resource-consuming DDoS attacks, the 'total-attack-connection-protocol' attribute is used to convey the percentile values (including peak and current observed values) of various attributes related to the total attack connections. The following optional sub-attributes for the target per transport protocol are included to represent the attack characteristics:

- The number of simultaneous attack connections to the target.
- The number of simultaneous embryonic connections to the target.
- The number of attack connections per second to the target.
- The number of attack requests per second to the target.
- The number of attack partial requests to the target.

The total attack connections per port number are represented using the 'total-attack-connection-port' attribute.

```

+--:(telemetry)
  +-- pre-or-ongoing-mitigation* []
    +-- (direction)?
      | +--:(server-to-client-only)
      |   +-- tmid?                               uint32
      +-- target
      |   ...
      +-- total-traffic* [unit]
      |   ...
      +-- total-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
      |   ...
      +-- total-traffic-port* [unit port]
      |   ...
      +-- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
      |   ...
      +-- total-attack-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
      |   ...
      +-- total-attack-traffic-port* [unit port]
      |   ...
      +-- total-attack-connection-protocol* [protocol]
      |   +-- protocol                               uint8
      |   +-- connection-c
      |     | +-- low-percentile-g?               yang:gauge64
      |     | +-- mid-percentile-g?              yang:gauge64
      |     | +-- high-percentile-g?             yang:gauge64
      |     | +-- peak-g?                        yang:gauge64
      |     | +-- current-g?                     yang:gauge64
      |     +-- embryonic-c
      |       | +-- low-percentile-g?            yang:gauge64
      |       | +-- mid-percentile-g?            yang:gauge64
      |       | +-- high-percentile-g?           yang:gauge64
      |       | +-- peak-g?                      yang:gauge64
      |       | +-- current-g?                   yang:gauge64
      |     +-- connection-ps-c
      |       | +-- low-percentile-g?            yang:gauge64
      |       | +-- mid-percentile-g?            yang:gauge64
      |       | +-- high-percentile-g?           yang:gauge64
      |       | +-- peak-g?                      yang:gauge64
      |       | +-- current-g?                   yang:gauge64
      |     +-- request-ps-c
      |       | +-- low-percentile-g?            yang:gauge64
      |       | +-- mid-percentile-g?            yang:gauge64
      |       | +-- high-percentile-g?           yang:gauge64
      |       | +-- peak-g?                      yang:gauge64
      |       | +-- current-g?                   yang:gauge64
      |     +-- partial-request-c
      |       | +-- low-percentile-g?            yang:gauge64
      |       | +-- mid-percentile-g?            yang:gauge64
      |       | +-- high-percentile-g?           yang:gauge64
      |       | +-- peak-g?                      yang:gauge64
      |       | +-- current-g?                   yang:gauge64
      +-- total-attack-connection-port* [protocol port]
      |   +-- protocol                               uint8
      |   +-- port                                 inet:port-number
      |   +-- connection-c
      |     | +-- low-percentile-g?               yang:gauge64
      |     | +-- mid-percentile-g?              yang:gauge64
  
```

```

| | +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- peak-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- current-g? yang:gauge64
+-- embryonic-c
| | +-- low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- peak-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- current-g? yang:gauge64
+-- connection-ps-c
| | +-- low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- peak-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- current-g? yang:gauge64
+-- request-ps-c
| | +-- low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- peak-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- current-g? yang:gauge64
+-- partial-request-c
| | +-- low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- peak-g? yang:gauge64
| | +-- current-g? yang:gauge64
+-- attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]
...

```

Figure 28: Total Attack Connections Tree Structure

### 8.1.5. Attack Details

This attribute (depicted in [Figure 29](#)) is used to signal a set of details characterizing an attack. The following sub-attributes describing the ongoing attack can be signaled as attack details:

**vendor-id:** Vendor ID. This parameter represents a security vendor's enterprise number as registered in the IANA "Private Enterprise Numbers" registry [[Private-Enterprise-Numbers](#)].

**attack-id:** Unique identifier assigned for the attack by a vendor. This parameter **MUST** be present, independently of whether 'attack-description' is included or not.

**description-lang:** Indicates the language tag that is used for the text that is included in the 'attack-description' attribute. This attribute is encoded following the rules in [Section 2.1](#) of [[RFC5646](#)]. The default language tag is "en-US".

**attack-description:** Textual representation of the attack description. This description is related to the class of attack rather than a specific instance of it. Natural Language Processing techniques (e.g., word embedding) might provide some utility in mapping the attack description to an attack type. Textual representation of an attack solves two problems: it avoids the need to (a) create mapping tables manually between vendors and (b) standardize attack types that keep evolving.

**attack-severity:** Attack severity level. This attribute takes one of the values defined in [Section 3.12.2](#) of [RFC7970].

**start-time:** The time the attack started. The attack's start time is expressed in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z ([Section 3.4.2](#) of [RFC8949]). The CBOR encoding is modified so that the leading tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) **MUST** be omitted.

**end-time:** The time the attack ended. The attack's end time is expressed in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z ([Section 3.4.2](#) of [RFC8949]). The CBOR encoding is modified so that the leading tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) **MUST** be omitted.

**source-count:** A count of sources involved in the attack targeting the victim.

**top-talker:** A list of attack sources that are involved in an attack and that are generating an important part of the attack traffic. The top talkers are represented using 'source-prefix'.

'spoofed-status' indicates whether a top talker is a spoofed IP address (e.g., reflection attacks) or not. If no 'spoofed-status' data node is included, this means that the spoofing status is unknown.

If the target is being subjected to a bandwidth-consuming attack, a statistical profile of the attack traffic from each of the top talkers is included ('total-attack-traffic'; see [Section 8.1.3](#)).

If the target is being subjected to a resource-consuming DDoS attack, the same attributes as those defined in [Section 8.1.4](#) are applicable for characterizing the attack on a per-talker basis.

```

+--:(telemetry)
  +-- pre-or-ongoing-mitigation* []
    +-- (direction)?
      | +--:(server-to-client-only)
      |   +-- tmid?                               uint32
    +-- target
      | ...
    +-- total-traffic* [unit]
      | ...
    +-- total-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
      | ...
    +-- total-traffic-port* [unit port]
      | ...
    +-- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
      | ...
    +-- total-attack-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
      | ...
    +-- total-attack-traffic-port* [unit port]
      | ...
    +-- total-attack-connection-protocol* [protocol]
      | ...
    +-- total-attack-connection-port* [protocol port]
      | ...
    +-- attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]
      +-- vendor-id                               uint32
      +-- attack-id                               uint32
      +-- description-lang?                       string
      +-- attack-description?                     string
      +-- attack-severity?                       attack-severity
      +-- start-time?                             uint64
      +-- end-time?                               uint64
      +-- source-count
        | +-- low-percentile-g?                   yang:gauge64
        | +-- mid-percentile-g?                   yang:gauge64
        | +-- high-percentile-g?                  yang:gauge64
        | +-- peak-g?                             yang:gauge64
        | +-- current-g?                          yang:gauge64
      +-- top-talker
        +-- talker* [source-prefix]
          +-- spoofed-status?                     boolean
          +-- source-prefix                       inet:ip-prefix
          +-- source-port-range* [lower-port]
            | +-- lower-port                       inet:port-number
            | +-- upper-port?                     inet:port-number
          +-- source-icmp-type-range* [lower-type]
            | +-- lower-type                       uint8
            | +-- upper-type?                     uint8
          +-- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
            | +-- unit                             unit
            | +-- low-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
            | +-- mid-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
            | +-- high-percentile-g?                yang:gauge64
            | +-- peak-g?                           yang:gauge64
            | +-- current-g?                        yang:gauge64
          +-- total-attack-connection-protocol*
              [protocol]
            +-- protocol                           uint8

```

```

+-- connection-c
| +-- low-percentile-g?   yang:gauge64
| +-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
| +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +-- peak-g?            yang:gauge64
| +-- current-g?        yang:gauge64
+-- embryonic-c
| +-- low-percentile-g?   yang:gauge64
| +-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
| +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +-- peak-g?            yang:gauge64
| +-- current-g?        yang:gauge64
+-- connection-ps-c
| +-- low-percentile-g?   yang:gauge64
| +-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
| +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +-- peak-g?            yang:gauge64
| +-- current-g?        yang:gauge64
+-- request-ps-c
| +-- low-percentile-g?   yang:gauge64
| +-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
| +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +-- peak-g?            yang:gauge64
| +-- current-g?        yang:gauge64
+-- partial-request-c
  +-- low-percentile-g?   yang:gauge64
  +-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
  +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
  +-- peak-g?            yang:gauge64
  +-- current-g?        yang:gauge64

```

Figure 29: Attack Details Tree Structure

In order to optimize the size of telemetry data conveyed over the DOTS signal channel, DOTS agents **MAY** use the DOTS data channel [RFC8783] to exchange vendor-specific attack mapping details (that is, {vendor identifier, attack identifier} ==> textual representation of the attack description). As such, DOTS agents do not have to convey an attack description systematically in their telemetry messages over the DOTS signal channel. Refer to [Section 8.1.6](#).

### 8.1.6. Vendor Attack Mapping

Multiple mappings for different vendor identifiers may be used; the DOTS agent transmitting telemetry information can elect to use one or more vendor mappings even in the same telemetry message.

Note: It is possible that a DOTS server is making use of multiple DOTS mitigators, each from a different vendor. How telemetry information and vendor mappings are exchanged between DOTS servers and DOTS mitigators is outside the scope of this document.

DOTS clients and servers may be provided with mappings from different vendors and so have their own different sets of vendor attack mappings. A DOTS agent **MUST** accept receipt of telemetry data with a vendor identifier that is different than the identifier it uses to transmit

telemetry data. Furthermore, it is possible that the DOTS client and DOTS server are provided by the same vendor but the vendor mapping tables are at different revisions. The DOTS client **SHOULD** transmit telemetry information using any vendor mapping(s) that it provided to the DOTS server (e.g., using a POST as depicted in [Figure 30](#)), and the DOTS server **SHOULD** use any vendor mappings(s) provided to the DOTS client when transmitting telemetry data to the peer DOTS agent.

```
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
/dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json

{
  "ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping": {
    "vendor": [
      {
        "vendor-id": 345,
        "vendor-name": "mitigator-c",
        "last-updated": "1629898958",
        "attack-mapping": [
          {
            "attack-id": 1,
            "attack-description":
              "Include a description of this attack"
          },
          {
            "attack-id": 2,
            "attack-description":
              "Again, include a description of the attack"
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

*Figure 30: POST to Install Vendor Attack Mapping Details*

The "ietf-dots-mapping" YANG module defined in [Section 11.2](#) augments the "ietf-dots-data-channel" module [[RFC8783](#)]. The tree structure of the "ietf-dots-mapping" module is shown in [Figure 31](#).

