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Stream: Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)  
RFC: [9310](#)  
Category: Standards Track  
Published: December 2022  
ISSN: 2070-1721  
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# RFC 9310

## X.509 Certificate Extension for 5G Network Function Types

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### Abstract

This document specifies the certificate extension for including Network Function Types (NFTypes) for the 5G System in X.509 v3 public key certificates as profiled in RFC 5280.

### Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

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## 1. Introduction

The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has specified several Network Functions (NFs) as part of the service-based architecture within the 5G System. There are 56 NF Types defined for 3GPP Release 17; they are listed in Table 6.1.6.3.3-1 of [TS29.510], and each NF type is identified by a short ASCII string.

Operators of 5G Systems make use of an internal PKI to identify interface instances in the NFs in a 5G System. X.509 v3 public key certificates [RFC5280] are used, and the primary function of a certificate is to bind a public key to the identity of an entity that holds the corresponding private key, known as the certificate subject. The certificate subject and the SubjectAltName certificate extension can be used to support identity-based access control decisions.

This document specifies the NFTypes certificate extension to support role-based access control decisions by providing a list of NF Types associated with the certificate subject. The NFTypes certificate extension can be used by operators of 5G Systems or later.

## 2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

## 3. Network Function Types Certificate Extension

This section specifies the NFTypes certificate extension, which provides a list of NF Types associated with the certificate subject.

The NFTypes certificate extension **MAY** be included in public key certificates [RFC5280]. The NFTypes certificate extension **MUST** be identified by the following object identifier:

```
id-pe-nftype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 34 }
```

This extension **MUST NOT** be marked critical.

The NFTypes extension **MUST** have the following syntax:

```
NFTypes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF NFieldType
NFieldType ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..32))
```

The NFTypes **MUST** contain at least one NFieldType.

Each NFieldType **MUST** contain only an ASCII string; however, the string **MUST NOT** include control characters (values 0 through 31), the space character (value 32), or the delete character (value 127).

Each NFieldType **MUST** contain at least one ASCII character and **MUST NOT** contain more than 32 ASCII characters.

The NFTypes **MUST NOT** contain the same NFieldType more than once.

If the NFTypes contain more than one NFieldType, the NFTypes **MUST** appear in ascending lexicographic order using the ASCII values.

The NFieldType uses the IA5String type to permit inclusion of the underscore character ('\_'), which is not part of the PrintableString character set.

## 4. ASN.1 Module

This section provides an ASN.1 Module [X.680] for the NFTypes certificate extension, and it follows the conventions established in [RFC5912] and [RFC6268].

```
<CODE BEGINS>
  NFTypeCertExtn
  { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-mod-nftype(106) }

  DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
  BEGIN

  IMPORTS
  EXTENSION
  FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- RFC 5912
  { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } ;

  -- NFTypes Certificate Extension

  ext-NFType EXTENSION ::= {
  SYNTAX NFTypes
  IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-nftype }

  -- NFTypes Certificate Extension OID

  id-pe-nftype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 34 }

  -- NFTypes Certificate Extension Syntax

  NFTypes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF NFType

  NFType ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..32))

  END

<CODE ENDS>
```

## 5. Security Considerations

The security considerations of [RFC5280] are applicable to this document.

Some of the ASCII strings that specify the NF Types are standard. See [Appendix A](#) for values defined in 3GPP Release 17. Additionally, an operator **MAY** assign its own NF Types for use in their own network. Since the NF Type is used for role-based access control decisions, an

operator-assigned NF Type **MUST NOT** overlap with a value already defined in the commonly defined set. Use of the same ASCII string by two different operators for different roles could lead to confusion or incorrect access control decisions. The mechanism for an operator to determine whether an ASCII string associated with a NF Type is unique across operators is outside the scope of this document.

The certificate extension supports many different forms of role-based access control to support the diversity of activities that NFs are trusted to perform in the overall system. Different levels of confidence that the NFTypes were properly assigned might be needed to contribute to the overall security of the 5G System. For example, more confidence might be needed to make access control decisions related to a scarce resource than implementation of filtering policies. As a result, different operators might have different trust models for the NFTypes certificate extension.

## 6. Privacy Considerations

In some security protocols, such as TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], certificates are exchanged in the clear. In other security protocols, such as TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], the certificates are encrypted. The inclusion of the NFTypes certificate extension can help an observer determine which systems are of most interest based on the plaintext certificate transmission.

## 7. IANA Considerations

For the NFTypes certificate extension defined in Section 3, IANA has assigned an object identifier (OID) for the certificate extension. The OID for the certificate extension has been allocated in the "SMI Security for PKIX Certificate Extension" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1).

For the ASN.1 Module defined in Section 4, IANA has assigned an OID for the module identifier. The OID for the module has been allocated in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0).

## 8. References

### 8.1. Normative References

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## 8.2. Informative References

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- [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>>.
- [RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268, DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268>>.
- [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>>.
- [TS29.571] 3rd Generation Partnership Project, "Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; 5G System; Common Data Types for Service Based Interfaces; Stage 3 (Release 17)", 3GPP TS:29.571 V17.8.0, December 2022, <[https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/29\\_series/29.571/29571-h80.zip](https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/29_series/29.571/29571-h80.zip)>.

## Appendix A. NFType Strings

Table 6.1.6.3.3-1 of [TS29.510] defines the ASCII strings for the NF Types specified in 3GPP documents; these enumeration values in 3GPP Release 17 are listed below in ascending lexicographic order. This list is not exhaustive.

"5G_DDNMF"	"LMF"	"PKMF"
"5G_EIR"	"MBSF"	"SCEF"
"AANF"	"MBSTF"	"SCP"
"ADRF"	"MB_SMF"	"SCSAS"
"AF"	"MB_UPF"	"SCSCF"
"AMF"	"MFAF"	"SEPP"
"AUSF"	"MME"	"SMF"
"BSF"	"MNPF"	"SMSF"
"CBCF"	"N3IWF"	"SMS_GMSC"
"CEF"	"NEF"	"SMS_IWMSC"
"CHF"	"NRF"	"SOR_AF"
"DCCF"	"NSACF"	"SPAF"
"DRA"	"NSSAAF"	"TSCTSF"
"EASDF"	"NSSF"	"UCMF"
"GBA_BSF"	"NSWOF"	"UDM"
"GMLC"	"NWDAF"	"UDR"
"HSS"	"PANF"	"UDSF"
"ICSCF"	"PCF"	"UPF"
"IMS_AS"	"PCSCF"	

## Appendix B. Example Certificate Containing a NTypes Extension

The example certificate conforms to the certificate profile in Table 6.1.3c.3-1 of [TS33.310]. In addition, the NTypes certificate is included with only one NType, and it is "AMF". The SubjectAltName certificate extension contains a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) and a uniformResourceIdentifier, which carries the NF Instance ID as specified in Clause 5.3.2 of [TS29.571].

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

```

The following shows the example certificate. The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and the length (in decimal).

```

30 720: SEQUENCE {
30 598: SEQUENCE {
A0 3: [0] {
02 1: INTEGER 2
:
}
02 20: INTEGER
: 0C 3E 68 E3 8C C4 75 F4 A0 85 3D A1 30 AF 8F FC
: 48 C6 1E 5A
30 10: SEQUENCE {
06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA384 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 3)
:
}
30 21: SEQUENCE {
31 19: SET {
30 17: SEQUENCE {
06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
0C 10: UTF8String 'Example CA'
:
}
:
}
:
}
30 30: SEQUENCE {
17 13: UTCTime 29/11/2022 18:14:58 GMT
17 13: UTCTime 29/11/2023 18:14:58 GMT
:
}
30 57: SEQUENCE {
31 11: SET {
30 9: SEQUENCE {
06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
13 2: PrintableString 'US'
:
}
:
}
31 42: SET {
30 40: SEQUENCE {
06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
13 33: PrintableString '5gc.mnc400.mcc311.3gppnetwork.org'
:
}
:
}
30 118: SEQUENCE {
30 16: SEQUENCE {
06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1)
06 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sec384r1 (1 3 132 0 34)
:
}
03 98: BIT STRING
: 04 C9 E8 81 47 23 AF 37 AB F2 49 8E C2 54 7C 48
: 91 16 A1 90 EA E2 83 18 9D 28 A8 33 FA C0 48 51
: 02 EB F2 13 2C F9 A6 04 66 CF FE CC CD ED 7E B3
: 5A 9C 9C F5 3D 9A 8D 6F AC 85 BD AE 32 A1 6F F1
: E6 F0 7F 53 3E F9 CC 43 00 91 0A D2 AF 08 3F 74
: 32 45 AF 73 F1 BC AB 20 81 A4 29 AC DF 33 4E 24
: E8
:
}
A3 321: [3] {
30 317: SEQUENCE {
30 19: SEQUENCE {
06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER nfTypes (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 34)
04 7: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
30 5: SEQUENCE {

```