```

module: ietf-dots-mapping
  augment /data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:dots-client:
    +--rw vendor-mapping {dots-telemetry}?
      +--rw vendor* [vendor-id]
        +--rw vendor-id          uint32
        +--rw vendor-name?      string
        +--rw description-lang?  string
        +--rw last-updated      uint64
        +--rw attack-mapping* [attack-id]
          +--rw attack-id        uint32
          +--rw attack-description string
  augment /data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:capabilities:
    +--ro vendor-mapping-enabled? boolean {dots-telemetry}?
  augment /data-channel:dots-data:
    +--ro vendor-mapping {dots-telemetry}?
      +--ro vendor* [vendor-id]
        +--ro vendor-id          uint32
        +--ro vendor-name?      string
        +--ro description-lang?  string
        +--ro last-updated      uint64
        +--ro attack-mapping* [attack-id]
          +--ro attack-id        uint32
          +--ro attack-description string

```

Figure 31: Vendor Attack Mapping Tree Structure

A DOTS client sends a GET request over the DOTS data channel to retrieve the capabilities supported by a DOTS server as per [Section 7.1](#) of [\[RFC8783\]](#). This request is meant to assess whether the capability of sharing vendor attack mapping details is supported by the server (i.e., check the value of 'vendor-mapping-enabled').

If 'vendor-mapping-enabled' is set to 'true', a DOTS client **MAY** send a GET request to retrieve the DOTS server's vendor attack mapping details. An example of such a GET request is shown in [Figure 32](#).

```

GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
  /ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Accept: application/yang-data+json

```

Figure 32: GET to Retrieve the Vendor Attack Mappings of a DOTS Server

A DOTS client can retrieve only the list of vendors supported by the DOTS server. It does so by setting the "depth" parameter ([Section 4.8.2](#) of [\[RFC8040\]](#)) to "3" in the GET request as shown in [Figure 33](#). An example of a response body received from the DOTS server as a response to such a request is illustrated in [Figure 34](#).



```
GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
    /ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping?depth=3 HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Accept: application/yang-data+json
```

Figure 33: GET to Retrieve the Vendors List Used by a DOTS Server

```
{
  "ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping": {
    "vendor": [
      {
        "vendor-id": 32473,
        "vendor-name": "mitigator-s",
        "last-updated": "1629898758",
        "attack-mapping": []
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 34: Response Message Body to a GET to Retrieve the Vendors List Used by a DOTS Server

The DOTS client repeats the above procedure regularly (e.g., once a week) to update the DOTS server's vendor attack mapping details.

If the DOTS client concludes that the DOTS server does not have any reference to the specific vendor attack mapping details, the DOTS client uses a POST request to install its vendor attack mapping details. An example of such a POST request is depicted in [Figure 30](#).

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request using the status-line. A "201 Created" status-line **MUST** be returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the vendor attack mapping details. If the request is missing a mandatory attribute or contains an invalid or unknown parameter, a "400 Bad Request" status-line **MUST** be returned by the DOTS server in the response. The error-tag is set to "missing-attribute", "invalid-value", or "unknown-element" as a function of the encountered error.

If the request is received via a server-domain DOTS gateway but the DOTS server does not maintain a 'cuid' for this 'cuid' while a 'cuid' is expected to be supplied, the DOTS server **MUST** reply with a "403 Forbidden" status-line and the error-tag "access-denied". Upon receipt of this message, the DOTS client **MUST** register ([Section 5.1](#) of [\[RFC8783\]](#)).

The DOTS client uses the PUT request to modify its vendor attack mapping details maintained by the DOTS server (e.g., add a new mapping entry, update an existing mapping).

A DOTS client uses a GET request to retrieve its vendor attack mapping details as maintained by the DOTS server ([Figure 35](#)).

```
GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  
  /dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw\  
  /ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping?\  
  content=all HTTP/1.1  
Host: example.com  
Accept: application/yang-data+json
```

*Figure 35: GET to Retrieve Installed Vendor Attack Mapping Details*

When conveying attack details in DOTS telemetry messages (Sections 8.2, 8.3, and 9), DOTS agents **MUST NOT** include the 'attack-description' attribute unless the corresponding attack mapping details were not previously shared with the peer DOTS agent.

## 8.2. From DOTS Clients to DOTS Servers

DOTS clients use PUT requests to signal pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry to DOTS servers. An example of such a request is shown in [Figure 36](#).

```

Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tmid=123"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry": {
    "pre-or-ongoing-mitigation": [
      {
        "target": {
          "target-prefix": [
            "2001:db8::1/128"
          ]
        },
        "total-attack-traffic-protocol": [
          {
            "protocol": 17,
            "unit": "megabit-ps",
            "mid-percentile-g": "900"
          }
        ],
        "attack-detail": [
          {
            "vendor-id": 32473,
            "attack-id": 77,
            "start-time": "1608336568",
            "attack-severity": "high"
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}

```

Figure 36: PUT to Send Pre-or-Ongoing-Mitigation Telemetry, Depicted as per Section 5.6

'cuid' is a mandatory Uri-Path parameter for DOTS PUT requests.

The following additional Uri-Path parameter is defined:

**tmid:** The Telemetry Identifier is an identifier for the DOTS pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data represented as an integer. This identifier **MUST** be generated by DOTS clients. 'tmid' values **MUST** increase monotonically whenever a DOTS client needs to convey a new set of pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data.

The procedure specified in [Section 4.4.1](#) of [RFC9132] for 'mid' rollover **MUST** be followed for 'tmid' rollover.

This is a mandatory attribute. 'tmid' **MUST** appear after 'cuid' in the Uri-Path options.

'cuid' and 'tmid' **MUST NOT** appear in the PUT request message body.

At least the 'target' attribute and another pre-or-ongoing-mitigation attribute ([Section 8.1](#)) **MUST** be present in the PUT request. If only the 'target' attribute is present, this request is handled as per [Section 8.3](#).

The relative order of two PUT requests carrying DOTS pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry from a DOTS client is determined by comparing their respective 'tmid' values. If these two requests have an overlapping 'target', the PUT request with a higher numeric 'tmid' value will override the request with a lower numeric 'tmid' value. The overlapped lower numeric 'tmid' **MUST** be automatically deleted and no longer be available.

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing a PUT request using CoAP Response Codes. In particular, the 2.04 (Changed) Response Code is returned if the DOTS server has accepted the pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry. The 5.03 (Service Unavailable) Response Code is returned if the DOTS server has erred. The 5.03 Response Code uses the Max-Age Option to indicate the number of seconds after which to retry.

How long a DOTS server maintains a 'tmid' as active or logs the enclosed telemetry information is implementation specific. Note that if a 'tmid' is still active, then logging details are updated by the DOTS server as a function of the updates received from the peer DOTS client.

A DOTS client that lost the state of its active 'tmid's or has to set 'tmid' back to zero (e.g., crash or restart) **MUST** send a GET request to the DOTS server to retrieve the list of active 'tmid' values. The DOTS client may then delete 'tmid's that should not be active anymore ([Figure 37](#)). Sending a DELETE with no 'tmid' indicates that all 'tmid's must be deactivated ([Figure 38](#)).

```
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tmid=123"
```

*Figure 37: Deleting Specific Pre-or-Ongoing-Mitigation Telemetry Information*

```
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
```

*Figure 38: Deleting All Pre-or-Ongoing-Mitigation Telemetry Information*

### 8.3. From DOTS Servers to DOTS Clients

The pre-or-ongoing-mitigation data (attack details in particular) can also be signaled from DOTS servers to DOTS clients. For example, a DOTS server co-located with a DDoS detector can collect monitoring information from the target network, identify a DDoS attack using statistical analysis or deep learning techniques, and signal the attack details to the DOTS client.

The DOTS client can use the attack details to decide whether to trigger a DOTS mitigation request or not. Furthermore, the security operations personnel at the DOTS client domain can use the attack details to determine the protection strategy and select the appropriate DOTS server for mitigating the attack.

In order to receive pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry notifications from a DOTS server, a DOTS client **MUST** send a PUT (followed by a GET) with the target filter. An example of such a PUT request is shown in [Figure 39](#). In order to avoid maintaining a long list of such requests, it is **RECOMMENDED** that DOTS clients include all targets in the same request (assuming that this information fits within one single datagram). DOTS servers may be instructed to restrict the number of pre-or-ongoing-mitigation requests per DOTS client domain. The pre-or-ongoing-mitigation requests **MUST** be maintained in an active state by the DOTS server until a DELETE request is received from the same DOTS client to clear this pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry or when the DOTS client is considered inactive (e.g., [Section 3.5](#) of [\[RFC8783\]](#)).

The relative order of two PUT requests carrying DOTS pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry from a DOTS client is determined by comparing their respective 'tmid' values. If these two requests have an overlapping 'target', the PUT request with a higher numeric 'tmid' value will override the request with a lower numeric 'tmid' value. The overlapped lower numeric 'tmid' **MUST** be automatically deleted and no longer be available.

```

Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tmid=567"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry": {
    "pre-or-ongoing-mitigation": [
      {
        "target": {
          "target-prefix": [
            "2001:db8::/32"
          ]
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

```

*Figure 39: PUT to Request Pre-or-Ongoing-Mitigation Telemetry, Depicted as per Section 5.6*

DOTS clients of the same domain can ask to receive pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry bound to the same target without being considered to be "overlapping" and in conflict.

Once the PUT request to instantiate request state on the server has succeeded, the DOTS client issues a GET request to receive ongoing telemetry updates. The client uses the Observe Option, set to "0" (register), in the GET request to receive asynchronous notifications carrying pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data from the DOTS server. The GET request can specify a specific 'tmid' (Figure 40) or omit the 'tmid' (Figure 41) to receive updates on all active requests from that client.

```

Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tmid=567"
Observe: 0

```

*Figure 40: GET to Subscribe to Telemetry Asynchronous Notifications for a Specific 'tmid'*

```
Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Observe: 0
```

Figure 41: GET to Subscribe to Telemetry Asynchronous Notifications for All 'tmid's

The DOTS client can use a filter to request a subset of the asynchronous notifications from the DOTS server by indicating one or more Uri-Query options in its GET request. A Uri-Query option can include the following parameters to restrict the notifications based on the attack target: 'target-prefix', 'target-port', 'target-protocol', 'target-fqdn', 'target-uri', 'alias-name', 'mid', and 'c' (content) (Section 5.4). Furthermore:

- If more than one Uri-Query option is included in a request, these options are interpreted in the same way as when multiple target attributes are included in a message body (Section 4.4.1 of [RFC9132]).
- If multiple values of a query parameter are to be included in a request, these values **MUST** be included in the same Uri-Query option and separated by a "," character without any spaces.
- Range values (i.e., a contiguous inclusive block) can be included for the 'target-port', 'target-protocol', and 'mid' parameters by indicating the two boundary values separated by a "-" character.
- Wildcard names (i.e., a name with the leftmost label is the "\*" character) can be included in 'target-fqdn' or 'target-uri' parameters. DOTS clients **MUST NOT** include a name in which the "\*" character is included in a label other than the leftmost label. "\*.example.com" is an example of a valid wildcard name that can be included as a value of the 'target-fqdn' parameter in a Uri-Query option.

DOTS clients may also filter out the asynchronous notifications from the DOTS server by indicating information about a specific attack source. To that aim, a DOTS client may include 'source-prefix', 'source-port', or 'source-icmp-type' in a Uri-Query option. The same considerations (ranges, multiple values) specified for target attributes apply for source attributes. Special care **SHOULD** be taken when using these filters, as their use may cause some attacks to be hidden from the requesting DOTS client (e.g., if the attack changes its source information).

Requests with invalid query types (e.g., not supported, malformed) received by the DOTS server **MUST** be rejected with a 4.00 (Bad Request) Response Code.

An example of a request to subscribe to asynchronous telemetry notifications regarding UDP traffic is shown in Figure 42. This filter will be applied for all 'tmid's.

```

Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Query: "target-protocol=17"
Observe: 0

```

Figure 42: GET Request to Receive Telemetry Asynchronous Notifications Filtered Using Uri-Query

The DOTS server will send asynchronous notifications to the DOTS client when an attack event is detected, following considerations similar to those discussed in [Section 4.4.2.1](#) of [RFC9132]. An example of a pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry notification is shown in [Figure 43](#).

```

{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry": {
    "pre-or-ongoing-mitigation": [
      {
        "tmid": 567,
        "target": {
          "target-prefix": [
            "2001:db8::1/128"
          ]
        },
        "target-protocol": [
          17
        ],
        "total-attack-traffic": [
          {
            "unit": "megabit-ps",
            "mid-percentile-g": "900"
          }
        ],
        "attack-detail": [
          {
            "vendor-id": 32473,
            "attack-id": 77,
            "start-time": "1618339785",
            "attack-severity": "high"
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}

```

Figure 43: Message Body of a Pre-or-Ongoing-Mitigation Telemetry Notification from the DOTS Server, Depicted as per Section 5.6



A DOTS server sends the aggregate data for a target using the 'total-attack-traffic' attribute. The aggregate assumes that Uri-Query filters are applied on the target. The DOTS server **MAY** include more fine-grained data when needed (that is, 'total-attack-traffic-protocol' and 'total-attack-traffic-port'). If a port filter (or protocol filter) is included in a request, 'total-attack-traffic-protocol' (or 'total-attack-traffic-port') conveys the data with the port (or protocol) filter applied.

A DOTS server may aggregate pre-or-ongoing-mitigation data (e.g., 'top-talker') for all targets of a domain or, when justified, send specific information (e.g., 'top-talker') for a specific target.

The DOTS client may log pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data with an alert sent to an administrator or a network controller. The DOTS client may send a mitigation request if the attack cannot be handled locally.

A DOTS client that is not interested in receiving pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data for a target sends a DELETE request similar to the DELETE request depicted in [Figure 37](#).

## 9. DOTS Telemetry Mitigation Status Update

### 9.1. From DOTS Clients to DOTS Servers: Mitigation Efficacy DOTS Telemetry Attributes

The mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes can be signaled from DOTS clients to DOTS servers as part of the periodic mitigation efficacy updates to the server ([Section 4.4.3](#) of [\[RFC9132\]](#)).

**Total attack traffic:** The overall attack traffic as observed from the DOTS client's perspective during an active mitigation. See [Figure 27](#).

**Attack details:** The overall attack details as observed from the DOTS client's perspective during an active mitigation. See [Section 8.1.5](#).

The "ietf-dots-telemetry" YANG module ([Section 11.1](#)) augments the 'mitigation-scope' message type defined in the "ietf-dots-signal-channel" module [\[RFC9132\]](#) so that these attributes can be signaled by a DOTS client in a mitigation efficacy update ([Figure 44](#)).

```

augment-structure /dots-signal:dots-signal/dots-signal:message-type
  /dots-signal:mitigation-scope/dots-signal:scope:
+-- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
|   +-- unit                               unit
|   +-- low-percentile-g?                  yang:gauge64
|   +-- mid-percentile-g?                  yang:gauge64
|   +-- high-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
|   +-- peak-g?                            yang:gauge64
|   +-- current-g?                         yang:gauge64
+-- attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]
  +-- vendor-id                            uint32
  +-- attack-id                            uint32
  +-- attack-description?                  string
  +-- attack-severity?                     attack-severity
  +-- start-time?                          uint64
  +-- end-time?                            uint64
  +-- source-count
  |   +-- low-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
  |   +-- mid-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
  |   +-- high-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
  |   +-- peak-g?                           yang:gauge64
  |   +-- current-g?                         yang:gauge64
+-- top-talker
  +-- talker* [source-prefix]
  |   +-- spoofed-status?                   boolean
  |   +-- source-prefix                     inet:ip-prefix
  |   +-- source-port-range* [lower-port]
  |   |   +-- lower-port                    inet:port-number
  |   |   +-- upper-port?                   inet:port-number
  |   +-- source-icmp-type-range* [lower-type]
  |   |   +-- lower-type                    uint8
  |   |   +-- upper-type?                   uint8
  |   +-- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
  |   |   +-- unit                          unit
  |   |   +-- low-percentile-g?              yang:gauge64
  |   |   +-- mid-percentile-g?              yang:gauge64
  |   |   +-- high-percentile-g?              yang:gauge64
  |   |   +-- peak-g?                        yang:gauge64
  |   |   +-- current-g?                     yang:gauge64
  |   +-- total-attack-connection
  |   |   +-- connection-c
  |   |   |   +-- low-percentile-g?          yang:gauge64
  |   |   |   +-- mid-percentile-g?          yang:gauge64
  |   |   |   +-- high-percentile-g?          yang:gauge64
  |   |   |   +-- peak-g?                    yang:gauge64
  |   |   |   +-- current-g?                 yang:gauge64
  |   |   +-- embryonic-c
  |   |   |   ...
  |   |   +-- connection-ps-c
  |   |   |   ...
  |   |   +-- request-ps-c
  |   |   |   ...
  |   |   +-- partial-request-c
  |   |   |   ...

```

Figure 44: Telemetry Efficacy Update Tree Structure

In order to signal telemetry data in a mitigation efficacy update, it is **RECOMMENDED** that the DOTS client have already established a DOTS telemetry setup session with the server in 'idle' time. Such a session is primarily meant to assess whether the peer DOTS server supports telemetry extensions and to thus prevent message processing failure ([Section 3.1](#) of [RFC9132]).

An example of an efficacy update with telemetry attributes is depicted in [Figure 45](#).

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
If-Match:
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
    "scope": [
      {
        "alias-name": [
          "https1",
          "https2"
        ],
        "attack-status": "under-attack",
        "ietf-dots-telemetry:total-attack-traffic": [
          {
            "unit": "megabit-ps",
            "mid-percentile-g": "900"
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 45: Example of Mitigation Efficacy Update with Telemetry Attributes, Depicted as per Section 5.6

## 9.2. From DOTS Servers to DOTS Clients: Mitigation Status DOTS Telemetry Attributes

The mitigation status telemetry attributes can be signaled from the DOTS server to the DOTS client as part of the periodic mitigation status update ([Section 4.4.2](#) of [RFC9132]). In particular, DOTS clients can receive asynchronous notifications of the attack details from DOTS servers using the Observe Option defined in [RFC7641].

In order to make use of this feature, DOTS clients **MUST** establish a telemetry session with the DOTS server in 'idle' time and **MUST** set the 'server-originated-telemetry' attribute to 'true'.

DOTS servers **MUST NOT** include telemetry attributes in mitigation status updates sent to DOTS clients for telemetry sessions in which the 'server-originated-telemetry' attribute is set to 'false'.

As defined in [RFC8612], the actual mitigation activities can include several countermeasure mechanisms. The DOTS server signals the current operational status of relevant countermeasures. A list of attacks detected by these countermeasures **MAY** also be included. The same attributes as those defined in Section 8.1.5 are applicable for describing the attacks detected and mitigated at the DOTS server domain.

The "ietf-dots-telemetry" YANG module (Section 11.1) augments the 'mitigation-scope' message type defined in the "ietf-dots-signal-channel" module [RFC9132] with telemetry data as depicted in Figure 46.

```

augment-structure /dots-signal:dots-signal/dots-signal:message-type
                  /dots-signal:mitigation-scope/dots-signal:scope:
+-- (direction)?
|
|  +--:(server-to-client-only)
|  |
|  |  +-- total-traffic* [unit]
|  |  |
|  |  |  +-- unit                unit
|  |  |  +-- low-percentile-g?   yang:gauge64
|  |  |  +-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
|  |  |  +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
|  |  |  +-- peak-g?            yang:gauge64
|  |  |  +-- current-g?         yang:gauge64
|  |  +-- total-attack-connection
|  |  |
|  |  |  +-- connection-c
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  +-- low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
|  |  |  |  +-- mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
|  |  |  |  +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
|  |  |  |  +-- peak-g?           yang:gauge64
|  |  |  |  +-- current-g?       yang:gauge64
|  |  |  +-- embryonic-c
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  ...
|  |  |  +-- connection-ps-c
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  ...
|  |  |  +-- request-ps-c
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  ...
|  |  |  +-- partial-request-c
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  ...
|  |  +-- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
|  |  |
|  |  |  +-- unit                unit
|  |  |  +-- low-percentile-g?   yang:gauge64
|  |  |  +-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
|  |  |  +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
|  |  |  +-- peak-g?            yang:gauge64
|  |  |  +-- current-g?         yang:gauge64
|  |  +-- attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]
|  |  |
|  |  |  +-- vendor-id            uint32
|  |  |  +-- attack-id           uint32
|  |  |  +-- attack-description? string
|  |  |  +-- attack-severity?   attack-severity
|  |  |  +-- start-time?        uint64
|  |  |  +-- end-time?          uint64
|  |  |  +-- source-count
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  +-- low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
|  |  |  |  +-- mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
|  |  |  |  +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
|  |  |  |  +-- peak-g?           yang:gauge64
|  |  |  |  +-- current-g?       yang:gauge64
|  |  +-- top-talker
|  |  |
|  |  |  +-- talker* [source-prefix]
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  +-- spoofed-status?   boolean
|  |  |  |  +-- source-prefix     inet:ip-prefix
|  |  |  |  +-- source-port-range* [lower-port]
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  +-- lower-port    inet:port-number
|  |  |  |  |  +-- upper-port?  inet:port-number
|  |  |  |  +-- source-icmp-type-range* [lower-type]
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  +-- lower-type    uint8
|  |  |  |  |  +-- upper-type?  uint8
|  |  |  |  +-- total-attack-traffic* [unit]

```

```

|   +-- unit                               unit
|   +-- low-percentile-g?                  yang:gauge64
|   +-- mid-percentile-g?                  yang:gauge64
|   +-- high-percentile-g?                 yang:gauge64
|   +-- peak-g?                            yang:gauge64
|   +-- current-g?                         yang:gauge64
+-- total-attack-connection
   +-- connection-c
      |   +-- low-percentile-g?             yang:gauge64
      |   +-- mid-percentile-g?             yang:gauge64
      |   +-- high-percentile-g?           yang:gauge64
      |   +-- peak-g?                       yang:gauge64
      |   +-- current-g?                     yang:gauge64
   +-- embryonic-c
      |   ...
   +-- connection-ps-c
      |   ...
   +-- request-ps-c
      |   ...
   +-- partial-request-c
      |   ...