```

16  3:    IA5String 'AMF'
    :    }
    :    }
    :    }
30 23:    SEQUENCE {
06  3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32)
04 16:    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
30 14:    SEQUENCE {
30 12:    SEQUENCE {
06 10:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER '2 16 840 1 101 3 2 1 48 48'
    :    }
    :    }
    :    }
    :    }
30 14:    SEQUENCE {
06  3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
01  1:    BOOLEAN TRUE
04  4:    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
03  2:    BIT STRING 7 unused bits
    :    '1'B (bit 0)
    :    }
    :    }
30 19:    SEQUENCE {
06  3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER extKeyUsage (2 5 29 37)
04 12:    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
30 10:    SEQUENCE {
06  8:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER clientAuth (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 2)
    :    }
    :    }
    :    }
30 29:    SEQUENCE {
06  3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
04 22:    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
04 20:    OCTET STRING
    :    4C 67 92 A0 C1 89 58 9F CF 39 98 A2 03 E7 96 5C
    :    13 39 C8 07
    :    }
    :    }
30 31:    SEQUENCE {
06  3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
04 24:    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
30 22:    SEQUENCE {
80 20:    [0]
    :    88 7F A2 04 E9 0B 6A 8D 74 76 FA 9F F1 0A D4 61
    :    E0 FA B3 35
    :    }
    :    }
    :    }
30 49:    SEQUENCE {
06  3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
04 42:    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
30 40:    SEQUENCE {
30 38:    SEQUENCE {
A0 36:    [0] {
A0 34:    [0] {
86 32:    [6] 'http://example.com/exampleca.crl'
    :    }
    :    }
    :    }

```

```

:      }
:      }
:      }
:      }
30 117: SEQUENCE {
06  3:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectAltName (2 5 29 17)
01  1:  BOOLEAN TRUE
04 107: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
30 105: SEQUENCE {
82  56: [2]
:      'amf1.cluster1.net2.amf.5gc.mnc400.mcc311.3gppnet'
:      'work.org'
86  45: [6]
:      'urn:uuid:f81d4fae-7dec-11d0-a765-00a0c91e6bf6'
:      }
:      }
:      }
:      }
:      }
:      }
30  10: SEQUENCE {
06  8:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecDSAWithSHA384 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 3)
:      }
03 104: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
30 101: SEQUENCE {
02  48: INTEGER
:      4B 50 12 EB 7D 91 E9 64 88 C2 0C 47 E4 33 91 23
:      46 22 E4 77 D0 BA F6 DD FB 5A AC B8 BD C0 CA 77
:      65 12 09 61 08 1A 01 67 3A 82 67 F7 31 50 29 ED
02  49: INTEGER
:      00 A3 28 60 0B 70 E6 CA E4 36 31 3E 66 0E 82 A8
:      49 1F F5 FD 9B 6A 71 65 B5 1B 8F 6D 3A 78 07 45
:      EB 6B 3E 73 FE 39 F7 34 33 CC F5 AB 5A 48 75 31
:      39
:      }
:      }
:      }
:      }

```

## Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Ben Smeets, Michael Li, Tim Hollebeek, Roman Danyliw, Bernie Volz, and Éric Vyncke for their review, comments, and assistance.

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