```

*Figure 46: DOTS Server-to-Client Mitigation Status Telemetry Tree Structure*

[Figure 47](#) shows an example of an asynchronous notification of attack mitigation status from the DOTS server. This notification signals both the mid-percentile value of processed attack traffic and the peak count of unique sources involved in the attack.

```

{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
    "scope": [
      {
        "mid": 12332,
        "mitigation-start": "1507818434",
        "alias-name": [
          "https1",
          "https2"
        ],
        "lifetime": 1600,
        "status": "attack-successfully-mitigated",
        "bytes-dropped": "134334555",
        "bps-dropped": "43344",
        "pkts-dropped": "333334444",
        "pps-dropped": "432432",
        "ietf-dots-telemetry:total-attack-traffic": [
          {
            "unit": "megabit-ps",
            "mid-percentile-g": "752"
          }
        ],
        "ietf-dots-telemetry:attack-detail": [
          {
            "vendor-id": 32473,
            "attack-id": 77,
            "source-count": {
              "peak-g": "12683"
            }
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}

```

Figure 47: Response Body of a Mitigation Status with Telemetry Attributes, Depicted as per Section 5.6

DOTS clients can filter out the asynchronous notifications from the DOTS server by indicating one or more Uri-Query options in its GET request. A Uri-Query option can include the following parameters: 'target-prefix', 'target-port', 'target-protocol', 'target-fqdn', 'target-uri', 'alias-name', and 'c' (content) (Section 5.4). The considerations discussed in Section 8.3 **MUST** be followed to include multiple query values, ranges ('target-port', 'target-protocol'), and wildcard names ('target-fqdn', 'target-uri').

An example of a request to subscribe to asynchronous notifications bound to the "https1" alias is shown in Figure 48.

```
Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=12332"
Uri-Query: "target-alias=https1"
Observe: 0
```

Figure 48: GET Request to Receive Asynchronous Notifications Filtered Using Uri-Query

If the target query does not match the target of the enclosed 'mid' as maintained by the DOTS server, the latter **MUST** respond with a 4.04 (Not Found) error Response Code. The DOTS server **MUST NOT** add a new Observe entry if this query overlaps with an existing Observe entry. In such a case, the DOTS server replies with a 4.09 (Conflict) Response Code.

## 10. Error Handling

A list of common CoAP errors that are implemented by DOTS servers is provided in [Section 9 of \[RFC9132\]](#). The following additional error cases apply for the telemetry extension:

- 4.00 (Bad Request) is returned by the DOTS server when the DOTS client has sent a request that violates the DOTS telemetry extension.
- 4.04 (Not Found) is returned by the DOTS server when the DOTS client is requesting a 'tsid' or 'tmid' that is not valid.
- 4.00 (Bad Request) is returned by the DOTS server when the DOTS client has sent a request with invalid query types (e.g., not supported, malformed).
- 4.04 (Not Found) is returned by the DOTS server when the DOTS client has sent a request with a target query that does not match the target of the enclosed 'mid' as maintained by the DOTS server.

As indicated in [Section 9 of \[RFC9132\]](#), an additional plaintext diagnostic payload ([Section 5.5.2 of \[RFC7252\]](#)) to help with troubleshooting is returned in the body of the response.

## 11. YANG Modules

### 11.1. DOTS Signal Channel Telemetry YANG Module

This module uses types defined in [\[RFC6991\]](#) and [\[RFC8345\]](#). It also reuses a grouping from [\[RFC8783\]](#).

```
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-telemetry@2022-05-18.yang"

module ietf-dots-telemetry {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-telemetry";
  prefix dots-telemetry;
```



```
import ietf-dots-signal-channel {
  prefix dots-signal;
  reference
    "RFC 9132: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
      Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
}
import ietf-dots-data-channel {
  prefix data-channel;
  reference
    "RFC 8783: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
      Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification";
}
import ietf-yang-types {
  prefix yang;
  reference
    "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types, Section 3";
}
import ietf-inet-types {
  prefix inet;
  reference
    "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types, Section 4";
}
import ietf-network-topology {
  prefix nt;
  reference
    "RFC 8345: A YANG Data Model for Network Topologies,
      Section 6.2";
}
import ietf-yang-structure-ext {
  prefix sx;
  reference
    "RFC 8791: YANG Data Structure Extensions";
}

organization
  "IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
contact
  "WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
  WG List: <mailto:dots@ietf.org>

  Author: Mohamed Boucadair
    <mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>

  Author: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy.K
    <mailto:kondtir@gmail.com>";
description
  "This module contains YANG definitions for the signaling
  of DOTS telemetry data exchanged between a DOTS client and
  a DOTS server by means of the DOTS signal channel.

  Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
  authors of the code. All rights reserved.

  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
  without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
  the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
  forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
```

```
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9244; see the
RFC itself for full legal notices.";

revision 2022-05-18 {
  description
    "Initial revision.";
  reference
    "RFC 9244: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
      Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry";
}

typedef attack-severity {
  type enumeration {
    enum none {
      value 1;
      description
        "No effect on the DOTS client domain.";
    }
    enum low {
      value 2;
      description
        "Minimal effect on the DOTS client domain.";
    }
    enum medium {
      value 3;
      description
        "A subset of DOTS client domain resources is
        out of service.";
    }
    enum high {
      value 4;
      description
        "The DOTS client domain is under extremely severe
        conditions.";
    }
    enum unknown {
      value 5;
      description
        "The impact of the attack is not known.";
    }
  }
  description
    "Enumeration for attack severity.";
  reference
    "RFC 7970: The Incident Object Description Exchange
      Format Version 2, Section 3.12.2";
}

typedef unit-class {
  type enumeration {
    enum packet-ps {
      value 1;
      description
        "Packets per second (pps).";
    }
  }
}
```

```
enum bit-ps {
  value 2;
  description
    "Bits per second (bps).";
}
enum byte-ps {
  value 3;
  description
    "Bytes per second (Bps).";
}
}
description
  "Enumeration to indicate which unit class is used.
  These classes are supported: pps, bps, and Bps.";
}

typedef unit {
  type enumeration {
    enum packet-ps {
      value 1;
      description
        "Packets per second (pps).";
    }
    enum bit-ps {
      value 2;
      description
        "Bits per second (bps).";
    }
    enum byte-ps {
      value 3;
      description
        "Bytes per second (Bps).";
    }
    enum kilopacket-ps {
      value 4;
      description
        "Kilo packets per second (kpps).";
    }
    enum kilobit-ps {
      value 5;
      description
        "Kilobits per second (kbps).";
    }
    enum kilobyte-ps {
      value 6;
      description
        "Kilobytes per second (kBps).";
    }
    enum megapacket-ps {
      value 7;
      description
        "Mega packets per second (Mpps).";
    }
    enum megabit-ps {
      value 8;
      description
        "Megabits per second (Mbps).";
    }
  }
}
```

```
enum megabyte-ps {
  value 9;
  description
    "Megabytes per second (MBps).";
}
enum gigapacket-ps {
  value 10;
  description
    "Giga packets per second (Gpps).";
}
enum gigabit-ps {
  value 11;
  description
    "Gigabits per second (Gbps).";
}
enum gigabyte-ps {
  value 12;
  description
    "Gigabytes per second (GBps).";
}
enum terapacket-ps {
  value 13;
  description
    "Tera packets per second (Tpps).";
}
enum terabit-ps {
  value 14;
  description
    "Terabits per second (Tbps).";
}
enum terabyte-ps {
  value 15;
  description
    "Terabytes per second (TBps).";
}
enum petapacket-ps {
  value 16;
  description
    "Peta packets per second (Ppps).";
}
enum petabit-ps {
  value 17;
  description
    "Petabits per second (Pbps).";
}
enum petabyte-ps {
  value 18;
  description
    "Petabytes per second (PBps).";
}
enum exapacket-ps {
  value 19;
  description
    "Exa packets per second (Epps).";
}
enum exabit-ps {
  value 20;
  description
```

```
        "Exabits per second (Ebps).";
    }
    enum exabyte-ps {
        value 21;
        description
            "Exabytes per second (EBps).";
    }
    enum zettapacket-ps {
        value 22;
        description
            "Zetta packets per second (Zpps).";
    }
    enum zettabit-ps {
        value 23;
        description
            "Zettabits per second (Zbps).";
    }
    enum zettabyte-ps {
        value 24;
        description
            "Zettabytes per second (ZBps).";
    }
}
description
    "Enumeration to indicate which unit is used.
    Only one unit per unit class is used owing to
    unit auto-scaling.";
}

typedef interval {
    type enumeration {
        enum 5-minutes {
            value 1;
            description
                "5 minutes.";
        }
        enum 10-minutes {
            value 2;
            description
                "10 minutes.";
        }
        enum 30-minutes {
            value 3;
            description
                "30 minutes.";
        }
        enum hour {
            value 4;
            description
                "Hour.";
        }
        enum day {
            value 5;
            description
                "Day.";
        }
        enum week {
            value 6;
        }
    }
}
```

```
        description
        "Week.";
    }
    enum month {
        value 7;
        description
        "Month.";
    }
}
description
"Enumeration to indicate the overall measurement period.";
}

typedef sample {
    type enumeration {
        enum second {
            value 1;
            description
            "One-second measurement period.";
        }
        enum 5-seconds {
            value 2;
            description
            "5-second measurement period.";
        }
        enum 30-seconds {
            value 3;
            description
            "30-second measurement period.";
        }
        enum minute {
            value 4;
            description
            "One-minute measurement period.";
        }
        enum 5-minutes {
            value 5;
            description
            "5-minute measurement period.";
        }
        enum 10-minutes {
            value 6;
            description
            "10-minute measurement period.";
        }
        enum 30-minutes {
            value 7;
            description
            "30-minute measurement period.";
        }
        enum hour {
            value 8;
            description
            "One-hour measurement period.";
        }
    }
}
description
"Enumeration to indicate the sampling period.";
```

```
}  
  
typedef percentile {  
  type decimal64 {  
    fraction-digits 2;  
  }  
  description  
    "The nth percentile of a set of data is the  
    value at which n percent of the data is below it."  
}  
  
typedef query-type {  
  type enumeration {  
    enum target-prefix {  
      value 1;  
      description  
        "Query based on target prefix."  
    }  
    enum target-port {  
      value 2;  
      description  
        "Query based on target port number."  
    }  
    enum target-protocol {  
      value 3;  
      description  
        "Query based on target protocol."  
    }  
    enum target-fqdn {  
      value 4;  
      description  
        "Query based on target FQDN."  
    }  
    enum target-uri {  
      value 5;  
      description  
        "Query based on target URI."  
    }  
    enum target-alias {  
      value 6;  
      description  
        "Query based on target alias."  
    }  
    enum mid {  
      value 7;  
      description  
        "Query based on mitigation identifier (mid)."  
    }  
    enum source-prefix {  
      value 8;  
      description  
        "Query based on source prefix."  
    }  
    enum source-port {  
      value 9;  
      description  
        "Query based on source port number."  
    }  
  }  
}
```

```
enum source-icmp-type {
  value 10;
  description
    "Query based on ICMP type.";
}
enum content {
  value 11;
  description
    "Query based on the 'c' (content) Uri-Query option,
    which is used to control the selection of configuration
    and non-configuration data nodes.";
  reference
    "RFC 9132: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
    Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel
    Specification, Section 4.4.2";
}
}
description
  "Enumeration of support for query types that can be used
  in a GET request to filter out data. Requests with
  invalid query types (e.g., not supported, malformed)
  received by the DOTS server are rejected with
  a 4.00 (Bad Request) Response Code.";
}

grouping telemetry-parameters {
  description
    "A grouping that includes a set of parameters that
    are used to prepare the reported telemetry data.

    The grouping indicates a measurement interval,
    a measurement sample period, and
    low-percentile/mid-percentile/high-percentile values.";
  leaf measurement-interval {
    type interval;
    description
      "Defines the period during which percentiles are
      computed.";
  }
  leaf measurement-sample {
    type sample;
    description
      "Defines the time distribution for measuring
      values that are used to compute percentiles.

      The measurement sample value must be less than the
      measurement interval value.";
  }
  leaf low-percentile {
    type percentile;
    default "10.00";
    description
      "Low-percentile. If set to '0', this means that
      the use of low-percentile values is disabled.";
  }
  leaf mid-percentile {
    type percentile;
    must '. >= ../low-percentile' {
```



```
    error-message
      "The mid-percentile must be greater than
       or equal to the low-percentile.";
  }
  default "50.00";
  description
    "Mid-percentile. If set to the same value as
     'low-percentile', this means that the use of
     mid-percentile values is disabled.";
}
leaf high-percentile {
  type percentile;
  must '. >= ../mid-percentile' {
    error-message
      "The high-percentile must be greater than
       or equal to the mid-percentile.";
  }
  default "90.00";
  description
    "High-percentile. If set to the same value as
     'mid-percentile', this means that the use of
     high-percentile values is disabled.";
}
}

grouping percentile-and-peak {
  description
    "Generic grouping for percentile and peak values.";
  leaf low-percentile-g {
    type yang:gauge64;
    description
      "Low-percentile value.";
  }
  leaf mid-percentile-g {
    type yang:gauge64;
    description
      "Mid-percentile value.";
  }
  leaf high-percentile-g {
    type yang:gauge64;
    description
      "High-percentile value.";
  }
  leaf peak-g {
    type yang:gauge64;
    description
      "Peak value.";
  }
}

grouping percentile-peak-and-current {
  description
    "Generic grouping for percentile and peak values.";
  uses percentile-and-peak;
  leaf current-g {
    type yang:gauge64;
    description
      "Current value.";
  }
}
```

```
    }
  }

  grouping unit-config {
    description
      "Generic grouping for unit configuration.";
    list unit-config {
      key "unit";
      description
        "Controls which unit classes are allowed when sharing
        telemetry data.";
      leaf unit {
        type unit-class;
        description
          "Can be 'packet-ps', 'bit-ps', or 'byte-ps'.";
      }
      leaf unit-status {
        type boolean;
        mandatory true;
        description
          "Enable/disable the use of the measurement unit class.";
      }
    }
  }

  grouping traffic-unit {
    description
      "Grouping of traffic as a function of the
      measurement unit.";
    leaf unit {
      type unit;
      description
        "The traffic can be measured using unit classes:
        'packet-ps', 'bit-ps', or 'byte-ps'. DOTS agents
        auto-scale to the appropriate units (e.g., 'megabit-ps',
        'kilobit-ps').";
    }
    uses percentile-and-peak;
  }

  grouping traffic-unit-all {
    description
      "Grouping of traffic as a function of the measurement unit,
      including current values.";
    uses traffic-unit;
    leaf current-g {
      type yang:gauge64;
      description
        "Current observed value.";
    }
  }

  grouping traffic-unit-protocol {
    description
      "Grouping of traffic of a given transport protocol as
      a function of the measurement unit.";
    leaf protocol {
      type uint8;
    }
  }
}
```

```
    description
      "The transport protocol.
      Values are taken from the IANA 'Protocol Numbers'
      registry:
      <https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.

      For example, this parameter contains 6 for TCP,
      17 for UDP, 33 for the Datagram Congestion Control
      Protocol (DCCP), or 132 for the Stream Control
      Transmission Protocol (SCTP).";
  }
  uses traffic-unit;
}

grouping traffic-unit-protocol-all {
  description
    "Grouping of traffic of a given transport protocol as
    a function of the measurement unit, including current
    values.";
  uses traffic-unit-protocol;
  leaf current-g {
    type yang:gauge64;
    description
      "Current observed value.";
  }
}

grouping traffic-unit-port {
  description
    "Grouping of traffic bound to a port number as
    a function of the measurement unit.";
  leaf port {
    type inet:port-number;
    description
      "Port number used by a transport protocol.";
  }
  uses traffic-unit;
}

grouping traffic-unit-port-all {
  description
    "Grouping of traffic bound to a port number as
    a function of the measurement unit, including
    current values.";
  uses traffic-unit-port;
  leaf current-g {
    type yang:gauge64;
    description
      "Current observed value.";
  }
}

grouping total-connection-capacity {
  description
    "Total connection capacities for various types of
    connections, as well as overall capacity. These data nodes
    are useful for detecting resource-consuming DDoS attacks.";
  leaf connection {
```

```
    type uint64;
    description
      "The maximum number of simultaneous connections that
       are allowed to the target server.";
  }
  leaf connection-client {
    type uint64;
    description
      "The maximum number of simultaneous connections that
       are allowed to the target server per client.";
  }
  leaf embryonic {
    type uint64;
    description
      "The maximum number of simultaneous embryonic connections
       that are allowed to the target server. The term
       'embryonic connection' refers to a connection whose
       connection handshake is not finished. Embryonic
       connections are only possible in connection-oriented
       transport protocols like TCP or SCTP.";
  }
  leaf embryonic-client {
    type uint64;
    description
      "The maximum number of simultaneous embryonic connections
       that are allowed to the target server per client.";
  }
  leaf connection-ps {
    type uint64;
    description
      "The maximum number of new connections allowed per second
       to the target server.";
  }
  leaf connection-client-ps {
    type uint64;
    description
      "The maximum number of new connections allowed per second
       to the target server per client.";
  }
  leaf request-ps {
    type uint64;
    description
      "The maximum number of requests allowed per second
       to the target server.";
  }
  leaf request-client-ps {
    type uint64;
    description
      "The maximum number of requests allowed per second
       to the target server per client.";
  }
  leaf partial-request-max {
    type uint64;
    description
      "The maximum number of outstanding partial requests
       that are allowed to the target server.";
  }
  leaf partial-request-client-max {
```

```
    type uint64;
    description
      "The maximum number of outstanding partial requests
      that are allowed to the target server per client.";
  }
}

grouping total-connection-capacity-protocol {
  description
    "Total connection capacity per protocol. These data nodes
    are useful for detecting resource-consuming DDoS attacks.";
  leaf protocol {
    type uint8;
    description
      "The transport protocol.
      Values are taken from the IANA 'Protocol Numbers'
      registry:
      <https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
  }
  uses total-connection-capacity;
}

grouping connection-percentile-and-peak {
  description
    "A set of data nodes that represent the attack
    characteristics.";
  container connection-c {
    uses percentile-and-peak;
    description
      "The number of simultaneous attack connections to
      the target server.";
  }
  container embryonic-c {
    uses percentile-and-peak;
    description
      "The number of simultaneous embryonic connections to
      the target server.";
  }
  container connection-ps-c {
    uses percentile-and-peak;
    description
      "The number of attack connections per second to
      the target server.";
  }
  container request-ps-c {
    uses percentile-and-peak;
    description
      "The number of attack requests per second to
      the target server.";
  }
  container partial-request-c {
    uses percentile-and-peak;
    description
      "The number of attack partial requests to
      the target server.";
  }
}
```

```
grouping connection-all {
  description
    "Total attack connections, including current values.";
  container connection-c {
    uses percentile-peak-and-current;
    description
      "The number of simultaneous attack connections to
      the target server.";
  }
  container embryonic-c {
    uses percentile-peak-and-current;
    description
      "The number of simultaneous embryonic connections to
      the target server.";
  }
  container connection-ps-c {
    uses percentile-peak-and-current;
    description
      "The number of attack connections per second to
      the target server.";
  }
  container request-ps-c {
    uses percentile-peak-and-current;
    description
      "The number of attack requests per second to
      the target server.";
  }
  container partial-request-c {
    uses percentile-peak-and-current;
    description
      "The number of attack partial requests to
      the target server.";
  }
}

grouping connection-protocol {
  description
    "Total attack connections.";
  leaf protocol {
    type uint8;
    description
      "The transport protocol.
      Values are taken from the IANA 'Protocol Numbers'
      registry:
      <https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
  }
  uses connection-percentile-and-peak;
}

grouping connection-port {
  description
    "Total attack connections per port number.";
  leaf protocol {
    type uint8;
    description
      "The transport protocol.
      Values are taken from the IANA 'Protocol Numbers'
      registry:
      <https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
  }
}
```

```
        <https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
    }
    leaf port {
        type inet:port-number;
        description
            "Port number.";
    }
    uses connection-percentile-and-peak;
}

grouping connection-protocol-all {
    description
        "Total attack connections per protocol, including current
        values.";
    leaf protocol {
        type uint8;
        description
            "The transport protocol.
            Values are taken from the IANA 'Protocol Numbers'
            registry:
            <https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
    }
    uses connection-all;
}

grouping connection-protocol-port-all {
    description
        "Total attack connections per port number, including current
        values.";
    leaf protocol {
        type uint8;
        description
            "The transport protocol.
            Values are taken from the IANA 'Protocol Numbers'
            registry:
            <https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
    }
    leaf port {
        type inet:port-number;
        description
            "Port number.";
    }
    uses connection-all;
}

grouping attack-detail {
    description
        "Various details that describe the ongoing
        attacks that need to be mitigated by the DOTS server.
        The attack details need to cover well-known and common
        attacks (such as a SYN flood) along with new emerging or
        vendor-specific attacks.";
    leaf vendor-id {
        type uint32;
        description
            "The Vendor ID is a security vendor's Private Enterprise
            Number as registered with IANA.";
        reference

```

```

    "IANA: Private Enterprise Numbers
      (https://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers/);
  }
  leaf attack-id {
    type uint32;
    description
      "Unique identifier assigned by the vendor for the attack.";
  }
  leaf description-lang {
    type string {
      pattern '((([A-Za-z]{2,3})(-[A-Za-z]{3})(-[A-Za-z]{3})'
        + '{0,2})?)|([A-Za-z]{4}|[A-Za-z]{5,8})(-[A-Za-z]{4})'
        + '?(-([A-Za-z]{2}|[0-9]{3}))?(-([A-Za-z0-9]{5,8}'
        + '|([0-9][A-Za-z0-9]{3}))*(-[0-9A-WYZa-wyz]'
        + '(-([A-Za-z0-9]{2,8})))*(-[Xx](-([A-Za-z0-9]'
        + '{1,8})))+)?|[Xx](-([A-Za-z0-9]{1,8}))+'
        + '([Ee][Nn]-[Gg][Bb]-[Oo][Ee][Dd]|[Ii]-'
        + '[Aa][Mm][Ii]|[Ii]-[Bb][Nn][Nn]|[Ii]-'
        + '[Dd][Ee][Ff][Aa][Uu][Ll][Tt]|[Ii]-'
        + '[Ee][Nn][Oo][Cc][Hh][Ii][Aa][Nn]'
        + '|[Ii]-[Hh][Aa][Kk]|'
        + '[Ii]-[Kk][Ll][Ii][Nn][Gg][Oo][Nn]|'
        + '[Ii]-[Ll][Uu][Xx]|[Ii]-[Mm][Ii][Nn][Gg][Oo]|'
        + '[Ii]-[Nn][Aa][Vv][Aa][Jj][Oo]|[Ii]-[Pp][Ww][Nn]|'
        + '[Ii]-[Tt][Aa][Oo]|[Ii]-[Tt][Aa][Yy]|'
        + '[Ii]-[Tt][Ss][Uu]|[Ss][Gg][Nn]-[Bb][Ee]-[Ff][Rr]|'
        + '[Ss][Gg][Nn]-[Bb][Ee]-[Nn][Ll]|[Ss][Gg][Nn]-'
        + '[Cc][Hh]-[Dd][Ee])|([Aa][Rr][Tt]-'
        + '[Ll][Oo][Jj][Bb][Aa][Nn]|[Cc][Ee][Ll]-'
        + '[Gg][Aa][Uu][Ll][Ii][Ss][Hh]|'
        + '[Nn][Oo]-[Bb][Oo][Kk]|[Nn][Oo]-'
        + '[Nn][Yy][Nn]|[Zz][Hh]-[Gg][Uu][Oo][Yy][Uu]|'
        + '[Zz][Hh]-[Hh][Aa][Kk][Kk][Aa]|[Zz][Hh]-'
        + '[Mm][Ii][Nn]|[Zz][Hh]-[Mm][Ii][Nn]-'
        + '[Nn][Aa][Nn]|[Zz][Hh]-[Xx][Ii][Aa][Nn][Gg])));
    }
    default "en-US";
    description
      "Indicates the language tag that is used for
        'attack-description'.";
    reference
      "RFC 5646: Tags for Identifying Languages, Section 2.1";
  }
  leaf attack-description {
    type string;
    description
      "Textual representation of the attack description.
        Natural Language Processing techniques (e.g.,
        word embedding) might provide some utility in mapping
        the attack description to an attack type.";
  }
  leaf attack-severity {
    type attack-severity;
    description
      "Severity level of an attack. How this level is
        determined is implementation specific.";
  }
  leaf start-time {

```



```
    type uint64;
    description
      "The time the attack started. The start time is
      represented in seconds relative to
      1970-01-01T00:00:00Z.";
  }
  leaf end-time {
    type uint64;
    description
      "The time the attack ended. The end time is represented
      in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z.";
  }
  container source-count {
    description
      "Indicates the count of unique sources involved
      in the attack.";
    uses percentile-and-peak;
    leaf current-g {
      type yang:gauge64;
      description
        "Current observed value.";
    }
  }
}

grouping talker {
  description
    "Defines generic data related to top talkers.";
  leaf spoofed-status {
    type boolean;
    description
      "When set to 'true', it indicates whether this address
      is spoofed.";
  }
  leaf source-prefix {
    type inet:ip-prefix;
    description
      "IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
  }
  list source-port-range {
    key "lower-port";
    description
      "Port range. When only 'lower-port' is
      present, it represents a single port number.";
    leaf lower-port {
      type inet:port-number;
      description
        "Lower port number of the port range.";
    }
    leaf upper-port {
      type inet:port-number;
      must '. >= ../lower-port' {
        error-message
          "The upper port number must be greater than
          or equal to the lower port number.";
      }
    }
    description
      "Upper port number of the port range.";
  }
}
```

```
    }
  }
  list source-icmp-type-range {
    key "lower-type";
    description
      "ICMP type range. When only 'lower-type' is
      present, it represents a single ICMP type.";
    leaf lower-type {
      type uint8;
      description
        "Lower ICMP type of the ICMP type range.";
    }
    leaf upper-type {
      type uint8;
      must '. >= ../lower-type' {
        error-message
          "The upper ICMP type must be greater than
          or equal to the lower ICMP type.";
      }
      description
        "Upper type of the ICMP type range.";
    }
  }
  list total-attack-traffic {
    key "unit";
    description
      "Total attack traffic issued from this source.";
    uses traffic-unit-all;
  }
}

grouping top-talker-aggregate {
  description
    "An aggregate of top attack sources. This aggregate is
    typically used when included in a mitigation request.";
  list talker {
    key "source-prefix";
    description
      "Refers to a top talker that is identified by an IPv4
      or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
    uses talker;
    container total-attack-connection {
      description
        "Total attack connections issued from this source.";
      uses connection-all;
    }
  }
}

grouping top-talker {
  description
    "Top attack sources with detailed per-protocol
    structure.";
  list talker {
    key "source-prefix";
    description
      "Refers to a top talker that is identified by an IPv4
      or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
  }
}
```

```
    uses talker;
    list total-attack-connection-protocol {
      key "protocol";
      description
        "Total attack connections issued from this source.";
      uses connection-protocol-all;
    }
  }
}

grouping baseline {
  description
    "Grouping for the telemetry baseline.";
  uses data-channel:target;
  leaf-list alias-name {
    type string;
    description
      "An alias name that points to an IP resource.
      An IP resource can be a router, a host,
      an Internet of Things (IoT) object, a server, etc.";
  }
  list total-traffic-normal {
    key "unit";
    description
      "Total traffic normal baselines.";
    uses traffic-unit;
  }
  list total-traffic-normal-per-protocol {
    key "unit protocol";
    description
      "Total traffic normal baselines per protocol.";
    uses traffic-unit-protocol;
  }
  list total-traffic-normal-per-port {
    key "unit port";
    description
      "Total traffic normal baselines per port number.";
    uses traffic-unit-port;
  }
  list total-connection-capacity {
    key "protocol";
    description
      "Total connection capacity.";
    uses total-connection-capacity-protocol;
  }
  list total-connection-capacity-per-port {
    key "protocol port";
    description
      "Total connection capacity per port number.";
    leaf port {
      type inet:port-number;
      description
        "The target port number.";
    }
    uses total-connection-capacity-protocol;
  }
}
```

```
grouping pre-or-ongoing-mitigation {
  description
    "Grouping for the telemetry data.";
  list total-traffic {
    key "unit";
    description
      "Total traffic.";
    uses traffic-unit-all;
  }
  list total-traffic-protocol {
    key "unit protocol";
    description
      "Total traffic per protocol.";
    uses traffic-unit-protocol-all;
  }
  list total-traffic-port {
    key "unit port";
    description
      "Total traffic per port number.";
    uses traffic-unit-port-all;
  }
  list total-attack-traffic {
    key "unit";
    description
      "Total attack traffic.";
    uses traffic-unit-all;
  }
  list total-attack-traffic-protocol {
    key "unit protocol";
    description
      "Total attack traffic per protocol.";
    uses traffic-unit-protocol-all;
  }
  list total-attack-traffic-port {
    key "unit port";
    description
      "Total attack traffic per port number.";
    uses traffic-unit-port-all;
  }
  list total-attack-connection-protocol {
    key "protocol";
    description
      "Total attack connections.";
    uses connection-protocol-all;
  }
  list total-attack-connection-port {
    key "protocol port";
    description
      "Total attack connections per target port number.";
    uses connection-protocol-port-all;
  }
  list attack-detail {
    key "vendor-id attack-id";
    description
      "Provides a set of attack details.";
    uses attack-detail;
    container top-talker {
      description
```

```

        "Lists the top attack sources.";
        uses top-talker;
    }
}
}
sx:augment-structure "/dots-signal:dots-signal"
    + "/dots-signal:message-type"
    + "/dots-signal:mitigation-scope"
    + "/dots-signal:scope" {
    description
        "Extends mitigation scope with telemetry update data.";
    choice direction {
        description
            "Indicates the communication direction in which the
            data nodes can be included.";
        case server-to-client-only {
            description
                "These data nodes appear only in a mitigation message
                sent from the server to the client.";
            list total-traffic {
                key "unit";
                description
                    "Total traffic.";
                uses traffic-unit-all;
            }
            container total-attack-connection {
                description
                    "Total attack connections.";
                uses connection-all;
            }
        }
    }
    list total-attack-traffic {
        key "unit";
        description
            "Total attack traffic.";
        uses traffic-unit-all;
    }
    list attack-detail {
        key "vendor-id attack-id";
        description
            "Attack details.";
        uses attack-detail;
        container top-talker {
            description
                "Top attack sources.";
            uses top-talker-aggregate;
        }
    }
}
sx:structure dots-telemetry {
    description
        "Main structure for DOTS telemetry messages.";
    choice telemetry-message-type {
        description
            "Can be 'telemetry-setup' or telemetry data.";
        case telemetry-setup {

```

```

description
  "Indicates that the message is about telemetry setup.";
choice direction {
  description
    "Indicates the communication direction in which the
    data nodes can be included.";
  case server-to-client-only {
    description
      "These data nodes appear only in a telemetry message
      sent from the server to the client.";
    container max-config-values {
      description
        "Maximum acceptable configuration values.";
      uses telemetry-parameters;
      leaf server-originated-telemetry {
        type boolean;
        default "false";
        description
          "Indicates whether the DOTS server can be
          instructed to send pre-or-ongoing-mitigation
          telemetry. If set to 'false' or the data node
          is not present, this is an indication that
          the server does not support this capability.";
      }
      leaf telemetry-notify-interval {
        type uint16 {
          range "1 .. 3600";
        }
        units "seconds";
        must '. >= ../../min-config-values'
          + '/telemetry-notify-interval' {
          error-message
            "The value must be greater than or equal
            to the 'telemetry-notify-interval' value in
            the 'min-config-values' attribute";
        }
        description
          "Minimum number of seconds between successive
          telemetry notifications.";
      }
    }
  }
  container min-config-values {
    description
      "Minimum acceptable configuration values.";
    uses telemetry-parameters;
    leaf telemetry-notify-interval {
      type uint16 {
        range "1 .. 3600";
      }
      units "seconds";
      description
        "Minimum number of seconds between successive
        telemetry notifications.";
    }
  }
  container supported-unit-classes {
    description
      "Supported unit classes and default activation

```

```

        status.";
        uses unit-config;
    }
    leaf-list supported-query-type {
        type query-type;
        description
            "Indicates which query types are supported by
            the server.  If the server does not announce
            the query types it supports, the client will
            be unable to use any of the potential
            'query-type' values to reduce the returned data
            content from the server.";
    }
}
list telemetry {
    description
        "The telemetry data per DOTS client.  The keys
        of the list are 'cuid' and 'tsid', but these keys are
        not represented here because these keys are conveyed
        as mandatory Uri-Paths in requests.  Omitting keys
        is compliant with RFC 8791.";
    reference
        "RFC 8791: YANG Data Structure Extensions";
    choice direction {
        description
            "Indicates the communication direction in which the
            data nodes can be included.";
        case server-to-client-only {
            description
                "These data nodes appear only in a telemetry
                message sent from the server to the client.";
            leaf tsid {
                type uint32;
                description
                    "A client-assigned identifier for the DOTS
                    telemetry setup data.";
            }
        }
    }
}
choice setup-type {
    description
        "Can be a mitigation configuration, a pipe capacity,
        or a baseline message.";
    case telemetry-config {
        description
            "Used to set telemetry parameters such as setting
            low-, mid-, and high-percentile values.";
        container current-config {
            description
                "Current telemetry configuration values.";
            uses telemetry-parameters;
            uses unit-config;
            leaf server-originated-telemetry {
                type boolean;
                description
                    "Used by a DOTS client to enable/disable
                    whether it requests pre-or-ongoing-mitigation

```

```

        telemetry from the DOTS server.";
    }
    leaf telemetry-notify-interval {
        type uint16 {
            range "1 .. 3600";
        }
        units "seconds";
        description
            "Minimum number of seconds between successive
            telemetry notifications.";
    }
}
}
case pipe {
    description
        "Total pipe capacity of a DOTS client domain.";
    list total-pipe-capacity {
        key "link-id unit";
        description
            "Total pipe capacity of a DOTS client domain.";
        leaf link-id {
            type nt:link-id;
            description
                "Identifier of an interconnection link of
                the DOTS client domain.";
        }
        leaf capacity {
            type uint64;
            mandatory true;
            description
                "Pipe capacity. This attribute is mandatory
                when 'total-pipe-capacity' is included in a
                message.";
        }
        leaf unit {
            type unit;
            description
                "The traffic can be measured using unit
                classes: packets per second (pps), bits per
                second (bps), and/or bytes per second
                (Bps).

                For a given unit class, the DOTS agents
                auto-scale to the appropriate units (e.g.,
                'megabit-ps', 'kilobit-ps').";
        }
    }
}
}
case baseline {
    description
        "Traffic baseline information related to a DOTS
        client domain.";
    list baseline {
        key "id";
        description
            "Traffic baseline information related to a DOTS
            client domain.";
        leaf id {

```







```

    This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9244; see the
    RFC itself for full legal notices.";

revision 2022-05-18 {
  description
    "Initial revision.";
  reference
    "RFC 9244: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
    Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry";
}

feature dots-telemetry {
  description
    "This feature indicates that DOTS telemetry data can be
    shared between DOTS clients and servers.";
}

grouping attack-mapping {
  description
    "A set of information used for sharing vendor attack mapping
    information with a peer.";
  list vendor {
    key "vendor-id";
    description
      "Vendor attack mapping information related to the
      client/server.";
    leaf vendor-id {
      type uint32;
      description
        "The Vendor ID is a security vendor's Private Enterprise
        Number as registered with IANA.";
      reference
        "IANA: Private Enterprise Numbers
        (https://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers/)";
    }
    leaf vendor-name {
      type string;
      description
        "The name of the vendor (e.g., company A).";
    }
    leaf description-lang {
      type string {
        pattern '((([A-Za-z]{2,3})(-[A-Za-z]{3})(-[A-Za-z]{3})'
          + '{0,2})?)|[A-Za-z]{4}|[A-Za-z]{5,8})(-[A-Za-z]{4})'
          + '?(-([A-Za-z]{2}|[0-9]{3}))?(-([A-Za-z0-9]{5,8}'
          + '|([0-9][A-Za-z0-9]{3})))*(-([0-9A-WYZa-wyz]'
          + '(-([A-Za-z0-9]{2,8})))+)*(-[Xx])(-([A-Za-z0-9]'
          + '{1,8}))+)?|[Xx])(-([A-Za-z0-9]{1,8}))+|'
          + '([Ee][Nn]-[Gg][Bb]-[Oo][Ee][Dd]|[Ii]-'
          + '[Aa][Mm][Ii]|[Ii]-[Bb][Nn][Nn]|[Ii]-'
          + '[Dd][Ee][Ff][Aa][Uu][Ll][Tt]|[Ii]-'
          + '[Ee][Nn][Oo][Cc][Hh][Ii][Aa][Nn]'
          + '|[Ii]-[Hh][Aa][Kk]|'
          + '[Ii]-[Kk][Ll][Ii][Nn][Gg][Oo][Nn]|'
          + '[Ii]-[Ll][Uu][Xx]|[Ii]-[Mm][Ii][Nn][Gg][Oo]|'
          + '[Ii]-[Nn][Aa][Vv][Aa][Jj][Oo]|[Ii]-[Pp][Ww][Nn]|'
          + '[Ii]-[Tt][Aa][Oo]|[Ii]-[Tt][Aa][Yy]|'

```

```

+ '[Ii]-[Tt][Ss][Uu]||[Ss][Gg][Nn]-[Bb][Ee]-[Ff][Rr]||'
+ '[Ss][Gg][Nn]-[Bb][Ee]-[Nn][Ll]||[Ss][Gg][Nn]-'
+ '[Cc][Hh]-[Dd][Ee])|([Aa][Rr][Tt]-'
+ '[Ll][Oo][Jj][Bb][Aa][Nn]||[Cc][Ee][Ll]-'
+ '[Gg][Aa][Uu][Ll][Ii][Ss][Hh]||'
+ '[Nn][Oo]-[Bb][Oo][Kk]||[Nn][Oo]-'
+ '[Nn][Yy][Nn]||[Zz][Hh]-[Gg][Uu][Oo][Yy][Uu]||'
+ '[Zz][Hh]-[Hh][Aa][Kk][Kk][Aa]||[Zz][Hh]-'
+ '[Mm][Ii][Nn]||[Zz][Hh]-[Mm][Ii][Nn]-'
+ '[Nn][Aa][Nn]||[Zz][Hh]-[Xx][Ii][Aa][Nn][Gg])));';
}
default "en-US";
description
  "Indicates the language tag that is used for
  'attack-description'.";
reference
  "RFC 5646: Tags for Identifying Languages, Section 2.1";
}
leaf last-updated {
  type uint64;
  mandatory true;
  description
    "The time the mapping table was updated. It is
    represented in seconds relative to
    1970-01-01T00:00:00Z.";
}
list attack-mapping {
  key "attack-id";
  description
    "Attack mapping details.";
  leaf attack-id {
    type uint32;
    description
      "Unique identifier assigned by the vendor for the
      attack.";
  }
  leaf attack-description {
    type string;
    mandatory true;
    description
      "Textual representation of the attack description.
      Natural Language Processing techniques (e.g.,
      word embedding) might provide some utility in
      mapping the attack description to an attack type.";
  }
}
}
}
}

augment "/data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:dots-client" {
  if-feature "dots-telemetry";
  description
    "Augments the data channel with a vendor attack
    mapping table of the DOTS client.";
  container vendor-mapping {
    description
      "Used by DOTS clients to share their vendor
      attack mapping information with DOTS servers.";
  }
}

```

```

    uses attack-mapping;
  }
}

augment "/data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:capabilities" {
  if-feature "dots-telemetry";
  description
    "Augments the DOTS server capabilities with a
    parameter to indicate whether they can share
    attack mapping details.";
  leaf vendor-mapping-enabled {
    type boolean;
    config false;
    description
      "Indicates that the DOTS server supports sharing
      attack vendor mapping details with DOTS clients.";
  }
}

augment "/data-channel:dots-data" {
  if-feature "dots-telemetry";
  description
    "Augments the data channel with a vendor attack
    mapping table of the DOTS server.";
  container vendor-mapping {
    config false;
    description
      "Includes the list of vendor attack mapping details
      that will be shared with DOTS clients upon request.";
    uses attack-mapping;
  }
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>

```

## 12. YANG/JSON Mapping Parameters to CBOR

All DOTS telemetry parameters in the payload of the DOTS signal channel **MUST** be mapped to CBOR types as shown in [Table 3](#):

Note: Implementers must check that the mapping output provided by their YANG-to-CBOR encoding schemes is aligned with the contents of [Table 3](#).

Parameter Name	YANG Type	CBOR Key	CBOR Major Type & Information	JSON Type
tsid	uint32	128	0 unsigned	Number
telemetry	list	129	4 array	Array
low-percentile	decimal64	130	6 tag 4 [-2, integer]	String

Parameter Name	YANG Type	CBOR Key	CBOR Major Type & Information	JSON Type
mid-percentile	decimal64	131	6 tag 4 [-2, integer]	String
high-percentile	decimal64	132	6 tag 4 [-2, integer]	String
unit-config	list	133	4 array	Array
unit	enumeration	134	0 unsigned	String
unit-status	boolean	135	7 bits 20	False
			7 bits 21	True
total-pipe-capacity	list	136	4 array	Array
link-id	string	137	3 text string	String
pre-or-ongoing-mitigation	list	138	4 array	Array
total-traffic-normal	list	139	4 array	Array
low-percentile-g	yang:gauge64	140	0 unsigned	String
mid-percentile-g	yang:gauge64	141	0 unsigned	String
high-percentile-g	yang:gauge64	142	0 unsigned	String
peak-g	yang:gauge64	143	0 unsigned	String
total-attack-traffic	list	144	4 array	Array
total-traffic	list	145	4 array	Array
total-connection-capacity	list	146	4 array	Array
connection	uint64	147	0 unsigned	String
connection-client	uint64	148	0 unsigned	String
embryonic	uint64	149	0 unsigned	String
embryonic-client	uint64	150	0 unsigned	String
connection-ps	uint64	151	0 unsigned	String
connection-client-ps	uint64	152	0 unsigned	String
request-ps	uint64	153	0 unsigned	String

Parameter Name	YANG Type	CBOR Key	CBOR Major Type & Information	JSON Type
request-client-ps	uint64	154	0 unsigned	String
partial-request-max	uint64	155	0 unsigned	String
partial-request-client-max	uint64	156	0 unsigned	String
total-attack-connection	container	157	5 map	Object
connection-c	container	158	5 map	Object
embryonic-c	container	159	5 map	Object
connection-ps-c	container	160	5 map	Object
request-ps-c	container	161	5 map	Object
attack-detail	list	162	4 array	Array
id	uint32	163	0 unsigned	Number
attack-id	uint32	164	0 unsigned	Number
attack-description	string	165	3 text string	String
attack-severity	enumeration	166	0 unsigned	String
start-time	uint64	167	0 unsigned	String
end-time	uint64	168	0 unsigned	String
source-count	container	169	5 map	Object
top-talker	container	170	5 map	Object
spoofed-status	boolean	171	7 bits 20	False
			7 bits 21	True
partial-request-c	container	172	5 map	Object
total-attack-connection-protocol	list	173	4 array	Array
baseline	list	174	4 array	Array
current-config	container	175	5 map	Object

Parameter Name	YANG Type	CBOR Key	CBOR Major Type & Information	JSON Type
max-config-values	container	176	5 map	Object
min-config-values	container	177	5 map	Object
supported-unit-classes	container	178	5 map	Object
server-originated-telemetry	boolean	179	7 bits 20	False
			7 bits 21	True
telemetry-notify-interval	uint16	180	0 unsigned	Number
tmid	uint32	181	0 unsigned	Number
measurement-interval	enumeration	182	0 unsigned	String
measurement-sample	enumeration	183	0 unsigned	String
talker	list	184	4 array	Array
source-prefix	inet:ip-prefix	185	3 text string	String
mid-list	leaf-list	186	4 array	Array
	uint32		0 unsigned	Number
source-port-range	list	187	4 array	Array
source-icmp-type-range	list	188	4 array	Array
target	container	189	5 map	Object
capacity	uint64	190	0 unsigned	String
protocol	uint8	191	0 unsigned	Number
total-traffic-normal-per-protocol	list	192	4 array	Array
total-traffic-normal-per-port	list	193	4 array	Array
total-connection-capacity-per-port	list	194	4 array	Array
total-traffic-protocol	list	195	4 array	Array



Parameter Name	YANG Type	CBOR Key	CBOR Major Type & Information	JSON Type
total-traffic-port	list	196	4 array	Array
total-attack-traffic-protocol	list	197	4 array	Array
total-attack-traffic-port	list	198	4 array	Array
total-attack-connection-port	list	199	4 array	Array
port	inet:port-number	200	0 unsigned	Number
supported-query-type	leaf-list	201	4 array	Array
			0 unsigned	String
vendor-id	uint32	202	0 unsigned	Number
ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup	container	203	5 map	Object
ietf-dots-telemetry:total-traffic	list	204	4 array	Array
ietf-dots-telemetry:total-attack-traffic	list	205	4 array	Array
ietf-dots-telemetry:total-attack-connection	container	206	5 map	Object
ietf-dots-telemetry:attack-detail	list	207	4 array	Array
ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry	container	208	5 map	Object
current-g	yang:gauge64	209	0 unsigned	String
description-lang	string	210	3 text string	String
lower-type	uint8	32771	0 unsigned	Number
upper-type	uint8	32772	0 unsigned	Number

Table 3: YANG/JSON Mapping Parameters to CBOR

## 13. IANA Considerations

### 13.1. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values

This specification registers the following comprehension-optional parameters in the IANA "DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values" registry [[Key-Map](#)].

Parameter Name	CBOR Key Value	CBOR Major Type	Change Controller	Reference
tsid	128	0	IESG	RFC 9244
telemetry	129	4	IESG	RFC 9244
low-percentile	130	6tag4	IESG	RFC 9244
mid-percentile	131	6tag4	IESG	RFC 9244
high-percentile	132	6tag4	IESG	RFC 9244
unit-config	133	4	IESG	RFC 9244
unit	134	0	IESG	RFC 9244
unit-status	135	7	IESG	RFC 9244
total-pipe-capacity	136	4	IESG	RFC 9244
link-id	137	3	IESG	RFC 9244
pre-or-ongoing-mitigation	138	4	IESG	RFC 9244
total-traffic-normal	139	4	IESG	RFC 9244
low-percentile-g	140	0	IESG	RFC 9244
mid-percentile-g	141	0	IESG	RFC 9244
high-percentile-g	142	0	IESG	RFC 9244
peak-g	143	0	IESG	RFC 9244
total-attack-traffic	144	4	IESG	RFC 9244
total-traffic	145	4	IESG	RFC 9244
total-connection-capacity	146	4	IESG	RFC 9244

Parameter Name	CBOR Key Value	CBOR Major Type	Change Controller	Reference
connection	147	0	IESG	RFC 9244
connection-client	148	0	IESG	RFC 9244
embryonic	149	0	IESG	RFC 9244
embryonic-client	150	0	IESG	RFC 9244
connection-ps	151	0	IESG	RFC 9244
connection-client-ps	152	0	IESG	RFC 9244
request-ps	153	0	IESG	RFC 9244
request-client-ps	154	0	IESG	RFC 9244
partial-request-max	155	0	IESG	RFC 9244
partial-request-client-max	156	0	IESG	RFC 9244
total-attack-connection	157	5	IESG	RFC 9244
connection-c	158	5	IESG	RFC 9244
embryonic-c	159	5	IESG	RFC 9244
connection-ps-c	160	5	IESG	RFC 9244
request-ps-c	161	5	IESG	RFC 9244
attack-detail	162	4	IESG	RFC 9244
id	163	0	IESG	RFC 9244
attack-id	164	0	IESG	RFC 9244
attack-description	165	3	IESG	RFC 9244
attack-severity	166	0	IESG	RFC 9244
start-time	167	0	IESG	RFC 9244
end-time	168	0	IESG	RFC 9244
source-count	169	5	IESG	RFC 9244
top-talker	170	5	IESG	RFC 9244

---

Parameter Name	CBOR Key Value	CBOR Major Type	Change Controller	Reference
spoofed-status	171	7	IESG	RFC 9244
partial-request-c	172	5	IESG	RFC 9244
total-attack-connection-protocol	173	4	IESG	RFC 9244
baseline	174	4	IESG	RFC 9244
current-config	175	5	IESG	RFC 9244
max-config-values	176	5	IESG	RFC 9244
min-config-values	177	5	IESG	RFC 9244
supported-unit-classes	178	5	IESG	RFC 9244
server-originated-telemetry	179	7	IESG	RFC 9244
telemetry-notify-interval	180	0	IESG	RFC 9244
tmid	181	0	IESG	RFC 9244
measurement-interval	182	0	IESG	RFC 9244
measurement-sample	183	0	IESG	RFC 9244
talker	184	4	IESG	RFC 9244
source-prefix	185	3	IESG	RFC 9244
mid-list	186	4	IESG	RFC 9244
source-port-range	187	4	IESG	RFC 9244
source-icmp-type-range	188	4	IESG	RFC 9244
target	189	5	IESG	RFC 9244
capacity	190	0	IESG	RFC 9244
protocol	191	0	IESG	RFC 9244
total-traffic-normal-per-protocol	192	4	IESG	RFC 9244

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Parameter Name	CBOR Key Value	CBOR Major Type	Change Controller	Reference
total-traffic-normal-per-port	193	4	IESG	RFC 9244
total-connection-capacity-per-port	194	4	IESG	RFC 9244
total-traffic-protocol	195	4	IESG	RFC 9244
total-traffic-port	196	4	IESG	RFC 9244
total-attack-traffic-protocol	197	4	IESG	RFC 9244
total-attack-traffic-port	198	4	IESG	RFC 9244
total-attack-connection-port	199	4	IESG	RFC 9244
port	200	0	IESG	RFC 9244
supported-query-type	201	4	IESG	RFC 9244
vendor-id	202	0	IESG	RFC 9244
ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup	203	5	IESG	RFC 9244
ietf-dots-telemetry:total-traffic	204	4	IESG	RFC 9244
ietf-dots-telemetry:total-attack-traffic	205	4	IESG	RFC 9244
ietf-dots-telemetry:total-attack-connection	206	5	IESG	RFC 9244
ietf-dots-telemetry:attack-detail	207	4	IESG	RFC 9244
ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry	208	5	IESG	RFC 9244
current-g	209	0	IESG	RFC 9244
description-lang	210	3	IESG	RFC 9244

Table 4: Registered DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values

### 13.2. DOTS Signal Channel Conflict Cause Codes

Per this document, IANA has assigned a new code from the "DOTS Signal Channel Conflict Cause Codes" registry [[Cause](#)].

Code	Label	Description	Reference
5	overlapping-pipes	Overlapping pipe scope	RFC 9244

Table 5: Registered DOTS Signal Channel Conflict Cause Code

### 13.3. DOTS Telemetry URIs and YANG Module Registrations

Per this document, IANA has registered the following URIs in the "ns" subregistry within the "IETF XML Registry" [[RFC3688](#)]:

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-telemetry

Registrant Contact: The IESG.

XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-mapping

Registrant Contact: The IESG.

XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

Per this document, IANA has registered the following YANG modules in the "YANG Module Names" subregistry [[RFC6020](#)] within the "YANG Parameters" registry.

Name: ietf-dots-telemetry

Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-telemetry

Maintained by IANA: N

Prefix: dots-telemetry

Reference: RFC 9244

Name: ietf-dots-mapping

Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-mapping

Maintained by IANA: N

Prefix: dots-mapping

Reference: RFC 9244

## 14. Security Considerations

### 14.1. DOTS Signal Channel Telemetry

The security considerations for the DOTS signal channel protocol are discussed in [Section 11](#) of [[RFC9132](#)]. The following discusses the security considerations that are specific to the DOTS signal channel extension defined in this document.

The DOTS telemetry information includes DOTS client network topology, DOTS client domain pipe capacity, normal traffic baseline and connection capacity, and threat and mitigation information. Such information is sensitive; it **MUST** be protected at rest by the DOTS server

domain to prevent data leakage. Note that sharing this sensitive data with a trusted DOTS server does not introduce any new significant considerations other than the need for the aforementioned protection. Such a DOTS server is already trusted to have access to that kind of information by being in the position to observe and mitigate attacks.

DOTS clients are typically considered to be trusted devices by the DOTS client domain. DOTS clients may be co-located on network security services (e.g., firewall devices), and a compromised security service potentially can do a lot more damage to the network than just the DOTS client component. This assumption differs from the often-held view (often referred to as the "zero-trust model") that devices are untrusted. A compromised DOTS client can send fake DOTS telemetry data to a DOTS server to mislead the DOTS server. This attack can be prevented by monitoring and auditing DOTS clients to detect misbehavior and to deter misuse, and by only authorizing the DOTS client to convey DOTS telemetry information for specific target resources (e.g., an application server is authorized to exchange DOTS telemetry for its IP addresses but a DDoS mitigator can exchange DOTS telemetry for any target resource in the network). As a reminder, this is a variation of dealing with compromised DOTS clients as discussed in [Section 11](#) of [\[RFC9132\]](#).

DOTS servers must be capable of defending themselves against DoS attacks from compromised DOTS clients. The following non-comprehensive list of mitigation techniques can be used by a DOTS server to handle misbehaving DOTS clients:

- The probing rate (defined in [Section 4.5](#) of [\[RFC9132\]](#)) can be used to limit the average data rate to the DOTS server.
- Rate-limiting DOTS telemetry, including packets with new 'tmid' values from the same DOTS client, defends against DoS attacks that would result in varying the 'tmid' to exhaust DOTS server resources. Likewise, the DOTS server can enforce a quota and time limit on the number of active pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data items (identified by 'tmid') from the DOTS client.

Note also that the telemetry notification interval may be used to rate-limit the pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry notifications received by a DOTS client domain.

## 14.2. Vendor Attack Mapping

The security considerations for the DOTS data channel protocol are discussed in [Section 10](#) of [\[RFC8783\]](#). The following discusses the security considerations that are specific to the DOTS data channel extension defined in this document.

All data nodes defined in the YANG module specified in [Section 11.2](#) that can be created, modified, and deleted (i.e., config true, which is the default) are considered sensitive. Write operations to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations.

Appropriate security measures are recommended to prevent illegitimate users from invoking DOTS data channel primitives as discussed in [RFC8783]. Nevertheless, an attacker who can access a DOTS client is technically capable of undertaking various attacks, such as:

- Communicating invalid attack mapping details to the server ('/data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:dots-client/dots-telemetry:vendor-mapping'), which will mislead the server when correlating attack details.

Some of the readable data nodes in the YANG module specified in Section 11.2 may be considered sensitive. It is thus important to control read access to these data nodes. These are the data nodes and their sensitivity:

- '/data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:dots-client/dots-telemetry:vendor-mapping' can be misused to infer the DDoS protection technology deployed in a DOTS client domain.
- '/data-channel:dots-data/dots-telemetry:vendor-mapping' can be used by a compromised DOTS client to leak the attack detection capabilities of the DOTS server. This is a variation of the compromised DOTS client attacks discussed in Section 14.1.

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